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Why Allows Richard Swinburne

Richard Swinburne is the Nolloth Professor of of the Christian at the Univeristy of Oxford. He has done important work in metaphysics, and the .

From Richard Swinburne Is There a God? pp. 95-113 (Oxford Univeristy Press, 1996) 106 PART 1 • and Religious

This world is a clearly providential world in this her own and that of close relatives and friends sense-that we can have a great influence (which can so easily seem the only important on our own destiny, and on the destiny of our thing in the world), and ask very generally what world and its other inhabitants; and it is very things would a generous and everlasting good for us that it is like that. And yet animals God give to beings in the course of a and humans suffer (through natural processes of short earthly life. Of course thrills of pleasure disease and accident), and they cause each other and periods of are good things, to suffer (we hurt and n1aim each other and and-other things being equal-God would cer­ cause each other to starve). The world, that is, tainly seek to provide plenty of those. But a gen­ contains much evil. An omnipotent God could erous God will seek to give deeper good things have prevented this evil, and surely a perfectly than these. He \vill seek to give us great respon­ good and o.mnipotent God would have done so. sibility for ourselves, each other, and the world, So why is there this evil? Is not its existence strong and thus a share in his own creative activity of evidence against the ? It would be determining what sort of world it is to be. And unless we can construct what is known as a theo­ he will seek to make our valuable, of great dicy, an explanation of why God would allo\v use to ourselves and each other. The problem is such evil to occur. I believe that that can be that God cannot give us these in full mea­ done, and I shall outline a in this chapter. sure without allo¥.ring much evil on the way. I emphasize that in ... \Vriting that God would do The is not that of the absence this or that, I am not taking for granted the exis­ of various good states. We noted in Chapter 1 * tence of God, but merely claiming that, if there that, ho\vever much good God creates, he could is a God, it is to be expected that he vvould do cer­ create more; and he does not in general have any tain things, including allowing the occurrence of obligation to create. That is vvhy death is not in certain ; and so, I am claiming, their occur­ itself an evil; death is just the end of a good rence is not evidence against his existence. , life (and in any case one of which God It is inevitable that any attempt by myself or may choose to give us more-by giving us a life anyone else to construct a theodicy will sound after death). Death may be an evil if it comes pre­ callous, indeed totally insensitive to human suf­ maturely, or causes great grief to others; but in fering. Many theists, as well as atheists, have felt itself it is not an evil. But there are plenty of that any attempt to construct a tl1eodicy evinces evils, positive bad states, which God could if he an immoral approach to . I can only chose remove. I divide these into moral evils and ask the reader to believe that I am not totally natural evils. I understand by "" all insensitive to hu1nan suffering, and that I do evil which is not deliberately produced by human n1ind about the agony of poisoning, child beings and which is not allowed by human beings abuse, bereavement, solitary imprisonment, and to occur as a result of their negligence. Natural evil marital infidelity as much as anyone else. True, I includes both physical suffering and mental suffer­ \Vould not in most cases recommend that a pastor ing, of animals as well as humans; all the trail of give this chapter to vi.ctin1s of sudden distress at suffering which disease, natural disasters, and acci­ their vvorst moment, to read for consolation. dents unpredictable by humans bring in their But this is not because its arguments are train. "Moral evil" I understand as including all unsound; it is simply that most people in deep evil caused deliberately by humans doing what distress need comfort, not argument. Yet there they ought not to do (or allowed to occur by is a problem about vvhy God allows evil, and, if humans negligently failing to do what they the theist does not have (in a cool moment) a sat­ ought to do) and also the evil constituted by isfactory answer to it, then his belief in God is less such deliberate actions or negligent failure. It than rational, and there is no reason why the includes the sensory pain of the blow inflicted by atheist should share it. To appreciate the argu­ ment of this chapter, each of us needs to stand back a bit fro1n the particular situation of his or *(01nitted here-Ed.] RICHARD SWINBURNE • Why God Allo"vs Evil 107

the bad parent on his child, the mental pain of the pleasurable sensations, and to pursue worthwhile parent depriving the child of , the starvation activities-to play tennis or the piano, to acquire allowed to occur in Africa because of negligence of history and science and philosophy, by members of foreign governments who could and to help others to do so, and thereby to build have prevented it, and also the evil of the parent deep personal relations founded upon such sensa­ or politician deliberately bringing about the pain tions and activities. And hu1nans arc so 1nade that or not trying to prevent the starvation. they can form their characters. fa1nously remarked: "we become just by doing just acts, MORAL EVIL pn1dent by doing prudent acts, brave by doing brave acts." That is, by doing a just act when it The central core of any theodicy must, I believe, is difficult-when it goes against our natural incli­ be the "free-vvill