Conceptualizing Moral Panic through aMoral Economy of Harm

SEAN P. HIER (Queen’s University)

ABSTRACT This paperexplicates acritical theory ofmoral panic, ar- guingthat there is an afŽnity tobe discerned between the sociologyof moralpanic and the sociologyof moralregulation. It isdemonstratedhow effortsto distance sociologicalinvestiga- tionsof moralregulation from studies of moralpanic have been foundedon a narrowtreatment ofthe ways in which the lat- ter have conceptualizedpanics uncritically as irrationalsocietal overreactions stemming fromsome variantof ‘ social anxiety.’ Advocatinga conceptualizationwhich attends tothe complex- ity ofways inwhich human conduct is governed,explanatory importanceis situatedin Valverde’s formulationof ‘moralcapi- tal,’showing how her modelnot only enables afusionbetween apoliticaleconomy ofthe state andethical subjectivity,but morecrucial between panics andregulatory projects through the productionof a moraleconomy ofharm.

Introduction Over muchof the pastdecade, it has becomecommonplace in studies of moralpanic to problematize the factthat, far from the restrictiveconŽ nes ofacademe, ‘ moralpanic’ has enteredthe lexicon ofmainstream society aswell asthe media.In fact,so dispersed is the conceptualimagery of the conceptthat, once purported to be the unintendedoutcome of journalistic practices,McRobbie and Thornton (1995) declare that moral panic has becomea goal.The falloutof the increasingly uidand eclectic usage

Critical Sociology, Volume 28,issue 3 also availableonline Ó 2002Koninklijke Brill NV,Leiden www.brill.nl 312 Hier ² ofthe languageand referent of moral panic has been thatsociologists have cleaved ontheir endorsement of the analyticutility of the concept. Whilst thosewho have soughtto employ the referentof moral panic primarilyin the contextof empirical investigation have tendedto do so inan uncriticaland indiscriminate manner (cf. Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994;Thompson 1998; Goode 2000; Doyle andLaCombe 2000; Tavener 2000),the resulthas been thatthose concerned with the widerŽ eld of moralregulation have rejectedthe utilityof the moralpanic concept on the groundsof its purported tendency toimport a negative normative judgementpertaining to irrational societal responses stemming from some variantof ‘socialanxiety’ (Hunt 1999; Moore and Valverde 2000). In lightof the conceptualin ation characterizing the sociological literatureconcerned with moral panic, and in responseto the inhospitable receptionof moral panic in scholarly research concerned with moral regulation,this paper conceptualizes moral panic as aformof moral regulation.MorespeciŽ cally, moralpanic is formulatedin terms of acritical conceptionof ideology which allows for the discursive[re]production of asense ofphenomenal securitythrough a ‘moraleconomy of harm.’ Conceptualizingmoral panic as an ideologico-discursiveformation neither negates the factthat it may vary inits speciŽ c contents,nor that it may serve tostimulate a variety of‘ moralactions’ or facilitate a range of‘ socialfunctions.’ Taking care to explicate whatis understood as the afŽnity betweenmoral panic and moral regulation, an approximationof the conceptualfoundation from which moral panics derive is sought, but noattempt is made to reveal anything aboutthe uniquefeatures of speciŽc instancesof moral panic. Expressions of the latter,it is maintained, are loggedin the spatialand temporal parameters of variegated governmental conŽgurations, susceptible to elucidationthrough the analyticinterrogation ofthe socialand political circumstances surrounding each panic’s inception andhistoricity.

TheSociology of Moral Panic In hisclassic study, Stanley Cohen(1972:9) explains that

Societiesappear to be subject,every nowand then, toperiods of moralpanic. Acondition,episode, person or group of persons emerges tobecome deŽ ned as athreat tosocietal values andinterests; its natureis presented in astylized andstereotypical fashionby the mass media : : : Sometimesthe objectof the panicis quitenovel andat other times itis something which has been in existence longenough, but suddenly appears in the limelight.Sometimes the panicpasses overand is forgotten,except in folkloreand collective memory; atother times ithas moreserious and long-lasting repercussions andmight Conceptualizing Moral Panic 313 ²

