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X86 Disassembly Exploring the Relationship Between C, X86 Assembly, and Machine Code
x86 Disassembly Exploring the relationship between C, x86 Assembly, and Machine Code PDF generated using the open source mwlib toolkit. See http://code.pediapress.com/ for more information. PDF generated at: Sat, 07 Sep 2013 05:04:59 UTC Contents Articles Wikibooks:Collections Preface 1 X86 Disassembly/Cover 3 X86 Disassembly/Introduction 3 Tools 5 X86 Disassembly/Assemblers and Compilers 5 X86 Disassembly/Disassemblers and Decompilers 10 X86 Disassembly/Disassembly Examples 18 X86 Disassembly/Analysis Tools 19 Platforms 28 X86 Disassembly/Microsoft Windows 28 X86 Disassembly/Windows Executable Files 33 X86 Disassembly/Linux 48 X86 Disassembly/Linux Executable Files 50 Code Patterns 51 X86 Disassembly/The Stack 51 X86 Disassembly/Functions and Stack Frames 53 X86 Disassembly/Functions and Stack Frame Examples 57 X86 Disassembly/Calling Conventions 58 X86 Disassembly/Calling Convention Examples 64 X86 Disassembly/Branches 74 X86 Disassembly/Branch Examples 83 X86 Disassembly/Loops 87 X86 Disassembly/Loop Examples 92 Data Patterns 95 X86 Disassembly/Variables 95 X86 Disassembly/Variable Examples 101 X86 Disassembly/Data Structures 103 X86 Disassembly/Objects and Classes 108 X86 Disassembly/Floating Point Numbers 112 X86 Disassembly/Floating Point Examples 119 Difficulties 121 X86 Disassembly/Code Optimization 121 X86 Disassembly/Optimization Examples 124 X86 Disassembly/Code Obfuscation 132 X86 Disassembly/Debugger Detectors 137 Resources and Licensing 139 X86 Disassembly/Resources 139 X86 Disassembly/Licensing 141 X86 Disassembly/Manual of Style 141 References Article Sources and Contributors 142 Image Sources, Licenses and Contributors 143 Article Licenses License 144 Wikibooks:Collections Preface 1 Wikibooks:Collections Preface This book was created by volunteers at Wikibooks (http:/ / en. -
Flare-‐On 4: Challenge 10 Solution – Shell.Php
Flare-On 4: Challenge 10 Solution – shell.php Challenge Author: Dominik Weber (@Invalid_handle) Summary Modelled after a real-world web shell, this crypto level is a PHP page containing an encrypted HTML stage2 with 3 encrypted JavaScripts. The HTTP POST variable flag is the key. This level is intended to be a two-stage password attack. The first stage gets the MD5 of the password and decrypt stage2, then the second stage derives the flag with a known-plaintext attack. Description: Figure 1 depicts the essential contents of shell.php <?php $o__o_ = base64_decode('<Base64 block omitted>'); $o_o = isset($_POST['o_o']) ? $_POST['o_o'] : ""; $o_o = md5($o_o) . substr(MD5(strrev($o_o)), 0, strlen($o_o)); for ($o___o = 0; $o___o < 2268; $o___o++) { $o__o_[$o___o] = chr((ord($o__o_[$o___o]) ^ ord($o_o[$o___o])) % 256); $o_o .= $o__o_[$o___o]; } if (MD5($o__o_) == '43a141570e0c926e0e3673216a4dd73d') { if (isset($_POST['o_o'])) @setcookie('o_o', $_POST['o_o']); $o___o = create_function('', $o__o_); unset($o_o, $o__o_); $o___o(); } else { echo '<form method="post" action="shell.php"><input type="text" name="o_o" value=" "/><input type="submit" value=">"/></form>'; } ?> Figure 1: Contents of shell.php The HTTP post variable, o_o is the flag for the level. This string is then hashed with MD5 and the textual hash is the first 16 bytes of a decryption XOR key. The remainder of the key bytes is the MD5 of the reverse string array, truncated to password length size. The resulting XOR key is password length dependent and consists of characters 0-9 and a-f. This key decrypts the Base64 blob into a PHP function that gets executed. Looking at the code, we can see that the resulting plain text of this FireEye, Inc., 1440 McCarthy Blvd., Milpitas, CA 95035 | +1 408.321.6300 | +1 877.FIREEYE (347.3393) | [email protected] | www.FireEye.com 1 function has 2268 bytes. -
PLNY TEXT (1.347Mb)
