Welcome to The Scottish Corridor, the fifth in our series of Pint‐Sized Campaigns for Chain This Pint‐Sized campaign focuses on the of Command. Here, again, we again look at attack by disparate bodies of veteran German the fighting around Caen after D‐Day; troops formed into improomptu kampfgrüppen specifically the crucial defence of the “Scottish against green but determined British units Corridor”, a salient into German lines whiich who had been training for nearly five years for was created by the 15th Scottish Division oon their first taste of war. It features a double the 27th of June 1944 when the Argyll & ladder, with the Germans attacking a narrow Sutherland Highlanders broke through the corridor from both the East and the West in a defences of 12 SS Hitlerjugend to seize a drive to first isolate and then destroy the bridgehead across the Odon River. British spearhead off to the South and already fighting on Hill 112. As will be seen, the key series of actions presented within, all fought on the 28th of One of the keys to making any campaign June, were critical to ensuring that the gains viable is keeping things siimple and brief. Our already made were retained and that the At the Sharp End caampaign handbook German grip on Caen was weakened. provides the key to unloccking this campaign. Using the rules in At the Sharp End you’ll be The Scottish Corridor campaign can be played able to run this campaign very easily and as a stand‐alone campaign or may be treated quickly, straight from the box. The fact that as a follow‐on from our Operation Martlet the support lists are specific to this campaign campaign which was fought on the ground also means that collecting the forces required adjacent to the area we are concerned wiith is also very achievable. here. Once you are ready to begin, the campaign With General Sir Bernard Montgomery’s plan will provide between six aand eleven games in to seize the initiative and keep the German total, by which point it will have reached a forces in Normandy wrong footed, Operatioon measurable conclusion. You’ll have a winner Epsom was the largest offensive launched and a loser, all in the type of time‐frame after D‐Day. In addition to the objective of which is ideal as a club project or for a couple seizing key ground around Caen, the offensiive of friends gaming over a month or two. was designed to tie down German armoured Perfect, we think, for a fast, fun and enjoyable forces, pinning them to the British sector and campaign experience. unable to launch a co‐ordinated counter‐ attack. The impact of this policy was never We hope you enjoy The Scottish Corridor and better illustrated than during Epsom, when that this campaign will provide you with hours three Panzer Divisions, 2 Panzer, of gaming fun whilst also providing an Leibstandarte and Das Reich, were all obliged illuminating insight into the historical battle to commit forces into action piecemeal and and the bravery of the innexperienced British straight from the march to the front. troops who stood firm against some of Germany’s most vaunted fformations. What Epsom also demonstrated, and this will also be seen herein, was how opportunity in Richard Clarke war is so often transient. A weak offensiive Lard Island, November 2015 launched at the right moment is often better than a strong attack launched after the moment of opportunity has passed.

Page 2 Following the D‐Day landings and immediate which had served them well time and again in establishment of a viable lodgement oon the East where a flexible, or elastic, form of French soil by Allied forces, the speed of defence saw the front line made up of progress inland failed to meet the strongpoints which would break up any Soviet expectations of Allied planners as German offensive before a counter‐attack by resistance solidified. armoured forces would restore the front line, isolating any Russian formations which had The initial plan optimistically demanded the successfully broken through the front. This British capture of Caen on D‐Day itself, well‐established method of defence was thereby allowing the RAF to establish clearly identified by General Sir Bernard operational airfields in Normandy to provide Montgomery, the Allied commander in critical support to ground operations. Normandy and he planned accordingly. However, a well‐timed, if somewhat chaotic, German counter‐attack by 21 Panzer Divisioon Monty’s prime consideration for the British on the afternoon of June the 6th was sufficient and Canadian forces was to ensure that the to halt the hesitant advance of the British 3rd US operations to the West were allowed to Division. progress unhindered by drawing the vast bulk of the German armoured forces to the British Over the following weeks efforts were made sector of the front. This would allow the port to break through the German defensive lines of Cherbourg to be captured and a build‐up of and to break out into the good tank country troops in the Cotentin prioor to a breakout and around Caen which would allow a battle of drive toward Paris. The initial failure to manoeuvre in which the British felt theeir capture Caen was turned tto an advantage as it superiority in materiel would favour them. became increasingly cleaar that the Germans However, at almost every point the Germans viewed the city as the corner‐stone of their thwarted their advances, most famously at defences and would commit ever‐increasing Villers‐Bocage a week after D‐Day when number of troops to that sector to prevent its Michael Wittmann and Tiger tanks of Schwere fall. US General Omar Bradley was later to SS Panzer Abteilung 101 plugged the breach in write: the line in an emphatic fashion. “The containment missiion that had been As we saw in Operation Martlet, the German assigned Monty was nnot calculated to High Command was not inactive during the burnish British pride in the weeks following the invasion. Plans were accomplishment of their troops. For in the made for a major counter‐attack by Panzer minds of most people, success in battle is Group West, attacking to the West of Caen measured in the rate and length of and destroying the British and Canadian advance. They found it difficult to realize lodgement before advancing westwards to that the more successfful Monty was in roll up the US forces around Omaha beach. stirring up German resistance, the less This would have isolated the remainder of likely he was to advance. By the end of Allied forces to the Cotentin Peninsular June Rommel had concentrated seven where, without supplies, they could be panzer divisions against Monty’s British contained and, ultimately, destroyed. sector. One was all the eenemy could spare However, this plan was based on the ability of for the US front.” the Germans to mass their armoured forces for a single co‐ordinated blow, a strategy

Page 3 Monty reasoned that if the British and Orne bridgehead to capture Ste‐Honorine la Canadian troops could exert pressure around Chardronette from 21 Panzer Division's Caen without respite, not only would the Kampfgruppe von Luck. With German Germans be obliged to deploy their reserves reserves now pulled to the East of Caen, he in that sector, but they would also be unable made plans to resume offensive operations to to hold back any forces with which to launch the West as rapidly as possible. the type of text‐book counter‐attack in which they specialised. Operation Epsom was Operation Epsom was devised as a plan to designed with this in mind and in the event encircle Caen, initially with attacks both West served to prove Monty correct. and East of the Orne but it was rapidly recognised that there was simply no room to BRITISH PLANS the East of the river for a major troop build‐up On the 23rd of June Montgomery attacked in that area, so the plan was revised to begin with the 51st (Highland) Division from the in the West with the possibility of further

