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Dialogue About the Doctrine of Consideration James D Cornell Law Review Volume 75 Article 1 Issue 5 July 1990 Dialogue About the Doctrine of Consideration James D. Gordon III Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation James D. Gordon III, Dialogue About the Doctrine of Consideration , 75 Cornell L. Rev. 986 (1990) Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol75/iss5/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A DIALOGUE ABOUT THE DOCTRINE OF CONSIDERATION James D. Gordon IIt Great scholars' have long contemplated the doctrine of consid- eration in contract law. 2 Come with me, if you will, 3 to a lawyer's office, where a conversation between the lawyer and a client is about to take place. 4 The lawyer is Robert Lichten (L), and the client is t Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School. B.A. 1977, Brigham Young University; J.D. 1980, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berke- ley. I wanted to thank several famous law professors who commented on this article in order to persuade lawreview editors that the article is really good, or in any event that I have several famous law professor friends and am probably pretty famous myself. Un- fortunately, the famous people I contacted told me they were too busy to read the arti- cle, not counting one person who read it and threatened to sue me if I mentioned his name anywhere in the article, or anytime during my entire life, for that matter. But here is the article anyway, with apologies to Pat Bagley, Jae R. Ballif, Dave Barry, George Carlin, Johnny Carson, the Congress of Wonders, Craig Griffin, Brian C. Johnson, Mel Lazarus, Tom Lehrer, Jay Leno, Hans A. Linde, Walter F. Pratt, Jr., Bud Scruggs, Mark Twain, and others. 1 Id. However, it is humbling for me to realize that by the time Stephen Crane was my age, he had been dead for six years. 2 And no wonder. Consideration is to contract law as Elvis is to rock-and-roll: the King. Revisionists, however, have questioned Elvis's greatness. They have wrestled with one disturbing issue: if Elvis is so great, how come he's buried in his own back- yard-like a hamster. They address the question openly, knowing that it is legally im- possible to slander a dead hamster. s Alfred Hitchcock and Rod Serling used this phrase when they were about to in- troduce you to a nightmare. 4 Law review articles in conversational style are in, and I certainly do not want to be left out. The best known is Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. Rxv. 1 (1984), an abstruse dialogue about critical legal studies that sounds "like a pair of old acid-heads chewing over a passage in Sartre." David Luban, Legal Modern- ism, 84 MicH. L. REv. 1656, 1671 (1986). Actually, I don't know much about acid-heads. I attended BYU as an undergradu- ate. By the time I arrived at Berkeley in the late 70s, drugs were becoming pass6, mostly because students could see ex-flower children from the 60s still wandering around Berkeley with vacant stares like those people in old pioneer photographs. While a few of my classmates still believed in "Better Living through Chemistry" (and a few had a slight dependency problem involving catnip), most of us were more "into" being laid-back, natural, and holistic, and getting in touch with our feelings. We learned that "the body is an entity." We didn't know what that meant, but it gave us a feeling of wholeness, which was one of the feelings we were busy trying to get in touch with. We ate stone ground bread. The primary advantage of stone ground bread is that it tastes better than oat bran. Of course, dirt tastes better than oat bran, too. But dirt wasn't organic enough. The official student health manual encouraged people not to wear underarm deo- dorant. It said something like, "Put some on. How does your body feel? Does your body like that?" I am not making this up. Consequently, some of our classes were pow- 987 988 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:987 Carla Marchant (M),5 the president of Slater Valley Coal Company. The camera zooms in, and the volume increases until we can hear what they are saying. 6 L: How can I help you today? M: My company has a contract to sell as much coal to Barton Steel Company 7 as it requires. The market price of coal has risen, so I asked Barton whether it would be willing to increase the con- tract price, and it agreed. I need you to draft the amendment. Here is the original contract. L: (After reading it for a few minutes.)8 This contract is not enforceable. M: What? Why not? L: It provides that Barton can terminate at any time without notice. This is called an unrestricted termination clause, and it means that there is no consideration for your promises in the contract.9 M: What's consideration? L: There are many definitions of consideration, but basically it's a performance or return promise which is bargained for.' 0 There must be consideration for your promises to make them le- gally binding. Although Barton made lots of promises in the con- tract, it can terminate at any time. This is called the "illusory promise" situation." Since Barton's promises are unenforceable, they cannot serve as consideration for your promises. Therefore, you are entitled to walk away from the contract. M: We don't want to walk away from it. We want to modify it, and Barton agreed. erful enough to knock over large rodents at 200 yards. Or at least make their eyes water. Of course, this all changed when interviewing season began. We could figure some things out for ourselves. 5 Notice how the capital letters also stand for lawyer (L), and merchant (M). No- tice also the clever play between "Marchant" and "merchant." Bonus points are awarded for recognizing that "Carla" and "client" both start with "C." This fascinating skill is related to the ability law professors have of writing those absolutely hilarious final exams that just slay students and send them into paroxysms of hysterical laughter. Law professors learn how to write those witty exams at an AALS seminar for new professors, "How to Make Up for Your Humorless Teaching Style on the Final Exam." 6 Thereby setting the billing meter running. Twenty-five hundred billable hours, here I come! 7 I would point out that the seller's name begins with "S" and the buyer's name begins with "B," but you probably saw that already and are sick of my pointing out the incredibly obvious. The merely obvious will do. 8 Moving his lips only slightly. 9 JOHN CALAMARI &JOSEPH PERILLO, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS 229 (3d ed. 1987). 10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(1) (1979). 11 SeeJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 9, at 228-32. 1990] A DIALOGUE ON CONSIDERATION 989 L: But the contract is unenforceable. Basically, you didn't get anything of value out of the deal. M: Lawyers are so arrogant. 12 Do you think that we spent 3 hours negotiating the deal and thousands of dollars in legal fees' drafting it just for fun? We got precisely what we wanted out of this deal, and the value we received justified our making a commitment to sell coal to Barton. It had commercial utility to us; otherwise we would not have done it. L: What were you bargaining for? M: We were bargaining for a business relationship, 14 the chance to sell coal to Barton. 15 Barton will probably buy an enor- mous amount of coal from us; it will probably not terminate. That's worth a lot-to us, anyway. L: But it's invalid consideration. 16 Barton's promise is illusory. M: You must learn to stop being so condescending. 17 Do you think we're fools? 18 That we can't read?19 We knew that we agreed to a termination clause. We were willing to live with that; we were 20 still willing to commit ourselves to the bargain. L: Not every bargained-for thing counts as consideration. 21 12 However, it is unfair to judge the entire profession by five or six hundred thou- sand bad apples. 13 See supra note 6. 14 Cf. Stewart Macauley, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. Rv. 465, 468: [Academic contract theories] rest on worlds of discrete transactions where people respond to calculations of short-term advantange. How- ever, people engaged in business often find that they do not need con- tract planning and contract law because of relational sanctions. There are effective private governments and social fields, affected but seldom controlled by the formal legal system. Even discrete transactions take place within a setting of continuing relationships and interdependence. The value of these relationships means that all involved must work to satisfy each other. Potential disputes are suppressed, ignored, or com- promised in the service of keeping the relationship alive. 15 See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 31 (1981). 16 "Invalid consideration" is an oxymoron, like legal ethics, marital bliss, military intelligence, family vacation, civil war, postal service, scholar athlete, Amtrak schedule, interesting professor, and Justice [insert the name of your least favorite Supreme Court justice here].
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