DOCSLIB.ORG

Rules of Criminal Procedure

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Rules of Criminal Procedure ALASKA RULES OF COURT RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Table of Contents PART I. SCOPE, PURPOSE AND CONSTRUCTION Rule 1 Scope. 2 Purpose and Construction. PART II. PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS 3 The Complaint. (a) The Complaint. (b) A Citation. (c) Defendant and Offense Information to be Included in Complaint. (d) Crimes Involving Domestic Violence. (e) Search Warrant Information. (f) Information Not to be Included in Complaint. 4 Warrant or Summons Upon Complaint. (a) Issuance. (1) Probable Cause. (2) Summons. (3) Failure of Defendant to Appear After Summons. (4 ) Additional Warrants or Summonses. (b) Form and Contents. (1) Warrant. (2) Summons. (c) Execution or Service and Return. (1) By Whom. (2) Territorial Limits. (3) Manner. (4) Return. 5 Proceedings Before the Judicial Officer. (a) Appearance Before Judicial Officer After Arrest. (b) Rights of Prisoner to Communicate with Attorney and Other Person. (c) Misdemeanor Arraignment or Felony First Appearance. (d) Initial Determination of Probable Cause at Arraignment or Felony First Appearance. (e) Felonies—Other Requirements at First Appearance. (f) Misdemeanors—Other Requirements at Arraignment. (g) Video or Telephonic Appearance 5.1 Preliminary Examination in Felony Cases. (a) Representation by Counsel. (b ) Order of Proof—Witnesses Called by the State. (c) Witnesses Called by the Defendant. (d) Evidence. (e) Telephonic Testimony. (f) Record. (g) Exclusion of Witnesses. (h) Discharge of the Defendant. (i) Commitment of Defendant. (j) Records. (k) Counsel for Complaining Witness—Counsel for Prosecution. 1 ALASKA COURT RULES PART III. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION 6 The Grand Jury. (a) By Whom Convened. (b) Where Grand Juries Shall be Convened. (c) Selection of Prospective Grand Jurors. (d) Summoning Grand Jurors. (e) Swearing and Instructing Jurors. (f) Alternate Jurors. (g) Objections to Grand Jury and to Grand Jurors. (h) Foreperson and Deputy Foreperson. (i) Preparing Indictments and Presentments. (j) Record of Proceedings. (k) Who May Be Present. (l) Secrecy of Proceedings and Disclosure. (m) Availability of Grand Jury Record to Defendant. (n) Finding and Return of Indictment. (o) Presentment. (p) Defense Witnesses. (q) Sufficiency of Evidence. (r) Admissibility of Evidence. (s) Excusing Grand Jurors. (t) Delegation of Duties. (u) Telephonic Testimony. 6.1 Grand Jury Reports. (a) Authority to Issue Reports. (b) Initial Judicial Review. (c) Judicial Review If Report Adversely Reflects on Identifiable Person. (d) Release of Report. (e) Appeal. 7 Indictment and Information. (a) Use of Indictment and Information. (b) Waiver of Indictment. (c) Nature and Contents—Defects of Form Do Not Invalidate. (d) Surplusage. (e) Amendment of Indictment or Information. (f) Bill of Particulars. 8 Joinder of Offenses and of Defendants. (a) Joinder of Offenses. (b) Joinder of Defendants. 9 Warrant or Summons Upon Indictment or Information. (a) Issuance. (b) Form. (1) Warrant. (2) Summons. (c) Execution or Service and Return. (1) Execution or Service. (2) Return. (3) Service of Summons by Mail. PART IV. ARRAIGNMENT AND PREPARATION FOR TRIAL 10 Felony Arraignment in Superior Court. (a) Generally. (b) Defendant’s Name. (c) Peremptory Disqualification of the Judge. 11 Pleas. (a) Alternatives. (b) Extension of Time for Pleading. 2 RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (c) Pleas of Guilty or Nolo Contendere. (d) Insuring That the Plea is Voluntary. (e) Plea Agreement Procedure. (1) Disclosure of Sentencing Agreement. (2) Acceptance of Agreement. (3) Rejection of Agreement. CrR (f) Determining the Accuracy of Plea. (g ) Record. (h) Plea Withdrawal. (i) Restorative Justice Programs. 