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THE ANSO REPORT -Not for Copy Or Sale

THE ANSO REPORT -Not for Copy Or Sale

The NGO Safety Office Issue: 54 16-31 July 2010

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2-4 In CENTRAL region the IMF present from 06-09 for the mistaken belief that 4-8 Northern Region Conference dominated proved incapable of pre- they were involved in Par- Western Region 9-11 the period with delegates venting massive AOG ex- liamentary campaigning. articulating a rather fanciful pansion during that period. ANSO assesses that it will Eastern Region 11-14 narrative of growth, stability Elsewhere in CENTRAL be intra-candidate violence Southern Region 15-17 and rights that seemed at former AOG allies the Is- that will mark this election odds with the reality of se- rather than any AOG ef- ANSO Info Page 18 lamic Emirate (Taliban) and vere and deteriorating war. Hezb-i-Islami (HiG) initi- fort to disrupt it. The conference likely marked ated a major clash in Abduction dominated the the beginning of the end, in NIRKH, WARDAK re- YOU NEED TO KNOW terms of foreign political and NGO threat profile this portedly as a result of IEA period with an unprece- military commitment to Af- efforts to disarm the latter • Kabul Conference sets the ghanistan, in that it laid the dented eleven persons after accusations of intent taken since July 1st (many stage for the exit narrative tracks for the exit to reconcile with the Gov- and transferred, albeit in were late reported). The • Intra-AOG conflict esca- ernment. This event has abductions occurred in as word only at this stage, re- deep similarities to the lates sponsibility for all successes diverse settings as March/April intra-AOG FARYAB, WARDAK, • Risk of NGO abduction and failures on to the Afghan conflict that sparked the now severe Government. The declaration BAGHLAN & HERAT current round of instability and yet all were resolved in of the 2014 deadline for ‗full in BAGHLAN and pro- • Election violence rising the same way via local security transition‘ became vides a useful portent of the the central outcome of the community intervention • Local militias attract insta- impending character of the predicated on the NGOs bility event and led to a slew of conflict which over time commentary on whether this impartiality and acceptance. will become less dominated To date all but two (the ANSO is supported by is feasible or not. We feel by the IMF vs AOG para- these largely missed the point latest) have been released digm and instead see unharmed. as the ‗end date‘ is not as smaller, local battles be- relevant to the conflict as the tween Afghan parties only. ‗peak date’ after which IMF AOG capability expanded will have an ever decreasing Elections related violence in PARWAN, KAPISA, capacity to influence the was prominent with Parlia- JAWZJAN, FARYAB & course of events. Whatever mentary candidates ab- NURISTAN while it was has not be achieved by then ducted in HERAT and challenged by IMF in is unlikely to be and so it is and one targeted BAGHLAN and HEL- from this baseline, not the with an IED in KANDA- MAND and by flooding in final exit date, that the con- HAR. An ex-Parliament KHOST. member‘s convoy was am- tours of the new conflicts Local militias were targeted will be drawn. The peak still bushed in SUROBI (KABUL) while seven civil- in KUNDUZ and TAK- looks set to occur in 2011. HAR while IMF and AOG Readers would do well to ians on a pick-nick in PARWN were murdered both cause civilian casual- remember that the +80,000 ties in the south. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

NGO Incidents PARWAN Year to Date 2 PARWAN 50 This Report Period 0 NGOs should keep an eye on 40 continuing contextual changes in transit through the province from 30 Parwan. As noted previously, the Kabul to Bamyan should be ac- 20 counted for. province appears to be experienc- 10 ing an increased AOG presence, In an example of the last concern, 0 likely initially spurred by AOG AOG ambushed three vehicles—a migration from Baghlan. With Surf, Saracha, and pickup truck—

this, the new presence of AOG as they were proceeding in Siagerd PARWAN AOG PARWAN ACG throughout the province, paired District on the Kabul-Bamyan with a low ANSF presence, could Road towards Bamyan, apparently District on the 25th and a Director of the Dis- easily result in abductions or de- because they believed the vehicles trict Lower Court in Ghorband District on the tentions of NGO staff for NGOs were associated with campaigning 26th. which do not have acceptance in for the upcoming parliamentary NGOs which transit through the province the areas they are travelling or election. In actuality, the vehicles should also note continual AOG activity in working in. Additionally, errone- contained a family that was travel- Baghram. Specifically, the district witnessed ous targeting of NGOs as they ling for leisure in Bamyan. In sum, the arrest of suspected AOG and a significant the ambush resulted in 7 family find of bomb making materials and military KEY THREATS & CON- members killed and an additional uniforms on the 16th in Qala-e Now. Two days CERNS 5 injured. Additionally, it marked later an SVBIED targeted an IMF convoy in  AOG activity in Ghorband the first incident in the district Ma Qalandar Khel. On the 25th, Qalandar Valley since May 2008. Also west of Khel also was the scene for an AOG ambush  ACG activity in Chaharikar Chaharikar, AOG abducted a lo- on an IMF road patrol. cal shura member in

NGO Incidents LOGAR Year to Date 1 LOGAR This Report Period 1 50 Logar became the focus of inter- 40 national attention on 22 July when one of the victim‘s corpses in 30 AOG attacked an IMF armoured Qalai Sayddan, Charkh, on the 20 vehicle in . While 26th. NGOs experienced misfor- 10 details are sparse, AOG killed one tune during the aftermath, though, 0 IMF in the apparent attack and with one NGO guard being killed abducted the other. Following the in an IMF operation in Dasht-e LOGAR AOG LOGAR ACG incident, IMF mobilised through- Dobar on the 27th. out the area to locate the service Besides the above incident, AOG mad Agha, Barak-e Barak, and Charkh; and members, purportedly locating activity was noted throughout the IED discoveries occurred solely in Pul-e Alam. KEY THREATS & CONCERNS province as usual. Looking at IED Of note, AOG attacked a road construction activity, specifically, it was some- site and abducted three staff on the 23rd near  IEDs, especially targeting IMF what limited: IED strikes were the Charkh District Centre.  Abduction recorded in Pul-e Alam, Muham-

NOTICE: Your input is important for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 Tagab, Nijrab remain the primary 40 areas of concern in Kapisa. AOG AOG attacked an ANA/ANP 30 joint patrol in the area. Two ANA reportedly have substantial free- 20 dom of movement night in these soldiers and four civilians were districts. The Tagab District have reportedly injured during the at- 10 the highest incident fre•quency. tack. And, on 24 July Mahmud 0 However, Alasay is reported to be Raqi District, AOG ambushed an unstable, with the lack of inci- IMF patrol in the area. IMF re- sponded to the attack, and the dents reflective of a limited secu- KAPISA AOG KAPISA ACG rity presence rather than a dearth AOG withdrew from the area of AOG. following a brief firefight Further- more on 26 July Alasay District, On 20 July in Tagab District, AOG attacked an IMF convoy on not. Last year, AOG incidents in Kapisa a road in the area. The IMF re- dropped on drastically in July. This year they KEY THREATS & CON- sponded to the attack. As a result remained high in July so the recent decline may CERNS of the attack, two IMF soldiers very well be attributable to a later than normal  AOG expansion were injured. AOG incident levels slowdown. Kapisa should still be considered  Low intensity factional disputes have been increased so far this an AOG shelter which serves a risky environ- in Kohistan I & II month, but it is difficult to know ment situation for NGOs.  AOG in Alasay, Nijrab, & Ta- if the incident decrease is from The overwhelming number of incidents in gab military operations. Likely, it is Kapisa have been attacks on security forces.

NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 6 50

This Report Period 0 40 All were quite surprised that the 30 Kabul Conference did not result 107mm rockets were fired to- in a grandiose attack in Kabul wards Kabul Airport with two of 20 City, as is the usual case surround- three reported to be landing inside 10 ing high-profile events. The pres- the perimeter but causing no sig- 0 ence of some regionally important nificant damage. Earlier that same figures likely contributed to the day ANSF interdicted what they lack of activity on the day. believed was a suicide attack cell KABUL AOG KABUL ACG in District 8 of Kabul. One of the There was some activity in the cell, allegedly a female, detonated uniforms on the 18th and another suspected lead up to the conference how- a vest during the raid killing only AOG commander on the 25th. ever with the BBIED on the 18th herself. Outside of these inci- in District 9, Kabul City targeting AOG activity in Musayi District was also dents, activity stuck to norms. an IMF convoy but killing 2 and noted during the period, with IMF raids on Surobi experienced typical activ- wounding 20 civilians. On the suspected AOG houses occurring on two oc- ity; for example, AOG attacked an night of the 19th up to five casions, as well as an AOG attack on ANP and IMF supply convoy, ANP check an IED discovery in the Katasang area. post, and a vehicle belonging to KEY THREATS & CON- The death of 3 Afghan civilians in a vehicle CERNS an ex-Member of Parliament on accident, with what was reported as a US Em-  Criminality in the morning 22, 20, and 23 July, respectively. bassy convoy, became the scene for clashes as ANSF were also active in Surobi,  Attention-grabbing AOG at- local witnesses set fire to the US vehicle and tacks targeting GoA, IMF, IOs, arresting suspected AOG com- shouted anti-US, anti-Karzi slogans. ANP fired and comingled targets manders who possessed ANA warning shots to disperse the crowds THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents WARDAK WARDAK Year to Date 3 100 This Report Period 0 NGOs are cautioned about the 80 security vacuum that exists in the and it appears that the AOG 60 province and intra-AOG clashes solely targeted the NGO to steal 40 that have begun to occur in one of its vehicles. Nirkh. With this, a late-recorded 20 Intra-AOG clashes occurred be- NGO abduction—7 June— 0 tween Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin occurred in Shashgow, Saydabad. (HIG) and Islamic Emirate of Apparent AOG stopped three Afghanistan (Taliban) fighters in WARDAK AOG WARDAK ACG NGO national staff as they were on at least 19, 20, transiting through the area and and 25 July, leading to an esti- detained the staff members for Taliban have been observed digging fighting mated 32 AOG fatalities (the Tali- circa five days, during which they positions and emplacing heavy machine guns. ban bore the overwhelming ma- questioned them on where the Looking at probable outcomes, it is highly jority of fatalities). Following the staff members resided, their posi- unlikely that HIG members would disarm due clashes, which appear to have tions in the NGO, purpose of to their strength in the district—Nirkh, bor- stemmed from one Taliban mem- travel, and involvement in girls‘ dering with the apparent HIG stronghold of ber being killed in the past couple education. Although the AOG Chahar Asyab District.. Further migration of of weeks, elders intervened to try agreed to release the staff, they Taliban should be expected due to the small to bring about peace; however, as did not return the NGO‘s vehicle, numbers of fighters in the district, especially of yet Taliban have refused their because of heavy Taliban casualties as of yet. mediation and insisted that all Due to HIG‘s massive, native presence in the KEY THREATS & CON- armed parties in the district dis- area, clashes could result in civilian casualties CERNS arm and submit to the Taliban. or, more likely, cause further clashes to result  AOG prevalence in Saydabad Reports also assert that more than in other surrounding districts or provinces  Abduction 200 Taliban fighters have moved where HIG exist as a minority. into the district following the  IEDs and ambushes targeting The very existence of intra-AOG conflict IMF/ANSF logistics convoys clashes with the intent to target speaks volumes about the lack of relevance of along Highway 1 HIG leaders and fighters, and IMF in the province.

NGO Incidents JAWZJAN Year to Date 0 This Report Period 0 The low-lying AOG presence ru- mored in southern Jawzjan Prov- two districts, where the son of an quiet over the past four months. The resur- ince over the past several months ANP member and five GOA em- gence of activity has occurred despite the suddenly came to light this period, ployees were abducted on two promise made by GOA and foreign govern- as AOG attacks on IMF/ANSF separate occasions. While the son ment donors in late April that the area that had skyrocketed. Four IED strikes of the ANP was released, the fate been ―cleared‖ of AOGs, encouraging NGOs against ANSF and IMF vehicles of the GOA staff is not yet to enter the area. In the provincial capital, po- occurred in Darzab and Qush known. The sudden increase in litical tensions were palpable following a public Tepa, in total killing three ANA AOG activity should not come as disagreement among high-ranking GOA offi- and injuring one other. The threat a surprise, given that the week cials. While additional ANSF have been de- of abduction for GOA and ANSF long IMF/ANSF operation in late ployed to protect certain GOA facilities in the employees is also present in the March only marginally increased wake of the dispute, actual physical confronta- the ANSF presence in the area. tion between the two parties has only been KEY THREATS & CONCERNS The AOGs -- now apparently rumored. Despite concerns that this conflict of  Heavy fighting Darzab Qush better equipped and trained -- personalities could turn into outward factional Tepa have chosen to re-launch opera- violence, the dispute will hopefully be resolved  Political tension Shibergan tions following a period of tense through diplomatic means. THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ KUNDUZ Year to Date 2 100 This Report Period 0 80 A sustained level of kinetic activ- ity was reported in Kunduz Prov- rare, given that AOGs require an 60 ince, comparable to last month‘s elevated level of planning, secrecy 40 and access to resources which incident rate. The perception of 20 they will not willingly expend on insecurity has increased, however, 0 as AOGs appear intent on dis- casual targets. The attack will playing their perseverance in the likely have an impact on security face of an IMF/ANSF joint op- in the militia commanders area of KUNDUZ AOG KUNDUZ ACG eration in north of Kunduz Dis- responsibility. Though fears have trict. At least two rockets were been heightened regarding a sec- ond complex attack on a private attack, posing a greater challenge to NGOs launched considerably deeper into who are intent on maintaining their neutrality. the city than previous rockets organization, no credible evidence has been received that there is which typically struck the western IED-related incidents were reported in all but actually a higher threat of suicide outskirts. The rockets did not two districts, two of which occurred in atypical attacks targeting civilian institu- detonate, however, and may areas – an RCIED which detonated against an tions within the city. Much like in therefore be interpreted as threat- ANP vehicle in Aliabad on the main road, and the aftermath of the Bakhtar ening messages of AOG capabil- an IED which injured six ANP in western guesthouse attack in Kabul, ity, rather than intent. Late in the Imam Sahib. IEDs also inflicted damages on though, more credibility is lent to reporting period, a BBIED deto- IMF both east and west of the Chahar Dara such threat warnings as people are nated in Spinzar Football Field, Bridge. In Khanabad, a rare daytime incident more attuned to AOG capability killing a pro-government militia of armed roadside abduction and killing under- and intent. ANSO assesses that commander, an ANP officer and scored the continued threat of criminal attacks. the Private Development Organi- one of his body guards, as well as Underpaid pro-government militias in the area zation was targeted because of its injuring 24 civilians including six are known to supplement their livelihoods affiliation with the IMF counterin- children. BBIEDs are extremely with criminal activity, particularly along the surgency strategy. Yet IMF‘s con- Khanabad-Kunduz highway. In Aliabad Dis- fusion between PDOs and NGOs trict armed clashes continue where AOGs KEY THREATS has prompted IMF to push for from southern Chahar Dara and the Kandahari  IMF Ops in North closer relations with the NGO belt are confronting ANP and their IMF men-  Indirect fire (rockets) in city community in the wake of the tors.

