Thursday, October 6, 2005

Part II

Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 1, 25, 91, etc. Enhanced Airworthiness Program for Airplane Systems/Fuel Tank Safety (EAPAS/FTS); Proposed Advisory Circulars; Proposed Rule and Notices

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION • Mail: Docket Management Facility; before and after the comment closing U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 date. If you wish to review the docket Federal Aviation Administration Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, in person, go to the address in the Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590– ADDRESSES section of this preamble 14 CFR Parts 1, 25, 91, 121, 125, 129 001. between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday • Fax: 1–202–493–2251. through Friday, except Federal holidays. [Docket No. FAA–2004–18379; Notice No. • Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on You may also review the docket using 05–08 ] the plaza level of the Nassif Building, the Internet at the Web address in the RIN 2120–AI31 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, ADDRESSES section. DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday Privacy Act: Using the search function Enhanced Airworthiness Program for through Friday, except Federal holidays. of our docket Web site, anyone can find Airplane Systems/Fuel Tank Safety For more information on the and read the comments received into (EAPAS/FTS) rulemaking process, see the any of our dockets, including the name SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of of the individual sending the comment AGENCY: Federal Aviation this document. (or signing the comment on behalf of an Administration (FAA), DOT. Privacy: We will post all comments association, business, labor union, etc.). ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking we receive, without change, to http:// You may review DOT’s complete (NPRM). dms.dot.gov, including any personal Privacy Act Statement in the Federal information you provide. For more Register published on April 11, 2000 SUMMARY: The intent of this proposal is information, see the Privacy Act (65 FR 19477–78) or you may visit to help ensure the continued safety of discussion in the SUPPLEMENTARY http://dms.dot.gov. commercial airplanes by improving the INFORMATION section of this document. Before acting on this proposal, we design, installation, and maintenance of Docket: To read background will consider all comments we receive their electrical wiring systems as well as documents or comments received, go to on or before the closing date for by aligning those requirements as http://dms.dot.gov at any time or to comments. We will consider comments closely as possible with the Room PL–401 on the plaza level of the filed late if it is possible to do so requirements for fuel tank system safety. Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, without incurring expense or delay. We This proposed rulemaking consists of SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. may change this proposal in light of the regulatory changes affecting wiring and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, comments we receive. systems and fuel tank systems in except Federal holidays. If you want the FAA to acknowledge transport category airplanes. First, it FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: receipt of your comments on this proposes to organize and clarify design Stephen Slotte, ANM–111, Airplane & proposal, include with your comments requirements for wire systems by Flight Crew Interface, Federal Aviation a pre-addressed, stamped postcard on moving existing regulatory references to Administration, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., which the docket number appears. We wiring into a single section of the Renton, WA 98055–4056; telephone will stamp the date on the postcard and regulations specifically for wiring and (425) 227–2315; facsimile (425) 227– mail it to you. adding new certification rules. It also 1320, e-mail [email protected] Availability of Rulemaking Documents proposes to require holders of type (certification rules) or Fred Sobeck, certificates for certain transport category AFS–304, Aircraft Maintenance You can get an electronic copy using airplanes to conduct analyses of their Division, Federal Aviation the Internet by: airplanes and make necessary changes Administration, 800 Independence (1) Searching the Department of to existing Instructions for Continued Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; Transportation’s electronic Docket Airworthiness (ICA) to improve telephone: (202) 267–7355; facsimile Management System (DMS) Web page maintenance procedures for wire (202) 267–7335, e-mail (http://dms.dot.gov/search); (2) Visiting the FAA’s Regulations and systems. It would require operators to [email protected] (operating Policies Web page at http:// incorporate those ICA for wiring into rules). their maintenance or inspection www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or programs. And finally, this proposed SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: (3) Accessing the Government rulemaking would clarify requirements Comments Invited Printing Office’s Web page at http:// of certain existing rules for operators to www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html. incorporate ICA for fuel tank systems The FAA invites interested persons to You can also get a copy by submitting into their maintenance or inspection participate in this rulemaking by a request to the Federal Aviation programs. submitting written comments, data, or Administration, Office of Rulemaking, views. We also invite comments relating ARM–1, 800 Independence Avenue DATES: Send your comments on or to the economic, environmental, energy, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by before February 3, 2006. or federalism impacts that might result calling (202) 267–9680. Make sure to ADDRESSES: You may send comments from adopting the proposals in this identify the docket number, notice [identified by Docket Number FAA– document. The most helpful comments number, or amendment number of this 2004–18379] using any of the following reference a specific portion of the rulemaking. methods: proposal, explain the reason for any • DOT Docket Web site: Go to http:// recommended change, and include Organization of This NPRM dms.dot.gov and follow the instructions supporting data. We ask that you send Discussion of the proposal in this for sending your comments us two copies of written comments. NPRM is organized under the following electronically. We will file in the docket all headings. Material supplementary to • Government-wide rulemaking comments we receive, as well as a this discussion, but not included in it, Web site: Go to http:// report summarizing each substantive appears in appendices at the end of the www.regulations.gov and follow the public contact with FAA personnel discussion, before ‘‘List of Subjects.’’ instructions for sending your comments about this proposed rulemaking. The Whenever there is a reference to a electronically. docket is available for public inspection document being included in the docket