12 Pleadings and Motions Before Trial—Defenses and Objections. (a) Pleadings and Motions. (b) Pretrial Motions. (c) Pretrial Motion Date. (d) Ruling on Motion. (e) Effect of Failure to Raise Defenses or Objections. (f) Record. (g ) Effect of Determination. (h) Continuance of Trial. 13 Trial of Indictments or Informations Together. 14 Relief From Prejudicial Joinder. 15 Depositions. (a) When Taken. (b) Notice of Taking. (c) How Taken. (d) Use. (e) Unavailability. (f) Objections to Admissibility. (g) Deposition by Agreement Not Precluded. (h) Joint Defendants. 16 Discovery. (a) Scope of Discovery. (b) Disclosure to the Accused. (1) Information Within Possession or Control of Prosecuting Attorney. (2) Information Provided by Informant—Electronic Surveillance. (3) Information Tending to Negate Guilt or Reduce Punishment. (4) Information Within Possession or Control of Other Members of Prosecuting Attorney’s Staff. (5) Availability of Information to Defense Counsel. (6) Information Regarding Searches and Seizures—Statements From the Accused—Relationship of Witnesses to Prosecuting Attorney. (7) Other Information. (8) Legal Research and Records of Prosecuting Attorney. (9) Restriction on Availability of Certain material. (c) Disclosure to the Prosecuting Attorney. (1) Non-Testimonial Identification Procedures —Authority. (2) Non-Testimonial Identification Procedures— Scope. (3) Right to Counsel. (4) Expert Witnesses. (5) Notice of Defenses. (6) Physical Evidence. (d) Regulation of Discovery. (1) Advice to Refrain From Discussing Case (2) Additional or Newly Discovered Information. (3) Materials to Remain in Custody of Attorney. (4) Restriction or Deferral of Disclosure of Information. (5) Material Partially Discoverable. (6) Denial or Regulation of Disclosure—Disclosure to Court in Camera—Record of Proceedings. (7) Confidential Filing. 3 ALASKA COURT RULES (e) Sanctions. (1) Failure to Comply with Discovery Rule or Order. (2) Willful Violations. (f) Omnibus Hearing. (1) Time for Hearing—When Set. (2) Duties of Trial Court at Hearing. 17 Subpoena. (a) For Attendance of Witnesses—Form—Issuance. (b) Defendants Unable to Pay. (c) For Production of Documentary Evidence and of Objects. (d) Service. (e) Place of Service. (f) For Taking Deposition—Place of Examination. (1) Issuance. (2) Place. (g) Contempt. PART V. VENUE — PRETRIAL 18 Venue: Place of Trial. (a) Venue Districts. (b) Determination of Trial Location. (1) Initial Assignment. (2) Transfer to Approved Additional Trial Site. (3) Change of Venue. (c) Additional Trial Site Standards. (d) List of Approved Additional Trial Sites. (e) Motion To Transfer By Right. (f) Fair Cross-Section. (g) Change of Venue. (h) Limitations of Rule. 19 Change of Venue—Application to Court. 20 Temporary Transfer of Case File. 21 Time of Motion to Transfer. 22 Pretrial Procedure. PART VI. TRIAL 23 Trial by Jury or by the Court. (a) Trial by Jury. (b) Number of Jurors. (c) Trial Without a Jury. 24 Jurors. (a) Examination. (b) Alternate Jurors. (1) Generally. (2) Procedures. (c) Challenges for Cause. (d) Peremptory Challenges. (e) Procedure for Using Challenges. (f) Oath of Jurors. 25 Judge—Disqualification or Disability. (a) Before Trial. (b) During Trial. (c) After Verdict. (d) Change of Judge as a Matter of Right (1) Entitlement. (2) Procedure. 4 RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (3) Re-Assignment. (4) Timeliness. (5) Waiver. 26.1 Exhibits. (a) Mark for Identification. (b) Procedure. CrR (c) Admission. (d) Custody of Exhibits. (e) Final Check. (f) Submission to the Jury. (g) Return of Some Exhibits After Hearing or Trial (h) Administrative Bulletin. 