defence," vvhich deals-to start nations (which is what I understand by desires)­ with-with moral evil, but can be extended to we make it easier to do a just act next ti1ne. We deal with 1nuch natural evil as well. The free-will can gradually change our desires, so that-for defence claims that it is a great good that humans example-doing just acts becomes natural. have a certain sort offree will which I shall call free Thereby we can free ourselves from the power and responsible choice, but that, if they do, then of the less good desires to which we are subject. necessarily there \v:ill be the natural possibility of And, by choosing to acquire knowledge and to moral evil. (By the "natural possibility" I mean use it to build machines of various sorts, humans that it will not be determined in advance whether can extend the range of the differences they can or not the evil will occur.) A God who gives 1nake to the world-they can build universities humans such necessarily brings about to last for centuries, or save energy for the next the possibility, and puts outside his own control generation; and by cooperative effort over many whether or not that evil occurs. It is not logically decades they can eliminate . The possibil­ possible-that is, it would be self-contradictory ities for free and responsible choice are enormous. to suppose-that God could give us such free It is good that the free choices of humans will and yet ensure that we always use it in the should include genuine responsibility for other right way. hun1ans, and that involves the opportunity to Free and responsible choice is not just free \vill benefit or harm them. God has the power to ben­ in the narrov.r sense of being able to choose efit or to harm hun1ans. If other agents are to be between alternative actions, without our choice given a share in his creative work, it is good that being causally necessitated by some prior cause. tl1ey have that power too (although perhaps to a I have urged, for the given in the last lesser degree). A world in which agents can bene­ ·chapter,* that humans do have such free will. But fit each other but not do each other harn1 is one humans could have that kind of free will merely where they have only very limited responsibility in of being able to choose freely benveen for each other. If my responsibility for you is lim­ nvo equally good and unimportant alternatives. ited to whether or not to give you a camcorder, Free and responsible choice is rather free will (of but I cannot cause you p~n, st1u1t your growth, the kind discussed) to make significant choices or limit your education, then I do not have a between good and evil, which make a big differ­ great deal of responsibility for you. A God vvho ence to the agent, to others, and to the world. gave agents only such li1nited responsibilities for Given that we have free will, we certainly have their fellows \Vould not hav~ given much. God free and responsible choice. Let us remind our­ would have reserved for himself the all-in1portant selves of the difference that humans can make to choice of the kind of world it was to be, while sim­ themselves, others, and the world. Humans have ply allowing humans the minor choice of filling in opportunities to give themselves and others the details. He would be like a father asking his elder son to look after the younger son, and add­ ing that he would be watching the elder son's *[0111itted here-Ed.] every move and would intervene the moment 108 PART 1 • Reason and Religious Belief

the elder son did a thing wrong. The elder son genuine alternative. I stress that, according to the might justly retort that, while he would be free-will defence, it is the natural possibility of happy to share his father's work, he could really moral evil which is the necessary condition of the do so only if he were left to make his own judge­ great good, not the actual evil itself. Whether tl1at ments as to what to do within a significant range occurs is (through God's choice) outside God's of the options available to the father. A good control and up to us. God, like a good father, will delegate responsibil­ Note further and crucially that, if I suffer in ity. In order to allow creatures a share in creation, consequence of your freely chosen bad action, he will allovv them the choice of hurting and that is not by any means pure loss for me. In a cer­ maiming, of frustrating the divine plan. Our tain respect it is a good for me. My suffering would world is one where creatures have just such deep be pure loss for me if the only good thing in life was responsibility for each other. I can not only bene­ sensory pleasure, and the only bad thing sensory fit my children, but harm them. One way in which pain; and it is because the modern world tends to I can harm them is that I can inflict physical pain think in those terms that the problem of evil on them. But there are much more damaging seems so acute. If these v,rere the only good and things which I can do to them. Above all I can bad things, the occurrence of suffering would stop them growing into creatures with significant indeed be a conclusive objection to the existence knowledge, power, and freedom; I can determine of God. But we have already noted the great whether tl1ey come to have the kind of free and good of freely choosing and influencing our future, responsible choice which I have. The possibility that of our fellows, and that of the world. And now of humans bringing about significant evil is a log­ note another great good-the good of our life serv­ ical consequence of their having this free and ing a purpose, of being of use to ourselves and responsible choice. Not even God could give us others. Recall the words of Christ, "it is more this choice without the possibility of resulting evil. blessed to give