Chinese-Malaysians in Singapore Negotiating “Skilled Diasporic Citizenship”
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The struggle to belong Dealing with diversity in 21st century urban settings. Amsterdam, 7-9 July 2011 The Sceptical Citizen, The Mobile Citizen, and The Converted National: Chinese-Malaysians in Singapore Negotiating “Skilled Diasporic Citizenship” Sin Yee Koh Paper presented at the International RC21 conference 2011 Session: RT19.1 Scales of Citizenship PhD student Department of Geography and Environment London School of Economics and Political Science Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE [email protected] The Sceptical Citizen, The Mobile Citizen, and The Converted National: Chinese-Malaysians in Singapore Negotiating “Skilled Diasporic Citizenship” Sin Yee Koh [email protected] Please do not quote without author’s permission This paper examines how the cases of tertiary-educated Chinese-Malaysians who are/were Singapore permanent residents and/or citizens inform a grounded theory of “skilled diasporic citizenship”. By connecting two previously unlinked themes of “skilled diaspora” and “meanings of citizenship”, I argue for a critical analysis of assumptions underlying notions of (diasporic) citizenship, identity, loyalty and belonging that have been left unquestioned with respect to skilled diasporas. I hypothesise that skilled diasporas’ negotiations of such concepts (through reciprocal relationships with their sending and receiving states) inform their subsequent citizenship and migration decisions. The cases, exemplifying the sceptical citizen , the mobile citizen , and the converted national, further complicate notions of “citizen”, “diaspora” and “transnational migrant” in the context of Malaysia and Singapore’s interlinked colonial and contemporary trajectories. Introduction Theoretical Context Globalisation and the age of migration have brought about challenges to the notion of “citizenship” through five dimensions. Firstly, geographies of citizenship – de-territorialised spaces, scales and boundaries (cities, regions, nation-states, global, transnational); secondly, relationships of citizenship – complexities in loyalty and social contract between citizenship- subjects and institutions conferring citizenships; thirdly, content of citizenship – differentiation and/or expansion of rights (social, political, democratic).; fourthly, meanings of citizenship – as identity, belonging and membership or as rights, privileges and responsibilities; and lastly, strategies of citizenship – how actors (including citizen-subjects, migrants and institutions conferring citizenship) manoeuvre and capitalise on citizenship statuses in their various projects. At the same time, globalisation and increased ease of mobility have catalysed international skilled migration. Some have referred to this as “skilled diaspora” (Brinkerhoff, 2006), and positioned this vis-à-vis the migration-development nexus. Debates have shifted from pessimistic (brain-drain, brain waste) to positive (brain-circulation). Emphases are now placed on roles of (1) sending states in engaging their diasporas and facilitating their contributions; and (2) diasporas in initiating and participating in homeland-development projects. For skilled diasporas, these take the form of diaspora networks, knowledge transfers, and return migration. 1 of 22 However, attention has been focused on economics of skilled diasporas from demand- side perspectives (remittances, competition for human capital). Consequently, there has been a lack of critical examination of “citizenship” in these debates 1: (1) an underlying assumption that skilled diasporas, by virtue of being citizens of sending states, are obliged or genuinely desire to contribute to development at home and/or return; (2) a lack of questioning of terms such as “citizens” and “nationals” in skilled diasporas’ relationships to sending and receiving states; (3) failure to recognise diversities within the assumed unified, collective diaspora 2; and (4) a lack of examination of these issues from diasporas’ perspectives (i.e. supply-side). Empirical Context Malaysia’s New Economic Policy (NEP) and its legacies have created a push for emigration, especially of the Chinese-Malaysians (Cartier, 2003; Hing, 2000; Yow, 2007). Here, I use the term “Chinese-Malaysians” in reference to people of Chinese ethnicity born in Malaysia, or of Malaysian parents. As Malaysia’s largest “diaspora”, many Chinese-Malaysians in Singapore have taken up Singapore permanent residence (PR) or citizenship. However, most continue to consider themselves Malaysians, and Malaysia as “home” (Lam & Yeoh, 2004). Although some feel strongly about retaining their Malaysian citizenship and harbour an “imagined return” (Long & Oxfeld, 2004), many have not actually done so, and do not have real