May 2011
Mehrabad Nawa
Uruzgan Province
TLO MANTEQA PROFILE
Mehrabad Nawa
A TLO Manteqa Profile
May 2011
© 2011, The Liaison Office. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, recording or otherwise without prior written permission of the publisher, The Liaison Office. Permission can be obtained by emailing info@tlo-afghanistan.org Mehrabad Manteqa
Acknowledgements
This report is financed by the Royal Netherlands’s Embassy in Afghanistan and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID).
TLO reports are independent surveys and analyses of local perceptions and attitudes. While TLO makes all efforts to review and verify field data prior to publication, some factual inaccuracies may still remain. Data collection for this report was completed by 10 April 2011 and information presented may have changed since that time. TLO is solely responsible for possible inaccuracies in the information presented. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of AusAID, the Australian Government, or the Government of the Netherlands. The report authors would like to thank all individuals who spent time with the research team to contribute to this report as well as TLO colleagues whose comments and contributions helped to improve the clarity of the report and the correctness of its facts.
About The Liaison Office (TLO)
The Liaison Office (TLO) is an independent Afghan non-governmental organization seeking to improve local governance, stability and security through systematic and institutionalized engagement with customary structures, local communities, and civil society groups. TLO’s mission is to facilitate the formal integration of communities and their traditional governance structures within Afghanistan’s newly emerging peace, governance and reconstruction framework. TLO main areas of activity are Research/Analysis using the do-no harm approach; Dialogue facilitation and participatory peacebuilding, access to justice and livelihoods. In addition to the TLO headquarter in Kabul, the organization has a total of four (3) regional (Paktia-Southeast, Kandahar-South, Nangarhar-East) and five (5) provincial (Uruzgan, Khost, Paktika, Helmand, Nimroz) offices across Afghanistan, with over 250 staff. TLO was established in 2003 by swisspeace on the request of community leaders in the Southeast. TLO has been funded by various donors from the non-governmental and governmental sectors, international organizations and foundations. Its main donors include the Heinrich Böll Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace and the governments of Australia (AusAID), Netherlands, Norway, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland (SDC).
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Table of Contents
ACRONYMS ...... iv
Executive Summary...... v
Recommendations / Development Opportunities ...... vii
1 Introduction ...... 1
2 Manteqa Context ...... 3 2.1 Demographic Overview ...... 4 2.1.1 The Hotak ...... 6 2.1.2 The Tokhi ...... 6 2.1.3 Other Non-Kuchi Pashtun tribes ...... 6 2.1.4 The Kuchi ...... 6 2.2 Key Development Actors ...... 8
3 Human Security Needs ...... 9 3.1 Access to Water ...... 9 3.2 Access to Electricity ...... 10 3.3 Access to Education ...... 10 3.4 Access to Health Care ...... 11 3.5 Access to Communication Infrastructure ...... 12 3.6 Vulnerable Populations ...... 12 3.6.1 Women ...... 13 3.6.2 Internally Displaced Populations ...... 14 3.6.3 Kuchi Nomads ...... 14
4 Economy, Natural Resources, Livelihoods ...... 15 4.1 Agriculture ...... 15 4.2 Livestock ...... 18 4.3 Natural Resource Management ...... 18 4.4 Labour Migration and Trade...... 20
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5 Security, Stabilization, Governance ...... 21 5.1 Government Control and Access ...... 22 5.2 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) ...... 23 5.3 Road Security ...... 24 5.4 Insurgency ...... 25
6 Key Actors in Mehrabad ...... 27
Annex: TLO Research Methodology ...... 31 6.1 Data Limitations and Management of Bias ...... 32
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ACRONYMS
ADA Afghan Development Association AFN Afghani, the official currency of Afghanistan AHDS Afghan Health and Development Services ANA Afghan National Army ANP Afghan National Police ANSF Afghan National Security Forces (ANA, ANP, NDS) AusAID Australian Agency for International Development AWCC Afghan Wireless Communications Company COIN Counterinsurgency DG District Governor FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas, an area of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan across the Durand Line HADAF Humanitarian Assistance for Development of Afghanistan, an Afghan NGO IED Improvised Explosive Device NGO Non-Governmental Organization PG Provincial Governor PKR Pakistani Rupee TK Tirin Kot (refers to either the district or the city) TLO The Liaison Office USD United States Dollar
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Post Script
Matiullah Khan, the Provincial Chief of Uruzgan (appointed 7 August 2011) managed to clear the Mehrabad valley of insurgents in September 2011 with most of the manteqa secured now through Afghan National Security Forces check-posts. Most insurgents are said to have left the area, some altogether, while others regrouped in Darafshan manteqa.
Executive Summary
Mehrabad manteqa 1, one of five in Tirin Kot district, consists of 15 or 16 villages scattered in a valley to the east-northeast of the provincial capital, straddling the banks of the Tiri River from Sanhan village up to the border between Tirin Kot and Chenartu districts, although the eastern end of the manteqa is disputed by some (see section 2.1). It lies in the southern part of a Kuchi migration route (with the northern end in Ajristan and Malistan districts of Ghazni province), and the Kuchis play a prominent role in the security situation within the manteqa.
Mehrabad is virtually 100% Pashtun, with the Hotak and Tokhi tribes of the Ghilzai confederation making up some 70% of the manteqa’s 12,000-17,000 inhabitants. The Hotak are the dominant tribe, accounting for roughly 50% of the population; they derive their importance from their large population as well as the fact that they occupy some of the most fertile and best-irrigated farmland in the manteqa. In addition to the Hotak and Tokhi, there are Pashtuns from the Taraki, Kakar, Suleiman Kheil, and Naser tribes living in Mehrabad, with the Taraki and Suleiman Kheil accounting for the Kuchi population of the manteqa (roughly 15-20% of the population).
Unlike much of Uruzgan, Mehrabad usually has enough water for most of its population, thanks to the river that flows through the manteqa. Just about all other human security needs, however, are poorly met. Less than a quarter of the population has electricity (the vast majority of which is generated by hydroelectric dynamos in the river). Cell phone coverage is spotty, as the lack of transmitters within the manteqa means that villages far from Tirin Kot centre have no coverage at all, and those closer to the provincial capital can only make calls when atmospheric conditions allow them to receive a signal. Manteqa residents must travel to Tirin Kot City for essentially all services and non-farming employment: there are no operating schools or clinics in Mehrabad, and no village has more than a handful of stores.
The manteqa is entirely dependent on agriculture for its economy (with climate allowing for two growing seasons), as there is virtually no outside economic activity in the area. The large majority of the farmland in Mehrabad is devoted to the cultivation of wheat, to which surveyors estimated 60% of the land is dedicated. Roughly 15-20% of the total arable land is used for opium poppy. About half
1 A “manteqa” is a term for an area within Afghanistan larger than a village but smaller than a district. Manteqas vary greatly in size and population, and there are few if any widespread criteria for defining an area as a manteqa.
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of the remainder—some 10% of the total farmland in the manteqa—is devoted to almond cultivation, with the rest given over to fruits and vegetables. The majority of each harvest is used for subsistence, and the remaining produce forms the manteqa’s only export. Almonds, apricots and pomegranates constitute the main cash crop of the manteqa. There is also little chance of finding employment on development projects, as the security situation in the manteqa has led to a near- total lack of development work.
The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have a presence in Mehrabad, in the form of four bases shared by the Afghan National Army (ANA) and international military forces (IMF). In the last year, increased activities by the security forces have reportedly led to substantial gains in security, possibly opening the door for the construction of much-needed infrastructure. The Taliban has also suffered because of the influx of ANSF; for example, respondents said that the insurgents are no longer able to collect taxes in the manteqa. Despite these gains, the Taliban still hold significant power in Mehrabad, even if they are a less visible and assertive presence now than in the past, mainly thanks to their long-held and well-established role in conflict resolution.
TLO identified 12 key actors within Mehrabad, who are mostly local elders and religious figures. Of the twelve key actors, eight (67%) are Hotak, a disproportionately large number given their share of the manteqa’s population, but a number reflective of their outsized influence in local politics (see section 2.1). Over half are either landed elite background actors (33%) or achieved their status during the jihad (25%), 2 while 42% are religious actors showing the importance of Islam in the manteqa. Half of the four elite background actors also served during the jihad , bringing the number of actors that were active during war as well to 42%.
This data on which this assessment is based was gathered through approximately 40 semi-structured interviews conducted by TLO’s Uruzgan field staff with local elders, shopkeepers and government officials during late March and early April 2011. All interviewed were men due to TLO’s all male survey staff (female surveyors work in clinics which are located in TK centre). In addition, members of the Kabul office during trips to the Tirin Kot field office also conducted interviews for triangulation purposes. A more detailed description of the research methodology can be found in the Annex.
