River Basin Trajectories: an Inquiry Into Changing Waterscapes

1 River Basin Trajectories: an Inquiry into Changing Waterscapes

François Molle1* and Philippus Wester2** 1Institut de Recherche pour le Développement, Montpellier, France; 2Wageningen University, Wageningen, The Netherlands; e-mails: *[email protected]; **[email protected]

Introduction influenced water–society relationships in the past 150 years (Molle, 2006; Warner et al., This book is concerned with ‘river basin 2008). Late in the 19th century it nurtured trajectories’, loosely defined as the long-term utopias and political struggles concerning the interactions between societies and their envi- relationships between central and local power ronments, with a focus on the development in countries such as Spain, France and the and management of water and associated land USA (Molle, 2006). Based on colonial experi- resources (Molle, 2003). A basin trajectory ences with water resources development in the encompasses human efforts to assess, capture, Indus (van Halsema, 2002) and the Nile convey, store, share and use available water (Willcocks, 1901) basins in the early 20th resources, thereby changing waterscapes and century and the establishment of the Tennessee turning parts of the hydrological cycle into a Valley Authority (TVA) in the USA during the hydro-social cycle (Wester, 2008). It also 1930s (Lilienthal, 1944), the river basin includes human efforts to deal with the threats became the unit where ‘unified’ or ‘compre- posed by particular ‘shock events’, such as hensive’ water resources development was to droughts, floods and contamination incidents, take place. This approach focused on the full and to achieve a degree of environmental utilization of rivers, multi-purpose dams, and sustainability. Last, a basin trajectory includes wider regional development planning (White, institutional change and the shifting relations 1957). of power that govern access to, and control With time, and partly in reaction to signifi- over, water resources. While this book focuses cant modifications of river systems by hydraulic on human-induced environmental and hydro- infrastructure and human water use, the river logical transformations, its chapters also show basin became the pivotal geographical unit for how environmental change impacts on society integrated water resources management and influences policy making. This includes the (IWRM). The aim of this approach is to take generation and particular social distribution of into account, and reconcile conflicts arising costs and risks, and shifts in the very concep- from, the interactions between surface water tion of, and values attached to, nature. and groundwater, water quantity and quality, The idea that the river basin is the ‘natural’ human use and environmental functions, and and most appropriate unit for water resources scales and sectors of management (GWP, 2000; development and management has strongly Grigg, 2008). More particularly, questions of

river basin governance, with the vexing issue of term ‘river basin trajectory’ may suggest there cross-scale interaction and integration, came to is a simple linearity in the development of river the fore, as water problems were increasingly basins from supply augmentation, through recognized as managerial, societal and political demand management to water (re)allocation (Molle et al., 2007). Watershed movements (Molden et al., 2005), the chapters in this book and river basin organizations (RBOs) of various show that these three responses occur simulta- stripes have emerged to address these con neously and at different scales. cerns. Technical and economic rationality have The choice of the river basin as the manage- long inspired ways to select among available ment or governance unit is not undisputed. options by proposing various types of sophisti- While there is an obvious (physical) logic for cated cost–benefit analyses and other impact working with hydrological units in which the assessments. The history of water resources generation and use of water resources are development (and that of public investment in largely coterminous, it is also well recognized general), however, abundantly shows that that river-basin-based approaches suffer from ‘good intentions are not enough’ (Green, ‘tunnel vision’ (Molle et al., 2007). Many driv- 1996) and that these techniques are value ers and consequences of river basin dynamics laden, prone to distortion, and often justifica- can be observed outside the basin, where solutions of projects that have (already) been tions to local problems may also lie. In addi- decided upon, on political or other grounds tion, even on a physical plane, river basin (Berkoff, 2002). It also shows that options are boundaries may not be relevant, for example in never equivalent and that they entail flows of the case of small islands, deltas, flood plains or benefits and costs (financial, political or other- coastal areas. The occurrence of aquifer wise), and risks that accrue to particular sectors systems that are non-coterminous with river or groups of society. The identification of risks basins, or of interbasin transfers, is also and costs is made more complex by the fact frequent and demands consideration of link- that interventions in the hydrological cycle tend ages with adjacent basins. Yet all these particu- – and increasingly so when pressure on water lar situations can be treated as extensions of resources rises – to generate externalities in the river basin concept, and the influence of terms of modifications of the hydrological external factors can be considered through regime that affect users or residents elsewhere specific examination of the interactions ofa in the basin (Molle, 2007). river basin with its physical, economic and The question of political power and deci- political ‘environment’. sion making – what are the options and who Water challenges, in the form of scarcity, decides – is at the core of the ‘shape’ of a excess or pollution, can be responded to in particular basin trajectory. The distribution of many different ways. Although droughts seem decision-making power and the political clout to call for dams, floods for dikes, and water of different groups of stakeholders in society – pollution for treatment plants, response options in other words a particular power configuration are often much broader. Flood damage can be or governance regime – are key to defining controlled locally by infrastructure (upstream allocation or dam management rules, the deci- dams, dikes, pumping stations) and also by sion to build another dam, or the establishment more careful land-use planning (avoiding settle- of particular water-related institutions. A defin- ment in flood-prone areas), efficient flood warn- ing characteristic of river basin trajectories is ing, changes in upstream land cover, restoration the political struggles surrounding the ways of buffer areas, etc. Situations of water scarcity water is owned, allocated and managed, and can be responded to in three different ways: ‘over the right to define what a water right supply augmentation (more water mobilized entails’ (Boelens and Zwarteveen, 2005). through dams, canals or pumps); demand One particular and generic aspect of a basin management (including reducing absolute trajectory is the closure of a basin. Basin demand or saving water to expand uses); and closure occurs when the quantity of water (re)allocation (redefining access to a given abstracted is too high to ensure regular supply amount of water) (Molle, 2003). Although the to downstream users or sufficient outflow to River Basin Trajectories: Changing Waterscapes 3