Page 4 exploitation in the East if the opportunity Epsom operational area. This was to protect presented itself. the flank of the main operation from potential armoured counter‐attacks from the high‐ Originally planned for the 22nd of the month, ground whilst also denying the enemy’s Epsom was to be undertaken by Lieutenant observers a grand‐stand view of the main General Sir Richard O’Connor’s VIII Corps attack. Code‐named Operation Martlet, this comprising the 11th Armoured Division, 15th was to be launched on the 25th of June, just 24 Scottish Infantry Division and the 43rd Wessex hours before Epsom was to be launched. Division. Armoured support was provided by st th the 31 Independent Tank Brigade and the 4 GERMAN DEFENCES Armoured Brigade, all in all a sizeable and On the German side, as already intimated, the well‐balanced force of 23 infantry Battalions, situation was becoming desperate. From the 10 battalion‐sized tank units, two dedicated Orne river as far West as Fontenay le Pesnel Reconnaissance Regiments and, most the main unit assigned to hold the front was importantly, impressive concentrations of 12 SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend. Formed in artillery. Accompanying this force was a full 1943 from youths volunteering from the Hitler complement of support units in the form of Youth movement, it had benefitted from a anti‐tank and anti‐aircraft units, Engineer and core of experienced leaders being provided the likes. In itself, the ability of the British at chiefly from 1 SS Leibstandarte Division and a Epsom (and the Allies in Normandy generally) training regime which focussed on realistic to commit whole Corps to a co‐ordinated combat training rather than drill and spit and attack stands in stark contrast to the Germans polish. This was fortunate as the Division was who were obliged to throw whatever they committed to the front as part of the first had into the line piecemeal as it arrived in the wave of German units close enough to make area of operations. an early intervention after D‐Day; first going into action on the 7th of June. Since that time Operation Epsom comprised of four main it had fought without respite or phases: Gout, Hangover, Impetigio and reinforcements gaining an immediate Goitre. In Phase One, the 44th and 46th reputation for bravery and stubbornness in Brigades were to attach with two squadrons defence as well as a less fortunate notoriety of Churchill tanks from 9 Royal Tank Regiment for the summary execution of some Canadian and 7 RTR respectively. With the initial prisoners. German defences overcome, 11th Armoured Division would release its reconnaissance With a two battalion Panzer Regiment, the troops who would head for the Tourmauville Division fielded predominantly a mix of Mark bridge whilst the 227th Highland Brigade V Panther tanks in the 1st battalion and Mark would advance with two battalions, again IV tanks in the 2nd battalion. Despite being supported by one Squadron of Churchills constantly in combat since just after the each, to occupy the Odon crossings. Phase invasion, these Panzer battalions were still Three would see the 29th Armoured Brigade remarkably well equipped, with 58 Panzer IVs cross Hill 112 before a general advance to the and 44 Panzer V Panthers in service two days Orne would take place in Phase four. before the launch of Epsom. Of the fifty‐five Following that there were options to exploit tanks lost up to that point, around half of further to the South, from the Orne them were under repair, a remarkable bridgehead and in the area of Carpiquet. statistic which is indicative of the fact that the Germans had generally been able to hold their Preceding Operation Epsom, the 49th Infantry ground and, as a result, salvage most of their Division were to launch an attach to capture damaged tanks. Fontenay‐le‐Pesnel prior to pushing on southwards to take the village of Rauray and In support, the 12 SS Division had two the high ground to the immediate West of the battalions of Field Artillery with one of self‐

Page 5 propelled battalion of two Wespe and one infantrymen rather than fulfilling their Hummel batteries. Additionally the usual intended duties. complement of support battalions, Aufklärung, Pioneer, Pak anti‐tank, On the 26th of June, 12 SS Hitlerjugend was Jägdpanzer and Nebelwerfer rocket launchers covering a twelve mile frontage with limited were also present and largely intact. Where numbers. The 25th SS Panzergrenadier the cost of nearly three weeks of constant Regiment was deployed to the North and contact with the enemy had been high was in North West of Caen from Epron to the infantry arm of the Division. Franqueville. At Franqueville 26 SS Panzergrenadier Regiment took over the The two Panzergrenadier Regiments, the 25th front, covering over seven miles with its three and 26th, were, in theory, both three depleted battalions; three to four times the battalions in size. However, the Division’s frontage which German doctrine newly appointed commander, Kurt ‘Panzer’ recommended for a Regiment's defensive Meyer, stated that by the time of Epsom the frontage, a Regimentabschnitt of just two to Panzergrenadier battalions had, "on average, three kilometres. a strength of two companies" and that "Most of the company commanders and platoon OPERATION EPSOM leaders had already been killed in action or Operation Martlet was launched on the 25th were wounded". Indeed, losses in manpower of June with immediate mixed results. The meant that the front could no longer be held troops advancing to the West of Fontenay in depth and that support units, such as pushed out elements of Panzer Lehr Division Pioneers and reconnaissance companies, who were holding that sector and were able were now fighting in the front line as to follow up initial success with further advances to the South. In Fontenay itself,

Page 6 well placed German tanks had been dug in to the German recovered and stuck stoically to provide fire support for the Panzer Grenadiers their positions. In St Mauvieu it took most of and the early morning mist also hampered the the day to secure the positions, with the British advance significantly, whole attackers having to see offff a counter‐attack by Companies becoming disorientated and failing elements of 21 Panzer and 12 SS from the to move onto their objectives. It was only direction of Marcelet during the afternoon. with the greatest of effort that the majority of the town was in British hands by the end of In Cheux the defenders were assisted by the day, the attackers having been obliged to supporting armour on the Rauray spur which fight off German armoured counter‐attacks to had originally been attacking the 49th Division secure the limited advances they had made. but was now pulled intto this new battle. German artillery fire, combined with well‐ However, whilst 12 SS had stood firm, Panzer placed minefields, obliged the British armour Lehr had withdrawn to create a three mile gap to move up through Cheux itself, jamming the in the line, a gap through which the German roads in which British infantry were still command were concerned would be fighting to oust the German defenders. exploited by Allied armoured forces. A major Indeed these traffic jams were to hamper armoured counter‐attack was planned for the forward movement by the troops who were morning of the 26th with the bulk of 12 SS ready to launch the seecond phase of the Panzer Regiment was scheduled to take paart. operation. As it was, the high ground around Rauray was firmly in German hands as Epsom began.

At 0720 on the 26th of June British artillery began hammering the German front lines wiith a ferocity which the Germans would never get used to. This was of a level the veterans of Leibstandarte’s campaigns in the East had never exxperienced and which the grenadiers in their ddefences simply had to endure as best they could.