2 For more about the importance of landed versus achieved status in Uruzgan, see Susanne Schmeidl, “The Man Who Would Be King: The Challenges to Strengthen Governance in Uruzgan,” Clingendael Institute , 2011.
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Recommendations / Development Opportunities
• Completion of the Tirin Kot-Chenartu-Khas Uruzgan road project. Residents said that this is the most important development priority in Mehrabad, as a good road would dramatically cut travel time to the schools, hospital, and other facilities in Tirin Kot centre.
• Increase service delivery and human security through school and clinic construction:
o Schools in Sanhan, Surkh Lez, Kochkel, and Charmestan villages were noted as priorities. Apart from the increase in job opportunities provided by an education, Mehrabad residents believe that attending school would decrease the appeal of the Taliban to local youths.
o Respondents suggested Musazai village as a location for a future medical care centre because of its central location within the manteqa, where the local NGO Afghan Health and Development Services already once attempted to build one. That being said, until security has improved this endeavour is unlikely to succeed.
• Continue to expand the Afghan National Police (ANP) presence in the manteqa. Residents reportedly have a good opinion of the police, and they believe that the ANSF have done a lot of good in their area.
• Bring back development work more generally. Mehrabad has not seen any development projects in almost a decade. As priorities, the following were noted:
o Wells in Sanhan, Musazai, and Kawri villages.
o Bridges in Kawri, Surkh Lez, and Nayak villages
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Chapter 1
1 Introduction
This assessment was commissioned by AusAID and the Dutch Embassy in order to increase the understanding of development actors about existing social, political, economic, security, and conflict dynamics in selected areas of Uruzgan. Working within the “Do-No-Harm” framework, which aims to increase understanding regarding the complexity of conflict environments, this assessment provides baseline data and ground realities about one of the five manteqas of Tirin Kot district.
Manteqas are a traditional territory delineating tribal jurisdiction, and thus their demarcation relies heavily on oral history. While elsewhere in Afghanistan they are usually comprised of several wandas3 with several elders sharing jurisdiction of a manteqa, in Uruzgan they are generally river valleys. As manteqas are unofficial regions, they might extend across the district or provincial boundaries set by the Afghan government depending on local perceptions. Manteqas have, however, been used in the past for administrative functions during the mujahideen and Taliban governments. Specifically, the Taliban has been known to use manteqas as the basis for levying taxes, although, as will be discussed in section 5.4 below, they no longer do so within Mehrabad.
The Do-No-Harm methodology recognizes first and foremost that assistance in conflict or post- conflict environments, regardless of motive, is not neutral. Furthermore, aid and development, which does not benefit the community as a whole can hinder reconciliation efforts, embolden spoilers, and re-ignite conflict. A first step towards ensuring that aid does not make a fragile situation more precarious is to gain an understanding of the current environment in light of the following areas included in this assessment:
3 A wanda basically represents the share in loss and profit of a community within the jurisdiction of the sub-tribe that inhabits a specific region. It also reflects the population size of a tribe and its’ overall input/output into the social fabric of the district. For this reason, often shura at a district level traditionally allocated the number of representatives per tribe based on its population. Government assistance or development funds are at times also distributed on the same ratio if left to elders to do so.
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o A better understanding of the district context and community needs, especially regarding the economy and delivery of services
o An understanding of social structures (ethnic, religious, tribal), inter-group relations and power dynamics
o An overview of governance, rule of law and security, from the perspective of district residents
o A background of key actors in Mehrabad, including those who may seek to “spoil” development and/or peace initiatives; but also potential capacities for peace
This assessment should be considered a primer for development actors seeking to develop sustainable engagement strategies. It can serve as an initial guide for navigating the district’s fractured political and tribal landscape and identify possible entry points for undertaking community- driven development.
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Chapter 2
2 Manteqa Context
Mehrabad manteqa consists of about 15 villages that are situated in the eastern part of Tirin Kot district, following the river valley east from the district centre up to the border with Chenartu (see Map 1). The northern and southern boundaries of the manteqa lie just slightly north and south of the river, given that the lands farther away from the river in both directions are uninhabited deserts.
In the east, the manteqa probably ends at the Chenartu Map 1: Mehrabad Manteqa / TLO border, which is also the site of a demographic shift from the largely Hotak and Tokhi population of Mehrabad to the majority- Popalzai population of northern Chenartu, although this is disputed (see below). TLO surveyors agreed that the manteqa’s western end is at or near Sanhan (Sinan) village; the small village of Sar Paj is sometimes included in Mehrabad as well, depending on who is being interviewed. The next major villages west of Sanhan, Khaneqa and Nachin, are universally seen as being outside Mehrabad.
There was only full agreement on the following 15 villages said to be part of Mehrabad: Sanhan (also referred to as Sinan or Saran), Kawri, Manda, Musazai, Nawjoy, Kuchkel, Totak, Surkh Lez, Nayak,
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Haydar, Landi Walah, Karak Toghi, Kolakh, Charmestan, and Gazara. The status of one other village— Kazaree 4—is less clear, as it was not consistently mentioned as part of the manteqa.
There is some disagreement about the location of Mehrabad’s eastern border. Those interviewed stated that the manteqa extends all the way to the official border between Tirin Kot and Chenartu districts, as marked on Map 1. TLO Chenartu-based field staff, however, insisted that the border between the two districts actually lies just to the west of Landi Walah village, making the area marked by the lines on Map 1 part of Chenartu rather than Tirin Kot. As mentioned in Chapter 1, due to the unofficial nature of manteqas (and its reliance on oral history) it is feasible that the areas east of Landi Walah are in fact part of Chenartu, as traditional tribal territory at times does not conform with official government borders (district or provincial).
2.1 Demographic Overview
Surveyors estimated a total population of 12,000-17,000 people in the manteqa based on the number of villages. The villages were said to range from 150 families to 300 families, with 5-8 people per family on average; albeit there are few very larger villages in the manteqa.
The population of Mehrabad is entirely Pashtun, with reportedly no Hazaras living in any of the manteqa’s villages. About 10-20% of the population is nomadic Kuchis (see section 3.5.2).
The Pashtun tribal system is widely portrayed as being divided into different confederations, tribes and sub-tribes. The most prominent confederations are the Durrani, Ghilzai, Karlyani, and Ghurghusht. The Durrani and Ghilzai confederations account for more than two-thirds of all Afghan Pashtuns and predominate in southern Afghanistan. The tribes said to be living in Mehrabad belong mostly to the Ghilzai confederation , which is made up of the Ali Kheil, Andar, Hotak, Kharoti, Naser, Suliman Kheil, Taraki, Tokhi and Tota Kheil. They are most prominent in Ghazni, Paktika, Zabul and parts of Kandahar. Similarly to the Panjpai (one of the two sub-confederations of the Durrani), they have usually been forced to take a back seat to the Zirak Durrani (the sub-confederation that has yielded most rulers in Afghanistan) in power-sharing arrangements. The Ghurghusht tribal confederation in Afghanistan is mostly made up of the Kakar tribe, living in Helmand, Uruzgan, Kandahar and Zabul. A much larger part of the Kakar tribe lives in Pakistan.
Figure 1 provides an overview of an estimated tribal breakdown of the total manteqa population: 50% Hotak, 20% Tokhi, 10% Kakar, 10% Taraki, 7% Suleiman Kheil, and 3% Naser. Figure 2 shows the sub-tribes identified by surveyors for the four most populous tribes in the manteqa.
4 TLO’s GIS officers were able to locate a village called Kharzee, but it lies outside of Mehrabad as defined by local elders (albeit within the area that TLO had previously designated as Mehrabad).
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Suleiman Kheil, Naser, 3% 7%
Kakar, 10%
Taraki, 10% Hotak, 50%
Tokhi, 20%
Figure 1: Tribal Co mposition of Mehrabad
100% Yousuf Khail,10% Panjpai Shabkhail Sanhan 10% Maghdozai 40% 35% 40% 80% (Kuchi)
Marufzai 35% 60%
40% Lalzai Jagzai Adokhail 60% 65% 60% Tunzai (Kuchi) 45% 20%
0% Hotak Tokhi Taraki Kakar
Figure 2: Sub-tribes of the four most populous tribes in Mehrabad
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2.1.1 The Hotak The Hotak , which make up 50% of the manteqa population, are distributed all across the manteqa and, according to local interviews, do not account for any of the district’s Kuchi minority. The most important sub-tribes of the Hotak in Mehrabad are the Tunzai and the Marufzai, which represent 45% and 35% of the Hotak population, respectively (see Figure 2). These two sub-tribes are concentrated in the eastern end of the manteqa near the border with Chenartu—specifically, the villages of Charmestan, Kochkel, and Nawjoy, with another cluster of Marufzai in Kawri village.
The Hotak are said to be the most powerful and important tribe in the manteqa, in large part because of their sheer numbers, but also the fact that they are living on some of the best land. This has allowed them to establish a strong agricultural base of almond cultivation, which provides them with an important source of revenue.
