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Delex Maritime Analysis Center (DMAC) Suez Canal Security Tracker August 2013 Table of Contents Introduction P. 3 Risk Assessment: Threats to Transiting Vessels, the Suez Canal Authority, Canal Infrastructure, and the SUMED Pipeline P. 4 Maps & Images of Potential Targets for Attack P. 14 Briefing 1: Sinai Instability and Suez Canal Security P. 21 Briefing 2: Political Upheaval and the Suez Canal P. 23 2 Delex Maritime Analysis Center (DMAC) Suez Security Tracker As months of massive opposition protests culminated on July 3, 2013 in a military coup against Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, the eyes of the commercial maritime industry were fixated on the Suez Canal. Though the general report from the vital waterway is ‘business as usual,’ the political and security situation in Egypt remains incredibly fluid. In the restless Sinai Peninsula, militant groups have seized a perceived moment of weakness to launch a fresh round of attacks against Egyptian authorities. In the major cities, including those along the Canal, pro- and anti-Morsi demonstrations have turned violent, resulting in dozens of deaths. Military deployments have been increased in the Canal Zone, but the balance between security and efficiency is a delicate one. The Delex Maritime Analysis Center (DMAC) Suez Security Tracker assists Canal users mitigate operational risk by providing timely and continuous analysis of Egypt’s political and security environment and assessing the implications for the Suez Canal. Issue Briefings assist in contextualizing unfolding events and promoting threat understanding, while a series of Risk Assessments cover vulnerable targets for attack, mitigating security measures, and the potential impact of worst-case scenarios. The aim is to reduce the uncertainty surrounding operational risk and thereby enable Canal users to make better-informed decisions and contingency plans. 3 Delex Maritime Analysis Center (DMAC) Suez Security Tracker Risk Assessment 1: Threats to Transiting Vessels, the Suez Canal Authority, Canal Infrastructure, and the SUMED Pipeline While there has been no explicit declaration, a potential threat to Suez Canal operations exists because militant groups have demonstrated their capability and intention to launch attacks against the authority and vital interests of the Egyptian state. The following is the first Risk Assessment in the DMAC Suez Security Tracker series, which analyzes vulnerable targets for attack, mitigating security measures, and the potential impact of worst-case scenarios. The aim is to reduce the uncertainty surrounding operational risk and thereby enable Canal users to make better-informed decisions and contingency plans. Vulnerability I: Vessel Attack Hijack/Scuttle with Intent to Block Canal – p. 6 o Probability of Occurrence: Very Low – p. 6 o Potential Impact: High – p. 6 o Risk Level: Low – p. 6 RPG/Missile Attack against Vessel – p. 7 o Probability of Occurrence: Low – p. 7 o Potential Impact: Medium-High – p. 7 o Risk Level: Medium – p. 7 Vulnerability II: Attack on Suez Canal Authority Attack on SCA Administrative or Control Center – p. 8 o Probability of Occurrence: Medium-Low – p. 8 o Potential Impact: High – p. 8 o Risk Level: Medium-Low – p. 8 4 Attack on SCA Personnel – p. 8 o Probability of Occurrence: Medium – p. 8 o Potential Impact: Low – p. 9 o Risk Level: Low – p. 9 Attack on SCA Pilots – p. 9 o Probability of Occurrence: Medium – p. 9 o Potential Impact: High – p. 9 o Risk Level: Medium-High – p. 9 Vulnerability III: Attack on Suez Canal Infrastructure Collapse Ahmed Hamdi Tunnel – p. 10 o Probability of Occurrence: Medium – p. 10 o Potential Impact: Low – p. 10 o Risk Level: Medium-Low – p. 10 Mine Approaches – p. 10 o Probability of Occurrence: Low – p. 10 o Potential Impact: High – p. 11 o Risk Level: Low-Medium – p. 11 Drop Highway/Railway Bridge – p. 11 o Probability of Occurrence: Low – p. 11 o Potential Impact: High – p. 11 o Risk Level: Low – p.11 Port/Cargo Facilities Attack – p. 12 o Probability of Occurrence: Medium – p. 12 o Potential Impact: Low – p. 12 o Risk Level: Medium-Low – p. 12 Vulnerability IV: Attack on SUMED Pipeline and Facilities Attack on SUMED Pipeline – p. 12 o Probability of Occurrence: Medium-High – p. 13 o Potential Impact: High – p. 13 o Risk Level: High – p. 13 5 Vulnerability I: Vessel Attack There is currently a low probability of an attack against a vessel transiting the Canal, but such an attack could potentially have significant adverse effects on Suez operations. The worst-case scenario would be a single large ship that, if scuttled at an ideal location, could obstruct the Canal and stop traffic until salvage is completed. Such an attack could occur via hijacking or infiltration, or by detonating explosives next to the vessel. A less significant, but more probable, scenario would be an isolated small arms attack against a transiting vessel. Hijack/Scuttle with Intent to Block Canal Probability