At 0730 the infantry of the 15th Scottish Division supported by 7 and 9 RTR rolled THE SECOND PHASE th forward with the support of 79 Armoured With the capture of the villages forming the Division’s “funnies”. On the left the two lead German main line of resistance, the might of th th battalion of the 44 Brigade, the 6 Royal 11th Armoured Division was to be unleashed. th Scottish Fusiliers and the 8 Royal Scots, were The 2nd Northamptonshire Yeomanry, the to take St Mauvieu and the hamlet of la Gaule Division’s Cromwell equipped reconnaissance nd respectively. To their right, the 2 Glasgow unit, was to make a rapid advance southwards th th Highlanders and 9 Cameronians of 46 to seize the bridges across the Odon at Gavrus Brigade attacked Cheux and Haut du Bosq. and Tourmauville. The 227th Highland Brigade was tasked with pushing on to capture the Divisional commander Kurt Meyer wrote a Villers‐Bocage to Caen road. The 10th graphic and highly dramatic account of the Highland Light Infantryy, supported by C action on that morning. In some areas the Squadron of 7RTR, were to capture Grainville‐ defenders were so thoroughly shocked by the sur‐Odon while the 2nd Gordon Highlanders British bombardment that the attacking and C Squadron 9RTR weere to seize Tourville‐ battalions were able to move up to theeir sur‐Odon before the 2nd Argyll & Sutherland objectives with little problem. Clearing out Highlanders advanced too relieve the armour the defenders was to prove more difficult as and secure the bridges. Following on would

Page 7 be the 23rd Hussars, the 2nd Fife & Forfar Yeomanry with 3RTR as a reserve. As the 7th Seaforth Highlanders, the reserve battalion of the 46th Brigade, moved forward It was an optimistic plan and one which to attack onto Ring Contour 100 to the South depended on speed combined with the rapid East of Cheux, they hit German resistance. clearance of the German held front‐line After suffering significant casualties they villages and the British ownership of the withdrew to the reverse slope. Rauray Spur. Neither of the latter had been achieved and as a consequence the delays in The Northamptonshire Yeomanry had no unleashing the armour gave the Germans better luck when its advance was halted by time to react. well‐placed Panzers. A pattern was emerging and at all points the British planned advance Around Rauray, 12SS Panzer Regiment was was blocked. Like the Seaforths, the HLI and able to move the Panzer IVs of its 2nd battalion the Gordons failed to make headway. By the to block the southern exits from Cheux. In end of the day it was looking as though the Grainville and Colleville, one Company of Germans had nipped Epsom in the bud, Schwere SS Panzer Abteilung 101 moved to although news of the fall of the Rauray spur to support the 12 SS Aufklärungs‐abteilung who the 49th Division provided a significant relief were providing a screen there with the as it obliged the withdrawal of some panzer support of a battery of 88mm Flak guns. Thus elements from that flank. strengthened, the Germans prepared to meet the next phase of the attack.

Page 8 As night fell, the Germans began to rearrange elements of 2 Panzer had reached Normandy their defences. The headquarters of 12 SS but these were now to be thrown into action Panzer Regiment was moved to Grainville. in an attempt to stem the British tide as were The remnants of the German defenders in the lead elements from 2 SS Panzer Division, Das frontline villages withdrew under cover of Reich which was just completing its long and darkness and heavy rain to form what Hubert infamous march from the South of France. Meyer, the Divisional Chief of Staff, described as a “chain of dispersed strongpoints without DAY TWO any depth”. Allowing for losses that day, the Dawn on the 27th of June saw the 10th Division reported its armoured strength to be Highland Light Infantry attempt to advance thirty Panzer IV and 17 Panthers. 12 SS towards Grainville but again their advance Pioneer‐abteilung was, to all intents and was blocked by four Panzer IVs from 8 purposes, destroyed and 26 Panzer Grenadier Kompanie now supported by disparate groups Regiment was so dispersed as to make an of Pioneers and Grenadiers from II/26 assessment of its strength impossible. Panzergrenadier Regiment. Fighting was intense and no headway was made, but this At this point Feldmarschall Rommel approved action did have the critical effect of pinning the use of II SS Panzer Korps in a counter‐ German forces to this sector. While this attack from the West and 1 SS Leibstandarte attack was underway the 2nd Argyll & Division from the East. This is a classic Sutherland Highlanders advanced from the example of the problems faced by the direction of Cheux across the saddle to the Germans; the principle units, 9 SS West of Ring Contour 100 and, supported by Hohenstaufen and 10 SS Frundsberg, were still the 23rd Hussars, to attack into Colleville. en route to the area and none would be able Here 12 SS Aufklarungs‐abteilung resisted to make any contribution for at least 48 with the 88mm guns of the Flak battery, but a hours. The Leibstandarte would have just two two hour fight saw the village fall and 15/25 battalions in the area to the South West of SS Panzer Grenadiers withdraw eastwards. Caen by the 28th, 36 hours away, the rest of the Division would take the best part of a Meanwhile, further North in Haut du Bosq, week to assemble and be ready for action. the 5th Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry had Rather than massing their fresh forces for a moved up to relieve the Cameronians. As co‐ordinated counter‐attack, they were used they arrived to conduct the relief it was clear to deal with immediate tactical demands. that the southern parts of the village, This was highlighted by Kurt Meyer who later occupied overnight by the HLI, had been wrote: infiltrated by small parties of Germans who needed clearing out. This operation came to “As so often in the past, command and an abrupt end with the arrival of six Panthers control was being exercised from a tactical which drove into the heart of the Cornwalls’ perspective and not strategic position. These were the vanguard of 2 considerations. Important decisions were Panzer Division which was being thrown into not made. Mobile defence had been action. Remarkably they attacked without abandoned. We had no other choice than infantry support and the DCLI despatched the to sell our lives as dearly as possible” bulk of them with PIATs among the orchards.

For now the Hitlerjugend would have to hold This action was a significant boost for British the line with whatever assistance they could morale, but it did raise concerns about a get from 21 Panzer Division and 2 Panzer counter‐attack in that sector and troops were Division, the latter a formation which had diverted to reinforce the flanks of the corridor spent its time since the invasion on the in that area. Somme awaiting the expected second landing around Calais which never came. Only a few

Page 9 At 1000 the 7th Seaforths crossed Ring testify. Nevertheless, as night fell, the 159th Contour 100, this time without any resistance. Infantry Brigade, the infantry element of 11th They moved to the right to relieve the 2nd Armoured Division, were able to move to Gordons which, in turn, allowed the latter to Tourmauville, ready to support an attack by move into Colleville with 29 Armoured the Division towards Hill 112 when Phase Brigade following into the gap created by the Three of Epsom was launched on the Argylls. following morning.

