User Authentication
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
CPAS04 Authenticator Options Version 1.0 11 November 2015
GSM Association Non-confidential Official Document PDATA.03 - CPAS04 Authenticator Options CPAS04 Authenticator Options Version 1.0 11 November 2015 This is a Non-binding Permanent Reference Document of the GSMA Security Classification: Non-confidential Access to and distribution of this document is restricted to the persons permitted by the security classification. This document is confidential to the Association and is subject to copyright protection. This document is to be used only for the purposes for which it has been supplied and information contained in it must not be disclosed or in any other way made available, in whole or in part, to persons other than those permitted under the security classification without the prior written approval of the Association. Copyright Notice Copyright © 2016 GSM Association Disclaimer The GSM Association (“Association”) makes no representation, warranty or undertaking (express or implied) with respect to and does not accept any responsibility for, and hereby disclaims liability for the accuracy or completeness or timeliness of the information contained in this document. The information contained in this document may be subject to change without prior notice. Antitrust Notice The information contain herein is in full compliance with the GSM Association’s antitrust compliance policy. V1.0 Page 1 of 38 GSM Association Non-confidential Official Document PDATA.03 - CPAS04 Authenticator Options Table of Contents 1 Introduction 3 1.1 Overview 3 1.2 Scope 3 1.3 Abbreviations 3 1.4 References 5 2 Level -
Version 7.8-Systemd
Linux From Scratch Version 7.8-systemd Created by Gerard Beekmans Edited by Douglas R. Reno Linux From Scratch: Version 7.8-systemd by Created by Gerard Beekmans and Edited by Douglas R. Reno Copyright © 1999-2015 Gerard Beekmans Copyright © 1999-2015, Gerard Beekmans All rights reserved. This book is licensed under a Creative Commons License. Computer instructions may be extracted from the book under the MIT License. Linux® is a registered trademark of Linus Torvalds. Linux From Scratch - Version 7.8-systemd Table of Contents Preface .......................................................................................................................................................................... vii i. Foreword ............................................................................................................................................................. vii ii. Audience ............................................................................................................................................................ vii iii. LFS Target Architectures ................................................................................................................................ viii iv. LFS and Standards ............................................................................................................................................ ix v. Rationale for Packages in the Book .................................................................................................................... x vi. Prerequisites -
Modern Password Security for System Designers What to Consider When Building a Password-Based Authentication System
Modern password security for system designers What to consider when building a password-based authentication system By Ian Maddox and Kyle Moschetto, Google Cloud Solutions Architects This whitepaper describes and models modern password guidance and recommendations for the designers and engineers who create secure online applications. A related whitepaper, Password security for users, offers guidance for end users. This whitepaper covers the wide range of options to consider when building a password-based authentication system. It also establishes a set of user-focused recommendations for password policies and storage, including the balance of password strength and usability. The technology world has been trying to improve on the password since the early days of computing. Shared-knowledge authentication is problematic because information can fall into the wrong hands or be forgotten. The problem is magnified by systems that don't support real-world secure use cases and by the frequent decision of users to take shortcuts. According to a 2019 Yubico/Ponemon study, 69 percent of respondents admit to sharing passwords with their colleagues to access accounts. More than half of respondents (51 percent) reuse an average of five passwords across their business and personal accounts. Furthermore, two-factor authentication is not widely used, even though it adds protection beyond a username and password. Of the respondents, 67 percent don’t use any form of two-factor authentication in their personal life, and 55 percent don’t use it at work. Password systems often allow, or even encourage, users to use insecure passwords. Systems that allow only single-factor credentials and that implement ineffective security policies add to the problem. -