of Occurrence: Very Low Incidents of maritime terrorism are rare (accounting for less than 2% of the global terrorist attacks) because of the intensive preparation and specialist maritime and technical skill required to mount an attack on water. Scuttling a vessel with the intent to block the Canal would require the attackers to have access to a large quantity of explosives and the ability to deliver them via hijacking or infiltration, or by detonating explosives (for instance, a small explosive laden boat) next to the ship. As they are currently locked in a struggle with the Egyptian military, there is currently little indication that Sinai militants would divert resource to launch a complex strike at a transiting vessel. Although there have been reports of Iranian agents plotting terror attacks on Israeli ships in the Canal, it is unlikely that Iran or any other Canal-using state would launch an attack that damages its own economic interests. An al-Qaeda affiliate would be the most likely group to attempt to block the Canal. Jihadist chatter from Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) prompted a heightened security alert for shipping companies operating off the Yemeni coast in early August. Reports of a foiled AQAP plot to seize ports and oil facilities in southern Yemen indicate that maritime terrorism remains an integral component of the militants’ strategy. That said, the robust security architecture of the Suez Canal makes it a less attractive target for attack, given the high cost and low probability for success. Potential Impact: High The scuttling of one or more large vessels in the Canal or at its bottleneck approaches is one of the few ways an outside actor could force the waterway’s closure. As a point of reference, the Canal remained blocked from 1967 to 1975 because of mines and war debris. The sudden closure of the Suez Canal would force transiting vessels to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, incurring increased fuel costs and supply chain delays. While the impact would be severe, such an attack is not be expected to close the Canal for longer than a week, given the speed in which previous blockages have been cleared. Risk Level: Low 6 RPG/Missile Attack against Vessel More plausible, would be an isolated attack (such as firing a Rocket Propelled Grenade [RPG], anti-tank, or anti-aircraft missile) on a vessel in transit or at anchor, as regional actors are known to be in possession of such weapons. RPGs fired by Somali pirates have penetrated bridges and staff accommodations of target vessels, resulting in fires and evacuations. Advanced anti-tank weapons pose a greater threat, as they are able to penetrate the hulls of most ships and could disable a vessel if they hit the rudder, bridge, engine room or fuel tanks. Probability of Occurrence: Low The probability of such an attack is currently low because the Egyptian military has heightened security along the entire length of the Canal and its approaches, while military aircraft and armored and mounted infantry units patrol the banks. A disabled or evacuated vessel could be cleared relatively quickly from the Canal, while a blockage resulting from a ship running aground would take a day or two to clear. Heightened Egyptian security following an attack may also result in reduced convoy schedules and delays. Potential Impact: Medium-High The impact of such an attack would depend on the type of vessel. Attacks on cargo ships in other regions (such as Nigerian and Somali waters) have resulted in delays to repair damage and detainment by authorities for investigation. It is not likely that serious mechanical damage could be repaired satisfactorily in an Egyptian shipyard, meaning that the vessel would have to be towed elsewhere, likely to Greece or Italy. Such an attack may also cause a spike in insurance premiums and demands for hazardous pay, resulting in a cost calculation to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope. Tankers face these same impacts from an attack, with the heightened environmental risk and cleanup costs that may arise from an oil spill. Cruise ships are the most vulnerable to heightened Canal risk, as any attack in Egyptian waters would see the industry divert away from the country’s ports and Canal. Risk Level: Medium 7 Vulnerability II: Attack on Suez Canal Authority An attack on the Suez Canal Authority (SCA) could encompass the raiding or bombing of an administrative building, such as the SCA control center in Ismailia, the signal station in Port Tewfik, or the pilot houses along the Canal. SCA personnel and pilots are other potential targets, with the pilots being the most vulnerable due to their high involvement with Canal traffic. Attack on SCA Administrative or Control Center Probability of Occurrence: Medium-Low An attack on a SCA building (such as a car bomb or other explosive) would require getting past SCA checkpoints and close to the intended target.

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