Submission by Civil Liberties Australia CLA

TO: Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee

Review of the Trade and Foreign Investment (Protecting the Public Interest) Bill 2014

Contents

1) Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement, has developed expanded legal rights for investors which do not exist in national legal systems. 2) The effect of creating special rights for foreign investors has led to the unintended consequence of offshoring jobs as corporations move offshore to acquire the rights of foreign corporations. 3) ISDS provisions dilute the competitive advantage enjoyed by developed economies characterised by the rule of law. 4) The number of cases pursued against countries for introducing measures to protect public health, the environment and other socially beneficial legislation has increased. 5) Costs to government and taxpayers and ongoing “chilling” effect on proposals for socially beneficial legislation. 6) ISDS procedures lack legal protections of the kind found in domestic legal systems 7) Recent “safeguards” included in ISDS clauses to protect health, environment and other public interest legislation have not been effective. 8) Increasing numbers of governments are withdrawing from ISDS. 9) ISDS provisions apply not only to the Commonwealth Government, but to state and local governments also. Yet there is no evidence of any consultation with state and local governments on this issue, or on this Bill. 10) ISDS provisions would weaken our sovereignty by removing the rights of the Commonwealth of Australia to make its own binding laws. 11) Arising out of all of the above effects, ISDS provisions are shown to be inherently anti- democratic.

References with annotations (Roman numerals in the text refer to the numerical sequence of the references)

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1) ISDS has developed expanded legal rights for investors which do not exist in national legal systems.

ISDS enables foreign investors to sue governments for compensation in an international tribunal if they can claim that a domestic law or policy “harms” their investment or threatens their profits. ISDS clauses were originally intended to ensure payment of monetary compensation to foreign investors in the event of the actual expropriation or taking of their property by host governments. They were designed to protect companies investing in countries with unstable governments or inadequate legal systems.

Over time, corporation interests have expanded legal concepts such as “indirect expropriation” and “fair and equitable treatment” beyond the scope of their meaning in national legal systems, enabling investors to lodge claims against countries on the grounds that a domestic law, regulation or policy reduces the value of their investment. This violates the principle of “equal treatment” in trade law.

(See VIII United Nations Committee on Trade and Development, (UNCTAD), 2000, p. 11)

2) The effect of creating special rights for foreign investors has led to the unintended consequence of offshoring jobs as corporations move offshore to acquire the rights of foreign corporations.

(See XXIII NAFTA at 20: 1 Million Lost Jobs, 580% Increase in Trade Deficit – 2013)

3) ISDS provisions dilute the competitive advantage enjoyed by developed economies characterised by the rule of law.

By removing the perception of risks to investing in developing countries, advanced economies lose their attractiveness to foreign investors. Even think tanks such as the US Cato Institute, which have long been bastions of free trade, are beginning to advise against pursuing ISDS provisions in free trade agreements.

(See XXIV Daniel J. Ikenson (2014). A Compromise to Advance the Trade Agenda: Purge Negotiations of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (Cato Institute))

4) The number of cases pursued against countries for introducing measures to protect public health, the environment and other socially beneficial legislation is increasing.

With increasing frequency, foreign investors are suing governments for hundreds of millions of dollars over health, environment and other public interest legislation. Recent examples include:

• In 2009, on recommendations from the World Health Organisation (WHO), Uruguay increased the size of health warnings on cigarettes packets. The Uruguayan government was subsequently sued for US$2 billion by Philip Morris which claimed Uruguay had expropriated its trademark • The Eli Lilly pharmaceutical company suing the Canadian national government over a court decision to refuse a medicine patent • When an Ecuadorian court ordered Chevron to pay US$18 billion in damages for contaminating areas of the Amazonian rainforest, Chevron responded by suing Ecuador

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on the grounds that simply by allowing its court case to continue, it breached an investment treaty with the United States. • The US Lone Pine mining company suing the Québec provincial government of Canada over environmental regulation of shale gas mining • The Swedish energy company, Vattenfall, sued the German government over its decision to phase out nuclear energy • Argentina has been plagued with over 40 law suits for millions of dollars after freezing electricity and water charges during a time of economic crisis.