producesuch changes as those in legaland social policyor even in the way society conceives itself. ForCohen, every moralpanic requires the delineationof a scapegoator ‘folkdevil,’ an identiŽable object onto which social fears and anxieties may beprojected.As the personiŽcation of evil, he conceptualizesfolk devils as susceptibleto instant recognition as ‘ unambiguouslyunfavorable symbols’ (p.41) which are stripped of all positivecharacteristics and endowed with pejorativeevaluations. Cohen is clear in hisstudy of the modsand rockers phenomenonof the 1960s,however, that moral panics come about through acomplexchain of social interactions involving claimsmakers, moral guardiansand the media,set inthe contextof socio-political change and an ensuingclimate of ‘ culturalambiguity.’ What thissigniŽ es forCohen isthat, although moral panics center on a particularfolk devil, the locus ofthe panicis not the objectof its symbolic resonances, not the folkdevil itself.Rather, folk devils serve asthe ideologicalembodiment of deeper anxieties, perceivedof as ‘ aproblem’only inandthrough social deŽ nition andconstruction. Derivingfrom the legacy ofCohen’ s seminal work,the conceptof moralpanic has predominantlybeen invoked uncriticallyin sociological analyses torefer to ‘an ideology,’a general set ofideaswhich are imputed toserve asthe foundationfor a variety offorms of collective behavior. Employingan uncriticalconception of ideology, considerable theorizing onmoral panic has unfoldedwith respect to the media,whereby moral panichas simultaneouslybeen conceivedof as a set ofideas and a form ofsocial action brought about through a moregeneralized state of fear or alarm.Whilst ina practicalsense humaninteraction can be understood simultaneouslyas an expressionof belief and action, recent commentary has afŽrmed that there isan importantanalytic distinction to be maintained betweenwhat people think andwhat they do,and an even greaterlevel ofanalyticcare to be exercised concerningwhat appears in the mediaand whatpeople accept as factual (cf. Ungar 2001). Disappointingly, the bulk oftheorizing contained within the sociologyof moral panic has conated notonly mediadiscourse and social perception in an uncriticalmanner, buthas failedto explore fully the relationshipbetween social perception andcollective action. Indicativeof thistendency isVictor’ s (1998)study of ritualchild abuse, where,using Goode and Ben-Yehuda’ s (1994)near-orthodox topology of ‘Žve crucialindicators’ as a foil,he deŽnes moralpanic as ‘ asocietal responseto beliefs about a threatfrom moral deviants [ : : : whichrepresent] acollective formof behavior characterized by suddenlyincreased concern andhostility in a signiŽcant segment ofsociety’ (p. 542, 543). At least twoproblems can be identiŽed in thisconceptualization, the Žrstof which 314 Hier ² involves measurement.It is a necessary assumptionembedded in Victor’ s deŽnition that moral panic as a collective formof behavioris presupposed byideological formations understood to envelop ‘signiŽcant segments of society,’but what exactly isimplied by ‘ adesignatedsegment’ of society isvaguely formulated,and the pointat which moral panic manifests as a formof collective actionis not clear. It was this conceptual problematic thatUngar (2001:278-81) had in mind when he arguedthat, in the absenceof any primafacie behavioral evidence ofpublic involvement (vigilante groups,boycotts, protests), researchers have Žnessed the problem oftapping into public concern by using media coverage or legislative activityas a surrogatefor widespread solicitude. His reasoning suggests that,because both legislative activityand the productionof mediareporting involve actorsseveral stepsremoved from the general public,there isno directlink tobe imputed between public concern and what appears in the media/legislation.Thus, although it may beconceded that Ungar is justiŽed in his appraisal of a patternwhich has cometo characterize the literature,in the absenceof any attentionto a criticaltheory of ideology(or tocritical media theory), his critique remains suspect – apointaddressed below. The secondproblem concerns the difŽculty encountered when, in con- atingthe productionand reproduction of meaning with the importance ofthe mobilizationof collective formsof behavior in anuncriticalmanner, explanatoryimportance is (perhaps inadvertently) placedon the function, notcontent(s), of panic discourses. Rather than representational patterns embodyingthat which is ideologically normative and culturally modular, ‘panics’are henceforth inferred to be embedded in the ‘collective con- science’of society (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994), appearing and disap- pearingwith great regularity in the interestsof the ‘socialcontrol of de- viance’(Victor 1998). To put this differently, the centralfocus is not on the contentsof particular ideological formations which Ž ndpoints of reso- nance withinthe widerdiscursive community, but rather on the ‘function,’ ‘intention’or ‘ purpose’of the discourse.Not only doessuch an emphasis onfunctionality serve tobroaden the Želd ofdeterministic claims about avariety offolk devils inthe interestsof ‘ socialcohesion’ vis-a-vis the indiscriminatelabeling of a variety offorms of praxis as ‘ moralpanic,’ butit simultaneously narrows the Želd ofdeterministic claims in regards tothose ideologico-discursive formations which do not precipitate direct behavioralresponses. In thisregard, it is somewhat of an ironyto re- ecton the Durkheimianfoundation from which such an epistemologyis derivedin light of Durkheim’ s (1895)warning that, because too often a functionalexplanation is invoked toexplain socialphenomena exclusively, Conceptualizing Moral Panic 315 ² there exists adangerof substituting the causalexplanation of social facts withexplanations deriving from their functionality. The problemof the indiscriminateuse of moral panic is only con- foundedby the realizationthat, since the mid1980s a parallelascendancy inusageof the concepthas been observedin the mainstreammedia. Hunt (1997),for example, informsus that as of 1989 FT ProŽle listedeleven variationson the usageof moral panic in the nationalpress in Britain,es- calatingto eighty-nine by1993. Pointing to itswide-ranging application to everything fromcrowd violence atfootball matches to surrogate mothers, he contendsthat by the closeof the 1980sthe referentof moralpanic was makingits way into the broadsheetpress at an acceleratedrate and was beginningto be treatedas commonplace.But what is mosttelling ofHunt’s discussionis that he isable to show how the liberaland sometimes con- tradictoryuse of moral panic in the academicliterature was (and remains) reected in the media’s applicationof the concept,though with a marked timedelay. Hence, notonly wasthe media’s incorporationof the language ofmoralpanic precipitated by itsuse in academic literature, but this logic canbe extended tosuggest that the media’s usehas sinceencroached on the courseof academic theorizing, at least partiallyremoving control of the conceptfrom the sphereof scholarly debate. In McRobbie’s (1994)assessment, the factthat sociologists have lost(or given up)the exclusive title todirect the way(s) inwhichmoral panic is used canbe traced to the expansionof the mediaand the diversiŽcation of the waysin which news is reported.What wasonce a relatively coherentbody oftheoretical variants revolving aroundnotions of disproportionality and socialcontrol primarily in relation to the tabloidpress, she explains, has becomea familiarif not ridiculous journalistic rhetoric, mediated through aarefor the sensational.‘ Used bypoliticians to orchestrate consent, by businessto promote sales incertain niche markets,and by journalists to make homeand social affairs newsworthy, moral panics are constructed ona dailybasis’ (McRobbie and Thornton 1995:565, 560). 1 And yet,

1 Contrary toCohen’ s argument that societiesare subject to periodic episodes of moral panic,McRobbie and Thornton (1995)contend that moral panicshave become a central meansby which dailyevents are reported and brought to the attentionof the public.With anexceptionallyhigh rate ofturnover, they suggestthat the propensityfor panic narratives toaccumulate has not servedpurposes of ‘ socialcontrol’ per se,but has additionally assumedthe form ofroutine marketing strategieswhich, amongstother things,are geared towardsyouth transgression. What thisimplies for McRobbie and Thornton isthat ‘: : :a tabloidfront page is frequently aself-fulŽlling prophesy.Sociologists might rightly seethis in terms of‘ devianceampliŽ cation,’ but youth have their owndiscourses which seethe processas one in which seethe processas one in which a‘scene’is transformed intoa movement (p.565). 316 Hier ² althoughsuch a contentionsigniŽ es awidertrend in the waysin which newsreporting unfolds, it is wise to exercise adegreeof caution when brandingall formsof sensational coverage with the label of‘ moralpanic.’ Foras Eide and Knight (1999) explain, thistechnique of reportingis caught upin a widertrend towards ‘ service journalism’: the waysin which the newsmedia impart knowledge, information and advice to their audiences onhow to negotiate the moraland social problems of everyday living. In the absenceof a criticalconception of ideology which is capable of engagingthe relationbetween audiences and media narratives, it is difŽ cult toaccept the argumentthat media sensationalism equates a priori to ‘moral panic.’ Therefore,given thatthe conceptualambiguity of the meaning and applicationof moral panic has resultedin its differential use not only at the level ofideology but also as a variety ofcollective formsof behavior, ithas becomeexceedingly difŽcult to discriminate analytically betweenthe production,reproduction and transmission of cultural meanings on the onehand, and the functionsto which those meanings andrepresentations extend onthe other.That is to say, byexhibiting such a wide-ranging varianceit is difŽ cult to establish to what extent the contentsof speciŽ c mediadiscourses serve toprecipitate various social responses – orto constitutevarious subject positions – withoutconsidering more completely the tenets ofacriticaltheory of ideology.It is not only witha formulation ofmoral panic in terms of a criticalconception of ideology that the incorporationof a theoryof discourse may berealized, but it is in this theoreticalspace that an understandingof the conceptualfoundations from whichmoral panics emerge may beapproximatedmore fully.

