!L~C~ Milton C

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY EAST LANSING

COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND PUBLIC SERVICE

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

November 10, 1961

President John A. Hannah 319 Ad.ministration Building Campus

Dear President Hannah:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of an article by Professor Jaffe and myself entitled, "A Crumbling Bastion." At the time of its publication in June of this year, the article represented a minority view on Vietnam.

Since then, the situation there has, of course, deteriorated further, and our position seems to be more than coni1rmed by subsequent articles appearing in the Wall Street Journal and The New Republic -- the latter au thored by the Time - Life correspondent in Saigon. I am taking the liberty of enclosing copies of both these articles.

Mr • .t'resident, at this late hour I pose only one question: Has MSUG been honest with itself, honest with you, and honest with the American people? Was not all this apparent three years ago and should it not there fore have been reported back when something could have been done about iti

Sincerely yours, ,,!l~c~ Milton c. Taylor Professor of Economics

MCT :bjs

Mff·/ 1 3 1961

b~lCRIGAN S'i'A'f£ UhlV'.ERSITY Prc::::! .... :i!.' .. ,::._. ;:;, A Crumbling Bastion 'Flattery and Lies Won't Save Vietnam by .Jldrian Jaffe and Milton C. Taylor

Vice Pre5ident Johnson's chMacterization of President dm except upon specifac government approval, which Ngo Dinh Diem of Vietnam as the "Churchill of to is virtually impossible to obtain without evidence o£ day" is more than hyperbole. If it was sincerely munt, political reliability. The press is u thoroughly con it is the kind of self-deception that has so oftm blinded trolled as it is in the Sovi~t Union. us to truth. And its absurdity becomes immedi.ttely Diem himself b,u admitted quite candidly to foreign appuent when we recall what purposes the United journalists on ~ion that democntic pr;ictices are a States has hoped to further in Vietnam: (1) a stable, luxury that Vietnam c&nnot afford. But he has not ad viable and democratic bastion of the free World; (2) mitted that the Vietnamese Government is an abtolute economic growth and .a consequent improvement in the dict<>, Pakistan politiul party or had established a record u an op received $3.e &nd India $1.9. position spokesnun. In addition, the elections are t0 As of June, 1961, what h.as been accomplished1 It f11udulent (Army detachments are rusMd to any poll must be said that Vietnam is not stable, not viable, not when the ii1ue is in doubt) that PrtSident Dian prob democratic and not a bution. The instability of the ably lost the election ,because he only received 63 per• government was demonstrated in the recent revolt cmt of the S&igon vote. 1lu~ National Assembly is a ;i~st the rf'gime in which an elite segment of the pitiful parody of parliament, not only a ndtber •tamp, .umed forces took part, ti revolt which required, on the but OM which it self-inking. part of President Diem, stem repression ;ind repriul. Vimwnese complain most bitterly about what tMy The government is virtually unable to maintrm one mothe-# tr.al V~tnam; brother Ngo Dinh Luyen is the AinbQ and detains some ..,o,ooo political prison~rs in concen- Nldor to London, Bonn and Brussels; Mn. Nh.u's tation CU\ps. Arrests are made ubitruify, ~tentioa father, Tran Ven Chuong, is Ambassador to WasWAg ii indefinite, fair trial procedures are unkN'Wtl, the ton, Canada, Argentina and Brazil; and Mn. Nhu's Nleguards of writs, juries and legal c:Ufense are virtu mothu rtprnents Vietnam in the United N&tiOl\s. Still ally ignored, and almost all lAw is by edict. Travel in another brothu it the Rom.in Catholic bishop of Vifth side the country is circumscribed, travel .abroad fodMd- Long. True, there is little definitive proof of widesprucl AoatAH J•nt u>u a Smith-Mundt Profes.or of Ameri corruption. How could there be, since there is no po ci:sn LitUlrtur~ arui Civilization ot tlw U nivf!"raity of Sci liticAl oppooition to expose vmality md the.re if ~ pi; in 19_r;7-58, 11ntl MILTON C. TAYLO« MUU fiscal ...Y plete censor.hip of the prns7 But 'the stories are rife. ~ to tlw Vi•tnllflf'r~H Government in 195~. Both A Nineantan will confide that he loet a govetftllllmt ge faculty ~5 11t Michi!a" StlfH U"'11n1ity. c.atrad "becaaaw his competitor made a higher pay-ol;

