International Journal of Humanities and Cultural Studies (IJHCS) ISSN 2356-5926

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Ghana’s Role in the Nigerian War: Mediator or Collaborator?

Johnson Olaosebikan Aremu Ekiti State University, Ado- Ekiti, Nigeria

Abstract

This article attempts an exploration of Ghana’s mediatory role in a bid to broker peace between the Federal Military Government of Nigeria and its dis-affectioned Eastern Region to prevent the impending Nigerian civil war of July 1967 to January 1970. It notes Nigeria’s disappointment in Ghana’s neutrality after the outbreak of war as well as Nigeria’s subsequent accusation of Ghana as a collaborator with the secessionist ‘Republic of Biafra’ throughout the war years. The article carefully interrogates the factors that propelled Ghana’s neutrality and the authenticity or otherwise of Nigeria’s insinuations against her action during the war. It submits that apart from the humanitarian challenge of reducing the carnage of the war, Ghana acted within the ambits of the Organisation of African Unity’s Charter and Resolutions to remain neutral in what was regarded as a ‘purely Nigerian internal affair’. The article concludes that since Ghana was never a party to the war, it should be exonerated from all insinuations as a collaborator with Biafra. Its mediatory role should be commended for promoting peace in the West African sub-region.

Keywords: Nigeria, Ghana, Civil War, Conflict, Biafra

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Introduction

One of the major events that have generated controversy in Nigeria-Ghana relations in contemporary times was Ghana‟s purported lukewarm attitude to the Nigerian civil war between 1967 and 1970. Ghana‟s mediatory role between the Federal Military Government of Nigeria and its dis-affectioned Eastern Region to prevent the impending Nigerian civil war of notwithstanding, its neutrality after the outbreak of war (July 1967 to January 1970) provoked insinuations from the Nigerian Government as it was accused of collaborating with the secessionist „Republic of Biafra‟ throughout the war years to decimate the country. It indeed played a significant role in soiling the fragile cordial relations between the two countries.

Nigeria-Ghana Relations on the Eve of the Nigeria Civil War

It is important to stress that in spite of the volatility of relations between both countries in the early years of their independence, Nigeria-Ghana relations witnessed a great improvement with the ascendancy of the military to power in both countries in early 1966. The overthrow of both Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria (15 January, 1966) and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana (24 February, 1966) may indeed be said to have marked the end of the unpleasant rivalry in Nigeria- Ghana relations, even though temporarily. This new-found cordial relation was premised largely on inter-personal relationship that existed between the two military leaders since the period of colonial rule (Aluko, 1976:9). Both Aguiyi Ironsi and J.A. Ankrah were Officers in the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF) stationed at Accra until 1956. For more information, See O. Aluko, Ghana and Nigeria; 1957 – 70: A Study in Inter-African Discord (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1976), p.9. Apart from this, the two military leaders had also been contemporaries at the Eaton Hall, England, one of the British military training institutions.

Other developments that helped in strengthening the improved bilateral relations between both countries included: the official recognition of the General Ankrah‟s government by Nigeria in February 1966 (Nivan, 1970: 37) and the arduous role played by Nigeria in ensuring the accreditation of the Ghanaian delegation to the defunct Organization of African Unity (O.A.U) Ministerial Council meeting held at Addis Ababa on 28 February, 1966 (Collins,1970:137). These two actions were said to have impressed the Ghanaian authorities so much that they quickly dispatched a high-powered delegation to Nigeria with a goodwill message. In a communiqué issued at the end of the visit, both countries expressed their desire to re-establish and further strengthen their traditional bond of friendship (Idang, 1973:120).