dilute pollution, control salinity intrusion, flush (supply-induced scarcity) or increases in popu- sediments and sustain healthy ecosystems at lation (demand-induced scarcity) but also by the the mouth of the river (Seckler, 1996; Molle, overdevelopment of water resources, the selec- 2003; Molden et al., 2005; Molle et al., tive entitlement of water rights and resource 2007). This phenomenon (illustrated in Fig. capture by better-off people, which Homer- 1.1) can be transient when it occurs only in a Dixon (1999) terms structural scarcity. The few dry months, and the basin is said to be design and social control over water technolo- closing, or almost permanent, when the basin gies such as dams, pipelines and irrigation is said to be closed. Basin closure occurs due to canals lead to what Vincent (2004) terms the ‘overbuilding’ of water infrastructure in designed water scarcity, which influences who river basins for the extraction of surface water gets access to water. and groundwater, to the point that more water Basin closure and water overexploitation is consumed by agriculture, industry and tend to spur water quality decline, intersectoral humans than is renewably available (Molle et water transfers, inequitable water allocation al., 2007). Rivers no longer reaching the sea and reduced access to water (Molle et al., or contracting lakes are the most visible signs 2007). The inequality in access to water and of basin closure, as exemplified by the Colorado the conflicts between the different users of River and the Aral and the Dead Seas. water call for new approaches to water manage- The process of river basin closure induces ment (Mehta, 2001). The construction of large increased competition between water use(r)s, dams, irrigation schemes, interbasin transfer and water scarcity reaches such a level that the schemes and groundwater pumps create path exploitation limits become evident. However, dependency and lock-in situations (Sexton, using the term ‘water scarcity’ to describe situ- 1990). The socio-ecologies that become depen- ations of water overexploitation is dangerous, dent on these technologies and the water as it obscures issues concerning unequal access resource base are formidable and very difficult to, and control over, water (Bakker, 1999; to reverse (Shah et al., 2003). While the over- Mehta, 2001). For most people, water scarcity building of river basins results in a situation that is caused by competition between water uses constrains the scope for reducing water use, it and by political, technological and economic also radically alters the role that hydrocracies barriers that limit their access to water, rather need to play, from centralized water resource than by physical water scarcity. Water scarcity developers to regulators and facilitators of is caused not only by variability in supply decentralized water governance.

Fig. 1.1. The process of basin closure. 4 F. Molle and P. Wester

This book presents a rich analysis of 11 where ‘conquering’, ‘harnessing’ or ‘taming’ river basin trajectories. Each chapter provides the wilderness were touted as a civilizing a historical perspective on river basin develop- mission made possible by science and advances ment, highlighting the particular set of physical in technology. The development of irrigation and human features that have shaped basin was central in wider state settlement policies, trajectories. All the authors have faced the whether it was to settle a nomadic population, double challenge of providing historical depth as in Jordan (Chapter 2) or in Tunisia (Chapter to their account while, at the same time, 7), provide jobs after the two World Wars to combining analyses of both environmental and returning servicemen in Australia (Chapter 12) institutional transformations. Because of the and South Africa (Chapter 3), break up hacien- scale chosen, that of medium river basins, it das and colonize them with a new type of was not possible to include the details of more industrious farmer devoted to ‘revolutionary local processes, such as changes in the manage- irrigation’ in Mexico (Chapter 4; Aboites, ment or governance of irrigation systems. 1998), or strategically occupy land (as in the The 11 river basins investigated are mostly USA, Chapter 6; or Israel, Lipchin, 2003). In located in one country (the Zayandeh Rud in the post-World War II period, irrigation held Iran, the Krishna and the Bhavani in India, the the promise of feeding the masses, raising rural Merguellil in Tunisia, the Lerma–Chapala in income and – in the particular context of the Mexico, the Yellow in China, the Ruaha in Cold War – enlisting ‘development’ and food Tanzania, and the Murray–Darling in Australia); self-sufficiency in the struggle against commu- other basins include the Olifants (South Africa) nism. Projects were churned out based on the and the Colorado (USA) basins, which have expectation of large increases in yields, opti- their lower tips located in Mozambique and mistic cropping intensities, and adoption of Mexico, respectively, and the Jordan basin, cash crops. whose study is limited to Jordan. Five basins The transition from local water control to are located in federal countries (USA, Mexico, large-scale water resources development by Australia, India), where relationships between the state, based on river basins, was intimately the federal and state governments appear to linked to the ‘hydraulic mission’ of the hydrau- be a crucial dimension of basin management and governance. The 11 river basins all face lic bureaucracies (hydrocracies) created in the conditions of water scarcity, with a few particu- 19th and 20th centuries. Wester (2008) defines larly acute cases (Jordan, Zayandeh Rud, the hydraulic mission as: Lerma–Chapala). the strong conviction that every drop of water This chapter presents general findings and flowing to the ocean is a waste and that the reflections drawn from the river basin trajecto- state should develop hydraulic infrastructure to ries analysed in this book, occasionally enriched capture as much water as possible for human by evidence drawn from other basins in the uses. The carrier of this mission is the world. It attempts to both identify commonal- hydrocracy who, based on a high-modernist ties and emphasize the specificity of each world-view, sets out to control nature and ‘conquer the desert’ by ‘developing’ water basin. It starts with a discussion on ideologies resources for the sake of progress and and models of river basin management and development. then describes four widely observed processes related to river basin trajectories. The responses The hydraulic mission era, which ended in the of society to the issues raised by basin trajecto- 1970s in most affluent countries, was marked ries are then discussed. Last, conclusions are by the growth of powerful state hydrocracies, drawn. such as in Mexico (Chapter 4), where the logo of the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources was Por la Grandeza de México (For the Greatness of Drivers of Change and Competing Mexico). Many of the senior hydrocrats Paradigms manning the hydrocracies were educated in the West, notably in the USA, where the River basin development has long been predi- Bureau of Reclamation trained ‘a new genera- cated on an ideology of domination of nature, tion of Mexican hydraulic engineers’ (Chapter River Basin Trajectories: Changing Waterscapes 5

4) as well as engineers of many other coun- conceptual transformation of water resource tries, where the export of the TVA model was development and management from engineer- attempted (see Ekbladh, 2002; Molle, 2006). ing-dominated approaches to approaches The hydraulic mission era was characterized based on demand management and the value by a massive injection of public money in all of water resources (a shift from emphasis on countries and ‘blatant subsidies and political gondchengshuili, engineering water benefits, favours’ in the USA (Chapter 6; Worster, to ziranshuli, broader water resources bene- 1985; Reisner, 1993). These subsidies were a fits). result of the recognition of the failure of private These changes were the result of a change irrigation initiatives at the end of the 19th in societal values linked to growing affluence century, such as in Australia (Chapter 12), and awareness of environmental degradation. India (Chapter 10) or the western USA In the Colorado basin (Chapter 6), the national (Chapter 6), and also of the overriding political goal of western settlement based on water goals attached to irrigation development. In resources development also created something the USA this phase was associated with ‘a heretofore missing from the region: an urban “private commodity” paradigm, featuring an constituency drawn to the aesthetic and envi- emphasis on water development and the rights ronmental amenities of the region, supportive of individual rights-holders’ (Chapter 6). of public lands and other collective resources, This first phase of agricultural growth and and emphasizing quality of life over return on modernization clearly marked the period from investment. As Kenney notes (Chapter 6), the 1960 to 1990 in the Ruaha basin in Tanzania inherent incompatibility of the two paradigms (Chapter 8). It was later substituted by a narra- suggests that they have evolved sequentially tive of efficiency, environmentalism and water and incrementally rather than simultaneously. reallocation during the period 1995–2005. In China, however, the two attitudes are linked While in the former period, water and land to competing philosophies and seem to have were seen to be abundant, the latter drew from always coexisted (Chapter 5): Confucianism a growing perception of water as a finite supply and the Naturalist school of thought sought to and concerns over power cuts. A similar shift explain nature on the basis of the complemen- emerged in most basins, albeit at slightly differ- tary cosmic principles of yin and yang and saw ent times. In the USA, a ‘public value’ para- man as a natural master of nature. Taoism, on digm, emphasizing resource protection, value the other hand, saw water as ‘the supreme pluralism, and democratic (i.e. collective and moral example of the stricture to find harmony participatory) decision making, took root with “the way” (tao), (…) as an object of (Chapter 6). In the Murray–Darling basin contemplation intending to reveal moral (Chapter 12), the water reforms beginning in truths … something to be admired rather than the late 1980s were also the product of chang- controlled, … with gardens as a place of ing ideas about how public institutions should contemplation where it was possible to connect be organized and operated. There was a wide- with the ultimate realities of nature, and to spread feeling that decision making could no escape worldly concerns.’ longer be left to small groups of engineers who With the growing recognition of the associ- had spent their careers dealing mainly with ated social and environmental costs, and also water resources infrastructure. Under the new with the decreasing availability of suitable dam arrangements, the basin’s river system was to sites, the hydraulic mission ran out of steam in be managed to conserve biodiversity and most affluent countries in the 1970s (Barrow, improve sustainability as well as for produc- 1998). Priority shifted towards water quality tion. In the Olifants basin (Chapter 3), environ- and environmental sustainability, setting the mental and social considerations were stage for a resurgence of the river basin concept incorporated into the 1998 Water Law, which in the 1990s. This resurgence was strongly triggered attempts at broadening participation inspired by the ecosystem approach, in which a of stakeholders and quantifying environmental river basin is seen as an ecosystems continuum flows. In China (Chapter 5), the Ministry of and water as an integral part of ecosystems Water Resources brought forward ideas for the (Marchand and Toornstra, 1986). In many 6 F. Molle and P. Wester

