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What Can We Learn from Shape Dynamics? International Loop Quantum Gravity Seminar
What can we learn from shape dynamics? International Loop Quantum Gravity Seminar Tim A. Koslowski University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, NB, Canada November 12, 2013 Tim A. Koslowski (UNB) What can we learn from shape dynamics? November 12, 2013 1 / 19 Outline 1 Motivation from 2+1 diemsnional qunatum gravity to consider conformal evolution as fundamental 2 Conformal evolution is different from spacetime (i.e. abandon spacetime) 3 Generic dynamical emergence of spacetime in the presence of matter (i.e. regain spacetime) Tim A. Koslowski (UNB) What can we learn from shape dynamics? November 12, 2013 2 / 19 Introduction and Motivation Tim A. Koslowski (UNB) What can we learn from shape dynamics? November 12, 2013 3 / 19 Motivation Canonical metric path integral in 2+1 (only known metric path integral) ab p necessary: 2+1 split and CMC gauge condition gabπ − t g = 0 R 2 ab R ab a pπ c i dtd x(_gabπ −S(N)−H(ξ)) Z = [dgab][dπ ][dN][dξ ]δ[ g − t]δ[F ] det[FP ]e R 2 A R A i dtd x(_τAp −Vo(τ;p;t)) = [dτA][dp ]e [Carlip: CQG 12 (1995) 2201, Seriu PRD 55 (1997) 781] where: τA are Teichm¨ullerparameters, Vo(τ; p; t) denotes on-shell volume, which depends explicitly on time t ) QM on Teichm¨ullerspace, phys. Hamilt. Vo(τ; p; t) [Moncrief: JMP 30 (1989) 2907] Fradkin-Vilkovisky theorem: [cf. Henneaux/Teitelboim: \Quantization of Gauge Systems"] \Partition function depends on gauge fixing cond. only through the gauge equivalence class of gauge fixing conditions." for a discussion and some examples of non-equivalence [see Govaerts, Scholtz: J.Phys. -
The Metaphysical Baggage of Physics Lee Smolin Argues That Life Is More
The Metaphysical Baggage of Physics Lee Smolin argues that life is more fundamental than physical laws. BY MICHAEL SEGAL ILLUSTRATION BY LOUISA BERTMAN JANUARY 30, 2014 An issue on tme would not be complete without a conversaton with Lee Smolin. High school dropout, theoretcal physicist, and founding member of the Perimeter Insttute for Theoretcal Physics in Waterloo, Canada, Smolin’s life and work refect many of the values of this magazine. Constantly probing the edges of physics, he has also pushed beyond them, into economics and the philosophy of science, and into popular writng. Not one to shy away from a confrontaton, his 2008 bookThe Trouble with Physicstook aim at string theory, calling one of the hotest developments in theoretcal physics of the past 50 years a dead end. In his thinking on tme too, he has taken a diferent tack from the mainstream, arguing that the fow of tme is not just real, but more fundamental than physical law. He spoke to me on the phone from his home in Toronto. How long have you been thinking about tme? The whole story starts back in the ’80s when I was puzzling over the failure of string theory to uniquely tell us the principles that determine what the laws of physics are. I challenged myself to invent a way that nature might select what the laws of physics turned out to be. I invented a hypothesis called Cosmological Natural Selecton, which was testable, which made explicit predictons. This wasn’t my main day job; my main day job was working on quantum gravity where it’s assumed that tme is unreal, that tme is an illusion, and I was working, like anybody else, on the assumpton that tme is an illusion for most of my career. -
Some Thoughts About Natural Law
Some Thoughts About Natural Law Phflip E. Johnsont My first task is to define the subject. When I use the term "natural" law, I am distinguishing the category from other kinds of law such as positive law, divine law, or scientific law. When we discuss positive law, we look to materials like legislation, judicial opinions, and scholarly anal- ysis of these materials. If we speak of divine law, we ask if there are any knowable commands from God. If we look for scientific law, we conduct experiments, or make observations and calculations, in order to come to objectively verifiable knowledge about the material world. Natural law-as I will be using the term in this essay-refers to a method that we employ to judge what the principles of individual moral- ity or positive law ought to be. The natural law philosopher aspires to make these judgments on the basis of reason and human nature without invoking divine revelation or prophetic inspiration. Natural law so defined is a category much broader than any particular theory of natural law. One can believe in the existence of natural law without agreeing with the particular systems of natural law advocates like Aristotle or Aquinas. I am describing a way of thinking, not a particular theory. In the broad sense in which I am using the term, therefore, anyone who attempts to found concepts of justice upon reason and human nature engages in natural law philosophy. Contemporary philosophical systems based on feminism, wealth maximization, neutral conversation, liberal equality, or libertarianism are natural law philosophies. -
Scientific Explanation