Oracle Solaris Security for Developers Guide • September 2010 Contents
Oracle® Solaris Security for Developers Guide Part No: 816–4863–16 September 2010 Copyright © 2004, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. This software and related documentation are provided under a license agreement containing restrictions on use and disclosure and are protected by intellectual property laws. Except as expressly permitted in your license agreement or allowed by law, you may not use, copy, reproduce, translate, broadcast, modify, license, transmit, distribute, exhibit, perform, publish, or display any part, in any form, or by any means. Reverse engineering, disassembly, or decompilation of this software, unless required by law for interoperability, is prohibited. The information contained herein is subject to change without notice and is not warranted to be error-free. If you find any errors, please report them to us in writing. If this is software or related software documentation that is delivered to the U.S. Government or anyone licensing it on behalf of the U.S. Government, the following notice is applicable: U.S. GOVERNMENT RIGHTS Programs, software, databases, and related documentation and technical data delivered to U.S. Government customers are “commercial computer software” or “commercial technical data” pursuant to the applicable Federal Acquisition Regulation and agency-specific supplemental regulations. As such, the use, duplication, disclosure, modification, and adaptation shall be subject to the restrictions and license terms setforth in the applicable Government contract, and, to the extent applicable by the terms of the Government contract, the additional rights set forth in FAR 52.227-19, Commercial Computer Software License (December 2007). Oracle America, Inc., 500 Oracle Parkway, Redwood City, CA 94065. -
Open Directory Administration for Version 10.5 Leopard Second Edition
Mac OS X Server Open Directory Administration For Version 10.5 Leopard Second Edition Apple Inc. © 2008 Apple Inc. All rights reserved. The owner or authorized user of a valid copy of Mac OS X Server software may reproduce this publication for the purpose of learning to use such software. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted for commercial purposes, such as selling copies of this publication or for providing paid-for support services. Every effort has been made to make sure that the information in this manual is correct. Apple Inc., is not responsible for printing or clerical errors. Apple 1 Infinite Loop Cupertino CA 95014-2084 www.apple.com The Apple logo is a trademark of Apple Inc., registered in the U.S. and other countries. Use of the “keyboard” Apple logo (Option-Shift-K) for commercial purposes without the prior written consent of Apple may constitute trademark infringement and unfair competition in violation of federal and state laws. Apple, the Apple logo, iCal, iChat, Leopard, Mac, Macintosh, QuickTime, Xgrid, and Xserve are trademarks of Apple Inc., registered in the U.S. and other countries. Finder is a trademark of Apple Inc. Adobe and PostScript are trademarks of Adobe Systems Incorporated. UNIX is a registered trademark of The Open Group. Other company and product names mentioned herein are trademarks of their respective companies. Mention of third-party products is for informational purposes only and constitutes neither an endorsement nor a recommendation. Apple assumes no responsibility with regard to the performance or use of these products. -
Trusted Execution Environments
Trusted Execution Environments Assaf Rosenbaum Technion - Computer Science Department - M.Sc. Thesis MSC-2019-03 - 2019 Technion - Computer Science Department - M.Sc. Thesis MSC-2019-03 - 2019 Trusted Execution Environments Research Thesis Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Computer Science Assaf Rosenbaum Submitted to the Senate of the Technion | Israel Institute of Technology Kislev 5779 Haifa November 2018 Technion - Computer Science Department - M.Sc. Thesis MSC-2019-03 - 2019 Technion - Computer Science Department - M.Sc. Thesis MSC-2019-03 - 2019 This research was carried out under the supervision of Prof. Eli Biham and Dr. Sara Bitan, in the Faculty of Computer Science. Acknowledgements First and foremost, I wish to thank my advisors, Prof. Eli Biham and Dr. Sara Bitan, for their incredible support during the work on thesis. Thank you for providing me the freedom to find my own path while constantly guiding and directing me. I learned a lot from both of you. I would also like to thank my parents, siblings and my parents-in-law for their help and support during this stressful time. Thank you for being there whenever I needed. A special thanks is due to my three lovely children, you sparkle my life with moment of pure joy. Most importantly, I would like to thank my beautiful wife, Lior. Thank you for your endless support, the long hours in which you worked hard to give me the time I needed to work and for always pushing me forward. You ar the light of my life and I love you very much. -