ways, this is a reaction to the construction bias particular politicians/parties, look for business of the hydraulic mission era, but proponents of opportunities. Last, development banks and the ecosystem approach are adamant that cooperation agencies also have vested interests ‘water resources should be managed on the in maximizing the disbursement of funds basis of river or drainage basins in an integrated (Chambers, 1997). fashion, with a continued and deliberate effort The overdevelopment of water-use infra- to maintain and restore ecosystem functioning structure, principally irrigation schemes, gener- within both catchments and the coastal and ates water scarcity ‘mechanically’. When most marine ecosystems they are connected with’ available resources are committed and little (IUCN, 2000). In the early 1990s, the central- ‘slack’ remains in the hydrological regime of a ity of river basins for environmental governance particular river basin, any substantial drop in was reflected in the Dublin Principles (ACC/ available resources below average values is ISGWR, 1992) and the formulation of IWRM likely to result in shortages for some users. approaches, and was later formalized by the With a growing hydrological variability due to European Union in its Water Framework climate change and a tendency to mismanage Directive (EU, 2000). carry-over stocks in reservoirs (managers being under pressure to generate electricity or to release water at the cost of mid-term reserves Major Processes at Work in River Basin and security of supply), the frequency and Trajectories intensity of such shortages are increasing. Crises result in public outcry, media coverage River basins are very different from one another. of farmers with withering crops, newspapers However, the 11 story-lines that follow, as well stamped with pictures of cracked soils, and as the wider bibliography on river basin devel- tales of looming disasters. Politicians are opment and management, allow us to identify prompt to seize such crises to promise more generic processes that are at work in most river populist projects aimed at tapping more water. basin trajectories. These are: (i) the overbuilding New irrigated areas are often necessary to of river basins; (ii) the overallocation of entitle- make dam or diversion projects economically ments; (iii) the overdraft of reservoirs and aqui- more attractive and also to achieve the ‘buy in’ fers; and (iv) the double squeeze of agricultural of provinces or populations that will be affected water use, due to declining water availability by new reservoirs or projects. The vicious circle and quality on the one hand and rising urban of overdevelopment thus becomes self-sustain- and environmental needs on the other. ing (Molle, 2008). Augmenting supply maximizes benefits to what has been termed the ‘iron triangle’ in the Overbuilding of river basins western USA (Reisner, 1993; McCool, 1994) and often minimizes short-term political stress, The overbuilding of river basins is a socially compared with options where supply to exist- constructed process that generates basin ing users must be reduced or reorganized. closure through the overextension of the water Logrolling (Chapter 6) is a political behaviour abstraction capacity, in general for irrigation. that fuels overbuilding, whereby ‘legislators Decision makers are faced with powerful incen- from various jurisdictions all agree to support tives for continued public investments in irriga- each other’s proposed projects in their home tion infrastructure. Politicians, whether at the districts. In this way, a project with only local local or government level, have long identified appeal can gain the support of a broad base of iconic, large-scale projects as the best way to legislators.’ build up constituencies and state legitimacy The process of basin overbuilding is well with public funds. Hydrocracies vie to maintain illustrated by the case of the Zayandeh Rud and expand their bureaucratic power (sustained (Chapter 9), where each new import of water budgets and fringe benefits, upholding of into the basin is justified by water shortages professional legitimacy, etc.). Private consult- and accompanied by an expansion of irrigation ing and construction firms, often linked to and out-of-basin transfers. Instead of stabilizing River Basin Trajectories: Changing Waterscapes 7