Scientific Explanation Michael Strevens For the Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy, second edition The three cardinal aims of science are prediction, control, and expla- nation; but the greatest of these is explanation. Also the most inscrutable: prediction aims at truth, and control at happiness, and insofar as we have some independent grasp of these notions, we can evaluate science’s strate- gies of prediction and control from the outside. Explanation, by contrast, aims at scientific understanding, a good intrinsic to science and therefore something that it seems we can only look to science itself to explicate. Philosophers have wondered whether science might be better off aban- doning the pursuit of explanation. Duhem (1954), among others, argued that explanatory knowledge would have to be a kind of knowledge so ex- alted as to be forever beyond the reach of ordinary scientific inquiry: it would have to be knowledge of the essential natures of things, something that neo-Kantians, empiricists, and practical men of science could all agree was neither possible nor perhaps even desirable. Everything changed when Hempel formulated his dn account of ex- planation. In accordance with the observation above, that our only clue to the nature of explanatory knowledge is science’s own explanatory prac- tice, Hempel proposed simply to describe what kind of things scientists ten- dered when they claimed to have an explanation, without asking whether such things were capable of providing “true understanding”. Since Hempel, the philosophy of scientific explanation has proceeded in this humble vein, 1 seeming more like a sociology of scientific practice than an inquiry into a set of transcendent norms. -
Two Concepts of Law of Nature
Prolegomena 12 (2) 2013: 413–442 Two Concepts of Law of Nature BRENDAN SHEA Winona State University, 528 Maceman St. #312, Winona, MN, 59987, USA [email protected] ORIGINAL SCIENTIFIC ARTICLE / RECEIVED: 04–12–12 ACCEPTED: 23–06–13 ABSTRACT: I argue that there are at least two concepts of law of nature worthy of philosophical interest: strong law and weak law . Strong laws are the laws in- vestigated by fundamental physics, while weak laws feature prominently in the “special sciences” and in a variety of non-scientific contexts. In the first section, I clarify my methodology, which has to do with arguing about concepts. In the next section, I offer a detailed description of strong laws, which I claim satisfy four criteria: (1) If it is a strong law that L then it also true that L; (2) strong laws would continue to be true, were the world to be different in some physically possible way; (3) strong laws do not depend on context or human interest; (4) strong laws feature in scientific explanations but cannot be scientifically explained. I then spell out some philosophical consequences: (1) is incompatible with Cartwright’s contention that “laws lie” (2) with Lewis’s “best-system” account of laws, and (3) with contextualism about laws. In the final section, I argue that weak laws are distinguished by (approximately) meeting some but not all of these criteria. I provide a preliminary account of the scientific value of weak laws, and argue that they cannot plausibly be understood as ceteris paribus laws. KEY WORDS: Contextualism, counterfactuals, David Lewis, laws of nature, Nancy Cartwright, physical necessity. -
A Singing, Dancing Universe Jon Butterworth Enjoys a Celebration of Mathematics-Led Theoretical Physics
SPRING BOOKS COMMENT under physicist and Nobel laureate William to the intensely scrutinized narrative on the discovery “may turn out to be the greatest Henry Bragg, studying small mol ecules such double helix itself, he clarifies key issues. He development in the field of molecular genet- as tartaric acid. Moving to the University points out that the infamous conflict between ics in recent years”. And, on occasion, the of Leeds, UK, in 1928, Astbury probed the Wilkins and chemist Rosalind Franklin arose scope is too broad. The tragic figure of Nikolai structure of biological fibres such as hair. His from actions of John Randall, head of the Vavilov, the great Soviet plant geneticist of the colleague Florence Bell took the first X-ray biophysics unit at King’s College London. He early twentieth century who perished in the diffraction photographs of DNA, leading to implied to Franklin that she would take over Gulag, features prominently, but I am not sure the “pile of pennies” model (W. T. Astbury Wilkins’ work on DNA, yet gave Wilkins the how relevant his research is here. Yet pulling and F. O. Bell Nature 141, 747–748; 1938). impression she would be his assistant. Wilkins such figures into the limelight is partly what Her photos, plagued by technical limitations, conceded the DNA work to Franklin, and distinguishes Williams’s book from others. were fuzzy. But in 1951, Astbury’s lab pro- PhD student Raymond Gosling became her What of those others? Franklin Portugal duced a gem, by the rarely mentioned Elwyn assistant. It was Gosling who, under Franklin’s and Jack Cohen covered much the same Beighton. -
Shape Dynamics
