Aufsätze Dennis Edwin Showalter Prussian Cavalry 1806-1871 The Search for Roles The European cavalryman of the nineteenth century has a wide variety of negative historical images. In an increasingly democratic age, the unabashedly aristocratic tone of the horse soldiers has sharpened academic antagonism. Blue-blooded, wasp- waisted, moustachioed, innocent of thought on subjects more profound than horses and women, the cavalryman can be portrayed as a comic figure. Sinister overtones are added by historians who describe officers obsessed with shock tactics, with the charge as a way of life, incapable of comprehending or responding to the changes wrought in warfare by the Industrial Revolution. From Balaklava to the "colossal, murderous, mismanaged butchery" of the First World War, cavalry generals are held answerable for wasted human lives1. Viewed at closer range, however, a new image begins to emerge. The nineteenth- century cavalryman, like his footslogging comrades, was caught in a double bind imposed by technology. Until the development and refinement of the internal com- bustion engine, cavalry was not a battlefield anachronism. No other really mobile arm existed. The question was not whether cavalry should be abolished, but how it could best function given the geometrically-increased range and accuracy of modern weapons2. This search for roles involved more than the ability to predict the future - itself a task less easy than is generally assumed when military technology is involved. It also required willingness to learn from past experience and avoid past mistakes. Institutions do not exist in a vacuum, and the problem of combining the skills of the historian and the futurologist to produce a viable military force are clearly illustrated by the experiences of the Prussian cavalry between 1806 and 1871. From the disaster of Jena to the triumph of Sedan, it struggled to do more than fill a niche in the order of battle, to be more than a system of outdoor relief for the lesser aristocracy. In the process it developed an increasingly coherent vision of the role and the nature of modern cavalry. That the vision was inaccurate in many respects, incomplete in many others, does not mean that it can be dismissed as the work of fools or charlatans. Nor can the circumstances contributing to its development be dismissed in a footnote. At least as significant, however, is the cavalry's continued willingness to modify its functions in light of its own experience. The adjustments may have been practical rather than theoretical, marginal instead of drastic. Their existence nevertheless reflects a degree of flexibility generally denied cavalry in general and Prussian cavalry in particular. I Like the state and the army, the Prussian cavalry was stunned by the events of 1806. Its reconstruction, however, was far more thoroughgoing than many other Prussian institutions during the Era of Reform. Before Jena and Auerstedt the heavy cavalry was considered a tactical as well as social elite, able to act independently, deciding battles by its mass charges. Light cavalry, initially used for scouting and reconnais- sance, enhanced its prestige at the expense of its traditional skills by assimilating as closely as possible to the cuirassiers operationally and socially. Mounted action was all-important. The flintlock carbines of the light cavalry were deliberately made 7 MGM 1/76 short enough that they could be fired from the saddle with one hand. The pistols carried by all troopers were considered signalling devices as much as firearms3. It was small wonder that an army joke suggested that an infantryman shot by a caval- ryman had to believe in fate4. The military reformers were determined to change the cavalry's role. To some extent this reflected the fact that a state burdened by heavy indemnities, with an army limited to 42000 men, could not afford large forces of cavalry. More important, however, was the development of new tactical doctrines for the entire army. These doctrines emphasized the close cooperation of all arms to build pressure on an enemy gradually, to wear down his resistance until a decisive attack became possible5. There was no room in this picture for the spectacular charges of a Seydlitz or a Ziethen. Cavalry must function as part of a team, distributed throughout the army in regiments and squadrons to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the infantry and artillery6. This view of the cavalry's future role was further strengthened by the reformers' general emphasis on disciplined initiative as the key to forming modern soldiers. And in the cavalry these qualities were best developed in small units engaged in reconnais- sance, outpost, and patrol duties - the traditional light cavalry. Heavy cavalry, to be effective at all, must function in disciplined masses, immediately responsive to com- mand, trained until their every move was reflex. None of these abilities were partic- ularly