Land Expropriation, Protest, and Impunity in Rural China
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Land expropriation, protest, and impunity in rural China Bo Zhao Abstract:Conflicts over rural land expropriation, which have intensified over the past decade in China, pose a significant threat to the country’s social stability and the sustainability of its economic development. This article argues that such con- flicts are inevitable under China’s current political and legal system. After a brief introduction of the present situation in China and an overview of China’s land regime, the article first analyzes reasons for the escalation of land conflicts, includ- ing the vague definition of public interest, the inadequate compensation, and the ambiguous nature of collective land ownership. It then argues that even the few existing rights of rural peasants under the present land regime are not adequately protected due to China’s poor law enforcement. The article further elucidates that impunity with regard to illegal land grabbing is common in China for a variety of reasons that all have roots in the Communist Party’s monopoly over Chinese society. With no fundamental reform to China’s party politics, the article con- cludes, there will be no effective measure to prevent further conflicts over land in the near future. Keywords: China, conflict, party politics, rule of law, rural land expropriation In April 2008 a violent clash between local po- attention even in the international media—it is lice and villagers resisting the expropriation of however only one of hundreds of uprisings tak- their land occurred in Saixi village in the south- ing place in present-day China related to rural western province of Yunnan (Hsiao 2008). The land expropriation. conflict began with villagers protesting against Forced appropriation of land and resistance the insufficient compensation they had received against it has increased dramatically during the from the Zijin Mining Corporation, one of the past ten years and appears to be accelerating (Zhu largest mining companies in China, which had and Prosterman 2007). According to data col- started excavations on the contested land. Local lected by the Ministry of Land and Resources, in police arrived and strived to put down the pro- the first half of 2002 40 percent of the petitions test but instead their presence increased the ten- received from peasants related to land acquisi- sion. In the end the police opened fire on the tions and illegal land seizures, of which 87 per- protesters, killing one person and critically injur- cent involved inadequate compensations for land ing several. The incident in Saixi village gained and unfair resettlement subsidies (Zhang 2004). Focaal—European Journal of Anthropology 54 (2009): 97–105 doi:10.3167/fcl.2009.540108 98 | Bo Zhao The Ministry of Public Security disclosed that in Since 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 2005 more than 65 percent of mass incidents in has gradually eradicated private land ownership rural China were reportedly the result of land ex- through a series of political campaigns to real- propriation (Hsiao 2008). In the first nine months ize its socialist ideology of a planned economy. of 2006, China reported a total of 17,900 cases of A new land regime was established after 1956 massive rural unrest, with at least 385,000 farm- that made all land publicly owned, either by the ers protesting against the government. Approx- state of by rural collectives (see Ho 2005). The imately 80 percent of these incidents were related only liberalization that has taken place since is to illegal land appropriations. Land acquisition that a market has developed for the lease of con- by the state has thereby become the top cause of tracted farmland and the transfer of farmland rural grievances in China (Zhu and Prosterman use rights. Ultimately, state and collective own- 2007). In the absence of a free media and with ership however remain untouched. local government trying to silence protest, it is According to Chinese law, urban land belongs safe to assume that there are many more inci- to the state; the State Council, by means of sub- dents related to land expropriation. organs, exercises this right. In contrast, rural and In recent years such mass incidents have sub-urban land, including arable land, forest, started to pose a significant threat to China’s so- grassland, and construction land, should—un- cial stability and economic development, as well less prescribed otherwise by law—be collectively as to the authority of the Chinese government. owned by farmers and be collectively adminis- In order to ease the accumulating tension in ru- tered on behalf of farmers at two levels—the ad- ral China, the latter has made considerable ef- ministrative village and the village group.1 This forts, including establishing new land markets, means that only farmers’ use rights (jingyingquan) legislating new laws, tightening law enforcement, to land are recognized and protected by law. Be- issuing stricter policies, increasing compensation cause all urban land belongs to the state, it must standards, and punishing corrupt officials. How- be noted that land expropriation in China merely ever, those measures have not had the expected refers to rural land. result. In the past two decades rapid industrializa- This article seeks to explain why conflict over tion and urbanization in China has caused an rural land expropriation is inevitable under the increasing demand to convert rural land for in- present political and legal regime of the party dustrial, housing, infrastructural or other urban state in China. It is not that the Chinese govern- use (see Wang 2005). But a potential land user— ment is not serious about the issue, but that un- for example a private property developer—can- der current conditions it is impossible for the not acquire rural construction land or arable state to solve it. Contrary to what has been the land directly from a collective on the land mar- expectation of many Chinese scholars, this arti- ket. Such conversion must be permitted and cle argues that the forthcoming land reform will carried out by the Chinese government. After not make much difference. There will inevitably the potential land user has made an application be more land expropriation-related tragedies for the land that is in accordance with land use unless fundamental political and legal reforms plan, the government can start the procedure of in pursuit of the rule of law and democratiza- land expropriation (tudi zhengyong) in the name tion are embarked on. of public interest, followed by a land transac- tion (tudi churang) between the government and the potential land user. Land expropriation under Rural land expropriation is carried out by the present regime the county government or higher level officials. Farmers who lose their land do not get compen- The main characteristic of the Chinese land re- sation directly from the local government, but gime is the prohibition of private ownership. from a potential land user, according to statu- Land expropriation, protest, and impunity in rural China |99 tory standards based on the principle that farm- comparison to the market value, farmers are of- ers’ living standard may not be lowered due to ten not even given that and a considerable part the expropriation. Compensation is based on of the compensation disappears into the pock- the original land use. It consists of three parts: a ets of local governments, collectives, and village compensation for the loss of land set at six to cadres. Moreover, there are no stipulations in ten times “the average annual output value,”2 a current Chinese law on the procedure to be fol- resettlement subsidy of four to six times the av- lowed where compensation fees are not paid ac- erage annual output value, and a compensation cording to the legal standard (Liu 2007). for structures and standing crops. Based on the Also the meaning of “collective ownership” is prescribed standard, each provincial government vague and it is not clear who the actual owners can decide its own compensation rates accord- of collectively owned rural land are. Scholars have ingly within its jurisdiction. However, in case the suggested that rural land is ultimately owned by prescribed compensation is not high enough to the state (Ho 2001), but in reality it is in the comply with the above principle, the total com- hands of village and township party cadres (Cai pensation of the first two categories shall not 2003; Guo 2001). In land expropriation cases, exceed thirty times the average annual output the latter pursue their personal interests in ne- value of the previous three years.3 gotiating how much is to be compensated and Land expropriation remains a highly contro- in deciding how much each villager may get. The versial matter in China, partly because of leg- overall gap between the compensation in farm- islative defects and poor law enforcement. An ers’ hands and the market value of the expropri- important issue in this regard is the ambiguity ated land is so big that landless farmers cannot of the notion of the “public interest,” in whose but feel heavily exploited.4 name land is expropriated. There is no specific However, not all rural land acquisitions give definition of the term in either case law or statu- rise to riots and unrests, even under the current, tory law. In common practice, the term is inter- defective legislation. Peasants do not have high preted extremely broadly to allow a variety of expectations because they know that they only urbanizing, industrializing, and “modernizing” have “use rights” to rural land. In cases where activities. In this way, local governments sup- the legally prescribed compensation is paid, they port many commercial projects to increase local are usually satisfied. In Guangzhuo City, Guang- revenue. It is, however, mostly certain local lead- dong province—one of China’s richest areas— ers, interest groups, and other insiders who ben- land requisition for urban development has for efit from such projects, while farmers’ interests instance been successful and has triggered no seem to be excluded from the definition of pub- apparent confrontations (Tang et al.2008).