(See I Ken Sievers (2013); IV Gaukrodger and Gordon OECD, 2012, p. 7, and VII Public Citizen Table of Cases, 2014).; XX Mike Seccombe (2013) Abbott: open for business and multinational law suits, 20 Sept. 2013 (The Global Mail; XVIII Martin Khor (2013) The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA): When Foreign Investors Sue the State (Third World Economics); XXII United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Investor-State Disputes arising from Investment Treaties: a review. UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development – 2005)

5) Costs to government and taxpayers and ongoing “chilling” effect on proposals for socially beneficial legislation.

The costs of running cases (OECD estimates an average of $8 million per case, with some cases costing up to $30 million) and the compensation awarded to foreign investors (often hundreds of millions and in some cases billions of dollars), can dissuade governments from pursuing legitimate domestic legislation. The highest amount awarded to date is $1.8 billion against the government of Ecuador. This is damaging for any government, but particularly damaging for developing countries.

Many foreign corporations have greater financial resources to draw on than the countries they are suing. It has been documented that the Canadian Government withdrew plain packaging legislation after it was threatened with legal proceedings by a foreign corporation.

When corporations are allowed to exercise such power over governments, the effect is far worse than mere lobbying. Such behaviour is destined only to increase if ISDS provisions are included in the TPP. They amount to standover tactics on a grand scale by foreign corporations.

(See IV Gaukrodger and Gordon, OECD, 2012, p. 19; IX UNCTAD, 2013a, p. 3; XVI Peter Henning (2014) and XVII TTP Australia. Investor-State Dispute Settlement)

6) ISDS procedures lack legal protections of the kind found in domestic legal systems.

The disputes are heard by international investment tribunals, operating under different sets of rules, but all of which lack the safeguards of national legal systems in the following ways:

• The proceedings are not made public unless both parties agree and even the results of proceedings can remain secret, unlike national legal systems, where both the proceedings and the results are made public. • The arbitrators may be practising advocates, and so lack the independence of judges in national legal systems. • There is no system of precedents, so decisions lack consistency.

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• There is no avenue for appeal against decisions even when the decisions ignore treaty wording. • third-party funding of cases, described by the OECD as “a new industry composed of institutional investors who invest in litigation by providing finance in return for a stake in a legal claim” has encouraged a growing industry of investment law firms which actively solicit business and encourage large claims.

(See X UNCTAD, 2013b, p. 1; IV Gaukrodger and Gordon, OECD, 2012, p. 36)

7) Recent “safeguards” included in ISDS clauses to protect health, environment and other public interest legislation have not been effective.

It is often claimed that recent changes to the wording of ISDS clauses in trade and investment agreements such as the Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA), provide safeguards to prevent foreign investors from suing governments over health, environment or other public interest legislation.

However, the initial “safeguard” sentence in the KAFTA reads: "except in rare circumstances non- discriminatory regulatory actions by a party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations" (KAFTA chapter 11, annex 2B).

It has been pointed out by many legal experts that the phrase "except in rare circumstances" leaves a giant loophole, which has been utilised in recent cases.

The second “safeguard” limits the definition of "fair and equitable treatment" for foreign investors (KAFTA chapter 11, clause 11.5.2 and Annex 2A). Nevertheless, tribunals have ignored these limitations and applied the previous higher standard.

A third “safeguard” is a reference to the general protections for “human, animal or plant life” in article XX of the WTO General agreement on Tariffs and Trade (KAFTA Article 22.1). This article has only been successful in one out of 35 cases in the WTO which have attempted to use it to safeguard health and environmental legislation.

These same “safeguards” in recent trade agreements – like the Central American Free Trade Agreement and the Peru-US Free Trade Agreement – have not prevented foreign investors from launching cases against environmental legislation. For example:

• the Government of El Salvador has been sued by Pacific Rim Mining Corporation, under the Central American Free Trade agreement, over a ban on mining to protect the nation’s limited groundwater resources; and • the US-based Renco Group is using ISDS in the Peru-US free Trade Agreement to contest a local court decision that it was responsible for pollution from its lead mine. Both cases are ongoing and may take several years.