ZADÁNÍ BAKALÁŘSKÉ PRÁCE I. OSOBNÍ A STUDIJNÍ ÚDAJE Příjmení: Sanchez Jméno: Luis Osobní číslo: 435714 Fakulta/ústav: Fakulta informačních technologií Zadávající katedra/ústav: Katedra softwarového inženýrství Studijní program: Informatika Studijní obor: Softwarové inženýrství II. ÚDAJE K BAKALÁŘSKÉ PRÁCI Název bakalářské práce: Multiplatformní HEX editor Název bakalářské práce anglicky: Multiplatform HEX Editor Pokyny pro vypracování: Mezi dostupnými editory binárních souborů (takzvanými HEX editory) je nedostatek těch, které jsou moderní, volně šiřitelné a multiplatformní. Proveďte analýzu současného stavu na poli takových editorů a na jejím základě vytvořte editor nový, který poskytne základní funkce, jež takové editory běžně nabízejí, a který bude zároveň splňovat výše zmíněné požadavky. Editor by měl běžet alespoň na platformách MS Windows, Linux a Mac OS. K implementaci použijte jazyk D a grafické rozhraní GTK+. Proveďte analýzu, návrh, implementaci a testování, jak je běžné ve vývojovém cyklu v softwarovém inženýrství. Seznam doporučené literatury: Dodá vedoucí práce. Jméno a pracoviště vedoucí(ho) bakalářské práce: Mgr. Martin Podloucký, katedra softwarového inženýrství FIT Jméno a pracoviště druhé(ho) vedoucí(ho) nebo konzultanta(ky) bakalářské práce: Datum zadání bakalářské práce: 05.12.2016 Termín odevzdání bakalářské práce: _____________ Platnost zadání bakalářské práce: _____________ ___________________________ ___________________________ ___________________________ Podpis vedoucí(ho) práce Podpis vedoucí(ho) ústavu/katedry -
Practical-Malware-Analysis Index.Pdf
INDEX Symbols and Numbers administrator privileges, for malware launchers, 254 ! (bang symbol), 305 Adobe Reader -- operation, 112 CVE-2010-0188 critical % operation, 112 vulnerability, 424 % symbol, 423 overflow in, 705 | (pipe symbol), in Snort, 304 ADS (Alternate Data Streams) ++ operation, 112 010 Editor, 468 feature, 139 32-bit applications, WOW64 and, 448 Advanced Encryption Standard 32-bit rotate-right-additive hash, 418 (AES), 618 64-bit malware, 441–449 decrypting, 625–626 clues to functionality, 448 advapi32.dll, 17 labs, 450–451 imports from, 20, 480, 481 solutions, 723–732 obtaining handle to, 237 advertisements, pop-up, 560–561 A AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), 618 A, at end of Windows function decrypting, 625–626 name, 17 Agobot, 376 absolute addresses, 443 air-gapped networks, 29 vs. relative addresses, in OllyDbg, _alloca_probe function, 522 184–185 alphabetic encoding, shellcode abstraction levels, in x86 disassembly, decoder with, 697 66–67 Alternate Data Streams (ADS) accept function, 143, 144, 454 feature, 139 access token, 246 ALU (arithmetic logic unit), 68 accuracy, vs. expediency, 304 AMD64 architecture, 441 active window, logging, 239 “Analysis of the Intel Pentium’s ADD encoding algorithm, 276 Ability to Support a Secure add instruction, 74, 349 Virtual Machine Monitor” AddCodeXref function (IDC), 342 (Robin and Irvine), 373 address space, loading executable AND logical operator, in x86 into another process’s, 595 architecture, 75 address space layout randomization anti-debugging, 351–366 (ASLR), 184 checks, -
R-Linux User's Manual
User's Manual R-Linux © R-Tools Technology Inc 2019. All rights reserved. www.r-tt.com © R-tools Technology Inc 2019. All rights reserved. No part of this User's Manual may be copied, altered, or transferred to, any other media without written, explicit consent from R-tools Technology Inc.. All brand or product names appearing herein are trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective holders. R-tools Technology Inc. has developed this User's Manual to the best of its knowledge, but does not guarantee that the program will fulfill all the desires of the user. No warranty is made in regard to specifications or features. R-tools Technology Inc. retains the right to make alterations to the content of this Manual without the obligation to inform third parties. Contents I Table of Contents I Introduction to R-Linux 1 1 R-Studi.o.. .F..e..a..t.u..r.e..s.. ................................................................................................................. 2 2 R-Linux.. .S..y..s.t.e..m... .R...e..q..u..i.r.e..m...e..n..t.s. .............................................................................................. 