An Overview of GBAS Integrity Monitoring with a Focus on Ionospheric Spatial Anomalies

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

An Overview of GBAS Integrity Monitoring with a Focus on Ionospheric Spatial Anomalies Indian Journal of Radio & Space Physics Vol. 36, August 2007, pp 249-260 An overview of GBAS integrity monitoring with a focus on ionospheric spatial anomalies Sam Pullen & Per Enge Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Stanford University, USA E-mail: [email protected] Received 2 April 2007; accepted 14 May 2007 The Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) or, more generally, the Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS), has been developed over the past decade to meet the accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability needs of civil aviation users. The GBAS utilizes a single reference station (with multiple GNSS receivers and antennas) within an airport and provides differential corrections via VHF data broadcast (VDB) within a 50-km region around that airport. This paper provides an overview of GBAS integrity verification, explaining how integrity risk is allocated to various potential safety threats and how monitors are used to meet these allocations. In order to illustrate GBAS integrity monitoring in detail, this paper examines the potential threat of ionospheric spatial anomalies (e.g., during ionospheric “storms”) to GBAS and how GBAS protects users against this threat. In practice, the need to mitigate potential ionospheric anomalies is what dictates CAT I GBAS availability. Keywords : LAAS, GBAS, Ionospheric spatial anomalies, Civil aviation PACS No : 94.20.Vv; 94.20B6 1 Introduction navigation aids such as VOR/DME and the When the GPS standard positioning service (SPS), Instrument Landing System (ILS). As a result, the based on L1 C/A code, reached initial operational International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) capability 1 (IOC) in 1993, it was understood that SPS selected differentially-augmented GPS as the primary by itself could not meet the accuracy, integrity and basis for future aircraft navigation and landing continuity requirements of civil aviation users. At that systems 9 in 1995. time, SPS was intentionally degraded by selective One of the key aspects of GBAS development was availability (S/A), which made SPS ranging accuracy to determine as to how to protect users against GNSS insufficient for precision-approach applications. In or GBAS system failures that are rare but not so rare addition, while the GPS operational control segment that they can be neglected. Several classes of potential (OCS) does its best to maintain the performance of failures in this category exist 10-12 . Ranging source GPS, it does not have the mandate to prevent or detect failures (e.g., failures within the GPS SPS) include: failures at the levels required for civil aviation operations 2. Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (i) Excessive acceleration in GNSS ranging (RAIM) was developed to utilize satellite redundancy measurements (e.g., due to satellite clock to enhance user integrity, but for a variety of reasons, failures), it cannot be the sole means of providing integrity for (ii) GNSS navigation data failures (significantly civil aviation 3,4 . erroneous clock and/or ephemeris data), The use of differential GPS (DGPS) was originally (iii) Code-carrier divergence in GNSS satellite range developed as a means of defeating S/A and achieving measurements, metre-level accuracy 5. The Local Area Augmentation (iv) Low GNSS satellite signal power, System (LAAS) was developed from generic local- (v) Deformation of GNSS code signals 13,14 . area DGPS as a means to provide higher-accuracy differential corrections and integrity alerts via a radio The primary failure mode within the GBAS ground data link 6,7 . Early flight tests of prototype LAAS system is the failure of a single ground receiver out of systems 8 convincingly demonstrated the potential of the four receivers typically fielded at a GBAS site. this technology to replace and expand upon the Two potential atmospheric-propagation anomalies capabilities of existing ground-based aircraft exist, i.e. ionospheric and tropospheric ones. Finally, 250 INDIAN J RADIO & SPACE PHYS, AUGUST 2007 RF interference occupies a category of its own, of remaining usable throughout an operation is below because it tends to be localized in impact, but is not the continuity risk requirement for that operation 13 . part of GNSS or GBAS. Details on