Ghana's Role in the Nigerian
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International Journal of Humanities and Cultural Studies (IJHCS) ISSN 2356-5926 Vol.1, Issue.3, December, 2014 Ghana’s Role in the Nigerian War: Mediator or Collaborator? Johnson Olaosebikan Aremu Ekiti State University, Ado- Ekiti, Nigeria Abstract This article attempts an exploration of Ghana’s mediatory role in a bid to broker peace between the Federal Military Government of Nigeria and its dis-affectioned Eastern Region to prevent the impending Nigerian civil war of July 1967 to January 1970. It notes Nigeria’s disappointment in Ghana’s neutrality after the outbreak of war as well as Nigeria’s subsequent accusation of Ghana as a collaborator with the secessionist ‘Republic of Biafra’ throughout the war years. The article carefully interrogates the factors that propelled Ghana’s neutrality and the authenticity or otherwise of Nigeria’s insinuations against her action during the war. It submits that apart from the humanitarian challenge of reducing the carnage of the war, Ghana acted within the ambits of the Organisation of African Unity’s Charter and Resolutions to remain neutral in what was regarded as a ‘purely Nigerian internal affair’. The article concludes that since Ghana was never a party to the war, it should be exonerated from all insinuations as a collaborator with Biafra. Its mediatory role should be commended for promoting peace in the West African sub-region. Keywords: Nigeria, Ghana, Civil War, Conflict, Biafra 1 International Journal of Humanities and Cultural Studies (IJHCS) ISSN 2356-5926 Vol.1, Issue.3, December, 2014 Introduction One of the major events that have generated controversy in Nigeria-Ghana relations in contemporary times was Ghana‟s purported lukewarm attitude to the Nigerian civil war between 1967 and 1970. Ghana‟s mediatory role between the Federal Military Government of Nigeria and its dis-affectioned Eastern Region to prevent the impending Nigerian civil war of notwithstanding, its neutrality after the outbreak of war (July 1967 to January 1970) provoked insinuations from the Nigerian Government as it was accused of collaborating with the secessionist „Republic of Biafra‟ throughout the war years to decimate the country. It indeed played a significant role in soiling the fragile cordial relations between the two countries. Nigeria-Ghana Relations on the Eve of the Nigeria Civil War It is important to stress that in spite of the volatility of relations between both countries in the early years of their independence, Nigeria-Ghana relations witnessed a great improvement with the ascendancy of the military to power in both countries in early 1966. The overthrow of both Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria (15 January, 1966) and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana (24 February, 1966) may indeed be said to have marked the end of the unpleasant rivalry in Nigeria- Ghana relations, even though temporarily. This new-found cordial relation was premised largely on inter-personal relationship that existed between the two military leaders since the period of colonial rule (Aluko, 1976:9). Both Aguiyi Ironsi and J.A. Ankrah were Officers in the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF) stationed at Accra until 1956. For more information, See O. Aluko, Ghana and Nigeria; 1957 – 70: A Study in Inter-African Discord (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1976), p.9. Apart from this, the two military leaders had also been contemporaries at the Eaton Hall, England, one of the British military training institutions. Other developments that helped in strengthening the improved bilateral relations between both countries included: the official recognition of the General Ankrah‟s government by Nigeria in February 1966 (Nivan, 1970: 37) and the arduous role played by Nigeria in ensuring the accreditation of the Ghanaian delegation to the defunct Organization of African Unity (O.A.U) Ministerial Council meeting held at Addis Ababa on 28 February, 1966 (Collins,1970:137). These two actions were said to have impressed the Ghanaian authorities so much that they quickly dispatched a high-powered delegation to Nigeria with a goodwill message. In a communiqué issued at the end of the visit, both countries expressed their desire to re-establish and further strengthen their traditional bond of friendship (Idang, 1973:120). This new era of cordial relationship was nearly truncated by the 29 July, 1966 counter- coup in Nigeria which brought about the death of General Aguiyi Ironsi. Idang reports that the news of Ironsi‟s death in the counter-coup was received with mixed feelings by the Ghanaian authorities (ibid: 122). Eventually, however, in a diplomatic way characteristic of experienced statesmen, General Ankrah, sent a congratulatory message to the new Nigerian Head of State, Yakubu Gowon, and commended him (Gowon) for having “a peculiar grasp and understanding of the difficulties afflicting Nigeria” (Gould,1974:356). It was this spirit of mutual respect and 2 