t 17 Tai N1w lhrvn1c

an intelltttual will relate the num~r of movf1e houses IWnne are following the usual Communist policy, they in Paris owned by Mrs. Ngo Dinh Nhu. are making a cONumptiSouth Vietnam Army, 50,000 in the civil gon, the villas of the government officials, and the lux guard, and about 50,000 local militiamen, but these urious restaurants do not reRect the standard of living forces have not been able to impede the increasing ac of the people. In the rural areas where foreigners Hl tivity of 7 ,000 to 15 ,000 Communist guerrillas in South dom go and are rarely admitted, the bulk of the popu Vietnam. Furthermore, evm if the troops were loyal, lation requires food, medicine, shelter and tools. There and it is clear from the recent revolt that many of is little evidence to suggest that American ~ bu had thnn are not; even if the troops were inspired by a deep an appreciable effect on the needs of theH peasant.. love of their government, and many of them, in com One American who undertook ntemive rnearch in the mon with the civilians, are apathetic; even if the troops vil~ges reported tMt most peasants were unaware of were violently opposed to Communism, and there is American aid. Of all the statistics that are disad.uted no evidence that they are fired up ideologically, they by the American FrimdS of Vietnam or the gowm are not equipped and trained to fight a hit-and-run war ment' s paid New York publicists, none cieal with the in the rice paddies against the Viet-Cong. incidence of leprosy, the number of unemployed, or the amount of malnutrition. Yet American relief work Economic Developmtnt ers in VietIWn report that the incidence of leproey ii one of the higMst in the Orient, tMt the unemployed What, then, of our effort to encourage economic are conspicuous on the strttts of Saigon, and that the growth? The system works this way: Vietnamnc im poor fikh food out of the garbage cans of the rich. porters deposit piasters into a counterpart fund, receiv There is no dearth of other statistics which attempt ing in turn foreign exchange advanced by the US; pias to prove that Vietnam is in the vanguard of economic ters in the counterput fund are used by the Vietnam development 1n Asia. But these are purposely decep ese Government for public expenditur~. But in the his tive. We are told that rice exports in ~C)6o reached• tory of counterp.ut fund operations, there are two all-time high since 1954, without at the NIM time revealing facts: First, of all goods imported by Viet being informed t~t these exports are not u high as nam under the commercial aid program, fully thrtt under the French regime, even when allowance i.s made fourths have been consumer rather than capital goods. h, :xports from all of the former lndo-Chinese uea. And, when the counterpart funds generated by t.h.se We are told that 1960 was a year of unprecedented imports were spent by the Vietramese Government, economic recovery, but the $i.55 million trade de&dt again about three-fourths were allocated to the main last year exceeded th.tt of the year before. tenance of the Army. Even in the narrow area in which economic devtiop Under the urgency to build up counterpart funds for _ment h.s been prosecuted, the US has been guilty of the mainten~e of the Vietnam Army, we have per b&d judgment and abnegation of responsibility. We m.itted the Vietnamese, with frw exceptions, to buy know that a devaluation of the piaster would stimulate wherewr they wish, and whatever they wish. There exports and restrict imports, but we have permitted it have been controls, but for legal and accounting pur to~ owrvalued by 100 percent because the Viehwn poses only. No o~ Sttms to have been too concerned e&e are concerned lest a change in the exchange rate re that an undue number of imports fell into the category sult in a decreaH in American aid. The US alloaetied of luxury items, such as expeuive automobil~, 45 percent of all projrct aid from 1955 to 19'<> .the scooters, radios and typewriters. In 1958, Vietn.am im development of highways and only 9 percent for agri ported $34.3 million in t'extile products, more than the culture, when the only real hope for a s.elf-•ustaining total imports ($30. J million) of industrial equipment Vietnamese economy is to increase agricultural expor'9. and machinery. In a country which must develop agri We have sponsored such statWJ symbols as a nuclear cultural outpl!t in order to improve its foreign exchanr,e reactor when government offices can't even afford earnings, a total of $5 million in fertilizers and insecti scotch tape, and an electronic computer when reli&ble cides wu imported in 1958, less than the imports of statistics are nonexistent and there is nothing to com private passenger vehicles ($7 .8 million) or petroleum pute. Instead of promoting an intelligent development products ($6.9 million). Meanwhile, if the North Viet- program, our basic approach in Vietnam is to sporuior