The Tunzai reportedly have strong connections with the Taliban through a local mullah who was allegedly a finance secretary during the Taliban regime. The Marufzai are not affiliated with the insurgents.
2.1.2 The Tokhi
The Tokhi in Mehrabad are clustered in and around Musazai village, which is located in the east- central part of the manteqa. Respondents identified the Adokheil as the largest Tokhi sub-tribe in Mehrabad, comprising 50-60% of the Tokhi population, with the remainder belonging to the Maghdozai sub-tribe (which is in turn split into the Shamolzai and Musazai). The Tokhi are reportedly well-connected with the Taliban. They are also said to be heavily involved in the cultivation of opium, which constitutes the bulk of their income.
2.1.3 Other Non-Kuchi Pashtun tribes
The majority of the remaining non-Kuchis in Mehrabad are Kakars , who live only in the village of Sanhan. One of their sub-tribes, the Sanhans, make up about 60% of the Kakar population and make their living mainly from livestock; they are said to maintain relations with both the government and the Taliban. The other Kakar sub-tribe, which one surveyor called Kakaren and the other called Jagzai, spend most of their time farming what is said to be excellent land while maintaining very close relations with the Taliban.
2.1.4 The Kuchi
As mentioned earlier, Mehrabad also has a noticeable minority of Kuchi , or Pashtun nomads, who make up 10-20% of the population. These nomads pass through Mehrabad twice per year. The Kuchi migration routes take them between their homeland of Ghazni (Jaghuri, Malistan, and Ajristan
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districts) in the northeast, where they spend the spring and summer, and Kandahar (Nesh, Ghorak, and Khakrez districts), where they spend the autumn and winter (See Map 2).
Map 2: Kuchi Migration Patterns / TLO
The Kuchis of Mehrabad belong to two different tribes, the Taraki and the Suleiman Kheil (both tribes were described by respondents as containing only Kuchis). Both tribes are comprised of both “migrating” and “settled” Kuchis, showing the growing trend of Afghan nomads to turn sedentary as nomadic lifestyles become more and more difficult.
The Taraki are divided into two sub-tribes, the Lalzai and the Shabkheil. Both sub-tribes contain migrating Kuchis—the Shabkheil migrate to Malistan and Ajrestan districts of Ghazni, while the Lalzai head for Ghazni’s Hazarajat areas—as well as settled Kuchis, who live in Sanhan and Musazai villages. The Suleiman Kheil tribe also has two sub-tribes in Mehrabad. The Dinar Kheil sub-tribe is entirely made up of settled Kuchis, who farm the areas around Sanhan and maintain a strongly anti- government stance. The other sub-tribe, the Akakheil, spends their autumns and winters in the deserts near Kawri village and then migrates to Jaghuri and Malistan districts of Ghazni province for the spring and summer.
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Map 2 on the previous page shows the districts of Ghazni (green) and Kandahar (orange) where the Kuchis spend their summers and winters, respectively. Locals reported that the Kuchis migrate along the main roads; the red lines on the map mark the approximate routes of the main roads of Uruzgan and the relevant districts of Ghazni and Uruzgan. Mehrabad manteqa is outlined in green.
2.2 Key Development Actors
The local non-governmental organization (NGO) Afghan Development Association (ADA) is the only development actor that has done any considerable work in Mehrabad at all since the beginning of the Karzai government in 2001. The Afghan NGO Humanitarian Assistance for Development of Afghanistan (HADAF) is said to support a local pharmacy and Afghan Health and Development Service (AHDS) tried to set up a clinic once and failed. TLO has no information on other NGOs being active in the manteqa, as insecurity has limited access to villages there.
ADA’s work in Mehrabad consisted of a small number of development projects in 2001 and 2002: they built small dams on water flowing streams in Nachin, Sanhan, Musazai, Totak and Karak Toghi villages; and they also dug wells in Sanhan, Kawri, Manda, Musazai and Surkh Lez villages.
Surveyors reported an anecdote, which TLO was not able to verify with the organization itself, used to explain the lack of development work in the last nine years. In 2002, locals allege that the Taliban and ADA made an agreement whereby ADA paid the Taliban in return for a guarantee that ADA would be allowed to safely carry out a road-building project to connect Mehrabad to Chenartu by way of Chora. ADA went ahead with the project, but they had only gotten as far as a bridge in Sanhan village when splinter groups of the local Taliban came to ADA and demanded that they each be paid additional money (above and beyond the sum stipulated in the agreement) before the project would be allowed to proceed. ADA was unable (or unwilling) to meet the demands, and so the Taliban kidnapped an ADA engineer who had been working on the road project. The engineer was released some time later (surveyors were unable to provide details about the circumstances of his release), but the incident was sufficient to stop any future development work by ADA in Mehrabad.
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Chapter 3 3 Human Security Needs
Mehrabad residents face substantial challenges in meeting most of their human security needs. The only resource, which is available in sufficient quantity for most of the manteqa is water, with which the manteqa is well-supplied (although areas far from the river do experience droughts). Electricity, which is mainly generated by the river through the use of hydroelectric dynamos, is available to less than a quarter of the manteqa’s population. There are no operating educational facilities and only one or two pharmacies within the manteqa, so residents must travel to Tirin Kot City in order to access education and adequate healthcare. Women in particular face substantial restrictions within the manteqa, as Pashtun tradition limits their mobility outside their family’s home.
Because of a lack of cell phone transmitters in the manteqa, phone coverage is spotty and dependent on weather conditions allowing residents to pick up signals from transmitters in other areas.
Kuchis play an important economic role in both the licit and illicit economies.
3.1 Access to Water
Mehrabad enjoys easy access to water, as the manteqa straddles the Tiri River, which flows year- round. The river’s source is in Khas Uruzgan district, whence it flows southwest through the northern part of Chenartu district, Mehrabad, Tirin Kot City, and the southern reaches of Deh Rawud district. As mentioned in section 2.1, the manteqa’s northern and southern boundaries lie close to the river, meaning that most residents are able to access river water readily from their houses. For locals, the river and its water are extremely important, even to the point that one of TLO’s surveyors reported that the local definition of a manteqa is the area, which receives water from a particular source.
It is said that the river provides more than enough water for much of Mehrabad, regardless of the season. For 80-90% of the manteqa, there is enough water available that there is no system in place for rationing or distributing water, as it exists in other areas of Uruzgan: locals simply take however much water they need whenever they need it.
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In the other areas of the manteqa (especially further away from the river), which include areas near Nawjoy and Haidar villages, a traditional water rationing system is used. This system revolves around the position of mirab , which literally means “water master.” The mirab is in charge of making sure that water is distributed fairly and according to actual needs and usage patterns, rather than being subject to interpersonal feuds or other such externalities. The mirab also is the primary contact person for the resolution of any disputes that arise from water usage or access. The rationed-water areas are situated at the ends of wialas (canals), so their water supply can be diminished if villages farther up the wiala take an increased amount of water. Even in the rationed areas, however, there were no reports of major water shortages.
Respondents reported that over 90% of the manteqa’s population drinks river water (100% use river water for irrigation), even though there is a general consensus among residents that the river water is not particularly sanitary. The remaining 5-10% mostly draw their drinking water from wells (which surveyors reported were built during the Taliban regime), with very few being able to afford bottled drinking water.
3.2 Access to Electricity Despite the reliance on hydropower, the manteqa is not nearly as well-supplied with electricity as it is with water. There are five hydroelectric dams in the manteqa that were constructed by the Afghan NGO Afghan Development Association (ADA) several years ago. They are located on Nachin, Sanhan, Musazai, Totak, and Karak Toghi wialas and provide access to electricity to about 20% of the population. Local villagers take it upon themselves to ensure that the dams are in good working order, and the community collectively supplies money and labor to repair the dams when needed. Unfortunately, this system has proved insufficient to keep up with the maintenance needed by each dam, and as a result, the dams’ electricity output is well below capacity. With the exception of Karak Toghi village, people in the manteqa receive only enough electricity to power one or two light bulbs; in Karak Toghi, the dam produces enough electricity to run lights as well as additional appliances, which is almost always an iron. A small proportion of manteqa residents have access to solar power, which they are said to have purchased on their own initiative at the Tirin Kot bazaar, rather than as part of any development program. There are no private generators or other power stations operational in Mehrabad. There has also been no commercialization of the electricity: those households who can get electricity from the dam take it and use it for themselves, rather than selling it to others.