• (See Case studies in Public Citizen, V 2010, VI 2013, VII 2014; XIX Patricia Ranald (2014) Reply to the Trade Ministers’ claims that “safeguards” in trade agreements prevent investors from suing governments over health and environmental legislation;)

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8) Increasing numbers of governments are withdrawing from ISDS.

Governments are reviewing and terminating their involvement in ISDS, increasingly. These include members of the European Union, such as France and Germany, as well as Brazil, Argentina and eight other countries in Latin America, plus India and South Africa. Indonesia has recently announced it will terminate all 67 bilateral investment treaties because of the inclusion of ISDS.

(See IV Gaukrodger and Gordon, OECD, 2012, p.7; III European Parliamentary Research Service, 2014. p.2, and II Bland and Donnand, 2014)

9) ISDS provisions apply not only to the Australian Government, but to state and local governments also. Yet there is no indication of any consultation with state and local governments.

As far as the public are aware, there has been no evidence of the Commonwealth consulting with states about the possible impacts of entering into the TPP with ISDS provisions included. In the past, there have been procedures for liaising with state governments over legal implications of international treaties. If no appropriate consultation has been carried out, state and local governments will be in the invidious position of being liable for damages under provisions of a treaty they have not signed and may not have supported. The dilemma would allow the Australian Government in future to shift risk and costs to states without their having any say.

(See XV Anthony Klan (2014))

10) ISDS provisions would weaken our sovereignty by removing the rights of the Commonwealth of Australia to make its own laws.

There has been a growing trend for ISDS provisions to be used to strike down the laws of purportedly sovereign states and even to exert pressure on legislators not to pass laws in the public interest which are likely to have the support of the people. This is despite so-called safeguards introduced into ISDS clauses over recent years. And we have also seen an increase in the number of cases and the size of compensation sought by corporations. The TPP along with ISDS may be expected to further the scope for compensation cases, as the bulk of the agreement concerns domestic law and legislation rather than free trade per se.

(See XVII TTP Australia Investor-State Dispute Settlement)

11) Arising out of all of the above effects, ISDS provisions are inherently anti-democratic.

In effect much domestic legislation will be removed from the democratic process and outsourced to foreign companies whose sole aim is to maximise profits with zero responsibility. When Australian governments lose their sovereignty to foreign corporations, democracy becomes a sham, because the people will lose the ability to select a policy platform of their choice, which is the cornerstone of any democracy. Furthermore, very little information has been provided to the public about the many possibly adverse implications of the TPP and in particular, the ISDS provisions. In fact, a recent survey by the Australia Institute revealed that only 11% of the population even knew of the existence of the TPP.

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(See XXV Australia Institute (2013) Aussies in the dark about risky TPP trade deal)

References with annotations

I Ken Sievers (2013) “Why Australians should be worried about the TPP” http://www.wikileaksparty.org.au/why-australians-should-be-worried-about-the-tpp/ Extract: Some examples [of ISDS actions] from Latin America: “In 2009, the government of Uruguay, following recommendations from the World Health Organization, increased the size of health warnings on cigarettes packages. A year later, it was sued for US$2 billion by tobacco giant Philip Morris which claimed Uruguay had expropriated its trademark. Back in 2000, when Argentina was in a deep economic crisis, the government eased people’s hardship by freezing electricity and water tariffs. It has since been battling over 40 lawsuits demanding multi-million dollar compensations. After an Ecuadorian court ordered Chevron to pay US$18 billion in damages and clean-up for oil- drilling-related contamination in the Amazonian rainforest, Chevron counter-sued Ecuador arguing that the government breached its investment treaty with the US by allowing the legal case to continue.”