these protection level calculations are This paper describes the methods used by GBAS to covered in Sec.4. mitigate these potential threats and briefly discusses how future upgrades to GBAS will allow for better 3 GBAS architecture overview and required fault mitigation of worst-case ionospheric impacts on user monitors errors and thus provide higher availability. The fundamental system element for both GBAS and SBAS is the reference station, comprising one or 2 Summary of civil aviation requirements more reference receivers connected to antennas at Requirements for civil aviation operations fixed locations known (pre-surveyed) to within 1-2 supported by GBAS were derived from the cm. These reference receivers provide continuous requirements that apply to existing navigation 10,11,14 measurements for all GPS satellites in view, so that aids , such as ICAO Annex 10 for ILS. Detailed differential corrections can be formed. They typically listings of these requirements can be found have multiple receivers and antennas to provide the elsewhere 4,15 . The key parameters upon which 16 required availability and continuity and to allow requirements are placed can be defined as follows : failures of individual reference receivers which can be Accuracy: Measure of navigation output deviation detected and excluded before they corrupt the σ from truth, usually expressed as 1 or 95% differential corrections. Approved corrections and σ (approximately 2 ) error limits. error bounding sigmas (to support protection level Integrity : Ability of a system to provide timely calculations; see Sec. 4) are broadcast to users via the warnings when the system is unsafe to use for VHF data broadcast (VDB) at a 2-Hz rate 17,18 . navigation. Figure 1 shows a functional block diagram for the Integrity risk : It is the probability of an Stanford University LAAS ground facility (LGF) undetected (and potentially hazardous) navigation prototype known as the Integrity Monitor Testbed system state. (IMT). The functions shown in yellow boxes are those Continuity: Likelihood that the navigation signal- required to calculate DGPS corrections 10,19 . These in-space supports the accuracy and integrity algorithms are well understood and comprise perhaps requirements for the duration of intended operation. 10% of the IMT software. The functions shown in Continuity risk: It is the probability of a detected green boxes are groupings of integrity monitor but unscheduled navigation interruption after the algorithms that are designed to detect different failure initiation of an approach. modes as follows: Availability: Fraction of time navigation system usable (as determined by compliance with accuracy, integrity and continuity requirements) before SQM (Signal Quality Monitoring): Detects satellite signal deformation, low signal power and code-carrier approach is initiated. 14 divergence . These requirements are parametrized in such a way DQM (Data Quality Monitoring) : Detects that each aircraft is able to determine, before anomalies in satellite navigation data 20,21 (ephemeris beginning an operation, whether or not it can proceed. and clock data) . The aircraft does this by computing (i) position- MQM (Measurement Quality Monitoring): Detects domain ‘protection levels’, based on the GPS step, ramp and acceleration errors in reference satellites in view and approved by GBAS, (ii) the receiver measurements (may be due to satellite or ranging error standard deviations or ‘sigmas’ receiver faults). broadcast by GBAS and (iii) the ‘ K-value’ multipliers MRCC (Multiple Receiver Consistency Check): needed to achieve the required integrity and Computes B-values that compare measurements continuity risk probabilities based on a zero-mean across reference receivers and uses them to detect Gaussian distribution of nominal errors. For GBAS reference receiver failures. requirements, the integrity requirement dominates the σµ -monitor ( Sigma-Mean Monitor): Collects B- accuracy requirement; thus verification of integrity values over time and uses them to detect violations of also confirms accuracy. Continuity is covered by only the broadcast pseudo-range correction error sigma including the set of measurements whose probability (σpr_gnd ) and assumed mean of zero. PULLEN & ENGE: GBAS INTEGRITY MONITORING FOR CIVIL AVIATION 251 Fig. 1 — LAAS integrity monitor testbed (IMT) functional block diagram The IMT implementation of these functions is fault (H1) hypothesis. The vertical protection level elaborated elsewhere 19,22 . (VPL) for the H0 hypothesis is given in