Deploying-Zones-11Gr2-Supercluster
An Oracle Technical White Paper November 2012 Best Practices for Deploying Oracle Solaris Zones with Oracle Database 11g on SPARC SuperCluster Best Practices for Deploying Oracle Solaris Zones with Oracle Database 11g on SPARC SuperCluster Introduction ....................................................................................... 1 SPARC SuperCluster Technologies for Database Consolidation ....... 2 SPARC T4-4 Domains in the SPARC SuperCluster ...................... 3 Database Services Within the SPARC SuperCluster ..................... 3 Database Consolidation on the SPARC SuperCluster ................... 4 Oracle Solaris Zones on the SPARC SuperCluster ........................ 4 Best Practices for Deploying Oracle Database 11g Using Oracle Solaris Zones .................................................................................... 6 Choosing the Number of Database Domains ................................. 6 Oracle Solaris Zones ..................................................................... 7 ZFS File System .......................................................................... 11 Zone Deployment Using the ssc_exavm Tool ............................ 11 Operating System Tunable Parameters ....................................... 12 Database Grid Configuration ....................................................... 14 Oracle RAC Configuration ........................................................... 19 Securing the Databases in SPARC SuperCluster ........................ 20 Example Database Consolidation Scenarios -
UNIX System Services Z/OS Version 1 Release 7 Implementation
Front cover UNIX System Services z/OS Version 1 Release 7 Implementation z/OS UNIX overview z/OS UNIX setup z/OS UNIX usage Paul Rogers Theodore Antoff Patrick Bruinsma Paul-Robert Hering Lutz Kühner Neil O’Connor Lívio Sousa ibm.com/redbooks International Technical Support Organization UNIX System Services z/OS Version 1 Release 7 Implementation March 2006 SG24-7035-01 Note: Before using this information and the product it supports, read the information in “Notices” on page xiii. Second Edition (March 2006) This edition applies to Version 1 Release 7 of z/OS (5637-A01), and Version 1, Release 7 of z/OS.e (5655-G52), and to all subsequent releases and modifications until otherwise indicated in new editions. © Copyright International Business Machines Corporation 2003, 2006. All rights reserved. Note to U.S. Government Users Restricted Rights -- Use, duplication or disclosure restricted by GSA ADP Schedule Contract with IBM Corp. Contents Notices . xiii Trademarks . xiv Preface . .xv The team that wrote this redbook. .xv Become a published author . xvi Comments welcome. xvii Chapter 1. UNIX overview. 1 1.1 UNIX fundamentals . 2 1.1.1 UNIX objectives . 2 1.1.2 What people like about UNIX . 2 1.1.3 What people don’t like about UNIX . 3 1.1.4 UNIX operating system . 3 1.1.5 UNIX file system . 4 1.1.6 Parameter files . 6 1.1.7 Daemons. 6 1.1.8 Accessing UNIX . 6 1.1.9 UNIX standards. 7 1.1.10 MVS and UNIX functional comparison . 8 1.2 z/OS UNIX System Services fundamentals . -
Version 20160304-Systemd
Linux From Scratch Version 20160304-systemd Created by Gerard Beekmans Edited by Douglas R. Reno Linux From Scratch: Version 20160304-systemd by Created by Gerard Beekmans and Edited by Douglas R. Reno Copyright © 1999-2016 Gerard Beekmans Copyright © 1999-2016, Gerard Beekmans All rights reserved. This book is licensed under a Creative Commons License. Computer instructions may be extracted from the book under the MIT License. Linux® is a registered trademark of Linus Torvalds. Linux From Scratch - Version 20160304-systemd Table of Contents Preface .......................................................................................................................................................................... vii i. Foreword ............................................................................................................................................................. vii ii. Audience ............................................................................................................................................................ vii iii. LFS Target Architectures ................................................................................................................................ viii iv. LFS and Standards ............................................................................................................................................ ix v. Rationale for Packages in the Book ................................................................................................................... -
Apple File System Reference