valued by the men reshaping the Prussian army between 1807 and 18127. Un- fortunately, they gave the cavalry nothing specific to replace them. The revised cavalry drill regulations issued in 1812 said nothing about controlling more than six squadrons at a time. They gave little freedom of action to regimental commanders. Given the attitudes of the reformers, these omissions were not surpris- ing. Far more serious was the absence of anything beyond elementary rules for cavalry in battle, and of any serious directions for the execution of reconnaissance. Dismounted combat was ignored; cavalry firearms remained inadequate. Instead the regulations stressed riding drill and artificial, complicated small-unit maneuvers. Far from being part of a military team, the cavalry was in practice regarded as an orna- ment to be sent off to a flank and hidden. It was not even supposed to be used in large numbers for scouting8. Whatever the shortcomings of its drill regulations and tactical doctrine, the Prussian cavalry began the campaign of 1813 with a moral ascendancy over its opponent. The French army had returned from Russia with almost no cavalry worthy of the name. In Napoleon's opinion horsemen posed such a threat to his raw conscripts that he ordered his infantry to move only in close order once it entered the German theater of operations9. Yet the Prussians, faithful to the regulations of 1812, distributed half their small force of cavalry in detachments among the mixed brigades of the new army. As a result, in battle the cavalry was usually either in the wrong place at the wrong time, or too weak on the spot to accomplish anything. Nor was the brigade cavalry more successful in the reconnaissance role. Its officers, closely tied to the infantry, did not develop the coup d'oeil of their French opponents. Its outpost work too remained mediocre. The cavalry held in corps and army reserve was initially even less aggressive, on one oc- casion failing to charge a French division surprised in bivouac10. By the time of the Armistice of Pläswitz, moreover, it was apparent that the Prussian cavalry lacked the strength as well as the attitude to take advantage of its opportunities. Good cavalry cannot be improvised, and as the army expanded the strain on existing organizations increased. Most of the twenty regular regiments formed detachments of volunteers, young men able to arm and equip themselves, serving at their own 8 expense. The National Cavalry Regiments, the Mecklenburg Hussars, and various Freikorps added another twenty or twenty-five reasonably efficient squadrons. The bulk of the newly-raised cavalry, however, came from the Landwehr, the citizen militia created in March, 1813. Most of the 113 squadrons formed by August had a high proportion of old soldiers in their ranks. The subalterns were often ex-officers pensioned or retired after Jena and recalled to duty on mobilization. As many of the recruits, particularly those from the rural areas, were acquainted with horses, the new units had a promising beginning - a beginning marked by a sharp debate over their employment11. Johann v. Scharnhorst, a long-time advocate of the Landwehr, was also a profound admirer of the Russian Cossacks. Initially he hoped to develop the Landwehr cavalry along similar lines, as an irregular force for raiding, scouting, and outpost duties. He even ordered the Landwehr troopers to be issued pikes, in imitation of the Cossacks' lances12. It required, however, little time to demonstrate the difference between men trained to the saddle from childhood and farmhands mounted on cart horses. Few weapons are more difficult to master than the lance. Even when commanding officers could find qualified instructors, its use remained an arcane mystery to most of the troopers13. The rest of Scharnhorst's hope proved equally vain. The commanders of the Land- wehr cavalry were more concerned with training their men to maneuver in squadron and regimental formations than with producing effective scouts and raiders. The tone of most of the Landwehr squadrons was set by men, both officers and other ranks, who had been molded in the active army. They were unable or unwilling to discard the standards of efficiency and excellence which they had learned in the years before Jena. Like the Landwehr infantry, the Landwehr cavalry took the field as a somewhat blur- red carbon copy of the cavalry of the active army — an image it never shed14. During the armistice the Prussian cavalry was at least redistributed to take advantage of the lessons of the spring campaign. Since experience had indicated that the brigades had more cavalry than they could normally use, most of the new squadrons were assigned to their respective corps reserves1S. The reorganization proved itself beyond all question in the autumn campaign. Though not a decisive weapon in the tradition of Murat or Seydlitz, the Prussian cavalry nevertheless proved an important battlefield instrument.