than to receive" (as quoted by Now ... an action would not be intentional St Paul (Acts 20:35)). We tend to think, when unless it was done for a reason- that is, seen as in the beggar appears on our doorstep and we feel some way a good thing (either in itself or because obliged to give and do give, that that was lucky of its consequences). And, if reasons alone influ­ for him but not for us who happened to be at ence actions, that regarded by the subject as most home. That is not what Christ's words say. They in1portant will determine what is done; an agent say that we are the lucky ones, not just because under the influence of reason alone will inevitably we have a lot, out of which we can give a little, do the action which he regards as overall the but because we are privileged to contribute to tl1e best. If an agent does not do the action which he beggar's - and that privilege is worth a regards as overall the best, he must have allowed lot more than money. And, just as it is a great factors other than reason to exert an influence on good freely to choose to do good, so it is also a hin1. In other words, he must have allowed desires good to be used by someone else for a worthy pur­ for what he regards as good only in a certain pose (so long, that is, that he or she has the right, respect, but not overall, to influence his conduct. the authority, to use us in this way). Being allowed So, in order to have a choice between good and to suffer to make possible a great good is a privi­ evil, agents need already a certain depravity, in lege, even if the privilege is forced upon you. the sense of a system of desires for what they cor­ Those who are allowed to die for tl1eir country rectly believe to be evil. I need to want to overeat, and thereby save their country from foreign oppres­ get more than my fair share of money or power, sion are privileged. Cultures less obsessed than our indulge my sexual appetites even by deceiving my own by the evil of purely physical pain have always spouse or.partner, want to see you hurt, if I am recognized that. And they have recognized that it is to have choice between good and evil. This deprav­ still a blessing, even if the one who died had been ity is itself an evil which is a necessary condition of a conscripted to fight. greater good. It makes possible a choice made seri­ And even twentieth-century man can begin to ously and deliberately, because made in the face of see that-sometimes-vvhen he seeks to help RICHARD SWINBURNE • Why God Allows Evil 109

prisoners, not by giving them more comfortable correct. Having comforting beliefs is only a good quarters, but by letting them help the handi­ thing if they are true beliefs. It is not a good capped; or when he pities rather than envies the thing to believe that things are going well when "poor little rich girl" who has everything and they are not, or that your life is of use when it is does nothing for anyone else. And one phenome­ not. Getting pleasure out of a comforting falsehood non prevalent in end-of-century Britain draws this is a cheat. But ifI get pleasure out of a true belief, it especially to our attention- the evil of unemploy­ must be that I regard the state of things vvhich I ment. Because of our system ofSocial Security, the believe to hold to be a good thing. IfI get pleasure unemployed on the 'vhole have enough money to out of the true belief that my daughter is doing well live without too nluch discomfort; certainly they at school, it must be that I regard it as a good thing are a Jot better off than are many employed in that my daughter does well at school (whether or Africa or Asia or Victorian Britain. What is evil not I believe that she is doing well). If I did not about une1nployment is not so much any resulting think the latter, I would not get any pleasure out poverty but the uselessness of the unemployed. of believing that she is doing well. Likewise, the They often report feeling unvalued by society, of belief that I am vulnerable to suffering at your no use, "on the scrap heap". They rightly think hands, and that that is a good thing, can only be it would be a good for them to contribute; but a good thing if being vulnerable to suffering at they cannot. Many of them. would welcome a sys­ your hands is itself a good thing (independently tem where they were obliged to do useful work in of whether I believe it or not). Certainly, when preference to one 'vhere society has no use for my life is of use and that is a good for 1ne, it is them. even better if I believe it and get co1nfort there­ It follows from that fact that being of use is a from; but it can only be even 'better if it is already benefit for him \Vho is of use, and that those v.rho a good for me whether I believe it or not. suffer at the hands of others, and thereby make But though suffering may in these ways serve possible the good of those others who have free good purposes, does God have the right to allo"' and responsible choice, are themselves benefited me to suffer for your benefit, without asking iny in this respect. I am fortunate if the natural possi­ permission? For surely, an objector will say, no bility of my suffering if you choose to hurt me is one has the right to allow one person A to suffer the vehicle which makes your choice really matter. for the benefit of another one B without A's con­ My vulnerability, my openness to suffering (which sent. We judge that doctors who use patients as necessarily involves nly actually suffering if you involuntary objects of experimentation in medical make the wrong choice), means that you are not experiments which they hope will produce results just like a pilot in a simulator, where it does not which can be used to benefit others are doing inatter if inistakes are made. That our choices n1at­ something wrong. After