DOCSLIB.ORG

Tightening and Development of Sanctions Against The

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Tightening and Development of Sanctions Against The TIGHTENING AND DEVELOPMENT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE BELARUSIAN REGIME: Arguments “for” and “against” LAURYNAS JONAVIČIUS is an As- Analytical publication sociate Expert at the Eastern Europe Studies Center and Political Science at Vilnius University. His research LAURYNAS JONAVIČIUS focuses on political developments and foreign policy of the Russian Federation and post-Soviet coun- tries. He holds a PhD in Internation- The purpose of this analysis is to assess the principles of al Relations from Vilnius University. operation of economic sanctions, the arguments “for” and He teaches the courses ‘Russian “against”, their effectiveness and the practical circum- Studies’, ‘Russian Politics and Econ- stances and consequences of their possible application in omy in a Post-Modern World’, and the context of discussions on the tightening of sanctions ‘Ukraine and Belarus Studies’. He against the Belarusian regime. worked as a foreign policy adviser to the President of the Republic of Lith- What does the current experience of sanctions and its aca- uania from 2009–2014 demic summary say about the conditions for the successful operation of sanctions and how many of these conditions exist in the case of Belarus? Could the tightening and devel- opment of sanctions (which are not the same thing) have a greater impact? Why are they necessary and why they might not work? The analysis begins with a theoretical review the purpose of which is to explain the logic and principles of (economic) sanctions, the conditions and limits of effectiveness. This is done by reviewing the existing academic literature on the LAURYNAS JONAVIČIUS | TIGHTENING AND DEVELOPMENT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE BELARUSIAN REGIME: ARGUMENTS “FOR” AND “AGAINST” 2 application of sanctions. The second part of values that the sender is guided by and is pre- the analysis is devoted to the practical appli- pared to suffer because of doing so. At the cation of theoretical assumptions to the situ- same time, it is a message not only to the tar- ation in Belarus – the theoretical perspectives get of sanctions, but to all other similar states- of the scope and depth of the introduction of men (regimes). sanctions are assessed, the pros and cons of In the traditional sense, the logic of imposing the application of sanctions are identified. The economic sanctions on (authoritarian) regimes last part of the analysis focuses on recom- is based on the assumption that sanctions mendations and suggestions on which ways increase the costs of the regime’s behaviour, of putting pressure on the Belarusian regime so the application of sanctions should create could be most effective. incentives to change such behaviour. Faced This text is not a political statement, it is an with economic difficulties due to sanctions, attempt to summarize academic research and the regime has fewer resources to maintain its use the resulting “best practices” in the situa- legitimacy in the eyes of the public and faces tion in Belarus. double pressure, both externally and internally, where public dissatisfaction with the regime’s policies grows or there is a possibility for Different objectives the elite to split off (Kirshner 1997; Lektzian and Souva 2003; van Bergeijk and Biersteker, of sanctions 2015). This is the ideal model for the operation Academic research identifies several key func- of sanctions – the “naïve” theory of sanctions tions (objectives) that are pursued through (Galtung, 1967) – which rarely proves to be (economic) sanctions. As academics summa- true in practice. rize (Crawford and Klotz 1999; van Bergeijk and Biersteker, 2015), the typical objectives of Authoritarian regimes rarely take public opin- sanctions are to: ion into account, so the response to sanctions can be different: while sanctions reduce the 1. Force the target to change behaviour (e.g. regime’s revenue and increase costs, authori- stop human rights abuses, hold free elec- tarian authorities certainly do not always yield tions, stop supporting terrorists, etc.). to demands for behaviour change. A fairly 2. Limit the target’s ability to continue unwant- common response to sanctions is that instead ed behaviour by increasing business costs. of a change in behaviour, the regime simply 3. Finally, sanctions very often perform a sig- redistributes funds in order to ensure that the nalling (normative communication) func- needs of those in