4 3 Contac.t. .I.n..f.o..r.m...a..t.i.o..n.. .a..n..d.. .T..e..c..h..n..i.c.a..l. .S...u..p..p..o..r.t. ......................................................................... 4 4 R-Linux.. .M...a..i.n.. .P..a..n..e..l. .............................................................................................................. 5 5 R-Linu..x.. .S..e..t.t.i.n..g..s. .................................................................................................................. 10 II Data Recovery Using R-Linux 16 1 Basic .F..i.l.e.. .R..e..c..o..v..e..r.y.. ............................................................................................................ 17 Searching for. -
Exploiting Rich Content Riley Hassell Isec Partners, Inc
iSEC Partners, Inc. Exploiting Rich Content Riley Hassell iSEC Partners, Inc. is a As rich Internet application (RIA) technologies flourish in the mar- information security firm ketplace security professionals begun to wonder what impact RIA that specializes in appli- will have on security landscape. I decided to perform an assessment cation, network, host, of one of the most widely deployed technologies, Adobe Flash, and and product security. For in the process discovered several issues that could be used to com- more information about promise systems with Adobe Flash installed. During the audit a iSEC, please refer to the large group of issues was uncovered that initially appeared harm- Appendix A or less. Later in this paper I will describe how attackers can exploit www.isecpartners.com these perceived low risk issues to have a much deeper impact. Flash Overview . Testing Methodology . Manual Review . Reverse Engineering . Automated Testing . Test Results Flash Overview Adobe Flash is one of the most widely deployed software technolo- gies to date. The (Millward Brown) estimates 99% of internet- connected computers are Flash enabled. Flash delivers a wide va- riety of rich multimedia feature to its clients including: rich web based application, video streaming, gaming, and Figure 1 Flash per Internet enabled desktops. 1 The SWF version 92 file format consists of 64 tag types that are parsed sequentially through the file. Tags have a TLV (type, length, value) structure. Some tags contain embedded data such as bitmaps, sounds, fonts, and even video. Several tags support subtypes of var- ious depths. One such tag is DoAction. This tag contains compiled ActionScript 2.0 byte codes. -
Positive-Research-2016-Eng.Pdf
03 05 07 09 11 13 15 CONTENTS 17 19 21 23 Editorial Note. Insecure Security and the Key Trends of 2016 ..............................................................................2 25 27 TOP 15 Leaks of 2015 .....................................................................................................................................................................3 29 Vulnerabilities in Corporate Information Systems in 2015: Worse than Expected ...................................6 31 33 Network Perimeter Life in Pictures .....................................................................................................................................10 35 Intelligent Transport Systems ................................................................................................................................................16 37 39 Cybersecurity at Sea ....................................................................................................................................................................19 41 Web Application Vulnerabilities in 2015 .........................................................................................................................23 43 45 Web Application Firewalls: Ways to Protect Your Site .............................................................................................27 47 Financial Sector: Key Vulnerabilities in 2015 .................................................................................................................31 49 51 Developing Secure Online -
X-Ways Forensics & Winhex Manual