a simplified The remaining 30-40% of the code is dedicated to form 13 by Executive Monitoring (EXM), which collects the outputs from each monitor and determines which VPL H0 = KFFMD σvert,H0 …(1) measurements, if any, are flawed and must be excluded from the set used to compute the differential where σvert,H0 is derived by computing the weighted corrections sent to users. The EXM in IMT is pseudo-inverse matrix S based on the line-of-sight primarily based on Boolean logic. vectors to the satellites and the range error (after For example, monitor alerts (generated when a test corrections are applied) sigmas broadcast for each statistic exceeds its pre-set acceptability threshold) on approved satellite. A separate VPL for the H1 multiple
Recommended publications
  • (Gnss) in View of Progress Made in Gagan
    INDIA LIABILITY IN CONTEXT TO THE AIR NAVIGATION SERVICE PROVIDER + By Ranjana Kaul* The Global Navigation Satellite System1 is poised to be one of the most critical technologies in the twenty-first century. Like most other technologies, GNSS was first developed for military application, and arguably, like other dual use technologies, it is a double edged sword. The 1990 Gulf War demonstrated how GNSS can be successfully deployed as a military force multiplier. Equally civilian applications of GNSS have brought lucrative returns2 and incremental developmental benefits to countries around the world3. In specific context to @ copyright Ranjana Kaul + This paper is the expanded version of Ranjana Kaul ‟s presentation on ”INDIA: LIABILITY IN CONTEXT TO THE AIR NAVIGATION SERVICE PROVIDER‟ made at the International Conference on Contemporary Issues in Air Transport, Air Law & Regulation, New Delhi, India, 23-25 April 2008. * B.A.( Bombay University); MA; PhD. (University of Poona) LLB ( University of Delhi); LL.M (Institute of Air & Space Law, Faculty of Law, Mc Gill University, Montreal, Canada); Partner, Dua Associates, (Advocates & Solicitors) , New Delhi, India. 1 Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is the standard generic term for satellite navigation systems that provide autonomous geo-spatial positioning with global coverage. A GNSS allows small electronic receivers to determine their location (longitude, latitude, and altitude) to within a few metres using time signals transmitted along a line of sight by radio from satellites. Receivers on the ground with a fixed position can also be used to calculate the precise time as a reference for scientific experiments. As of 2007, the United States NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) is the only fully operational GNSS.
    [Show full text]
  • ABAS), Satellite-Based Augmentation System (SBAS), Or Ground-Based Augmentation System (GBAS
    Current Status and Future Navigation Requirements for Mexico City New Airport New Mexico City Airport in figures: • 120 million passengers per year; • 1.2 million tons of shipping cargo per year; • 4,430 Ha. (6 times bigger tan the current airport); • 6 runways operating simultaneously; • 1st airport outside Europe with a neutral carbon footprint; • Largest airport in Latin America; • 11.3 billion USD investment (aprox.); • Operational in 2020 (expected). “State-of-the-art navigation systems are as important –or more- than having world class civil engineering and a stunning arquitecture” Air Navigation Systems: A. In-land deployed systems - Are the most common, based on ground stations emitting radiofrequency signals received by on-board equipments to calculate flight position. B. Satellite navigation systems – First stablished by U.S. in 1959 called TRANSIT (by the time Russia developed TSIKADA); in 1967 was open to civil navigation; 1973 GPS was developed by U.S., then GLONASS, then GALILEO. C. Inertial navigation systems – Autonomous navigation systems based on inertial forces, providing constant information on the position of the flight and parameters of speed and direction (e.g. when flying above the ocean and there are no ground segments to provide support). Requirements for performance of Navigation Systems: According to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) there are four main requirements: • The accuracy means the level of concordance between the estimated position of an aircraft and its real position. • The availability is the portion of time during which the system complies with the performance requirements under certain conditions. • The integrity is the function of a system that warns the users in an opportune way when the system should not be used.