NGO Incidents BADAKSHAN Year to Date 1 BADAKHSHAN 50 This Report Period 0 A second IED was discovered in 40 suspected to have been intended 30 Feyzabad New City this period, to threaten its victim into paying similar to that which was discov- 20 for local security guards, and the 10 ered last period in front of an second device may have had the 0 INGO compound. The device same purpose. The threat of was made up of TNT contained IEDs in Kishim District is in a plastic bag, but not rigged to slightly more real, however, BADAKHSHAN AOG BADAKHSHAN ACG detonate. The previous device is where two RCIEDs were discov- ered and defused. KEY THREATS  IED in Faizabad & Kishim THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents Year to Date 5 BALKH This Report Period 0 50 40 The operation ongoing in Chahar are so far are far from clear. De- 30 Bolak and Chimtal Districts con- spite a temporary downturn in tinues, as IMF and ANP have roadside incidents, the threat of 20 established an outpost and a abduction and armed attack 10 checkpoint in the vicinity of Ali against parties to the conflict con- 0 Zai Village, where AOGs were tinued this period on the Mazar- believed to be based. They have Shibirgan Road. An AOG check- BALKH AOG BALKH ACG since moved northwards toward point was established one evening the main highway, conducting this period, prompting an ANP search operations in the Zig Zig response. More significantly, how- Area. The results of the operation ever, a PSC convoy of three white road. Hiluxes was shot down near the Further northeast, in Balkh District, reports of KEY THREATS & CON- border between Balkh and Chahar an increase in openly armed men in certain CERNS Bolak, resulting in the death of areas have driven NGOs to proactively work  Operations in Chahar Bo- one PSC employee and the injury with communities to ensure security for their lak/Chimtal of two others. While the attack projects. Much like the majority of the north-  AOG east of Sholgara river was believed to have been tar- ern region, NGOs have been able to continue  Abduction in Kishindeh geted, the incident underscores their work in areas which may be hostile to- the increased risk of attack against wards IMF, ANSF and GOA. white high-profile vehicles on that

NGO Incidents SAMANGAN Year to Date 0 SAMANGAN This Report Period 0 50 Four road construction company 40 workers were abducted in western Local authorities believe the group 30 Dara-e Suf Payan this period, and may have infiltrated from 20 were released after an ANP opera- neighboring Kishindeh and Shol- 10 tion resulted in the death of one gara districts of , 0 ANP and the injury of one other. while other theories suggest the The abduction took place in Bal- group originated in Baghlan. While SAMANGAN AOG SAMANGAN ACG local authorities encouraged NGOs kal Village between Sorkha and gains, particularly ahead of elections. There is to leave the district shortly after the Zeraki villages where a group of apparently a genuine AOG presence in the appearance of these armed men in approximately 40 armed men were district; however, their origins, motives and late June, it is still not yet clear if seen roaming the area and intimi- attitude toward NGOs has yet to be deter- the group in fact poses a threat to dating locals against supporting mined. NGOs have been able to work in NGOs themselves. The security the GOA about one month ago. much more volatile districts, where they have situation in has gained a guarantee of security from the com- proven in the past to be particu- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS munity itself. NGOs may be able to continue larly vulnerable to political manipu-  Abduction of road workers operations in the district according to their lation, as certain figures may at-  AOG presence own thresholds of risk and localized under- tempt to exacerbate the perception standing of the security situation. of insecurity for their own political THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

NGO Incidents FARYAB Year to Date 13 FARYAB This Report Period 2 50 Conflict dynamics in Faryab have 40 they had no intention of harming challenged NGOs throughout the 30 medical staff, as it was against province to reassert their posi- 20 their AOG policy. The incident tions as neutral actors in the face 10 highlights the risks presented to of increasing political and military 0 tension. A new threat of NGO NGOs, in spite of their local ac- abduction emerged north and east ceptance, when political dynamics of Maymana from Kwaja Sabz shift in their areas of operation. It FARYAB AOG FARYAB ACG Push toward Dawlatabad, east of is suspected that local Uzbek the ring road. This threat revealed AOGs may be joining ranks with itself when Uzbek AOGs ab- those Pashtun AOGs who have ducted a group of local NGO traditionally dominated pockets in By proactively advocating for a ―soft solution‖ staff in and the west of the province, forming involving negotiations led by village elders, as held them for several days before an alliance which may currently opposed to a ―hard‖ solution involving GOA releasing them unharmed. The span all but a few of the districts interference or the use of force, NGOs are NGO enjoys a high degree of lo- in Faryab. These emerging AOG able to maintain their neutrality and ensure cal acceptance in the area; how- leaders are eager to assert their continued access to their areas of operation. ever, based on the details of their authority and undermine that of Near daily reports of armed confrontation in abduction it may be speculated the GOA, putting NGOs at in- has increased the threat of col- that a newly emerging AOG lead- creased risk. However, this risk is lateral involvement for NGOs who continue ership, eager to establish them- likely temporary until the NGOs to successfully implement development pro- selves, was simply misguided in in question are able to prove their jects, despite the AOG threat to GOA and their choice of target. The abduc- political neutrality and local accep- military actors. In addition, NGOs are faced tors reportedly questioned the tance to the AOGs. In the run up with the added challenge of asserting their neu- staff members whether they had to the elections in particular, trality to avoid becoming targets of AOG at- been spreading Christianity, a NGOs may face an added risk of tack. As IMF and ANSF continue heavy- stigma against NGOs which was being targeted for political rea- handed ―kill and capture‖ operations, the recently popularized in the north- sons. At least twice in the north- threat of NGO abduction may be increased in ern region by a journalistic ex- ern region in the past month, this region as well, as NGOs are seen as poten- pose. It quickly came to light that GOA officials have offered to tial collateral for prisoner exchange. To miti- the NGO had no interest in become involved in NGO abduc- gate against this risk, it is integral for NGOs to proselytizing, and, due to the in- tion cases, using their influence to ensure a maximum degree of community in- volvement of community elders, increase pressure on AOGs. This volvement in project implementation, as bene- that they were supported by the added pressure is sure to compli- ficiaries understand that projects will only con- local population. Upon their re- cate negotiation processes and put tinue if NGO security is guaranteed. lease, the abductors stated that NGO workers at increased risk.