------]t1Jf! 19, 1961

a multitude of piecemeal projects in diverse areas in the hope that they will add up to something in \he end. Our third aim, to prove that an alternative to Com munism was possible and attainable, has about gone down the drain with the first two. While the Viet namese Government conducts an unremitting anti Communist campaign in the press, in its brainwashing classes and over its radio, it presents the Vietnamese people with a social order the effects of which are hardly distinguishable from those in North Vietnam. In neither North nor South Vietnam is there respect for the dignity of the individual. In many respects the . South Vietnamese Government is le!ls repressive and in some areas life in South Vietnam is less harsh, but it is a matter of so small a degree that instead of hav ing created an example of non-Communism at work, we have illustrated how inept democracy can be. One of the most succinct and accurate statements of political conditions in Vietnam was provided by an American who lived in the villages for six months. After seeing how life was regimented by Pr5ident Diem's party, he said: "If the Communists ever take over this country, there will be very little that they will have to change." W~n the population s~ little difference between Diem's autocratic control and Communism, there is little will to defend the government. Communism may have no positive appeal, but there is also no militant "It'• BHutiful, But Wt Wt:rt: Sort of Hoping -~for a l'low." urge to resist the guerrillas. Unless the mass of Viet namese can identify themselves with the government, no amount of American military aid will hold back President of Vietnam is lurning English at present the Communists for long. from an American Chief of Mission. Another adviser, a political scientist with a PhD, has made some u trips How Did It Happen? h:J the Far East, and has written an article mtitled "Vietnam's Democratic One-Man Rule." But never in How was it possible for us to make so many mistakes, the history of our foreign Aif airs have we received over so long a pmod of time? The answer wiil not be more misinformatkA._Jrom a more qualified group. found by investigating the CIA or by another Congres Almost without exception •heee advi~rs, experts sional inquiry. As a matter of fact, we have had and professors have told us less than the full truth. many people who could have given us the facts. To some, no doubt, it has been a matter of not killing President Diem has not been surrounded only by the the ICA goose and of being sure of another tow of military, nor have his advisers all been cautious career tax-free Ci,,,ry, with SttVants and social prestige. Othert men in the Sta.te ~partment worried about their rat develop L afhction for an environment which pro ings. We have sent to Vietnam, in large numbers, vides additional money, status and a sense of impor men of distinction in the academic and governmental tance without at the same time requiring one to face worlds, profes50f'S and experts drawn from government the competitive rigors of the United States. With still agencies and from one of the great land grant univeni othen, it is a simple inability to see beyond appear ties. There have been some frauds and misfits, but ances, or an unwillingness to offend, in a university, for the group has included an unusual number of able men, example, the hierarchy of deans who might adversely and there have been few days since 1955 when Presi affect future foreign assignments. In othtt cues, it dent Diem has not broken bread with at lea.st one is 1 matter of the poUce-prednct mind, to which aU Americ&n PhD and on good days, three or four. One experience is uncomplicated. Whatever the motives, of Preeident Diem's pe!'SOMI advisers, paid mirabile however, there has been unanimous and uniform dis ktu from his own funds, is one of the world's leading tortion. What little truth has leaked out has come, not npms in the field of agricultural reform, and the V.ce from official agencies and the professio.W experts, but Tai N1w R1ruauc from a few journalists. To illustrate, in the contract be with false praise. The other side, of COUl'H.1 is the fail tween the VietnameH Government and one US uni ure to P4tY any heed whatt<>n'er to thoee men and versity, it ii agreed that no materials, ntm personal women who have returned from Vietnam wtdt. 1torla research notes, may b. used against the security or the contrary to the party line. What the State Department interests of Vietnam. This constitutes a restriction cannot see, the univttsity officials cannot heer. Indeed, on professional freedom which no university professor, such