27 Proceedings Upon Trial—Management of Juries. (a) Order of Proceedings. (b) View of Premises by Jury. (c) Admonition to Juror Upon Separation From Jury. (d) Juror Unable to Continue. (e) Selection of Foreperson—Deliberations of Jury—Communications. 27.1 Defendant’s Right to Testify. (a) Advice of Right. (b) Inquiry of Nontestifying Defendant. 28 Expert Witnesses. 29 Motion for Acquittal. (a) Motions for Judgment of Acquittal. (b) Reservation of Decision on Motion—Renewal of Motion. 30 Instructions. (a) Requested Instructions—Objections. (b) Instructions to Be Given. 31 Verdict. (a) Return. (b) Several Defendants. (c) Conviction of Lesser Offense. (d) Poll of Jury. (e) Special Verdicts—Insanity. (f) Sealed Verdict. PART VII. JUDGMENT 32 Sentence and Judgment. (a) Sentence. (b) Other Counts. (c) Judgment. (1) Conviction. (A) Incarceration. (B) Restitution. (C) Conviction of a Corporation. (2) Discharge. (d) Judgment for Sex Offenses or Child Kidnapping. (e) Judgment for Crimes Involving Domestic Violence. (f) Judgment for Crime Against a Person. (g) Information To Be Included in Judgment. 32.1 Presentence Procedure for Felony Sentencings. (a) Scheduling & Preliminary Filings. (A) Defendant’s Sentencing. (B) Defendant’s Financial Statement. (b) Presentence Investigation and Report. (1) Contents and Filing. (2) Restitution Information. (3) Disclosure. 5 ALASKA COURT RULES (4) Plea Agreements. (5) Service. (c) Notice of Aggravating Factors, Extraordinary Circumstances, and Restitution. (d) Notice of Mitigating Factors, Extraordinary Circumstances, and Responses to State’s Notices. (e) Disputing Mitigating Factors, Extraordinary Circumstances, and Objections to Restitution. (f) Adjudicating Factual and Legal Issues. (g) Restitution Procedures When There Is No Presentence Investigation. 32.2 Sentencing Hearing. (a) Consideration of Victim’s Statement. (b) Defendant’s Allocution. (c) The Sentence. (d) Transcript of Sentencing Proceeding. 32.3 Judgment and Orders. (a) Effective Dates of Orders and Judgments. (1) Oral Orders. (2) Written Orders Not Preceded by Oral Orders. (3) Judgments. (b) Commencement of Time for Appeal, Review and Reconsideration. (c) Date of Notice. (1) Oral Orders. (2) Written Orders. (3) Judgments. (4) Other Service Requirements. (d) Clerk’s Certificate of
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Supreme Court and the New Equity
    Vanderbilt Law Review Volume 68 | Issue 4 Article 1 5-2015 The uprS eme Court and the New Equity Samuel L. Bray Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr Part of the Supreme Court of the United States Commons Recommended Citation Samuel L. Bray, The uS preme Court and the New Equity, 68 Vanderbilt Law Review 997 (2019) Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol68/iss4/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW VOLUME 68 MAY 2015 NUMBER 4 ARTICLES The Supreme Court and the New Equity Samuel L. Bray* The line between law and equity has largely faded away. Even in remedies, where the line persists, the conventional scholarly wisdom favors erasing it. Yet something surprisinghas happened. In a series of cases over the last decade and a half, the U.S. Supreme Court has acted directly contrary to this conventional wisdom. These cases range across many areas of substantive law-from commercial contracts and employee benefits to habeas and immigration, from patents and copyright to environmental law and national security. Throughout these disparate areas, the Court has consistently reinforced the line between legal and equitable remedies, and it has treated equitable remedies as having distinctive powers and limitations. This Article describes and begins to evaluate the Court's new equity cases.