Shape Dynamics Tim A. Koslowski Abstract Barbour’s formulation of Mach’s principle requires a theory of gravity to implement local relativity of clocks, local relativity of rods and spatial covariance. It turns out that relativity of clocks and rods are mutually exclusive. General Relativity implements local relativity of clocks and spatial covariance, but not local relativity of rods. It is the purpose of this contribution to show how Shape Dynamics, a theory that is locally equivalent to General Relativity, implements local relativity of rods and spatial covariance and how a BRST formulation, which I call Doubly General Relativity, implements all of Barbour’s principles. 1 Introduction A reflection on Mach’s principle lead Barbour to postulate that rods and spatial frames of reference should be locally determined by a procedure that he calls “best matching,” while clocks should be locally determined by what he calls “objective change.” (For more, see [1].) More concretely, Barbour’s principles postulate lo- cal time reparametrization invariance, local spatial conformal invariance and spatial covariance. The best matching algorithm for spatial covariance and local spatial conformal invariance turns out to be equivalent to the imposition of linear diffeo- morphism and conformal constraints Z Z 3 ab 3 H(x) = d xp (Lx g)ab; C(r) = d xr p; (1) S S Tim A. Koslowski Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics, 31 Caroline St. N, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada New address: Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of New Brunswick Fredericton, New Brunswick E3B 5A3, Canada e-mail: [email protected] 1 2 Tim A. -
Ast#: ___Science Knowledge Study Guide Physical
Name: ______________________________ Pd: ___ Ast#: _____ Science Knowledge Study Guide Physical Science Honors Provide a short response to the following prompts. 1. Describe how scientific knowledge is affected by new evidence (if the new evidence does NOT support the current understanding). Scientific knowledge grows and changes as new evidence is uncovered. 2. What is scientific knowledge built from? (list 3 things) Continuous testing and observation Debate (argumentation) All contribute to the EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE Confirmation (repetition & replication) 3. Why is it important that we use phrases such as “the results suggest…” or “the evidence supports…” rather than using words such as “prove” or “proof”? Using words such as “prove” violate the tentative nature of science. They imply that scientific knowledge is concrete and unchanging. However, scientific knowledge must remain open to change. 4. Under what circumstances will a scientific theory become a law? Explain. A scientific theory will NEVER become a scientific law; it cannot, nor is it supposed to. A scientific theory and a scientific law are two different things with different purposes (an apple will never become an orange). 5. Why are scientific theories rarely discarded (completely abandoned), even when new evidence doesn’t fit within the current theory? Scientific theories are rarely completely discarded because they are heavily-tested and well-supported explanations. It is rare that new evidence completely invalidates a theory; rather, it is more likely that the theory can be “tweaked” or changed slightly to accommodate the new evidence. 6. What represents the BEST explanation that science can offer? Scientific theories represent the best explanations science has to offer. -
On the Axioms of Causal Set Theory
On the Axioms of Causal Set Theory Benjamin F. Dribus Louisiana State University [email protected] November 8, 2013 Abstract Causal set theory is a promising attempt to model fundamental spacetime structure in a discrete order-theoretic context via sets equipped with special binary relations, called causal sets. The el- ements of a causal set are taken to represent spacetime events, while its binary relation is taken to encode causal relations between pairs of events. Causal set theory was introduced in 1987 by Bombelli, Lee, Meyer, and Sorkin, motivated by results of Hawking and Malament relating the causal, conformal, and metric structures of relativistic spacetime, together with earlier work on discrete causal theory by Finkelstein, Myrheim, and 't Hooft. Sorkin has coined the phrase, \order plus number equals geometry," to summarize the causal set viewpoint regarding the roles of causal structure and discreteness in the emergence of spacetime geometry. This phrase represents a specific version of what I refer to as the causal metric hypothesis, which is the idea that the properties of the physical universe, and in particular, the metric properties of classical spacetime, arise from causal structure at the fundamental scale. Causal set theory may be expressed in terms of six axioms: the binary axiom, the measure axiom, countability, transitivity, interval finiteness, and irreflexivity. The first three axioms, which fix the physical interpretation of a causal set, and restrict its \size," appear in the literature either implic- itly, or as part of the preliminary definition of a causal set. The last three axioms, which encode the essential mathematical structure of a causal set, appear in the literature as the irreflexive formula- tion of causal set theory. -