This new era of cordial relationship was nearly truncated by the 29 July, 1966 counter- coup in Nigeria which brought about the death of General Aguiyi Ironsi. Idang reports that the news of Ironsi‟s death in the counter-coup was received with mixed feelings by the Ghanaian authorities (ibid: 122). Eventually, however, in a diplomatic way characteristic of experienced statesmen, General Ankrah, sent a congratulatory message to the new Nigerian Head of State, Yakubu Gowon, and commended him (Gowon) for having “a peculiar grasp and understanding of the difficulties afflicting Nigeria” (Gould,1974:356). It was this spirit of mutual respect and

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Vol.1, Issue.3, December, 2014 understanding between the military leaders of both countries that prepared the ground for Ghana‟s intervention in the impending Nigerian civil war of 1967 to 1970. This leads us to an examination of the mediatory role played by General Ankrah in a bid to broker peace between the Nigerian Federal government and its Eastern region to prevent the outbreak of civil war in Nigeria. But before then, it is essential to state that the Ghanaian Government‟s intervention in Nigeria‟s political crisis was informed by a number of factors. These included; an attempt to promote on in-house settlement of African disputes devoid of extra-African intervention; the zeal to maintain the territorial integrity of Nigeria; the necessity of maintenance of peace in the West African sub-region; pro-active step aimed at preventing large flows of refugee into Ghana in the event of outbreak of war in Nigeria; the need to unify the Nigerian Army and resolve the internal wranglings among its officers; and most importantly, the humanitarian factor of reducing the carnage of death in the event of outbreak of hostilities between Nigeria‟s Federal Government and the Eastern Region. (Abubakar, 1992)

Ghana’s Mediatory Role in the Nigerian Political Crisis: Aburi and After

The events that led to the Nigerian civil war (6 July 1967- 15 January, 1970) have been well articulated in previous works that they need no rehearsals in this article. However, for records purposes, it will be succinct to mention some of the recurring ones identified in the literature namely; the 15 January, 1966 coup and its ethnic connotations. Aguiyi Ironsi‟s miscalculated politics of stability necessitating unitarism as against federalism; the 29 July, 1966 counter-coup and the attendant pogroms of Easterners in the North; emergence of Yakubu Gowon as military leader and, the refusal of Odumegwu Ojukwu to recognize his leadership and; the secession of the Eastern region and declaration of independence of the Republic of Biafra in July, 1967 (Ikime, 2002; Onyeoziri, 2002; Elaigwu, 2005; Nwolise, 2002 and Umoru-Onuka, 2002). Consequent upon the massacre of about 30,000 people of Igbo extraction across the Northern part of Nigeria between May and July 1966 (Olomola & Ola, 1989:18), and the large number of easterners flocking back to the Eastern Region, Lt. Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, the military Governor of the Eastern Region demanded for more security measures for the Igbos as well as more autonomy for the Eastern Region. However, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria under Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon, did not grant the request. This was the beginning of heightened tension within the polity in a build-up towards the civil war. Following from the refusal of the Nigerian government to grant his request, Lt. Colonel Ojukwu in early November 1966 refused to accept Gowon‟s leadership and declined from attending the Supreme Military Council (SMC) meetings henceforth (Ikime, 2002:62; Elaigwu, 1986). However, upon much persuasion, Ojukwu on 23 November, 1966 indicated his willingness to attend the SMC meeting provided such meetings would hold outside the country, claiming that his personal security could no longer be guaranteed anywhere in the country except in the Eastern Region (Ojukwu,1969:14).

In an attempt to win over the apparently disgruntled Governor, Yakubu Gowon acceded to Ojukwu‟s demand and the search for a suitable and acceptable venue began in earnest. In

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December 1966, the Ghanaian Head of State, General J.A. Ankrah offered to host the mediation meeting. It was perhaps the last major attempt to broker peace between Lt. Colonel Odunmegwu Ojukwu and Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon (Forsyth, 2001; Madiebo, 1980). Eventually, the search for peaceful co-existence of the peoples of Nigeria as one virile, united country took the Nigerian military leaders and senior police officials to Aburi in Accra, Ghana between 4 and 5 January, 1967 (Gailey Jr., 1972:210; Uwechue, 2004; Forsyth, 2001; Ojukwu, 1969). The terms of the agreement signed at the conference popularly known as the Aburi Accord included: the Army was to be governed by the Supreme Military Council (SMC), under the Chairman of the Head of the Federal Military Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces; establishment of a military headquarters in which each region was to be represented. It would be headed by the Chief of Staff; Establishment of an Area Command in each region under an Area Commander; the SMC was to deal with all matters of appointment and promotions of people in executive posts in the Armed Forces and the Police and; Military Governors were to have control over Area commands in their regions for the purpose of internal security (Elaigwu, 2005: 18-19; Oluleye, 1985:42; Obasanjo, 1971:47). Unfortunately, however, the Agreement was never implemented by Gowon‟s government because they were viewed as representing no more than a victory for Ojukwu. The refusal of Gowon to implement the Aburi Accord and Ojukwu‟s insistence that “on Aburi we stand: there will be no compromise” eventually led to the breakdown to the Accord. (Abubakar, 2002: 257).