NGO Incidents S AR- E -P UL Year to Date 3 This Report Period 1 The overall security situation in (Jawzjan, Sar-e Pul and Faryab). On at least Sar-e Pul remained unchanged activity, GOA assess that several one occasion this reporting period, AOGs es- this week, with little kinetic activ- areas in Sar-e Pul Province are tablished a checkpoint in the evening hours ity reported aside from a pro- host to AOG influence, particu- along the Sar-e Pul-Shibirgan Highway, search- longed clash between ACGs and larly . Sayyad Dis- ing for GOA and ANSF employees. AOGs ANP in , which trict is suspected to house a sig- also attacked the home of a former AOG led to the injury of three ACGs nificant number of AOGs who commander in Jerghan Area of Kohistanat, and the arrest of five others. De- are also active in the neighboring confirming a continued presence of AOGs in spite the lack of outward AOG districts in the tri-provincial area , particularly in Jerghan THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents TAKHAR TAKHAR Year to Date 2 50 This Report Period 0 AOGs launched the first ANSO- 40 recorded attack on the Khwaja Khwaja Ghar have also become 30 Ghar DAC, epitomizing the rapid more prolonged, suggesting an 20 increase in the number and pre- decrease in security in the district 10 paredness of AOGs in northern in the past four months. Six at- 0 tacks on ANBP and pro- Takhar. government militias have oc- In the centre of the province two curred in Khwaja Ghar since April IED incidents were reported, one TAKHAR AOG TAKHAR ACG 2010, up from zero recorded in which was discovered and re- the past four years. The first IED moved near Pul-e Bangi on the Taloqan-Kunduz Road, and one incident in the district was also new development, as it is the first such attack which detonated on the road lead- reported this period, where two on the airport road. According to reports, the ing to the Taloqan Airport, injur- RCIEDs were discovered and civilians injured were not likely targeted in a ing four civilians. While IEDs on defused on the road to the ANP criminal attack, and the device therefore may the Taloqan-Kunduz Road were Headquarters. Meanwhile in have been intended for the incoming IMF reported frequently last summer, , AOGs continued troops which have increased their presence in thus far this year such incidents their campaign against ANP and the provincial capital over the past few have been rare. The latter inci- pro-government militias. AOG months. attacks in both Darqad and dent, however, perhaps belies a

NGO Incidents BAGHLAN Year to Date 4 BAGHLAN This Report Period 3 50 40 The first major attack within Da- had been essentially left to AOG 30 han-e Ghori District since mid- control. Additional troop pres- May occurred on 20 June when ence in Shahabuddin Triangle and 20 AOGs attacked the ANP Head- Dand-e Ghori may temporarily 10 quarters in Dahan-e Ghori Dis- curb AOG attacks and presence 0 trict Centre from multiple direc- on the main roads; however, as tions with SAF and RPGs. Out- seen in the past levels of security BAGHLAN AOG BAGHLAN ACG ward AOG attacks in Dahan-e will revert once troops have been Ghori have been infrequent since withdrawn. an ANSF operation concluded on bushed an unmarked INGO vehicle and ab- 17 May. The week-long operation The threat of abduction and at- ducted two staff members. Despite being self- succeeded in killing and capturing tacks on ANSF/IMF-affiliated proclaimed ―Taliban,‖ the abductors de- a number of AOG leaders; how- targets continue to impede transit manded a ransom in exchange for the release ever, no considerable sustained through the province. Three of the staff. Twice on the Mazar-Pul-e Khumri ANSF presence was established in NGO-direct incidents were re- Road NGO vehicles were stopped in Chesh- the area to deter a reconsolidation ported this period, two abductions mashir Area by armed men reportedly search- of AOG efforts. This attack may and an illegal checkpoint on the ing for ―GOA, ANSF or NGOs.‖ While two signify a re-emergence of outward main roads running through Pul-e NGO staff were abducted from this area, the AOG activity in the district, and Khumri. The risk of NGO abduc- circumstances of their capture and release sug- further clashes or future military tion persists on both highways gested that they may had been mistaken for operations may be expected in running through the province, as other high-profile passengers. The threat of response. AOGs may be seeking ransom or armed attack against IMF/ANSF also persists collateral for a prisoner exchange. on the main road west of Pul-e Khumri City, Later in the reporting period, a Early this month on the Pul-e en route to Mazar, where three separate attacks major operation was launched as Khumri-Kunduz Highway in took place on the road, two of which occurred ANSF/IMF attempt to reign in Baghlani Jadid, armed men am- between 1000 and 1300 hours. the areas of Pul-e Khumri which THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents BADGHIS Year to Date 0 BADGHIS This Report Period 0 50 The north-eastern districts – 40 Murghab, Ghormach and Muqur even in AOG strongholds which again has a negative impact on the 30 – remain the major concern in 20 regard to the security situation in predictability of AOG actions and reactions. In Murghab District, 10 . AOG activities 0 as well as ANSF/IMF operations both recorded IED detonations continue to focus on these dis- during this reporting cycle hit ci- tricts. In regard to AOG activity, vilians. On 16 July in Senyha Area BADGHIS AOG BADGHIS ACG the current reporting cycle saw as well as on 25 July in Akazaiha the same number of direct attacks Area, civilians on motorbikes as IED related incidents were wounded by IED detona- (including discoveries and prema- tions. eastern parts of the province. In addition, Qala ture detonations). In Murghab, Unusual was an IED detonation -I-Naw District witnessed an AOG SAF attack AOGs clashed on 17 July due to in Qala-I-Naw City, which deto- against an ANP patrol in Laman – Sabzak Pass an internal dispute in relation to nated against the vehicle of the Area. Therefore, a further increase in AOG the collection of illegal taxes, indi- Deputy Governor. In March, activity in Qala-I-Naw is not unlikely. AOG cating an incoherence of interests NDS already seized explosive de- activity was also noticeable in Jawand District vices, which was unusual for the and again Ab Kamari District. In Jawand, an KEY THREATS & CON- area as well. An increase of IED IED detonated prematurely on the main road CERNS related incidents would fit into the to the DAC on 18 July, wounding an AOG  AOG-ANSF/IMF clashes broader picture of an increasing member. In Ab Kamari, AOG also attacked an  IEDs in Murghab, Muqur, use of IEDs throughout the West- ANP check-post with SAF and RPGs on 23 Ghormach and Qadis ern Region as well as a shifting July in Chelgazi Area, forcing ANP to with-  Abduction AOG presence in Badghis due to draw. IMF/ANSF operations in north-