    [Show full text]
  • Confession Admissibility Issues
    John E. Reid and Associates, Inc. Established 1947 209 W. Jackson Blvd., Suite 400 312-583- 0700 Chicago, Illinois 60606 800-255-5747 www.reid.com Fax 312-583-0701 Confession Admissibility Issues In the past several years the courts have become more concerned about the issue of false confessions. While the incidence of documented false confessions is rare, more and more jurisdictions are suggesting, if not requiring, interrogators to electronically record interviews and interrogations. With that in mind the courts are carefully examining the interrogator’s behavior and assessing the impact of that behavior on the voluntariness of the confession. The following represents a few court decisions regarding unacceptable interrogator behavior. California Court of Appeal Finds Confession Involuntary In the case of People v. Fuentes July, 2006 the Court of Appeal, Second District, California found the defendant's confession to be inadmissible because improper promises and threats were made during the interview, both express and implied, which rendered the confession involuntary as the product of coercive police activity. From the Appeal Court's decision: "In making this argument, defendant focuses on exhortations that even good people can do bad things while intoxicated and that defendant's not being in his “right state of mind” when the incident happened would “help” him. In addition, defendant was told that not confronting the situation would be “worse” for him, if defendant lied the case would go “very, very bad” for him, and if defendant kept quiet he could be charged “for something more serious, very ugly.” Conversely, if a person tells the truth “it goes much better for them” and “the charges are lowered - a little.” Finally, at least one and one-half hours after the interview started, defendant was given the alternative of spending either “the rest of [his] life” or “five or six years” in jail.
    [Show full text]
  • The History of the Special (Struck) Jury in the United States and Its Relation to Voir Dire Practices, the Reasonable Cross-Sect
    William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal Volume 6 (1997-1998) Issue 3 Article 2 May 1998 The History of the Special (Struck) Jury in the United States and Its Relation to Voir Dire Practices, the Reasonable Cross-Section Requirement, and Peremptory Challenges James Oldham Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons Repository Citation James Oldham, The History of the Special (Struck) Jury in the United States and Its Relation to Voir Dire Practices, the Reasonable Cross-Section Requirement, and Peremptory Challenges, 6 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 623 (1998), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol6/iss3/2 Copyright c 1998 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL VOLUME 6 SUMMER 1998 ISSUE 3 THE HISTORY OF THE SPECIAL (STRUCK) JURY IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS RELATION TO VOIR DIRE PRACTICES, THE REASONABLE CROSS-SECTION REQUIREMENT, AND PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES James Oldham* In this Article, Professor Oldham provides a unique historical study of the special, or struck, jury in the United States. First, Professor Oldham discusses the influence of the 1730 English statute on eigh- teenth-century American law and reviews the procedures of several states in which the struck jury remains valid, in addition to the once- authorized procedures that states have since declared invalid. He also analyzes the relationship between the struck jury and peremptory chal- lenges. Second, Professor Oldham analyzes the special qualifications of the jurors comprising special juries in the context of the "blue ribbon," or "high-class," jury, the jury of experts, and the juries for property condemnation and diking district assessment disputes.
    [Show full text]
  • Equity in the American Courts and in the World Court: Does the End Justify the Means?