all, if my arguments ter tremendously, that 've can make great differen­ about the uti.lity of suffering are sound, ought \Ve ces to things for good or ill, is one of the greatest not all to be causing suffering to others in order gifts a creator can give us. And if my suffering is that those otl1ers may have the opportunity to the means by \vhich he can give you that choice, react in the right way? I too am in this respect fortunate. Though of There are, however, crucial differences course suffering is in itself a bad thing, my good between God and the doctors. The first is that fortune is that the suffering is not random, point­ God as the author of our being has certain , less suffering. It is suffering which is a consequence a certain authority over us, vvhich we do not have of my vulnerability which inakes 1ne of such use. over our fellow humans. He is tlle cause of our Someone may object that the only good thing existence at each moment of otu- existence and sus­ is not being of use (dying for one's country or tains the laws of \vhich give us everything being vulnerable to suffering at your hands), but 've are and have. To allow someone to suffer for believing that one is of use- believing that one is his own good or that of others, one has to stand dying for one's country and that this is of use; in some kind of parental relationship towards the "feel-good" experience. But that cannot be him. I do not have the right to let some stranger 110 PART 1 • Reason and Religious Belief suffer for the sake of some good, when I could eas­ cause each other to suffer, there must be a limit ily prevent this, but I do have some right of this to the amount of suffering 'vhich he has the kind in respect of iny own children. I n1ay let the right to allow a human being to suffer for the younger son suffer somewhat for his own good or sake of a great good. A parent inay allow an that of his brother. I have this right because in elder child to have the power to do some harm small part I am responsible for the younger son's to a younger child for the sake of the responsibility existence, his beginning and continuance. If I given to the elder child; but there are limits. And have begotten him, nourished, and educated there are limits even to the moral right of God, him, I have some limited rights over him in return; our creator and sustainer, to use free sentient to a very limited extent I can use him for some wor­ beings as pawns in a greater game. Yet, if these lim­ thy purpose. If this is correct, then a God who is so its were too narrow, God would be unable to give much more the author of our being than are our htunans 1nuch real responsibility; he would be able parents has so much more right in this respect. to allow them only to play a toy gaine. Still, limits Doctors do have over us even the rights of parents. there must be to God's rights to allow humans to But secondly and all-importantly, the doctors hurt each other; and limits there are in the world could have asked the patients for permission; and to the extent to which they can hurt each other, the patients, being free agents of some power provided above all by the short finite life enjoyed and knowledge, could have made an informed by humans and other creatures-one human can choice of whether or not to allow themselves to hurt another for no more than eighty years or be used. By contrast, God's choice is not about so. And there are a number of other safety-devices how to use already existing agents, but about in-built into our physiology and , limit­ the sort of agents to make and the sort of world ing the amount of pain we can suffer. But the pri­ into which to put them. In God's situation mary safety limit is that provided by the shortness there are no agents to be asked. I am arguing of our finite life. Unending unchosen suffering that it is good that one agent A should have would indeed to my mind provide a very strong deep responsibility for another B (who in turn argument against the existence of God. But that could have deep responsibility for another C). It is not the human situation. is not logically possible for God to have asked B So then God, vvithout asking humans, has to if he wanted things thus, for, if A is to be respon­ choose for them benveen the kinds of world in sible for B's growth in freedom, knowledge, and which they can live-basically either a world in po\ver, there "''ill not be a B with enough freedom which there is very little opportunity for humans and knowledge to make any choice, before God to benefit or hartn each other, or a world in has to choose vvhether or not to give A responsi­ which there is considerable opportunity. Hovv bility for him. One cannot ask a baby into vvhich shall he choose? There are clearly reasons for sort of world he or she wishes to be born. The both choices. But it seems to me (just, on balance) creator has to make the choice independently of that his choosing to create the world in which we his creatures. He will seek on balance to benefit have considerable opportunity to benefit or harm them-all of them. And, in giving them tlle gift each other is to bring about a good at least as of life-whatever suffering goes with it- that is a great as the evil which he thereby allO\.\'S to substantial benefit. But when one suffers at the occur. Of course the suffering he allows is a bad hands of another, often perhaps it is not enough thing; and, other things being equal, to be of a benefit to outweigh the suffering. Here is avoided. But having the natural possibility of caus­ the point to recall that it is an additional benefit ing suffering mal