    [Show full text]
  • Dynamic Performance Evaluation of Various GNSS Receivers and Positioning Modes with Only One Flight Test
    electronics Technical Note Dynamic Performance Evaluation of Various GNSS Receivers and Positioning Modes with Only One Flight Test Cheolsoon Lim 1, Hyojung Yoon 1, Am Cho 2, Chang-Sun Yoo 2 and Byungwoon Park 1,* 1 School of Aerospace Engineering, Sejong University, 209 Neungdong-ro, Gwangjin-gu, Seoul 05006, Korea; [email protected] (C.L.); [email protected] (H.Y.) 2 Future Aircraft Research Division, Korea Aerospace Research Institute, Daejeon 34133, Korea; [email protected] (A.C.); [email protected] (C.-S.Y.) * Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +82-02-3408-4385 Received: 20 November 2019; Accepted: 7 December 2019; Published: 11 December 2019 Abstract: The performance of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receivers in dynamic modes is mostly assessed using results obtained from independent maneuvering of vehicles along similar trajectories at different times due to limitations of receivers, payload, space, and power of moving vehicles. However, such assessments do not ensure valid evaluation because the same GNSS signal environment cannot be ensured in a different test session irrespective of how accurately it mimics the original session. In this study, we propose a valid methodology that can evaluate the dynamic performance of multiple GNSS receivers in various positioning modes with only one dynamic test. We used the record-and-replay function of RACELOGIC’s LabSat3 Wideband and developed a software that can log and re-broadcast Radio Technical Commission for Maritime Services (RTCM) messages for the augmented systems. A preliminary static test and a drone test were performed to verify proper operation of the system.
    [Show full text]
  • Augmented GNSS: Fundamentals and Keys to Integrity and Continuity
    ION GNSS 2011 TUTORIAL Augmented GNSS: Fundamentals and Keys to Integrity and Continuity Sam Pullen Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics Stanford University, Stanford, CA. 94305-4035 USA Tuesday, Sept. 20, 2011 1:30 – 5:00 PM Oregon Convention Center, Portland, Oregon (last updated 9/16/11) Acknowledgements: B. Belabbas, J. Blanch, R. Braff, M. Brenner, J. Burns, B. Clark, K. Class, S. Datta-Barua, P. Enge, M. Harris, R. Kelly, R. Key, J. Lee, M. Luo, A. Mitelman, T. Murphy, Y.S. Park, B. Parkinson, B. Pervan, R.E. Phelts, J. Rife, C. Rodriguez, J. Scheitlin, C. Shively, K. Suzuki, R. Swider, F. van Graas, T. Walter, J. Warburton, G. Xie, G. Zhang, and more… ©2011 by Sam Pullen Outline • Augmented GNSS Terminology • Introduction to GNSS and GNSS Augmentation – Differential GNSS (DGNSS) • GBAS and SBAS System Architectures • Aviation Applications and Requirements • Principles of Integrity and Continuity • Specific Examples: – Nominal Error Bounding – Signal Deformation Monitoring – Ephemeris Monitoring – Ionospheric Anomaly Mitigation • Summary 20 September 2011 Augmented GNSS: Integrity and Continuity 2 Augmented GNSS Terminology • GPS: Global Positioning System • GNSS: Global Navigation Satellite Systems • DGPS: Differential GPS (or GNSS) • L(A)DGPS: Local-Area Differential GPS • WADGPS: Wide-Area Differential GPS • CDGPS: Carrier-Phase Differential GPS (usually a subset of Local-Area DGPS) • LAAS: Local Area Augmentation System (FAA) • GBAS: Ground-Based Augmentation System (international; includes LAAS) • WAAS: Wide Area Augmentation
    [Show full text]
  • Global Navigation Satellite Systems Performance Analysis And
    Global navigation satellite systems performance analysis and augmentation strategies in aviation Roberto Sabatini1*, Terry Moore2 and Subramanian Ramasamy1 1RMIT University, School of Engineering – Aerospace Engineering and Aviation Discipline, Bundoora, VIC 3083, Australia 2University of Nottingham, Nottingham Geospatial Institute, Nottingham, NG7 2TU, United Kingdom ABSTRACT In an era of significant air traffic expansion characterised by a rising congestion of the radiofrequency spectrum and a widespread introduction of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are being exposed to a variety of threats including signal interferences, adverse propagation effects and challenging platform-satellite relative dynamics. Thus, there is a need to characterize GNSS signal degradations and assess the effects of interfering sources on the performance of avionics GNSS receivers and augmentation systems used for an increasing number of mission-essential and safety-critical aviation tasks (e.g., experimental flight testing, flight inspection/certification of ground-based radio navigation aids, wide area navigation and precision approach). GNSS signal deteriorations typically occur due to antenna obscuration caused by natural and man-made obstructions present in the environment (e.g., elevated terrain and tall buildings when flying at low altitude) or by the aircraft itself during manoeuvring (e.g., aircraft wings and empennage masking the on-board GNSS antenna), ionospheric scintillation, Doppler shift, multipath, jamming and spurious satellite transmissions. Anyone of these phenomena can result in partial to total loss of tracking and possible tracking errors, depending on the severity of the effect and the receiver characteristics. After designing GNSS performance threats, the various augmentation strategies adopted in the Communication, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management and Avionics (CNS+A) context are addressed in detail.
