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Secure Cloud Identity Wallet Assessment Report on Cryptographic Project number: 653454 Project start: October 1, 2015 H2020-DS-2014-1 Project duration: 3 years Secure Cloud IdentityWallet D4.1 Assessment report on cryptographic technologies, protocols and mechanisms Document Identification Due date March 31, 2017 Submission date March 31, 2017 Revision 1.0 Related WP WP4 Dissemination PU Level Lead TUG Lead Author Felix Hörandner (TUG) Participant Contributing AIT, FOKUS, GUF, Related Deliv- D2.2, D2.3, D3.3, D4.2, Beneficiaries TUG, KGH, LISPA, SIC erables D4.3, D4.4, D5.1 D4.1 – Assessment report on cryptographic technologies, protocols and mechanisms Abstract: This report contains a detailed assessment and analysis of eligible basic crypto- graphic technologies, security protocols, and authentication mechanisms with respect to CRE- DENTIAL requirements. It gives an overview of the start of the art in the different areas, evaluates the existing schemes regarding efficiency, security, privacy, usability, etc., and makes concrete suggestions on which technologies to use in the project. This document is issued within the CREDENTIAL project. This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Programme under grant agreement no. 653454. This document and its content are the property of the CREDENTIAL Consortium. All rights relevant to this document are determined by the applicable laws. Access to this document does not grant any right or license on the document or its contents. This document or its contents are not to be used or treated in any manner inconsistent with the rights or interests of the CREDENTIAL Consortium and are not to be disclosed externally without prior written consent from the CREDENTIAL Partners. Each CREDENTIAL Partner may use this document in conformity with the CREDENTIAL Consortium Grant Agreement provisions. The information in this document is provided as is, and no warranty is given or implied that the information is fit for any particular purpose. The user thereof uses the information at its sole risk and liability. D4.1 – Assessment report on cryptographic technologies, protocols and mechanisms Executive Summary On a high level, the central goal of the CREDENTIAL project is to develop a privacy-preserving data sharing platform (wallet) with integrated identity provider (IdP), which can be used to share authenticated data without the wallet learning any of the user’s personal information. The functionality and added value of these services will be showcased by concrete pilots from the domains of eGovernment, eHealth, and eBusiness. A central task that has to be performed in order to develop such a data sharing platform is the identification and evaluation of relevant base technologies, which is provided by this deliverable. First, we concisely introduce relevant technologies, covering different aspects of the generic data sharing system. These aspects include cryptographic technologies, authentication mechanisms, as well as identity and access management protocols and technologies. We perform assessments based on high-level criteria with a focus on security, privacy, usability and integration effort. These high-level criteria are then mapped to criteria specific to the technologies under evaluation. The criteria are motivated by CREDENTIAL’s use cases and requirements. As a result of the assessment, this deliverable makes concrete recommendations for technologies that should be considered in the design and implementation of the generic data sharing plat- form as technological basis. Also, this deliverable presents technologies, which could provide additional benefits to CREDENTIAL’s envisioned goal and might therefore be of interest for further research in order to apply them. Besides the generic technologies, we also present an overview of technologies relevant to the pilot use cases in order to facilitate a common understanding of the involved technological ecosystem. Finally, this deliverable provides detailed descriptions of relevant technologies in the appendix for the curious reader. This appendix also serves as a knowledge base for project participants to acquire information on technologies that are not in their core expertise. ii D4.1 – Assessment report on cryptographic technologies, protocols and mechanisms Document information Editors Name E-mail Organisation Bernd Zwattendorfer [email protected] SIC Felix Hörandner [email protected] TUG Contributors Name E-mail Organisation Stephan Krenn [email protected] AIT Christoph Striecks [email protected] AIT Thomas Lorünser [email protected] AIT Nicolas Notario McDonnell [email protected] ATOS Florian Thiemer fl[email protected] FOKUS Jörg Caumanns [email protected] FOKUS Jetzabel Serna [email protected] GUF Andreas Abraham [email protected] TUG Christof Rabensteiner [email protected] TUG Elias Klughammer [email protected] KGH Andrea Migliavacca [email protected] LISPA Alberto Zanini [email protected] LISPA Silvana Mura [email protected] LISPA Franco Nieddu [email protected] SIC Simon Roth [email protected] SIC Enrico Francescato [email protected] ICERT Reviewers Name E-mail Organisation Stephan Krenn [email protected] AIT Florian Thiemer fl[email protected] FOKUS Elias Klughammer [email protected] KGH History Version Date Reason/Change Editor 0.1 14.01.2016 Document creation Bernd Zwattendorfer 0.2 16.02.2016 Added General Factsheets Felix Hörandner 0.3 10.03.2016 Added eHealth Factsheets Florian Thiemer iii D4.1 – Assessment report on cryptographic technologies, protocols and mechanisms 0.4 18.03.2016 Added eGovernment Factsheets Andrea Migliavacca 0.5 02.05.2016 Added Technology Details: OpenID Co- Felix Hörandner nenct 0.6 02.05.2016 Added Technology Details: FIDO, SAML Andreas Abraham 0.7 25.05.2016 Added eBusiness Factsheets Enrico Francescato 0.8 27.05.2016 Added Technology Details: Proxy Re- Felix Hörandner Encryption 0.9 27.05.2016 Added Technology Details: SQRL Nicolas Notario 0.10 28.06.2016 Added Technology Details: Malleable Sig- Andreas Abraham natures 0.11 28.06.2016 Added Technology Details: OAuth Felix Hörandner 0.12 01.07.2016 Added Technology Details: UMA, XACML Andreas Abraham 0.13 01.07.2016 Added Technology Details: PDPs and Christoph Striecks PORs 0.14 15.07.2016 Added Technology Details: KMIP Andreas Abraham 0.15 27.07.2016 Added Technology Details: FHE and SE Christoph Striecks 0.16 27.07.2016 Added Technology Details: secret sharing, Stephan Krenn pseudonyms, TPASS 0.17 29.07.2016 Added Technology Details: Anonymous Jetzabel Serna credentials 0.18 29.07.2016 Added details for WS-* description Florian Thiemer 0.19 01.08.2016 Added e-Health Technology Details Jörg Caumanns 0.20 01.08.2016 Added Technology Details: SCIM Andreas Abraham 0.21 16.08.2016 Added eGovernment Technology Details Andrea Migliavacca Alberto Zanini 0.22 16.08.2016 Evaluated Identity Protocols Felix Hörandner 0.23 21.09.2016 Added Details for ABCs and PIR Jetzabel Serna 0.24 03.10.2016 Added Details for PKCS11 Andrea Migliavacca 0.25 13.10.2016 Evaluated Malleable Signatures Christoph Striecks 0.26 14.10.2016 Evaluated Secret Sharing Stephan Krenn 0.27 17.10.2016 Restructured Document Felix Hörandner 0.28 18.10.2016 Evaluated SCIM Andreas Abraham 0.29 25.10.2016 Evaluated PRE Types Felix Hörandner 0.30 03.11.2016 Evaluated Authorization Protocols Andreas Abraham 0.31 08.11.2016 Updated Introduction and Methodology Felix Hörandner 0.32 29.11.2016 Evaluated PDP, POR, PIR, ORAM, and Stephan Krenn FHE Thomas Lorünser 0.33 01.12.2016 Evaluated PRE vs ABE and redactable sig- Christoph Striecks natures vs anonymous credentials Stephan Krenn 0.34 20.12.2016 Evaluated searchable encryption and added Christoph Striecks details for remote attestation Stephan Krenn 0.35 20.12.2016 Evaluated KMIP and WebCrypto API Christof Rabensteiner 0.36 28.12.2016 Added Technology Details: TPM and TEE Franco Nieddu iv D4.1 – Assessment report on cryptographic technologies, protocols and mechanisms 0.37 13.01.2017 Evaluated TPM and TEE Franco Nieddu 0.38 13.01.2017 Improved structure of document Felix Hörandner 0.39 16.01.2017 Evaluated Authentication Technologies Jetzabel Serna 0.40 16.01.2017 Evaluated Verifiable Computing Felix Hörandner 0.41 16.01.2017 Evaluated Policy Languages Florian Thiemer 0.42 16.01.2017 Added abstract and acronyms Stephan Krenn 0.43 23.01.2017 Added introductions and floating text to Stephan Krenn core crypto technologies 0.44 24.01.2017 Added methodology section Stephan Krenn 0.45 24.01.2017 Added Introduction and introductions to Andrea Migliavacca eGovernment and eBusiness sections 0.46 26.01.2017 Finalized additional crypto section and Ap- Christoph Striecks pendix B 0.47 27.01.2017 Finalized protocols section Christof Rabensteiner 0.48 27.01.2017 Added Executive Summary Felix Hörandner 0.50 14.01.2017 Reviewing and fixing Felix Hörandner Stephan Krenn 0.51 14.02.2017 Added Conclusion Elias Klughammer 0.52 24.02.2017 Polished eGovernment and eBusiness sec- Silvana Mura tions 0.53 03.03.2017 Reviewed Document Florian Thiemer 0.54 07.03.2017 Addressed Review Comments Felix Hörandner Stephan Krenn 0.56 08.03.2017 Re-Wrote Conclusion Felix Hörandner 0.57 27.03.2017 Polishing Felix Hörandner 1.0 31.03.2017 Final copy-editing Stephan Krenn v D4.1 – Assessment report on cryptographic technologies, protocols and mechanisms Table of Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 The CREDENTIAL Project . .1 1.2 Scope of this Deliverable . .3 1.3 Relation to Other Deliverables . .4 1.4 Overview of Assessment Results . .4 1.5 Outline . .6 2 Assessment Methodology 7 2.1 Fact Sheet Description . .8 2.2 High-Level Criteria . .9 3 Core Cryptographic Technologies 11 3.1 Secure Data Sharing . 11 3.2 Authentic Data Disclosure . 22 3.3 Section Conclusion . 29 4 Additional Cryptographic Technologies 30 4.1 Authentication . 30 4.2 Access to Encrypted Data .
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