II Ben Bland and Shawn Donnand (2014) “Indonesia will terminate more than sixty bilateral investment treaties,” 26 Mar. 2014 / Ben Bland and Shawn Donnand (Asia Pacific) http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3755c1b2-b4e2-11e3-af92-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2xEkbhWqk

III European Parliamentary Research Service, (2014) “Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): state of play and prospects for reform” European Parliamentary Research Briefing, Brussels. January http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2014/130710/LDM_BRI(2014)1307 10_REV2_EN.pdf

IV David Gaukrodger and Catherine Gordon, (2012), “Investor-state dispute settlement: a scoping paper for the investment policy community”, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, no. 2012/3, OECD Investment Division, Paris, December http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2012_3.pdf

V Public Citizen, (2010) CAFTA Investor Rights Undermining Democracy and the Environment: Pacific Rim Mining Case, Washington Foundation at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Pacific_Rim_Backgrounder1.pdf

VI Public Citizen, (2013) Only One of 35 Attempts to Use the GATT Article XX/GATS Article XIV “General Exception” Has Ever Succeeded https://www.citizen.org/documents/general- exception.pdf

VII Public Citizen, (2014) Table of Foreign Investor-State Cases and Claims under NAFTA, August, Washington, found at http://www.citizen.org/documents/investor-state-chart.pdf

VIII United Nations Committee on Trade and Development, (UNCTAD) (2000) "Taking of property", Issues in International Investment Agreements, UNCTAD, Geneva. http://unctad.org/en/docs/psiteiitd15.en.pdf

IX United Nations Committee on Trade and Development, (UNCTAD) (2013a) Recent Developmentsin Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA Issues Note, UNCTAD, May, found at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d3_en.pdf

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X United Nations Committee on Trade and Development, (UNCTAD) (2013b) Reform of investor state dispute settlement: in search of a roadmap, IIA Issues Note, UNCTAD, June, found at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf

XI Investor-state dispute settlement the Trojan horse in free trade agreements http://wa.greens.org.au/content/investor-state-dispute-settlement-trojan-horse-trade-agreements

XII Edward Alden (2014) Investor-State Arbitration in Trade Agreements: A Bad Idea? (Renewing America) http://blogs.cfr.org/renewing-america/2014/03/05/investor-state-arbitration-in-trade-agreements- a-bad-idea/ … as Ikenson explains in detail, ISDS has morphed from a fairly narrow tool to deal with blatant expropriation to a much broader weapon that companies can use to challenge government policies and regulations that they believe harm their businesses. In the process, ISDS has become far more controversial, feeding public fears that trade agreements will be used to undermine the sovereign right of governments to protect consumer health and welfare and safeguard the environment. This is one of the biggest reasons for growing congressional opposition to the Obama trade agenda. … from 1959 to 2002, there were fewer than 100 ISDS claims filed worldwide, but since 2003 there have been 514 cases, including a record number of new claims in 2012. Not surprisingly, ISDS has become increasingly controversial. The United States is facing opposition from many TPP governments that do not want to include the provision…

XIII “Investor-State” Disputes in Trade Pacts Threaten Fundamental Principles of National Judicial Systems http://www.citizen.org/documents/isds-domestic-legal-process-background-brief.pdf

XIV Matthew Cawood (2014) ISDS: the devil in KAFTA's detail, (North Queensland Register) http://www.northqueenslandregister.com.au/news/agriculture/agribusiness/general-news/isds- the-devil-in-kaftas-detail/2688622.aspx A headline case of the complications ISDS can cause is occurring in Canada, where the Quebec government placed a moratorium on fracking for gas beneath the St Lawrence River while it concluded safety and environmental studies. As a result, United States miner Lone Pine last year launched a $250 million lawsuit against Quebec through US-Canada ISDS provisions. Lone Pine argues that it spent millions of dollars on project development before the government laid down the moratorium.

XV Anthony Klan (2014) Coal-seam gas group Metgasco wants compo for lost drilling income (The Australian) http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/coal-seam-gas-group-metgasco-wants-compo- for-lost-drilling-income/story-fnaxx2sv-1226752389167 COAL-SEAM gas group Metgasco has called on the NSW government to compensate it for losses of millions of dollars after the introduction of new restrictions on drilling, which it says are "killing" the industry in that state. Metgasco chief executive Peter Henderson also attacked the state coalition government for failing to identify firmly which specific areas were off-limits to CSG wells in NSW.

