Nuclear Deterrence Model
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by OTHES DISSERTATION Titel der Dissertation „Iran’s Nuclear Program: Comparative Study of Deterrence Stability Models in South Asia and the Middle East“ Verfasser Muhammad Tehsin angestrebter akademischer Grad Doktor der Philosophie (Dr.phil.) Wien, am Februar 2009 Studienkennzahl It. Studienblatt: A 092 300 Dissertationsgebiet It. Studienblatt: Geschichte Politikwissenschaft Betreuer: Univ.-Prof. Hans-Georg Heinrich ABSTRACT The advent of nuclear weapons since the end of World War II altered threat perceptions and the Weltanschauung of policy makers and laymen alike. And, while the nuclear ‘taboo’ has matured over time, states have continued to pursue nuclear capability for its ‘equalizing capability.’ The scholars of international relations offer three general motivations behind national pursuit of nuclear capability. First, national power, second, scientific advancement and technological prowess, and the third reason put forward for nuclearization is national prestige. Given reports of an Iranian nuclear program, it is important to assess policy prescriptions to help prevent nuclear proliferation in Iran and the Middle East. In order to conceptualize the evolving strategic environment in Middle East, this study focuses on its` comparison with South Asia. It has been posited that stability of détente – i.e. conflict normalization (CBMs, resolution of political differences and economic linkages) and non-aggressive nuclear policies and doctrines – is empirical evidence of the stability of a nuclear deterrence model. An unstable deterrence model is characterized by hegemony; spiraling arms races; alliances, and bandwagoning/balancing: efforts that could lead to a general war involving nuclear weapons. Die Entwicklung der Atomwaffen seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg veränderte die Wahrnehmung der Gefahren und das Weltbild sowohl der politischen Akteure als auch der Öffentlichkeit. Während die Tabuisierung von Atomwaffen einer gewissen Reifezeit bedurfte, haben die Staaten an der Erweiterung ihres Atompotentials zum Zwecke der wechselseitigen Abschreckung weitergearbeitet. Wissenschaftler aus dem Bereich der internationalen Beziehungen haben drei grundsätzliche Motivationsmuster hinter dem Streben der Nationalstaaten nach dem Besitz von Atomwaffen ausgearbeitet. Erstens, als Beweis des eigenen Status als Supermacht. Zweitens, wissenschaftlicher und technologischer Forschritt. Als dritter Grund, der für den Erwerb von Atomwaffen angegeben wird, gilt das nationale Prestige. Angesichts etwa der Entwicklung des iranischen Atomprogramms ist es wichtig, die internationalen politischen Vorgaben zu analysieren, um die Verbreitung von Atomwaffen im Iran und Nahen Osten zu verhindern. Um die Entwicklung des strategischen Umfeldes im Nahen Osten zu vergleichen, konzentriert sich diese Arbeit auf die Unterschiede zwischen dem mittleren Osten und Südasien. Es wurde festgestellt, dass die Stabilität dieser Abschreckungsmaßnahmen – d.h. die Konfliktnormalisierung (vertrauensschaffende Maßnahmen (CBMs), die Lösung der politischen Divergenzen und der Aufbau wirtschaftlicher Beziehungen) sowie die friedliche Atompolitik und atomare Doktrin ein empirischer Beweis für die Stabilität des Models der atomaren Abschreckung und Abrüstung sind. Für ein instabiles Abschreckungssmodell sind wiederum Hegemonie, die Aufrüstungsspirale, Bündnis- und Gegengewichtspolitik: Dynamiken, die zu einem totalen Krieg mit dem Einsatz der Atomwaffen führen können. ABBREVIATIONS CARs Central Asian Republics ECO Economic Cooperation Organization EU European Union FDI Foreign Direct Investment IDB Islamic Development Bank IMF International Monetary Fund JEC Joint Economic Commission KKH Karakoram Highway LIC Low Intensity Conflict LoC Line of Control MNC Multi-National Corporation MoU Memorandum of Understanding NFU No First Use NNWS Non-Nuclear Weapon State NSS National Security Strategy NWS Nuclear Weapon State SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization VNSA Violent Non-State Actor WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction WTO World Trade Organization i MAPS AND CHARTS Sr. No. Topic Page # 1.1 Poverty Profile of South Asia 40 1.2 Human Deprivation Profile of India and Pakistan 41 1.3 Military Expenditure in South Asia 44 1.4 Key development statistics for Arab World 76 Map 2.1 Kashmir Region 101 ii CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 01 Part I STRATEGIC STABILITY & NUCLEAR DETERRENCE The Concept of Deterrence 34 Strategic Stability in South Asia 38 Nuclear Deterrence: Comparison of Cold War & South Asian 45 Models Two-Track Stability Process 60 Low-Intensity Conflict in South Asia 64 US Role During the Kargil Conflict & the 2001-02 Military Stand- 68 off