power are met, i.e. reducing tion, i.e. demonstrate what behaviour is un- public revenues but increasing revenues for supported and unacceptable. the pillars of support for the regime. The side effect of such a reaction is very often the in- creasing repression against opponents of the Since (economic) sanctions inevitably entail regime. In other words, naïve sanctions often costs not only for the target but also for the have the opposite effect than expected, lead- sender, the willingness to bear those costs is ing to broader use of broad economic sanc- already a strong message of the norms and tions against authoritarian states. LAURYNAS JONAVIČIUS | TIGHTENING AND DEVELOPMENT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE BELARUSIAN REGIME: ARGUMENTS “FOR” AND “AGAINST” 3 Sanctions and type rents in the case of Belarus is related to Rus- sia, which is a factor that negatively affects of regime the impact of Western sanctions. The prospects for sanctions are also influ- enced by the type of (undemocratic) regime, whether it is a one-party, a military or a per- Effective and sonalist regime (Peksen, 2019). Academic re- search suggests that one-party and military efficient sanctions regimes are the most resilient to sanctions (di- The objectives of sanctions may be different rected against undemocratic regimes), while and their effectiveness should also be assessed the 1vulnerability of personalist regimes may separately from an analytical point of view. be higher due to underdeveloped institutional According to Pala (2021), when assessing the capacity to control society and high reliance “effectiveness” of sanctions, the latter should on external support or rents from natural re- be understood as the ability to achieve the set sources. While the Belarusian regime has the objectives, and not just as a cost-benefit ratio, characteristics of a personalist regime, it also i.e. process evaluation (efficiency). This dif- has characteristics that theoretically reduce ference is important because, at least for the its vulnerability to Western sanctions: time being, Western policy towards the Belaru- First, while it is indeed dependent on exter- sian regime has been dominated by a process nal support and, indirectly, on the rent of orientation (“it is important to do something natural resources, Belarus depends not on and agree on something”) rather than pursuit the West but on Russia (Dyner, 2018). of an objective. The search for a common low- est denominator in the imposition and negoti- Second, although personalistic, the ation of sanctions within the EU is essential- Lukashenko regime has complete control ly an attempt to ensure an effective process over the country’s security structures and that would not cost much politically (would has developed a trusted model for their con- not cause serious disagreements and would trol (Shraibman, 2020). generally not prevent unanimity within the EU) and allow for at least some solution. Howev- er, such a focus on the process has so far not contributed in any way to the achievement of Both of these factors make Western sanctions the defined objectives, i.e. was not effective in less effective on Belarus, the possibility to off- the literal sense. In the context of the impact set the cost of sanctions by economic support on Belarus’s processes, such a distinction from Russia still remains. The dissociation between process orientation and the actual of security structures from the regime is also implementation of the objective creates con- unlikely, as the regime has invested for many straints on EU policy and makes the policy par- years in increasing the capacity of the coer- tially efficient but not effective. cive apparatus and, at the same time, loyalty. A regime that is personalistic and increasingly It should be emphasized, however, that the dependent on the loyalty of security structures effectiveness of sanctions is in principle very tends to redistribute funds in favour of secu- difficult to measure and is often a subjective rity structures, with the greatest repression assessment by the sanctioner, which depends against the rest of society. In addition, the on the interplay of available intentions, capa- regime’s economic dependence on external bilities and interests. Sometimes even the very LAURYNAS JONAVIČIUS | TIGHTENING AND DEVELOPMENT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE BELARUSIAN REGIME: ARGUMENTS “FOR” AND “AGAINST” 4 fact of imposing sanctions can be considered 2. The greatest impact of sanctions is seen in a success, as the sanctioner’s ability to in- the first year of their application (until the crease the cost of disobedience of the target target has time to adjust). The pre-sanction- while not forcing it to change its behaviour is ing comparative advantage available at the also an influence and a form of expression of beginning of the sanctions (in the case of sanctioner’s power (Baldwin, 2000). Belarus – potassium fertilizers, petroleum products) has no effect in the long run and Sanctions do not and cannot be assessed ac- needs to be changed. As long as sanctions cording to a simplified black/white division. are thought about, they really do hurt. As Such a difference is not capable of measur- sanctions continue, the target has the op- ing not only partial success, but also to cov- portunity to adapt to changed conditions. er more diverse, “incomplete” dimensions of success. Finally, when understood as a po- 3. Psychological factor – the success of sanc- litical response to the crisis, sanctions are a tions depends on available expectations, safe “golden mean”. Given that the costs of reliability, strategic interaction. (1) Unex- military intervention are often excessive, and pected sanctions, i.e.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • No Justice for Journalists in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia September 2011
    No Justice for Journalists in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia September 2011 ARTICLE 19 Free Word Centre 60 Farringdon Road London EC1R 3GA United Kingdom Tel: +44 20 7324 2500 Fax: +44 20 7490 0566 E-mail: [email protected] www.article19.org International Media Support (IMS) Nørregarde 18, 2nd floor 1165 Copenhagen K Denmark Tel: +45 88 32 7000 Fax: +45 33 12 0099 E-mail: [email protected] www.i-m-s.dk ISBN: 978-1-906586-27-0 © ARTICLE 19 and International Media Support (IMS), London and Copenhagen, August 2011 This work is provided under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-ShareAlike 2.5 licence. You are free to copy, distribute and display this work and to make derivative works, provided you: 1) give credit to ARTICLE 19 and International Media Support (IMS); 2) do not use this work for commercial purposes; 3) distribute any works derived from this publication under a licence identical to this one. To access the full legal text of this licence, please visit: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ legalcode. ARTICLE 19 and International Media Support (IMS) would appreciate receiving a copy of any materials in which information from this report is used. This report was written and published within the framework of a project supported by the International Media Support (IMS) Media and Democracy Programme for Central and Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. It was compiled and written by Nathalie Losekoot, Senior Programme Officer for Europe at ARTICLE 19 and reviewed by JUDr. Barbora Bukovskà, Senior Director for Law at ARTICLE 19 and Jane Møller Larsen, Programme Coordinator for the Media and Democracy Unit at International Media Support (IMS).
    [Show full text]
  • Belarus Headlines XIII .Pub
    Office for a Democratic Belarus Belarus Headlines Issue XIII July 11 – August 31, 2007 PACE RAPPORTEUR ON BELARUS ANDREA RIGONI: THERE IS NO NEUTRAL THINKING ON THE SITUATION IN BELARUS Interview with PACE special and that rapporteur on Belarus is the (series: Face to face with reason Europe) why it Office for a Democratic Italian deputy of the Parlia- isn’t Belarus mentary Assembly of the easy to Council of Europe Andrea set a Rigoni was appointed Rap- dialogue Inside this porteur on Belarus in the Po- about it. issue litical Affairs Committee in February 2007. Since then he ODB: has had several meetings with What is Interview with 1-2 Belarusian officials in Rome then the Andrea Rigoni and Strasbourg. country it is focused on the opinion like? exchange for the elabora- Politics and Society 2-4 Office for a Democratic Bel- tion of the report within the arus: Mr.Rigoni, you seem to AR: I am currently building my personal idea on Bela- Political Committee of the be the first Rapporteur on the Council of Europe. situation in Belarus with rus through the hearings in Economics 4-7 whom the Belarusian officials the Sub-Committee for ODB: Will you cooperate are ready to have a regular Belarus, through the meet- only with the Belarusian dialogue. Your colleagues ings I am having on this authorities for your re- Announcements 7 Andres Herkel (CoE) and issue and even more with port? When will your re- Adrian Severin (UN) have the help of the visits that I port be ready? never been able to visit Bela- will carry out to Minsk.