NGO Incidents FARAH FARAH Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 40 A complex attack was launched in 30 the early morning hours on 18 IED attached to a bicycle deto- 20 July in Farah City. AOG attacked nated in the vicinity of the Gover- four ANP check-points between nor‘s office. At 2100 hrs, an IED 10 0000-0200 hrs with RPGs and placed under a bridge detonated 0 SAF and the main target, the in Ganj Area. Five hours later, an prison in Farah, between 0215- IED exploded prematurely while FARAH AOG FARAH ACG 0230 hrs. After an explosion at being emplaced under a bridge in the front gate, more than 20 pris- Yazdi Area of Farah City. So far, Delaram Area of Bakwa, a local transport bus oners escaped. Reportedly, at least the majority of IED related inci- was hit by an IED, demonstrating the risk of half of them were killed, wounded dents during 2010 occurred in D1, civilians getting collaterally damaged. All other or recaptured during the search in vicinity of the governor‘s office IED related incidents were recorded in Bala operation afterwards. or in vicinity of the airport. A fur- Buluk District in Shiwan Area and the District ther increase – especially during Centre Area. Bala Buluk was the major hotspot In addition, Farah City has seen a the remaining summer months – during this reporting period among the south- visible increase in IED related cannot be excluded. In addition, ern and western districts of the province. As incidents during the present re- NDS officers discovered an already mentioned in the last report, intimida- porting period. Of note, three RCIED on 25 July in Tanke Haji tion tactics targeting those perceived as linked IED incidents were recorded in a Tahir Area of Farah City. to security forces or the GoA were again re- timeframe of approximately 10 corded in Bakwa, where a local civilian was hours. On 21 July at 1700 hrs, an IEDs remain the preferred AOG tactic throughout the Province. In killed in Shahgai Area. THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents HERAT HERAT Year to Date 6 50 This Report Period 1 As already noted during the previ- 40 ous reporting period, Herat Prov- candidate for the upcoming parlia- 30 ince saw several abductions in- mentary elections was abducted 20 cluding an abduction of NGO together with two others allegedly staff. On 27 July, AOG abducted by AOG on the main road to the 10 two of five NGO staff members District Centre in Qalae Reg Area. 0 who were present during the elec- The abductees were released on tion of the Community District 26 July, due to mediation efforts HERAT AOG HERAT ACG Council (CDC) in Khalawak Ha of community elders. Of note, Village, . At present this area has already experienced local elders are involved in the an IED attack targeting a politi- IEDs as well as AOG activity is very unusual negotiations for the release of the cian in May and AOG distributed in this area of ; however, reports abductees. There are indications night letters in June, warning lo- suggest that AOGs try to increase their influ- that AOG were informed about cals not to participate in the up- ence and presence in the area already for quite the presence of the NGO staff; coming parliamentary election. A some time. The current incident alone does however, the exact motive for the third abduction was recorded in not necessarily indicate an increased threat abduction still remains unclear. Adraskan, another district with level on the road mentioned above. Neverthe- The incident again underlines the high AOG presence. On 24 July, less, NGOs should be aware of the incident importance of local support for AOG abducted a local civilian, and exercise caution while travelling on the NGOs since the community pre- perceived as spying for GoA and road, making sure to avoid possible targets vented the abduction of three IMF. Further abductions of this such as ANSF/IMF or GoA vehicles and con- NGO staff members. Of note, kind, especially during the run-up voys. Shindand – where the abduction to the elections, cannot be ex- AOG related activities in fo- of NGO staff took place during cluded. cused on Shindand, Adraskan and Guzara dis- the previous reporting cycle – as Apart from abductions, the use of tricts during this reporting period, according to well as Karukh are increasingly IEDs continues to be a major the incidents recorded. Herat City itself re- difficult areas with high levels of concern in Herat Province. In the mained calm except two armed robberies in AOG activity. Hause Karbas Area of Injil Dis- District 2 and 7. However, NDS seized ap- In , on 20 July a trict on the main road from Herat proximately 500 kg of explosive materials and to Zinda Jan District Centre via other IED materials in District 10. As men- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Pul-e Hashimi, an IED detonated tioned already in the previous reports, it can- while an IMF EOD team was de-  IED not be excluded that IED related incidents will fusing another IED, which was  Abductions increase also in Herat City in the run-up to the found by ANP earlier on 28 July. parliamentary elections in September.

NOTICE: Your input is important for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents GHOR Year to Date 4 GHOR This Report Period 0 50 After a quiet period at the begin- 40 ning of this reporting cycle, Ghor 2009, AOG activity in Pasaband is visibly higher this year. Of note, 30 Province saw again several IED 20 related incidents as well as direct two-thirds of AOG initiated inci- 10 attacks by AOGs in Taywara and dents in the district this year af- Pasaband districts. fected civilians and one-third 0 ANSF. The latest incident again On 29 July, AOG attacked the confirms the trend of an increas- District Administration Centre GHOR AOG GHOR ACG ing AOG activity in Pasaband – (DAC) in Pasaband with SAF, also seen in the neighbouring Tay- RPGs and mortars around 1200 wara District – including intimida- an influx of AOG from the neighbouring Hel- hrs. Since approximately 1300 hrs, tion tactics and the use of IEDs. mand Province to both districts – which also the telecommunication networks On 25 July, an IED hit and killed might affect the security situation in other in were down. a civilian on a motorbike. The use parts of the province – is to be expected, espe- The fighting between AOG and of IED in Pasaband seems to cially in the run-up to the parliamentary elec- ANP lasted until the next morn- have notably increased since May, tions. ing when AOG withdrew from with 5 out of 6 IEDs hitting civil- Further IEDs were discovered in the area, after further ANSF rein- ians. In , an IED District on the main road of Darea Ghazy forcements arrived. Compared to was discovered in Arpatow Area Area and in . In addition, in on 28 July and AOG attacked an Shahrak District unknown armed men stopped KEY THREATS & CONCERN ANP patrol with SAF in Tangio a local transport vehicle and robbed the pas-  AOG attack in Pasaband Chardar Area on 23 July. A fur- sengers of their cash and valuables in Taida &Taiwara ther increase of IED related inci- Area on 24 July.  IED & Armed Robbery dents and direct attacks as well as