3.3 Access to Education
There are currently no schools operational anywhere in the manteqa, due to insecurity in the area. Two closed schools do exist in the manteqa, both of which are boys’ elementary schools: one in
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Sinan, at the western edge of the manteqa, and one in Charmestan, at the eastern edge. Because both of these schools are currently closed, children would have to travel to Tirin Kot centre in order to attend school, but the road conditions are bad enough that only families living in the very western end of the manteqa (or those who have migrated to TK for work) can send their children to school. One respondent said that some families even send their children (especially girls) further away for school, sometimes as far away as Kandahar, although TLO was unable to verify this independently. 5
Overall it was hard to gauge the numbers of school-aged children attending school in Tirin Kot centre or elsewhere. It is estimated that about 6-7,000 school-aged children live in Mehrabad manteqa. According to an education assessment by TLO in 2010, about 27% of children in Tirin Kot district are attending school (only 3% girls). Due to the fact that children are unable to attend schools close to their village, this percentage in Mehrabad is likely much smaller. With only 4-5 villages considered close enough to TK centre to allow children to school, the number of children attending school is likely no more than 350 (maximum 500); with only 10-15 girls doing so. 6
3.4 Access to Health Care
There are no clinics or hospitals in Mehrabad, nor are there community healthcare workers, forcing sick residents to travel to Tirin Kot City for healthcare. The travel time to the provincial centre was reported by surveyors as being as much as 40 minutes by car or two hours by foot, although this would obviously vary based on where in the manteqa the traveler begins.
There is only one place within the manteqa where locals have access to a trained medical professional: a pharmacy in Surkh Lez village where the pharmacist has received medical training. An Afghan NGO, Humanitarian Assistance for Development of Afghanistan (HADAF), is said to be the main supporter of this pharmacy. This pharmacist reportedly serves as a doctor to locals suffering from minor illnesses. There were also reports of two other small pharmacies in the Surkh Lez area, although these are said to be staffed only by merchants, not by any medical professionals.
The local NGO, Afghan Health and Development Services (AHDS) previously attempted to start a clinic in Musazai village, but stopped after being told by villagers that they did not think they could provide adequate security. As of May 2011, that sentiment remains, at least among those interviewed by TLO.
Women’s access to healthcare in Mehrabad is comparable to that of men, largely because of the presence of a large women’s hospital in Tirin Kot centre. Locals reported that the construction of the women’s hospital, which is staffed exclusively by female doctors, has resulted in far more women seeking healthcare in Tirin Kot than in the past. The doctors at the women’s hospital received high
5 The fact that it is common for elite families from Uruzgan that can afford to send their children to school in Kandahar make this statement plausible, albeit it may be only affordable to a few well-to-do families. 6 TLO will attempt to obtain better data on this in future ME updates.
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praise from respondents for their qualifications and for the fact that they dispense medicine free of charge; one surveyor even estimated that there are more female than male patients going from Mehrabad to Tirin Kot for treatment.
3.5 Access to Communication Infrastructure
Mehrabad manteqa has limited access to telecommunications infrastructure. Less than a quarter of the manteqa receives cellular phone service; those areas that do receive coverage get it from either Roshan or Afghan Wireless Communication Company (AWCC). The small coverage area is a by- product of the fact that neither phone company maintains a transmitter within Mehrabad itself, and residents therefore can only get service when weather patterns or geography allow them to pick up the signal of a tower outside of the manteqa. The western area of the manteqa, which is closer to Tirin Kot City, enjoys the best cell coverage, thanks to their ability to pick up signals from the provincial capital. By contrast, Charmestan village, on the manteqa’s eastern edge, never gets cell phone coverage. The one benefit of this situation for Mehrabad residents is that they do not have to worry about the Taliban dictating when transmitters can be switched on (or destroying transmitters entirely): the towers within Tirin Kot City are well-protected and provide 24/7 coverage to those areas of Mehrabad which can receive it.
Apart from cellular phones, ordinary locals have no access to other types of phone connections. Thuraya phones are reportedly used only by the Taliban, the government, and a handful of Mehrabad’s very wealthiest residents, and there are no public call centres set up in the manteqa.
Radio access is much better and more widespread than telephone access in Mehrabad. Roughly two- thirds of the manteqa’s population has radios, and those who do have access to a variety of different stations for their listening pleasure. Five different news stations can be heard in the manteqa: Azadi Radio, BBC Radio, Voice of America, Voice of Kabul, and Matiullah Khan’s Mili Paywastoon station. The first four cover the entire manteqa, while Mili Paywastoon reaches more than 75% of the manteqa. Mehrabad locals from anywhere in the manteqa can even tune into a radio station from Quetta, Pakistan, which broadcasts comedy programs. Azadi Radio and the Voice of America were ranked as the two most popular radio stations in the manteqa; listenership rankings for the other stations varied from respondent to respondent. Despite not ranking as the most popular station, the BBC is seen as being the most reliable news source out of the stations available in Mehrabad. Radio is the only form of mass media to which Mehrabad’s residents have access, though, as there is neither television nor print media in the manteqa.
3.6 Vulnerable Populations
The populations identified as most vulnerable in Mehrabad were women, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and Kuchis. IDPs and Kuchis often lack the same rights as “settled populations”, while overall women do not have the same rights and mobility as men in Pashtun society.
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3.6.1 Women
Women in Mehrabad, as in much of Uruzgan, face substantial restrictions and constraints on their participation in public life. As a general rule, women are not allowed to leave their houses throughout Mehrabad. This prevents them from engaging in virtually all economic and political activity and makes it difficult for them to obtain anything more than a rudimentary education.
As is common in many Pashtun areas, women are generally not allowed to travel within or outside of the manteqa unless accompanied by a mahram (a male relative related to the women closely enough that they could not get married), and even then only with the consent of their husbands or male guardians. This applies to just about everything that could bring a woman out of her house, including weddings, funerals, clinic visits in Tirin Kot centre, and shopping trips to local bazaars.
Despite these constraints, women seem to be informed that some other Uruzgani women are able to work and participate in politics. They have interacted with female health care staff at the Tirin Kot clinic and know of female teachers and the female members of the Tirin Kot Provincial Council, the Meshrano Jirga 7, and the Wolesi Jirga (although she is a Hazara from Day Kundi). They also hear of women in Tirin Kot centre being able to work as cleaners, doctors in the women’s hospital, teachers, or even as employees for NGOs; the final profession is said to provide a large enough salary to allow a woman to support a family on her own.
Surveyors reported that the Voice of America and BBC radio stations include sporadic programming for women in their broadcast line-ups. These programs do not explicitly call for women’s rights, focusing instead on topics such as how to educate women within the realm of Islam and how women should raise their children and care for their families. These stations are widely available in the manteqa, and women do listen to the programs targeted at them, although the irregular timing of these broadcasts does work to limit the audience they reach.
Two things were highlighted as lacking in the healthcare provided for women. First, there has only been one immunization program in Mehrabad under the Karzai regime, and many Mehrabad women did not receive immunizations during that program, largely because many of the manteqa’s conservative families did not want to let their young daughters travel to Tirin Kot for the vaccinations. 8 Second, there are no family planning services offered in Mehrabad, although these services are available at the women’s hospital in Tirin Kot.
7 There is currently only one woman on the Provincial Council (PC), a Kuchi named Marjana from Tirin Kot. One other woman elected to the PC—Hila—was nominated to serve as one of Uruzgan’s two representatives in the Meshrano Jirga (the upper house of the Afghan Parliament). 8 This situation has been improving, however, as vaccines are now available on request for women at the women’s hospital in Tirin Kot.
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3.6.2 Internally Displaced Populations
An estimated 10% of the manteqa’s households—100-150 families, depending on the source—have been forced to leave their homes in recent years, primarily due to insecurity but also because of an ongoing drought in the manteqa. These families have headed to various places, with the most common being Tirin Kot, Kandahar, Helmand, and Pakistan, in that order. The driving force behind the choices of destinations is said to have been the possibility of gainful employment.
So far, only a few of the displaced families have returned to Mehrabad (no more than 10% of those who left), as the factors that initially caused them to flee have not changed significantly. The drought is still affecting the manteqa, meaning that those whom the drought forced out have not been able to return yet. Furthermore, while security is improving in the manteqa, many areas are still as insecure as they were when people left. Those families have returned were drawn back to their established homes and gardens when they were unable to find better prospects wherever they had fled to.
3.6.3 Kuchi Nomads
As mentioned in section 2.2, Mehrabad is located along the southern portion of a Kuchi migration route. Surveyors reported that the Kuchis contribute significantly to the economy of Mehrabad, primarily because of their large livestock herds. Among non-Kuchis, the average livestock herd is some 15-20 animals, with 30 being considered a very large herd. The Kuchis, on the other hand, keep more than ten times that many livestock in their herds: an average Kuchi livestock herd is reportedly 180-200 animals, with the largest herds containing as many as 400. This means that when the Kuchis bring their herds through Mehrabad in the autumn and winter, they bring with them large quantities of butter, wool, and other animal products to sell in the bazaars; the small size of non-Kuchi herds means that the Kuchis are the main source of animal products for the manteqa. Kuchi elders also deal in taweez , which are amulets or other containers that hold verses of the Holy Qur’an and are given to the sick to aid in the healing process. The migratory lifestyle of the Kuchis has also been taken advantage of by the Taliban. All of the manteqa’s Kuchi sub-tribes are said to maintain close relations with the insurgents, who use the migrating Kuchis to smuggle drugs and weapons between Uruzgan and Ghazni in the absence of good road connections between the two provinces.