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for this NPRM, the docket referred to is years later, an MD–11 airplane crashed require them to develop maintenance Docket Number FAA–2004–18379. A into the Atlantic Ocean, killing all 229 and inspection tasks to identify, correct, list of acronyms used is included as people aboard. Although an exact cause and prevent wiring conditions that Appendix A. Unless stated otherwise, could not be determined, a region of cause risk to continued safe flight. We rule sections referenced in this NPRM resolidified copper on a wire of the in- are proposing that these tasks be are part of Title 14 of the Code of flight-entertainment system cable included in new instructions for Federal Regulations. indicated that wire arcing had occurred continued airworthiness for wiring and in the area where the fire most likely that they be compatible with Table of Contents originated. instructions for continued airworthiness I. Executive Summary Investigations of those accidents and for fuel tank systems. We are further II. Background subsequent examinations of other proposing to amend Title 14 Code of A. Flight 800 Accident airplanes showed that deteriorated Federal Regulations (CFR) parts 91, 121, B. Flight 111 Accident wiring, corrosion, improper wire 125 and 129 operating rules to require C. FAA Aging Transport Nonstructural installation and repairs, and operators of transport airplanes to Systems Plan contamination of wire bundles with incorporate those tasks for wiring and D. Fuel Tank Safety Rule metal shavings, dust, and fluids, which fuel tanks into their regular E. Existing Wiring Certification Regulations would provide fuel for fire, were maintenance programs. Finally, we are III. General Discussion of the Proposal A. Nature of the Problem common conditions in representative creating a new subpart of part 25 to B. Relationship of this Proposal to Other examples of the ‘‘aging fleet of transport contain all applicable certification Aging Aircraft Initiatives airplanes.’’ The FAA concluded that requirements for airplane wiring, C. Alternatives to Rulemaking current maintenance practices do not including new rules to improve safety in IV. Overview of Proposal adequately address wiring components, manufacture and modification. V. Section-by-Section Discussion of Proposed wiring inspection criteria are too The total estimated benefits of the Rules general, and unacceptable conditions, proposal are comprised of efficiency A. Part 25 Subpart H-Electrical Wiring such as improper repairs and benefits and safety benefits. The Interconnection Systems (EWIS) B. Part 25 Subpart I—Continued installations, are not described in efficiency benefits are $192.3 million Airworthiness and Related Part 25 enough detail in maintenance ($78.3 million present value). The safety Changes instructions. Wiring failures result in benefits are $563 million ($262.4 C. Other Proposed Changes to Part 25 airplane delays, unscheduled landings, million present value). From 1995– D. Part 25 Electrical System Harmonization in-flight entertainment system 2002, 397 wiring failures were reported. Rules problems, nonfatal accidents, and fatal We used industry estimates to E. Proposed Changes to Part 91, 121, 125, accidents. determine that 68% of those failures and 129 Operating Rules for Fuel Tank Up until this time, airplane wiring has would be detectable. The 7 most Systems and EWIS and Other Existing never been singled out for special common—burned, loose, damaged, Continued-Airworthiness-Related Rules F. Proposed Changes to Parts 121 (Subpart attention during maintenance shorted, failed, chafed, and broken Y) and 129 (Subpart B)-EWIS inspections. Although close attention is wires—account for 84% of all wiring Maintenance Programs paid to safe design within systems, we failures. Wiring failures cause 22.1 flight G. Proposed Changes to Parts 91 (Subpart had assumed that for the wiring delays per year, with an average time of L), 121 (Subpart Y), 125 (Subpart M), and providing power to those systems, 3.5 hours and an estimated cost of 129 (Subpart B) ( Fuel Tank Maintenance standard industry practice was approximately $35,639 each, and Programs appropriate, and modifications have without this proposal, we believe that H. Advisory Circulars often been performed without scrutiny wiring delays will increase VI. Regulatory Analyses and Notices for the effect their wiring additions may Appendices proportionately with the growth of the Appendix A—List of Acronyms have on other systems in the airplane. fleet. Wiring failures cause 27.5 Appendix B—Correlation Between Damaged wire and insulation can cause unscheduled landings per year at an Proposed New Part 25 Regulations and electrical arcing, providing the spark average cost of approximately $200,461 Existing Regulations that can cause fire. Dust, dirt, lint, per unscheduled landing. We estimate Appendix C—Correlation Between Existing contamination, and vapors provide fuel that, based on expected fleet growth of Part 25 Regulations and Proposed New for fire. Recent rules have established 3.82% per year, there will be 1,118 Regulations requirements for wiring connected to unscheduled landings caused by wiring Appendix D—Existing Part 25 fuel tank systems. This proposal goes failures over a 25-year period, of which Requirements Requiring Revision to further, to address all the wiring Support the New Proposed Regulations approximately 760 would be prevented Appendix E—Flowchart 1: Pre- and Post- contained in an airplane as systems on by this proposal, resulting in a total Type Certification Safety Analysis their own and provide scrutiny to the benefit of averting unscheduled Concept—Flowchart 2: Post-TC Safety conditions that affect their safe landings of $152.4 million. Delays and Analysis Concept functioning. It aligns with the unscheduled landings contain safety requirements for fuel tank wiring. risks for passengers and crew and I. Executive Summary We are proposing new maintenance, increase the likelihood of a more serious Safety concerns about wiring systems inspection, and design criteria for event. We estimate 32.8 wiring-related in airplanes were brought to the airplane wiring to address conditions incidents or accidents could be forefront of public and governmental that put transport airplanes at risk of prevented by this proposal in the next attention by a mid-air explosion in 1996 wire failures, smoke, and fire. We are 25 years, for a total safety benefit of involving a 747 airplane. Ignition of proposing requirements for type $563 million ($262.4 million present flammable vapors in the fuel tank was certificate holders and applicants for value). This includes 1.2 fatal accidents the probable cause of that fatal accident type certificates and supplemental type that can be prevented. and the most likely source was certificates to analyze all the zones of The estimated total cost of this NPRM determined to be a wiring failure their airplanes for the presence of wire is $474.4 million ($209.2 million causing a spark to enter the fuel tank. and for the likelihood of contaminant present value) over 25 years. The total All 230 people aboard were killed. Two materials. The proposal would also estimated benefits are $755.3 million

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($340.7 million present value) over the • Use of an oversized strain relief approximately 53 minutes of the same period. This proposal is meant to clamp on the terminal block of the airplane’s departure from New York to proactively address wiring conditions number 1 fuel tank compensator. The Geneva, Switzerland, the flightcrew existing in the transport airplane fleet clamp did not adequately secure the smelled an abnormal odor in the that we now know affect safe flight and wires. cockpit. The cockpit voice recorder can be detected, corrected, or prevented. • Many open-ended (rather than indicates that they thought the smell sealed) wire splices, which exposed was coming from the air-conditioning II. Background conductors to possible water system. A short time after the flightcrew A. Flight 800 Accident contamination. noticed the smell, there was smoke in • Several wire bundles containing the cockpit, and they diverted the Safety concerns about wiring systems many wire splices on adjacent wires at in airplanes were brought to the airplane to the Halifax airport. the same location. While preparing for landing, the forefront of public and governmental • Excessive solder on the connector flightcrew were unaware that fire was attention by a 1996 accident over the pins inside the fuel totalizer gauge. The spreading above the ceiling in the front Atlantic Ocean near East Moriches, New solder had apparently caused of the aircraft. They declared an York, involving a 747–131 airplane, inadvertent joining of connecting pins/ emergency and signaled a need to land operated as TWA Flight 800. That wires from the right main fuel tank and immediately. About one minute later, accident was investigated extensively by CWT FQIS. radio communications and secondary the National Transportation Safety Some of these conditions may suggest radar contact with the aircraft were lost, Board (NTSB). It also prompted the FAA the need for improved maintenance. and the flight recorders stopped to investigate fuel tank wiring, and to However, the NTSB found that functioning. About five and one-half focus on aging wiring in general. On deterioration, damage, and minutes later, the aircraft crashed into May 7, 2001, the FAA published a final contamination of aircraft wiring and the ocean. rule titled ‘‘Transport Airplane Fuel related components, such as those In its final report, ‘‘Aviation Tank System Design Review, found on the accident airplane, were Investigation Report, In-Flight Fire Flammability Reduction, and common in other transport category Leading to Collision with Water,’’ Maintenance and Inspection airplanes inspected as part of the Report Number A98H0003, the Requirements’’ (66 FR 23086) to accident investigation. This was Transportation Safety Board of Canada specifically address safety of the fuel especially true in older airplanes. The (TSB) (the Canadian governmental body tank, including wiring, which was NTSB concluded that ‘‘the condition of charged with aircraft accident determined to be the probable cause of the wiring system in the accident investigation) could not identify the the TWA Flight 800 accident. This airplane was not atypical for an airplane exact cause of the fire. As part of its 11 NPRM addresses safety concerns related of its age and one that had been findings of causes and contributing to aging wiring in general, and maintained in accordance with factors, however, the TSB stated that: incorporates maintenance requirements prevailing industry practices.’’ ‘‘A segment of in-flight entertainment specific to fuel tanks. The NTSB expressed concern about network power supply unit cable The NTSB determined the probable the damage and contamination found on exhibited a region of resolidified copper cause of the TWA Flight 800 accident, electrical wiring and components on one wire that was caused by an in which the airplane broke up in flight, during their examinations of numerous arcing event. This resolidified copper was an explosion of the center wing fuel transport category airplanes, including was determined to be located in the area tank (CWT) resulting from ignition of the accident airplane. The conditions where the fire most likely originated. the flammable fuel and air mixture in found were especially disturbing This arc was likely associated with fire the tank. The source of ignition energy because it was clear from those initiation event; however, it could not for the explosion could not be examinations that much aircraft wiring be determined whether this arced wire determined with certainty. However, of is difficult, if not impossible, to inspect was the lead event.’’ That report can be all the sources evaluated, the most and test because of its inaccessibility. found in the docket. likely was a wiring failure outside the The NTSB concluded that inadequate In the section of the report entitled CWT. This failure allowed excessive attention to the condition of aircraft ‘‘Findings as to Risk,’’ the TSB cited 24 electrical energy to enter the CWT electrical wiring had resulted in separate risks that had the potential to through electrical wiring associated potential safety hazards. The degrade aviation safety but could not be with the fuel quantity indication system conclusions from the accident shown to have played a direct role in (FQIS). investigation brought a heightened the event, or are unrelated to this event During its investigation, the NTSB awareness to the FAA, other but were found during the investigation. found several potentially unsafe government agencies, and the general Among those findings of risks are the conditions in and near the electrical public of the importance of maintaining following statements. (The numbers wiring of the accident airplane. The the integrity of aircraft wiring. A copy under which each finding appears in the findings included cracked wire of the NTSB findings (NTSB Aircraft TSB report are indicated.) insulation, metal shavings adhered to a Accident Report Number AAR–00/03) • ‘‘Regulations do not require that floor beam where FQIS wires would can be found on the NTSB Web site aircraft be designed to allow for the have been routed (consistent with http://www.NTSB.gov, and is contained immediate de-powering of all but the maintenance records describing in the docket. minimum essential electrical systems as compressed air being used to blow part of an isolation process for the metal shavings off avionics units), other B. Flight 111 Accident purpose of eliminating potential debris, and sulfide deposits. In addition, Two years after the Flight 800 ignition sources.’’ (3.2.3) it found evidence of several repairs that accident, in September 1998, an MD–11 • ‘‘Examination of several MD–11 did not comply with the guidelines in airplane, operated as Swissair Flight aircraft revealed various wiring Boeing’s ‘‘Standard Wiring Practices 111, crashed into the Atlantic Ocean off discrepancies that had the potential to Manual’’ (SWPM). Noncompliant the coast of Nova Scotia, Canada. There result in wire arcing. Other agencies repairs included: were no survivors. Within have found similar discrepancies in