    [Show full text]
  • No. 21 TRONDHEIM STUDIES on EAST EUROPEAN CULTURES
    No. 21 TRONDHEIM STUDIES ON EAST EUROPEAN CULTURES & SOCIETIES David R. Marples THE LUKASHENKA PHENOMENON Elections, Propaganda, and the Foundations of Political Authority in Belarus August 2007 David R. Marples is University Professor at the Department of History & Classics, and Director of the Stasiuk Program for the Study of Contemporary Ukraine of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. His recent books include Heroes and Villains. Constructing National History in Contemporary Ukraine (2007), Prospects for Democracy in Belarus, co-edited with Joerg Forbrig and Pavol Demes (2006), The Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1985-1991(2004), and Motherland: Russia in the 20th Century (2002). © 2007 David R Marples and the Program on East European Cultures and Societies, a program of the Faculties of Arts and Social Sciences, Norwegian University of Science and Technology. ISSN 1501-6684 ISBN 978-82-995792-1-6 Trondheim Studies on East European Cultures and Societies Editors: György Péteri and Sabrina P. Ramet Editorial Board: Trond Berge, Tanja Ellingsen, Knut Andreas Grimstad, Arne Halvorsen We encourage submissions to the Trondheim Studies on East European Cultures and Societies. Inclusion in the series will be based on anonymous review. Manuscripts are expected to be in English (exception is made for Norwegian Master’s and PhD theses) and not to exceed 150 double spaced pages in length. Postal address for submissions: Editor, Trondheim Studies on East European Cultures and Societies, Department of History, NTNU, NO-7491 Trondheim, Norway. For more information on PEECS and TSEECS, visit our web-site at http://www.hf.ntnu.no/peecs/home/ The photo on the cover is a copy of an item included in the photo chronicle of the demonstration of 21 July 2004 and made accessible by the Charter ’97 at http://www.charter97.org/index.phtml?sid=4&did=july21&lang=3 TRONDHEIM STUDIES ON EAST EUROPEAN CULTURES & SOCIETIES No.
    [Show full text]
  • The Mineral Industry of Belarus in 2016
    2016 Minerals Yearbook BELARUS [ADVANCE RELEASE] U.S. Department of the Interior February 2020 U.S. Geological Survey The Mineral Industry of Belarus By Elena Safirova Belarus’s mineral production enterprises included a potash The total value of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Belarus’s mining company, three metallurgical steel plants, a nitrogen economy in 2016 was $6.9 billion, which was a 4.3% decrease production enterprise, and two crude petroleum refineries. compared with the FDI in 2015. The mineral sector received Belarus was the third-ranked country among the world’s potash only 2.3% of the total foreign investment. Russia provided producers following Canada and Russia (Jasinski, 2018). 51.5% of the total FDI and was the main source of foreign The country’s only mineral production enterprise that played investment in 2016 (National Statistical Committee of the a major role in world markets was its potash mining firm Republic of Belarus, 2017, p. 423–438). OAO Belaruskali. Belarus does not have significant resources In 2016, Belarus exported $23.5 billion worth of goods, which of mineral fuels within its territory; however, its energy was an 11.7% decrease compared with the total export revenue infrastructure includes an extensive network of oil pipelines in 2015. Belarus also imported $27.6 billion worth of goods, and gas pipelines, which position the country as an important which was an 8.9% decrease compared with the value of imports participant in the transportation of oil and natural gas to in 2015. In 2016, Belarus exported 13.0 Mt of refined petroleum Europe from Russia.
    [Show full text]
  • U.S., EU Lift Sanctions on Belarus Entities Ex-Im Renewal Still Faces
    Vol. 35, No. 43 November 2, 2015 U.S., EU Lift Sanctions on Belarus Entities In response to the August release of six political prisoners in Belarus, the U.S. and European Union (EU) Oct. 29 lifted sanctions against more than 180 entities in that country. Treasury issued General License 2 authorizing transactions with nine blocked companies and any entities owned 50% or more by them. “This limited reprieve from sanctions opens the door to expanded com- mercial ties for the Belarusian economy. We encourage the government of Belarus to take additional positive steps to improve its record with respect to human rights and democracy,” said State Spokesperson John Kirby at his daily press briefing Oct. 29. At the same time, the EU suspended for four months the asset freeze and travel ban applying to 170 individuals and the asset freeze applying to three entities in Belarus. “Four persons involved in unresolved disappearances in Belarus remain subject to restric- tive measures. The arms embargo also continues to apply,” the EU said in a statement. At an April meeting with representatives of the U.S. fertilizer industry, State and Treas- ury officials promised to investigate charges that Belarus had reorganized of its potash industry to avoid sanctions (see WTTL, April 13, page 1). The industry had claimed Belneftekhim, a major potash producer, had spun off Belaruskali to circumvent U.S. restrictions. Belneftekhim was one of entities taken off the sanctions list. With the changes, Treasury will now authorize U.S. transactions with Belarusian Oil Trade House, Belneftekhim, Belneftekhim USA, Inc., Belshina OAO, Grodno Azot OAO, Grodno Khimvolokno OAO, Lakokraska OAO, Naftan OAO and Polotsk Steklovolokno OAO.
