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. .; --- 2:7- 2 - - -- I - -- - .. *1 7 1 1 ,, 4 f; THE HURTGEN FOREST 4 03 .4., A RESEARCH REPORT PREPARED BY 'I CO1 ITTEE 7, OFFICERS /7 ADVANCED COURSE /1 -- Ii T~EARMORED SCHOOL (I '-ft '-4, 1948 a1949 .1. it LIEUTENANT -COLONEL CAREY A. CLARK MAJOR JOHN NI.GAIJSTAD, Chairman MAJOR JOHN P. SHEFFEY 1.: MAJOR WILLIAM B. JACOBS 7CAPTAIN- ADR IAN ST. JOHN 44. CAPTAIN ROBERT Do, DWVAN I .CAPTAIN GERALD V.o REBERRY N L $jk~) ttrXt I! ,~ S .4, r llp~A FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY "C; MAY 1949 DOCTUh'yNT3'SELcTION * T-1AAI~bSHO t T4 I PREFACE The purpose of this study is (1) to assemble all available data on the use of armor'in the HEJRTGEN FOREST between 14 Septem- ber and 15 December 1944, (2) to evaluate th~e contribution of arm- or to the First United States Army offensive in this area, and (3) to interpret our findings in the light of past and present dec- - tr ine. of arm or ed empl1oyment. -In appr-oachingr th is study all sources availab le were ex- plorAEd.~ The princ-ipal sources include unit histories, after- ac- t-ion reports, comrbat interviews, and personal interviews. Not all of tesesouceswer acessble for each unit considered and asa result there is a cerAtain lack of balance in the chapters making up the report.. For example, while an abundance of material was ava-ilable on the 5-th Armore.Dd DiviLsidn and the 707th Tank Batt1.alion, comabat interviews with personnel ofLthU0t akBatlo ol not be obtained. Cer-tain data regarding the other units listed in the report were also unobtainable, However, within these limits the committee has at.tempted to do justice to each armored unit in-m volved. In view of the purpose of the report the infantry pictu1re The few conflicting reports of action have been checked and evaluated to arrive at.what is be.3lieved to be t,.he most prob-I ,4 -~ C.- and conclusions reflc. h able conclusions.Teinrptaos the c onmitewsest cnw opinion at'-the committee; however, officers who made them-m ledge its indebtedness to the following on sdveral occasions lent their selves available for interview and upon the early drafts of the time in order to review. and comment Wh.A. Ramberg, 10th Tank-l BattaN- actions of their units: Lt. Col. Wallace J. Nichols, 745th Tank ion, 5th Armored Division; Lt. Col. 745th Tank Battalion; Lt. Col* Batta-lion; Lt William K. Saniers, LcFwis C. Taynton., Roer. ane,707tLh Tan Bat1talion; Mv'ajor D. ko'Lanachan, 70th Tank Bat- 70th Tank Batt-ali,.on; Captain James talion. Research and The committee further wishe.s to than-3kthe of The 1Armored School Evaluatl-.ion Division and otherdeatns reproductbion of maps and whnose v--3rsonnel have be-en helpful in the materials, and other tasks photog-raphs, the procurement of sourc^e rle-port. nec,,essary to the prprtion of this TABaLE OF CON4TENTS Chapter Pa ge PRFA E CZ FA I. INTRODUCIO 0 40W 04D0 beginningi the New Offensive......... .. 0. 6 II9 THE 746THIf TA NY BAT TA LIN IN SUPPORT OFqTH1E 9TH1 jINFAiL'ITRY D.IVI SION. .. .. .. .. .. p 12 The 47th ROT Capture s and Holds SCIIEVWtITTTE . 15 The 3 9th'' ECT 'Near IADIESDORP...........0 16 The 6Oth RCT Niear LONSOHAU ............. ap 18 The Attack on GEP&-IETER and VOSSEI frCK ................ 19 Emfploymuent of Tanks., . .. .. .20 5 K~~~~ umnary.... & ...................... 33 II.TE77HThrit BATTALION IN SUPPORT OF THE 28TH .*.35 I "ATRYDI1TLS ION.1L ... ActionaEt VOSSEAOCK,.. 37 Acion- at KGESCHIED and SC }II IDT. .V 4 Log9istic al Cos ide r ati ons 9 . ...... ...... ..... ...... ...... .. Conclusions..........................0, 62 V. THE 745TH 'TAM,- -BALTTAhLION IN 'SUPPORT OF THE 1S.T INEATEY DIVISIEON. 01809. 67 CombaU-Lt Oerations. .. .. .68 Conclusi-ons.. .. .* .* 8 T V. THE 70Mh -TA'NK..BATTALIO0N IN SUFTPOFT OF TUE 4 Th - I 'T DIVIS IONg. .. .. .. .8 P!a nniJ.n the ntta'ck (1 to 1 o) , .*~8 In it ial1 Pe nut-tti on by' 1-2 8th Rog imeb (1 t 1 Nov) . 4& 0 4P .. .4 .. 0 . .. 89 Attak o GLOSSIUJ by, the 22d Infakntry,... .9 The Ge rmcin Cognter-A.-ttack.. .. .- 9 VI. TE 709Th Thl-i B1,T T- i 1)N IN SUPPORT OF THE 8TH i-V Cha pte r Page The HURTGtN4 operation (23 to .25 Nov).. 130 KLflM-/U Operation (28 to 30 Nov)..... 137 -E-RANLENBERG Ope-ration (zo Newvt c 4Dee). 146 BERGSTEIN Operation (4 to 8 Dec) 15P6 GRG2SIIAU-to SCHAFBERG (99- Nov to 5 Dec). 171 4ush" to the hOER (9 to 15 Dec) 175 Logis tics............. 179 Surmary.............. 183 0 * . S VII.T, COCLU SIOS *.TC 194 Tactics. * q00 00 00* 196 TIBIOGRAPhfY ........................ * 5 9 9 9 203 APPEND-ICES................ i I Terrain Study ,............ 