water use in the basin, providing more ‘slack’ through the lens of investment costs (soon to and security to users, whatever additional water become cost overruns). is made available is committed to expanding irrigation areas. This process is also illustrated by the Lerma–Chapala basin (Chapter 4) and Overallocation of water entitlements other case studies from central and north-east Thailand, and from the Bhavani basin (Chapter Basin overbuilding is also made possible by the 11). fuzziness or absence of water rights, which Other critical drivers of basin overbuilding means that many projects are, in fact, partly appear in our case studies. In the Colorado predicated upon water that is already commit- basin (Chapter 6), the upper states, and later ted to other (generally downstream) areas. Arizona, partly pursued development as a Such a problem may occur not only because of means of securing their entitlements and claims uncontrolled expansion of private irrigation, as by effectively diverting water. In the Krishna in the Ruaha (Chapter 8), Lerma–Chapala basin (Chapter 10), as the award (basin-sharing (Chapter 4), Zayandeh Rud (Chapter 9) and agreement) of 1976 was to be revised in 2000, Krishna basins (Chapter 10), but also because the states sharing the Krishna water ‘engaged of state-initiated anti-erosion works, as in the in massive development of their hydraulic Merguellil (Chapter 7) and Yellow River infrastructure (with serious economic and fiscal (Chapter 5) basins, or even public irrigation damage) to lay claim on water resources and schemes, as in the Zayandeh Rud and Chao ensure they would be holding a prevailing posi- Phraya (Thailand) basins. tion when the award would be renegotiated’ River basins with stricter control of hydro- (Gulati et al., 2005). Politically motivated logical conditions and definition of water rights concerns for regional equity also fuel basin and entitlements should theoretically avoid this overbuilding. Preventing regional tensions and trap. Experience shows that this is not the case. threats of state implosion under the pressure of Overbuilding through private investments is independence claims from all three regions of paralleled by an overallocation of water entitle- Andhra Pradesh state have been major drivers ments that creates similar patterns of scarcity. In of infrastructural development in the lower the Colorado basin, apportionment of water Krishna basin (Chapter 10; Venot et al., 2007). among riparian states has been based on opti- Although irrigation is first expanded in favour- mistic average hydrological data, without consid- able areas, it leads to later claims from other ering either evaporation losses in reservoirs to (poorer) regions that they have not only been be built years later (now totalling 2 billion m3) or discriminated against but also need such invest- native Indian rights. In the Murray–Darling ments for their development. This often leads basin, notably the state of New South Wales, to the expansion of costly infrastructure in licences have been granted despite recognition marginal areas. of the ticking time bomb represented by large Politicians are used to resorting to overrid- contingents of ‘dozers and sleepers’ who only ing justifications that close or ‘securitize’ the use their rights occasionally or pay their fees debate (Warner, 2008): new projects are indis- without using water. This has led to a water allo- pensable and cannot be delayed because cation that amounts to 65% of all entitlements, ‘poverty demands that we do something’, on average, and to a reduction in security and development is needed and requires ‘sacrifice’, predictability. In the Olifants basin (Chapter 3), national or food security is at stake, or growing all water was allocated, making it virtually impos- energy needs make the development of hydro- sible to grant new rights to black communities. power ‘unavoidable’. These concerns are In the Lerma–Chapala basin, the 1991 treaty legitimate and often truly pressing. But by clos- on surface water allocation was based on an ing the debate, decision makers also make it optimistic assessment of annual water availabil- impossible to discuss alternatives, to examine ity (with two dry periods excluded from the in detail the social and environmental costs of hydrological model underlying the treaty) and projects, and to reveal the frequent absurdity of no attempt was made to reduce the volumes of supply augmentation projects when seen water concessioned to water users. 8 F. Molle and P. Wester

The overallocation of water entitlements is water allows managers to ensure supply in dry an obvious political expedient to reduce years. Water security, measured as the capac- tension, avoid denying access to resources, ity to withstand a number of successive dry and satisfy a maximum of existing (or would- years, is largely dependent upon storage capac- be) users in particular constituencies (Allan, ity. The Murray–Darling and Colorado basins 2006). This, of course, occurs at the cost of are famous for storage capacities that are much supply security to all. More recently, over higher than the average annual runoff: dams allocation was made more critical because can store 2.8 and 3.5 times annual runoff, of prolonged droughts (Murray–Darling, respectively. Conversely, the lack of storage in Colorado, Lerma–Chapala), dwindling runoff basins such as the Ruaha and the Jordan means (Yellow River), and painful expectations of that users have to face greater irregularity and climate change (Murray–Darling). On top of risk. these concerns, preoccupation with aquatic Under pressure from users and politicians, ecosystem health put environment flows on managers frequently release more water in a top of the agenda. Attempts to reallocate water given year than would be expected if carry-over to the environment from existing users have storage were managed prudently. This been largely frustrated, and this remains an increases risk and does indeed generate or unresolved issue. In the Olifants basin, environ- magnify crises. The case of the Zayandeh Rud mental flows (eflows) have been much discussed basin (Chapter 9) shows how careless releases but have so far remained on paper. In the in 1999 and 2000 contributed to an excep- Colorado basin, federal laws generally defer to tional crisis in 2001. Likewise, in 2000, the the tradition in state water law of allowing managers of the Nagarjuna Sagar dam in the water users to consume rivers in their entirety. lower Krishna basin took a gamble and released Western states now provide some mechanisms all the available water, paving the way for the for granting water rights to instream flows, but ensuing crisis (Chapter 10). In the Ruaha basin these tend to be very limited in scope, often (Chapter 8), pressure to generate hydroelec- relying on water rights that are junior to tradi- tricity at the national level also led to lowering tional consumptive users. In the Murray– of dam water levels beyond what risk manage- Darling basin, attempts to reduce entitlements ment dictated, and to subsequent major power to enhance environmental flows have also not cuts in the capital. In the Lerma–Chapala basin been popular, and states have been forced to (Chapter 4), the 1991 surface water allocation resort to a (still limited) buy-back of water rights. treaty was based on the assumption that the In the Zayandeh Rud and Jordan basins, the carry-over storage in reservoirs would increase environmental objective of maintaining termi- with time if the treaty was adhered to. Instead, nal sinks (the Gavkhuni lake and the Dead Sea) carry-over storage was largely depleted to has been simply written off. The Lerma– comply with annual water allocations as river Chapala (Chapter 4) offers an example of real- runoff was less than predicted by the hydro- location away from irrigation with the aim of logical model underlying the treaty. sustaining the level of the Chapala lake, but Overdraft of aquifers is a better-documented this objective was mainly dictated by urban and more familiar problem. Almost all basins supply objectives downstream of the lake. show a long-term drawdown of water tables. This is particularly worrying in basins where groundwater provides a ‘buffer’ in case of Overdraft of reservoirs and aquifers insufficient supply of surface water, such as in the Zayandeh Rud, Lerma–Chapala and lower As a consequence of basin overbuilding and/or Yellow River basins. Indeed, as surface deliver- the overallocation of entitlements, the case ies become more uncertain, users develop studies confirm a widely observed tendency for conjunctive use and turn to groundwater in managers and users to ‘overtap’ reservoirs and compensation. In the Lerma–Chapala basin, aquifers. Reservoirs generally have several groundwater-based irrigation also developed as purposes but are pivotal in providing interan- a market response to opportunities for produc- nual regulation and carry-over storage. Storing ing vegetables for the USA market. Ten years River Basin Trajectories: Changing Waterscapes 9

ago, water tables were dropping at rates that 45%, while the Murray–Darling basin expects would bring aquifers to exhaustion, but these reductions in mean annual flow in the order of have been partly replenished by exceptional 20–30%. Degradation of water quality is also a rainfall. The Merguellil, Jordan and Zayandeh trend that contributes to reducing freshwater Rud basins are typical cases where aquifers are availability, with some river or drainage water declining and where authorities have found no unfit for use in domestic supply and even in way of reversing this process. The Jordan agriculture. highlands suggest that price-based regulation is On the demand side, the large historical illusory and that where enforcement of quotas share of agricultural use now collides with is not realistic the only solution is buying back urbanization and environmentalism. All water- wells and controlling further drilling. The short basins, although sometimes buying respite Merguellil case illustrates the contradiction by continued supply augmentation, end up between long-term sustainability concerns and facing the issue of water reallocation. It is always the short-term needs of food and income politically very sensitive to take water away generation, which explains why authorities from existing users to serve expanding urban often turn a blind eye to private drilling and constituencies; it is even more challenging – in aquifer overdraft (a decline of between 0.25 a closed basin – to set water apart for ‘environ- and 1 m a year since the 1980s). mental use’, i.e. to sustain or restore ecosystem health. Figure 1.2 shows how irrigation gets squeezed by these trends in supply and demand Reallocation from agriculture to cities (and and how the variability of freshwater supply the environment) induces increasingly severe shortages, which tend to primarily affect environmental and agri- Another lesson drawn from many river basin cultural uses. trajectories is that agriculture – often after a The case of the Lerma–Chapala basin phase of overexpansion due to basin overbuild- (Chapter 4) illustrates how the hydro-social ing – ends up constrained by a double squeeze networks constituted around, and by, the (see Fig. 1.2). On the supply side, water avail- hydraulic infrastructure in the basin make it ability is sometimes reduced by long-term difficult to reduce consumptive water use, trends due to climate change or otherwise. even if a range of water reforms are attempted Predictions for the Colorado basin by 2100 and serious efforts are made to arrive at nego- point to reductions anywhere between 11 and tiated agreements on surface water allocation