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Chapter 4 4 Economy, Natural Resources, Livelihoods
Like many southern provinces, especially those located in border regions, Uruzgan in general and Mehrabad in particular use the Pakistani Rupee (PKR) in addition to the official currency of Afghanistan, the Afghani (AFN). The Afghani plays a limited role in the area, mostly used only for the salaries government officials (line departments, soldiers, police), and some NGOs. Many NGO workers, however, get paid in USD, which is a fairly common practice around Afghanistan. All major economic transactions, including prices for goods in the bazaar, are handled in PKR 9, showing the dependency of the Uruzgan economy on the bazaar in Kandahar, which in turn is oriented toward Pakistan. Furthermore, Uruzgan also maintains trade relations with Quetta.
Economic life in the manteqa is almost entirely focused on agriculture, and this is reflected in everything from the goods available in the bazaar to the systems in place for land and water management. Livestock is important to the settled residents of the manteqa, but the Kuchis who pass through provide most of the animal products available in the bazaar and keep much larger herds than their settled counterparts.
There is no bazaar within the manteqa, so purchases and sales of fruits and vegetables take place either at individual farms or in the Tirin Kot bazaar. All import and export activity goes through Tirin Kot, as the road to Chenartu and Khas Uruzgan is not suitable for the transportation of produce. Labor migration is oriented towards Kandahar, given the paucity of job opportunities in Tirin Kot City, although some residents migrate farther afield for work.
4.1 Agriculture
Agriculture accounts for virtually all of the economic activity in Mehrabad, with the remainder deriving from imports and exports. Surveyors reported that over 90% of the manteqa’s land area is arable, due to the presence of irrigation systems that divert water from the river to the fields. The remaining land, which lies further away from the river in the centre of the manteqa between Surkh
9 The exchange rates reported by surveyors are as follows: 2 PKR = 1 AFG and 45 AFG = 1 USD.
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Lez and Kawri villages, is shardala , or dry land. This land is generally considered too sandy to be used for crops, although in years of particularly high rainfall even the shardala land can sometimes be productive.
Essentially all of the arable land in Mehrabad is used for farming. The climate of Uruzgan allows for two growing seasons: one harvest in the late spring or early summer (late May through early July), and another harvest in the fall (late September through early November).
The large majority of the farmland in Mehrabad is devoted to the cultivation of wheat, to which surveyors estimated 60% of the land is dedicated. Roughly 15-20% of the total arable land is used for opium poppy. About half of the remainder—some 10% of the total farmland in the manteqa—is devoted to almond cultivation, with the rest given over to fruits and vegetables. According to local sources, this allocation of land is very different from that of a few years ago, when the percentages of land devoted to opium poppy and to wheat were more or less reversed: 70% of the land was used for opium poppy, with only 25% or so used for wheat. Surveyors reported that the major reason behind the decrease in opium cultivation allegedly were a couple of bad harvest years recently, when the opium crop in Mehrabad was devastated by disease. A majority of all wheat grown is used for subsistence purposes, with only larger farmers able to sell it on the markets. Almonds, apricots and pomegranates constitute the main cash crops of the manteqa. Table 1 provides estimations for the percentage of each crop that is grown for subsistence versus cash.
Table 1: Cash Crops vs. Subsistence Crops in Mehrabad
Crop % Subsistence % Cash Crop
Wheat (small farms) 100% 0% Wheat (large farms) 40% 60% Vegetables 99% or more <1% Almonds 1% 99% Dried Apricots 0% 100% Pomegranates 30% 70% Fresh fruits 100% 0%
Residents of Mehrabad grow a wide variety of crops on the small percentage of the manteqa’s land that is not used for wheat or opium poppy. Corn, barley, beans, onions, green and black mung beans, tomatoes, eggplants, and okra are all grown in the fields of the manteqa. Of these crops, only
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corn and barley (in addition to wheat) are grown in large enough quantities to be sold in the bazaar; all of the rest are grown purely to be used in the kitchen of the particular farmer.
There are also orchard lands that produce important cash crops. Of the orchard products, almonds are by far the most important, and as noted in section 2.2 above, surveyors reported that a good deal of the power base of the Hotak tribe within the manteqa comes from the revenue they collect from their almond crops. Other crops grown in the orchards include figs, apricots, pomegranates, apples, plums, grapes, peaches, prunes, and nectarines. For all of the orchard crops, some are kept for personal consumption while some are sold in the bazaar.
The prices per kilogram for some of the main crops of the manteqa, including opium poppy, can be found in Table 2. The prices illustrate why farmers turn to opium when they are able to, given its output is by far the most profitable when compared to legal crops.
Table 2: Prices of Key Food Items
Item Unit Price (PKR) Price (AFN) Price (USD)
Apples 1 kg 40 20 $0.44 Almonds 1 kg 200 100 $2.22 Apricots, Fresh 1 kg 200 100 $2.22 Apricots, Dried 1 kg 200 100 $2.22 Wheat 1 kg 45 22.5 $0.50 Corn Meal 1 kg 45 22.5 $0.50 Tea 1 kg 200 100 $2.22 Sugar 1 kg 100 50 $1.11 Flour 1 man (4.5 kg) 200 100 $2.22 Rice 1 man (4.5 kg) 450 225 $5.00 Cumin 1 kg 500 250 $5.56 Fig 1 kg 200 100 $2.22 Opium 1 kg 25,000-80,000 10 12,500-40,000 $278-$889
10 Opium prices vary widely based on a number of factors: wet vs. dry opium, security, quality, season, degree of processing undergone, etc.
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4.2 Livestock Livestock plays an important role in the lives of Mehrabad’s residents. This is particularly true for the Kuchis who migrate through the area, as described in section 3.5 above. Even for the settled residents of the manteqa, though, livestock are important sources of both food and income. The average herd size for the non-Kuchi population of Mehrabad is 15-20 animals, with an upper limit of around 30. Manteqa residents keep a wide variety of animals: surveyors reported that sheep, cows, donkeys, chickens, turkeys, goats, and swans are all popular in the manteqa. Local residents do not commonly own camels, although the Kuchis who pass through the district do bring camels with them.
As reported above, residents do not generally sell animal products (e.g. butter or milk) in the bazaar; settled locals have small enough herds that they use basically all of their animal products for their own families, and the butter or milk on the local markets comes from Kuchi herds. The animals themselves, however, do get bought and sold in Mehrabad, and reported prices are listed in Table 3. As the Table 3 shows, with the exception of chickens, all animals represent a substantial investment for an average family.
Table 3: Average Prices of Key Livestock in Mehrabad
# of months’ salary Item Price (PKR) Price (AFN) Price (USD) for average family 11
Chicken 500 250 $5.56 1/20 Goat 6,000 3,000 $66.67 3/5 Donkey 7,000 3,500 $77.78 7/10 Sheep 20,000 10,000 $222.22 2 Cow 50,000 25,000 $555.56 5
4.3 Natural Resource Management
As noted earlier, the two most important resources by far in Mehrabad are land and water, as there are no real forests to speak of within the manteqa. Much of the manteqa is sufficiently well-supplied with water from the river that they do not need to ration it. There are two areas of the manteqa that do have to rely on rationed water: those villages at the ends of wialas , and areas that are far enough away from the river that they cannot use its water for irrigation (although these latter areas are quite sparsely populated).
11 Surveyors estimated an average monthly salary of 10,000 PKR (5,000 Afghanis, or US$111.11) for the average family in the manteqa.
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In the rationed-water areas, water is distributed by a water manager ( mirab ) for each irrigation canal who is in charge of maintenance and who has primary responsibility for resolving disputes related to water use. The system used is called a “turn system,” which regulates how long each household is allowed to “turn” the water towards their land and house. This distribution system is based on a few basic principles.
• First, land size. Hence, large landowners get the lion’s share of access to water, as they have more land to irrigate (and often larger families as well).
• Second, proximity to the water source. People who live far away from the river get second priority, because otherwise they would be at a disadvantage relative to those who lived closer to the river, since the water in the canals would be severely depleted by the time it got to the more distant farms.
• Last on the priority list are those who own small amounts of land close to the river, because they do not need priority access in order to be able to meet their water needs.