returning travelers are often om-adzed because it including one who goes to Vietnam, would accept in the is felt that they have lost their objectivity. United States. When it was learned that an American press was about to publish some essa.ys 9" Viet ls the US Powerlt.s? nam not entirely favorable to the regime, rerresenta tions were made from Washington to defer the' publica We stand at a curious point in history where moral tion. When the American Emb&My in S~gon publishes ity and expediency coincide. The only arpment for a news sheet, it follows the cmsored news of the cap continuing our present policy, that it works, is non tive local press down to the last sycophantic panegyric. senff, for it does not. Nor can we be conAdmt that When the United States Information Agency orders a Vietnamese Army of 170,000 can accomplish what an books for a library J!Wntained for the Vietnamese peo Army of t so,ooo cannot. More military aid might help, ple, it must carefully avoid those b~ed by the regime, but only if an appealing altttMtive to Communitml lt like The Ugly Amtric.i" and Tiu Quiet American. created - not the police state of Diem, not a disordered When the Vietnamese Govet'l\lna\t prevents students and Wlregulated economy. We must use our resources from going to America for univenlty training, becaUM not to support lies and fakery, but to push forwanl a of their alleged political unreli&bility, our cultural af steady democratization of the nati~. And we mull do fairs office in Saigon meekly offers the scholarships to it. It is idle to say that Vietnam is independent. It it the chosen hacks and packs them off to America re not. If history has catapulted us into a posltioa of gardlus of their scholastic aptitude. None of the hun power, we should use the power to further democratic dreds of Vietnamese students studying in the United aims not only because these aims are worthwhile in States is allowed to travel home through France because themselves but because it is only through their realiza- of the fear that they may not ~tum. . tion that Communism can be kept in ct.ck. (la a dkect But these are only minor illustrations. More impor communication to the authors, these thoupb were tant is the failure of most experts on Vietnam to pub mott eloquently expresHd by an Asian, who wrote: ,. A lish an accurate, honest appraisal of the economic, chAnge must come quickly, or it wtll be too late. The social and political facts of life in this country and the peasants may be illiterate but they reali&e that they Rooding of most American newspapers and magazines are b.ing cheated out of their buic human cl.igsdty In the rwne of freedom. If they llff little difference between Diem and Communinn, arc they to be blamed il they don't care who ls the winMr?j Ngo Dinh Diem Uhere i1 no reason Diem could not continue as Presi In a Saigon where there is nothing else but poli deltt, provided he reforms his regime and broadens his tic• [President Diem} reprnents at least an idea of political ~· &ut if reform ii to b. conttrued by patriotism. He has some words in common with . the VietMIMte peop~ as real and not lfMlriout, at Ho Chi Minh H Catholicism has some words in least four changes would have to come about: (1) The common with Communism, but he is separated family oligarchy must be dissolved with hi.pest pri from the people by cardinals and police cars with ority being usigned to the removal of the Nhu's. (1) wailing sirens and foreign advlffn droning of Diem must be prevailed upon to release his political global strategy, when he should bt walking in the opponents from jail, to tolerate thrir opposition, and rlc. fields improtected, I.aming the hard way how to encourage their support and cooperation in the fight to be loved and o~ - the two cannot be sepa against Communism. (J) Certain basic freedoms mmt rated. One pictured him there in the Norodom Palace, sitting with his blank brown gaze, incor be introduced: namely freedom of the press, free elec rv.ptible, ob.tinate, ill-advised, going to his weekly tions, and freedom to travel. (4) Economk reform COftfetsion, bolstered up by hi. relief that God is should be instituted by a conscientious effort of self always on the Catholic tide, waiting for a miracle. help, which would include a devaluation of the piaster, The name I would write under his portrait is the tax reform, the substitution of capital goods impom Patrtol Ruined by the West. for luxury items, and the undertaking of a national - Gu.HAM CHENE, New ~public, development program. Nothing would ht! gained by May 16, 1.9H supporting President Diem rther if he were to oppose this order or reforms.