Ideology,Discourse, Articulation Whilst contemporarysocial theory has taken upthe questionof ideology largely withinthe parametersof the Gramsciannotion of hegemony – namely, tograsp the processesand practices involved inreproducing relationsof dominationwith little recourseto immediateor direct coercion –the applicationof the conceptof discourse has been directedmore towardsunderstanding the constitutionof individualsas subjects in relation totheir intersubjective lifeworlds. Hence, whereasideology has tendedto devolve aroundhow individuals come to perceive (or imagine) their social positionsin relation to what is conceived of as the external reality ofthe materialworld, discourse has derivedmore from the viewthat all social relationsare lived andexperienced through communicative sign systems (suchas language) which serve toconstitute subjectivities and associated identities.To put this differently, at a general level ‘discourse’is typically adoptedto refer to the linguisticif not semiotic dimension(s) of everyday Conceptualizing Moral Panic 317 ² living throughwhich the organizationand understanding of an individual’s experiential consciousnessmay berealized, whereas ‘ ideology’is invoked inan effortto connect those lived experiences witha broadermaterial existence insuch a wayas to make existing relationsappear not only naturalbut inevitable. Any yet despitethese provisionaldifferences, there has persistedin sociologicalinquiry a paradoxicaltreatment of ideology and discourse assimultaneously similar and different: similar in that both have been understoodto devolve around,or applyto, the same Želd ofsocialrelations; differentin that ideology derives from a Marxistinterpretation of the socialworld which holds that ideology ‘ functions’to mystify subordinate- superordinaterelations. That is, the notionof ideologyhas been invokedin aneffortto counterpose various forms of experiential consciousnessto the arbitrationof ‘ the real’in an otherwiseinstrumental attempt to formulate aconceptionof power presupposing a humansubject ‘ : : :endowedwith aconsciousnesswhich power is then thoughtto seize upon’(Foucault 1980:118).Analyses ofdiscourse, on the otherhand, have tendedto eschew the epistemologyof the truth/falsitydichotomy in the interestsof conceptualizingpower as a set ofphenomena distributedacross a multiplicity ofdiscursivesites, though remaining self-consciously neutral about whether variousdiscourses derive from a formof materialityextending beyondlived experience (Purvisand Hunt 1993) What isadvanced here isa criticalconception of ideology which recognizesthat the variousways people conceptualize themselves and theirsocial positions are situated within the normativeand historical parametersof a particularsocial and moral order, but one that remains detachedfrom any ontologicalcertainty as to what those positions willbe. The criticalconception of ideology can be discerned from a general understandingof discourse in that it is concerned to expound the relationshipbetween forms of consciousness and material existence. One ofthe crucialways in which the criticalperspective is to be differentiatedfrom other treatments of ideology is that it attempts to locatethe reproductionof dominant/ subordinaterelations at the level ofsocial action. That is, the criticalconception of ideology has been orientedtowards explaining howforms of consciousness generated in and through the lived experiences ofdispersed socialgroups contributeto the maintenance ofhegemonicsocial relations. What the criticalapproach adds tootherwiseundifferentiated conceptions of ideology, then, isthe criterion ofdirectionality: the stipulationthat ideology always works in the interests ofsometo the delimitationof others (Purvis and Hunt 1993). It follows that the presenceof ideologyis tobe discernedfrom its social consequences or 318 Hier ² effects,not from any claimto a ‘real’or ontological material presence. 2 Hegemony, inconsequence, cannot simply be understood to come about throughthe organiccohesion of political and civil society at the level ofthe consciousnessof those who rule and those who are ruled, but ratherthrough what Gramsci referred to more prophetically as ‘ feeling- passion’: thatpoint where individuals’ understandings of how the social world‘ is’intersects with their lived experiences insucha fashionas to fuse perception/understandingof ‘ reality’with lived experience ina manner whichis emotionallyand normatively resonant. Itis in this sense thata morecomplete appreciation of the intercon- nectedrelation between ideology and discourse is achieved byconsidering Laclauand Mouffe’ s (1985)notion of articulation. Breaking withFoucault’ s insistence onthe separationof the discursivefrom the non-discursive,La- clauand Mouffe develop the notionof ‘ articulation’to refer to the com- ingtogether of dispersed elements withinvarious discursive conŽ gurations whichgive riseto, or facilitate, the ideologicalsigniŽ cance of speciŽ c dis- cursiveformations. Put differently, articulation is used to displace the view thatthere exists apre-givenclass-based ideological formation (variations of whichare constituted as ‘ hegemony’) whichexists for,or at the exclusive convenience of,the dominantclass/ group.Laclau and Mouffe maintain thatall formsof knowledge are discursively constructed within interim ar- ticulations,and it is this conŽ gurational character of articulation which allowsthem tomove beyondthe viewthat ideology is somehow Ž xed, fast andfrozen. Sequently, the articulationof interactingdiscursive Ž elds isun- derstoodto never achieve astateof absolute Ž nality,but rather holds that discoursesare always subject to struggle and contestation, engagement and subversion.Stipulating that all objectsare constituted in and through dis- coursedoes not negate the epistemologyof an external ideological-material

2 It isin thisregard that the critical approachoperates at considerable distance from the epistemologicalunderpinnings of structuralism. Concerned toelaborate Marx’ s conception ofideology and the state,for example, Louis Althusser theorizeda compellingevidentness aboutideology as an objectdemanding of total assent – ‘ideology,’Althusser (1971:164) maintained,‘ isalways already there.’ He arguedthat the evidentnessof ideology operates asan instrument which servesto conceal from the subjectthe imaginarycharacter of his/her relationsto the objectof experience. What thissigniŽ ed for Althusser wasthat there existsan eternal, omni-present character toideology, and it is this insistence which servesto eclipse his otherwise instructive commentary onsubjectivity and subjectiŽ cation where acritical conceptionof ideology is concerned. Put simply,caught up in abroader concern tocomprehend howrelations of domination are reproduced, he insistedthat the actor mustbe reconciledto class structure andto the positions/ he hascome to occupy in that structure. Whilst not withoutmerit, what isofinterest toa critical formulationis how ideologyactually becomes internalized, lived and acted upon. Conceptualizing Moral Panic 319 ² reality,but simply maintains that it is through discourse that any external realityis mediated to the endof either consolidation or reconŽ guration. Hence, the signiŽcance of the notionof articulation is that discursive formationsare never unitary,but that they areconstituted in dispersion (cf.Foucault 1972). Ideology in the criticalsense isneither reducibleto the conceptionof discourse alluded to above, nor is it reducible to an undifferentiatedset ofideas about how the world‘ really is.’Rather, it assumesthat the wayspeople comprehend their social surroundings have animmediateapplication to how they actin the socialworld.

It is precisely the ‘spontaneous’quality of common sense, its transparency, its ‘naturalness,’its refusalto examine the premises onwhich itis grounded, its resistance tocorrection, its qualityof being instantly recognizablewhich makes commonsense, atone and the same time,‘ lived,’‘ spontaneous’and unconscious.We live incommon sense –we donot think it(Purvis andHunt 1993:479).