    [Show full text]
  • GNSS Satellite-Based Augmentation Systems for Australia
    GNSS Satellite-Based Augmentation Systems for Australia Dr. Suelynn Choy School of Science, RMIT University GPO BOX 2476V, Melbourne 3001, Victoria, Australia. Tel: +61 3 9925 2650 Fax: + +61 3 9663 2517 Email: [email protected] Dr. Joost Kuckartz School of Science, RMIT University GPO BOX 2476V, Melbourne 3001, Victoria, Australia. Email: [email protected] Professor Andrew G Dempster School of Electrical Engineering & Telecommunications, The University of New South Wales (UNSW) Sydney 2052, New South Wales, Australia. Tel: +61 2 93856890 Fax: +61 2 93855519 Email: [email protected] Professor Chris Rizos School of Civil & Environmental Engineering, The University of New South Wales (UNSW) Sydney 2052, New South Wales, Australia. Tel: +61 2 93854205 Fax: +61 2 9385 6139 Email: [email protected] Matt Higgins Queensland Department of Natural Resources and Mine Brisbane 4000, Queensland, Australia. Tel: +61 7 389 63754 Email: [email protected] 1 GNSS Satellite-Based Augmentation Systems for Australia ABSTRACT This paper provides an overview of various Satellite-Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) options for augmented GNSS services in Australia, and potentially New Zealand, with the aim to tease out key similarities and differences in their augmentation capabilities. SBAS systems can technically be classified into two user categories, namely SBAS for aviation and “non-aviation” SBAS. Aviation SBAS is an International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) certified civil aviation safety critical system providing wide-area GNSS augmentation by broadcasting augmentation information using geostationary satellites. The primary aim is to improve integrity, availability and accuracy of basic GNSS signals for aircraft navigation.
    [Show full text]
  • Improvement of the Procedures for Monitoring the Positioning Service of the National Land Survey
    Improvement of the procedures for monitoring the positioning service of the National Land Survey Topi Rikkinen School of Engineering Thesis submitted for examination for the degree of Master of Science in Technology. Espoo 24.11.2017 Supervisor Prof. Martin Vermeer Advisor Lic.Sc. (Tech.) Hannu Koivula Aalto University, P.O. BOX 11000, 00076 AALTO www.aalto.fi Abstract of the master’s thesis Author Topi Rikkinen Title Improvement of the procedures for monitoring the positioning service of the National Land Survey Degree programme Master’s Programme in Geoinformatics Major Geoinformatics Code of major ENG22 Supervisor Prof. Martin Vermeer Advisor Lic.Sc. (Tech.) Hannu Koivula Date 24.11.2017 Number of pages 64+4 Language English Abstract The National Land Survey positioning service offers real-time correction data for code- and phase-based positioning. The service operates on the data of FinnRef reference stations. The data is used to model the error sources affecting GNSS observations. Based on the model, the service sends corrections to the users. The aim of this thesis is to improve the performance of the NLS positioning service by improving its real-time monitoring procedures. The whole monitoring of posi- tioning services is examined, starting from the observations of the reference stations and ending to the user positioning quality. This work defines relevant parameters that should be monitored and investigates different monitoring possibilities. From the possibilities, the ones most suited for the needs of the NLS are implemented. As a result of this work, the applied improvements to the monitoring are pre- sented: enabled internal monitoring procedures of the positioning service software (GNSMART) and the acquired software solutions for external monitoring.