0 11 United States Order of Battle * 9 5 5. * III German Order of: Battle,.. xi IV Mlap References., * 5 9 .~ 4 xiv V map S............. VI -Artillery.......... xx IN-f 71 /1 -- mAh AI CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Cf the campaigns and battles which led to "Victory in Europie," one of the most bitter and bloody was the battle. of the REJETEN FORE ST. Although this battle Was predominantly an infan"R try, action, a separate tank battalion supported each infa ntry division and the 5th Armored Division played a decisive role. The objective of this study is to examine the manner in which armored units were employed and to evaluato their contribuition to the Allied eff ort in the WURTGEN FOREST. Befcre. bringing these units under close scrutiny it is first desirable to discuss the back- ground of the operation. The HURTGiEN FOREST covers an area of approximately fifty square miles of GERILANY near the .BELGiIA border and within the triangle'formed by the cities, of AACIEN (K840450), DUREN (F120460)1, and MiON$CHAU (K9401835). "Tall, closely packed fir trees rise seventy-five to one hundred- teet above the damp., ru'gged floor of the forest allowing little' sunlight to filter through even on the brightest days." 1l The forest is dotted wi1th hills and cut by deep draws which are effective natural obstacles. The weather which the Americans encountered during the battle wa . unusually severe rain turned the grouind into, a sea of mud; mist hindered vis i biit;.nVtoWad% bittor cold."followed. "Nota.in% w yea mt rsihA b 1 - ,o /4 V Why was it necessary f or ,the Allies to fight over this formidable terrain? The battle f or the HIJRTGE N was primarily a battle Por the ROER damfs. The ROE RIVER was controlled by -a series of head. water dat'.s in the hills east .of EUPEN 1N798272 and in AAC1VN the Americans had captured very comnjiete engineering studies thowing just what could be done with them. 3 In the even-t that the Alli"ed fprces north of the HUR TGE N F ORE ST area succeede~d in crossing the. :ROER it would be a simple matter for. the Germans, choosing their tizmo, to produce a flood which could effectively cut off these forces.- During the planning stages of the Allied offensive to be launched in the direction of the COLOGNE PLAIN, Geoneral Dwight D, Eisenhower, Supreme Commander-, Allied Expeditionary Force, wrote to General George C. Miarshall, Chief of Staff., United States, Army: - He (the enemy) is assisted in thiat area...by the flooded condition of the ROER RIVER and the capability he has of pro-ib ducing a sudden rush of water by bloWing; the dams near 'SCHMIDT F063298, Bradley has about come to the conclusion that we must take that area~by a very difficult attack fr6m the 'west and s outhwe st.4 And again, in writing atter the war, General Eisenhower stated:, YVe first attempted destruction of the dams by air. The bombing against then was accurate and direct hits were secured; however, the concrete structures were so massive that damage was negl igie and thet~e was no recourse except, to take them by ground attack. 5 General Marshall in his Second biennial Report states: "The seiz- ure of the ROER RIVER dams in the vic.inity of SCHM1IDT was a nece-* 2 in the vicinity of AACHEN and U.S6 tr-oops, in large. numbers were east of AALCEN. By the end of September .1944, although AACHEN itself was still under assault, troops of the First.U.S., Atmy,. spearheaded by the 9th Infantry Divisio,: pushed east'andt soutimp east of that city and occupied a s'alient within s-ix miles of the HOER dams,, 'This did not mean that no mwore Ceortif ications were to be met f'or another band of defense lihs ran through the HURTGEN and MQNSOHAIJ FORESTS, taking full -advdntage of the terrain. This band was as much as, nine to twelve miles deep and included many heavil/ fortified villages which served as key strongpoints. In spite of the terrain, the- fortifications, and the threat ~of bad winter weather, General mnar Bradley, Twelfth Army Group Commander, felt (and SHLLE1 agree-d) that both the HURTGEN FOREST area and the HOER RIVER dams must be secured. .This mission fell to, the First United States Army. On 21 October Twelfth Army Group ordered a general attack to the east'which directed First Army to reach the RZHINE' in' the vic-inity *of BONN (F547375) adCLOGNE (F450600), and to' seize a bridgehead. First briny at this time had assigned to it a front of aAs a prelimintary to its attack First airmy had to replace the 9th-Infantry.Division in the line.

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