NGO Incidents LAGHMAN Year to Date 1 LAGHMAN This Report Period 0 50 On 26 July in Qarghayi, an uni- 40 dentified armed group established known that several ACG operate a mobile check point on the main across Qarghayi, criminal activity 30 -Kabul Highway, and of this quality is a very rare occur- 20 rence, especially while having the temporarily abducted an off duty 10 ANP along with three other pas- significant ANSF presence on the 0 sengers from a vehicle. The group road in mind. robbed the passengers of cash and During this reporting cycle, AOG mobile phones, and released them activity decreased slightly to 10 LAGHMAN AOG LAGHMAN ACG after three hours. This incident AOG-initiated incidents, in com- appears to be clearly motivated by parison to 12 such incidents re- criminal intend. Although it is corded in the previous period. All Next to the abovementioned ACG CP, the of them occurred in Alingar, Al- activity along the Kabul-Jalalabad Highway ishing, and Qarghayi districts. Al- remained rather stagnant, with one attack KEY THREATS & CON- ishing accounted for three direct CERNS against a fuel tanker and one against an ANP attacks, one IDF strike, and one  Direct Attacks on IMF Alingar CP recorded. and Alishing IED detonation; Qarghayi saw  AOG activity Kabul-Jalalabad two direct attacks and two IDF highway assaults, while Alingar witnessed one direct attack. THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents NANGARHAR Year to Date 4 NANGARHAR This Report Period 1 100 On 24 July in Jalalabad City, AOG ing AOG activity in hitherto 80 left a warning letter at the main rather unaffected areas of the 60 entrance of an INGO office in province continued during this 40 Zone 2, claiming that the organi- reporting cycle. For instance, on 20 zation's activities are against Af- 18 July in , AOG 0 ghanistan's cultural and religious conducted two direct attacks, with values, and that the NGO should the first one targeting an ANP CP stop such operations or might and the second assaulting the Dis- NANGARHAR AOG NANGARHAR ACG face severe consequences. This trict Administration Centre. Dur- marks the first intimidation at- ing the latter, two mortars im- tempt targeting specially a NGO pacted inside an INGO clinic in IDF strikes and 4 IED detonations recorded in Nangarhar in 2010, and it re- the immediate vicinity of the inside the city and surrounding areas in Bihsud mains unclear why this organisa- DAC, causing damages to the District. With one IDF assault and two mag- tion was targeted. Still, it is under- building. Although it appears that netic IED detonations, the area surrounding stood that the NGO‘s previous the clinic was targeted rather by the Jalalabad Airfield (JAF) remains a hotspot cooperation with a for-profit de- accident, such incidents of collat- of AOG activity in the urban area. Addition- velopment agency might have eral damage involving NGOs ally, displaying a rare occurrence, AOG fired a affected the organisation‘s percep- have become more frequent in rocket into the city on 27 July, injuring a civil- tion negatively. In late July, the Nangarhar recently, mostly in- ian. Usually, such assaults target GoA/ANSF/ overall amount of recorded AOG volving NGO facilities located in IMF facilities, and tend to impact in surround- incidents remained relatively con- close proximity to potential tar- ing areas. This projectile impacted in the very stant across Nangarhar, with 27 gets such as DACs and IMF/ heart of Jalalabad City near Chawk-e Talashe, incidents reported. Still, the previ- ANSF facilities. As outlined in with no potential target in the immediate vicin- ously identified trend of expand- early July, NGOs should be aware ity. AOG continued to attack District Admini- of the elevated risk of being tar- stration Centre‘s across the province. Next to KEY THREATS & CONCERN geted collaterally in areas sur- the direct attack reported from Rodat District,  IED & IDF J‘bad city rounding such targets. The secu- ANSO recorded to two IDF strikes in  DAC attacks rity environment in the urban Jala- Chaparhar, one direct attack in Kot, another labad area remains volatile, with 2 one in Achin, and a rocket assault in .

NGO Incidents NURISTAN NURISTAN Year to Date 0 50 This Report Period 0 40 On 24 July, AOG again overran sets – recaptured the DAC on 25 30 Barg-e Matal‘s District Administra- July, this time without any resis- 20 tion Centre, and captured the dis- tance. The same day, AOG at- trict after ANSF announcing a tacked the DAC of Waygal Dis- 10 ‗tactical retreat‘. After conducting trict, injuring at least four ANP. 0 ‗shaping operations‘ against ANBP Unconfirmed reports suggest that positions and the DAC several AOG now concentrated signifi- days beforehand, AOG concen- cant manpower in areas surround- NURISTAN AOG NURISTAN ACG trated several hundred fighters ing Waygal‘s DAC, making a geo- against remaining ANSF in the graphical expansion of AOG‘s there. Both attacks targeted ANSF, with the DAC compound, following the ‗Barg-e Matal strategy‘ rather direct attack assaulting an ANP reinforcement strategic approach already seen in likely. Additionally, AOG pres- convoy travelling northwards. Locals report the late May assault against the ence in Nurgaram remains signifi- that ANP are reluctant to oppose AOG who same target. Similar to the latter, cant, with one direct attack and they see has having superior firepower and ANSF – supported by IMF air as- one IDF strike reported from manpower. THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

NGO Incidents KUNAR KUNAR Year to Date 5 200 This Report Period 0 With 71 AOG-initiated incidents 150 during this reporting period, mentioned ceasing of IMF/ANSF continues to be operations in central and eastern 100 the most violent province Kunar, allowing AOG to return to 50 throughout the Eastern Region. their previous areas of operation. 0 As outlined in early July, the huge Late July saw an unusual increase bulk of incidents occur in the of AOG assaults in Kunar‘s cen- Pech Valley area and in Kunar‘s tral and southern districts along northern districts of Bar Kunar the Jalalabad-Asadabad Road, KUNAR AOG KUNAR ACG and Nari, with nearly 50 % of all namely in Khas Kunar, Nurgal, AOG incidents reported from Chawkay, and Narang. All in all, road travel towards or from Asadabad after there. While early July saw a sig- around 14 direct attacks and three 1500 hrs. nificant increase of AOG activity IDF strikes – all of them targeting The previously described trend towards more in northern Kunar, the overall security forces – were recorded in diversified AOG operational tactics in Kunar level of reported incidents from these districts, accounting for 24 lost its steam in late July. IED deployment was there returned to rather usual % of all recorded AOG incidents only of marginal relevance in this cycle, and amounts in this cycle. A possible in the province. Attacks against the amount of recorded IDF assaults fell from driver behind this dynamic re- convoys/patrols on the JAL- 13 to 9 incidents. Nearly 80 % of all AOG- allocation of AOG activity is the Asadabad Road are frequent, par- initiated incidents were direct attacks, display- ticularly in Narang and Chawkay, ing very familiar tactical picture in comparison with no clear cut pattern with re- to the winter months. AOG intimidations as KEY THREATS & CON- gards to timing identifiable. Hav- CERNS well as abductions remain high, particularly in ing said this, it is still understood Wata Pur District. For example, on 25 July in  AOG attacks Asadabad – that the road is particularly risky Jalalabad Quro area of Wata Pur, AOG abducted four in the afternoon and late evening  Pech & Watapur vaccinators whilst they were conducting a vac- hours, and NGOs should avoid cination campaign in the area.

NGO Incidents PAKTYA Year to Date 1 PAKTYA 100 This Report Period 0 After a very violent period in early 80 Additionally, at least three tar- July, the amount of recorded 60 geted killings were reported from AOG incidents decreased by 25 40 % during this cycle, with 36 AOG Shwak and Gardez districts, with -initiated incidents reported. Still, one targeting an influential tribal 20 the security environment in Pak- elder in Shwak, and the others 0 tya remains very violent. AOG‘s being assassinations of civilians tactical pattern continued to be accused of spying for GoA/ comparatively diversified, includ- ANSF/IMF in Gardez. As seen in PAKTYA AOG PAKTYA ACG ing 16 direct attacks, 11 IED the previous period, AOG activity detonations, and six IDF assaults. remained concentrated on Gardez and Zurmat districts, accounting together for 52 % of all AOG of all detonated explosive devices reported KEY THREATS & CONCERNS incidents. While Zurmat‘s envi- from there. Incidents related to indirect fire  Direct Attacks in Zurmat ronment is dominated by direct decreased significantly compared to the previ-  Emplaced IED in Gardez attacks against security forces, ous period, with the majority recorded this  IDF Jani-Khel AOG‘s preferred tactic through- time in Jani Khel district. out Gardez appears to be IED emplacement, with around 55 % THE ANSO REPORT Page 14

NGO Incidents KHOST Year to Date 2 KHOST This Report Period 0 100 With 25 recorded AOG-initiated 80 Northern Waziristan. During this incidents, the overall level of 60 AOG activity in Khost fell sharply period, IEDs returned to be 40 during this period, after 58 such AOG‘s preferred tactic, with 15 incidents recorded in early July. IED detonations reported from 20 Although not fully understood, Mando Zayi, Khost City, Bak, 0 this decrease might be a result of Sabari, and Spera. Particularly Khost City, with IED attacks re- the recent heavy rain throughout KHOST AOG KHOST ACG the Eastern Region, and subse- corded, remains a hotspot of em- quent flooding in several districts placed explosive devices. Addi- of Khost, interrupting AOG tionally, two direct attacks were bari, Tani, Musa Khel, and Nadir Shah Kot movements as well as the AOG recorded in Tere Zayi, and 8 IDF districts, with the majority (> 60 %) of IDF supply chain between Khost and assaults were reported from Sa- strikes occurring in Sabari.