    EQUITY IN THE AMERICAN COURTS AND IN THE WORLD COURT: DOES THE END JUSTIFY THE MEANS? I. INTRODUCTION Equity, as a legal concept, has enjoyed sustained acceptance by lawyers throughout history. It has been present in the law of ancient civilizations' and continues to exist in modem legal systems.2 But equity is no longer a concept confined exclusively to local or national adjudication. Today, equity shows itself to be a vital part of international law.' The International Court of Justice--"the most visible, and perhaps hegemonic, tribunal in the sphere of public international law" 4-has made a significant contribution to the delimitation,5 development of equity. Particularly in cases involving maritime 6 equity has frequently been applied by the Court to adjudicate disputes. Equity is prominent in national legal systems and has become increas- ingly important in international law. It is useful, perhaps essential, for the international lawyer to have a proper understanding of it. Yet the meaning of equity remains elusive. "A lawyer asked to define 'equity' will not have an easy time of it; the defimition of equity, let alone the term's application in the field of international law, is notoriously uncertain, though its use is rife."7 Through a comparative analysis, this note seeks to provide a more precise understanding of the legal concept of equity as it relates to two distinct systems oflaw: the American and the international. To compare the equity administered by the American courts with that administered by the World Court, this note 1. See sources cited infra notes 10, 22.
    [Show full text]
  • The Common Law Jurisdiction of the United States Courts
    YALE LAW JOURNAL VOL. XVII NOVEMBER, 1907 No. i THE COMMON LAW JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS To me it seems clear, beyond question, that neither in the Constitution, nor in the statutes enacted by Congress, nor in the judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States can there be found any substantial support for the proposition that, since the adoption of the Constitution, the principles of the Common Law have been wholly abrogated touching such matters as are by that instrument placed within the exclusive control of the National Goverment. (Judge Shiras in Murray v. Chicago & N. W. Rly. Co., 62 Fed. 24.) To whatever has required for its upbuilding the prolonged activity of countless men, in one generation after another, whether expressed in unconfined exertion of physical labor which produces for our astonishment a pyramid, a cathedral, or in endless mental effort which evolves for our wonder a science, an art, a system of law, men have always paid respect. As conferred upon a system of law, that respect has always, in English-speaking countries, been acorded to the Common Law. Law exists for justice, and Webster said: "The Common Law is a fcuntain of justice, perennial and per- petual." Rightly did he as a representative American pay this tribute, for to the founders ot this government there never had been another system of law. They were, in large measure, descendants of those Englishmen who, centuries back, had ceaselessly petitioned for YALE LAW JOURNAL recognition of their rights of person and property; had finally obtained them, and from that foundation had ever thereafter through their courts received justice as their due.
    [Show full text]
  • Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
    Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court The text of the Rome Statute reproduced herein was originally circulated as document A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998 and corrected by procès-verbaux of 10 November 1998, 12 July 1999, 30 November 1999, 8 May 2000, 17 January 2001 and 16 January 2002. The amendments to article 8 reproduce the text contained in depositary notification C.N.651.2010 Treaties-6, while the amendments regarding articles 8 bis, 15 bis and 15 ter replicate the text contained in depositary notification C.N.651.2010 Treaties-8; both depositary communications are dated 29 November 2010. The table of contents is not part of the text of the Rome Statute adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998. It has been included in this publication for ease of reference. Done at Rome on 17 July 1998, in force on 1 July 2002, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2187, No. 38544, Depositary: Secretary-General of the United Nations, http://treaties.un.org. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Published by the International Criminal Court ISBN No. 92-9227-232-2 ICC-PIOS-LT-03-002/15_Eng Copyright © International Criminal Court 2011 All rights reserved International Criminal Court | Po Box 19519 | 2500 CM | The Hague | The Netherlands | www.icc-cpi.int Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Table of Contents PREAMBLE 1 PART 1. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COURT 2 Article 1 The Court 2 Article 2 Relationship of the Court with the United Nations 2 Article 3 Seat of the Court 2 Article 4 Legal status and powers of the Court 2 PART 2.
