By Beth Seacord
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UNTO THE LEAST OF THESE: ANIMAL SUFFERING AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL by Beth Seacord B.A. University of Southern California, 1998 M.A. Biola University, Talbot School of Theology, 2004 M.A. University of Colorado, Boulder, 2010 A thesis submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado, Boulder in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy 2013 This Thesis entitled: UNTO THE LEAST OF THESE: ANIMAL SUFFERING AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL written by Beth Seacord has been approved for the Department of Philosophy _______________________________________ (Wes Morriston) ________________________________________________________________________ (Paul Draper, Christopher Heathwood, Claudia Mills, Michael Tooley) Date_____________________ The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards of scholarly work in the discipline of philosophy. Seacord, Beth (Ph.D., Philosophy) Unto the Least of These: Animal Suffering and the Problem of Evil Thesis directed by Professor Wes Morriston Abstract: In this dissertation I argue that animal pain and suffering pose a greater problem for God’s goodness than has been generally acknowledged in the history of the discussion of the problem of evil. I take David Hume’s abductive approach to the problem of evil as my model and compare two explanations for the evidence of animal suffering—the hypothesis of indifference and classical theism. I argue that theism is a poor fit with the total evidence—evidence that includes animal suffering. I argue that there are certain features of the world that are surprising on the hypothesis that a perfectly good, all-powerful being governs the universe. Among these features are the pain and suffering of sentient animals, the phenomena of predation, and the mechanism of evolution by natural selection. Given that there is an alternate hypothesis that is a better fit with the data, it is unreasonable to accept theism. Then I evaluate some of the best attempts to diffuse the problem of animal suffering—I survey various theodicies and defenses designed to raise the probability of theism on the evidence of animal suffering including Peter van Inwagen’s modal and moral skeptical defense, Michael Murray’s neo-Carteisian defense and evolutionary goods defense and Richard Swinburne’s animal virtue theodicy. I conclude that each of the theodicies and defenses are highly implausible and, therefore, fail to raise the probability of theism relative to the evidence. I conclude that the prospects for theodicies and defenses are dim. Unless the theist has recourse to some very strong argument for the existence of an all-good God, I argue that it unreasonable to believe in the God of classical theism. iii To Scout and Spike Contents I. Chapter One: An Introduction to the Problem of Animal Suffering…………………………………………………………………..1 1. Dissertation Outline……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..…….…..13 2. Situation My Project: Some Important Distinctions………………………………………………………………….…………....16 i. Logical and Evidential Arguments from Evil……………………………………………………………………………….17 ii. The Local and Global Problems of Evil……………………………………………………………………………………….19 iii. Moral and Natural Evil……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….22 iv. Pain and Suffering……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..24 v. The Relative Moral Worth of Human and Animal Suffering……………………………………………………….29 vi. Theodicies and Defenses…………………………………………………………………………………………………………..31 II. Chapter Two: Evolution and the Problem of Predation………………………………………………………………………………….34 i. Evolution—A Quick Definition…………………………………………………………………………………………………..35 1. Creation by Evolution………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..36 i. The Objection from the Inherent Goodness of Evolutionary Progress………………………………….......44 ii. The Objection from the Value of Wild, Natural Systems……………………………………………………….…..49 iii. Peter Van Inwagen’s Objection from Moral and Modal Skepticism…………………………………….…….60 iv. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..…...68 III. Chapter Three: The Neo-Cartesians………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..70 1. The No-Self View………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………72 2. Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: The HOT and DHOT Views…………………………………………..….79 i. Motivating the Plausibility of Non-Conscious Experience……………………………………………….....84 ii. Phenomenal Consciousness on the Higher-Order Thought (HOT) Theory…………………….......87 iii. Animal Concepts…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….