The other natural resource that is subject to management in Mehrabad is land. Land prices in Mehrabad vary according to a few unsurprising factors: road access, proximity to the river (or other water sources, such as wells), and quality of the soil. When asked the prices for different types of land—farmland, orchard land, and land for houses and stores, surveyors reported that only orchard and agricultural lands are available; if a person wants to build a new house or open a store, they buy farmland and then use a portion of it to build the building. As is the case all over Afghanistan, land in Uruzgan is sold by the jerib , a measure roughly equivalent to 2,000 square meters (see Table 5 for land prices in Mehrabad). With an average monthly salary of roughly 10,000 PKR per month in the manteqa, farmland constitutes a very large investment for a family.
Table 5: Land Prices per jerib (2,000 m 2) in Mehrabad: # of months’ Land Type Price (PKR) Price (AFN) Price (USD) salary for average family Agricultural, poor 350,000 175,000 $3,888.89 35 quality Agricultural, good 750,000 375,000 $8,333.33 75 quality Orchard, poor 450,000 225,000 $5,000.00 45 quality Orchard, good 850,000 425,000 $9,444.44 85 quality
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The average family in Mehrabad reportedly farms 10-15 jeribs of land, although this varies by village; Kawri, Haidar, and Nayak villages were said to have the best-quality land and the largest landholdings. The largest landholder in the manteqa has 50 jeribs , while some families have as few as one or two jeribs . Surveyors commented that the families with the smallest landholdings tend to be more likely to support the Taliban actively, as one or two jeribs of land cannot produce enough fruit and vegetables to sustain a family.
4.4 Labour Migration and Trade Mehrabad’s relative lack of economic opportunity causes many residents to leave the manteqa in search of gainful employment. Tirin Kot is the nearest destination, but its small size (roughly 10,000 people) limits its absorption capacity and the amount of economic opportunity it can offer. Beyond the provincial capital, as is the case in most of rural southern Afghanistan, Kandahar City is a very popular destination, as are the smaller cities elsewhere in Kandahar province and in neighbouring Helmand. Farther afield, Pakistan is the destination for a large percentage of those leaving Mehrabad to search for work, with Quetta being the most popular destination due to its good road connectivity with Tirin Kot (via Kandahar, Spin Boldak, and the Chaman border crossing). A few people from the district also travel to Iran, but they form a very small minority of all labour migrants.
The majority of Mehrabad’s trading is conducted between the manteqa and Kandahar, which is by far the biggest economic centre in the region. Most of Mehrabad’s imports are manufactured goods, on which Kandahar has the local market cornered. Vehicles, spare parts, clothing, and building materials top the list of imports, according to surveyors. In return, Mehrabad exports crops to Kandahar, particularly wheat, almonds, corn, dried apricots, and figs, among other crops.
There is also some longer-range trading that goes on with other provinces and with Pakistan, but most of that trade goes through Kandahar as well, given Uruzgan’s poor road connections to anywhere else. Trade with Helmand is dependent on the border crossing in south-western Char China being open—it is closed as of late March 2011—and trade with Day Kundi (via Gizab) is impossible for part of the year, when the Gizab-Day Kundi road is impassable due to snow.
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Chapter 5
5 Security, Stabilization, Governance
Mehrabad falls under the administration of Tirin Kot district, even though some actors, such as the Taliban, have used it for taxation purposes in the past. Thus in terms of formal governance there is little to report. Informal governance is administrated by elders, often on a village basis (see Chapter 6 for an overview of key actors). Any kind of conflict in Mehrabad is initially referred to local tribal elders or mullahs. There is not any specific group or shura of either tribal elders or mullahs, who are tasked with conflict resolution: all villages have elders and mullahs, and any of them, who are present when needed, can be used as judges .
If a decision taken by any tribal elder or mullah is unsatisfactory to any party involved, the decision can be appealed to a higher authority. Exactly who this higher authority is depends both on the sympathies of the village involved and the importance of the case. In villages with a large pro- government population, such as Nachin, the decision is usually appealed to the government (as opposed to the Taliban), which means a trip to Tirin Kot City or to another city, which has a formal court presence. In other villages, such as Sanhan, the case can be referred either to the Taliban or the government, depending on the preferences of the particular people involved. If the issue is appealed to the Taliban (see 5.4), the Taliban then in turn remand it to a tribal elder or a mullah of the manteqa, who reviews the facts of the case and either upholds the original verdict or issues a new decision. If this second verdict is still unsatisfactory, the resolution process diverges based on how important the case is to the local Taliban. For a case the Taliban considers to be trivial, they will simply enforce the second decision. If the case is more important, then it can be referred to the Quetta Shura, whose decision is final and binding. 12
12 If the case is very important from the outset, then the Taliban sometimes refer it to the Quetta Shura without asking for a second opinion from a local elder or mullah.
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5.1 Government Control and Access
Post Script Matiullah Khan, the Provincial Chief of Uruzgan (appointed 7 August 2011) managed to clear the Mehrabad valley of insurgents in September 2011 with most of the manteqa secured now through Afghan National Security Forces check-posts. Most insurgents are said to have left the area, some altogether, while others regrouped in Darafshan manteqa.
Government control in Mehrabad is limited to those places in which there is a visible military presence from either the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) or foreign troops (see Map 3). There are three joint bases—manned by the ANSF as well as Australian troops—in Musazai, Surkh Lez, Nowjoy and Nayak 13 villages, which were established in early 2010; on March 17, 2011, the ANA opened a new base near Haidar and Kochkel villages in the east-central part of the manteqa, which will also house both Afghan National Army (ANA) and Australian forces. The bases in Musazai and Surkh Lez are larger than the others, which are closer to checkpoints than bases (even though they are referred to as bases). In addition, there is one police checkpoint in the Sanhan area on the western end of the manteqa, which was established in the fall of 2010.
Map 3: Government Control in Mehrabad / TLO
13 Nawjoy and Nayak villages sit directly across the river from each other, and as such the bases in the two towns are operated as two halves of a single base.
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The government controls the areas around the joint bases and the police checkpoint out to a radius of roughly one kilometre, 14 24 hours per day; the circles on Map 3 are drawn to a roughly one- kilometre radius to give a visual illustration of these areas of control. Areas farther away from the bases and checkpoint, such as Kawri village and the areas starting at Manda and heading east to the Chenartu border are secured during the day, but unsecured at night. There are two reasons for the differential security levels. This stems from the tactics of the security forces: they reportedly only go out on patrols when they have information about a potential suspect or plot in the area, which means that most nights there are no security forces patrolling at all.
5.2 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
The Afghan National Security Forces’ presence in Mehrabad consists of Afghan National Police (ANP), who deployed to the manteqa in early 2010, and the Afghan National Army (ANA), who arrived about six months after the ANP. Locals reportedly expect that the Afghan Local Police (ALP) will also establish a presence in the manteqa at some point in the near future, given their expanding presence in the other districts of Uruzgan, but it is not clear when and if this will actually come to pass.
The Afghan National Army (ANA) maintains a substantial and growing presence in the manteqa, while the Afghan National Police (ANP) has only a single checkpoint. There are roughly 400 ANA soldiers stationed in Mehrabad, with 100 or so in each of the four joint bases mentioned in section 5.1 above. There are about 30 ANP policemen stationed at the checkpoint in Sanhan village, and locals reported that there is minimal if any ANP presence in the rest of the manteqa. These size differentials reflect the overall difficulties that have been encountered in scaling up ANP in Uruzgan, but also the general focus on counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Mehrabad at present, which makes ANA a more natural and trusted partner of international military. That being said, despite the allegedly greater effectiveness of the ANA, they reportedly do not have the manpower to stabilize areas outside of the one-kilometre radius around their bases, as described in section 5.1.
The ANP in Mehrabad is entirely composed of Pashtuns, either from Uruzgan or from other Afghan provinces. Surveyors estimated that of the ANP members in Mehrabad, roughly 50% are Achekzai, 25% are Barakzai, 15% are Popalzai, and 10% are Alkozai. By contrast, the ANA is said to be more ethnically diverse. According to local estimates, approximately 50% of the ANA soldiers in Mehrabad are Pashtuns, 30% are Tajiks, 10% are Uzbeks, and 10% are Hazaras, despite the fact that Mehrabad’s population is more or less 100% Pashtun (see section 2.1 above). As with the ANP, the ANA troops come from all over Afghanistan.
ANA troops are said to be paid substantially more than their ANP counterparts: an ANA soldier receives a salary of 18,000 AFN (US$400) per month, while an ANP policeman receives a reported
14 A one-kilometre radius around the bases results in coverage of a surprisingly large percentage of Mehrabad’s land, given that the distance between them is 3-5 kilometres.
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12,000 AFN (US$266.66) each month. These salaries are reportedly seen as quite fair (particularly compared to previous years when the salary for the ANP was as low as US$75 per month) and provide the soldiers and policemen with enough money to support their families.