    [Show full text]
  • Aviation Benefits of GNSS Augmentation
    Aviation Benefits of GNSS Augmentation Workshop on the Applications of GNSS Chisinau, Moldova 17-21 May 2010 Jeffrey Auerbach Advisor on GNSS Affairs Office of Space and Advanced Technology U.S. Department of State Overview • LAAS Capabilities and the Future • Benefits of WAAS • Global SBAS and Aviation – Where are We Headed? Moldova GNSS Workshop – 17-21 May 2010 2 U.S. GPS Augmentation Programs Designed for Aviation Moldova GNSS Workshop – 17-21 May 2010 3 Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) • Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) • Designed for aviation use Aviation Capabilities • Precision approach for ILS Category - I, II, III approaches • Multiple runway coverage at an airport • 3D RNP procedures (can be supported by multiple navigation sources) • Continuous Decent Arrivals (CDA) • Navigation for closely spaced parallel runways Moldova GNSS Workshop – 17-21 May 2010 4 LAAS Next Steps • Category-I system design approval at Memphis – Complete • Category-III ICAO technical validation by - 2010 • Category-III final investment decision by - 2012 Moldova GNSS Workshop – 17-21 May 2010 5 Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) • Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS) • Designed for aviation use, but available and used by many GPS users today • Localizer Performance Vertical (LPV)-200 approach is comparable to ILS Category I Moldova GNSS Workshop – 17-21 May 2010 6 GPS WAAS/SBAS Aviation Benefits • Increased Runway Access • More direct en route flight paths • New precision approach services • Reduced and simplified equipment on board
    [Show full text]
  • GNSS Augmentation Systems in the Maritime Sector
    GNSS augmentation systems in the maritime sector Michael Fairbanks, The General Lighthouse Authorities of the UK and Ireland Nick Ward, The General Lighthouse Authorities of the UK and Ireland William Roberts, Nottingham Scientific Limited, UK Mark Dumville, Nottingham Scientific Limited, UK Vidal Ashkenazi, Nottingham Scientific Limited, UK BIOGRAPHY GNSS for aviation, maritime and rail applications. He has over ten years experience in transport and non-transport Dr Michael Fairbanks is currently working as a applications of GNSS technology, his main interests radionavigation specialist for the General Lighthouse relating to the technical and operational challenges facing Authorities of the UK and Ireland. He has many years the different user communities in their transition to experience of radionavigation policy and planning in the satellite navigation systems. maritime and aviation sectors in Europe and internationally. He has been involved in the European Professor Vidal Ashkenazi is the Chief-Executive Officer satellite navigation program since 1995 and was of NSL. Prior to establishing NSL, Professor Ashkenazi instrumental in establishing the European Maritime founded the Institute of Engineering Surveying and Space Radionavigation Forum (EMRF). Dr Fairbanks has Geodesy at Nottingham University which grew into one Bachelor and Doctorate degrees in Physics from Oxford of the leading satellite navigation institutes in Europe. University. He is a Fellow of the Royal Institute of Professor Ashkenazi is internationally recognized as a Navigation and a Member of the Institute of Navigation. leading authority on satellite navigation. He is a Fellow of He is also a Member of the Institute of Physics and a the Royal Academy of Engineering and is a member of Chartered Physicist.