On the German side the possibility of a British For the Germans nightfall brought some sense breakthrough was becoming clear and in the of relief. With advanced elements of the early afternoon 8 Kompanie, 12 SS Panzer Leibstandarte and Das Reich arriving on the which had been blocking the advance of the next morning, they were able to withdraw HLI all morning withdrew Southwards as it much of Hitlerjugend from the front line and, was outflanked both in the area of Colleville withdrawing them South of the Odon, re‐ and with the 49th Division pushing South from organise them to form a Security Line, Rauray. This allowed a fresh advance by the Sicherheitslinie, running from Esquay to Hill Fife & Forfar Yeomanry towards Grainville, 112 and northwards to Fontaine‐Etoupefour. but the German line was shored up here by Some elements of the Division still in contact Tigers from Schwere SS Panzer Abteilung 101 with the British, such as the remnants of 26 and the rag‐tag collection of German units Panzer Grenadier Regiment, now formed as here again repulsed the attack. However, this Kampfgrüppe Olboeter, and 7 Kompanie 12 SS action once again stopped the Germans from Panzer Regiment remained in place; the re‐deploying their forces and the Argylls were former blocking further southwards able to continue their advance against limited movement by 49 Division, the latter blocking opposition. any westward expansion of the breach from Grainville. By 1500 the Argylls had taken the twin villages of Tourville and Mondrainville. At 1700 they One company of tanks was released from 21 captured the Tourmauville bridge over the Panzer Division to stop any push eastward Odon intact, immediately forming a defensive from the corridor and to hold the line while perimeter with their anti‐tank guns. Half an Kampfgrüppe Frey of the Leibstandarte hour later the 23rd Hussar Battlegroup, one moved into position around Verson. tank squadron with 8 Rifle Brigade in M5 halftracks, followed up; the dismounted DAY THREE Motor Infantry clearing the route of any The events of the 28th of June are too broad to remnants of resistance. By 1930 three tank be covered in full detail here. Suffice to say squadrons were across the Odon. that 11th Armoured Division began the day with an attack across Hill 112 as planned for On Day One, Cheux had proved to be a the third phase of Epsom. Fighting was to bottleneck, with isolated German infantry rage here through the day with the tanks of putting up resistance until dark. The failure to 29th Armoured Brigade and 159th Infantry eject them had meant that British Engineers Brigade locked in battle for possession of the had been unable to clear the minefields high ground. around the village and now traffic jammed the single clear route southwards. What was While events were unfolding on Hill 112, more, whilst German armour was not keen to Standartenführer Kurt Meyer was attempting advance against Mondrainville and Tourville, to organise an immediate counter‐attack lacking the infantry support to operate in against what the British were now calling the close country; they were able to snipe down “Scottish Corridor”. Meyer recognised that at the straight road with some effect, as this moment the corridor was limited in width numerous burning British tanks served to and held by troops who had been fighting for

Page 10 two days. A major counter‐attack was already Unfortunately getting the plan to become a being planned for the following day, but reality was problematic. Kampfgrüppe Meyer recognised that any delay would allow Weidinger had, in theory, two infantry the British to move fresh troops forward to battalions, one each from 4 SS strengthen their defences, at which point it Panzergrenadier Regiment Der Führer and one was unlikely that even the strongest force from 3 SS Panzergrenadier Regiment would be unable to make headway. For Deutschland one tank battalion from Das Meyer, the 28th was the critical moment, even Reich as well as accompanying Pioneers from though he lacked the forces he would 2 SS Das Reich. This was to be accompanied normally desire to undertake the task. by a number of Panthers from I Kompanie, 3rd Panzer Regiment. Certainly none of Das Meyer planned to use lead element of Reich’s tanks were available on the 28th of Kampfgrüppe Weidinger to attack from June, Weidinger was later to confirm that to Noyers in the West up the Villers‐Bocage to Hubert Meyer, so he was obliged to attack Caen road whilst Kampfgrüppe Frey attacked with the 1st battalion of Der Führer supported from Verson in the East. The objective was to only by Pioneers, some reconnaissance cut off 11th Armoured Division by securing the elements and a small number of Panthers railway line which ran to the North of Mouen from 2 Panzer Division. Their objective was and Colleville. This line, with a succession of Mondrainville and the railway crossing at cuttings and low embankments formed a Colleville. natural anti‐tank obstacle, with a limited number of crossing points which the British To the East Obersturmbannführer Albert Frey, had to use to cross it. If this could be secured, commander of the 1st SS Panzergrenadier it would provide a strong bulwark against Regiment Leibstandarte was not at all happy further attacks and allow time for 11th about being attached to 12 SS and, in Armoured Division to be defeated in detail; particular, with Meyer’s plan. He protested isolated and without supply, as it would be. It vociferously that only two battalions of his was an audacious plan. Regiment were available and that none of the Division’s artillery was present to support the

Page 11 attack. Indeed the armoured support he was village, halting the German attacks in the allocated was a mix of one short Company of orchards to the West of Mouen. Panzer IVs from 21 Panzer Division and a few th (literally two or three) Tigers from Schwere SS On the morning of the 28 Kampfgrüppe Panzer Abteilung 101. Meyer over‐ruled him Weidinger was delayed in launching its attack rd and stressed that Hitlerjugend would provide as a battalion of 3 SS Panzergrenadier artillery support. The attack began at 0600, Regiment Deutschland was diverted to the its objective Tourville and the railway crossing North to attack into Bretteville where at Mouen. Kampfgrüppe Olboeter was under severe th pressure from the 49 Division still pushing th Unsurprisingly, no artillery support was down from Rauray. With this delay, the 9 forthcoming for Kampfgrüppe Frey. On the Cameronians were able to capture Grainville left, II/1 Leibstandarte advanced along the before midday after a frontal attack with main road whilst on the right I/1 artillery support. The battalion was in the Leibstandarte advanced along a track skirting process of securing the village when elements st th the southern edge of the railway line to clear of the 1 battalion of 4 SS Panzergrenadier out Mouen. Regiment Der Führer attacked with Panthers nd from the 2 Panzer Division. This was part of By sheer accident, one Company of the 3rd Weidinger’s main thrust against both Monmouths, part of 159th Brigade, had Grainville and up the main Villers‐Bocage to become disorientated as it advanced Caen road. The Cameronians’ history records southwards in the dark night of the 27th of that “several hours of confused street fighting June. Upon arriving in an unidentified village, followed” as Churchills and Panther clashed at the Company commander decided to rest his short range. However, but the village was men in the deserted buildings and continue held and by late in the afternoon the his march South in the morning. This accident Cameronians were pushing their outposts placed C Company, 3rd Monmouths, directly in westwards. the path of the 1st battalion of the th Leibstandarte. Fighting began almost Meanwhile, to the South, the 7 Seaforth immediately and the tanks of the 4th Highlanders had spent the morning moving up Kompanie of 22 Panzer Regiment went into to their new positions in the hamlet of Le th action to support the attack. Valtru where they, in concert with the 9 Cameronians, were to guard the western flank Outnumbered, the Monmouths nevertheless of the corridor. This move would also secure put up a fight. It was only in the afternoon North‐South road communications with the that Mouen was fully secured by the Argylls in Gavrus on the southern bank of the Leibstandarte but the key rail crossing there Odon. Before they could reach Le Valtru, they was now cut. To the West Colleville was still too were hit by the same attack as the in British hands and thus far there was no sign Cameronians. Fortunately their commanding of Weidinger’s force capturing it. As a result officer, Lieutenant Colonel Grant, had insisted Frey’s men pushed on to this next objective. on the battalion advancing in battle formation with armoured support provided by A It is clear that the British command was Squadron 9 RTR and the two forces met as focussed on events around Hill 112 and the they advanced. action in Mouen had passed them by. As such the reports from the Glasgow Highlanders Unfortunately for the Seaforths, the 9 RTR that Colleville was under attack came as a liaison officer’s radio was faulty and the co‐ nasty shock. Fortunately a number of troops ordination between the two units was poor, of Churchill tanks, passing through en‐route to friendly fire from the tanks causing some the action to the South, were dragged into the casualties. Nevertheless the Seaforths were fight and the Highlanders clung on to the able to advance onto their objective after an initial armoured battle. However, elements of