    [Show full text]
  • The Mineral Industry of Belarus in 2014
    2014 Minerals Yearbook BELARUS U.S. Department of the Interior December 2017 U.S. Geological Survey THE MINERAL INDUSTRY OF BELARUS By Elena Safirova Belarus’s mineral production enterprises included a potash of Belarus by far was Russia, which supplied 54.6% of goods mining company, three steel plants, a nitrogen production and services, by value. Other significant import partners were enterprise, and two crude oil refineries. Belarus was the third- Germany (6.0%), China (5.8%), Ukraine (4.1%), Poland ranked country among the world’s potash producers, following (3.8%), and Italy (2.9%) (National Statistical Committee of the Canada and Russia (Jasinski, 2016). The country’s only mineral Republic of Belarus, 2015). production enterprise that played a major role in world markets was its potash mining firm OAO Belaruskali. Although Belarus Production does not have significant sources of fuel minerals, it had oil In 2014, potash production in Belarus increased by 49% pipelines, gas pipelines, and two large petroleum refineries to about 6.3 Mt in K O equivalent. Output of steel cord, that positioned the country as an important player in the 2 which was used in tire production, increased by 12.4% to transportation of oil and natural gas to Europe from Russia 80,700 metric tons (t), cement production increased by 11.1% (Safirova, 2012). to about 5.6 Mt, and nitrogen production increased by almost Minerals in the National Economy 10% to 1.0 Mt. Rolled and crude steel output increased by 9.4% to 2.3 Mt and by 8.4% to 2.6 Mt, respectively.
    [Show full text]
  • Sanctions Program: Belarus: Verordnung Vom 11. Dezember 2020 Über Massnahmen Gegenüber Belarus (SR 946.231.116.9), Anhang 1 Origin: EU Sanctions: Art
    Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research EAER State Secretariat for Economic Affairs SECO Bilateral Economic Relations Sanctions Version of 07.07.2021 Sanctions program: Belarus: Verordnung vom 11. Dezember 2020 über Massnahmen gegenüber Belarus (SR 946.231.116.9), Anhang 1 Origin: EU Sanctions: Art. 2 Abs. 1 (Finanzsanktionen) und Art. 3 Abs. 1 (Ein- und Durchreiseverbot) Sanctions program: Bélarus: Ordonnance du 11 décembre 2020 instituant des mesures à l’encontre du Bélarus (RS 946.231.116.9), annexe 1 Origin: EU Sanctions: art. 2, al. 1 (Sanctions financières) et art. 3, al. 1 (Interdiction de séjour et de transit) Sanctions program: Bielorussia: Ordinanza del 11 dicembre 2020 che istituisce provvedimenti nei confronti della Bielorussia (RS 946.231.116.9), allegato 1 Origin: EU Sanctions: art. 2 cpv. 1 (Sanzioni finanziarie) e art. 3 cpv. 1 (Divieto di entrata e di transito) Individuals SSID: 20-45419 Name: Buhuk Natallia Mikhailauna Spelling variant: a) БУГУК Наталля Мiхайлаўна (Belarusian) b) Buguk Natalia Mikhailovna (Russian) c) БУГУК Наталья Михайловна (Russian) Sex: W DOB: 19 Dec 1989 POB: Minsk, Belarus Nationality: Belarus Justification: In her position as judge at the Fruzensky district court in Minsk, Natallia Buhuk is responsible for numerous politically motivated rulings against journalists and protesters, in particular the sentencing of Katsiaryna Bakhvalava (Andreyeva) and Darya Chultsova. Violations of rights of defence and of right to a fair trial were reported during trials conducted under her supervision. She is therefore responsible for serious human rights violations and for seriously undermining the rule of law, as well as for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition.