10 The Fading Strength of Vietnam

by Jerry JI. Rost

Saigon After six hours of dukness, after balancil\g step by in touch with its people? Well, it wasn't - and isn't. step along the narrow dikes that separate one rice-field Still, is any propaganda so convincing that it could from the next, there was dawn: flat and fog-grey. The induce a man to live like a rabbit in a narrow warren Vietnamese rangers glanced toward their American during the day and prey like a bat during the night7 Special Forces instructor. He raised his hand, and the Is any propaganda so convincing that it can induce a attack was on. Rifle fire erupted suddenly from the man to keep silent under the most cruel torture? What woods ahead. The bullets hit the water of the rice motivates these Communist guerrillas? fields to raise small geysers. The rangers, still charging, Here, personal struggle is the keynote. "Act for the began to return the fire. The rangers entered the edge Viet Cong and you act for yourself." The paint is of the woods, and the guerrilla rifle fire ceased. Now brought home in a number of ways. First, terrorism: to the guerrillas were running. But this time the elusive cooperate with the government is to risk on-:' s life - Communist guerrilla was unaware of one thing: on the inversely, cooperation with the Viet Cong is a sort of other side of the village was another platoon of rangers. self-protection. Second, the Viet Cong deliberately re And five of the estimated fifteen guerrillas were caught. cruit or kidnap young men from as many families ai; Yet despite the fren:z;y of the chase, those five had man they can. No family wants to see its son (or often aged to hide their weapons. daughter) killed, and thus refuses intelligence informa The two platoons united and swept back through tion even under torture (South Vietnamese intelligence Nhuan Due village with its scattered straw huts and is notoriously poor; one Vietnamese general said: a population of less than a hundred, on the far edge of "Nine out of ten attacks on the Viet Cong fail because rice-fields. People were rounded up. Homes were of either our poor intelligence or their excellent intelli searched. And from this typical village came an as gence."). These ever-increasing family ties between tounding array of Communist propaganda: song Viet Cong and peasants are built on a solid base: after sheets, banners, notebooks, a newspaper, printed tracts the Geneva Agreement of 1954, there were over 100,- and cartoons. Not one scrap of government propaganda 000 Communist Viet Minh sent north, and many have was to be found. by now returned to rejoin their families, to take part in On the way back, a Vietnamese lieutenant who spake and to advance the revolution. English began to translate some of the Commu Ho Chi Minh is played down in striking contrast to nist propaganda. It had one major theme: down with the father-king role played by Diem. Thus, attention is the Americans, down with Diem, down with the Amer focused on a nation, not an individual. Further, political ican-Diem clique. One sign said: "The Americans will cadres (and for that matter, military groups - the two go back to America. Diem will go back to America. usually work hand in hand) live among the people, Where will you go?" A small mimeographed tract read: even helping in the farming (when they later take their "Put your guns on the American instructors and pull cut of the rice-harnst, they can more or less legiti the trigger." A cartoon showed the Viet Cong and the mately say, "we worked for it"). One of the Austra people pushing Uncle Sam and President Diem, both lians kidnapped recently by the Viet Cong said: "The loaded with bags of dollars, to the edge of a cliff. One guerrillas paid the farmer for food and lodging in the pamphlet emphasized land reform, another, inequality place where we stayed." The ex-t~me of this technique _.unong_people. There was no mention of Ho Chi Minh is carried on by those Communists who enter the or of North Vietnam. Leader worship was avoided. jungles to live with the mountain tribes: these cadres Each fighting peaHnt was a hero. It was simple and file down and blacken their teeth, pierce their ear-lobes, effective. "The only good propaganda out here," said wear loinclothes, learn the native dialect, hunt and one of the American instructors, "is that damn stuff fish with primitive traps, and take native wives. By put out by the Viet Cong!" contrast the government approach to these tribes has Where, then, was the government's propaganda? been somewhat well-intentioned, and very ineffective. How was the government of President Diem keeping The government has attempted and is attempting to resettle the natives near large villages where they ]Ea.av A. RosE is a correspondent with the Time-Life can be surveyed and integrated. Unfortunately, the na Bureau in Saigon. tives do not take well to this displacement - nor would