BEYOND SPACE and TIME the Secret Network of the Universe: How Quantum Geometry Might Complete Einstein’S Dream
BEYOND SPACE AND TIME The secret network of the universe: How quantum geometry might complete Einstein’s dream By Rüdiger Vaas With the help of a few innocuous - albeit subtle and potent - equations, Abhay Ashtekar can escape the realm of ordinary space and time. The mathematics developed specifically for this purpose makes it possible to look behind the scenes of the apparent stage of all events - or better yet: to shed light on the very foundation of reality. What sounds like black magic, is actually incredibly hard physics. Were Albert Einstein alive today, it would have given him great pleasure. For the goal is to fulfil the big dream of a unified theory of gravity and the quantum world. With the new branch of science of quantum geometry, also called loop quantum gravity, Ashtekar has come close to fulfilling this dream - and tries thereby, in addition, to answer the ultimate questions of physics: the mysteries of the big bang and black holes. "On the Planck scale there is a precise, rich, and discrete structure,” says Ashtekar, professor of physics and Director of the Center for Gravitational Physics and Geometry at Pennsylvania State University. The Planck scale is the smallest possible length scale with units of the order of 10-33 centimeters. That is 20 orders of magnitude smaller than what the world’s best particle accelerators can detect. At this scale, Einstein’s theory of general relativity fails. Its subject is the connection between space, time, matter and energy. But on the Planck scale it gives unreasonable values - absurd infinities and singularities. -
Why Do We Remember? the Communicative Function of Episodic Memory
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2018), Page 1 of 63 doi:10.1017/S0140525X17000012,e1 Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory Johannes B. Mahr Department of Cognitive Science, Cognitive Development Center, Central European University, 1051 Budapest, Hungary [email protected] https://cognitivescience.ceu.edu/people/johannes-mahr Gergely Csibra Department of Cognitive Science, Cognitive Development Center, Central European University, 1051 Budapest, Hungary [email protected] https://cognitivescience.ceu.edu/people/gergely-csibra Abstract: Episodic memory has been analyzed in a number of different ways in both philosophy and psychology, and most controversy has centered on its self-referential, autonoetic character. Here, we offer a comprehensive characterization of episodic memory in representational terms and propose a novel functional account on this basis. We argue that episodic memory should be understood as a distinctive epistemic attitude taken toward an event simulation. In this view, episodic memory has a metarepresentational format and should not be equated with beliefs about the past. Instead, empirical findings suggest that the contents of human episodic memory are often constructed in the service of the explicit justification of such beliefs. Existing accounts of episodic memory function that have focused on explaining its constructive character through its role in future-oriented mental time travel do justice neither to its capacity to ground veridical beliefs about the past nor to its representational format. We provide an account of the metarepresentational structure of episodic memory in terms of its role in communicative interaction. The generative nature of recollection allows us to represent and communicate the reasons why we hold certain beliefs about the past. -
THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD and the LAW by Bemvam L
Hastings Law Journal Volume 19 | Issue 1 Article 7 1-1967 The cS ientific ethoM d and the Law Bernard L. Diamond Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Bernard L. Diamond, The Scientific etM hod and the Law, 19 Hastings L.J. 179 (1967). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol19/iss1/7 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND THE LAW By BEmVAm L. DIivmN* WHEN I was an adolescent, one of the major influences which determined my choice of medicine as a career was a fascinating book entitled Anomalies and Curiosities of Medicine. This huge volume, originally published in 1897, is a museum of pictures and lurid de- scriptions of human monstrosities and abnormalities of all kinds, many with sexual overtones of a kind which would especially appeal to a morbid adolescent. I never thought, at the time I first read this book, that some day, I too, would be an anomaly and curiosity of medicine. But indeed I am, for I stand before you here as a most curious and anomalous individual: a physician, psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, and (I hope) a scientist, who also happens to be a professor of law. But I am not a lawyer, nor in any way trained in the law; hence, the anomaly. The curious question is, of course, why should a non-lawyer physician and scientist, like myself, be on the faculty of a reputable law school.