Strategic Stability in the Middle East 72 Iran’s Expanding Regional Role 78 Iran’s Nuclear Program and Regional Responses 83 Part II NUCLEAR DETERRENCE & CONFLICT RESOLUTION Hegemonic-Objective Conflict 93 Kashmir Dispute 99 Smaller Disputes Between India & Pakistan 108 The Dynamics of Subcontinental Détente 109 Détente, CBMs and Linkages 113 The Middle East Peace Process 125 Conflict Management and Israel 133 From Conflict Management to Normalization 143 Part III STRATEGIC STABILITY & NUCLEAR DOCTRINE iii Nuclear Doctrine and Stability 147 Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture 148 Indian Nuclear Doctrine 159 The US Nuclear Doctrine 161 Counterproliferation 165 Iran’s Projected Nuclear Posture 175 Israel’s Options 168 GCC Security Options Impact of GCC Options on US & the Middle East 199 Conclusion 200 BIBLIOGRAPHY 214 Curriculum Vitae iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I am indebted to my supervisor, Univ.-Prof. Hans-Georg Heinrich, and co-supervisor, Univ.-Prof. Heinz Gärtner, for taking time out of their busy schedules to read and correct my thesis along with valuable comments and suggestions. Without their unstinted support and guidance, this work would not have been possible. I am grateful to my parents for their love and forbearance. And I also wish to thank my colleagues who gave me new ideas to approach the subject and look in directions that I had not considered earlier. Finally, the errors in the work are my own. Muhammad Tehsin v INTRODUCTION: The advent of nuclear weapons since the end of World War II altered threat perceptions and the Weltanschauung of policy makers and laymen alike. And, while the nuclear ‘taboo’ has matured over time, states have continued to pursue nuclear capability for its ‘equalizing capability.’ The scholars of international relations offer three general motivations behind national pursuit of nuclear capability. First, national power, second, scientific advancement and technological prowess, and the third reason put forward for nuclearization is national prestige. Given reports of an Iranian nuclear program, it is important to assess policy prescriptions to help prevent nuclear proliferation in Iran and the Middle East. In order to conceptualize the evolving strategic environment in Middle East, this study focuses on the composite parts of détente and nuclear deterrence. It has been posited that stability of détente – i.e. conflict normalization (CBMs, resolution of political differences and economic linkages) and non-aggressive nuclear policies and doctrines – is empirical evidence of the stability of a nuclear deterrence model. An unstable deterrence model is characterized by hegemony; spiraling arms races; alliances, and bandwagoning/balancing: efforts that could lead to a general war involving nuclear weapons. A major assumption based on the role of nuclear weapons is that of deterrence. The goal of deterrence is to prevent the outbreak of war by using nuclear weapons as a threat of force. Thus a society will not be offensive if their actions will be countered by a damaging action. The ‘second-strike capability’ of a country is also an actor in the theory of deterrence. It is unlikely that a country would retaliate at one nation-state’s threat of nuclear war if they were aware that their supply of nuclear warheads was insufficient in comparison to the adversary. It is irrational that a country would initiate attack if a second strike could wipe out a nation-state’s military and civilian strongholds. Kenneth Waltz, a leading theorist on this subject, is clear and confident in his position that nuclear weapons have been 1 given a bad name. His assured prediction sees a nation will be deterred from attacking even if it believes that there is only a possibility that its adversary will retaliate, therefore the probability of major war among nuclear states is zero. However, as Sagan has pointed out, the fact that nuclear adversaries were able to maintain the peace during the Cold War should not be a cause for complacency in the future in case of new nuclear powers.1 Nonetheless, Sagan has also cautioned against despair about the workability of nuclear deterrence in the future. He says it can lead to false utopianism about the elimination of war. So, while he proposes alteration in nuclear strategy, arms control and nuclear safety regimes as the realistic prospects for lessening the persistent risks of living in the nuclear age, this dissertation dwells upon the efficacious role of concrete progress on the ‘core’ or ‘flashpoint’ conflict i.e. movement from conflict management to normalization, as well as national formulation of defensive (as opposed to offensive) doctrines, as evidence of the stability of the deterrence model. The Cold War adversaries maintained a two-track stability process within