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Mehrabad Nawa May 2011 Mehrabad Nawa Uruzgan Province TLO MANTEQA PROFILE Mehrabad Nawa A TLO Manteqa Profile May 2011 © 2011, The Liaison Office. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, recording or otherwise without prior written permission of the publisher, The Liaison Office. Permission can be obtained by emailing [email protected] Mehrabad Manteqa Acknowledgements This report is financed by the Royal Netherlands’s Embassy in Afghanistan and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). TLO reports are independent surveys and analyses of local perceptions and attitudes. While TLO makes all efforts to review and verify field data prior to publication, some factual inaccuracies may still remain. Data collection for this report was completed by 10 April 2011 and information presented may have changed since that time. TLO is solely responsible for possible inaccuracies in the information presented. The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of AusAID, the Australian Government, or the Government of the Netherlands. The report authors would like to thank all individuals who spent time with the research team to contribute to this report as well as TLO colleagues whose comments and contributions helped to improve the clarity of the report and the correctness of its facts. About The Liaison Office (TLO) The Liaison Office (TLO) is an independent Afghan non-governmental organization seeking to improve local governance, stability and security through systematic and institutionalized engagement with customary structures, local communities, and civil society groups. TLO’s mission is to facilitate the formal integration of communities and their traditional governance structures within Afghanistan’s newly emerging peace, governance and reconstruction framework. TLO main areas of activity are Research/Analysis using the do-no harm approach; Dialogue facilitation and participatory peacebuilding, access to justice and livelihoods. In addition to the TLO headquarter in Kabul, the organization has a total of four (3) regional (Paktia-Southeast, Kandahar-South, Nangarhar-East) and five (5) provincial (Uruzgan, Khost, Paktika, Helmand, Nimroz) offices across Afghanistan, with over 250 staff. TLO was established in 2003 by swisspeace on the request of community leaders in the Southeast. TLO has been funded by various donors from the non-governmental and governmental sectors, international organizations and foundations. Its main donors include the Heinrich Böll Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace and the governments of Australia (AusAID), Netherlands, Norway, Canada, Germany, and Switzerland (SDC). i Mehrabad Manteqa Table of Contents ACRONYMS ....................................................................................................................... iv Executive Summary............................................................................................................ v Recommendations / Development Opportunities ............................................................ vii 1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 2 Manteqa Context ...................................................................................................... 3 2.1 Demographic Overview .............................................................................................. 4 2.1.1 The Hotak ............................................................................................................... 6 2.1.2 The Tokhi ................................................................................................................ 6 2.1.3 Other Non-Kuchi Pashtun tribes ............................................................................ 6 2.1.4 The Kuchi ................................................................................................................ 6 2.2 Key Development Actors ............................................................................................ 8 3 Human Security Needs .............................................................................................. 9 3.1 Access to Water .......................................................................................................... 9 3.2 Access to Electricity .................................................................................................. 10 3.3 Access to Education .................................................................................................. 10 3.4 Access to Health Care ............................................................................................... 11 3.5 Access to Communication Infrastructure ................................................................. 12 3.6 Vulnerable Populations ............................................................................................ 12 3.6.1 Women ................................................................................................................. 13 3.6.2 Internally Displaced Populations .......................................................................... 14 3.6.3 Kuchi Nomads ....................................................................................................... 14 4 Economy, Natural Resources, Livelihoods ............................................................................. 15 4.1 Agriculture ................................................................................................................ 15 4.2 Livestock ................................................................................................................... 18 4.3 Natural Resource Management ............................................................................... 18 4.4 Labour Migration and Trade..................................................................................... 20 ii Mehrabad Manteqa 5 Security, Stabilization, Governance ........................................................................... 21 5.1 Government Control and Access .............................................................................. 22 5.2 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) .................................................................. 23 5.3 Road Security ............................................................................................................ 24 5.4 Insurgency ................................................................................................................ 25 6 Key Actors in Mehrabad ........................................................................................... 27 Annex: TLO Research Methodology .................................................................................. 31 6.1 Data Limitations and Management of Bias .............................................................. 32 iii Mehrabad Manteqa ACRONYMS ADA Afghan Development Association AFN Afghani, the official currency of Afghanistan AHDS Afghan Health and Development Services ANA Afghan National Army ANP Afghan National Police ANSF Afghan National Security Forces (ANA, ANP, NDS) AusAID Australian Agency for International Development AWCC Afghan Wireless Communications Company COIN Counterinsurgency DG District Governor FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas, an area of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan across the Durand Line HADAF Humanitarian Assistance for Development of Afghanistan, an Afghan NGO IED Improvised Explosive Device NGO Non-Governmental Organization PG Provincial Governor PKR Pakistani Rupee TK Tirin Kot (refers to either the district or the city) TLO The Liaison Office USD United States Dollar iv Mehrabad Manteqa Post Script Matiullah Khan, the Provincial Chief of Uruzgan (appointed 7 August 2011) managed to clear the Mehrabad valley of insurgents in September 2011 with most of the manteqa secured now through Afghan National Security Forces check-posts. Most insurgents are said to have left the area, some altogether, while others regrouped in Darafshan manteqa. Executive Summary Mehrabad manteqa 1, one of five in Tirin Kot district, consists of 15 or 16 villages scattered in a valley to the east-northeast of the provincial capital, straddling the banks of the Tiri River from Sanhan village up to the border between Tirin Kot and Chenartu districts, although the eastern end of the manteqa is disputed by some (see section 2.1). It lies in the southern part of a Kuchi migration route (with the northern end in Ajristan and Malistan districts of Ghazni province), and the Kuchis play a prominent role in the security situation within the manteqa. Mehrabad is virtually 100% Pashtun, with the Hotak and Tokhi tribes of the Ghilzai confederation making up some 70% of the manteqa’s 12,000-17,000 inhabitants. The Hotak are the dominant tribe, accounting for roughly 50% of the population; they derive their importance from their large population as well as the fact that they occupy some of the most fertile and best-irrigated farmland in the manteqa. In addition to the Hotak and Tokhi, there are Pashtuns from the Taraki, Kakar, Suleiman Kheil, and Naser tribes living in Mehrabad, with the Taraki and Suleiman Kheil accounting for the Kuchi population of the manteqa (roughly 15-20% of the population). Unlike much of Uruzgan, Mehrabad usually has enough water for most of its population,
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