    [Show full text]
  • Belarus Before Voting: the Referendum (Past, Presence and Perspectives)
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Policy Documentation Center CENTER FOR POLITICAL EDUCATION Miensk, Republic of Belarus -mail: [email protected] Gutta c a v at lapidem Belarus before Voting: The Referendum (Past, Presence and Perspectives) Introduction: This analysis was prepared from August 25-September 25, 2004 by Andrei Liakhovich, the head of the Minsk-based Center for Political Education (CPE), focusing on the referendum on a possible third term in office for President Alexander Lukashenka, which is scheduled – together with the parliamentary elections – on October 17, 2004. Since September 2003, the Pontis Foundation of Slovakia has been implementing a project in Belarus assisting think-tank and analytical groups mainly through exchange programs.1 As part of this project, Pontis is distributing two analyses before the parliamentary elections (and the referendum) to help increase the flow of analytical information. The views in the analysis are by the CPE. The Pontis Foundation does not necessarily share them. Summary: The democratic opposition could stop President Lukashenka’s bid for a third term only if it were to implement the “Yugoslav variant” in Belarus. However, there are no pre-conditions for such an approach. Most Belarusian voters believe that the elections will be falsified. Despite the fact that there is general disappointment regarding the democrats, the ideas of democracy and European Belarus are still popular among citizens.2 The problem is the lack of (personal) alternatives to Lukashenka, and the fact that Belarusian voters (including the traditional supporters of the democrats) are resigned to the up-coming falsification.
    [Show full text]
  • During the Year 2000-01, Several Initiatives of the Previous
    Annual Report 2000-2001 Introduction and Synopsis uring the year 2000-01, several initiatives of the previous two Minister of Mauritius were telling examples of the global reach of Indias D years reached fruition and India consolidated further its diplomatic engagement. In furthering the objectives of the U.N. Charter, relationship with the major powers and other friends and partners India led the international communitys effort to restore democracy underscoring its position as a factor of peace, stability, security and and constitutionality in Fiji and contributed to U.N. peace-keeping balance not only in Asia but on a much wider canvas in the world. The efforts in Sierra Leone and the Horn of Africa. The global trend towards first ever Indo-EU Summit and the inauguration of the Ganga-Mekong democratisation drew sustenance from the success of democratic Cooperation Project launched new avenues of engagement with countries governance in a country of one billion people; at the same time, of these two regions whilst, at the same time, reflecting the level of democracys antithesis, international terrorism was decisively condemned maturity that had been reached in relations with them. The visit of and rejected by the international community. The strength and resilience President, Shri K.R. Narayanan, to China as well as the visits to India of of Indias economy and science & technology made it an attractive partner the Prime Minister of Nepal, the President of Sri Lanka as well as those in trade and investment and in international cooperation in knowledge- of the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Peoples based and cutting edge industries.
    [Show full text]
  • Debevoise Sanctions Alert
    Issue 44 Table of Contents Iran News Adoption Day: US and EU Take Steps to Implement Iran Nuclear Deal Switzerland to Ease Iran Sanctions CJEU Rejects First Islamic Investment Bank’s Annulment Application OFAC Clarifies Secondary Sanctions for Non-US Suppliers to Iranian Diplomatic Missions in Third Countries Russia and Ukraine News European Commission Updates Guidance on Russia Sanctions EU Publishes Space Industry-related Exceptions to Russia Sanctions EU Renews Ukraine-related Asset Freeze on One Individual EU News Al-Qaeda: EU Amends Sanctions List Belarus: EU Suspends Sanctions for Four Months Belarus: CJEU Annuls Sanctions Against Belarusian Football Club Liberia: UN and EU Repeal Financial Sanctions Syria: EU Widens Sanctions Regime US News OFAC Authorises All Transactions with Nine Selected Belarusian SDNs for Six Months Crédit Agricole Unit Agrees to $787 million Settlement with US Agencies for Wire Transfer Violations OFAC Issues Finding of Violation, Without Accompanying Monetary Penalty, for Persian Carpet Payments OFAC Issues Guidance on “False Hit” Lists OFAC Designates Honduran Bank and its Owners as Narcotics Traffickers, Authorises Dealings with Honduran Liquidators OFAC Blocks Companies and Individuals Linked to Narcotics Trafficking US Blocks Additional Members of ISIL, Caucasus Emirates and the Taliban OFAC Fines US Travel Agency for Cuba Trips Three Convicted for Illegal Exports from US to Russia Debevoise Client Update: U.S. Further Relaxes Cuba Sanctions UN News UN Security Council Intends to Impose Libya Sanctions UK News Export Control Organisation Updates and Amends OGELs UN Adds British Individual to Sanctions List Iran News Adoption Day: US and EU Take Steps to Implement Iran Nuclear Deal On 18 October 2015, referred to as “Adoption Day”, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal (the “JCPOA”) between Iran, the EU and the P5+1 (see Issue 41 of the Sanctions Alert) was formally adopted.