Page 12 Der Führer managed to by‐pass the cross‐raids patch up their lines wherever a breach was and penetrated through towards made. Mondrainville. This was to be the high‐water mark of the German advance, with lead Operation Epsom continued for several more elements of Frey and Weidinger’s forces just days but the result wwas, effectively, a 600 yards apart. British artillery and elements stalemate. Hill 112 was reinforced to such a of the Glasgow Highlanders stopped the degree that the British did not capture it until advance and Weidinger’s men withdrew. the 4th of August. Yet despite failing to achieve the territorial gaains hoped for, the Finally recognising the threat still posed by impact on the Germans was clear to see. Four Kampfgrüppe Frey, the British committed the days after Epsom Operation Windsor was 10th Highland Light Infantry to attack from launched around Carpiquet. Four days later North of the railway line into Mouen. Two Operation Charnwood, followed two days companies attacked with a squadron of tanks later by Operation Jupiter. The measure of in support but were halted by combined the success of this strategy of continuous machine gun and tank fire from Frey’s men. attacks without respite should not be viewed Unsuccessful as this attack was, the actioon in miles of advance, but by the final saw German tank numbers depleted further destruction of German fforces in the Falaise and put an end to the German attack. The Pocket and the fall of Paris in August, just corridor was still open and further British eleven weeks after D‐Day.. troops were committed to its defennce overnight.

As it was a larger German counter attack was launched on the next day, with 9 SS Hohenstaufen and 10 SS Frundsberg again being thrown into combat before they could assemble for a co‐ordinated attack. However, the moment of opportunity had passed and this attack was defeated with almost no territorial gains.

Was Kurt Meyer correct to hurl these disparate elements into battle when he did? Clearly Frey believed that to commit his force to battle before his division had assembled and was ready act in a coherent manner was unwise. Certainly there are significant questions to be asked about what would haave happened if C Company of the Monmouths had not been present in Mouen, or if Weidinger had attacked earlier and the Camerons had been unable to take Grainville. However, the truth was that ultimately Meyer had little choice. To delay would have seen the British reinforce the corridor in strength and allow the 11 Armoured Division to attack Hill 112 without harassment. Thanks to Montgomery’s policy of exerting constant pressure on the Germans they simply had to

Page 13 Operation Epsom presents us with several support choices. What is more, the two‐ campaign options, the attack by the Argylls pronged attack makes thhe campaign ladder down through to the Odon, taking on 12 SS rather different to any we have seen recce troops has great appeal. However, the previously. German counter‐attack on the 28th offers a really interesting option as its failure was to The following campaign has been designed to ensure that the lodgement achieved by the run with At the Sharp End, the campaign 15th Scottish Division was secured and a toe supplement for Chain of Command. As such, hold established across the Odon. Had the not all of the campaign rules are duplicated counter‐attack succeeeded, what would haave here. Rather all of the rules from At the happened next is anyone’s guess, but it would Shharp End are applied unlless otherwise stated certainly have changed the way we view here. Epsom. Consequently, it is this series of actions which we focus on here. The Scottish Corridor is a Full Map Campaign. Below is the master campaign map, taken The foremost Allied players are the 15th from a 1944 1:25,000 General Staff map, Scottish Division with the German forces showing the six potentiall battlefields for this being two disparate kampfgrüppe made up of campaign. We have used this period map, men from many different units of the Heer along with aerial reconnaaissance photographs and the Waffen SS. The ad hoc nature of taken in June of 1944 too construct all of the these formations makes for some interesting tabletop maps which will follow. We have

Page 14 also consulted modern 1:25,000 maps to If playing The Scottish Corridor as a ensure that the survey data used is correct. continuation of the Operation Martlet Campaign, Kampfgrüppe Weidinger will have As can be seen, the campaign takes place two platoons if the British win thata across a stretch of French countryside around campaign. If the Germans win a narrow five kilometres, three miles, wide. From the victory then they will have three platoons but East, Kampfgrüppe Frey are attacking; from with one (of the German player’s choice) the West Kampfgrüppe Weidinger. For the being withdrawn after two games. If the Germans, the objective is simply to link the Germans win a major victory or more, then two forces. This may happen when all six Weidinger will have three platoons for the tables have been secured. Unusually, as the whole campaign as the British 49th Division Germans are attacking from two directions, have been well and truly stopped and that how this is achieved will depend on where the flank is secure. Germans have success. It could be that Kampfgrüppe Frey capture four table whilst The British will get a fresh platoon for each Kampfgrüppe Weidinger only capture two. All game they fight. They will not track casualties that is important is that the two German or consider reinforcements or replacements; attacks hold all six tables. The British player however, they will track the C.O. and the must hold his ground and stop the Germans men’s opinion through the whole campaign as achieving their objective in order to keep 11th though they are one unit. Armoured Division to the South in supply.

