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Welcome to The Scottish Corridor, the fifth in our series of Pint‐Sized Campaigns for Chain This Pint‐Sized campaign focuses on the of Command. Here, again, we again look at attack by disparate bodies of veteran German the fighting around Caen after D‐Day; troops formed into improomptu kampfgrüppen specifically the crucial defence of the “Scottish against green but determined British units Corridor”, a salient into German lines whiich who had been training for nearly five years for was created by the 15th Scottish Division oon their first taste of war. It features a double the 27th of June 1944 when the Argyll & ladder, with the Germans attacking a narrow Sutherland Highlanders broke through the corridor from both the East and the West in a defences of 12 SS Hitlerjugend to seize a drive to first isolate and then destroy the bridgehead across the Odon River. British spearhead off to the South and already fighting on Hill 112. As will be seen, the key series of actions presented within, all fought on the 28th of One of the keys to making any campaign June, were critical to ensuring that the gains viable is keeping things siimple and brief. Our already made were retained and that the At the Sharp End caampaign handbook German grip on Caen was weakened. provides the key to unloccking this campaign. Using the rules in At the Sharp End you’ll be The Scottish Corridor campaign can be played able to run this campaign very easily and as a stand‐alone campaign or may be treated quickly, straight from the box. The fact that as a follow‐on from our Operation Martlet the support lists are specific to this campaign campaign which was fought on the ground also means that collecting the forces required adjacent to the area we are concerned wiith is also very achievable. here. Once you are ready to begin, the campaign With General Sir Bernard Montgomery’s plan will provide between six aand eleven games in to seize the initiative and keep the German total, by which point it will have reached a forces in Normandy wrong footed, Operatioon measurable conclusion. You’ll have a winner Epsom was the largest offensive launched and a loser, all in the type of time‐frame after D‐Day. In addition to the objective of which is ideal as a club project or for a couple seizing key ground around Caen, the offensiive of friends gaming over a month or two. was designed to tie down German armoured Perfect, we think, for a fast, fun and enjoyable forces, pinning them to the British sector and campaign experience. unable to launch a co‐ordinated counter‐ attack. The impact of this policy was never We hope you enjoy The Scottish Corridor and better illustrated than during Epsom, when that this campaign will provide you with hours three Panzer Divisions, 2 Panzer, of gaming fun whilst also providing an Leibstandarte and Das Reich, were all obliged illuminating insight into the historical battle to commit forces into action piecemeal and and the bravery of the innexperienced British straight from the march to the front. troops who stood firm against some of Germany’s most vaunted fformations. What Epsom also demonstrated, and this will also be seen herein, was how opportunity in Richard Clarke war is so often transient. A weak offensiive Lard Island, November 2015 launched at the right moment is often better than a strong attack launched after the moment of opportunity has passed. Page 2 Following the D‐Day landings and immediate which had served them well time and again in establishment of a viable lodgement oon the East where a flexible, or elastic, form of French soil by Allied forces, the speed of defence saw the front line made up of progress inland failed to meet the strongpoints which would break up any Soviet expectations of Allied planners as German offensive before a counter‐attack by resistance solidified. armoured forces would restore the front line, isolating any Russian formations which had The initial plan optimistically demanded the successfully broken through the front. This British capture of Caen on D‐Day itself, well‐established method of defence was thereby allowing the RAF to establish clearly identified by General Sir Bernard operational airfields in Normandy to provide Montgomery, the Allied commander in critical support to ground operations. Normandy and he planned accordingly. However, a well‐timed, if somewhat chaotic, German counter‐attack by 21 Panzer Divisioon Monty’s prime consideration for the British on the afternoon of June the 6th was sufficient and Canadian forces was to ensure that the to halt the hesitant advance of the British 3rd US operations to the West were allowed to Division. progress unhindered by drawing the vast bulk of the German armoured forces to the British Over the following weeks efforts were made sector of the front. This would allow the port to break through the German