TIGHTENING AND DEVELOPMENT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE BELARUSIAN REGIME: Arguments “for” and “against” LAURYNAS JONAVIČIUS is an As- Analytical publication sociate Expert at the Eastern Europe Studies Center and Political Science at Vilnius University. His research LAURYNAS JONAVIČIUS focuses on political developments and foreign policy of the Russian Federation and post-Soviet coun- tries. He holds a PhD in Internation- The purpose of this analysis is to assess the principles of al Relations from Vilnius University. operation of economic sanctions, the arguments “for” and He teaches the courses ‘Russian “against”, their effectiveness and the practical circum- Studies’, ‘Russian Politics and Econ- stances and consequences of their possible application in omy in a Post-Modern World’, and the context of discussions on the tightening of sanctions ‘Ukraine and Belarus Studies’. He against the Belarusian regime. worked as a foreign policy adviser to the President of the Republic of Lith- What does the current experience of sanctions and its aca- uania from 2009–2014 demic summary say about the conditions for the successful operation of sanctions and how many of these conditions exist in the case of Belarus? Could the tightening and devel- opment of sanctions (which are not the same thing) have a greater impact? Why are they necessary and why they might not work? The analysis begins with a theoretical review the purpose of which is to explain the logic and principles of (economic) sanctions, the conditions and limits of effectiveness. This is done by reviewing the existing academic literature on the LAURYNAS JONAVIČIUS | TIGHTENING AND DEVELOPMENT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE BELARUSIAN REGIME: ARGUMENTS “FOR” AND “AGAINST” 2 application of sanctions. The second part of values that the sender is guided by and is pre- the analysis is devoted to the practical appli- pared to suffer because of doing so. At the cation of theoretical assumptions to the situ- same time, it is a message not only to the tar- ation in Belarus – the theoretical perspectives get of sanctions, but to all other similar states- of the scope and depth of the introduction of men (regimes). sanctions are assessed, the pros and cons of In the traditional sense, the logic of imposing the application of sanctions are identified. The economic sanctions on (authoritarian) regimes last part of the analysis focuses on recom- is based on the assumption that sanctions mendations and suggestions on which ways increase the costs of the regime’s behaviour, of putting pressure on the Belarusian regime so the application of sanctions should create could be most effective. incentives to change such behaviour. Faced This text is not a political statement, it is an with economic difficulties due to sanctions, attempt to summarize academic research and the regime has fewer resources to maintain its use the resulting “best practices” in the situa- legitimacy in the eyes of the public and faces tion in Belarus. double pressure, both externally and internally, where public dissatisfaction with the regime’s policies grows or there is a possibility for Different objectives the elite to split off (Kirshner 1997; Lektzian and Souva 2003; van Bergeijk and Biersteker, of sanctions 2015). This is the ideal model for the operation Academic research identifies several key func- of sanctions – the “naïve” theory of sanctions tions (objectives) that are pursued through (Galtung, 1967) – which rarely proves to be (economic) sanctions. As academics summa- true in practice. rize (Crawford and Klotz 1999; van Bergeijk and Biersteker, 2015), the typical objectives of Authoritarian regimes rarely take public opin- sanctions are to: ion into account, so the response to sanctions can be different: while sanctions reduce the 1. Force the target to change behaviour (e.g. regime’s revenue and increase costs, authori- stop human rights abuses, hold free elec- tarian authorities certainly do not always yield tions, stop supporting terrorists, etc.). to demands for behaviour change. A fairly 2. Limit the target’s ability to continue unwant- common response to sanctions is that instead ed behaviour by increasing business costs. of a change in behaviour, the regime simply 3. Finally, sanctions very often perform a sig- redistributes funds in order to ensure that the nalling (normative communication) func- needs of those in power are met, i.e. reducing tion, i.e. demonstrate what behaviour is un- public revenues but increasing revenues for supported and unacceptable. the pillars of support for the regime. The side effect of such a reaction is very often the in- creasing repression against opponents of the Since (economic) sanctions inevitably entail regime. In other words, naïve sanctions often costs not only for the target but also for the have the opposite effect than expected, lead- sender, the willingness to bear those costs is ing to broader use of broad economic sanc- already a strong message of the norms and tions against authoritarian states. LAURYNAS JONAVIČIUS | TIGHTENING AND DEVELOPMENT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE BELARUSIAN REGIME: ARGUMENTS “FOR” AND “AGAINST” 3 Sanctions and type rents in the case of Belarus is related to Rus- sia, which is a factor that negatively affects of regime the impact of Western sanctions. The prospects for sanctions are also influ- enced by the type of (undemocratic) regime, whether it is a one-party, a military or a per- Effective and sonalist regime (Peksen, 2019). Academic re- search suggests that one-party and military efficient sanctions regimes are the most resilient to sanctions (di- The objectives of sanctions may be different rected against undemocratic regimes), while and their effectiveness should also be assessed the 1vulnerability of personalist regimes may separately from an analytical point of view. be higher due to underdeveloped institutional According to Pala (2021), when assessing the capacity to control society and high reliance “effectiveness” of sanctions, the latter should on external support or rents from natural re- be understood as the ability to achieve the set sources. While the Belarusian regime has the objectives, and not just as a cost-benefit ratio, characteristics of a personalist regime, it also i.e. process evaluation (efficiency). This dif- has characteristics that theoretically reduce ference is important because, at least for the its vulnerability to Western sanctions: time being, Western policy towards the Belaru- First, while it is indeed dependent on exter- sian regime has been dominated by a process nal support and, indirectly, on the rent of orientation (“it is important to do something natural resources, Belarus depends not on and agree on something”) rather than pursuit the West but on Russia (Dyner, 2018). of an objective. The search for a common low- est denominator in the imposition and negoti- Second, although personalistic, the ation of sanctions within the EU is essential- Lukashenko regime has complete control ly an attempt to ensure an effective process over the country’s security structures and that would not cost much politically (would has developed a trusted model for their con- not cause serious disagreements and would trol (Shraibman, 2020). generally not prevent unanimity within the EU) and allow for at least some solution. Howev- er, such a focus on the process has so far not contributed in any way to the achievement of Both of these factors make Western sanctions the defined objectives, i.e. was not effective in less effective on Belarus, the possibility to off- the literal sense. In the context of the impact set the cost of sanctions by economic support on Belarus’s processes, such a distinction from Russia still remains. The dissociation between process orientation and the actual of security structures from the regime is also implementation of the objective creates con- unlikely, as the regime has invested for many straints on EU policy and makes the policy par- years in increasing the capacity of the coer- tially efficient but not effective. cive apparatus and, at the same time, loyalty. A regime that is personalistic and increasingly It should be emphasized, however, that the dependent on the loyalty of security structures effectiveness of sanctions is in principle very tends to redistribute funds in favour of secu- difficult to measure and is often a subjective rity structures, with the greatest repression assessment by the sanctioner, which depends against the rest of society. In addition, the on the interplay of available intentions, capa- regime’s economic dependence on external bilities and interests. Sometimes even the very LAURYNAS JONAVIČIUS | TIGHTENING AND DEVELOPMENT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST THE BELARUSIAN REGIME: ARGUMENTS “FOR” AND “AGAINST” 4 fact of imposing sanctions can be considered 2. The greatest impact of sanctions is seen in a success, as the sanctioner’s ability to in- the first year of their application (until the crease the cost of disobedience of the target target has time to adjust). The pre-sanction- while not forcing it to change its behaviour is ing comparative advantage available at the also an influence and a form of expression of beginning of the sanctions (in the case of sanctioner’s power (Baldwin, 2000). Belarus – potassium fertilizers, petroleum products) has no effect in the long run and Sanctions do not and cannot be assessed ac- needs to be changed. As long as sanctions cording to a simplified black/white division. are thought about, they really do hurt. As Such a difference is not capable of measur- sanctions continue, the target has the op- ing not only partial success, but also to cov- portunity to adapt to changed conditions. er more diverse, “incomplete” dimensions of success. Finally, when understood as a po- 3. Psychological factor – the success of sanc- litical response to the crisis, sanctions are a tions depends on available expectations, safe “golden mean”. Given that the costs of reliability, strategic interaction. (1) Unex- military intervention are often excessive, and pected sanctions, i.e.