Putotherwise, ‘ commonsense’ does not involve the invocationof a tra- ditionalideological formation which serves asa sortof blunt instrument ofrepression, but more precisely what Geertz (1973)terms ‘ retradition- alism’: ameeting ofthe oldand the newin such a waythat ‘ common sense’is reputed to stand for a taken-for-grantedsocial resource, recon- textualizedas that which is actively engaged,shaped and lived through everyday negotiationsin the socialworld, organized around the dualism ofpraxis/ consciousness.Although this contention lends itselfto the con- tinuanceof a certaindistance between ideology and discourse, the critical theorygoes some distance to explain howdiscourse is able to coexist with ideologyto facilitate the possibilityfor, but by no means mandatethe un- foldingof, particular ‘ ideologicaleffects.’ It does so by reinvigorating the Althusseriannotion of interpellation as an ideologicalmechanism which situatessubjects within speciŽ c discursivecontexts (Purvis and Hunt 1993; Greenbergand Hier 2001). By invokinga set ofnormativeepistemological assumptionsabout the ontologyof the socialworld, interpellation facilitates the ascendence ofa set ofdiscoursesby whichand through which individ- ualssee themselves assubjects constituted in and through narrative, but set inthe contextof a wider(but  exible) ideologicalframework. 3

3 The notionof interpellation– aninterpellativehailing – wasused by Althusser torefer tothe processeswhereby individualsare constituted as subjects by the mere presenceof ideology– ideologyas always already there. Forpresent purposes,usage of the concept isoriented towards understanding how a setof discourses serve to constitute subjectivities in ongoing,developmental, interactive ways,based on widerideological assumptions about the ontologyof the materialworld. In thissense, interpellation does not passively‘ hail’ 320 Hier ²

With reference tonews reporting and moral panic, interpellation can beobserved along at least two(often overlapping) axes ofidentiŽ cation. The Žrstconcerns a socio-personalaxis ,wherethe consumersof news storiesare addressed through socio-personal identiŽ cations such as parents ormembers of racialized/ genderedcommunities, who hold a vested interestin the welfareand security of their immediate surroundings. The second,the political-economicaxis, involves the constitutionof identities suchas tax payersor consumers motivated by facets such as personal accumulationand the protectionof what is understood as a common rightto property, who are interpellated through their shared interests concerninghow the politicalaffairs of the stateunfold (cf. Knight 1998). Processesof interpellation, then, arecontingent on how successfully social actorscan Ž ndpoints of identiŽ cation embedded in media discourses, asnews discourse must be able to amplify those features of reporting whichtap into individuals’ experiential domainto enable actorsto see themselves representedin and through narrative. What thisframework suggestsis that individuals are not passive recipients of the ideological contentsof news reporting, but that they actively participatein their own interpellation. 4 Andit is this discursive conception of ideology as a form of

subjects,but rather ‘invites’individuals to actively and imaginatively decode the contents andmeanings of fragmented, uid,complex discourses embedded with multiplemeanings. Hence, interpellationis formulatedhere asthe processesby which individualsare addressed andconstituted as subjects through their emotionalconnectedness to a speciŽc discourse, andthe waysin which discoursesconfront indiivdualswith the realizationthat the issueat hand willcarry real life,material consequences. 4 Neither isthis to imply that the activereader is a resistantone, nor that an active readingimplies some form ofsubversion. How reporting is framed, whose points of view arepredominant, page layouts and the manner in which newsstories unfold are among the many important factorsinvolved in producingan ideologicaleffect. Indicative of the latter isWelch, Fenwickand Roberts’ (1997) work oncrime andmoral panic,where attention isdirected towards the importance ofprimary deŽners in the construction ofnews text andhow experts and state managers contribute to the consolidationof dominant ideology, not through conspiratorialrelations, but based on the media’s reliance onprimary deŽners asa productof the structure ofnews reporting itself. More recently, Greenberg andHier (2001)have taken upthe issueof hownews reporting is structured in the context ofmoral panic,arguing that privilegingof dominant viewpoints is not basedon a dominantgroup’ s structural positionas gatekeepers of specializedknowledge so much asitison their overall accessibilityand the mere fact that the very essenceof their positionsas politicians, police personal,etc. facilitates the materialdemands imposed upon the newsmakingprocess itself –deadlines,constant turnover, quotingsources, etc. But where their analysisdiffers is in the fact that they advocatea ‘dualistic’framework, whereby the contents andstructure of newsare analysed alongside the styleof reporting. Hence they explorethe discursiveand rhetorical patterns ofnews coverage using the techniqueof critical discourseanalysis within the more generalparameters of structural analysis.In thisway, the interpretive aspectsof Conceptualizing Moral Panic 321 ² socialaction thatreveals interpellationas an active andimaginative set of processeswhich ‘ invite’social agents todecode the contentsof ideologico- discursiveformations based on their normatively and emotionally charged experiences unfoldingin andthrough the productionof everyday living.

Moral Panicas CriticalIdeology Moralpanic as a criticaltheory of ideology initially found fertile ground inHall et al.’s (1978)classic study of ‘ muggingsas a socialphenomenon,’ whereit was argued with reference toGreat Britain of the early 1970s thatmoral panic culminated around what was mediated primarily in the mainstreampress as the criminalityof black youth. Diverging from Cohen’ s (1972)otherwise indiscriminate usage of the constructof social control, Hall et al.provide a moreintegrated understanding of moral panic as an envoy ofthe dominantideology, geared towards the consolidationof hegemony conceivedof through the discursiveregulatory apparatus of ‘ law andorder.’ As an exceptionalmoment in the governmental historyof Britishcapitalism, they incorporateGramsci’ s notionof common sense toargue that moral panic was one way in which the statewas able to penetratebelow the surfaceof civil society by tappinginto shared anxieties concerningsocial order and legal transgressionin an ultimateattempt to secureconsent by drawing attention away from, and thereby ‘policing,’ realcrises in the capitalistmode of production (see alsoHall 1985,1987). Morerecently, ColinHay (1996)has advancedon Hall et al.’s modelin awidereffort to rehabilitate a criticalconception of ideology which treats subjectsas more than passivevessels ofideological indoctrination. Parting companywith Hall et al.,who perhaps inadvertently conceptualizethe consumersof news stories as ideological dupes, Hay explicitly advocates atheoryof ideology capable of understanding individuals as active and imaginativeagents, whose emotional connectedness to speciŽ c discursive formationsis the basison which s/ he actively participatesin her/ his owninterpellation. As Hay explains, the interpellative strengthof moral panicsas ideologico-discursive formations rests on their ability to Ž nd pointsof identiŽ cation capable of unambiguously attributing causality and responsibilityto the discursivemediation of aparticularsigniŽ er embodying amoregeneralized ideological state of social or moral disintegration (e.g. racializedfolk devils vis-a-vis increasingimmigration; the stigmatizationof youthcrime vis-a-vis single mothers).In hisown words,

newstext areconsidered alongside the structural aspectsof reporting to approximate more fully anunderstandingof howinterpellation works. 322 Hier ²

[w]e inject ourown subjectivities into the empty senarios constructed within a mediateddiscourse. We recognize ourselves (as mothers, fathers, orguardians) as we positionourselves as subjects within the narrativestructure constructed within such reportedevents. It is inthis moment ofidentiŽcation, empathy and recognition( connaissance )that the pointof resonance is secured, as we Žndour ‘hailing’and become subjects through it,andthus subject to it (Hay 1996:208).