XVI Peter Henning (2014) Tell me a story … about free trade (Tasmanian Times) http://tasmaniantimes.com/index.php?/weblog/article/tell-me-a-story-about-free-trade/ Extract: Australia has entered into free trade agreements with a number of countries, but before the Abbott administration came to power previous governments refused to include ISDS mechanisms in those agreements, for obvious reasons. The history of these agreements between

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multinational companies operating in South America is indicative of the risks. Some estimates are that as many as 500 lawsuits have been brought against Latin American governments by US corporations. A typical recent example is US mining company Renco suing the Peruvian government for $800 million after the government withdrew a license for a smelter operating in a notoriously polluted area. Examples are reminiscent of the exploitation of poor countries by the agents of the powerful and wealthy through time immemorial.

XVII TTP Australia Investor-State Dispute Settlement http://tppaustralia.org/th_gallery/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds A leaked negotiating text from June 2012 shows that if the TPP negotiations are successful an investor from any of the TPP countries (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Singapore, the United States, Japan and Vietnam) will be able to sue the Australian government for millions in damages in secretive offshore tribunals. Under ISDS foreign investors could claim that new laws and regulations introduced by the Australian government have breached their special rights under the TPP and seriously undermined the value of their investments. Under the leaked text, “investment” is defined extremely widely, to include almost anything a foreign company has spent money on in Australia — including shares, businesses, contracts, land, intellectual property rights, and even government bonds.

There is also a risk of what is known as ‘regulatory chill’ which is when a government decides not to change its laws because of the threat of legal action, even if those laws would benefit the people of their country. The prospect of ‘regulatory chill’ as a risk brought about by ISDS, not just for developing countries seeking to improve their standards of regulation, but also developed countries. For example, Professor Van Harten noted the documented withdrawal by Canada of a proposal to impose cigarette plain-packaging regulations following the threat of ISDS arbitration. AFTINET highlighted the arbitration case against Uruguay over the same proposal.

XVIII Martin Khor (2013) The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA): When Foreign Investors Sue the State (Third World Economics) http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/twe/2013/552/1.htm In most US free trade agreements ISDS provisions, the tribunal most mentioned is the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an arbitration court under the World Bank in Washington. Any foreign investor from TPP countries can make a claim that a government has not met its TPP obligations. If it succeeds, the tribunal could award the investor financial compensation. If payment is not made, the award can be enforced through the seizure of assets of the government that has been sued, or through tariffs raised on the country’s exports. … An American company Renco sued Peru for $800 million because its contract was not extended, even after the company’s operations caused massive environmental and health damage.

XIX Patricia Ranald (2014) Reply to the Trade Ministers’ claims that “safeguards” in trade agreements prevent investors from suing governments over health and environmental legislation, http://aftinet.org.au/cms/Reply-to-trade-ministers-claims-of-safeguards-in-tpp-health- environment-02-2014 Extract: The so-called safeguards seek to limit the definition of indirect expropriation. One of the key clauses reads as follows: "Except in rare circumstances non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations". Many legal experts have pointed out that the phrase "except in rare circumstances" leaves a very big loophole, which recent cases have used to advantage. Another safeguard is a more restrictive

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definition of "fair and equitable treatment" for foreign investors. Previous interpretations by tribunals of "fair and equitable treatment" for foreign investors have applied a much higher standard of treatment to foreign investors than to local investors. This amounts to a situation where any change to policy or legislation without very extensive and detailed consultation with foreign investors can be interpreted as unfair treatment. The safeguard clauses try to limit this interpretation. However tribunals have ignored these limitations and applied the previous higher standard, leading to damages being awarded against governments. Two ongoing cases involving ISDS clauses provide examples that corporations have ignored.

XX Mike Seccombe (2013) Abbott: open for business and multinational law suits, 20 Sept. 2013 (The Global Mail) http://www.theglobalmail.org/feature/abbott-open-for-business-and-multinational-lawsuits/700/ According to a report in May 2013 by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which monitors these things, a record 58 ISDS cases were begun in 2012. In the same year, decisions were made on 42 cases by an assortment of more or less credible international arbiters. Only 31 of these were publicly disclosed, but of those, 70 per cent went in favour of the corporations, at least in part; and nine resulted in significant awards for damages, including one – to an oil company which sued Ecuador – for a record US$1.77 billion.