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR Year to Date 4 KANDAHAR 200 This Report Period 0 has recorded 150 once again an enormous number struck by an RCIED, killing a 100 of incidents in the past two weeks. child and wounding another two In particular, the security environ- civilians. Regarding the latter, the 50 frequency of such attacks, ment remains tense in Kandahar 0 City and its surroundings. During whether AOG/ACG initiated, will the present cycle, within the city, likely increase in the months pre- ceding the Parliamentary Elec- AOG activity manifested itself KANDAHAR AOG KANDAHAR ACG particularly in District 4, with four tions. In District 3, on 26 July AOG initiated incidents, followed another RCIED hit a private car, by District 2 (three incidents) and wounding seven civilians, includ- Districts 9 and 7 (two). Next to ing a local contractor working for Kandahar City, Zhari and Ar- IMF. Already mentioned in previ- ghandab districts have also experi- ous reports, drive-by killings have enced a significant number of in- continued as well unabated in cidents. Kandahar City, with four inci- dents targeting off-duty ANP offi- In Kandahar City, the large major- cial (two times), a PSC guard and ity of recorded incidents were re- a civilian working for PRT. In lated to the use of IED/RCIED, addition, similar targeted killings primarily targeting ANP/NDS arms fire. As a result, one local child was killed were reported two times in Dand vehicles. However, on 30 July in and ten other civilians, including a woman District and once in Maywand. District 7, the car of a candidate were wounded. Other direct attacks reported Still regarding Kandahar City, be- in the upcoming elections was during the present cycle included those target- sides an AOG attack on an ANP/ ing IMF contracted convoys and numerous IMF check post on 28 July, there attacks on ANP check posts, and were concen- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS was an attack, on 19 July in Dis- trated particularly in . Lastly,  Assassinations trict 2 on a newly-established ANSF/IMF continued to be active, with sev-  ANP/ANCOP checkpoint, in- Direct Attacks on ANP eral airstrikes and operations in Arghandab volving both RPGs and small District THE ANSO REPORT Page 15

NGO Incidents PAKTIKA Year to Date 0 PAKTIKA This Report Period 0 140 120 Although the overall level of secu- 100 rity incidents recorded across the ous periods, the AOG‘s tactic of 80 province has dropped compared choice remains indirect fire target- 60 ing DACs and IMF bases. In the 40 to the previous reporting period, 20 Paktika still remains highly volatile past two weeks AOGs have con- 0 with a total of 60 ANSO-recorded tinued their attacks on before incidents. In addition, AOGs con- mentioned targets, particularly in Barmal (5), Omna (3), Sar Hawza tinue to be active in the province‘s PAKTIKA AOG PAKTIKA ACG northern and north-east districts (3) and Yahya Khel (2). IED de- and were responsible for more ployment also continues to be than 75% of incidents. During the high across the province, with 18 present cycle, the bulk of AOG IED related incidents of which 14 activity was concentrated in Bar- devices resulted in detonation. mal, Yosuf Khel, Yahya Khel and The use of IEDs often inhere the Finally, IMF/ANSF appeared to be relatively Omna districts. As seen in previ- risk for the civilians being targeted less active than usual, with however two opera- collaterally. For instance, on 26 tions of note involving the use of air assets. July in Yosuf Khel District, a civil- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS One of them, on 18 July in Sar Hawza District ian was killed when a roadside  IED (Tawda Chin area), resulted in the reported IED struck his vehicle. The same  AOG attack on DAC death of 18 AOG, including 15 Pakistani na- day in Mata Khan, another civilian tionals.  Airstrikes was wounded in a similar incident.

NGO Incidents GHAZNI Year to Date 1 GHAZNI This Report Period 0 250 continues to 200 inhere an extremely volatile and tars), targeting this time mainly insecure environment. During the IMF/ANA bases and only one 150 time the DAC in Muqur District. present reporting period the ma- 100 jority of AOG initiated incidents Of note, the DACs across the were recorded in Qarabagh, province are usually the favoured 50 Ghazni, Muqur and Andar dis- AOG targets. Worth noting, there 0 tricts. The usual pattern of AOG were also two attacks on ANP/ GoA high rank officials. In Ajris- direct attacks was this time con- GHAZNI AOG GHAZNI ACG centrated on ANP check posts, tan, (the DAC area) an AOG at- particularly in Ghazni (5 attacks) tacked with SAF the vehicle of the and Qarabagh districts (6 attacks). District Chief of Police, then in Additionally, ANP/IMF convoys Waghaz an ANP CP and the resi- were ambushed seven times dur- dence of the District Administra- ing the present cycle with the bulk tor came under small arms fire. of incidents occurring in Andar Intimidation continued unabated, and Muqur. As it has been identi- with on 16 July in Ajristan, one fied in the past, AOGs continue civilian killed and another ab- on 23 July in Ghazni (Piraki area) AOG ab- to use indirect fire (rockets, mor- ducted. Both apparently accused ducted 10 civilians working for a local council of ―collaboration with the GoA‖. and NSP in . They were re- It is worth noting that abductions KEY THREATS & CONCERNS leased the following day. Finally, in Qarabagh throughout the province appear to  IED on 24 July, a candidate for the upcoming Par- be on the rise. Also in Ajristan,  School attacks liamentary Election was abducted in the area on 17 July, AOG abducted 12 of Jangalak.  AOG Direct Fire members of a local Shura. Later, THE ANSO REPORT Page 16

NGO Incidents HELMAND Year to Date 3 HELMAND This Report Period 0 200 The security situation in Helmand 150 remains extremely insecure, with previously mentioned, ANSF/ Marja, Nahri Sarraj, Lashkar Gah, IMF were AOG‘s primary target, 100 nonetheless four IED initiated Sangin and Nad Ali districts ex- 50 periencing the majority of AOG incidents involved civilian casual- initiated incidents. During the ties. For instance, on 27 July, in 0 present reporting period AOGs Nahri Sarraj District two locals continued to target ANSF/IMF in were killed as their vehicle hit a HELMAND AOG HELMAND ACG the form of direct attacks against roadside IED in Babaji village. mainly facilities and patrols, how- Two days earlier, on 25 July in ing reportedly a significant number of civilians. ever the bulk of incidents were Marja, one civilian was killed and Casualty figures emerging from the GoA as- related to the use of IEDs. Re- another wounded in a similar inci- serted that up to 47 civilians were killed, how- garding the latter, Marja witnessed dent. IMF/ANSF operations have ever these figures have not yet been confirmed six IED related incidents, Nahri continued across the province, as an investigation is ongoing. Lastly, on 30 Sarraj five then Nad Ali and Lash- resulting in significant seizures of July in UK troops launched kar Gah districts four reported explosive materials and ammuni- the Operation Tor Shezada (Black Prince) in incidents. As seen in previous re- tions as well as in killing numer- order to clean up the city of Saidabad. As past ports, despite the Operation ous AOG members. During one practice indicates, fleeing AOG elements tend Mushtarak, Marja and Nad Ali of these operations, an airstrike to affect the security in neighbouring areas. continue to be highly volatile. As was conducted on 23 July, in (Regi village), kill-