    [Show full text]
  • Silitski-16-4
    PREEMPTING DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF BELARUS Vitali Silitski Vitali Silitski is a 2004–2005 Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy. In 2003, he was forced to leave his position as associate professor at the European Humanities University in Minsk after publicly criticizing Belarus’s government. In 2001, ten years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the prospects for democracy in its successor states (outside the Baltic) seemed in- creasingly bleak. Even countries that had begun their independence from the USSR in relatively promising fashion seemed to be sliding back toward autocracy. But then things suddenly seemed to change. A series of dramatic events—Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution, Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, and the Tulip Revolution that ousted Kyrgyz president Askar Akayev following rigged February 2005 parliamentary elections—created a very different set of expectations. Many thought that this new wave of change would spread democratic impulses through- out the region, leading to the ouster of autocrats in other countries. In reaction to the events in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan, poli- tics is indeed changing in postcommunist Eurasia—but in many places it is changing for the worse. Several of the region’s surviving autocra- cies have tightened the reins: Kazakhstan recently outlawed its major opposition party; Tajikistan introduced new regulations restricting con- tact between foreign diplomats and local civil society groups; Azerbaijan’s opposition groups and independent press face a new round of attacks in advance of the November 2005 parliamentary elections; in Uzbekistan, a May 2005 rebellion against President Islam Karimov was violently suppressed; and Russian president Vladimir Putin recently announced an upcoming ban on civil society assistance from abroad and implemented an electoral reform that makes it impossible for par- ties independent of the presidential administration to win representation in parliament.
    [Show full text]
  • Belarus: Background and U.S. Policy Concerns
    Belarus: Background and U.S. Policy Concerns Steven Woehrel Specialist in European Affairs February 12, 2013 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL32534 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Belarus: Background and U.S. Policy Concerns Summary Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko snuffed out Belarus’s modest progress toward democracy and a free market economy in the early 1990s and created an authoritarian, Soviet- style regime. Belarus has close historical and cultural ties to Russia. Russian policy toward Belarus appears to be focused on gaining control of Belarus’s key economic assets while reducing the costs of subsidizing the Lukashenko regime. For many years, the United States has limited ties to the regime while providing modest support to pro-democracy organizations in Belarus. The United States and the European Union also imposed sanctions on Belarusian leaders. In March 2008, Belarus withdrew its ambassador from Washington and forced the United States to recall its ambassador from Minsk, in response to what Belarus perceived as a tightening of U.S. sanctions against Belneftekhim, the state-owned petrochemicals firm. Belarus also limited the number of U.S. diplomats in Belarus to five persons. From 2008 to 2010, the United States and European Union suspended some sanctions in exchange for very modest improvements on human rights issues. This policy suffered a setback in December 2010, when Belarus held presidential elections that observers from the OSCE viewed as falling far short of international standards. Moreover, in response to an election-night demonstration against electoral fraud in a square in central Minsk, the Lukashenko regime arrested over 700 persons, including most of his opponents in the election, as well as activists, journalists, and civil society representatives.
    [Show full text]