Crucialto Hay’ s formulationis the argumentthat moral panics are symptomaticof a moregeneral situationof protracted state and economic failure,but one not (yet) perceivedof interms of ‘crisis.’That is, as a point wherethe oldis dying but the newcannot be born (Gramsci 1971:276) moralpanic represents one manifestation of indecisive intervention,‘ where agreatvariety ofmorbid symptoms appear’ (ibid). In thisregard, struggles aroundchanges inpolitical and cultural consensus are understood to unfold,not at the level ofstate structure but at the level ofeveryday consciousness(Gitlin 1980).Crises, then, areconceptualized by Hay as processualnarratives subjectively perceived of, lived andacted upon; they areconstructions or mediations of statecontradictions or failures. Accordingly,in the intermediaryspaces where social antagonisms are variouslyarticulated through the antitheticaltensions of liberty and re- straint,freedom and regulation, politics and the transgressiveemerges a style ofauthoritative intervention which assumes the formof a highly emo- tive andrhetorical discourse that appeals to the establishedsentiments ofstigma and prejudice (Knight 1998). By constitutingthe individualas subjectwithin the discursiveconŽ nes ofvariegated governmental conŽgu- rations,interpellation is henceforth revealed toconstitute subject positions ina mannerthat reinforces, reproduces and recontextualizes dominant so- cialrelations through ‘ commonsense.’ It does so, not by attributing to folk devils causalityand responsibility for moral deviations/ transgressionsin a highly structureddiscursive environment, but rather, while remaining  uid andelusive intheirapplication, panic discourses must be understood to tap intopopular sentiments atthe phenomenal level ofeveryday consciousness, carryinga universalappeal pertaining to something which is uncritically andunproblematically received as problematic. For as both Hall (1983) andHay (1996)recognize, ideology does more than merely interpellate individualsas subjects; ideology penetrates below the level ofconsciousness tobecome internalized and lived, day in andday out. Forpurposes of illustration, consider the discoursescentering on child sexual abuseto emerge followingthe SupremeCourt of British Columbia’ s decisionin 1999 to strike down a lawprohibiting the possessionof childpornography. With the closureof the legal grievance levied against RobinJohn Sharpe, a Vancouverman charged with possessing child pornography,Doyle andLacombe (2000) provide an analysis ofhow Conceptualizing Moral Panic 323 ² the rulingset inmotion a moralpanic through the discursivelinkage ofchild pornography, paedophilia, child sexual abuseand homosexuality (Sharpehappened to be of homosexual orientation). Irrespective of the factthat their analysis revolves aroundthe notionthat the case was narratedin the newsmedia in terms of the dangersof child abuse despitesuch occurrences having been onthe decline forthe pastthree decades(i.e. representation versus ‘ the real’), whatis most telling about theirdiscussion is the identiŽcation of a discursivespace in which the problematizationof grievance intersectedwith the problematizationof risk/danger.As they explain, the discursivemediation of danger allegedly posedby Sharpe came to be rearticulated in the formof the mediation ofharm-avoidance,whereby the processesinvolved inregulating Sharpe – and,by corollary, supposed child molesters more generally –gave way tothe discursiverearticulation of an apparatusof safety. Thatis, by projectinga symbolicdimension of harm onto a panoplyof risk factors facingchildren in the contemporaryworld, the explanatorychallenge reachedbeyond understanding the processesand practices involved in the expurgationof the Other(Sharpe) to the morefundamental issue ofunderstanding how various narratives conjoin with the discursive signiŽcation of ‘ dangerous’populations to amplify the threatposed by ‘the Other’largely byideologically redeŽ ning what precisely that threat is.By intuitinga level ofharm believed tobe posed by a particular personor population through an externally deŽned object (e.g. threat of disease,strangers, crime), the discursivecon ation of the dangerousOther withthe symbolicsigniŽ cation of harm precipitates the development of an apparatus ofsecurity andthe symbolicfortiŽ cation of an inclusivesense ofcollective safety. Notonly doesthis make rearticulationof ‘ the threat’ moreamenable todeŽ nition and regulation, but it legitimates ampliŽ cation ofthe threatinsofar as the objectof rearticulation almost always takes the formof normative ideological constructions of fear or danger. To put this schematically,the otherwisenebulous identiŽ cation of ‘ the Other’Ž nds stablepoints of articulation in variations on the ideologicallynormative constructsof safety andsecurity, as variousdiscourses become appropriated throughthe sensitivitiesand sensibilities of what must be conceptualized as creativeand imaginative social agents. Whilst remainingdetached from any deterministicconception of the ideologicalnature of panicnarratives, such acontentionafŽ rms that discourses become ideological insomuch as their active appropriationserves toestablish various subjectivities through one’ s emotionalconnectedness (as parents,tax payers,citizens, etc.) to discourse andnarrative. The necessity thereforepresents itself to probe the widernormative foundationsfrom which moral panics emerge toarticulate as concerns 324 Hier ² whichare deemed worthy of sustained attention and extended debate. In doingso, it is essential toengage the relationshipbetween panics andregulatory projects. Although no effort is made to establish a clearconceptual distinction between these twocentral concepts, it is demonstratedbelow how moral panics represent a formof moralregulation and,as such, why itis amoreprosperous analytic endeavor to interrogate the speciŽc conŽgurational formations through which regulatory projects manifestand panic episodes emerge. In thisregard, it is afŽ rmed that moralpanics and regulatory projects are mutually reinforcing, though there doesexist certainkey differencesand subtle complexities which need tobe broughtto light to achieve amorecomplete understanding of the workings ofcontemporarymoral politics.