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other aircraft types. Such discrepancies team, along with information from Nonstructural Systems Plan. They reflect a shortfall within the aviation meetings with FAA principal inspectors concluded that they are important safety industry in wire installation, and representatives of major airplane issues and must be fully addressed maintenance, and inspection manufacturers, as well as an analysis of through rulemaking or other means. procedures.’’ (3.2.7) airplane service histories. From this Specifically addressed by the NTSB • ‘‘The consequence of contamination combined information, we developed (NTSB Recommendation No. A–00–108, of an aircraft on its continuing the Aging Transport Nonstructural included in the docket) were the need airworthiness is not fully understood by Systems Plan (included in the docket for for: the aviation industry. Various types of this NPRM). The plan’s primary focus is • Improved training of maintenance contamination may damage wire on electrical wiring systems. There are personnel to ensure adequate insulation, alter the flammability other on-going research and recognition and repair of potentially properties of materials, or provide fuel development activities that address unsafe wiring conditions; to spread a fire. The aviation industry mechanical and avionics systems. • Improved documentation and has yet to quantify the impact of The July 1998 Aging Transport reporting of potentially unsafe electrical contamination on the continuing Nonstructural Systems Plan includes wiring conditions; 1 and airworthiness and safe operation of an results of the evaluation of five transport • Incorporation of the use of new aircraft.’’ (3.2.8) category airplanes considered technology, such as arc-fault circuit • ‘‘There is no guidance material to representative of the ‘‘aging fleet of breakers and automated wire test identify how to comply with the transport airplanes.’’ The FAA found equipment. requirements of Federal Aviation conditions similar to those the NTSB The NTSB also recommended (NTSB Regulation (FAR) 25.1353(b) [relating to found during its investigation of the Recommendation A–00–106, included cable routing] in situations where TWA Flight 800 accident. Those in the docket) that the FAA review the physical/spatial wire separation is not conditions included: design specifications for aircraft wiring practicable or workable, such as in • Deterioration of wiring and related systems of all U.S.-certified aircraft and confined areas.’’ (3.2.10) components. then: • ‘‘Inconsistencies with respect to CB • Stiff and cracked wire. • Identify which systems are critical (circuit breaker) reset practices have • Contamination of wire bundles with to safety; and • been recognized and addressed by major metal shavings, dust, and fluids. Require revisions, as necessary, to aircraft manufacturers and others in the • Corrosion on connector pins. ensure that adequate separation is • aviation industry. Despite these Improper wire installation and provided for the wiring related to those initiatives, the regulatory environment, repairs. critical systems. including regulations and advisory The FAA also found, as had NTSB Finally, the NTSB recommended that material, remains unchanged, creating investigators, that wires contained in the FAA ensure that all part 25 transport the possibility that such ‘‘best practices’’ wire bundles are difficult to inspect. category airplanes, regardless of will erode or not be universally applied The conclusions reached from this whether they are operated under parts evaluation were that: 91, 121, 125, or 135, be included in the across the aviation industry.’’ (3.2.12) • • ‘‘FAR 25.1309 requires that a Current maintenance practices do review of aging transport airplane system safety analysis be accomplished not adequately address wiring systems and structures (NTSB on every system installed in an aircraft; components. Recommendation A–00–119, contained • Wire inspection criteria are too however, the requirements of FAR in the docket). general. The FAA Administrator established a 25.1309 are not sufficiently stringent to • Unacceptable conditions, such as ensure that all systems, regardless of formal advisory committee (the Aging improper repairs and installations, are Transport Systems Rulemaking their intended use, are integrated into not described in enough detail in the aircraft in a manner compliant with Advisory Committee, or ATSRAC) in maintenance instructions. 1998. Its purpose was to facilitate the aircraft’s type certificate.’’ (3.2.21) • Repair instructions and data are actions recommended by the Aging In addition to the two accidents difficult to extract from SWPMs. discussed above, multiple incidents and • Transport Nonstructural Systems Plan The information that maintenance (FAA Order 11110.127, Aging Transport accidents that have occurred over the personnel are given for wire years illustrate the types of wire Systems Rulemaking Advisory replacement may not be adequate. Committee, dated Jan. 19, 1999, malfunctions that can affect flight • Current incident/maintenance included in the docket). This committee safety. A discussion of some of those, reporting procedures do not allow for is made up of representatives of aircraft titled ‘‘EAPAS NPRM Supplemental easy identification of failures. manufacturers, transport airplane Material, Other Incidents and Accidents The NTSB agreed with these operators, aerospace and industry Involving Electrical Wiring,’’ is conclusions. included in the docket for this NPRM. The Aging Transport Nonstructural associations, and governmental Systems Plan detailed several tasks and agencies. C. FAA Aging Transport Nonstructural In January 1998, the FAA assigned associated subtasks aimed at correcting Systems Plan five tasks to ATSRAC. These included these problems, including: After the Flight 800 accident, at the • Improving wiring inspection collecting data on aging wiring systems recommendation of the White House criteria and providing more detailed through airplane inspections, reviewing Commission on Aviation Safety and descriptions of undesirable conditions. Security (WHCSS), the FAA expanded • Improving inspector training to 1 Recommendations for improved documentation and reporting and for incorporation of new its Aging Aircraft Program, which in the ensure that it adequately addresses the technology are not addressed by this proposed rule. past had focused on structures, to cover recognition and repair of aging wiring They are, however, part of the FAA’s Enhanced nonstructural systems. We formed a components. Airworthiness Program for Airplane Systems team to study aging nonstructural • Developing new methods for (EAPAS). The EAPAS report, dated October 15, 2002, can be found in the docket for this NPRM. systems and conduct detailed physical nondestructive testing of wiring. For a discussion of training, see ‘‘ATSRAC evaluations of aging airplanes. We The NTSB responded to the issues Recommendations for Rulemaking’’ in the same reviewed the report from that study defined in the Aging Transport docket.