Fig. 1.2. River basin ‘double squeeze’. 10 F. Molle and P. Wester

mechanisms. In the Colorado basin, the recipe main challenges for the future concern the best of ‘drawing on surplus flows in wet years, way to reduce overall allocation in the basin transferring water from agricultural to urban and, more importantly, to make sure that each users in normal years, and tapping reservoir state will take its share of the burden. It is no storage in dry years’ has reached its limits, as longer merely a question of complying with the storage reached critical lows and transfers 1994 cap on abstraction but of adjusting to faced a series of difficulties. Market mecha- significantly reduced allocations for the irriga- nisms allow a degree of reallocation to cities, tion sector. The pressure to do this is mostly and several direct agreements between urban driven by current environmental allocation and irrigation areas can also be noted: San concerns, plus the expectation of reductions in Diego buying water from the Imperial Valley mean annual flow in the order of 20–30% by irrigation district (supplied from the lower 2100 under a range of climate change Colorado), Melbourne acquiring rights to 75 scenarios. Mm3 of the lower Murray–Darling in exchange for investments, and Chinese cities in the Yellow River basin transacting with irrigation Major Societal Responses and Issues districts. In other basins (diversions to Amman in the Jordan basin, to Hyderabad in the Several major issues, associated with the four Krishna basin, to Tirrupur and Coimbatore in processes highlighted above, can be singled the Bhavani basin, to coastal cities in the out and illustrated by our case studies. One Merguellil basin), transfers have been decided issue concerns the ‘politics of blame,’ which is by administrative fiat. This was also the case the way crises are explained, handled and used in the Lerma–Chapala basin, where, in 1999, to justify specific policies and further particular because of critically low levels in Lake Chapala agendas. Other issues concern the actual and to secure Guadalajara’s water supply, the responses to basin closure, the impact of water CNA (National Water Commission) trans- scarcity on water-use efficiency and equity, and ferred 200 Mm3 from the Solis dam, the main basin governance. water source of the largest irrigation district in the basin, to Lake Chapala. A second transfer of 270 Mm3 followed in November 2001, as The politics of blame lake levels continued to decline. Keeping water in lakes and rivers is even Water-related problems (floods, shortages, more challenging. In the Olifants basin, the contamination, etc.) are often accompanied by establishment of environmental flows has efforts by stakeholders, managers and politi- remained largely theoretical, with different cians to find explanations and apportion blame. approaches tested to determine environmental The way blame is apportioned to different requirements. The gridlock as to how to reduce causes is important because it not only reflects agricultural use is likely to be eventually eased the distribution of power (and the capacity of by constructing a new dam and therefore devel- particular stakeholders to get their message oping more resources. Such a way out is also across in the media) but also paves the way for visible in the Mexican case (with a new dam on what will be done next, the money that will be the upper Santiago River to serve Leon city spent, and the options that will be favoured. As and a new dam on the Santiago River near such, it is an exercise of power. Guadalajara to supply its urban water) and the Predictably, climatic vagaries or El Niño are Zayandeh Rud case (interbasin transfer). When convenient scapegoats, which, indeed, often ever possible, and often regardless of costs, bear part of the ‘responsibility’, but irrigation, supply augmentation is still a favoured option, its large share of water diversion, highlanders which minimizes political stress but, of course, (responsible for deforestation) and pastoralists only buys time and eventually compounds basin (associated with overgrazing) are also primary closure. targets. During the second Lake Chapala crisis Expectations of reduced supply are taken (Chapter 4), water authorities blamed the desic- very seriously in the Murray–Darling basin. The cation of the lake on the drought and the high River Basin Trajectories: Changing Waterscapes 11

levels of evaporation from the lake, although for the desiccation of Lake Chapala by urban the extractions from the lake by Guadalajara dwellers and environmentalists. city of at least 240 Mm3 a year contributed Conversely, proponents of particular solu- strongly to the decline of the lake. In the Ruaha tions must paint them in a positive mode. The basin, water shortages experienced in the Red–Dead project in Jordan, which proposes to Mtera–Kidatu hydropower complex (which bring water from the Red Sea into the Dead resulted in power cuts in the capital and other Sea, generate hydropower and desalinate water, cities) were blamed on upstream irrigators and and pump part of it to Amman and other cities pastoralists. A series of analyses demonstrates (Chapter 2), is alternatively painted with envi- that, despite claims by power-generation ronmental (save the Dead Sea), religious (the authorities, the power cuts experienced from cradle of three religions) or political (the peace 1992 onwards were largely due to improper conduit) arguments. Other mega-projects, such dam operation rather than to upstream deple- as the diversion of the São Francisco in Brazil tion of water. In 2004, for example, the situa- (Alves, 2008) or the Water Grid in Thailand tion was so critical that the Mtera reservoir was (Molle and Floch, 2008), also emphasize ‘eradi- operated by utilizing the dead storage, despite cation of poverty’, enhanced rural incomes and advice to the contrary from the Rufiji Basin abundant water, while typically disregarding Water Office and the ministry responsible for costs and investment alternatives. water. This advice was not heeded, resulting in higher risks and showing the economic and political importance of maintaining power Responses to basin closure generation at any risk and cost. In the Mekong basin, the floods in the Basin closure and associated water scarcity, summer of 2008 were used to critique the decline of water quality and environmental dams built by the Chinese in the upper basin degradation – as mentioned earlier – give way and the lack of transparency concerning dam to three types of responses: supply augmenta- releases, although evidence of their responsi- tion, demand management and (re)allocation. bility is dubious. Floods in central Thailand or It has been hypothesized that these three types the Ganges basin have also been associated of responses occur sequentially along the basin with land management practices by highland- closure trajectory (Molden et al., 2005). While ers, although scientific evidence of a correla- it is true that early phases of basin develop- tion is at best weak (Forsyth and Walker, 2008). ment are almost exclusively typified by supply In the Thai case, accusations have been blended augmentation, case studies of closing or closed with ethnic stereotypes and conveniently justi- basins show that – under pressure and in the fied expansion of state enclosures (in the guise face of recurring crises – the three options are of national parks, reserves, etc.), afforestation pursued concurrently. by private companies and, in some cases, The blend of options selected depends on expulsion of hill tribes (Walker, 2003). the physical, financial and political features of Whether justified or not, such accusations each option. Physical constraints refer to the are active elements of negotiation processes (if accessibility of water resources and clearly set a any) and/or state decision making. In the limit to what is possible. Yet such constraints Lerma–Chapala basin, the Grupo de Trabajo are typically qualified by financial and political Especializado en Planeación Agrícola Integral considerations, as shown by the interbasin (GTEPAI, Specialized Working Group on transfers through tunnels in the Zayandeh Rud Integral Agricultural Planning) attempted to basin and by the Red–Dead project in Jordan. strengthen the negotiating position of irrigators If the costs of such works are shifted to the in the river basin council. Its strategy was to country as a whole and/or, partly, to the inter- show that the irrigated agriculture sector was national community, then they may be eventu- serious about saving water and hence a credible ally realized. Likewise, the acceptance of negotiating partner. However, the stigma of federal policies in the Murray–Darling and the irrigation being a wasteful use of water was too Colorado basins was strongly linked to billions strong, and the farmers continued to be blamed of dollars of federal subsidies in various guises 12 F. Molle and P. Wester