    [Show full text]
  • WHICH COURT IS BINDING?1 Binding Vs
    WHICH COURT IS BINDING?1 Binding vs. Persuasive Cases © 2017 The Writing Center at GULC. All rights reserved. You have found the perfect case: the facts are similar to yours and the law is on point. But does the court before which you are practicing (or, in law school, the jurisdiction to which you have been assigned) have to follow the case? Stare decisis is the common law principle that requires courts to follow precedents set by other courts. Under stare decisis, courts are obliged to follow some precedents, but not others. Because of the many layers of our federal system, it can be difficult to figure out which decisions bind a given court. This handout is designed to help you determine which decisions are mandatory and which are persuasive on the court before which you are practicing. Binding versus Persuasive Authority: What’s the Difference? • Binding authority, also referred to as mandatory authority, refers to cases, statutes, or regulations that a court must follow because they bind the court. • Persuasive authority refers to cases, statutes, or regulations that the court may follow but does not have to follow. To get started, ask yourself two questions: 1) Are the legal issues in your case governed by state or federal law? and 2) Which court are you in? Once you know the answers to these questions, you are well on your way to determining whether a decision is mandatory or persuasive. Step 1: Are the Legal Issues in Your Case Governed by Federal or State Law? First, a lawyer needs to know the facts and issues of the case.
    [Show full text]
  • Federal Law, Federal Courts, and Binding and Persuasive Authority
    1 Federal Law, Federal Courts, and Binding and Persuasive Authority © 2013 The Writing Center at GULC. All rights reserved. The United States is a common law jurisdiction. Common law countries generally give significant weight to prior judicial opinions. By adhering to the outcomes relating to questions of law of prior decisions, common law judges build a body of jurisprudence that, hopefully, leads to consistent and predictable outcomes. In this way, adherence to binding or persuasive judicial opinions, serves the same purpose as stare decisis: “[The] promot[ion of] the evenhanded, 2 predictable, and consistent development of legal principles.” Not all prior opinions are created equal, however. Sometimes prior decisions are binding on courts; courts must follow these binding precedents. In other instances, prior decisions are 3 only persuasive; they provide good rules of thumb, but do not necessarily dictate the result. Whether a case is binding or persuasive can make all of the difference. As such, this handout will first describe the various relationships of federal courts with other federal courts and how that affects whether law is binding or persuasive. This will teach the legal writer when to recognize whether certain case law is binding or not. Second, this handout will briefly explain different ways to deal with binding precedent. This will teach the legal writer how to work around seemingly binding precedent that undermines the proposition that the legal writer is attempting to establish. Binding Law and Federal Courts The System To understand when an interpretation of law is binding and when it is not in federal court, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of the federal court system.
    [Show full text]
  • The Court of Justice of the European Union
    THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is one of the EU’s seven institutions. It consists of two courts of law: the Court of Justice proper and the General Court. It is responsible for the jurisdiction of the European Union. The courts ensure the correct interpretation and application of primary and secondary EU law in the EU. They review the legality of acts of the EU institutions and decide whether Member States have fulfilled their obligations under primary and secondary law. The Court of Justice also provides interpretations of EU law when so requested by national judges. COURT OF JUSTICE A. Legal basis — Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), Articles 251 to 281 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Article 136 of the Euratom Treaty, and Protocol No 3 annexed to the Treaties on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (‘the Statute’); — Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2422 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union; — EU Budget (Section 4). B. Composition and Statute 1. Membership a. Number of members (Article 19 of the TEU and Article 252 of the TFEU) One judge per Member State (27). The Court is assisted by eight advocates-general, whose number may be increased by the Council if the Court so requests. The judges of the Court of Justice elect from among themselves a President and a Vice-President for a renewable term of three years.