While the ANA is seen by the foreign military forces as being more effective than the ANP at combating terrorism, surveyors reported that local residents hold the opposite opinion. Locals are said to believe that the ANP performs better than the ANA, in large part because the ANP contains a higher percentage of local recruits—who are more familiar with the local context—than the ANA. Furthermore, the policemen who currently staff the ANP checkpoint in Mehrabad are said to be better-trained than policemen who had previously worked in Mehrabad, which also increases their effectiveness.
Overall, the ANSF presence in Mehrabad is said to have directly contributed to substantial improvements in security within the manteqa. Surveyors reported that there have been fewer bomb attacks in Mehrabad in the months since the ANSF bases were established, and that the residents of the manteqa unequivocally attribute this decline to the ANSF presence. Furthermore, the increased ANSF presence has meant that when the Taliban does manage to mount some kind of operation, it tends to be smaller and less direct than in previous years. Instead of forming groups and directly attacking government-affiliated positions, respondents reported that the Taliban have been much more reliant on IEDs, suicide bombings, and other (relatively) indirect types of operations since the ANSF was set up in Mehrabad. The growing ANA presence has reportedly weakened the Taliban substantially in the manteqa, and insurgents no longer collect taxes as they once did. Insurgents do, however, engage in conflict resolution quite regularly.
5.3 Road Security
Road security in Mehrabad is uniformly bad, whether one travels on the main road or on side roads. The main road through the manteqa, as shown on Map 3, connects Tirin Kot City with Chenartu and Khas Uruzgan districts. It is unpaved and considered much too insecure for government officials (or those seen as associated with government), NGO workers or foreigners to travel on safely.
The other important road into the manteqa begins in Tirin Kot city and leads to the village of Haider in Mehrabad, via the villages of Khaneqa and Sarmarda, both of which lie to the west of Mehrabad. This road is reportedly at least as insecure as the main road, if not more so, thanks to the constant threat of thieves in addition to the Taliban. As with the main road, government and NGO workers cannot use this secondary road. This poor road security on the main connecting road between Tirin Kot City and Chenartu has rendered the manteqa, for all intents and purposes, inaccessible to those with ties to any
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government or NGO. Locals are said to be able to travel with less fear of the Taliban, although there is always the threat of collateral damage from an improvised explosive device (IED) or attack on ANSF or foreign military, in addition to the danger posed by common criminals.
5.4 Insurgency The most influential and effective spoilers of peace in Mehrabad are the insurgents. Despite the fact that the Taliban’s presence in Mehrabad has decreased thanks to the ANSF (see section 5.2), the threat of insurgent activity and reprisals remains a strong deterrent to development in the manteqa. The insurgents reportedly torture and kill anyone they can find who works with (or is seen to be affiliated with) NGOs, the government, or international actors.
Apart from insurgents and thieves, there are individual conflicts that might hinder the establishment of peace on the local level, as they might be exploited by the insurgency or have the potential to erupt into something larger (see Box 1 for an example).
“Insurgent” and “Talib” are virtually synonymous within Mehrabad. There is no parallel Taliban shadow governmental structure in Mehrabad as that is established at the district level. The Taliban used to collect taxes in Mehrabad, but in their current weakened state they do not have the capability to do so any more: one local said that Taliban fund-raising efforts at present are “more like begging than taxation.” The military structure of the Taliban is organized in a group or cell system. For example, there are groups under the leadership of Mullah Qader, Haji Mohammad, Mullah Ghanzee, Mullah Wali Jan, Mullah Hanan, Abdul Hai Mateen, and Mullah Abdul Aziz. Each of these groups consists of Box 1: An Example of Taliban Conflict Resolution between three and ten fighters, Some time ago in Nayak Village, there was a fight between although the sizes vary for any two pairs of brothers: Habibullah and Azizullah, on one side, number of reasons. Respondents and Mohammad Jan and Faiz Mohammad, on the other. said that these groups do not During the fight, Habibullah was hit with a stone and generally act in concert, and that suffered a serious injury. This became a more and more there can be substantial serious problem, to the point that the local Taliban could not disagreements between groups over resolve it, since both parties had equally strong influence on many different issues. the Talibs responsible for ruling on the case. The issue was referred to the high-ranking Taliban in Quetta, but the Furthermore, local conflicts, which strength of both parties’ connections within the Taliban was cannot be solved by the tribal elders, such that even at the Quetta level, no satisfactory decision are referred to the Taliban for could be rea ched, and the case reportedly remains open. resolution. When this happens, the
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Taliban first try to resolve the issue either by themselves or by selecting a tribal elder or mawlawi of a mosque as an external arbiter. A decision rendered by a tribal elder or mawlawi selected for the purpose is supposed to be accepted as final by all of the parties to the original conflict; anyone who shows any opposition to the decision is punished by the Taliban, who function as a form of enforcement mechanism. If an issue is very sensitive or serious, and the local Taliban in Mehrabad are unable to resolve it, they refer it to upper-level Taliban in Quetta, Pakistan, for arbitration. The story in Box 1 serves as an example of how this dispute resolution process played out in Mehrabad.
As for the tribal backgrounds of the insurgents, the majority are said to be from the Taraki or Suleiman Kheil tribes, two of Mehrabad’s Kuchi tribes. This helps to explain the usage of Kuchis by the Taliban for weapon and drug smuggling, as was mentioned in section 3.5 above.
In the past, according to locals, insurgents used to rely on the people of Mehrabad to provide them with food, weapons, and even the ‘ushr’15 , a form of religious tax constituting 10% of every farmer’s harvest. In recent months, the presence of ANSF in Mehrabad has forced insurgents to rein in this practice, as it would attract unwanted attention from the police or the army. Instead, most of the insurgents’ reported interactions with locals now consist of information-gathering about the movements and motivations of community members—where they go and why, whom they associate with, and other such information. TLO’s sources were unable to say where the insurgents have turned to in order to make up for the supplies and weaponry they are no longer collecting from the local population. The Taliban reportedly use mullahs and other religious figures to try to convince people to join the insurgency. These religious men present possible recruits with various quotations and passages from the Qur’an and other Islamic texts in the hopes of persuading them that waging jihad against non- Muslims and invaders is obligatory for all Muslims. Night letters containing threats against those who do not join the insurgency are also powerful tools used by the Taliban for recruitment.
Furthermore, the Taliban are said to benefit from the low levels of education among Mehrabad’s young men, who are thus less able to counter the arguments put forward by the Taliban. The fact that the Taliban have managed to remain entrenched in locals’ minds as a persistent threat reportedly means that the families of those targeted for recruitment often do not try to stop the recruits from joining for fear of reprisals. Indeed, family ties sometimes actively work in the Taliban’s favour, as the long history of insurgent presence in Mehrabad means that some potential recruits already have relatives (distant or close) within the insurgents’ ranks.
15 Unlike other forms of charity prescribed by Islam, such as zakat , the ‘ushr is calculated solely based on the amount of fruits and vegetables a farmer harvests. The Qur’an stipulates that the ‘ushr is to be given directly to local people. Interestingly, the ‘ushr is paid in kind; that is, every farmer must give 10% of the physical fruits and vegetables he grows to the poor, not the monetary equivalent thereof.
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Chapter 6 6 Key Actors in Mehrabad
This section focuses on individual actors, their tribal background and the larger social networks to which they belong, who significantly shape the situation, events and future of Mehrabad. The importance and influence of actors comes from their ability to control resources and mobilize support by redistributing these resources to their respective constituencies. In general, power is often based on an accumulation of the following resources:
• Networking: connections with national and sub-national government actors and foreign sponsors, but also factional ties. At least five types of networks currently allow local leaders to access resources in Uruzgan: 1) the Government of Afghanistan, 2) international military and 3) international development actors; 4) smugglers; and 5) Taliban insurgents
• Tribal membership – membership in specific tribes (and their respective population size, power alliances and combined land holdings) greatly influences political allegiance, power and status;
• Family status (inherited) – membership in a prominent family (including landed elite) remains important
• Land: important as cultural status symbol, in addition to the economic benefit land can provide via agricultural production;
• Other economic resources: these allow for less dependence on daily work and the ability to gain clients through distribution of assets;
• Control and access to the means of violence : which allows for control of territory and illicit trading routes;
• Knowledge: traditionally this was primarily knowledge of pashtunwali and/or sharia , increasingly it has become a knowledge of how to access or ‘win’ resources from internationals or the government);
• Personal leadership
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o Knowledge (e.g. different customs of the customary law - pashtunwali , or religious knowledge such as sharia in order to cope with conflicts);
o Mitigation skills and ability to solve disputes; o “Good reputation“ as a source of moral authority and power; o Military skills (e.g., leadership skills during conflict) as well as control and access to arms and ammunition that allows control of territory and trade) Table 6 lists the most important key actors in Mehrabad. They are mostly local elders and religious figures from the different tribes and sub-tribes within the manteqa. As Mehrabad is rather isolated, few influential outsiders find it worth their while to become deeply involved in the politics of such an intensely localized region. Second, as noted earlier, the Taliban commonly refer cases to local elders for resolution, making the elders the loci of justice provision. Finally, the low levels of development and government activity in the manteqa work to limit the visibility and importance of those actors as political figures outside Mehrabad.