(e.g. for Land Care groups in Australia, or strategies for increasing yields and avoiding water diversions and dams in the USA). (overcoming) limits, highlighted by efforts to Interbasin transfers may be opposed by ‘donor eliminate reservoir spills (and associated ‘over- basins’, and imposition by the central govern- deliveries’ to Mexico), marketing of water ment may involve lots of political manoeuvring salvaged through conservation programmes, and arm-twisting, as seen in the current project the eradication of water-loving tamarisk and to divert the water of the São Francisco River Russian olive trees, weather modification (i.e. in Brazil (Alves, 2008). While in some cases cloud seeding), desalination, the proposed project costs are an impediment, in other cases importation of water from neighbouring basins, higher costs may be seen as desirable by and compensated fallowing of agricultural land. unchecked private interests. In Jordan (Chapter 2), policies have also mixed While most infrastructural projects are all kinds of conservation incentives with supply costly, other measures are financially more augmentation (dams, import of groundwater attractive. Technical improvements or conser- from distant aquifers) and forced reallocation of vation policies, whether physical (e.g. canal water (from agriculture in the valley to cities in lining or retrofitting of home appliances) or not the highlands). (e.g. awareness campaigns), may be cost-effec- In the past, the key to positive-sum bargain- tive. Fine tuning of management may also ing in river basins was to expand the available result in savings. In the Colorado basin, the benefits (i.e. water and power) at public cost, reservoir operations and shortage-sharing rules with little consideration of environmental and were the most debated elements in the recent other public values. Today, opportunities for audit process (Chapter 6). The water level in new storage or diversions are limited, civil the dams governs not only the head (hydro- society at large has gained political space and power generation) and the flood-control capac- clout, and decisions are increasingly debated in ity but also the size of the water body and thus wider and more contested arenas. Yet this its evaporation losses. New rules may better clearly varies from one basin to another, and account for hydrological changes and desired unilateral state decision making still prevails in levels of security, and better balance priorities many countries. (e.g. environment versus human use). Political constraints refer to the political benefits and costs associated with particular Hydrological pathologies options. Options impacting key supportive or strong constituencies are likely to be discarded. The hydrology of closing basins is problematic. This is clearly demonstrated in the case of the Because most flows, including return flows Jordan basin (Chapter 2), where regulation of from existing uses, are tapped, there is little groundwater use in the highlands and charging ‘slack’ in the basin hydrological system to for water in the valley (notably in citrus and dampen or buffer natural hydrological variabil- banana farms) are poised to damage the ity, and perturbations thus strongly reverberate support of certain tribes and entrepreneurs to on the whole system. The pathology of closed the King and the government. In the Olifants river basins has been the subject of many basin (Chapter 3), redistributive and participa- works, which have emphasized the concept of tory policies are adverse to white economic river basin efficiency, as opposed to local user interests and have made little progress. Other or system efficiency (Seckler, 1996; Molle and types of policies meet with little popular Turral, 2004; Perry, 2007). They have shown support but they seem to go ahead out of how local ‘inefficiencies’ associated with leaky bureaucratic inertia or ideology, as the intrigu- canals, reservoir spills, inefficient irrigation ing case of water-harvesting structures in the practices and other system losses are often the Merguellil basin suggests (Chapter 7). primary source of water for other users or for As a result of such complex sets of constraints, ecosystems. responses are often diverse and shifting but More generally, interventions in the hydro- more or less efficient. The Colorado basin has logical cycle generate externalities in terms of seen the emergence of an unusually rich suite of water quantity, water quality, sediment load or River Basin Trajectories: Changing Waterscapes 13

timing that travel across the basin. These exter- ing demand can only come from reduced use nalities are heightened by the process of closure (i.e. mostly reduced evapotranspiration). With but are also sometimes difficult to seize or almost no water reaching the sea, it could be appreciate as they involve time lags and two- argued that the same holds true for the Yellow way interactions between surface water and River in general. groundwater resources. Deforestation in the The lesson drawn from all these examples is Murray–Darling basin has altered runoff and that the management of river basins becomes groundwater recharge, resulting in the phenom- increasingly difficult with closure. Arid basins enon of dry-salinity. Afforestation in the upper are somewhat easier to manage, in that most Olifants basin has reduced natural runoff to the of the resource mobilized is stored in a few point that forest areas are considered as a reservoirs or aquifers, which are potentially water user and forestry companies have to pay amenable to quantification. In basins such as fees accordingly. Development of diffuse water- the Yellow or Krishna, where rainfall is more harvesting structures and shallow wells in the frequent and better distributed throughout the Krishna and Merguellil basins has critically year, supply and demand vary a lot and the curtailed runoff and benefits to downstream spatial and temporal distribution of flows is water users. In the Zayandeh Rud basin, several harder to grasp and control. In all cases, supply hydrological interactions have also been augmentation, conservation and reallocation evidenced, including reverted net flows between appear to be clearly scale dependent. What is the river-bed and adjacent aquifers. In the stored or conserved at one point is often a Yellow and Lerma–Chapala basins, reduced reallocation when seen at a larger scale. river base flows due to groundwater over Managing such externalities and interconnect- exploitation have also been observed. edness is challenging in both technical and Unless they save water that goes to sinks, governance terms. such as saline aquifers or the sea (all ecosystem Adding further complexity to the hydrology functions of river outflows being considered), of closed river basins is the variability of rain- conservation efforts tend to amount to disguised fall. There is no such thing as an ‘average’ reallocation. This is a zero-sum game, with hydrological year, although many treaties on reallocation from public environmental inter- surface water are based on calculations of long- ests to water users, or from one user to another, term averages. However, the periods for which merely robbing Peter to pay Paul. The deal rainfall data are available have proven to be too between San Diego and the Imperial Valley short to calculate robust averages; assuming Irrigation district, supplied from the lower this is still meaningful in a context of climate Colorado, is a textbook example of a zero-sum change, where the future will not look like the game branded as a ‘win–win agreement’. The past. In both the Colorado and Lerma–Chapala 100 Mm3 of water ‘saved’ by lining the basins, treaties on surface water were based on All-American canal and reallocated to San calculations of average runoff that later proved Diego have merely been subtracted from the to be too high. With climate change it appears flows reaching the Salton Sea and replenishing that variability in rainfall will increase, further the Mexicali aquifer, on which Mexican farm- weakening the reliability of estimates of aver- ers on the other side of the border depend age runoff. (Cortez-Lara and García-Acevedo, 2000; Cortez-Lara, 2004). Kendy et al. (2003) have also highlighted Family/subsistence farming versus the hydrological nature of closed basins in the entrepreneurial capitalism North China Plain, where virtually all annually renewable water is used (depleted) and ground- As competition increases, water tends to be water tables are falling with agricultural and gradually reallocated towards uses with higher urban expansion. While water might be used economic value. This is achieved through and reused more wisely or reallocated within administrative decisions, negotiations between the basin, little water reaching the sea means users, or market mechanisms. An important that all resources are depleted and that reduc- and ubiquitous question is the allocation of 14 F. Molle and P. Wester

