Volume 7 | Issue 28 | Number 4 | Article ID 3187 | Jul 13, 2009 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus The Battle of Singapore, the Massacre of Chinese and Understanding of the Issue in Postwar Japan Hayashi Hirofumi following the capture of Singapore The Battle of Singapore, the The first point to be considered is why Massacre of Chinese and the massacre took place, and the second Understanding of the Issue in is how the massacre has been presented Postwar Japan in postwar Japan. Although even ex- Kempeitai officers involved have Hayashi Hirofumi admitted that the killings were inhumane and unlawful, little attention has been Shortly after British forces surrendered paid to the episode in Japan. While there in Singapore on 15 February 1942, the has been valuable research carried out Japanese military began operation on the Japanese military administration Kakyou Shukusei [a] or Dai Kenshou [b], of Malaya and Singapore, no detailed known in the Chinese community of Japanese study of the killing has Singapore as the Sook Ching ("Purge") appeared. Moreover, while the Singapore [c], in which many local Chinese were Massacre is well known to scholars, massacred.[1] Although the killings have similar killings in the Malay Peninsula been investigated extensively by scholars only came to the attention of the in Malaysia and Singapore, this article Japanese public in the late 1980s after I draws on Japanese sources to examine discovered documents relating to the the events. Japanese military units involved. Why did the Japanese Military Massacre Chinese in Singapore? On the night of 17 February 1942, Maj. Gen. Kawamura Saburo, an infantry brigade commander, was placed in charge of Japan’s Singapore Garrison. The next morning, he appeared at Army Headquarters and was ordered by 25th Army commander, Lt. Gen. Yamashita Tomoyuki, to carry out mopping-up Chinese inspected by Kempeitai operations. He received further detailed 1 7 | 28 | 4 APJ | JF instructions from the chief of staff, Lt. unsettled. Gen. Suzuki Sosaku, and Lt. Colonel Tsuji Masanobu. Kawamura then consulted The mass screening was carried out with the Kempeitai commander, Lt. Col. mainly by Kempeitai personnel between Oishi Masayuki. The plan to purge the 21 and 23 February in urban areas, and Chinese population was drawn up in the by the Imperial Guard Division at the end course of these meetings. Under this of February in suburban districts. Most scheme, Chinese males between the ages accounts of the killings include a map of 18 and 50 were ordered to report to that shows the island divided into four mass screening centers. Those deemed sections, and explain that the Imperial anti-Japanese were detained, loaded onto Guards, the 5th Division, and the 18th lorries, and taken away to the coast or to Division carried out the mass screening other isolated places where they were in suburban districts.[6] However, on 21 machine-gunned and bayoneted to February, the 25th Army ordered both death.[2] My survey of official the 5th and 18th Divisions to move into documents of the Japanese military the Malay Peninsula to carry out revealed two sources that specified the mopping-up operations.[7] The order number massacred. One is Kawamura’s assigned the Imperial Guard Division to diary that shows the figure as 5,000.[3] conduct a mass screening of non-urban The other is an issue of the Intelligence areas of Singapore, with the 5th and the Record of the 25th Army (No.62, dated 18th Divisions responsible for the rest of 28 May 1942) prepared by the staff the Malay Peninsula. According to war section of the 25th Army.[4] This secret diaries and documents relating to these record states that the number missing as two divisions, neither played a role in the a result of bombing and the purge was mass screening in Singapore. The 1947 11,110. This second record is important British war crimes trial in Singapore[8] because it was drawn up as a secret prosecuted the commander of the document shortly after the purge took Imperial Guard Division, Lt. Gen. place. However, it includes both bombing Nishimura Takuma, on charges related to and purge casualties and offers no basis the Singapore Massacre, but not the for the figure. commanders of the 5th or 18th Divisions. This version of events is correct, and the In Singapore it is generally believed that conventional mapping of the massacre is the number killed in this event was about incorrect. 50,000.