defensive lines of Cherbourg to be captured and a build‐up of and to break out into the good tank country troops in the Cotentin prioor to a breakout and around Caen which would allow a battle of drive toward Paris. The initial failure to manoeuvre in which the British felt theeir capture Caen was turned tto an advantage as it superiority in materiel would favour them. became increasingly cleaar that the Germans However, at almost every point the Germans viewed the city as the corner‐stone of their thwarted their advances, most famously at defences and would commit ever‐increasing Villers‐Bocage a week after D‐Day when number of troops to that sector to prevent its Michael Wittmann and Tiger tanks of Schwere fall. US General Omar Bradley was later to SS Panzer Abteilung 101 plugged the breach in write: the line in an emphatic fashion. “The containment missiion that had been As we saw in Operation Martlet, the German assigned Monty was nnot calculated to High Command was not inactive during the burnish British pride in the weeks following the invasion. Plans were accomplishment of their troops. For in the made for a major counter‐attack by Panzer minds of most people, success in battle is Group West, attacking to the West of Caen measured in the rate and length of and destroying the British and Canadian advance. They found it difficult to realize lodgement before advancing westwards to that the more successfful Monty was in roll up the US forces around Omaha beach. stirring up German resistance, the less This would have isolated the remainder of likely he was to advance. By the end of Allied forces to the Cotentin Peninsular June Rommel had concentrated seven where, without supplies, they could be panzer divisions against Monty’s British contained and, ultimately, destroyed. sector. One was all the eenemy could spare However, this plan was based on the ability of for the US front.” the Germans to mass their armoured forces for a single co‐ordinated blow, a strategy Page 3 Monty reasoned that if the British and Orne bridgehead to capture Ste‐Honorine la Canadian troops could exert pressure around Chardronette from 21 Panzer Division's Caen without respite, not only would the Kampfgruppe von Luck. With German Germans be obliged to deploy their reserves reserves now pulled to the East of Caen, he in that sector, but they would also be unable made plans to resume offensive operations to to hold back any forces with which to launch the West as rapidly as possible. the type of text‐book counter‐attack in which they specialised. Operation Epsom was Operation Epsom was devised as a plan to designed with this in mind and in the event encircle Caen, initially with attacks both West served to prove Monty correct. and East of the Orne but it was rapidly recognised that there was simply no room to BRITISH PLANS the East of the river for a major troop build‐up On the 23rd of June Montgomery attacked in that area, so the plan was revised to begin with the 51st (Highland) Division from the in the West with the possibility of further Page 4 exploitation in the East if the opportunity Epsom operational area. This was to protect presented itself. the flank of the main operation from potential armoured counter‐attacks from the high‐ Originally planned for the 22nd of the month, ground whilst also denying the enemy’s Epsom was to be undertaken by Lieutenant observers a grand‐stand view of the main General Sir Richard O’Connor’s VIII Corps attack. Code‐named Operation Martlet, this comprising the 11th Armoured Division, 15th was to be launched on the 25th of June, just 24 Scottish Infantry Division and the 43rd Wessex hours before Epsom was to be launched. Division. Armoured support was provided by st th the 31 Independent Tank Brigade and the 4 GERMAN DEFENCES Armoured Brigade, all in all a sizeable and On the German side, as already intimated, the well‐balanced force of 23 infantry Battalions, situation was becoming desperate. From the 10 battalion‐sized tank units, two dedicated Orne river as far West as Fontenay le Pesnel Reconnaissance Regiments and, most the main unit assigned to hold the front was importantly, impressive concentrations of 12 SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend. Formed in artillery. Accompanying this force was a full 1943 from youths volunteering from the Hitler complement of support units in the form of Youth movement, it had benefitted from a anti‐tank and anti‐aircraft units, Engineer and core of experienced leaders being provided the likes. In itself, the ability of the British at chiefly from 1 SS Leibstandarte Division and a Epsom (and the Allies in Normandy generally) training regime which focussed on realistic to commit whole Corps to a co‐ordinated combat training rather than drill and spit and attack stands in stark contrast to the Germans polish.

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