7 Novunn 13, 1961

anyone whose life has bttn completely disrupted in power, not to beat the Viet Cong." order to protect and preserve some other person. On the other end of the social scale is the attitude But to obtain the cooperation of the populace is one expressed by a cyclos driver: "Colonel Nam (the well thing; to produce a fanatic guerrilla fighter is an liked liaison officer to the International Control Com other. And this requires a carefully planned religio mission who was recently kidnapped and killed] was psychological conversion. Among the Viet Cong bands, murdered by Diem. Colonel Nam w.is too honest." there is an - incredible esprit de corps, a feeling of More frequently, the uneducated or semi-educ.ited man brotherhood. Here is a secret organization founded on will lash out against President Diem's family: ag.iinst soJ11e primitive rite of loving and killing. To this simple Madame Nhu, Mr. Nhu, Mr. Can etc. They are all ritual, the peasant-guerrilla can adhere with fanatic accused of corruption (the President himself is gener devotion; from this simple ritual, he can gain a sense of ally held to be better than his immediate family- but power and purpose in life. And because the movement more and more people are unwilling to forgive him for is like a religion, and its followers like apostles, disci being "good-hearted but misled"). The Catholicism of pline is created, created out of the sheer drive of the "royal family" (as it is now termed) comes in for fanaticism. To one degree or another, 70 to 90 pttcent speci.il attack - especially since one of the President's of the entire peasant population now leans toward the politically powerful brothers is an Archbishop. Heft Viet Cong. the allegations can be somewh.it substantiated (though Here it must be emphasized the Viet Cong, though again, the truth does not really matter, it is what people obviously Communist-led (directed from North Viet beliro~ is true). No visitor to Vietnam can help but be nam), is not founded on a Communist ideal. Like its struck by the well-being of the priesthood and the new predecessor, the Viet Minh, its prime objective is church in almost every village. For a population o~r against something, not for something. The Viet Minh 80 percent Buddhist, this religious favoritism is a bit were against the French; the Viet Cong are against the difficult to swallow. One mild Buddhist said to me: "I government of President Ngo Dinh Diem. Of course, if hope the next president is .ilso a Catholk, otherwise the Viet Cong were to win the war of subversion in thtte m.iy be a massacre." Appuently, the Catholics South Vietnam, then the country would md in the themselves are not a little worried: an estimated 50 Communist bloc; but many do not realize this, or if percent are now anti-Diem. they do, feel it is worth the risk - or their hate for Diem At this point, it is almost needless to say that the is such that they do not care. Two religious sects, the professional people and the intellectual elite are agailllt Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao, both of which President Diem. Many complain .is would any educated per50ll Diem viciously betrayed after the armistice, now have living under a dictatorship. But there are many others joined hands with the Viet Cong. who center their complaints on Diem's ineptitude in dealing with the Viet Cong md improving the economy Discontent in the Army of the country. The ineptitude stems in a large degree from Diem's person.ility. Diem's unpopularity in Vietnam is now so universal Mr. Vu Van Thai, former director-general of the that it is amazing he still remains in power (it will be budget .ind foreign aid (who resigned and left the still more amazing if he retains that power much country in July) put it this way: "Diem h.is, unfortu longer). He is intensely disliked by the Army: the or nately, come to think of himself .is a god. Meg.ilo dinary soldier who receives about $10 a month, one or m.inia is probably the word. In any case, he can no two days of leave in one or two years (if he's lucky), longer take .idvice or criticism. He wants only yer and no promotion at all unless he oils the palm of an men and flatterers. Consequently, ma.ny men of talent officer or has influential friends, laughs at you when have left the government and refuse to work for it. you aslc. why he is fighting (desertions from the army The greatest waste in Vietnam is its human talent." are increasing, and many are going over to the Viet All this criticism is harsh, and, unhappily, much of it Cong arms in hand; one of the main supply sources for is justified. But Diem is the product of a tradition. the guerrillas has been the army). Even among high Mandarinism with its innumerable unpleasant charac ranking officers there is vast discontent. One very teristics is a firmly entrenched institution in Vietnam. high-ranking officer said to me: "We are discussing a As a political md social system it gttW to be very ugly. coup, but Diem has so organized the army that [the It bred a disdain for the working class: men wore long very high-ranking officers] have no command over finger-n.iils to show they did not indulge in manual troops. The hierarchy of power goes from division or labor (the habit is still widely practiced among profes batt.ilion commander, selected on the basis of personal sional men .ind students). Abstr.ict philosophy and loyalty to Diem, not on qualifications, to the presi belles ldtres were the pulse of the mandarin-mind; the dency. The army is designed now to maint.iin Diem's incredibly outdated educational system of Vietnam and