    [Show full text]
  • Common Law Powers
    If you have issues viewing or accessing this file contact us at NCJRS.gov. • ;:, . '. .',,~. ' b. '. ()" '. }" " Common Law Powers This microfiche was produced from documents received for inc~usion In the HeJIRS data base.' Since HCJRS cannot exercise of State Attornys control over the physical condition of the documents submitted, neral th~ individual frame qualit~ will vary. Th! resolution chart on this frame may be used to evaluate the :document quality. January, 1975 . ..~ Ij II . II 2 5 i, 1.0 1111/ . i.! 'I The National Association of Attorneys General 2.2 , ! ,! Committee on the Office of Attorney General I 1.1 :I , j A. F. Summer, Chairman I ·1 I .1l 1111,1.25 111111.4 1111I i.6 1 I I 1 MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART . It NATIONAL BUREAU Of STANDARDS-1963-A I : I ; ! U Microfilmin& procedlfJres used to create this fiche comply with the standards set forth in 41CFR 101·11.504/. ~. ft. " • .1 Points of view or opinions $tahd in this documant are those of the authorls) and do not represent the official pOSition 9J policies o~ tha U.S. Department of Justice. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE lAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION NA TlOHAl CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERVICE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20531 ··----w_~w ....... o ate f i I m'e II; 8/5/7 5 ~"""""'-~"'-~-' ~ .... ---.--~ --------------------- ----.--~-------------------------------------------- THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL National Association of Attorneys General COMMITTEE D.N THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL Committee on the Office of Attorney General I Chairman j Attorney General A. F. Summer, Mississippi President-Elect, National Association of Attorneys General ,\! Vice-Chairman Attorney General Rufus L.
    [Show full text]
  • Summer 2021 Criminal Law Webinar Case
    Phil Dixon [email protected] Jonathan Holbrook [email protected] Brittany Williams [email protected] Summer Criminal Law Webinar June 4, 2021 Cases covered include reported decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court and the North Carolina appellate courts decided between December 15, 2020, and May 18, 2021. The summaries were prepared by School of Government faculty and staff. To view all of the summaries, go to the Criminal Case Compendium or the North Carolina Criminal Law Blog. To obtain the summaries automatically by email, sign up for the Criminal Law Listserv. Investigatory Stops and Seizures The application of physical force with intent to restrain a suspect, even if unsuccessful, is a Fourth Amendment seizure Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 989 (Mar. 25, 2021) (Roberts, C.J.). Law enforcement officers were attempting to serve an arrest warrant early in the morning at an apartment complex in New Mexico. They noticed the plaintiff in the parking lot and realized she was not the subject of the warrant but wished to speak with her. As they approached, the plaintiff entered her car. According to the plaintiff, she did not immediately notice the police approaching (and was admittedly under the influence of methamphetamine). When an officer tried to open her car door to speak with her, she noticed armed men surrounding her car for the first time and drove off, fearing a carjacking. Although not in the path of the vehicle, the officers fired 13 rounds at the car as it drove away. The plaintiff was struck twice in her back but escaped, only to be apprehended the next day.
    [Show full text]
  • Limitations on an Accused's Right to Counsel John W
    Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume 38 | Issue 4 Article 7 1948 Limitations on an Accused's Right to Counsel John W. Kerrigan Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons Recommended Citation John W. Kerrigan, Limitations on an Accused's Right to Counsel, 38 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 375 (1947-1948) This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 1947] CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS or social or economic status4 6 a member of the excluded class may cog- ently attack his conviction by such a jury on the grounds that he was denied equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.47 Furthermore, when the administration of any jury selec- tion procedure has resulted in the exclusion of such a class for similar reasons it is open to attack as violative of the due process clause. Finally, where the state prescribes a dual jury system, clear and con- vincing evidence showing a greatly disparate ratio of conviction by the special as compared with the general jury for a substantial length of time prior to trial may be used to prove the procedure violative of the equal protection clause and unconstitutional. DAVID W. KETLEa* Limitations on an Accused's Right to Counsel In the recent case of Foster v.
    [Show full text]