The German Cavalry at the Battle of the Marne
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Royal United Services Institution. Journal ISSN: 0035-9289 (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rusi19 The German Cavalry at the Battle of the Marne Lieut.-Colonel Poudret To cite this article: Lieut.-Colonel Poudret (1920) The German Cavalry at the Battle of the Marne, Royal United Services Institution. Journal, 65:460, 767-779, DOI: 10.1080/03071842009421922 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071842009421922 Published online: 11 Sep 2009. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 17 View related articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rusi20 Download by: [University of California Santa Barbara] Date: 18 June 2016, At: 13:58 THE GERMAN CAVALRY AT THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE. By LIEUT.-COLONELPOUDRET. Translated, by permission, from the Revue Militaire Suisse. GENERAL VON KLUCK seemed to be acting in obedience to a recognized rule of strategy when he diverted his army on September 4th, 1914, from the direction of Paris, a geographical objective, in order to concentrate on the destruction of the French armies. That might well have been achieved had Paris constituted nothing but a geographical objective. In reality, however, it represented something quite different. From behind its fortifications appeared a menace followed by a pressure which became more and more violent until it finally brought to nought a very fine plan of campaign. The movement of General von Kluck, ordered, or at any rate approved by the German General Spff (for it is inconceivable that such a decision could have been left to the sple judgment of the commander of the First Army), can only be justified on the assump- tion that he was fully in touch with all that was going on near the capital. Was Von.Kluck badly informed by his cavalry? Was he ignorant of the concentration of the Sixth French Army. Finally, was he wrong in not leaving all Von der Marwitz's cavalry on his right ffank when diverting his course towards Coulommiers? I think one can safely answer all these questions in the negative. As far as the first two are concerned, a.study of the details where it is possible will be 'worth while, not only because it is interesting to know exactly under what conditions the march on Paris was aban- doned, but also because cavalry have seldom, been confronted by reconnaissance .work so full of interest and respon'sibility. The situation was as follows :-By September 3rd the withdrawal of the Sixth French Army, formerly the Army of the Somme, brought it to the line Dammartin-Pontoise, where it halted and took up a position facing north. It had in front of it the army of Von Kluck Downloaded by [University of California Santa Barbara] at 13:58 18 June 2016 stretching from Creil to Nanteuil. It.was on this day that the German commander decided to wheel to the south-east. General von Kluck cannot have been ignorant of the presence of the Sixth Army, now supported on the garrison of Paris. The cavalry looked for it and should have found it. Its patrols were working forward in the right places: since September 1st they had been searching the country in all directions. It is true that they were less numerous on the right, held up probably by the large 268 GERMAX CAVALRY AT THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE stretch of forests which block the approaches to Paris on a wide and broad front; though one patrol, consisting of a force of Uhlans, penetrated as far as Pontoise. Farther to the left reconnaissance patrols worked forward to La Chapelle-en-Serval, Survillers, and Sainte-’CVitz, where the high ground commands the road to Senlis and the railway to Saint-Denis. Such an observation post was certainly most valuable. Still farther to the east, the forest obstacle does not esist, the country is open and allows an extensive field of view. Here also the patrols pushed well ahead along the corridor between the railways to Saint-Denis and to Nanteuil-le-Houdoin. Before September 1st dawned several squadrons had already passed through Ermenonville. Lagny- le-Sec was occupied on the and,’ and the patrols pushed forward, following the main road to Paris, on Dammartin and Villeneuve, one of them getting close to Gonesse on the 4th. Neither was the Meaus district forgotten ; Plessis-L’Eveque, Chanconin, and other villages were searched, also Penchard, where good observation can be had from the high ground. On September qth, hearing of the German change of direction, General Gallieni ordered the Sixth Army to concentrate on its right. This brought the VIIth Corps near Louvres, General Lamaze’s corps near Menil-Amelot, and the territorial divisions to Tremblay-les- Gonesses. These three sectors, or the two flank ones at any rate, one of which includes the road and railway Paris-Nanteuil-le-Houdoin and the other the Senlis road and the SaintTDenis railway, must have been reconnoitred, since the visit of patrols has been recorded in each of them. Without taking into account the esaggerations of the Berlin bulletin which triumphantly announced on September 3rd that the cavalry of the First Army were patrolling “close up to the gates of Paris,” it must be admitted that they were not far from them, and that they had in any case worked sufficiently far ahead to be in a position to gain all the .necessary information. Quite apart from reports which he certainly had from other sources, General von Kluck must therefore have heard from his cavalry about the concentration of Maunoury’s army. It will also be remembered that the IVth German Reserve Corps was not taken by surprise. It appears, in fact, that the first shots were fired by it about midday on the Sth, from the heights a Downloaded by [University of California Santa Barbara] at 13:58 18 June 2016 of Monthyon, against French battery leaving Yverny which thought itself in safety. If General von Icluck was not altogether ignorant of the presence of Maunoury’s army on his right flank, he did not know its actual strength and composition; even had his cavalry been stronger and more enterprising it could not have given him that information. Further, it could not have told him that the enemy, far from being demoralized and thinking himself beaten, was preparing for the most ~ ~~ 1La Marche sur Paris de l’aile droite allemande. Comte de Caix de Saint- Aymour. Lavauzelle, Paris, 1916. GERMAN CAVALRY AT THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 769 vigorous offensive and was confident of victory. Again, the cavalry could not report that in the following days fresh forces would come out from Paris and increase the danger which had been gradually growing since the first days of September. The German General Staff took a false step through not having foreseen this possibility, or through disregarding its importance, and also through under-estimating their opponent. Their error lay in a wrong appreciation of the facts, and this led to a hazardous maneuvre. Paris was neglected, owing to the certainty they felt of entering it a week later; a corps was marched across the front of the British Army as the latter was regarded as of no value after its hurried retreat, even if it was considered before that. The first effort to attack the German flank, that begun by the Army of the Somme, had been easily repulsed, and it was doubtless thought that the second could be similarly .dealt with if it ever matured. Such a possibility, however, seemed improb- able, as the French Government had left Paris, and, according to the German papers, revolution had broken out in the capital. To sum up, therefore, it seems that an error of judgment rather than lack of information was responsible, and the cavalry must be held blameless. Of the three divisions of Von der illarwitz’s corps we have seen that only the 4th was left with the IVth Reserve Corps on the Ourcq. So far as reconnaissance, this division should certainly have sufficed for all needs, although they became very considerable during the battle. Nevertheless, it is impossible to admit that the presence of the whole corps on the Ourcq would have altered the issue of the battle. Further, the clever employment of the cavalry south of the Marne and the services it rendered between September. 6th and 10th seem to prove that the distribution of it as ordered was not a mistake. Let us now see what was the general situation on the evening of the 5th on that part of the front which concerns us: namely, the German right wing. The whole interest of the battle is there. The movement begun on the 4th brought General von Kluclr’s army along and to the south of the Crecy-Esternay road on the 5th. The right, formed by the-IInd Corps, faced the British Army. Then came the IVth (Active) Corps and the two divisions of Von der RIarwitz’s cavalry, south-east of Coulommiers. Richthofen’s Downloaded by [University of California Santa Barbara] at 13:58 18 June 2016 cavalry corps lay to the south of La FertBGaucher, with the IIIrd Corps on its left. The IXth Corps was at Esternay, with a portion farther to the north, and formed the left of the First Army. General von Kluclr’s line of outposts estended from Villiers-sur-Rlorin through RIortcerf, Vaudoy, and Courchamp to Saint Bon, and Chatillon-sur- Morin. General von Biilow’s army was not in line with the First Army, but echeloned behind it.