TheSociology of Moral Regulation The conceptof moral regulation originally appeared in Corrigan’ s (1981) preliminarystatement, soon to be developedmore completely inCorrigan andSayer’ s (1985)exploration of the historyof English state formation. ForCorrigan and Sayer, moral regulation refers to a ‘: : : project of normalizing,rendering natural, taken forgranted, in a word,‘ obvious,’ whatare in fact ontological and epistemological premises of a particular andhistorical form of socialorder’ (p. 4). They explain thatfor a particular statestructure to exist, itneeds tobe legitimated by a particularform of‘ moralethos.’ That is, as a mechanismof state legitimation, moral regulationserves tofacilitate the consolidationof state power by having certainepistemological social arrangements appear to the citizenryas both naturaland inevitable. Under the tenets ofthis conception, the stateis understoodto facilitatevarious hegemonic representations which are taken upby social actors through the state’s abilityto penetrate the institutions ofcivil society and affect cultural transformation vis-a-vis the constitution ofsocialagents asmoral subjects. Containedin Corrigan and Sayer’ s analysis isa Marxistemphasis onthe consolidationand reproduction of hegemony, combinedwith aFoucauldianemphasis on the constructionand constitution of social subjectivity.Attempting to overcome the epistemologicalprimacy of ‘ the social’as asociological a priori,they arguethat processes of state-formation areinterlinked with citizen-formation in a mannerthat is reminiscent ofElias’ (1978) writings on the civilizingprocess, and it is the latter problematicwhich constitutes the impetusfor Dean’ s (1994)refutation of Corriganand Sayer’ s state-formationthesis. Asserting that the Corrigan- Sayerargument falters on the stipulationthat the boundarybetween state andnon-state agencies isfar from clear, he arguesthat their analysis notonly leaves little roomto allow for agencies withdissonant strategies Conceptualizing Moral Panic 325 ² fallingoutside the realmof the state,but additionally for con icting if notantithetical policies and practices found within and between different stateagencies. Nor is the statethe only ‘moralregulator’ in regulatory projects,Dean continues.Moral regulation, he explains, involves amuch morefragmentary process than Corrigan and Sayer recognize, making it exceedingly difŽcult to distinguish between the centralityof the stateand ‘outside’bodies.

This isillustratedby the multipleand overlapping jurisdictions involving local, regional,national, international and global authorities within which actors arelocated. It is evidenced bythe widespreaddevelopment of non-proŽ t community andsocial services in advancedliberal democracies which are fundedpartially by the nationalstate butrun by citizen associations,and by the neoliberaluse ofcorporations,charities, andfamilies, to achieve governmental objectives(e.g. the provisionof welfare anddomestic care, the establishment ofprisons, job-centres, etc.) (Dean 1994:152,153).

In Dean’s assessment, toframe the questionof moral regulation in termsof the dualityof structure and experience isto advocate a dual- level frameworkof experience andmeaning, situated in a ‘culturalist conception’of moral regulation which presupposes a realmof experience groundedin material relations. Not only doesthe emphasison a dualistic conceptioninvoke anaturalismthat belies the attemptto examine the naturalizationprocess, says Dean,but it unduly takes the formof a ‘philosophicalanthropology’ of the humansubject as a culturalbeing. What isleft,he interjects,is an insufŽcient degree of attentionto practices ofself-regulationand ethical subjectivity. Sequently, Dean insistson a more sustainedexamination of whathe termsethical self-formation: the processes andpractices whereby individuals come to act upon the self independentof the stateor external materiality.Although he isclear from the beginning ofhis discussion that his interests rest in elucidating the interconnection betweenethical self-formation and political and governmental practices andprocesses (‘ governmental self-formation’), he nevertheless comesto placepredominant emphasis on the latterin aneffortto better appreciate thosedomains of self-formation that operate at distance from the state. The value tobe derived from Dean’ s analysis canbe found in his effortto divorce a stateinitiated conception of moral regulation as in Corriganand Sayer from the processesand practices involved inethical self-formation.Dean’ s insistenceon differentiating ‘ morals’apropos the statefrom ‘ ethics’according to Foucault is a usefulanalytic manoeuver withrespect to the ‘Eliasiannature’ of Corrigan and Sayer’ s thesis,but it shouldbe noted that there isnoinherent dangerin con ating morals and ethicsso longthat it isunderstood that the movement ofan external ‘moral 326 Hier ² ethos’does not move intandem with internal processes of self-formation (cf.Hunt 1999). In thisregard, Dean’ s advocationthat we cast aside the conceptof moral regulation in favor of the constructof governmentality isbest approached with caution, and his contention that Corrigan and Sayer’s ‘culturalist’account somehow places limitations on the analysis ofself-formation is suspect. For projects of moral regulation are always sociallyconstituted in that they involve onegroup of persons seeking to actupon the conductof others in some manner. As such, the pertinent analytictask isto appreciate how speciŽ c instancesof regulatory activity stimulateprocesses of self-governance whichneed notcorrespond to any governmental authority,not on how governance of the self unfolds sui generis.