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airplane manufacturers’ service task, ATSRAC examined the special emphasis. Three areas—the information, reviewing operators’ applicability of their previous cockpit, electrical power centers, and maintenance programs, and providing recommendations to this group of power feeder cables—were considered the FAA with recommendations to airplanes and identified issues unique critical. This is because chafing on improve the safety of those systems. to electrical wiring systems on small wiring in these areas, combined with ATSRAC’s work on those tasks focused transport category airplanes. ATSRAC’s flammable materials close by, can result on transport category airplanes. work in this area is continuing. in severe outcomes, such as wire-to- The ATSRAC review of data (The Another investigative group structure or wire-to-wire shorting and ‘‘Aging Systems Task Force Aging functioning within ATSRAC, whose arcing. Since a fire in these areas could Transport Systems Task 1 and Task 2 wiring inspections extended to the present a high risk to continued safe Final Report,’’ included in the docket) laboratory, was the Intrusive Inspection flight and landing, the IIWG yielded the following wiring-related Working Group (IIWG).2 The IIWG recommended more detailed findings: subjected selected wire installations on inspections for those three areas. The • Nine B–727 airplanes inspected; six decommissioned airplanes to an intent was to ensure potential problems 276 discrepancies found. intensive, detailed visual inspection, are identified and corrected. This effort • Nine B–737 airplanes inspected; followed by destructive testing and led to the development of an enhanced 399 discrepancies found. laboratory analysis (an intrusive zonal analysis procedure (EZAP) to • Seven B–747 airplanes inspected; inspection). They studied the results to assess risk for fire so that maintenance 238 discrepancies found. assess the state of wire on aged programs developed for wire systems in • Fourteen DC–8 airplanes inspected; airplanes as a function of wire type and such critical areas would require more 974 discrepancies found. service history. In addition, the results detailed inspections. An EZAP is a • Fifteen DC–9 airplanes inspected; from the visual inspections were specific wire-focused version of the 116 discrepancies found. zonal analysis procedure widely used to • compared with the nondestructive Fourteen DC–10 airplanes testing and laboratory analysis to analyze an airplane’s physical areas or inspected; 714 discrepancies found. zones. It’s used for developing • determine the efficacy of visual Three L–1011 airplanes inspected; inspections for the detection of age- maintenance tasks. One version of an 247 discrepancies found. EZAP is described in proposed AC 120– • related deterioration. Ten A–300 airplanes inspected; 408 The findings from the IIWG were XX, ‘‘Program to Enhance Transport discrepancies found. documented in the ‘‘Transport Aircraft Category Airplane Electrical Wiring The results from those five initial Intrusive Inspection Project (An Interconnection System Maintenance.’’ tasks showed that problems related to Analysis of the Wire Installations of Six ATSRAC made a number of wiring systems on aging airplanes were Decommissioned Aircraft) Final recommendations to the FAA. Those not entirely related to degradation over Report,’’ issued on December 29, 2000 recommendations and the FAA’s time. Inadequate installation and (from now on referred to as ‘‘Intrusive responses to them are included in the maintenance practices were identified Inspection Report’’). A copy is included docket in the document titled ‘‘ATSRAC as factors that can lead to what is in the docket. The findings showed that Recommendations for Rulemaking.’’ commonly referred to as an ‘‘aging wire-related failures have multiple ATSRAC working groups also produced system’’ problem. As a result, the scope causes. These include: four proposed advisory circulars (AC) as of ATSRAC’s work was expanded to • Localized heat damage. guidance for their recommended include improving the continued • Breaches in wire insulation. rulemaking. These proposed ACs are on airworthiness of airplane systems, • Wire embrittlement. the topics of wiring system particularly wiring systems. • Charred wire insulation. maintenance, training, standard wiring In May 2001, the FAA assigned four • Missing insulation. practices manuals, and the proposed new tasks to the committee to carry out • Chafing. subpart H, and will be briefly discussed the ATSRAC recommendations on the • Arcing. at the end of this preamble under the first five tasks (66 FR 29203). These next • Arc tracking. heading ‘‘Advisory Circulars.’’ tasks were to accomplish the following: • Reduced insulation resistance in • Address the need for new wire D. Fuel Tank Safety Rule certain wires. system certification requirements. In addition to the activities described • Defective and broken connectors. • Propose changes to the standard earlier, in response to the TWA 800 • Damage to connector backshells. wiring practices manual. accident, the FAA has developed an • Develop a training program for wire Both the nonintrusive, visual extensive program to address safety systems. inspections on the airplane and the problems associated specifically with • Develop maintenance criteria for intrusive inspections found most wiring fuel tanks. As mentioned previously, on wire systems. discrepancies were in areas of frequent May 7, 2001, the FAA issued a final rule The results discussed earlier from maintenance activity. In addition, fluid entitled, ‘‘Transport Airplane Fuel Tank ATSRAC’s review of the eight models of contamination and dust and dirt System Design Review, Flammability large transport category airplanes had accumulations were common in those Reduction, and Maintenance and heightened concern about whether areas. Inspection Requirements.’’ This similar conditions existed in small The Intrusive Inspection Report discussion refers to that final rule as the transport category airplanes (airplanes identified several areas that required ‘‘Fuel Tank Safety Rule.’’ The Fuel Tank with a 6- to 30-passenger seating Safety Rule was issued to address 2 The IIWG was a separate but parallel group capacity). As a result, in March 2002 (67 within the Aging Systems Task Force (ASTF). The unforeseen failure modes and the lack of FR 9799), the FAA assigned another task Air Transport Association (ATA) formed the ASTF specific maintenance procedures that to ATSRAC—to investigate and develop in June 1998 to review the effectiveness of could result in degrading the design recommendations to improve the safety maintenance on electrical wiring systems and safety features intended to preclude assess the condition of those systems on aircraft of electrical wiring systems in transport with type certificates (TC) older than 20 years. ignition of fuel tank vapors. category airplanes certificated for fewer When ATSRAC was formed in 1998, it continued One part of the Fuel Tank Safety Rule, than 30 passengers. In response to this the work started under the ASTF. Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88,

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(SFAR 88) applies to design approval This quote from FAA Wiring Policy many anomalies in electrical wiring holders of certain turbine-powered ANM–01–04 supports the need for more systems and their components, as well transport category airplanes, and any specific wiring information: ‘‘The FAA as contamination by dirt and debris. person who modifies those airplanes expects the applicant to provide Section 43.13(b) requires anyone later. SFAR 88 requires these regulated engineering drawings instead of merely performing maintenance or alteration to parties to perform safety assessments to statements such as ‘install in accordance do the work in such a manner and use confirm if the design of the fuel tank with industry standard practices,’ or materials of such a quality that the system precludes the existence of ‘install in accordance with AC 43.13 condition of the aircraft, airframe, ignition sources in the fuel tank system. [‘‘Acceptable Methods, Techniques, and aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance SFAR 88 also requires development of Practices—Aircraft Inspection and worked on will be at least equal to its design changes and maintenance and Repair’’].’ The FAA considers such original or properly altered condition inspection instructions to assure the statements inadequate because the (with regard to aerodynamic function, safety of the fuel tank system. standard practices cannot define the structural strength, resistance to Other sections of the Fuel Tank Safety location or routing of the wiring to the vibration and deterioration, and other Rule (referred to as the ‘‘operational level needed to ensure that new/ qualities affecting airworthiness). rules’’) require that operators of those modified wiring does not invalidate Anyone performing maintenance must airplanes include fuel tank safety previous certification findings for use methods, techniques, and practices maintenance and inspection existing airplane systems.’’ prescribed in the current manufacturer’s maintenance manual or ICA prepared by instructions in their existing III. General Discussion of the Proposal maintenance or inspection programs. the manufacturer, or methods, The requirements of those sections A. Nature of the Problem techniques, and practices referred to in § 43.13(a) as acceptable to the address two areas: Electrical wiring systems perform (i) The fuel tank systems of the Administrator. However, current roles essential to the safety of the entire practice has shown that, when wiring is ‘‘baseline’’ airplane (as originally made airplane. They distribute power by the TC holder); and inspected as part of the maintenance throughout the airplane, transmit program or following alterations, it is (ii) The ‘‘actual configuration’’ of the signals for control, and send data. Over not always cleaned appropriately for the fuel tank systems of each affected time, as more sophisticated inspection being performed. Generally, airplane (as modified or altered after computerized systems have been neither FAA inspectors nor airline original manufacture). introduced into airplane controls, their maintenance workers have been fully As discussed later, one purpose of electrical wires, cables, and associated aware of the vulnerable and critical this rulemaking is to make sure that the components have become increasingly condition of wire and fuel tank systems. implementation of this proposal for important to safe flight. Little focus has been placed on the wiring is aligned with the Historically, manufacturers have been importance of cleaning electrical wiring implementation of the Fuel Tank Safety required to provide maintenance-related during maintenance or alteration. The Rule. information for airplane systems. result has been to hasten the aging of E. Existing Wiring Certification However, there has never been a wiring. Regulations requirement for maintenance Extensive research by the FAA, in information specifically addressing partnership with the aviation industry Traditionally, wire has not been wiring systems. Since January 28, 1981, and other government agencies, has looked upon as having the same design approval holders have been shown that electrical wiring on importance to safety as the rest of the required to provide ICA for the airplane. transport category airplanes is subject to systems for which it provides the ICA must be prepared in accordance a breakdown of physical and functional electrical interconnection. Whereas a with Appendix H to part 25. In properties. This is not just a function of particular piece of electrical equipment developing ICA, the applicant must time, but also because of many stresses may be the focus of intense scrutiny include certain information. This on the wiring. These stressors include regarding its design, installation, and includes a description of the airplane chafing, vibration, contamination, and maintenance, the wires that provide the and its systems, servicing information, temperature variation, all of which can electrical interconnection to that and maintenance instructions, including cause cumulative damage. Each airplane equipment have not received the same the frequency and extent of inspections maintenance procedure or modification, amount of attention, except for the necessary to provide for the continued whether performed on the wiring wiring on engines. Additionally, in the airworthiness of the airplane. Currently, system itself or on surrounding past, system safety assessments usually § 25.1529 includes a requirement for an components, introduces possibilities for addressed only the effect of a wire FAA-approved Airworthiness unintentional damage, changes to the failure on the system itself. The safety Limitations section in the ICA. This previously approved wire design, or assessments have not usually identified section must list those mandatory contamination of the wiring systems by the effect of wire failures on other inspections, inspection intervals, fluids, foreign objects, and debris. As systems or on the airplane. replacement times, and related the aviation industry matures, there are Existing regulations fall short of procedures approved under §§ 25.571 more older airplanes in service, and the providing specific wiring-related and 25.981. There are no requirements wiring in those airplanes has had more requirements that we now recognize for specific information related to years of exposure to all these factors. should be included. For example, wiring. Electrical wiring system malfunctions current rules do not adequately address Airplanes must be continually resulting from inadequate design, requirements for wires in system maintained and inspected, and the alteration, maintenance, inspection, and separation, safety assessments, information contained in the ICA is repair practices can cause incidents and component selection, component used as a basis for developing a accidents involving smoke, fire, and/or identification, protection in cargo and maintenance program. Yet the loss of function. baggage compartments, and accessibility examinations of large transport Wire contamination is a major for inspection, maintenance, and repair. airplanes discussed earlier revealed concern, especially in older airplanes,