THE CAMPAIGN LADDER The master map shows the six “rungs” of the campaign. What is unusual is that the INITIATIVE Germans begin the game at both ends of the The campaign will begin with the German ladder. The campaign rungs are as follows: player holding the initiative and attacking in Scenario 6, Probe at Bas de Mouen. After Rung Name Scenario that, who holds the initiative at the beginning 6 Probe at Bas de Mouen 2 of each campaign turn will normally depend 5 Attack into Mouen 3 on the result of the previous game. 4 Capturing Colleville 6 3 The Outskirts of Colleville 3 When the Germans win a game and, as a 2 Exploiting the Gap 4 consequence, hold the initiative, the next 1 An Encounter at Le Valtru 1 game played must be at the other end of the ladder. So, if the Germans win Scenario 6, the

next game to be played is at the opposite end

of the ladder, Scenario 1. If they win this in SETTING UP THE CAMPAIGN turn, the next game will be Scenario 5, Attack The Scottish Corridor sees numerous units into Mouen. This continues for as long as involved. Both Kampfgrüppe Weidinger and both Kampfgrüppe are still attacking. Kampfgrüppe Frey have two platoons which they may commit to the action as they desire. If either Kampfgrüppe declares that it is no At the start of each game the German player longer advancing but is attempting to secure decides which platoon he is using for that its gains (see below), then the campaign game. Casualties are tracked as normal as are continues with the British player holding the men returning to the unit after being initiative in any campaign turn when the wounded. However, neither force has any inactive Kampfgrüppe would have been additional replacements or reinforcements. attacking, irrespective of who wins the game. Once a Kampfgrüppe makes such a declaration it cannot resume the offensive

Page 15 and attack in any subsequent Campaign Turn. seize the initiative for that turn and launch an It may, however, be attacked by the British attack against the most advanced position of who can attempt to regain lost ground. either German Kampfgrüppe with the Highland Light Infantry. If the British hold the initiative, they may elect to attack at either Kampfgrüppe. Any British This attack will be undertaken by a fresh attack will fight the scenario as an Attack & platoon with twenty points of support and an Defend scenario, using the Patrol Phase set up automatic preliminary bombardment at no from Scenario Three in the main rules. cost. The German player may select 12 points Support available is always as indicated in the of support. The scenario will be treated as campaign scenario. Scenario Three, Attack & Defend, irrespective of what table it is fought on.

CONSOLIDATION & STRENGTHENING DEFENCES At any point in the campaign either German THE ARMY LISTS & BRIEFINGS Kampfgrüppe may declare that it is halting its The following lists are used for the Germans advance and trying to secure the gains it has and British forces in this campaign. They are made. In this case they may strengthen the based on standard organisational structures defences on their foremost table with one for the period, but allow for losses suffered to additional minefield, entrenchment or barbed date, localised reinforcements allocated and wire in each turn which it defends that table. with support options specific to this campaign This occurs whether they are attacked in a and based on what equipment was known to turn or not. be in the area at the time as well as preferences within that formation. If the British hold the initiative at the end of any turn they may strengthen the defences at one point of their chosing.

CASUALTIES, REPLACEMENTS & REINFORCEMENTS For both players, casualties are treated according to the rules in At the Sharp End, with losses in each game being split into those never to return, those who are lightly wounded and return for the next game and those who miss the next game.

WILD CARD OPTIONS Only one Wild Card is present in this campaign. The British may elect to play The Skirl of the Pipes card once at any time in the campaign after midday. This sees the British

Page 16 BRITISH CAMPAIGN BRIEFING GERMAN CAMPAIGN BRIEFING Two days in and the Epsom offensive appears For over three weeks German forces have to be going well. You can hear the fight raging been fighting in Normandy to contain the to the South and know that our troops and invasion. Your force has been rushed to the armour have crossed the Odon and are region in order to launch a major counter‐ pushing on towards the Orne River. attack which will drive the enemy back into the sea. However, as you arrived in Your battalion has been assigned to guard the Normandy you have been surprised to flanks of the corridor which stretches some discover that your force has been five miles in length and is critical for supplies subordinated to another Division and is to be to get through to the troops exploiting the used to make an immediate counter‐attack breakthrough. against a localised British breakthrough. You are not best pleased, but orders are orders! You are keenly aware that the Germans are masters of the counter‐attack and recognise Your objective is to attack in a pincer to sever that, with the corridor being just a couple of the narrow corridor which the British have miles wide, there is a real chance that the pushed southwards and across the Odon. Our enemy could be preparing to launch an attack forces will be attacking from both the East in your sector. If they do so you must be and West with the objective of meeting and ready to fight to secure the gains made thus trapping the enemy lead elements in a kessel far. which can then be contained and destroyed.

At the start of the campaign your At the start of the campaign your C.O.'s commander's opinion is at zero as is your opinion and men's opinion both stand at 0. men's. You roll for your own Outlook on page Roll for your own outlook on page 38 of At 38 of At the Sharp End with an unmodified the Sharp End with an D6‐1. D6. Track these through the campaign as normal. The opinions reflect those of the Division as a whole, so you will only need to track this once, not for each unit deployed.

Page 17 LIST ONE Medical Orderly Adjutant Jeep or Car, no crew INFANTRY PLATOON Entrenchments for one Team This force is used throughout this campaign. LIST TWO Despite lack of combat experience, these PIAT Team, 2 men units had been training for four years in 2” mortar Team, 2 men preparation for the invasion and theeir Roadblock performance is consequently rated as Pre‐Game Barrage Regular. LIST THREE Command Dice: 5 Sniper Team Quality: Regular Universal Carrier Team with Junior Leader Pre‐Game Close Support Barrage PLATOON HEADQUARTERS LIST FOUR Lieutenant, Senior Leader armed with pistol Regular Infantry Section with Junior Leader Platoon Sergeant, Senior Leadere , armed wiith Regular Vickers MMG on tripod mount, 5 SMG crew PIAT Team, 2 men LIST FIVE 2" mortar Team, 2 men 6 pounder anti‐tank gun with 5 crew and Juunior Leader SECTIONS ONE TO THREE M5 Stuart Light Tank withh Junior Leader Corporal, Junior Leader armed with Sten LIST SIIX BREN TEAM RIFLE TEAM M4 Sherman with Junior Leader Bren LMG Six riflemen LIST SEVEN Three crew Sherman Firefly with Junior Leader Churchill Mk VII with Junior Leader National Characteristics are the same as those listed in the main rule book for a British force: The support list options lissted are the same as Five Rounds Rapid! and Concentrated Fire. those in the main Chain of Command rule book, with the same speciific rules applying. SUPPORT OPTIONS The following supports may be selected wiith Sherman Firefly the support points available for each scenarrio. For each Sherman Fireflly selected, at least The list is relatively eclectic due to the one standard M4 Sherman must be selected number of units which were sucked into the as support for that game. action while en route Southwards to cross the Odon. Close Support Barrage This barrage is the same as a Pre‐Game Please note, these lists and their points values Barrage, but continues until the end of the are specific to this supplement and do not second game turn. replace those in the main rules for general gaming.