8 NovEMIH 13, 1961

the pemment's abstruse political philosophy called is the pivotal point in Vietnam's struggle for survival. "pet9Jllalism" are direct heirs to mandarin thinking. The other main points of a liberal Vietnamese's pro As a political system, it fur.ctioned on nepotism, influ gram are almost always the same: ential friends, obsequiousness to an immediate super 1. Military: pay and leave-time must be improved, a ior, and haughty arrogance to an immediate inferior. system of promotion established. The army must be Thus one Vietnamese lawyer neatly summed up the greatly augmented (from 170,000 to at least 300,000). mandarin attitude and its heritage today: "In the heart Civil guard training and equipment must be amelio of every Vietnamese there is a dictator." rated. But most important, self-defense militias for Dictatorship is the almost inevitable outgrowth of each Yillage must be established by drawing on the false humility and false pride, and of manifold dis people of each village, training them, and equipping honesties in government. Mandarinism established a them (the government now refuses to give self-defense rigid measure for one man's humanity-value over an units proper equipment in fear that it will end up in other's, and as a result each man had to and has to, the hmds of the Communists - and it probably would find himself lord and master over some poorer soul. under the present state of morale). The army must This derogatory attitude toward a social and financial operate in smaller more mobile units; comnanders of inferior can be changed, providing the educated of the these units must be treated with responsibility (no one country are willing to force the change. And they prob dares to act in the present army without the accord of ably would be willing to make that tremendously im some higher officer - as a result, there have been times portant change - to have a national unity which en when besei~d posts did not receive reinforcements for compasses all, from farmer to doctor - when the politi 48 hours). Protection must be afforded to the self cal trappings of mandarinism are thrown off: when ne- defense units (better radio communications between . potism, favoritism, corruption, and dictatorship a.re them and larger forces in the area), and through the eliminated. self-defense units to the people. With protection What can force the change in mandarin attitudes is against Viet Cong retaliation, intelligence gathering some form of government that lies between democracy will be greatly improved. and single-man dictatorship. Another dictator like .i. Propaganda: propaganda teams must circulate Diem would not only be demoralizing but it would with the army. They should work with squad or even again run the risk of one man's miscalculations. Demo platoon escorts if necessary. No village should be left cracy, on the other hand, would be no good as there is untouched. Every man, woman, and child should come too much fanatic disagreement among all sorts of minor to feel that the government is personally looking out political figures, and the country, in the face of in for him or her. Distribution of radios would help. The creasing aggression, cannot afford one minute of in spirit of nationalism should be nourished by asking decision. If a change in government occurs, the new each person's advice - and acting on that advice as government must step in with a solid plan and initiate often as possible. Hate too should be used as a weapon: that plan immediately. it should be turned against the Viet Cong just as the Viet Cong has turned it against the goveJ'ru;!'ent. Hope Lies in a Brain-Trust 3. Economy: austerity must be embraced, luxury items cut out. Small industry should be -encouraged What, then, lies between dt!tnocracy and a single with low interest government loans. The search for man dictatorship 7 "A brain-trust," said an astute Viet agricultural improvement must be enormously stepped namese politician. A brain-trust which drew the best up with teams of agricultural experts and experiments men of the country into it, which asked for the advice with new crops. Geological eicploration must begin. of those who were not part of it, which involved every '4· Education: more technicians must be produced. cap•ble man in the governr,1ent. "It would be a sort of 5. Pulitil:s and law: u.bsoluie, inco!'!'\!'pti'!:-le untaif'lt~ oligarchy whose dictatorial powers were inwardly con justice (as existed in Malaya) must be imposed. Any trolled and limited by its members." government official caught indulging in corruption of "How in the world will you ever agree to the mem any kind must be dealt with severely All government bers of this oligarchy?" I asked. financial affairs should be open to public inspection. "The Americans can help. If for once they don't But as this is written, the hard-headed Vietname~ hesitate, they can help organize the composition of the men of ideals seem far from power. Viet Cong aggres government. Vietnam needs the directive help of the sion increases from day to day, the economy worsens, US- not only its money. America must help organize nationalism is non-existent in tenr,s of the government, the ruling body if Vietnam is to survive." In this politi the political leaders are set in their ways - 11.nd their cian's mind, as in the minds of many political thinkers ways are clearly inadequate. The strength of South in Vietnam, the involvement of each and every person Vietnam is fading.