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and it occurs in many ways. Dust, dirt, to address several issues that have failures. We would continue to address and lint from airplane carpets and seats, arisen since they were adopted. Also, these situations ‘‘reactively’’ on a case- lavatory waste products, hydraulic because there are elements in the fuel by-case basis (as they occur) by issuing fluid, engine oil, corrosion prevention tank system that include wiring, those airworthiness directives. This is compounds, and galley spills all collect ICA could conflict with the unacceptable from a safety standpoint. over time. Liquids can corrode requirements for electrical systems in Improved certification regulations, connectors and other wiring this proposal. Additionally, the FAA inspection and maintenance programs, components and degrade wire believes that the compliance times for and ICA for wiring systems are needed insulation. In addition, electrical the regulations for those two systems, to address the potential for similar current flow in the wiring attracts dust, wiring systems and fuel tank systems, problems arising on existing and future dirt, and lint, and they are deposited on should be aligned. designs, and to ensure their long-term the wiring system and surrounding safety. airplane structure by cabin airflow. B. Relationship of This Proposal to Other Aging Aircraft Initiatives Rely on voluntary compliance with Leakage of fluid lines and spills make the intent of the rule by affected parties. the wiring grimy, so more dust, dirt, and The FAA, as part of a broader review Some in industry have suggested simply lint are attracted to them. and realignment of its Aging Airplane issuing ACs to give guidance on the To fully understand why wiring Program, has determined that certain changes that need to be made. Issuing system contamination is a major compliance dates in existing rules and ACs would depend on voluntary problem and a potential fire hazard that pending proposals could be better compliance, and would not be could prevent the safe operation of an aligned, so that operators can comply enforceable. While certain members of airplane, it is necessary to understand more efficiently with the requirements the industry would proceed with the ‘‘fire triangle’’ of combustion. The during scheduled maintenance. voluntary programs, others would not. fire triangle symbolizes three Compliance dates could also impact our The use of ACs alone would ensure elements—oxygen, heat or ignition ability to schedule oversight programs neither consistent results nor the source, and fuel. All three are necessary efficiently. In addition, based on our achievement of the safety objectives of for fire to occur. review, we have determined that certain this proposal for the current and future In an airplane, oxygen, the first substantive changes are needed to fleet. Previous voluntary safety element of the triangle, is always improve the cost-effectiveness of these assessments, such as those relating to present, because the heating and air- rules and proposals. Therefore, we have the thrust reverser and cargo door conditioning system must provide a decided to revise these requirements reviews, have been difficult to complete suitable environment for passengers. and proposals and align the compliance in a timely manner because they lacked Wiring can act as an ignition source schedules as practically as possible. enforceability. The proposed rules (second element), especially if damage, Notice of these changes and a such as cracked insulation or chafing, provide an enforceable means to require description of our Aging Airplane timely completion of the actions causes a short to ground or to another Program review appeared in the Federal conductor, or if it causes arcing. Fuel for identified as necessary to address aging Register on July 30, 2004 (69 FR 45936). electrical wiring systems. fire (third element) can be present in the The actions affected by these revisions form of dust, dirt, lint, hydraulic fluid, are this proposal and three others: IV. Overview of Proposal engine oil, engine fuel, and corrosion • Transport Airplane Fuel Tank prevention compound. Eliminating or The FAA proposes several rule System Design Review, Flammability changes that collectively provide a more mitigating any of these elements will Reduction, and Maintenance and help remove the fire threat. proactive management of wiring Inspection Requirements Special systems. These changes would require For obvious reasons, oxygen cannot Federal Aviation Regulation (Fuel Tank be eliminated from an airplane. Wiring development and implementation of Safety Rule) (final rule). ICA for wiring systems and subsequent systems provide critical functions, so • Aging Airplane Safety (interim final incorporation of those ICA into the they cannot be eliminated either. But rule). operators’ maintenance or inspection their ability to act as a fire ignition • Widespread Fatigue Damage program. We are also proposing changes source can be mitigated by proper (pending proposal). design, maintenance, and repair. The To prevent any conflicts within this in the certification rules to require, easiest element to alleviate is fuel for proposal, which affects fuel tank wiring during design and installation of fire. The improved maintenance issues, changes to the operational airplane systems, more attention to requirements in this proposal, as well as requirements of the Fuel Tank Safety conditions that could compromise wire the more rigorous design standards, are Rule requiring the incorporation of fuel safety and accessibility. intended to address the fuel and tank system maintenance and The result of these changes to the ignition elements of the fire triangle of inspection tasks are proposed as part of maintenance and certification programs combustion. this rulemaking. would be to remove, as far as possible, This NPRM also addresses the sources of ignition and fuel for fire from requirement that certain operators C. Alternatives to Rulemaking the wiring systems. In addition, a new incorporate ICA for their fuel tank Before proposing new rulemaking, the part 25 subpart dedicated to wiring systems into their maintenance or FAA must consider alternative ways to systems would be created. The current inspection programs, to ensure the solve the safety issues under part 25 regulations for wire would be continued safe operation of those design consideration. Following is a brief moved into this new subpart and features that minimize the potential for discussion of two of the alternatives we combined with new regulations. An an ignition source in the fuel tank considered during deliberations on this alignment of the compliance times for system. Although there are existing rulemaking proposal. incorporation of the wire and fuel tank regulations that require these ICA, the No new regulatory action. The FAA ICA would also occur to enable a more FAA believes, based on lessons learned believes that the result of no action comprehensive treatment of those ICA from SFAR 88 and industry comments, would be continued incidents and and accomplishment of the maintenance that the existing operational rules need accidents resulting from wiring system instructions at time intervals consistent