Page 18 GERMAN SUPPPORT LIST LIST ONE Medical Orderly Adjutant SS PANZERGRENADIER PLATOON Pioneer Demolition Team This unit represents the troops of both the Pioneer Mine Clearance Team Leibstandarte and Der Führer with support Pioneer Wire Cutting Team from a variety of units. Entrenchment for one Team

Additional single Panzerfaaust 30 Command Dice: 5 Quality: Superior Regulars LIST TWO Senior Leader PLATOON HEADQUARTERS LIST THREE Oberscharführer, Senior Leader with Machine Pioneer flamethrower Teaam Pistol Sniper Team Three Panzerfaust 30 LIST FOUR MG42 on tripod mount, 5 crew SQUADS ONE TO THREE leIG.18 with 5 crew and Juunior Leader Scharführer, Junior Leader armed wiith LIST FIVE machine pistol. Panzergrenadier Squad wiith Junior Leader LMG TEAM LMG TEAM LIST SIIX MG42 MG42 Pak 40 anti‐tank gun with 5 crew and Junior Three crew Three crew Leader One rifleman One rifleman Panzer IV F with Junior Leader LIST SEVEN The three panzerfausts are used like hand‐ Panzer IV G/H with Junior Leader grenades, requiring a Command initiative to Flammpanzer III with Juniior Leader fire each one. They may be allocated to one or more squads. They are not allocated to LIST TEN specific figures, but are considered to be wiith Panther with Junior Leader the squad until they are required. Tiger I with Junior Leader

National Characteristics are the same as those The support list options lissted are the same as listed in the main rule book for a German those in the main Chain of Command rule force: Maschinengewehr and Handgranaten! book, with the same specific rules applying. However, the above options are unique to this As Superior Regular troops, any roll of the campaign. Command Dice which results in a single 6 being rolled sees this generate one Chain of Command point.

SUPPORT OPTIONS The following support list is used for this campaign. The support options listed in red are only available to Kampfgrüppe Weidinger. Those in Blue are only available for Kampfgrüppe Frey.

Page 19 CAMPAIGN ARSENAL The following table is used for the campaign. For other weapons, consult the main rules.

CAMPAIGN ARSENAL TABLE ARMOURED VEHICLES VEHICLE ARMOUR A.P. H.E. SPEED NOTES Flammpanzer III 6 Flame Flame Average Hull MG only Panzer IV F 6 5 6 Average Panzer IV G/H 6 9 5 Average Panther A/G 11 12 5 Fast Tiger I 11 12 7 Slow Slow turret, Heavy Armour M5 Stuart 4 5 3 Fast Sherman M4 6 7 6 Average Ronson Sherman Firefly 6 12 2 Slow No H.E. shell, no Hull MG Churchill VII 10 7 6 Slow Heavy Armour TRANSPORT VEHICLES Jeep 0 ‐ ‐ Wheeled Open top Universal Carrier 2 ‐ ‐ Fast Low profile, small ANTI‐TANK WEAPONS ANTI‐TANK WEAPON A.P. H.E. leIG18 4 6 Pak 40 9 5 6 Pounder 7 4

Page 20 For the following scenarios we have provided to breach walls by driving through them, and the players with a total of the support points then they risk "bogging down". which they may select from the campaign specific lists. Buildings shown with red roofs are residential, those with grey rooffs are agricultural, General Terrain Notes normally barns. Most buiildings should be two We have provided specific terrain notes for storeys in height. each scenario; however, some general remarks are worthwhile on the terrain in this Where fields are shown as wheat they provide area of Normandy. light cover when troops are stationary in them, no cover when movving. All other fields Firstly, this is not bocage country, so hedges are low‐lying crops which count as open are not impenetrable. However, this is a very ground. rural area and hedges do block line of sight. Troops within 2" of a hedge may be seen All of the scenarios have been designed with a through it, but further away they are invisible minimum of notes. The campaign backdrop and may not be targeted. Moving through should set the scene for eeach game. Just one such hedges counts as a Medium Obstacle. sheet is required to be printed for each scenario, showing the map and the support Most of the roads in this campaign are dirt list options for each player. tracks, these being shown in tan. Cobbled or metalled roads are shown in grey. At this time On each map, the deployyment areas for the of year it makes little practical difference as Patrol Markers are indicaated. In some cases the ground is hard. Metalled or cobbled roads this is a single point, shown by one Patrol can take up to two tanks abreast but other Marker. In such cases all of that nation’s AFVs are too wide to pass each other. The Patrol Markers begin at tthat point. Where a lesser roads, shown in tan, are just wide table edge is shown by an arrow extending enough for a single tank or AFV. Two jeeps or along that edge, or where the arrow or boxed light halftracks may pass each other. area indicate a general area, the Patrol Makers show which side begins in which Orchardds make up most of the woodland location, not the precise location of the actual shown. Where planted in a regular pattern, Patrol Markers which may be deployed as the the visibility rules for orchards in the main player wishes in, or along,, the area indicated. rules apply. Where these are more randomly distributed, treat them as woods. Norman We have attempted to use the scenarios here buildinggs tend to be well built of stone and, as “straight from the box”, so that they match up such, should be treated as hard cover. Walls with the ones in the main rule book. As a are either shown in a dark tan colour, these result there are limited additional umpire's being medium obstacles of 5' maximum in notes required for this campaign, as seen height, or a light tan, these being major above. Below each map are the briefings obstacles, typically high walls around 6' to 10' which may be cut out and handed to the in height. Only the fully tracked vehicles relevant players. present in this campaign are sufficiently heavy

Page 21 Scenario One AN ENCOUNTER AT LE VALTRU

Background This scenario sees Der Führer launch their attack at Le Valtru just as the 7th Seaforth Highlanders attempt to move into the village. launch their attack into the eastern outskirts of Mouen. This is a Patrol Scenario, albeit one with a lot of support to reflect this encounter action.

Patrol Phase Deployment Both players must deploy four Patrol Markers on the table, but unlike Scenario One in the main rules they may place these anywhere along their friendly table edge within 12” of another marker. All other aspects of the scenario set‐up and objectives for victory are as indicated for Scenario Two in the main rules.

British Forces The British player fields one platoon of infantry with a total of 16 support points available for the first time this scenario is played. On subsequent playing of this scenario, decrease the amount of support available by 2 points each time.

German Forces The German player has a total of 16 support points available whenever this scenario is played.

Page 22 Scenario Two EXPLOITING THE GAP

Background In this scenario the German troops attempt to push on through the farming community of Mondrainville towards Colleville. Isolated British forces will attempt to delay them for as long as possible. The Germans must clear this position before they can progress further.

Patrol Phase Deployment This is Scenario Four in the main rule book and all deployment is as stated there. The German and British initial Patrol Marker deployment options are shown on the image above, with all of the German markers beginning on the road at left with the British in the shaded area at lower right. The British also have one fixed Patrol Marker on the village school, as indicated, which may not move in the Patrol Phase but will lock down any German markers which move to within 12”.