Apple File System Reference Developer Contents About Apple File System 7 General-Purpose Types 9 paddr_t .................................................. 9 prange_t ................................................. 9 uuid_t ................................................... 9 Objects 10 obj_phys_t ................................................ 10 Supporting Data Types ........................................... 11 Object Identifier Constants ......................................... 12 Object Type Masks ............................................. 13 Object Types ................................................ 14 Object Type Flags .............................................. 20 EFI Jumpstart 22 Booting from an Apple File System Partition ................................. 22 nx_efi_jumpstart_t ........................................... 24 Partition UUIDs ............................................... 25 Container 26 Mounting an Apple File System Partition ................................... 26 nx_superblock_t ............................................. 27 Container Flags ............................................... 36 Optional Container Feature Flags ...................................... 37 Read-Only Compatible Container Feature Flags ............................... 38 Incompatible Container Feature Flags .................................... 38 Block and Container Sizes .......................................... 39 nx_counter_id_t ............................................. 39 checkpoint_mapping_t ........................................ -
A Closer Look at SQRL Research Findings
A closer look at SQRL Agenda • SQRL introduction • Related work • SQRL design details • Research questions • Research method • Research findings • Conclusion UvA-SNE-RP1 presentation 1 A closer look at SQRL SQRL introduction: trigger Secure Quick Reliable Login UvA-SNE-RP1 presentation 2 A closer look at SQRL SQRL introduction: how it works QR-scanning QR-tapping QR-clicking UvA-SNE-RP1 presentation 3 A closer look at SQRL SQRL introduction: design goals SSO 2FA out-of-band (OOB) authentication no secret(s) exchange anonymity no (additional) TTP low friction deployment UvA-SNE-RP1 presentation 4 A closer look at SQRL Related work: SSO • Open standards • OpenID • TiQR UvA-SNE-RP1 presentation 5 A closer look at SQRL SQRL design details: crypto ID site (fixed) specific secret 1-F secret 2-F Brute Elliptic Force Curve UvA-SNE-RP1 presentation 6 A closer look at SQRL SQRL design details: more crypto Compromised ID ? • ID revocation support • proves ID ownership • uses additional keys • Lock (disable) • Unlock (enable/change) UvA-SNE-RP1 presentation 7 A closer look at SQRL SQRL design details: messages UvA-SNE-RP1 presentation 8 A closer look at SQRL Research questions • How does SQRL improve authentication security compared to related solutions? • What does SQRL offer to both parties? • What constraints must be met to guaranty this behaviour? • What additional features are relevant to extend deployability? • What attacks remain feasible and what countermeasures are to be considered? UvA-SNE-RP1 presentation 9 A closer look at SQRL -
Zero-Knowledge User Authentication: an Old Idea Whose Time Has Come
Zero-Knowledge User Authentication: An Old Idea Whose Time Has Come Laurent Chuat, Sarah Plocher, and Adrian Perrig ETH Zurich Abstract User authentication can rely on various factors (e.g., a pass- word, a cryptographic key, and/or biometric data) but should not re- veal any secret information held by the user. This seemingly paradoxical feat can be achieved through zero-knowledge proofs. Unfortunately, naive password-based approaches still prevail on the web. Multi-factor authen- tication schemes address some of the weaknesses of the traditional login process, but generally have deployability issues or degrade usability even further as they assume users do not possess adequate hardware. This as- sumption no longer holds: smartphones with biometric sensors, cameras, short-range communication capabilities, and unlimited data plans have become ubiquitous. In this paper, we show that, assuming the user has such a device, both security and usability can be drastically improved using an augmented password-authenticated key agreement (PAKE) pro- tocol and message authentication codes. 1 Introduction User authentication still typically involves transmitting a plaintext password to the web server, which is problematic for many reasons. First, an attacker could obtain the user’s password using malware, a keystroke logger, phishing, or a man-in-the-middle attack. Second, the user might be using the same password on different websites, allowing a malicious server operator to impersonate the user. Third, if the website’s database is breached, although passwords may be protected by a hash function, a brute-force attack could reveal low-entropy pass- words. Fourth, as password-reuse and low-entropy passwords are problematic, users are constantly advised to pick new, long, complicated passwords.