This notwithstanding, General Ankrah was still convinced that the crisis could still be resolved amicably. His decision to persuade Gowon to implement the Aburi Agreement yielded some result when the Federal Government of Nigeria promulgated the Decree No.8 of 28 May, 1967 as the only acceptable compromise the government could afford (Achebe, 2012:86). But rather than bringing about the desired peace, it inspired new tensions in the already heated political climate of Nigeria, as Ojukwu rejected the Decree (Elaigwu, 2005:21; Kirk-Greene, 1971:35).

The Ghanaian government remained undaunted in playing its mediatory role and quickly dispatched a three-man delegation to persuade Ojukwu to modify his stand on the Aburi Accord and to consult with other military leaders so as to ensure peace in Nigeria, but without success (ibid). Subsequently, General Ankrah invited all the senior law and finance officers from all the regional governments in Nigeria to a meeting in Accra. His aim was to make the officers translate the constitutional and financial proposals of the Aburi Summit into action (Obasanjo, 1971:51). Like the previous attempts, the forum also failed to achieve its set objectives. The conflict took a new turn almost immediately after that meeting when Ojukwu enacted, “The Revenue Collection Edict” in which he demanded that all companies operating in the Eastern Region should pay their taxes into the purse of the Eastern Region instead of the Federal Government‟s account. The Federal Government reacted swiftly to the Edict. First it declared it illegal and ordered an economic and diplomatic blockade of the Eastern Region (ibid). Lt. Colonel Ojukwu in a counter- reaction gave the Federal Government till 31 May, 1967 to put into effect the terms of the Aburi Accord for a loose federation and assist Igbo refugees, among others. On 26 May, 1967, the Eastern Region Consultative Assembly voted to secede from Nigeria. It mandated Ojukwu to declare, at the earliest practicable date, Eastern Nigeria a free,

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Vol.1, Issue.3, December, 2014 sovereign and independent State by the name and title of „The Republic of Biafra‟ (Achebe, 2012:91). Subsequently on 30 May, 1967, Ojukwu declared the secession of the Eastern Region from Nigeria, naming the new country the Republic of Biafra (Uwechue, 2004:20) Vowing to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of the Nigerian federation, General Gowon declared war against the so-called Republic of Biafra on 6 July, 1967. This signaled the commencement of the Nigerian civil war which lasted till 15 January, 1970.

Outbreak of Nigeria Civil War: Ghana’s Neutrality and Nigeria’s Insinuations

It is interesting to note that as soon as the war broke out in July 1967, Ghana‟s change of attitude became apparent. The government of Ghana remained neutral in the war, probably as a sign of respect for the O.A.U‟s principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence (Article III, Paragraphs 2 & 3, O.A.U Charter, 1963). It would be recalled that the O.A.U at its Kinshasa Summit of September 1967, recognized the Nigerian civil war as “an internal affair, the solution of which is primarily the responsibility of Nigerians themselves” (Elaigwu, 2005:30). Similarly at its Algiers Summit of September 1968, the O.A.U. called on all member states to refrain from any action detrimental to the peace, unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria (Cervenka, 1971:108; Elaigwu, 2005:30). As a frontline member state of OAU, Ghana had little or no choice than to conform to the organization‟s resolutions and principle; hence, its neutrality in the war. This made the Nigerian government to suspect Ghana‟s actions throughout the war (Balogun, 1973:46). Ghana‟s posture impeded good neighbourliness between the two countries. It is necessary to emphasize the fact that Ghana did not, at any time during or after the Nigerian civil war, grant open diplomatic recognition to Biafra (Johns,1979:270; Onwudiwe,2002:422). However, the purported press war launched by the Ghanaian print media against Nigeria, during the war; the constant reference to “Biafra” as a sovereign country by the Ghanaian government; the emotional-laden support given to Igbo elements living in Ghana and the expulsion of Nigerian immigrant community from Ghana in 1969, with the exception of the Igbo‟s who were classified “special refugees”, all raised fears about Ghana‟s unfriendly relations with Nigeria. A brief discussion of some of these issues will suffice.