water within the agriculture sector and the fate In the Lerma–Chapala basin, the boom in of irrigated agriculture as water becomes more export agriculture (primarily vegetables) has valuable. Following the Dublin principle on been fed by expensive groundwater, while water as an economic good, maximizing aggre- support for land reform communities was gate welfare has become a commonplace discontinued in the early 1990s. recommendation, but it is apparent that this In the Krishna basin, two sets of policies principle also tends to conflict with that of have translated into two different modes of ensuring equity or livelihoods for the poorest. access to, and use of, water in different parts of Most basins present a contrast between two the basin (Chapter 10). Broadly, the first group broad types of agriculture: the first type is of policies aims at ‘efficiency in development’ family based, sometimes partly devoted to and concentrates financial and institutional subsistence agriculture, with limited links to investments on those social groups and areas markets and a lack of capital or knowledge, that offer the highest potential for develop- which prevents farmers from intensifying or ment. They are the technologies of the Green embarking on more market-oriented and risky Revolution, adopted in medium and large irri- ventures. The second type is entrepreneurial, gation projects, and more recently they have market oriented or export oriented, and owners attempted integrating agriculture into agribusi- – frequently absentee owners – often manage ness chains. The second group aims at ‘equity their farms through hired managers and labour- in development’ and advocates rural developers. This dichotomy is a simplification and does ment programmes through strong state plan- not do justice to hybrid types of farms: small- ning and public investments in remote areas. holders fully integrated to the market (e.g. peri- They are watershed and tank rehabilitation urban vegetable farming in the Merguellil plain) programmes, and minor irrigation projects in or absentee owners keeping low-value prestige upper secondary catchments (Landy, 2008). olive tree plantations in Jordan. Yet it is useful This need to balance economic efficiency and in highlighting governments’ dilemmas in allo- equity in rural development has been a major cating water and other resources. driver of the spatial distribution of water use in Many state policies, indeed, are predicated the Krishna basin over the last 50 years. on transforming the former type into the latter, Although vegetable and fruit production often with little understanding of the constraints typically provides higher farm revenues, it tends faced by farmers and with optimistic assump- to be capital intensive and a risky venture that is tions on how they will respond to ‘incentives’. unfit for smallholders. In any case, this produc- In particular, it is often inferred that higher tion only makes up 9% of the world’s total water prices would trigger a shift towards cropping area and it cannot be expected to higher-value crops, an assumption that runs displace other grain, oil or fibre crops. into contradictions since these higher-value Modernization of more extensive farms devoted crops are already available to farmers; they to such crops is a problem experienced in many have not opted for them for good reasons, countries (including European countries such as which are often poorly understood. Spain and Italy). It is clear that productivity The contrast between smallholder and agri- gains cannot be satisfactorily achieved through business agriculture is particularly apparent in negative incentives such as pricing but must the Olifants basin, where discourses on come through subsidies to help farmers invest economic efficiency and policies to redress and intensify. Adoption of micro-irrigation, for inequalities of the past are at loggerheads. In example, is almost invariably made possible by the Colorado basin, agribusinesses that produce generous public subsidies. vegetables exported to distant states are indirectly pitted against extensive rearing of dairy cows in Wyoming. In Brazil’s São Basin governance Francisco basin, public irrigation schemes designed to settle poor farmers have been All the hydrological and socio-political complex- abandoned in favour of wealthy and corporate ities of river basin development and manage- investors coming from the south and abroad. ment discussed above must be addressed by River Basin Trajectories: Changing Waterscapes 15

relevant decision-making and governance struc- tend to have a large autonomy in managing tures. Although the establishment of RBOs has their water resources, but it is clear that the become a standard prescription, the diversity of sum of uncoordinated state-centred interests is physical and historical contexts militates for a unlikely to lead to sustainable river basin less normative approach (Molle et al., 2007; management. The case of India shows that Warner et al., 2008). However, the belief that states pursue antagonistic expansion strategies a river basin agency should deal with all the that are poorly checked by the existing sharing water problems in a river basin is deeply rooted agreement. Interstate regulation in the Krishna, in the water sector. This reflects the modernist Colorado and Lerma–Chapala basins is largely conviction that strong government agencies achieved through water-sharing agreements staffed by scientifically trained experts should and through the management of the main be delegated responsibilities for policy design infrastructures by federal agencies. and implementation in natural resources In Australia, salinity, and, more recently, management (Norgaard, 1994). For hydrocra- environmental and drought-related problems, cies, the river basin forms an ideal territorial have triggered federal interventions. The insti- unit over which they can rule, based on the tutional challenge is whether a more active and argument that nature has determined this to be dominant role by central government will the scale at which water should be managed. deliver arrangements that are better than exist- Thus, a central element of river basin trajec- ing ones. Although the Murray River Basin tories is the process of turning river basins into Commission has been credited with a success- domains of water governance, a ‘scale-making ful mediation role, negotiated and voluntary project’ (Tsing, 2000) frequently pursued by water sharing and custodianship of the basin hydrocracies. However, this process is hidden have been slow to react in front of pressing from view, as recourse is made to the ‘natural- needs and environmental degradation. ‘The izing metaphor’ of the river basin (Bakker, belief of Federal government is that it has the 1999). This leads to a neglect or denial of the intellectual horsepower, political muscle and political dimensions of river basin manage- financial resources to succeed where it (and ment, through the reification of ‘natural’ others) believes that the Murray River Basin boundaries, the emphasis on ‘neutral’ planning Commission has failed. This is probably a belief and the search for optimal management strate- that is common to many central government gies (Molle, 2006). Frequently, the situation elites, and their immediate technocracies, and before the creation of new river basin institu- often leads to impatience with detail and the tions is treated like a tabula rasa, while, in preservation of considerable secrecy and mini- effect, many organizations and institutions and mal transparency’ (Chapter 12). the technologies for controlling water are In the Olifants basin, attempts at establish- already in place (Warner et al., 2008). The ing a catchment management agency (CMA) chapters in this book show that the delineation have been stalled. Officials initially had high of river basin boundaries, the structuring of hopes for CMAs as ‘the key vehicles to imple- stakeholder representation and the creation of ment the new water management paradigm’ institutional arrangements for river basin (Schreiner et al., 2002), but underestimated management are political processes revolving the requirements to make the initial consulta- around matters of choice. An explicit recognition process genuinely inclusive, given the tion of the political dimension of river basin highly unlevel playing field, with the large public management is necessary so that institutions and private water users well organized to defend and procedures may be designed in a more their interests (Wester et al., 2003). Similar democratic and inclusive manner. difficulties had been faced by the Olifants River International basins, multi-state basins in Forum, established in 1993 to promote federal countries and national basins clearly cooperation for conservation and sustainable appear as distinct cases. We focus here on the use of the river. The forum was founded by latter two. Federal countries exhibit a tension white representatives of large mining firms, between the states overlapping within the basin Kruger National Park and the Department of and the central federal government. States Water Affairs and Forestry in order to influence 16 F. Molle and P. Wester