Towards aMoral Economyof Character In an innovative attemptwhich goes some distance to reconcile the dis- sonancebetween Corrigan and Sayer’ s culturalistaccount of human sub- jectivityand Dean’ s neo-Foucauldianemphasis on ethical self-formation, Valverde (1994)invokes Bourdieu’s (1984)notion of ‘culturalcapital’ in an effortto expound what she termsa ‘mixedeconomy’ of forms of regu- lation(see alsoValverde 1995).Drawing on Bourdieu’ s (1984)distinction betweeneconomic and cultural capital, Valverde addsto this social Ž eld athirdconcept: ‘ moralcapital.’ Re ecting Bourdieu’ s attemptto surpass whathe understandsto be the analytically debilitatingopposition between objectivismand subjectivism, she contendsthat neither are these circuits ‘: : :separatefrom relations of power originating in and sustaining the state, norare they reducibleto the latter’(p. 218). Rather, argues Valverde, the administrationof the populationin civilsociety must be understoodas the cross-articulationor interaction of the three circuitsof capital. By moralcapital, then, Valverde designatesan ‘elusive inwardessence’ orientedtowards considerations of how others come to judge one’ s moral worth,but it is an essence thatis ‘ : : :usefully conceptualizedas oriented towardsthe maximizationof both the individualmoral capital of the recipientand the aggregatemoral capital of the nation-state’(p. 215). Whilst itwas Bourdieu’ s objectiveto reveal the varioussocial processes involved increating, certifying and maximizing various kinds of cultural capital,Valverde attemptsto explicate whatshe identiŽes asa parallel processthrough which certain dispositions and habits are constituted and naturalized.The centralfeature of moral regulation in this sense isnot thatcertain behaviors are acted upon in an ultimateattempt to change or delimitthe actionsof the moraldeviant(s), butrather to generate certain kindsof ethical subjectivities that appear to social agents asinherently ornaturally ‘ moral.’Essentially, whatValverde isadvocating is a sort Conceptualizing Moral Panic 327 ² of‘ moraleconomy of character,’ whereby social agents arecalled upon byspatially and temporally situated governing bodies (the church,special interestgroups, professional organizations) to engage inmorally reŽ ned practicesto ‘ carefor the self.’ Valverde’s invocationof the conceptof moral capital was primarily directedtowards understanding late Victorianphilanthropy, though she maintainsthat the conceptextends beyonda mere antiquarianapplication. Counterposingphilanthropy of the nineteenth centuryto various forms of charity,she explains thatthe formerinvolved along-termproject oriented towardsan overall improvementin, or restoration of, the moralcharacter ofthe urbanpoor, whereas the latterrepresented a socialpractice entailing the donationof various sums of money withlittle interestin how it was actuallyused. That is, in contrast to s/ he whocontributes to charity, the philanthropistis purported to invest little economicbut doses of moral capitalto the endthat s/ he receives inreturn a particular‘ moralgain’ inthe formof character development and habit reform. Crucial to this argumentis the factthat, because the primaryobjective of philanthropy wasthe maximizationof moral capital in the formof the transformation ofthe individualattributes of the pauperor moral degenerate (as opposed tosweeping and impersonal state measures aimed at alleviating poverty), thosewho ‘ managed’moral capital had to individualize as they managed. Toput this differently, whilst it was the roleof the stateto engage ina formof ‘ moralarchitecture’ which saw the constructionof sewers, housing reformand public health initiativesaimed at reversingthe moraldecay of the misère,scientiŽc philanthropyinvolved amoreconcerted effort directed inwardtowards the characterreformation of paupérisme bydealingwith the poor‘ asindividuals and by individuals.’ Itis this reciprocal or dialectical element ofethical subjectiŽ cation introducedby Valverde thatenables usto understand more fully the uidand historically variable nature of the ‘mixedeconomy’ of forms ofregulation. As is evident fromher discussion, it was through the processesinvolved inacting upon the moralcharacter of the poorin a mannerintended to induce ethical subjectivities that the identityand moral capitalof the philanthropistwas simultaneously constituted, reconŽ gured andconŽ rmed. That is, whilst Valverde explains moralregulation in termsof the constitutionof, or the effortto generate, certain discursive channels ofethical behavior to be adopted and emulated on the part ofthe ‘morallydegenerative,’ it is important to remain cognizant of the factthat those behaviors were presupposed by, or derived from, sociallyconstituted ideologico-discursive representations of what can for purposesof convenience bedesignated as ‘ moralrighteousness.’ That the constitutionof ethical subjectivity is explained byValverde notonly as 328 Hier ² involving an imperativeto care for the self, butmore speciŽ cally an engagement with‘ individualsby individuals,’ we may appreciatemoral regulationapropos ‘ moralcapital’ as an amalgamationof discourseswhich arelived, experienced, internalized and acted upon. It is for this reason thatI dismissRuanavaara’ s (1997)contention that Valverde’ s modelis not ableto account for why the philanthropistis obsessed with obtaining a moralreturn as limited in its appreciation of the complexityof Valverde’ s conceptualoffering, for projects of moral regulation reveal asmuchabout the identitythose who seek toregulate as they doabout those who come toserve asthe objectof regulation. Hence, oneof Valverde’ s mostvaluable contributionsis that the circuitof moral capital is divorced from any necessary ordeterministic conceptionof the state,oriented towards the dialecticsof self-formation in areciprocaltheory of ideologyvis-a-vis mixeddiscursive economies and/ or conŽgurations of governance. Not only doesthis formulation facilitate adeconstructionof the binaryopposition between state/ civilsociety to reconŽgure the public/privatedichotomy into a morecomplex web of relationshipsunder the auspicesof the mixed economy(cf. Valverde 1995), butit allows for the possibilitythat the moralcircuit may serve asa spacewhere the articulationof social antagonisms unfold under the wider umbrellaof state authority and hegemonic consolidation (cf. Hall et al. 1978).Indeed, it is this interlinkage betweenstate and civil society which facilitatesa morein-depth understanding of how regulatory projects unfold throughthe lived experiences ofsocial agents, in addition to allowing for the elucidationof moral panic as a formof moralregulation.

Towards aMoral Economyof Harm Fundamentally,both moral panic and moral regulation involve oneset ofpersons seeking toact on the conductof others, and they both containan inherent linkage betweenthe identityof the regulatorand the identityof the regulated.Put differently, moral regulation shares in commonwith moral panic the centralfeature that they bothinvolve a disturbancein the processesof regulating the conductof others, as well asprocesses concerning how to conduct oneself. Butthis is where they divergein a crucialway. In each ofthe three perspectiveson moral regulationreviewed above, there exists onecommon thread: an emphasis onthe moraldeviant/ degenerative toengage amorallyresponsible ‘ ethos’ whichis imputed to translate into a refashioningof the self. Whether conceivedof ‘ fromabove,’ ‘ the middle’or ‘ below,’moral regulation is understoodto entail long-termprocesses of normalizationconcerning some Želd ofmoralized conduct to the endof the ‘characterenhancement’ ofthose persons subjected to regulation on the onehand, and the self- Conceptualizing Moral Panic 329 ²