NATURAL EVIL knowledge of the effects of their actions without inhibiting their freedom, and if evil is to be a pos­ Natural evil is not to be accounted for along the sibility for them they must know how to allow it same lines as moral evil. Its main role rather, I to occur. suggest, is to make it possible for humans to The other way in which natural evil operates have the kind of choice which the free-will to give humans their freedom is that it makes pos­ defence extols, and to make available to humans sible certain kinds of action towards it between specially worthwhile kinds of choice. which agents can choose. It increases the range There are two ways in which natural evil of significant choice. A particular natural evil, operates to give humans those choices. First, such as physical pain, gives to the sufferer a the operation of natural laws producing evils choice- whether to endure it with patience, or gives humans knowledge (if they choose to seek to bemoan his lot. His friend can choose whether it) of how to bring about such evils themselves. to sho\v compassion towards the sufferer, or to be Observing you catch some disease by the opera­ callous. The pain 1nakes possible these choices, tion of natural processes gives me the power which would not otherwise exist. There is no either to use those processes to give that disease guarantee that our actions in response to the to other people, or through negligence to allow pain will be good ones, but the pain gives us others to catch it, or to take measures to prevent the opportunity to perform good actions. The others from catching the disease. Study of the good or bad actions which we perform in the mechanisms of nature producing various evils face of natural evil themselves provide opportuni­ (and goods) opens up for humans a wide range ties for further choice-of good or evil stances of choice. This is the way in which in fact we towards the former actions. If I am patient with learn how to bring about (good and) evil. But my suffering, you can choose whether to encour­ could not God give us the requisite knowledge age or laugh at my patience; if I bemoan my lot, (of how to bring about good or evil) which we you can teach me by word any example what a need in order to have free and responsible choice good thing patience is. If you are sympathetic, I by a less costly means? Could he not just whisper have then the opportunity to show gratitude for in our ears from time to time what are the differ­ the ; or to be so self-involved that I ent consequences of different actions of ours? ignore it. H you are callous, I can choose whether Yes. But anyone who believed that an action of to ignore this or to resent it for life. And so on. I his would have some effect because he believed do not think that there can be much doubt that that God had told him so would see all his actions natural evil, such as physical pain, makes available as done under the all-watchful eye of God. these sorts of choice. The actions 'vhich natural He would not merely believe strongly that there evil makes possible are ones which allow us to was a God, but would know it with real certainty. perform at our best and interact with our fellows That knowledge would greatly inhibit his free­ at the deepest level. dom of choice, would make it very difficult It may, hovvever, be suggested that adequate for him to choose to do evil. This is because \ve opportunity for these great good actions would all have a natural inclination to wish to be be provided by the occurrence of moral evil with­ thought well of by everyone, and above all out any need for suffering to be caused by natural by an all-good God; that we have such an inclina­ processes. You can show courage 'vhen threat­ tion is a very good feature of humans, \vithout ened by a gunman, as well as when threatened which we would be less than human. Also, if we by cancer; and show sympathy to those likely to were directly informed of the consequences of be killed by gunmen as well as to those likely to our actions, we would be deprived of the choice die of cancer. But just imagine all the suffering whether to seek to discover what the conse­ of mind and body caused by disease, earthquake, quences were through experiment and hard and accident unpreventable by humans removed cooperative work. Knowledge would be available at a stroke from our society. No sickness, no on tap. Natural processes alone give humans bereavement in consequence of the untimely 112 PART 1 • Reason and Religious Belief death of the young. Many of us would then have intentional actions. Animals look for a mate, such an easy life that we simply would not have despite being tired and failing to find one. They much opportunity to show courage or, indeed, take great trouble to build nests and feed their manifest much in the way of great goodness at young, to decoy predators and explore. But all all. We need those insidious processes of decay this inevitably involves pain (going on despite and dissolution which money and strength can­ being tired) and danger. An animal cannot inten­ not ward off for long to give us the opportunities, tionally avoid fires, or take trouble to rescue so easy otherwise to avoid, to become heroes. its offspring from forest fires, unless there exists a God has the right to allow natural evils to serious danger of getting caught in a forest fire. occur (for the san1e reason as he has the right The action of rescuing despite danger simply can­ to allow moral evils to occur)-up to a limit. It not be done unless the danger exists- and the would, of course, be crazy for God to multiply danger will not exist unless there is a significant evils inore and more in order to give endless natural probability of being caught in the fire. Ani­ opportunity for heroism, but to have some signif­ mals do not choose freely to do such actions, but icant opportunity for real heroism and conse­ the actions are nevertheless worthwhile. It is great quent character formation is a benefit for