Of the twelve key actors, eight (67%) are Hotak, a disproportionately large number given their share of the manteqa’s population, but a number reflective of their outsized influence in local politics (see section 2.1). Over half are either landed elite background actors (33%) or achieved their status during the jihad (25%), 16 while 42% are religious actors showing the importance of Islam in the manteqa. Half of the four elite background actors also served during the jihad , bringing the number of actors that were active during war as well to 42%.
The largest concentration of key actors is in Musazai village, where four of the actors live (including all three of the Tokhi on the list), which makes sense given Musazai’s central location and large land area, as well as the fact that it was noted by surveyors as having the largest Tokhi population in the manteqa (see section 2.1). It is also interesting to note that all of the key actors who worked for the Taliban government in an official capacity are Hotak, possibly reflecting tribal loyalties to the Taliban’s founder, Mullah Muhammad Omar, himself a Hotak.
As noted in Table 6, some of the local elders are known to have connections to both the Taliban and the government. This “fence-sitting” behaviour, however, should not necessarily be taken as a sign of underlying loyalties for the insurgency, and it is important to note that locals do not immediately judge an elder positively or negatively if he is found to be maintaining relationships with the Taliban. In many ways, it is a logical survival tactic, as the elders have learned that the best way to stay alive in a contested area is to hedge their proverbial bets. As discussed earlier, while the Taliban are certainly weaker than they used to be, they are still an important part of daily life for residents. It is therefore difficult (but by no means impossible) for many important political figures to secure both
16 For more about the importance of landed versus achieved status in Uruzgan, see Susanne Schmeidl, “The Man Who Would Be King: The Challenges to Strengthen Governance in Uruzgan,” Clingendael Institute , 2011.
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themselves and their status without maintaining some sort of relationship with the insurgents. For many people in Mehrabad dealing with the Taliban is simply a fact of life.
Table 6: Key Actors in Mehrabad
Name Tribe Village Status Background
Before 1978 he was an average citizen who did his own thing; during jihad he was with Hizb-e Islami (Hekmatyar); during the mujahideen regime he was Jan jobless; worked in Taliban government during Taliban Hotak Kochkel Achieved Muhammad regime; seems to have good relations with Taliban; uneducated; his father (Musa Jan) used to be tribal elder and was well-liked, which is why many people respect Jan Muhammad as well Jobless before 1978; mujahid with Hizb-e Islami (Hekmatyar) during jihad ; jobless during the mujahideen regime; assistant for peacebuilding Malem activities to Mullah Shafiq (PG in Ghazni and Paktia) Hotak Musazai Achieved Habibullah during Taliban regime; no official job now, but helps with NGOs and governor and other such people; grandson of Khodai Rahim (tribal elder); studied to 6 th grade During the jihad time he was a commander with Haji Abdul Rabbani’s Jamiat faction. Under the Taliban regime he Hotak Nayak Achieved Baqi was an assistant PG in Ghazni, Paktia, Samangan, and Khost provinces. Haji He has been an important tribal elder for as long as Muhammad Hotak Charme-stan Inherited respondents could remember. Omar One of the largest landholders in the manteqa. Malem Reportedly has good relations with Taliban; served with Abdul Hotak Kawri Inherited Taliban under cousin Mullah Pai Muhammad during Manan Taliban regime; in Iran through the jihad time; never been to school Tribal elder before 1978; mujahid with Hizb-e Islami (Hekmatyar) during jihad ; uneducated; businessman during mujahideen regime; during Taliban regime he Malek Hotak Surkh Lez Inherited was jobless; still jobless and at home and acts as elder; Ishaqzai no link with government or NGO; father was Nazar Muhammad Khan (tribal elder); sons and brothers are said to be Taliban supporters
Haji Abdul Was a farmer in his village before 1978, served with Tokhi Musazai Inherited Habib Hizb-e Islami (Hekmatyar) during jihad ; farmer during mujahideen and Taliban regimes; uneducated; his
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Name Tribe Village Status Background father was a malek named Abdul Hamid Khan; now has good relations with Taliban and not with government; still working as a farmer Has been an imam since 1978; no official duties for Mullah Sahib regimes; studied in Afghanistan; father was also imam Hotak Kochkel Religious Saadullah and then did a lot of peace-building work in his tribe; no official job in government; good relations with everyone Has been imam and taweez -maker since 1978; studied Haji Ibrahim at madrassas in Afghanistan; he is originally from Dand Hotak Surkh Lez Religious Jan Agha district in Kandahar but moved to Uruzgan 45-50 years ago; father was also imam and taweez-maker Has been a taweez maker since before 1978; never Ghulam worked for any government in an official capacity; Taraki Sanhan Religious Sadiq Agha studied at madrassa; good relations with both government and Taliban Has been an imam since 1978; no official jobs for any regime; father was Mullah Shir Muhammad ( taweez Mullah Tokhi Musazai Religious maker and spell-binder); has no links with either Taliban Niamatullah or government; studied at madrassa in Afghanistan and he’s an ‘alim and well-respected Was imam before 1978, mujahideen commander with Hizb-e Islami (Hekmatyar) during jihad ; no official job during mujahideen regime; imam during Taliban regime Haji Mullah (no official job); studied at Afghan madrassa ; no Abdul Baqi Tokhi Musazai Religious relations with Taliban or government and does not Akhund 17 want any relations; father was Mullah Zein ul-‘Albedeen (also imam); lives in Mehrabad right now with no official job
17 “Akhund” is a title that signifies someone with some religious knowledge, but not enough to get a turban from the mosque.
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Annex: TLO Research Methodology
The methodology used for this assessment reflects a pragmatic approach to conducting research in a difficult and insecure environment where obtaining information is not without danger. This is reflected in the selection of surveyors, sampling techniques and triangulation of data.
First, due to an environment characterized by volatility and mistrust of outsiders, field surveyors were selected not based on their previous research experience, but according to the following criteria:
• Surveyors had to be at least literate, and preferably have completed at least some formal schooling
• Surveyors had to be elders, which TLO defined for the purposes of this report as being older than 30 years of age
• Surveyors had to be well-known in the manteqa, which was established either by their reputation with TLO staff or by checking their background with manteqa residents
• Surveyors had to be able to travel to all parts of the manteqa
Surveyors relied on a mix of non-probability sampling techniques in order to reduce risk to their person: • Purposive/stratified sampling , where a respondents are selected from a subset of the population that shares at least one common characteristic. For this assessment individuals with relevant knowledge on the district were selected for interviews. Men from all tribes within the district were interviewed.
• Convenience sampling , where those individuals known to the surveyor, or readily available to participate in the research, are interviewed. Here surveyors also relied on snowballing technique, where they relied on referrals from initial interview partners to identify additional ones.
• Judgment sampling , whereby surveyors used their best judgment regarding whom to include in the interview process. This only worked due to the careful selection of surveyors based on their previous experience and knowledge of the districts included in this study.
Field researchers collected their data through about 40 semi-structured interviews based on lists of questions provided to them by the Uruzgan team in TLO’s Kabul office. These first-round interviews
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were mostly conducted between 20 March 2011 and 5 April 2011 with local elders, shopkeepers and government officials. Different numbers of interviews based on the type of information they were seeking: simple facts about the manteqa could be ascertained in only one or two interviews, while lists of key actors and information about local perceptions of security forces required additional interviews in order to establish a more complete and balanced data set. Follow-up interviews with key informants, tribal elders and government officials were also conducted by research staff from the Kabul office during a trip to Tirin Kot for triangulation purposes, which took place from 4-10 April 2011.
6.1 Data Limitations and Management of Bias
First, even though surveyors were rigorously screened and subsequently trained, their potential biases towards or against other tribes/ethnic groups/communities, ISAF, ANSF, and the Afghan government must be taken into account.
Second, while the sampling techniques used dramatically reduced risks to the surveyors, they may have simultaneously introduced bias, as those interviewed likely did not form a representative cross- section of the population of Mehrabad. As a result, those interviewed by no means reflect the views of the entire population in the manteqa, although surveyors attempted to make their interviewee selection as representative as possible. Third, insecurity and cultural characteristics further limited surveyors. Some of the villages near the Chenartu end of the manteqa were largely inaccessible to surveyors, although an attempt was made to compensate for this by interviewing people from those areas in other parts of the manteqa. Insecurity and the conservative Pashtun nature of Mehrabad also inhibited surveyors to interview women due to not having female survey staff as part of the Mehrabad research team. Hence, issues considering women were gauged indirectly through interviewing men.
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