[re]afŽrmation of the identityof the regulatoron the other.It can be imputed,then, thatmoral regulation involves a dialectic ofsubjectiŽ cation , irrespectiveof where the regulatoryprojects commences (i.e the state,the self, privateorganizations). Moralpanics, conversely, donot involve any characterreformation of moraldeviants, and thus entail adifferentkind of dialectic. As a more convulsive andvolatile disturbancein the courseof moral governance, panicstend to be short-lived, concentrated on limiting the action/agency, notethic, of speciŽ ed ‘ folkdevils.’ Moral panics in this sense represent aparticularmanifestation of moral regulation, whereby processes and practicesinvolved inconstituting the self/inclusivecommunity intersect withvariegated governmental conŽgurations to delimit the actionsof the Otherin the interestsof fortifying the identityof the self/inclusive community.Through a dialecticalprocess of signiŽ cation (discursively articulatedin terms of ‘ us’/ ’them’), moralpanics operate as political technologiesvis-a-vis the discursiveconstruction of anapparatusof security, andthey areconcentrated on a moreimmediate form of regulatory intervention.Hence, whilemoral regulation hinges ona dialecticalprocess ofsubjectiŽ cation to the extent thatthe regulatedare purported to internalizecodes of moral conduct shared by the regulator,moral panics may beunderstood in two discrepant ways: Ž rst,as those moments when the subjectiŽcation of the Otheris deemed to be in a stateof ‘ crisis’or breakdown(i.e. when the regulateddo not adequately respond to a call to carefor the self); andsecond, when the subjectiŽcation of the Otheris not possible.In eithercase, moral panic culminates at that point where moral regulationis perceivedto be in a stateof failure or dislocation, giving rise toa moreimmediate or explicit manifestation of regulatory intervention wherethe processesand practices involved inconstitutingthe self/inclusive communityintersect with an uncertainmix ofpolitical conŽ gurations of ruling. Asa processof identity afŽ rmation, therefore, we may foremost conceptualizemoral panic as the volatile localmanifestation of what can otherwisebe understood as the global projectof moral regulation .Moralpanic tendsto take the formof a periodic‘ crisis’or breakdown in the Želd ofmoralgovernance and, as such,the articulationof moralpanic remains dependenton the abilityof various discursive formations to unambiguously attributecausality and responsibility to folkdevils whichare understood to embodya moregeneral stateof social/ moralharm. Not only doesthis reveal moralpanics as inherently individualizingin the sense thatthey designateas unproblematicallyproblematic the agency ofthe folkdevil, but itparadoxicallyexposes panicnarratives as socializing in that they operate 330 Hier ² throughvarious governmental rationalities(e.g. risk and responsibility; neoliberalism)which are temporally and spatially speciŽ c. Thissummons forth a secondcrucial difference between moral panic andmoral regulation. While moralregulation involves long-termprocesses ofnormalization, moral panics as volatile localmanifestions of wider anxieties atonce articulate a momentof problematization (i.e. the attributionof causality/ blame) anda momentof solution (i.e. how to resolve the problem).That is, whilst moral regulation involves oneset of personsacting on the conductof others over a widerange of discursive sites withthe ultimategoal of ethicalreconstitution at some future point, panic narrativesas political resources reduce the Želd ofregulatory intervention tothe extent thata tangibleobject is designated for immediate intervention, set inthe contextof afarmore immediate moment of closure.It is for this reasonthat recent commentary has suggestedthe fateof moral panics dependon the abilityfor folk devils andoppositional groups to respond immediatelyto claims making in a highly differentiatedpublic sphere (McRobbieand Thornton 1995; Hier 2002). 5 Throughthe distribution ofthe politicizationof causality, the ideologicalconsolidation of ‘ common sense’comes to be structured around a victim-centereddiscourse in that s/he whois able to retain the abilityto legitimately speak forand about victims(designating who is a victim)remains contingent on making claims thatresonate in what Knight (1998) terms a ‘moraleconomy of harm.’ What thisconcept implies is not that moral panics unfold based on the objectiveassessment ofharm stemming from some activity or behavior, buthow effectively claimsmaking is able to tap into the ‘feeling-passion’ or‘ commonsense’ of those who are subject to the ideologicalcontents of panicdiscourses and, in the wordsof Hay (1996),become subjects through it. Contextualizedas such, it is crucial to reiterate that hegemony does notsimply come to be reproduced in direct reference tothe stateor ofŽcial authorities, nor is hegemony the inevitable productof dominant claimsmaking embedded in mediadiscourses. Whilst moralpanics usually involve someform of authoritative intervention (though their origins often

5 McRobbieand Thornton (1995)argue that with the diversiŽcation of the mass,niche andmicro media– yers,fanzines, pirate radio, internet websites, email distribution lists –the relationshipbetween media reporting, folk devils and social control isfar more complexthan traditionalformulations allow for, as folkdevils can anddo Ž ght back.Using empiricaldata to substantiate McRobbie and Thornton’ s theoretical claims,Hier (2002) hasrecently demonstratedhow folk devils are able to engage a diversityof media outlets (niche television,internet, musicoutlets) to challenge andsubvert dominant claims-making in ahighly differentiatedpublic sphere centered onthe notionof rational-critical debate andvictim-centered discourses. Conceptualizing Moral Panic 331 ² derivefrom domains outside the state),the narrationof moral panic is equally susceptiblethrough the politicaldispersion of causality/ blameto turnagainst those who emerge asauthoritative claims makers ina moral economyof harm. Again to borrow from Knight, what this means isthat ‘: : :the politicaleconomy of power is confronted openly bythe moral economyof harm in which ordinary victims, and their supporters and representatives,enjoy adegreeof discursive in uence overthe groundson whichhegemony iscontested and negotiated’ (1998:124). For Knight, this impliesa still moredifferentiated moral economy of harm, where ‘ victims’ struggleto make resonantclaims about their ‘ worthiness’as victims (one mightwish to extend thiseven furtherto a‘moraleconomy of innocence’ ). The ideologicaleffect, then, isthat the moral/mixedeconomy takes the formof the redistributionof blame in an ultimateattempt to charge antagonisticsocial agents witha moreaggravated degree of harm.That is, the moreharm that is imputed to emanate fromthe folkdevil, the more innocentthe victimis perceived to be, in turn making the mobilizationof authoritativeintervention that much more imminent.

Conclusion The foregoinganalysis has soughtto formulate moral panic in terms ofa criticalconception of ideology. The value tobe derived from conceptualizingmoral panic as critical ideology is principally found in the factthat it renders as problematic the contentionthat moral panic has becomea centralmeans bywhich the newsis reported. For as has been argued,an analyticseparation between ‘ moralpanic’ and what has been identiŽed as a morerudimentary form of ‘ mediasensationalism’ mustbe maintained. But equally asimportant is the factthat such aconceptualizationgoes considerable distance to reconcile the tension betweenideology and social action (i.e. media narrative and public concern)to the disenchantmentof the analyticutility of moral panic in sociologicalresearch. Put simply, ideology in this sense isunderstood as, andconceptualized in terms of, a formof social action, situated Ž rmly withinthe popular– butironically mystifying – dualisticantagonism of consciousnessand action. Moral panics bring into play anumberof normativepresuppositions about social subjectivity, but they doso through the discursivemediation of thoseaspects of everyday living whichserve as pointsof condensation for wider anxieties –criminality,health risk,sexual deviance andgeneral perceptionsof public/personalsafety. Conceptualized inthese terms,it is unfortunate to consider that those who have sought toexpound the highly inuential concept of moral regulation have been quickto dismiss moral panic on the alleged groundsthat it imports a negative normativejudgement from the outset,in turn limiting rather than 332 Hier ² enhancing conceptualunderstandings of the complexand multifaceted waysin whichhuman conduct is governed. Assuch, the intentionof the foregoinganalysis has notbeen oriented towardsapproximating ‘ truth’in any Žnal instance,but rather to chart newconceptual territory oriented towards the compatiblenature of the sociologyof moral panic and the sociologyof moral regulation. Although ithas been maintainedthat there persistscertain key differences,the differencessketched betweenmoral regulation and moral panic should be receivedin the contextof a moregeneralized attempt to formulatea critical theoryof moral panic as a formof moral regulation. Indeed, it seems as thoughthe convulsive powerof the ‘panic,’combined with the long-term reserve ofregulatory projects, is wherethe realthrust of moral governance (ofthe self aswell asothers)is to be located. Both moral panic and moral regulationoperate through ideologico-discursive formations, but they differ inthe waysin which they articulateto common sense: oneas a sustained dialecticalprocess of subjectiŽ cation, the otheras a volatile momentof failureor dislocation. What the analysis suggestsis that moral panics are inno dangerof dying out (as someobservers have recently suggested),and whata theoryof moral panic as critical ideology necessitates isa more integratedunderstand of the workingsof contemporary moral politics.

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