British Forces The British player fields his core platoon of infantry along a total of six support points each time this scenario is played. A Pre‐Game Barrage is always available at no cost and this may be upgraded to a Close Support Barrage for one support point.

German Forces The German player has a total of 16 support points available whenever this scenario is played. If the Germans have by‐passed Le Valtru in Scenario One, the number of support points will be reduced by 3 each time this scenario is subsequently played.

Page 23 Scenario Three THE OUTSKIRTS OF COLLEVILLE

Background Pushing onwards, the Germans are intent on moving into Colleville from the West. The railway crossing here is flat with neither embankment or any type of cutting.

Patrol Phase Deployment This is Scenario Three in the main rule book and all deployment is precisely as stated there. The German and British initial Patrol Marker deployment options are shown on the image above. The German player places all of his markers on the road. The British player may deploy his Patrol Markers anywhere within the area shown within 12" of at least one other marker.

British Forces The British player fields his platoon of infantry with a total of 14 support points available for the first time this scenario is played. On subsequent playing of this scenario, increase the amount of support available by 2 points each time.

German Forces The German player has a total of 14 support points available whenever this scenario is played. On subsequent playing of this scenario, decrease the amount of support available by 2 points each time.

Page 24 Scenario Four CAPTURING COLLEVILLE

Background The Germans are seeking to capture one of their key objectives, the village of Colleville. If this falls the railway crossing to the North will be shut, closing a crucial British line of supply and communications.

Patrol Phase Deployment This is Scenario Six, Attack on an Objective, in the main rule book and all deployment is precisely as stated there. The German and British initial Patrol Marker deployment options are shown on the image above. Both the attacker and defender may place their Patrol Markers anywhere along their deployment area, indicated by the dashed lines, within 12" of a friendly Patrol Marker.

British Forces The British player fields his platoon of infantry with a total of 20 support points available for the first time this scenario is played. On subsequent playing of this scenario increase the amount of support available by 1 point each time. A Pre‐Game Barrage is always available at no cost and this may be upgraded to a Close Support Barrage for one support point.

German Forces The German player has a total of 20 support points available each time this scenario is played. On subsequent playing of this scenario, decrease the amount of support available by 2 points each time.

Page 25 Scenario Five ATTACK INTO MOUEN

Background Mouen itself is a key objective if the railway crossing to the North is to be secured. The Germans attempt to fight their way through the close terrain to push the British defenders out.

Patrol Phase Deployment This is Scenario Three in the main rule book, Attack & Defend, and all deployment is precisely as stated there. The German and British Patrol Marker deployment options are shown on the image above with the German markers are all deployed on the road on their table edge. The British may deploy their Patrol Markers anywhere within their deployment zone within 12” of another marker.

British Forces The British player fields his platoon of infantry with a total of six support points available for the first time this scenario is played. On subsequent playing of this scenario, decrease the amount of support available by 1 point each time.

German Forces The German player has a total of 15 support points available whenever this scenario is played.

Page 26 Scenario Six PROBE AT BAS DE MOUEN

Background The Leibstandarte attack the isolated troops of the 3rd Monmouths in Bas de Mouen. They must break through quickly in order to push on to their objectives.

Patrol Phase Deployment This is Scenario Two in the main rule book, The Probe, and all deployment is precisely as stated there. The German and British Patrol Marker deployment options are shown on the image above with the German markers deployed on the road on the eastern table edge. The British player places all of his Patrol Markers at one spot within his deployment area.

British Forces The British player fields his platoon of infantry with a total of six support points available for the first time this scenario is played. On subsequent playing of this scenario, decrease the amount of support available by 1 point each time.

German Forces The German player has a total of 16 support points available for the first time this scenario is played. On subsequent playing of this scenario, decrease the amount of support available by 2 point each time.

Page 27 Kampfgrüppen in order to isolate 11th As the campaign progresses, the umpire will Armoured Division to the South of the Odon. need to make the British and German players aware of certain events. The Campaign begins at 0700 and lasts until 2100 with each turn llasting an hour; a Scenario One, the By‐Pass Option possible twelve turns (the 2000 turn ending at When playing Scenario One, the German 2100). However, Kampfgrüppe Weidinger player may elect to attempt to simply by‐pass was delayed in starting and this may affect the British by turning this action into a Probe the campaign. scenario. However, if this option is taken, the German platoon which progresses on must If this campaign is being played as a follow‐on complete the campaign and can never be from Operation Martlet,, a narrow German replaced with another platoon as these forces victory or better in that campaign will mean are considered to be still engaged at Le Valtru that the campaign begins at 0700 without and will not feature again. Support for delay. A draw will delay the start until 0800, a subsequent scenarios may still be selected as British win will delay it until 0900 and an normal. outright British win will ddelay the start until 1000. If a subsequent British counter‐attack pushes the Germans back to Scenario One they are If the campaign is beiing played without automatically defeated as Le Valtru is still in reference to Operation Martlet, roll a D6 British hands. whenever it is the turn of Weidinger’s force to attack. A roll of 1 or 2 means that they fail to The Ladder – Going the Other Way do so due to pressure on their left flank from 49 Division. This delay will hand the initiative In designing the scenarios for this campaign in that turn to the British. we have assumed that scenarios one to thrree will be fought by Weidinger’s forces whereas To win an outright victory, the Germans must four to six (or six to four to be precise) will be capture all six tables by the end of the day. If fought by Frey and the Leibstandarte. There they capture five tables this is a draw, being is a possibility that this will not actually be the successful in seeing 12 SS secure Hill 112 and case and that one Kampfgrüppe will be held 11th Armoured Division retreat to leave only a up while the other pushes on to the rungs bridgehead across the Odon. If the British designed to be fought from the other side. hold two tables they wiin a narrow victory, This will mean that the deployment areas whereas holding three or more tables shown for the Patrol Phase are incorrect. represents a major victory for the British.

If this occurs, each scenario fought “the wrong way round” will be treated as an Attack & Defend scenario with the Patrol Phase deployment shown in Scenario Three in the main rules.

Winning the Campaign Winning this campaign depends entirely oon whether the Germans can link theeir

Page 28 LEGAL STUFF All contents of this book are Copyright 2015 to TooFaatLardies and Richard Clarke and may not be reproduced in any format without permission.

Permission is granted to the purchaser to print out this book in its entirety for personal use and the scenario notes and briefings for limited distribution within your immediate circle of gaming friends, or for use for displlay purposes if running the campaign or a component game at a show or convention.

Please don’t make this product available oon file sharing web sites. It is cheap at the price of a pint, especially when measured against the fun you should have from playing the campaign. It isn’t “sharing”, it is theft and it hurts the hobby. Thanks. www.toofatlardies.co.uuk

Page 29