X-Ways Software Technology AG X-Ways Forensics/ WinHex Integrated Computer Forensics Environment. Data Recovery & IT Security Tool. Hexadecimal Editor for Files, Disks & RAM. Manual Copyright © 1995-2021 Stefan Fleischmann, X-Ways Software Technology AG. All rights reserved. Contents 1 Preface ..................................................................................................................................................1 1.1 About WinHex and X-Ways Forensics.........................................................................................1 1.2 Legalities.......................................................................................................................................2 1.3 License Types ...............................................................................................................................4 1.4 More differences between WinHex & X-Ways Forensics............................................................5 1.5 Getting Started with X-Ways Forensics........................................................................................6 2 Technical Background ........................................................................................................................7 2.1 Using a Hex Editor........................................................................................................................7 2.2 Endian-ness...................................................................................................................................8 2.3 Integer -
Reverse Engineering III: PE Format
Reverse Engineering III: PE Format Gergely Erdélyi – Senior Manager, Anti-malware Research Protecting the irreplaceable | f-secure.com Introduction to PE • PE stands for Portable Executable • Microsoft introduced PE in Windows NT 3.1 • It originates from Unix COFF • Features dynamic linking, symbol exporting/importing • Can contain Intel, Alpha, MIPS and even .NET MSIL binary code • 64-bit version is called PE32+ 2 Complete Structure of PE 3 File Headers: MZ header struct _IMAGE_DOS_HEADER { 0x00 WORD e_magic; MZ Header 0x02 WORD e_cblp; 0x04 WORD e_cp; PE Header 0x06 WORD e_crlc; 0x08 WORD e_cparhdr; 0x0a WORD e_minalloc; 0x0c WORD e_maxalloc; Code Section 0x0e WORD e_ss; 0x10 WORD e_sp; 0x12 WORD e_csum; 0x14 WORD e_ip; Data Section 0x16 WORD e_cs; 0x18 WORD e_lfarlc; 0x1a WORD e_ovno; 0x1c WORD e_res[4]; Imports 0x24 WORD e_oemid; 0x26 WORD e_oeminfo; 0x28 WORD e_res2[10]; Resources 0x3c DWORD e_lfanew; }; 4 File Headers: PE Header MZ Header struct _IMAGE_NT_HEADERS { 0x00 DWORD Signature; 0x04 _IMAGE_FILE_HEADER FileHeader; File Header 0x18 _IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER OptionalHeader; }; Optional Header Section Header Section Header 5 File Headers: File Header MZ Header struct _IMAGE_FILE_HEADER { 0x00 WORD Machine; 0x02 WORD NumberOfSections; File Header 0x04 DWORD TimeDateStamp; 0x08 DWORD PointerToSymbolTable; 0x0c DWORD NumberOfSymbols; Optional 0x10 WORD SizeOfOptionalHeader; Header 0x12 WORD Characteristics; }; Section Header Section Header 6 File Headers: Optional Header struct _IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER { 0x00 WORD Magic; 0x02 BYTE MajorLinkerVersion; -
Winhex Manual
X-Ways Software Technology AG WinHex/ X-Ways Forensics Integrated Computer Forensics Environment. Data Recovery & IT Security Tool. Hexadecimal Editor for Files, Disks & RAM. Manual Copyright © 1995-2007 Stefan Fleischmann, X-Ways Software Technology AG. All rights reserved. Contents 1 Preface ..................................................................................................................................................1 1.1 About WinHex and X-Ways Forensics.........................................................................................1 1.2 Legalities.......................................................................................................................................2 1.3 License Types ...............................................................................................................................3 1.4 Differences between WinHex and X-Ways