The Press War

On 30 May 1967, Ojukwu, Head of State of the Secessionist Republic of Biafra, in an apparent war of propaganda, published the names of countries which he claimed had granted recognition to Biafra. Among the list of African states, Ghana‟s name was most conspicuous (Nivan, 1970:52). Though, Ghana never recognized Biafra openly at any point in time, the fact that it took the Ghanaian government ten days to refute the allegation was a very strong proof to political observers of Ghana‟s tacit support for Biafra. Incidentally, the Ghanaian press (newspapers and journals) made matters worse by their editorial comments. For instance, The Daily Graphic which had initially described Ojukwu‟s secession bid as “foolhardy” changed

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Vol.1, Issue.3, December, 2014 tone within the first month of the war. The newspaper published massive pro-Biafran propaganda (Balogun, 1973:57).

The Daily Graphic went ahead to commit a greater blunder when it called on the O.A.U Kinshasa summit of 1967 to revise the O.A.U Charter to accommodate secession in its Charter (Collins, 1970:160). Though this call was ignored by well-meaning African leaders and the communiqué issued at the end of the summit out-rightly condemned secession (Obasanjo, 1971: 65), the fact that the idea was ever conceived at all was in itself abominable and detestable.

Emotional Support for Igbo Elements in Ghana

The emotional support given to “Biafra” by the Ghanaian government and public came to the limelight on 29 May, 1968 when both the Daily Graphic and Ghanaian Times carried full- page advertisements in memory of about 30,000 civilians of Igbo extraction who were allegedly massacred in the 1966 civil strife in Northern Nigeria. As part of the advertisements too, the Biafra Union in Ghana also announced a memorial service for the same day at the Catholic Cathedral, Accra (Nivan, 1970:110). The Nigerian High Commissioner in Ghana in a swift reaction to the said publications called on the Ghanaian government to disallow the service. The Ghanaian government quickly responded that “she did not recognize the residence in Ghana, of any citizen of any state known as Biafra” but regretted that she could not stop the service from holding as scheduled in the interest of freedom of worship (ibid:111). This particular event clearly brought Nigeria-Ghana relations to its lowest-ebb for it depicted the level of emotional attachment of Ghanaians to Biafra and Ghana‟s indifference to the corporate well-being of Nigeria.

Ghana‟s tacit support for the secessionist could also be gleaned from its constant mention of Biafra. This, no doubt indicated that Ghana was tacitly aligning herself with the rebel‟s cause, a development that was totally unimaginable to the Federal Government of Nigeria. For instance, during the Niamey Peace Talks, as part of the O.A.U‟s efforts at restoring peace to Nigeria, General Ankrah, as leader of the six-member consultative committee sent to convey to both Gowon and Ojukwu, the O.A.U‟s commitment to the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Nigeria as well as its desire for peace and unity in the country, constantly referred to the secessionist enclave as the State of Biafra while Ojukwu was also referred to as “Head of State” (Obasanjo, 1971:65). These undiplomatic statements of Ankrah were strongly condemned by the Nigerian delegation to the meeting (Nivan, 1970:110). To further compound this unpleasant situation, the peace proposals made by the Committee were more or less a replica of the conditions laid down by the secessionist. Political observers interpreted the development as a confirmation of Ghana‟s tacit support for Biafra (ibid: 95).