….90 iv. The Mindreading Faculty……………………………………………………………………………………………………94 v. Phenomenal Consciousness on the Dispositional Higher-Order Thought Theory……………………………………………………………………………………….…102 vi. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….……109 3. Michael Murray’s Neo-Cartesian Defense…………………………………………………………………………………..…110 i. The Standard Argument from Analogy for Animal Pain……………………………………………………111 ii. Strengthening the Argument from Analogy……………………………………………………………..………119 iii. Murray’s Four Neo-Cartesian Proposals………………………………………………………………………..…125 4. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..………..133 IV: Chapter Four: Animal Pain and the Regularity of Nature……………………………………………………………………….…..135 1. The Intrinsic and Instrumental Goods of a Regular World………………………………………………………..……136 i. The Good of Human Moral Freedom……………………………………………………………………………….136 ii. The Good of Scientific Discovery………………………………………………………………………………….….141 iii. The Nature of God Revealed…………………………………………………………………………..…………..…..143 iv. The Good of Divine Hiddenness……………………………………………………………………..……………….148 v. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….……..151 2. Is Pain Necessary for Embodied Existence?.......................................................................................151 3. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…162 v. V: Chapter Five: Animal Suffering and Animal Virtue………………………………………………………………………………………163 1. Richard Swinburne’s Animal Virtue Theodicy……………………………………………………………………………..….164 i. Empirical Evidence for Moral Behavior in Animals………………………………………………….………..166 ii. Evaluating Swinburne’s Animal Virtue Theodicy………………………………………………….……………171 iii. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….….177 VI: Chapter Six: The Argument from Animal Suffering and the Objection from Skeptical Theism…………….….…179 i. An Introduction to Skeptical Theism…………………………………………………………………………………179 1. Skeptical Theism and the Hume-Style Argument from Evil…………………………………………………………………….185 i. Michael Bergmann’s Objection to the Hume-Style Argument from Evil……………………………189 ii. Peter van Inwagen’s Objection to the Hume-style Argument from Evil………………….…………186 iii. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………….195 VII: Chapter Seven: Concluding Thoughts………………………………………………………………………………………..…………….….197 1. Animals and the Afterlife………………………………………………………………………………………………….…………….197 2. Concluding Remarks…………………………………………………………………………………….………………….……………..203 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..……….……….205 vi. Chapter One: An Introduction to the Problem of Animal Suffering The wolf and the lamb will graze together, and the lion will eat straw like the ox; and dust will be the serpent’s food. They will do no evil or harm in all my holy mountain,’ says the Lord.1 There is no greater challenge to the goodness of God than the suffering of the innocent. Such suffering represents a deep affront to our moral sensibilities, and tempts even the most faithful to shake their fist at the universe and cry foul. Job, the archetypal sufferer, observes that God is ultimately responsible for the suffering of his creatures: “‘if it is not he, then who is it?’”2 After all, Job reasons, if God is sovereign, then both good and evil come from His hand.3 Philosophers of later generations have fashioned various defenses or theodicies for this longstanding theological problem which range from the importance of the choice between good and evil for morally significant action, to the necessity of evil in the valuable process of soul- building. However, attempts to explain why God allows the innocent to suffer have focused exclusively on one class of innocents to the exclusion of others—theodicies have tended to focus on the problem of human pain while the suffering of non-human animals4 has been little more than an afterthought. It can only be assumed that bias in favor of our own species has prevented many from appreciating the moral force of animal suffering. In his influential book, Animal Liberation, Peter Singer argues that there is no philosophically tenable justification for our ‘speciesism’: “…pain 1 Isaiah 65:25, New American Standard Bible (NASB). 2 Job 9:24, (NIV) New International Version 3 Job 2:10, (ASV) American Standard Version 4 Hereafter animals 1 is pain, and the importance of preventing unnecessary pain and suffering does not diminish because the being that suffers is not a member of our species.”5 Failure to appreciate the problem of animal suffering for classical theism can only be attributed to a philosophically unjustified, yet deeply engrained, bias. For instance, some of the best- respected theodicies of our time assume—with very little or no argument—that animal suffering is of little moral importance. In Peter van Inwagen’s treatment of the problem of evil, he claims that “…the sufferings of human beings are a much worse