Forensics..................................................................4 1.5 Getting Started with X-Ways Forensics........................................................................................5 2 Technical Background ........................................................................................................................5 2.1 Using a Hex Editor........................................................................................................................5 2.2 Endian-ness...................................................................................................................................6 2.3 -
COMPARATIVE FILE STRUCTURE ANALYSIS of VIDEO FILES SENT and RECEIVED VIA WHATSAPP by SIMON JEROME VICTOR B.F.A. University of Th
COMPARATIVE FILE STRUCTURE ANALYSIS OF VIDEO FILES SENT AND RECEIVED VIA WHATSAPP by SIMON JEROME VICTOR B.F.A. University of the West Indies, 2016 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science Recording Arts Program 2020 This thesis for the Master of Science degree by Simon Jerome Victor has been approved for the Recording Arts Program by Catalin Grigoras, Chair Cole Whitecotton Jeffrey Smith Date: December 12, 2020 ii Victor, Simon Jerome (M.S., Recording Arts Program) Comparative File Structure Analysis of Video Files Sent and Received via WhatsApp Thesis directed by Associate Professor Catalin Grigoras ABSTRACT WhatsApp is a popular cross-platform messaging service that is used by a sizable fraction of the world’s population for passing along all manner of information. This paper compares the differences introduced in video files sent, and then received via WhatsApp. It utilizes videos created in native video recording applications, and where possible, files recorded in the WhatsApp application using the recording feature. The information gathered in this research project will be useful in understanding changes to the file structure of video files sent through WhatsApp, which aids in the process of video authentication for forensic purposes. It will also explore the differences in available acquisition methods of the files sent through WhatsApp to preserve as much data as possible for forensic purposes. To achieve this the study will look at metadata, binary data, file structure, and any other relevant observations. -
ODTTF ? O ODTTF Is an Embedded Font File Type Used in Microsoft Office XML Format
BREAKING FONT PARSERS CELIL UNUVER – BEKIR KARUL • Celil UNUVER @celilunuver o Founder and Researcher @SignalSEC Ltd. o Organizer of NOPcon Hacker Conference o Vuln Research, RE, Fuzzing and SCADA o Speaker at CODE BLUE, CONFidence 2010, Swiss Cyber Storm, DefCamp • Bekir KARUL @bek_phys o Researcher @SignalSEC Ltd. o Windows Internals, Malware, RE o bekirkarul.com 21 Ekim 2015 signalsec.com 2 I. Introduction to Fonts II. TTF Structure III. Kırlangıç TTF Fuzzer IV. Generating test cases with fuzzed TTF V. Fuzzing Results VI. Questions 21 Ekim 2015 signalsec.com 3 • Applications can use four different kinds of GDI font technologies to display and print text 1. Raster 2. Vector 3. TrueType 4. Microsoft OpenType • The GDI(Graphis Device Interface ) is part of the core operating system component responsible for representing graphical objects and transmitting them to output devices such as monitors and printers. • The differences between these fonts reflect the way that the glyph for each character or symbol is stored in the respective font-resource file 21 Ekim 2015 signalsec.com 4 Raster : a glyph is a bitmap that the system uses to draw a single character in the font. Vector : a glyph is a collection of line endpoints that define the line segments that the system uses to draw a character in the font. TrueType & OpenType : a glyph is a collection of line and curve commands as well as a collection of hints. http://msdn.microsoft.com/en‐us/library/dd162893(v=vs.85).aspx 21 Ekim 2015 signalsec.com 5 • A TrueType font file contains data in table format, that comprises an outline font • And the raster device uses combinations of data from different tables to render the glyph data in the font.