the that animals feed their young, not just themselves; person to whom it is given. Natural evils give to that animals explore when they know it to be dan­ us the knowledge to make a range of choices gerous; that animals save each other from preda­ between good and evil, and the opportunity to tors, and so on. These are the things that give perform actions of especially valuable kinds. the lives of animals their . But they do There is, however, no reason to suppose that often involve some suffering to so1ne creature. animals have free \.vill. So what about their suffer­ To return to the central case of humans-the ing? Animals had been suffering for a long time reader will agree with me to the extent to \vhich he before humans appeared on this planet-just or she values responsibility, free choice, and being how long depends on which animals are con­ of use very much more than thrills of pleasure or scious beings. The first thing to talce into account absence of pain. There is no other way to get here is that, while the higher animals, at any rate the evils of this world into the right perspective, the vertebrates, suffer, it is tnost unlikely that they except to reflect at length on innumerable very suffer nearly as much as humans do. Given that detailed thought experiments (in addition to suffering depends directly on brain events (in actual experiences of life) in which we postulate turn caused by events in other parts of the very different sorts of worlds from our own, and body), then, since the lower animals do not suffer then ask ourselves whether the perfect goodness at all and hun1ans suffer a lot, ani1nals of interme­ of God would require him to create one of these diate complexity (it is reasonable to suppose) suf­ (or no world at all) rather than our own. But I fer only a moderate amount. So, while one does conclude with a very small thought experiment, need a theodicy to account for why God allo\VS ~rhich may help to begin this process. Suppose animals to suffer, one does not need as powerful that you exist in another world before your birth a theodicy as one does in respect of humans. One in this one, and are given a choice as to the sort only needs reasons adequate to account for God of life you are to have in this one. You are told allo\ving an amount of suffering much less than that you are to have only a short life, maybe of that of humans. That said, there is, I believe, only a fe\v minutes, although it will be an adult available for animals parts of the theodicy which life in the sense that you will have the richness of I have outlined above for humans. sensation and belief characteristic of adults. You The good of animals, like that of hu1nans, have a choice as to the sort of life you will have. does not consist solely in thrills of pleasure. For You can have either a few minutes of very consid­ animals, too, there are more worthwhile things, erable pleasure, of the kind produced by some and in particular intentional actions, and among drug such as heroin, which you will experience them serious significant intentional actions. The by yourself and which will have no effects at all life of animals involves many serious significant in the world (for example, no one else will know B. C. JOHNSON • God and the Problem of Evil 113

about it); or you can have a few minutes of consid­ after death if he is to be justified in holding his erable pain, such as the pain of childbirth, which theodicy.... While believing that God does pro­ will have (unknown to you at the time of pain) vide at any rate for many humans such life after considerable good effects on others over a few death, I have expounded a theodicy without rely­ years. You are told that, if you do not make the ing on this assumption. But I can understand second choice, those others will never exist-and someone thinking that the assumption is needed, so you are under no moral obligation to make especially when we are considering the worst the second choice. But you seek to make the evils. (This compensatory need not nec- choice which will make your own life the best life essarily be the ever-lasting life of .) · for you to have led. How will you choose? The It remains the case, however, that evil is evil, choice is, I hope, obvious. You should choose and there is a substantial to pay for the the second alternative. goods of our world which it makes possible. For someone who remains unconvinced by God would not be less than perfectly good if my claims· about the relative strengths of the he created instead a world without pain and suf­ good and evils involved-holding that, great fering, and so vvithout the particular goods though the goods are, they do not justify the which those evils make possible. Christian, evils which they involve- there is a fall-back posi­ Islamic, and much Jewish tradition claims that tion. My arguments may have convinced you of God has created worlds of both kinds-our the greatness of the goods involved sufficiently world, and the Heaven of the blessed. The latter for you t o allow that a perfectly good God is a marvellous world vvith a vast range of possi­ would be justified in bringing about the evils ble deep goods, but it lacks a few goods which for the sake of the good which they make possi­ our vvorld contains, including the good of ble, if and only if God also provided compensa­ being able to reject the good. A generous God tion in the form of happiness after death to the might well choose to give some of us the choice victims whose make possible the of rejecting the good in a world like ours before goods. Someone whose theodicy requires but­ giving to those who embrace it a wonderful tressing in this way will need an independent rea­ world in which the former possibility no longer son for believing that God does provide such life exists.