    [Show full text]
  • Global Navigation Satellite System and Augmentation
    GENERAL ARTICLE Global Navigation Satellite System and Augmentation KCTSwamy Knowing about Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is imperative for engineers, scientists as well as civilians be- cause of its wide range of applications in various fields, in- cluding personal and vehicle navigation, aviation, defense, transportation, science, security, telecommunication, and sur- vey. Global availability of signal and continuous service has made GNSS technology popular with a large number of users. This article covers various aspects of GNSS/GPS like archi- Dr. K C T Swamy is an tecture, working principle, signal structure and augmenta- Associate Professor in ECE at tion (GAGAN). The article also covers the Indian Regional G Pullaih College of Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) and its potentials. Engineering and Technology, Kurnool, Andhra Pradesh. His research interests are 1. Introduction global navigation satellite system and antennas. He has Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is a generic name been carrying out research in the area of GNSS since 2010 given to a group of several satellite constellations such as the and has published papers in Global Positioning System (GPS), GLObal NAvigation Satellite reputed journals and System (GLONASS), Galileo, and Compass. The satellite con- conference proceedings. stellations (navigation satellites) broadcast their positions and tim- ing data on radio frequencies continuously under all weather con- ditions. GNSS receiver determines its own location coordinates by capturing the radio signals transmitted by the navigation satel- lites. The first worldwide satellite navigation system – GPS – was developed by the US Department of Defense (DoD) for mil- itary purposes. Later, GPS found several applications, and today it has become an essential navigation technology.
    [Show full text]
  • Do We Need Augmentation Systems?
    Do We Need Augmentation Systems? Adam Gorski and Greg Gerten Analytical Graphics, Inc. 220 Valley Creek Blvd. Exton, PA 19341 610.981.8224 [email protected], [email protected] Biography costly augmentation systems if Global Navigation Greg Gerten is the navigation and electronic Satellite Systems (GNSS) are available, accurate, warfare (EW) point of contact for Analytical and “free.” While GNSS are making strides in even Graphics, Inc. (AGI). He received his Master’s higher accuracy, availability, and continuity— Degree in electrical engineering from the concerns still exist over assured reliability and University of Dayton, including graduate courses integrity especially, when the concepts of in GPS at the Air Force Institute of Technology. interference and urban canyons are introduced. He has more than 10 years experience in This paper will discuss the advantages of constructive mission simulation development in augmentation systems and their added benefits on the areas of communications, navigation warfare, accuracy, availability, continuity, and integrity. Dr. EW tactics, and weapon effectiveness. Gerten Brad Parkinson will be the first to give you a list of has been responsible for the design, GPS problems, but in this paper we will investigate development, and deployment of several such events as clock run off, interference, and loss of NAVWAR simulations and has been involved in service (for several reasons) and determine the using these models to support numerous trades’ quantitative benefits that several different analysis and campaign studies. augmentation systems (LORAN-C, Pseudolites, and LAAS) provide. To give each GNSS its fair shot, we Adam Gorski is the lead systems engineer for will also provide results on how the same events AGI in the United Kingdom.
    [Show full text]
  • Galileo: Commercial Hopes Unrealistic
    ARTICLE GIM INTERVIEWS OWEN M. GOODMAN, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, FUGRO N.V. Galileo: Commercial Hopes Unrealistic It is likely to be 2012 before the Galileo system itself is fully operational on a stand-alone basis, says this month’s interviewee Owen Goodman, and Galileo will never be a commercially viable service as long as GPS and Glonass are free. Given current plans, Galileo is heading inevitably towards a funding crisis. National security and defence agencies could make a substantial financial contribution, but this at the expense of Galileo’s status as a civilian system. The EU should leave the fulfilment of specialist civilian needs to commercial GNSS augmentation service providers and the makers of ‘RTK-type’ GNSS equipment, so that only the user and not the general taxpayer pays for improved performance. How did Fugro get involved in satellite positioning? In the mid-1980s a company based in Lafayette Louisiana and called John E. Chance & Associates (JECA) introduced the world’s first ‘24x7’ satellite positioning system. The system called ‘Starfix’ made use of four geostationary C- band satellites and custom-built mobile equipment to establish in real time the accurate position of vessels working in the Gulf of Mexico. In the early 1990s Fugro acquired JECA, followed by a number of other international survey/positioning companies, most by that time active in the field of Differential GPS (DGPS) positioning. By the mid-1990s Fugro had established a global DGPS service capability under the brand-name Starfix in support of its worldwide marine survey and geotechnical operations. More recently, Fugro N.V.
    [Show full text]