course of actions in contributing towards the development of “homeland” in terms of existing interpretations of “diaspora”. Table 1 : Number of Malaysian migrants with tertiary education in OECD countries Resident in 1990 2000 Increase (%) Australia 34,716 39,601 14.07 Canada 8,480 12,170 43.51 New Zealand 4,719 5,157 9.28 United Kingdom 9,812 16,190 65.00 United States 12,315 24,695 100.53 Others 2,607 4,508 72.92 Total 72,649 102,321 40.84 Source: Docquier & Marfouk (2004) In March 2010, the Malaysian government announced the New Economic Model (NEM), aimed at achieving “high income”, “sustainability”, and “inclusiveness” with benefits for the rakyat (lit. the people) (Abdul Razak, 2010). Talent Corporation Malaysia Berhad (Talent Corp), 1 An exception is Liu (2009). Leitner and Erhkamp’s (2006) study does so, but not specifically on skilled diasporas. 2 Where diversities are acknowledged, they often refer to heterogeneity of diaspora organisations or types of skilled diaspora (e.g. students, professionals, scientists), and not individuals. 2 of 22 set up on 1 January 2011 under the Prime Minister’s Department, has been tasked to initiate and facilitate strategies to meet Malaysia’s talent needs, including attracting the Malaysian diaspora and foreign skilled migrants through appealing policies (e.g. open-ended visas, lowering restrictions in property acquisition). One of the key strategies is to revive the Brain Gain Malaysia (BGM) programme by attracting the “Malaysian diaspora” home (Yakcop, 2009). However, this specifically targets “Researchers, Scientist, Engineers and Technopreneurs (RSETs)” (MOSTI, 2010), effectively ignoring the increasing exodus of tertiary-educated emigrants who may not be RSETs ( Table 1 ). At the same time, amidst recent concerns on the increasing numbers of immigrants, PRs and naturalised citizens, the Singapore government has shifted its stand from open (skilled) immigration and naturalisation towards “ensuring quality and assimilability” (Wong, 2010:3). This will be implemented by moderating “the inflow of … foreign workforce over time” ( ibid. ), tightening the PR/citizen assessment framework ( ibid. :4), and establishing “a greater distinction in privileges and benefits between Singaporeans and PRs in the areas of education and healthcare” ( ibid. :5). Between 2008 and 2009, the number of PRs granted has significantly dropped by 25%, while the number of citizenships granted has dropped by 3% ( Figure 1). In addition, the National Integration Council was set-up in 2009 to “promote mutual trust and understanding, and foster a common sense of belonging to Singapore” (MCYS, 2009). These shifts signal the increasing emphasis placed on a Singaporean nation for Singaporeans. Figure 1: Singapore’s PR and citizenship trends (2000-2009) 90,000 79,167 80,000 70,000 59,460 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 23,509 20,513 19,928 20,000 10,000 6,076 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 New PR granted New SC granted Source: Wong (2010:Chart 2) This Research These recent developments present a unique and timely opportunity to investigate skilled diasporas’ politics of citizenship, identity and belonging in the Malaysia-Singapore 3 of 22 context. This research, conducted between January and August 2010, is based on questionnaire surveys and in-depth interviews with Chinese-Malaysians who have resided in Singapore for at least two years. The cases of tertiary-educated Chinese-Malaysians who are/were Singapore PR or citizens challenge notions of “citizens”, “diasporas” and “transnational migrants”. Caught in between two “umbilically linked” (Lam & Yeoh, 2004:142) countries, I argue that their negotiations of citizenship, identity, home and belonging, shaped simultaneously by institutional and everyday life processes, subsequently inform and shape their citizenship and migration trajectories. Although scholars calling for research grounded in everyday lives do so with respect to transnational migration (e.g. Conradson & Latham, 2005; Portes et al., 1999), I see this as equally relevant to skilled diaspora studies, especially in relation to issues of identity and belonging. Using Laguerre’s (1997) and Siu’s (2005) “diasporic citizenship” as starting points, I propose a grounded theory of “skilled diasporic citizenship” as a conceptual and methodological tool to understand skilled diasporas’ reciprocal relationships to both sending and receiving states in the Malaysia-Singapore context. This paper is structured into 4 sections. First, I explain the theoretical framework for “skilled diasporic citizenship”. Second, I provide empirical background on skilled emigration from Malaysia into Singapore. Third, I focus on 3 citizen-types – the sceptical citizen , the mobile citizen , and the converted national – and consider questions they raise for “citizenship”