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with typical airplane maintenance before they happen. Causes of wire maintaining and modifying them. checks. degradation must be addressed Maintenance personnel need to be The FAA believes that traditional separately and collectively, and aware that current industry practice for ways of addressing wiring are no longer analyzed in relation to the entire maintenance and inspection of these enough. Because wire damage or airplane. Based on the findings and systems is inadequate and must be degradation can be the result of research described earlier in this improved, as provided by this proposal. successive and interactive factors document, the FAA has determined that The changes proposed in this NPRM introduced over time, the approach to air carriers, operators, TC holders, were derived from the maintenance, ensuring wiring safety must be supplemental type certificate (STC) inspection, design, and alteration best analytical, multilayered, and proactive, holders, repair stations, and certificated practices developed through extensive rather than reactive. An analytical maintenance personnel need to place research by ATSRAC and other groups, approach means assessing logically the more emphasis on wiring and fuel tank possibilities for fire occurring. A including the White House Commission systems when performing maintenance 3 multilayered approach means and alterations. Currently, other than on Aviation Safety and Security, the addressing multiple layers of stressors, the visual inspections required by National Science and Technology like chafing, vibration, temperature maintenance or inspection programs, Council Committee on Technology Wire change, and modification that act on maintenance is not normally performed System Safety Interagency Working 4 wiring in succession or concurrently on these systems unless an obvious Group, the IIWG, and safety reviews and can cause cumulative damage to an discrepancy is identified. This proposal required in accordance with SFAR 88. electrical system. A proactive approach is designed to heighten awareness of the The following table summarizes the means addressing conditions affecting criticality of wiring systems and to proposed regulatory changes that are safe flight that we know can happen— change the current approach to discussed in detail in this section.

SUMMARY OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING IN THIS NPRM

Affected part of 14 CFR Description of proposal Applies to

1 ...... Adds the abbreviation ‘‘EWIS’’. 25 ...... Harmonization rules ...... Applicants for type, amended, and supplemental type certificates 25 ...... New subpart H containing: New and revised wire-re- Applicants for type, amended, and supplemental type lated certification requirements including require- certificates ments to develop ICA for electrical wiring inter- connection systems. 25 ...... New subpart I containing: New requirements to develop Type certificate holders for large transport category air- ICA for electrical wiring interconnection systems in planes and certain applicants for type, amended and accordance with proposed § 25.1539 and the revised supplemental type certificates Appendix H for the current specified fleet. Parts 121/129 ...... Requirement to incorporate new EWIS ICA into mainte- U.S. certificate holders and foreign persons operating nance program (included in new subparts for Contin- U.S. registered large transport category airplanes ued Airworthiness). Parts 91/121/125/129 ...... New subparts (L, Y, M, and B respectively) for Contin- U.S. certificate holders and foreign persons operating ued Airworthiness containing parts 121/129 EWIS U.S. registered large transport category airplanes. ICA requirements (above) and: • Requirement to incorporate fuel tank ICA into mainte- nance program. • Redesignation of other existing requirements into these new subparts

Currently, part 25 does not have a ATSRAC recommended placing part No single regulation was moved in its separate subpart governing wiring. 25 wiring-related regulations into one entirety to the new subpart, but Certification rules that apply to wiring section. This change would increase the applicable portions of regulations were appear throughout the regulations, visibility of these regulations and moved. Some regulations easily lent under the headings ‘‘Design and facilitate a comprehensive process for themselves to division into wire and Construction,’’ ‘‘Powerplant,’’ and the design and certification of wire non-wire portions, while others did not. ‘‘Equipment.’’ In some of these rules, systems. ATSRAC reviewed the current In some cases it was difficult to remove the term ‘‘wiring’’ is not specifically part 25 to identify each regulation that the wire-related portion and maintain used. related to wiring, either directly or the continuity of the existing regulation. The discussion of proposed changes indirectly. Each wire-related regulation In those cases, the regulation was not moved to subpart H. Instead, the current to part 25 is broken into four parts: was then reviewed to determine if it • Part 25 Subpart H—Electrical regulation remained in place and a new should be moved (in whole or in part) subpart H regulation was created to state Wiring Interconnection Systems (EWIS). into the proposed new subpart. As a • the importance of wiring systems to the Part 25 Subpart I—Continued result of ATSRAC’s recommendations, safe design of the system that is the Airworthiness. this NPRM would change some existing subject of the existing regulation. • Other Proposed Changes to Part 25. wire requirements, add new ones, and Portions of some current regulations • Part 25 Electrical System compile all of them into a new subpart: that were moved to the new subpart Harmonization Rules. subpart H of part 25. were divided and distributed among

3 ‘‘Final Report to President Clinton, February 12, 4 ‘‘Review of Federal Programs for Wire System 1997,’’ a copy of which is in the docket. Safety,’’ November 2000, in the docket.

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several new subpart H sections to follow to EWIS. We do not intend to change to complete an electrical connection is the logical structure of the new subpart. their legal effect in any other way. included in the EWIS definition. The Accordingly, there is not always a one- exception to this is the mating Section 25.1701 Definition to-one correspondence between the connection on those devices that are existing regulations and the new subpart Proposed § 25.1701 would define excluded from the proposed definition. H regulations. A table showing the what constitutes an EWIS for the The excepted devices are addressed correlation between proposed new purposes of complying with the later in this discussion. regulations and the existing regulations proposed subpart H requirements and Connector accessories fall under the can be found in APPENDIX B. The table other EWIS-related requirements of definition of EWIS. Such accessories in APPENDIX C compares the existing parts 25, 121, and 129. include, but are not limited to, regulations to the proposed new ones. Current regulations do not provide a backshells, strain reliefs, grommets, and The APPENDIX D table shows which of definition of a wiring system. Without sealing plugs. Electrical connections to the current wire-related rules must be this definition, the proposed rules could devices such as relays, interrupters, changed to accommodate the new be inconsistently applied to various switches, contactors, terminal blocks, subpart and which will remain the wire-related components. To completely and feed-through connectors are parts of same. address the safety issues associated with an EWIS. For example, the connection Adoption of the proposed new and wiring systems, requirements must device on a relay is considered part of revised requirements and advisory address not only the wiring itself, but the EWIS, but the relay mechanism is material would help prevent future also components and devices that are not, because it is a termination point. A occurrences of the types of incidents required to adequately install and splice can be considered an electrical and accidents described in this NPRM. identify each wire. Various components connector because it performs the same The creation of a new part 25 subpart and devices needed to route and role as other connection devices by for all existing, revised, and new wire identify wires are critical in ensuring providing an electrical connection system certification requirements would that a proper electrical interconnection between two or more wires. The failure strengthen the role of properly designed, is made and maintained. of a splice or relay connection could installed, and maintained wire systems For the purposes of this NPRM, the create a hazardous situation by exposing in increasing the safety of flight. It term ‘‘wire’’ means bare and/or bare conductors or impairing system would also provide the regulatory tools insulated wire used for the purpose of functionality. to help ensure this outcome and locate electrical energy transmission, Although a bus bar is not a all applicable regulations in a single grounding, or bonding. This includes ‘‘connector’’ in the traditional sense, it place that is easy to reference and use. electrical cables, coaxial cables, ribbon is a collector and distribution device for Certain vintage airplanes type cables, power feeders, and databuses. electrical energy and thus must be certificated before 1958, the beginning A proper electrical interconnection treated as part of an EWIS. of the jet age, would be excluded from between two or more points requires Wire or wire bundles require devices the requirements of this proposal. They more than just wire. Making the to physically route and support them, are named in paragraph (f) of § 25.1805 connection in a manner that ensures such as clamps, brackets, standoffs, and and in the final paragraph of each of the both functionality and safety requires other such components. These are proposed fuel tank and EWIS operating various types of components, of which included in the EWIS definition. Cable rules. There are no known wire is one. Therefore, a clear definition ties are included because they are used reciprocating-powered transport of an electrical interconnection is to hold multiple wires together and in category airplanes currently in necessary. The proposed regulation place. The failure of one or more of scheduled passenger service, and the provides this and at the same time these EWIS components could affect the few remaining in cargo service would be introduces the term ‘‘electrical wiring ability of the wire to perform its excluded. Compliance is not required interconnection system (EWIS)’’ to intended function. It could cause for these specific older airplanes describe that interconnection. The term collateral damage to other wires in the because their advanced age or small EWIS means any wire, wiring device, or same or adjacent bundles or cause the numbers would likely make compliance combination of these, including bundle to fail in a way that would cause economically impractical. termination devices, installed in the structural damage or ignite flammable airplane for transmitting electrical material, fluid, or vapors in the area. V. Section-by-Section Discussion of energy between two or more termination Some wires must pass through Proposed Rules points. The proposed regulation pressure bulkheads, so a pressure seal is The FAA proposes to add the expands on this basic statement to needed. Failure of a pressure seal could abbreviation for electrical wiring clearly identify which wire-related cause damage to the wires in the wire interconnection systems (EWIS) to 14 components are included in the EWIS bundle and affect the functioning of the CFR part 1—Definitions and definition and which are not. Most system they support. Some wire bundles Abbreviations. The purpose of this wires are routed with other wires that use shields or braids to protect them addition is to ensure the use of a make up wire bundles and cable from electromagnetic radiation, common term for EWIS throughout the assemblies (or ‘‘looms,’’ as they are lightning, abrasion, and other types of regulations. More detailed analysis of sometimes called). A single wire may physical damage. Failure of the shields the other proposed changes and also be routed separately. The same or braid could cause, or allow, the wires additions is outlined below. definition of an EWIS is applied to a to be damaged. It could also allow single wire or to a bundle containing unwanted electrical energy to be A. Part 25 Subpart H—Electrical Wiring hundreds of wires. coupled into systems and cause system Interconnection Systems (EWIS) To complete an electrical connection, malfunction. Thus, shields, braids, and The proposed subpart H consists of various types of connectors are pressure seals must be considered part relocated, revised, and new regulations necessary. Examples are MS connectors of the EWIS and treated as such. about EWIS. Unless we say otherwise, (MS means military specification), D- Sometimes adequate physical our purpose in moving requirements to subminiature connectors, and rack and separation distance is not possible, and subpart H is to ensure their application panel connectors. Any connector used some sort of protective sleeving may be