Expulsion of Nigerians from Ghana in 1969

The next hostile action against Nigeria occurred in November 1969 when the Ghanaian government under the leadership of Dr. Kofi, A. Busia promulgated the Aliens Compliance

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Order requiring all aliens in Ghana without residence permits to leave Ghana within fourteen days, that is not later than 2 December, 1969 (Olaniyi, 2007:10; Adomako-Sarfo, 1974:76; Ahooja-Patel, 1974:175-176). Though the Order affected some migrants from other West African countries such as Togo, Burkina Faso, and Ivory-Coast, majority of the victims were Nigerian Yoruba‟s from the South-Western part of the country numbering about 140,000 who were forced out of Ghana at the height of the civil war (West Africa, 20 Dec., 1969:1533-1535; Boahen, 1975:196).

But if the expulsion of Nigerians at that particular period infuriated the Nigerian government, the decision of the Ghanaian government to regard the Igbo‟s as special refugees while other Nigerians (Yorubas and Hausas) were due for expulsion, drove a bigger wedge into Nigeria-Ghana relations. The interpretation of that Ghanaian directive that the Ghana government recognized that Igbo‟s were no longer Nigerians but belonged to another state being terrorized by a “bully”, made nonsense of the governments earlier claims of “not recognizing Biafra or the residence in Ghana of any citizen of such a State”. This singular event, more than any other development heightened insinuations of Ghana‟s hypocrisy in the Nigerian civil war.

The already tensed relation between Nigeria and Ghana was also further aggravated by the comment of Dr. Kofi Busia on the question of the Nigerian civil war. He was accused of stressing the need for an “urgent unconditional ceasefire between the Nigerian and Biafran forces” (Aluko, 1976:120). That comment was condemned by Aluko as not only “unhelpful” but also “mischievous” for “deliberately ignoring the facts of the Nigerian government‟s case” (ibid: 129). Though it is difficult to determine the exact reason(s) for the sudden change of attitude of the peoples and government of Ghana since the onset of the Nigerian civil war, Nigerian government officials regarded all the aforementioned actions as premeditated attempts to dissipate the Nigerian government and divert its attention away from the all-important war of unity on-going then. It was equally viewed as a Ghanaian tactic to compound Nigeria‟s political and economic challenges of the time. Ghana‟s jealousy of the large Nigerian population which she regarded as intimidating also probably contributed to her hostile posture. She may thus be accused of attempting to discomfit the Nigerian state and enhance the secession of Biafra and cause Nigeria to disintegrate and thus remove the threat of Nigeria, her only age-long rival and contender to the status of hegemonic power in the West African sub-region. These issues brought deep strain in Nigeria-Ghana relations.

Concluding Remarks It has been established that in the event of stalemate between the Federal Government of Nigeria and Ojukwu‟s Eastern Region to resolve Nigeria‟s internal conflict, Ghana, under the leadership of General J.A. Ankrah, in the spirit of good neighbourliness, offered its territory for mediation, between the belligerent parties to the crisis in January 1967. While some African countries like Gabon, Ivory Coast, Tanzania and Guinea gave diplomatic recognition to the secessionist Republic of Biafra, Ghana maintained her neutrality, though, to the consternation of the Nigerian Government.

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Though Ghana‟s categorization of people of Igbo descent living in its territory as special refugees‟ and its expulsion of Yoruba and Hausa elements in November 1969 raised great suspicion of its sympathy for the Republic of Biafra”, it never at any point in time made any official pronouncement to the effect of recognizing Biafra as a sovereign state. Even then, its action may be rationalised based on the perception of the international community that the rest of Nigeria was bent on exterminating the Igbo ethnic nationality (Ikime, 2002:67). Finally, Ghana was not the architect of the Nigerian civil war. All the remote and immediate factors that prompted the war suggest that the Nigerian State was faced with internal dissention and disintegration between 1966 and 1970. Nigeria was indeed a house divided against itself at the time of Ghana‟s intervention. Since Ghana was never a party to the war, it should therefore be exonerated from all insinuations as a collaborator with Biafra. Its mediatory role should be commended for promoting peace and good neighbourliness in the West African sub-region.

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