NGO Incidents URUZGAN Year to Date 0 URUZGAN

This Report Period 0 100 In Uruzgan, AOG activity re- ground, IMF conducted airstrikes. 80 sumed after a temporary lull ob- AOG continued a campaign of 60 intimidation and assassination that served during the last reporting 40 period. The prevalent threat re- during the present cycle was fo- mains IEDs, with 10 recorded cused on , 20 incidents that were mainly con- killing four individuals accused of 0 centrated in Tirin Kot, Dihrawud cooperating with the GoA. Re- and Chora districts. Although ported ANSF/IMF operations URUZGAN AOG URUZGAN ACG AOGs primary target across the were extremely rare during the pre- province were security forces, sent cycle, however following a four IED related incidents re- raid on a private house apparently sulted in civilian casualties. On 16 located in Mehrabad village. On 29 July, in (Khosh July, in Tirin Kot City, the locals consideration another element that will Qadir area) an IED struck a pri- staged a demonstration to protest likely play an important role in shaping the vate car wounding seven occu- against alleged desecration of the security environment in Uruzgan during the pants. In Tirin Kot on 24 July, an holy Quran that occurred during coming months. After four years in Af- RCIED hit an ANA patrol, killing the said operation. As it had been a ghanistan, the Dutch withdrawal from the three civilian pedestrians and case in the past, regarding the emo- province is set to start on 1 August and wounding another three. Direct tive nature of the issue, the demon- with their replacement with a new US –led AOG attacks are usually rare in stration turned violent. The dem- multinational taskforce (including UK, NZ Uruzgan, however during the pre- onstrators threw stones at ANP, and AUS forces) further incidents of local sent cycle there were five reported wounding seven ANP officials and opposition to IMF presence are likely to close range attacks. In two cases, ANP responded with warning escalate. following a heavy fire fight on the shots. NGOs should also take into THE ANSO REPORT Page 17

NGO Incidents ZABUL Year to Date 1 ZABUL This Report Period 0 100 In Zabul, the overall number of 80 There were in total 11 IED incidents has dropped when com- 60 pared to the previous reporting strikes, with the majority targeting period. During the present cycle ANA/IMF/ANBP vehicles. 40 the majority of incidents in the However, on 17 July in Qalat Dis- 20 province took place in Qalat and trict (Bakorzi area) an IED ex- 0 Shahjoy districts. As seen previ- ploded against the convoy of the ously, IED deployment, during Provincial Governor, damaging the present cycle particular con- one ANP vehicle. Another three ZABUL AOG ZABUL ACG centrated in these two districts, IED related incidents occurred in was the AOG‘s tactic of choice. Naw Bahar, Shinkay and Mizan districts, resulted in 8 civilians killing a child and wounding another two. killed and another 7 wounded. ANSF/IMF operations have continued as well KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Of note, on 27 July in Qalat City, throughout the present reporting period, and  IED strikes the residence of the Governor were focused on Shahjoy, Qalat and Daycho-  IMF operations was targeted with rockets. The pan districts. projectiles impacted in the area,

NGO Incidents NIMROZ Year to Date 0 NIMROZ This Report Period 0 100 Activity in Nimroz remains con- 80 sistent with the previous reporting posts have been a rather regular period. Numerous attacks, usually occurrence throughout the prov- 60 ince over the past few months. in the form direct attacks against 40 ANP CPs were carried out in Furthermore, the DAC of Khash , in the areas Rod continued to be a target of 20 indirect fire, with nine rockets of Minar, Rakan and Posht-e- 0 Hasan. Most of these attacks were fired on 24 July. The projectiles detonated without causing any ineffective and resulted in one NIMROZ AOG NIMROZ ACG ANP wounded and three AOG casualties. To counter this AOG members killed. With regards to activity IMF conducted an air- cern, with an incident that occurred on 25 July, Posht-e-Hasan area, an AOG strike on 18 July, targeting an in (Tangi Abresham area), mounted an illegal check point on AOG hideout in Naalan village when Iranian border police forces fired on a 18 July. Of note, illegal check area. There were reports that six AOG members were killed, in- group of civilians whilst they were crossing the KEY THREATS & CONCERNS cluding two commanders and an- border, killing three civilians and wounding  AOG illegal checkpoints other two were arrested. Finally, another three.  AOG attacks on ANP the border tensions remain a con- THE AFGHANISTAN NGO SAFETY OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO MISSING This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the prov- CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) ANSO is hosted by inces of: Deutsche Welthungerhilfe Vacant - [email protected] - 0799 323 792  Mukhtar - [email protected] - 0799 322 116 Daykondi  Bamiyan NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR)  Panjshir Elizabeth Detwiler - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 Firoz - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 This is because we To Register with ANSO do not know enough contact: EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) about the area to [email protected] Philipp Schweers - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 comment on the sig- Shohar - [email protected] - 0798 778 014 nificance of the inci- dents occurring there. ANSO is managed by an NGO SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR)

Board. If you have any Peter Dimitroff—[email protected]—0796 688 416 feedback, good or bad, let Noori - [email protected] - 0700 492 550 If you can help us them know on: understand the prov- ince better, please [email protected] WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) contact us. Rachel Adam - [email protected] - 0799 322 192

ANSO ACRONYMS Sayed Karim- [email protected] - 0707 474 135

ACG-Armed Criminal Group / COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANBP-Afghan National Border Ali Riazi - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 Police / ANP-Afghan National Patrick Malach - [email protected] - 0793 230 118 Police / AOG-Armed Opposition Group / APPF-Afghan Public Protection Forces (local depu- tised militias) / DC-District AOG INITIATED ATTACKS (2006-2010) Centre / GOA-Government of 1400 Afghanistan / IDF-Indirect Fire 1319 1200 (ex: mortars) / IED-Improvised 1171 Explosive Device / IMF- 1093 1095 International Military Forces / 1000 853 NDS-National Directorate of 800 811 741 Security (Intelligence) / PRP- 709 657 634 630 600 602 611 Previous Reporting Period / 569 580 511 533520 526533 523 508 487 PSC-Private Security Company 463 405 420 400 387381 / RPG-Rocket Propelled Gre- 376 353 372 335 329344 344 332 300 279 261 276 nade / SAF-Small Arms Fire / 235 255 200 213 206 218 173 189 VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro- 160 159145 160 111121 129 81

vised Explosive Device 0

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The slight downturn from June to July may indicate that the 2010 campaign has peaked or is just taking a break going in to the early RAMADAN celebrations.

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