International Journal of Humanities and Cultural Studies (IJHCS) ISSN 2356-5926 Vol.1, Issue.3, December, 2014 understanding between the military leaders of both countries that prepared the ground for Ghana‟s intervention in the impending Nigerian civil war of 1967 to 1970. This leads us to an examination of the mediatory role played by General Ankrah in a bid to broker peace between the Nigerian Federal government and its Eastern region to prevent the outbreak of civil war in Nigeria. But before then, it is essential to state that the Ghanaian Government‟s intervention in Nigeria‟s political crisis was informed by a number of factors. These included; an attempt to promote on in-house settlement of African disputes devoid of extra-African intervention; the zeal to maintain the territorial integrity of Nigeria; the necessity of maintenance of peace in the West African sub-region; pro-active step aimed at preventing large flows of refugee into Ghana in the event of outbreak of war in Nigeria; the need to unify the Nigerian Army and resolve the internal wranglings among its officers; and most importantly, the humanitarian factor of reducing the carnage of death in the event of outbreak of hostilities between Nigeria‟s Federal Government and the Eastern Region. (Abubakar, 1992) Ghana’s Mediatory Role in the Nigerian Political Crisis: Aburi and After The events that led to the Nigerian civil war (6 July 1967- 15 January, 1970) have been well articulated in previous works that they need no rehearsals in this article. However, for records purposes, it will be succinct to mention some of the recurring ones identified in the literature namely; the 15 January, 1966 coup and its ethnic connotations. Aguiyi Ironsi‟s miscalculated politics of stability necessitating unitarism as against federalism; the 29 July, 1966 counter-coup and the attendant pogroms of Easterners in the North; emergence of Yakubu Gowon as military leader and, the refusal of Odumegwu Ojukwu to recognize his leadership and; the secession of the Eastern region and declaration of independence of the Republic of Biafra in July, 1967 (Ikime, 2002; Onyeoziri, 2002; Elaigwu, 2005; Nwolise, 2002 and Umoru-Onuka, 2002). Consequent upon the massacre of about 30,000 people of Igbo extraction across the Northern part of Nigeria between May and July 1966 (Olomola & Ola, 1989:18), and the large number of easterners flocking back to the Eastern Region, Lt. Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, the military Governor of the Eastern Region demanded for more security measures for the Igbos as well as more autonomy for the Eastern Region. However, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria under Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon, did not grant the request. This was the beginning of heightened tension within the polity in a build-up towards the civil war. Following from the refusal of the Nigerian government to grant his request, Lt. Colonel Ojukwu in early November 1966 refused to accept Gowon‟s leadership and declined from attending the Supreme Military Council (SMC) meetings henceforth (Ikime, 2002:62; Elaigwu, 1986). However, upon much persuasion, Ojukwu on 23 November, 1966 indicated his willingness to attend the SMC meeting provided such meetings would hold outside the country, claiming that his personal security could no longer be guaranteed anywhere in the country except in the Eastern Region (Ojukwu,1969:14). In an attempt to win over the apparently disgruntled Governor, Yakubu Gowon acceded to Ojukwu‟s demand and the search for a suitable and acceptable venue began in earnest. In 3 International Journal of Humanities and Cultural Studies (IJHCS) ISSN 2356-5926 Vol.1, Issue.3, December, 2014 December 1966, the Ghanaian Head of State, General J.A. Ankrah offered to host the mediation meeting. It was perhaps the last major attempt to broker peace between Lt. Colonel Odunmegwu Ojukwu and Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon (Forsyth, 2001; Madiebo, 1980). Eventually, the search for peaceful co-existence of the peoples of Nigeria as one virile, united country took the Nigerian military leaders and senior police officials to Aburi in Accra, Ghana between 4 and 5 January, 1967 (Gailey Jr., 1972:210; Uwechue, 2004; Forsyth, 2001; Ojukwu, 1969). The terms of the agreement signed at the conference popularly known as the Aburi Accord included: the Army was to be governed by the Supreme Military Council (SMC), under the Chairman of the Head of the Federal Military Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces; establishment of a military headquarters in which each region was to be represented. It would be headed by the Chief of Staff; Establishment of an Area Command in each region under an Area Commander; the SMC was to deal with all matters of appointment and promotions of people in executive posts in the Armed Forces and the Police and; Military Governors were to have control over Area commands in their regions for the purpose of internal security (Elaigwu, 2005: 18-19; Oluleye, 1985:42; Obasanjo, 1971:47).