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used. Since the sleeving is used to environments in which it will be Because of its generality and the fact achieve separation, it must be operated. that the FAA has not published any considered part of the EWIS. This proposal also does not apply to advisory circular for this rule, § 25.1301 Conduits are included in the proposal miscellaneous electrical equipment if has not been applied in a standardized because they are used to provide that equipment has been adequately way. Currently, § 25.1301 is applicable protection for wires as well as provide qualified to environmental conditions to wire and its associated components physical separation. Conduits that have and testing procedures approved by the but it does not provide sufficient wire- electrical termination for bonding are FAA, unless that equipment is specific requirements to ensure proper considered part of an EWIS because the specifically included in the proposed function and installation of EWIS. It failure of the bonding could create a § 25.1701 as discussed in the following does not adequately cover all factors hazardous situation. paragraph. that need to be considered when The definition of an EWIS includes The definition of EWIS includes selecting, identifying, and installing labels or other means used for electrical wiring interconnection system wiring components. identification. This supports the components inside shelves, panels, The requirements of § 25.1301 are the proposed § 25.1711 requiring new racks, junction boxes, distribution basis for the new § 25.1703, but those identification criteria for wires and panels, back-planes of equipment racks requirements are supplemented by new other EWIS components. Discussion of including circuit board back-planes, and ones. Requirements from other existing the proposed labeling requirements wire integration units. We have sections are also moved into the new appears under the heading for § 25.1711. included the components in this type of regulation, so that the proposed rule The proposed regulation does not equipment because it, unlike avionics would specifically apply to EWIS cover portable, carry-on, or other equipment, is typically designed and components. Adoption would ensure electrical equipment not certified for made for a particular airplane model or that the selection of wires and other installation on the airplane under part series of models. The same requirements EWIS components, and their 25. Examples of items not included are that apply to airplane EWIS components installation, are carried out in a safe, laptop computers and portable audio must also be applied to the components consistent, and standardized manner. and/or video or other consumer devices inside that equipment. Avionics Section 25.1703(a)(1) would require typically carried on-board by passengers components must be sent back to their that each EWIS component be of a kind for personal use. Increasingly, flight and manufacturer or a specialized repair and design appropriate to its intended cabin crew are using laptop computers shop for service. But this type of function. While § 25.1301(a) contains in the performance of their duties. As equipment is maintained, repaired, and the same requirements, § 25.1703(a)(1) stated, laptops are not part of the EWIS modified by the same personnel who is specific to EWIS components. In this definition, but any electrical connection maintain, repair, and modify the EWIS context, the requirement means that used to support power and/or signal in the rest of the airplane. In an components must be qualified for transmission that is part of the airplane electrical distribution panel system, for airborne use, or otherwise specifically TC, and that is used for the laptop or example, separation must be designed assessed as acceptable for their intended other carry-on items, is covered by the and maintained within the panel just as use. To be ‘‘appropriate’’ means that the proposed definition. in the EWIS leading up to that panel. equipment is used in a manner for The proposed EWIS definition does Identification of components inside the which it was designed. For example, a not cover fiber optic cable because fiber panel is just as important as for those wire rated at 150 degrees Celsius would optic cable does not transmit electrical outside the panel since the wiring not be appropriate for installation in an energy. But since fiber optics can inside the panel is treated much the airplane zone where the temperature provide functions (for example, data same. Also, while this type of exceeds 150 degrees Celsius. Wire and transmission) similar to those provided equipment is designed for its intended other components made for household by wire, it is being expressly eliminated function and is manufactured and or consumer products use would not be from the EWIS definition to avoid installed to the same standards as other appropriate for airborne use because confusion. EWIS, it is typically not qualified to an they are manufactured for the consumer The proposed definition excludes environmental standard such as RTCA market and not for use in an airborne electrical wiring interconnection system DO–160. environment. Exceptions to this would components inside avionics equipment be wire or other consumer components (high-frequency communication radio or Section 25.1703 Function and shown to comply with all the applicable flight data recorder, for instance), or the Installation: EWIS airworthiness requirements of part 25. mating electrical connectors mounted Proposed § 25.1703 would require In the past this showing of compliance on that equipment. Such equipment is that applicants select EWIS components has proven to be difficult because produced by various manufacturers for that are of a kind and design appropriate manufacturers of consumer products use on a broad range of airplane models to their intended function. Factors such have been reluctant to modify their and is designed and built to various as the components’ design limitations, designs to accommodate aviation use. performance and environmental functionality, and susceptibility to arc Aviation use of consumer products specifications. Environmental testing, tracking and moisture must be represents too small a market. either by means of RTCA (Radio considered when selecting EWIS Other factors that must be considered Technical Commission for Aeronautics) components. for EWIS component selection are Document No. RTCA DO–160, Section 25.1301 requires that each mechanical strength, voltage drop, EUROCAE 55 specification item of installed equipment be of a kind required bend radius, and expected (specification of the European and design appropriate to its intended service life. Expected service life means Organization for Civil Aviation function, be labeled (identified), be the expected service lifetime of the Equipment), or other environmental installed according to any limitations EWIS. This is not normally less than the qualification procedures approved by specified for it, and function properly expected service life of the aircraft the FAA, ensures that the EWIS when installed. This is a general ‘‘catch- structure. If the expected service life contained within avionics equipment is all’’ regulation applicable to equipment requires that all or some of the EWIS robust and well suited for the airborne and systems certified under subpart F. components be replaced at certain