XXI Kyla Tienhaara (2010) Investor-state dispute settlement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (Regulatory Institutions Network, Australian National University) https://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/tpp/subs/tpp_sub_tienhaara_100519.pdf Summary of recommendations “This submission outlines serious problems with both the process of investor-state dispute settlement and the handling of important issues of public policy by investment arbitration tribunals. The key recommendations are that the government should:

• strongly oppose the inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement • not sign any agreements that contain an investor-state dispute settlement clause

This public submission looks at some of the serious failings of the current system of international investment arbitration. It also draws on the experience of Canada, which has been exposed to claims by American investors under the investment chapter of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for the last fifteen years, to illustrate how an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism in the TPP could negatively affect public policy in Australia.”

XXII United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Investor-State Disputes arising from Investment Treaties: a review UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development - 2005 http://unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20054_en.pdf Extracts p. 8. This rise in investment disputes poses a particular challenge for developing countries. The financial implications of the investor-State dispute-settlement process can be substantial, from the point of view of both the costs of the arbitration proceedings and the awards rendered. Information about the level of damages being sought by investors tends to be patchy and unreliable. Even ascertaining the amounts sought by foreign investors can be difficult, as most of the cases are still at a preliminary stage and, under the ICSID system, claimants are not obliged to quantify their claims until after the jurisdictional stage has been completed. Claims proceeding under other rules of arbitration are also difficult to quantify. It is, nonetheless, clear that some

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claims involve large sums (box 1). Furthermore, even defending against claims that may not ultimately be successful costs money.

XXIII NAFTA at 20: 1 Million Lost Jobs, 580% Increase In Trade Deficit - 2013 http://ourfuture.org/20131230/nafta-at-20-1-million-lost-jobs-580-increase-in-trade-deficit report compares the promises with which NAFTA was sold with the results we can measure 20 years later. NAFTA was not just a “trade” agreement. Trade agreements focus on cutting tariffs and easing quotas and barriers to goods moving across borders. The report points out that NAFTA was much more, giving corporations special rights, incentivizing offshoring and limiting regulation.

XXIV Daniel J. Ikenson (2014) A Compromise to Advance the Trade Agenda: Purge Negotiations of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (Cato Institute) http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/compromise-advance-trade-agenda-purge- negotiations-investor-state While ISDS may benefit U.S. companies looking to invest abroad, it neutralizes what was once a big U.S. advantage in the competition to attract investment. Respect for property rights and the rule of law have been relative U.S. strengths, but ISDS mitigates those U.S. advantages. Access to ISDS could be the decisive factor in a company’s decision to invest in a research center in Brazil, instead of the United States. Why should U.S. policy reflect greater concern for the operations of U.S. companies abroad than for the operations of U.S. and foreign companies in the United States? Why should ISDS effectively subsidize outsourcing, and not insourcing?

XXV Australia Institute (2013) Aussies in the dark about risky TPP trade deal http://www.tai.org.au/content/mr-aussies-dark-about-risky-tpp-trade-deal Most Australians aren’t aware of a trade deal which could risk environmental laws, increase the cost of medicines and enable corporations to sue Australian governments, according to a new survey by The Australia Institute … “For example, some state governments have conducted environmental reviews of coal seam gas mining and introduced regulations. But will state or federal governments be able to further regulate CSG or protect our environment from other damaging activities if they are likely to end up in a long and costly case in an international investment tribunal?” Executive Director of The Australia Institute Dr Richard Denniss said. The survey found that only 11 per cent of respondents said they ‘definitely know’ about the TPP

ENDS

CLA Civil Liberties Australia Inc. A04043 Box 7438 Fisher ACT Australia Email: secretary [at] cla.asn.au Web: www.cla.asn.au

(Lead author: Pauline Westwood, Treaties Action Organisation (TAO) section of CLA; co-author: Bill Rowlings, CEO)

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