the formation of the planned CMA, with local evolving and adapting to changing needs, communities not well represented, and signalled biophysical influence and public expectation. a continuation of the ‘white water economy’ (van Koppen, 2007). In the Lerma–Chapala basin, a river basin Conclusions council was formed in the 1990s, initially only with government representatives, and later also The chapters in this book illustrate the diversity with water-user representatives. However, this of both the water challenges that societies face council had very few decision-making powers, and their responses to these challenges in and was not delegated the authority to approve varied physical and historical contexts. the budgets of the federal water agency’s river Although crucial water issues include flood basin office. Although proposals to move to a management, urban water supply and sanita- bimodal form of river basin management have tion, and pollution control, the dominant proc- been debated since 1992, they have been ess is that of basin closure, whereby available successfully resisted by the federal water agency water resources are invariably gradually tapped during the various revisions of the national and depleted beyond the level required to water law. While more space has been created ensure the sustainability of aquatic ecosystems for the participation of water users and state and minimize the conflicts caused by supply governments in river basin management, the variability. With river basin closure the interde- federal government remains in control. pendencies among stakeholders, the water In many cases, participatory policies are cycle, aquatic ecosystems and institutional initiated by government agencies with the arrangements increase. These interdependen- implicit intent to keep control of river basin cies manifest themselves in alterations of the management. The Lerma–Chapala case, water cycle that create positive and negative however, shows that such processes also create externalities to different categories of users and a political space that stakeholders can use to the environment. These externalities are not challenge the dominant power of the state. always easy to foresee or quantify and often This has not yet happened to a significant result in amplified turbulence and greater degree in the Olifants and Ruaha basins, but complexity in terms of water governance could change with time. mechanisms. The Yellow River Conservancy Commission Despite the diversity of contexts presented is another type of RBO where central power by the case studies, four generic processes can seems to be overriding. The Esfahan Water be singled out. First, the process of overbuild- Agency is also an example of centralized water ing, which directly fuels the closure of basins, administration that concentrates decisional reveals a number of societal and political mech- power. Likewise, little direct representation of anisms by which the development of water-use users in decision making is observed in the capacity and infrastructure tends to outstrip Jordan, Krishna or Merguellil basins. The resil- resources and thus to generate ‘scarcity’. ience of civil-engineering-dominated water Second, this overcommitment of resources bureaucracies is clearly one of the main obsta- also affects systems of allocation, whether cles to change in these water sectors. Their formal – through a system of rights – or other- water resources governance structure and poli- wise, which signals that it is politically always cies remain characterized by centralization, easier to downplay hydrological realities by hierarchy, specialization in infrastructural plan- overallocating one ‘pie’ than by excluding ning and secretive, top-down decision making. some constituencies (or nature) from accessing As mentioned earlier, with regard to shifting it. Third, pressure over resources translates paradigms, ideologies and societal values, water into the ‘overtapping’ of both superficial (lakes management is – or should be – in a constant and dams) and underground (aquifers) reser- flux to accommodate these changes. The voirs. Fourth, basin closure makes the issue of Murray–Darling basin provides a good example water allocation critical, and a ‘double squeeze’ of where water management is constantly of agriculture is widely observed: the share of River Basin Trajectories: Changing Waterscapes 17

agriculture is under pressure from both grow- many cases, pursued in parallel with demand- ing non-agricultural needs and a widening management options. awareness of, and call for, a need to increase Response options are diverse and always in environmental flows, since nature, the residual competition. This book clearly shows how user, bears the brunt of variability in supply. politically contested decision making is, both Indeed, the lack of possibilities to develop with regard to the selection of these options in new water supplies, and the perception that general, and to water allocation in particular. agriculture is a ‘low-value’ use of water, lead to The era of water resources development was increasing intersectoral water transfers: one- characterized by a consensus on the desirability way (frequently extra-legal) transfers from agri- of the hydraulic mission, by the need to ‘make culture to industry and domestic use, as well as the desert bloom’, and the problems it dealt intrasectoral transfers in agriculture to econom- with could be classified as ‘tame’, i.e. amenable ically higher-value crops and from small farm- to solution by construction of hydraulic infra- ers to large commercial farmers. Most structure and injection of technology and governments face the need to reconcile the expertise (Lach et al., 2005). Many problems antagonistic objectives of privileging economic can now be characterized as ‘wicked’, with a efficiency and supporting the livelihoods of the multiplicity of viewpoints, interests and uses poorest. Plans to transform subsistence farm- that demand new governance mechanisms. ers into market-oriented producers make light Conventional water bureaucracies or RBOs, of issues of risk, marketing, and access to capi- which were instrumental in (over)building river tal, labour and information. basins, need to change their operating para- The overexploitation of water sources leads digms to be able to deal with basin closure. to environmental degradation through the The chapters in this book show that the destruction of aquatic ecosystems, the deple- cognitive, social and political complexities in tion of aquifers and the generation of polluted closed basins are such that no easy-to- wastewater flows (both industrial/urban efflu- implement blueprints are available to resolve ents and agricultural drainage effluents). In wicked water resources management prob- closed river basins, these trends can principally lems. They take us through very rich and be reversed by consuming less water and instructive stories that make explicit the deeply making judicious use of wastewater; but creat- political and contentious nature of river basin ing new ‘hydraulic property’ (Coward, 1986), management, and the need to start from this even where only marginal and costly solutions recognition as a necessary first step for work- remain available (distant dams, interbasin trans- ing towards a socially and environmentally just fers, desalination), is often preferred and, in governance of water resources.

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