[5] However, on the basis of materials available in Japan, Singapore, and the UK, I find no basis for this figure. Although I can not present exact figures, my estimation is that a minimum of 5000 died; I can offer no figure for the maximum. The issue of numbers remains 2 7 | 28 | 4 APJ | JF 1942. Rebuttal of the Defense Let us consider the justification or defense for the actions of the Japanese army presented by some Japanese writers and researchers. One of the major points is that the Chinese volunteer forces, such as the Dalforce, the Singapore Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army, fought fiercely and caused heavy Japanese casualties. This is supposed to Kempeitai headquarters: the old have inflamed Japanese anger and led to YMCA Building reprisals against local Chinese.[11] About 600 personnel from among the 1,250- It is important to note that the purge was strong Dalforce volunteers were sent to planned before Japanese troops landed in the front. Some 30 per cent of Dalforce Singapore. The military government personnel either died in action or were section of the 25th Army had already killed during the subsequent Purge.[12] drawn up a plan entitled, It is generally said in Singapore that the "Implementation Guidline for Dalforce personnel fought fiercely.[13] Manipulating Overseas Chinese" on or Whatever their bravery, however, their around 28 December 1941.[9] This role seems exaggerated in Singapore guideline stated that anyone who failed accounts. The volunteers of Dalforce to obey or cooperate with the occupation were equipped only with outdated authorities should be eliminated. It is weapons. Japanese military histories clear that the headquarters of the 25th make no reference to Chinese volunteers Army had decided on a harsh policy during the battle of Singapore, and toward the Chinese population of report that the opposition put up by Singapore and Malaya from the British forces was weaker than expected. beginning of the war. According to Onishi The greatest threat to the Japanese was Satoru,[10] the Kempeitai officer in artillery bombardment.[14] charge of the Jalan Besar screening centre, Kempeitai commander Oishi During the war crimes trial of 1947, no Masayuki was instructed by the chief of Japanese claimed that losses suffered by staff, Suzuki Sosaku, at Keluang, Johor, Japanese forces at the hand of Chinese to prepare for a purge following the volunteers contributed to the massacre. capture of Singapore. Although the exact As noted above, the 25th Army had date of this instruction is not known, the planned the mass purge even before the Army headquarters was stationed in battle of Singapore. This sequence of Keluang from 28 January to 4 February events clearly rebuts the claims. 3 7 | 28 | 4 APJ | JF A second point raised is that the Chinese Otani Keijiro, a Kempeitai lieutenant in Malaya were passing intelligence to colonel in charge of public security in the British and that Chinese guerrillas Singapore from the beginning of March were engaged in subversive activities 1942, also rejected this line of defense, against Japanese forces during the severely criticizing Japanese atrocities in Malayan campaign, for example by Singapore.[18] Onishi stated that he had flashing signals to British airplanes. The not expected hostile Chinese to begin an Kempeitai of the 25th Army was on the anti-Japanese campaign, at least not in alert for such activities during the the short term, since public security in Malayan campaign, but made only two Singapore was improving.[19] arrests. Kempeitai officer Onishi Satoru The fourth argument is that staff officer said in his memoirs that they had been Tsuji Masanobu was the mastermind unable to find any evidence of the use of behind the massacre, and that he flash signals and that it was personally planned and carried it out. technologically impossible. Thus, this line Although Tsuji was a key figure in these of argument is refuted by a military events, I believe that researchers have officer who was directly involved in the overestimated his role. At the time of the events.[15] war crimes trials, Tsuji had not been A third explanation offered for the arrested. As soon as the war ended, he massacre is that anti-Japanese Chinese escaped from Thailand to China, where were preparing for an armed he came under the protection of the insurrection, and that law and order was Kuomintang government, having deteriorating in Singapore. They claim cooperated with them in fighting the that a purge was necessary to restore communists. He later secretly returned to public order, and this point was raised at Japan in May 1948 where he was the war crimes trial in Singapore.[16] protected by the US military, namely G2 One piece of evidence cited by the of GHQ.[20] In this situation, the defense defense during the trial was an entry in counsel of the war crimes trial of 1947 Kawamura’s personal diary for 19 attempted to pin all responsibility on February that purportedly said looting Tsuji, who could not be prosecuted. This still continued in the city. The same point will be discussed in more detail evidence was presented to the Tokyo War below. Crimes Trial.