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intervals, then these intervals must be Systems on Transport Category known moisture build-up be adequately specified in the ICA as required by Airplanes,’’ will clarify these protected to minimize moisture’s § 25.1529. distinctions. hazardous effects. This is to ensure that Section 25.1703(a)(2) requires that Section 25.1703(a)(4) is a new all practical means are used to ensure EWIS components be installed requirement to ensure that EWIS damage from fluid contact with according to their limitations. As used components be designed and installed components does not occur. Wires here, limitations means the design and so mechanical strain is minimized. This routed near a lavatory, galley area, installation requirements of the means the EWIS installation must be hydraulic lines, severe wind and particular EWIS component. Examples designed such that strain on the wires moisture problem areas such as wheel of EWIS component limitations are would not be so great as to cause wire wells and wing trailing edges, and any maximum operating temperature, degree or other components to fail. This other area of the airplane where of moisture resistance, voltage drop, requirement would ensure that adequate moisture collection could be a concern maximum current-carrying capability, consideration is given to mechanical must be adequately protected from and tensile strength. Section 25.1301(c) strain when selecting wire and cables, possible adverse effects of exposure to contains that requirement, but fails to clamps, strain reliefs, stand-offs, and the types of moisture in these areas. specifically address the unique other devices used to route and support If a TC includes subpart H in its characteristics of EWIS. EWIS the wire bundle. certification basis, the TC holder would component selection and installation Proposed § 25.1703(b) would require have to show compliance with the design must take into account various that selection of wires for installation proposed EWIS requirements. For future environmental factors including, but not takes into account known characteristics modifications of those TCs, use of the limited to, vibration, temperature, of different wire types in relation to same design practices as those used by moisture, exposure to the elements or each specific application, to minimize the TC holder will enable the modifier chemicals (de-icing fluid, for instance), risk of damage. It is important to select to substantiate compliance with the insulation type, and type of clamp. For the aircraft wire type whose subpart H requirements based on a example, wire bundle adhesive clamps construction matches the application comparison with the TC holder’s are known to work loose during aircraft environment. The wire type selected methods. If modifiers choose to deviate operation. Attention must be given to must be constructed for the most severe from those design practices, they would the selection of and methods of affixing environment likely to be encountered in have to substantiate compliance this type of wire bundle support and it service. Among other things, the independently. They would also have to must be shown that this type of clamp proposed section would ensure that consider the design practices used by is appropriate for the environment in insulation types susceptible to arc the TC holder in order to justify their which it will be used. tracking be used only in environments own choice of components. Section 25.1703(a)(3) would require that will minimize the likelihood of that In summary, these new rules would that EWIS function properly when phenomenon. Arc tracking is a require the designer and installer to be installed. This is the same requirement phenomenon in which a conductive careful in wire type choices, system as § 25.1301(d). However, the carbon path forms across an insulating design, and installation design. The § 25.1301(d) requirement is so general surface. A breach in the insulation existing § 25.1301 would be amended to that it is applied in a nonstandardized allows arcing. The arcing carbonizes the contain a reference to § 25.1703 for manner. Sometimes the term ‘‘function insulation. The carbon residue is EWIS component requirements. properly when installed’’ has been electrically conductive. The carbon path Section 25.1705 System Safety: EWIS interpreted to mean that even non- then provides a short circuit path safety-related functions of a given through which current can flow. This Proposed § 25.1705 would require system must function in the manner for can occur on either dry or wet wires. applicants to perform a system safety which it was designed. The key word in Certain types of wire insulation are assessment of the EWIS. The safety understanding the intent of this more susceptible to arc tracking than assessment must consider the effects proposed section is ‘‘properly,’’ as that others. Wire insulated with aromatic that both physical and functional relates to airworthiness of the airplane polyimide is one type that is susceptible failures of EWIS would have on the in which the electrical wiring to arc tracking. While this type of airplane’s safety. Based on that safety interconnection systems are installed. insulation is well suited for use in very assessment, it must be shown that each For an EWIS component to function low or high temperature environments, EWIS failure considered to be hazardous properly means that it must be capable it generally should not be used in areas is extremely remote. Each EWIS failure of safely performing the function for of an airplane prone to excessive considered to be catastrophic must be which it was designed. For example, the moisture or vibration, such as those shown to be extremely improbable and fact that an airplane’s in-flight areas designated as severe wind and not result from a single failure. entertainment (IFE) system fails to moisture problem (SWAMP) areas The current regulation requiring deliver satisfactory picture or sound without taking into account this system safety assessments is § 25.1309. quality is not what the term ‘‘properly’’ insulation property’s unique But current § 25.1309 practice does not refers to and is not a certification issue. characteristics. Installations exposed to lead to the type of analysis that fully However, the failure of an EWIS vibration and constant flexing in a ensures all EWIS failure conditions component has the potential for being a moisture-prone area would need wire affecting airplane-level safety are safety hazard whether it is part of a type suitable for that environment. considered. This is because the current safety-related system or an IFE system. Proposed § 25.1703(c) would require § 25.1309(a) only covers systems and Therefore, EWIS components must that design and installation of the main equipment that are ‘‘required by this always function properly when power cables allow for a reasonable subchapter,’’ and wiring for nonrequired installed, no matter what system they degree of deformation and stretching systems is sometimes ignored. The are part of. The guidance material being without failure. This requirement now current safety analysis requirements of prepared to accompany the proposed resides in § 25.869(a)(3). § 25.1309(b) and (d) have not always subpart H, AC 25,17XX, ‘‘Certification Proposed § 25.1703(d) requires that been applied to wire associated with the of Electrical Wiring Interconnection EWIS components located in areas of airplane systems that are covered by the

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same rule. When they are, there is § 25.1309 does not provide that sufficient requirements to ensure such evidence of inadequate and inconsistent assurance. modifications maintain the level of application. This is especially true for The FAA has issued over 100 wire- safety intended by the regulation. miscellaneous electrical equipment that related airworthiness directives (AD) Accordingly, a more comprehensive is not required, such as IFE systems. since 1998. Over 50 of those were issued and specific safety assessment Traditional thinking about these since 1999 to correct wiring deficiencies regulation for EWIS is necessary. The nonrequired systems has been that, on the Model MD–11 airplane as objective of the proposed § 25.1705 is to since they are not required, and the delivered by the manufacturer. focus attention on EWIS and the safety function they provide is not necessary Airplanes as delivered from all transport issues associated with them by using the for the safety of the airplane, their category airplane manufacturers have concepts of § 25.1309 to provide for failure could not affect the safety of the been the subject of mandatory corrective consistent use of a more thorough and airplane. This is not a valid assumption action to correct safety-related wiring structured analysis of aircraft wiring because failure of an electrical wire can problems. and its associated components. Similarly, the FAA has issued many have hazardous or even catastrophic The integrated nature of wiring and ADs to correct unsafe EWIS installations results regardless of the system it is the potential severity of failures demand because of postdelivery modifications. associated with. Wire failure can cause a more structured safety analysis One example of this involves the IFE serious physical and functional damage approach than that traditionally used system installed on the Swissair MD–11 whether the wire or other EWIS under the current, or the ARAC’s airplane that crashed off the coast of components are associated with an proposed revision to, § 25.1309. There Nova Scotia and was discussed autoland system or an IFE system. An are more failure modes that need to be example of this is arcing from a shorted previously in this document. That modification is a clear case of not addressed than have been addressed wire cutting through flight control previously with traditional analyses cables. considering the effect that EWIS failures can have on airplane safety. The (arcing events that occur without The Aviation Rulemaking Advisory airplane was modified using the tripping circuit breakers, resulting in Committee (ARAC), based on the work supplemental type certification process complete wire bundle failures and fire; of its System Design and Analysis to add the IFE system. That system or wire bundle failures that lead to Harmonization Working Group, has contained roughly 750 separate structural damage, for example). Current made recommendations to the FAA for electronic boxes and was installed § 25.1309 system safety assessments changes to the current § 25.1309. We are without an adequate safety assessment typically evaluate effects of wire failures evaluating those recommendations. (A per § 25.1309. Although this IFE system on system functions. But they have not copy of those recommendations has consumed relatively large amounts of considered physical wire failure as a been placed in the docket for reference.) electrical power and its components and cause of the failure of other wires within We have considered the ARAC wiring were distributed throughout, the EWIS. The traditional assessments recommendations in developing the below, and above the entire passenger look at external factors like rotor burst, proposed § 25.1705. cabin, the applicant did not thoroughly lightning, and hydraulic line rupture, One of the factors we considered in address the safety implications of but not at internal factors, like a single developing the proposed § 25.1705 is routing the system wire in the same wire chafing or arcing event, as the that the proposed ARAC revisions to bundles as wire from other airplane cause of the failure of functions § 25.1309 would exempt certain systems, thus raising a concern for supported by the EWIS. Compliance airplane systems, including the EWIS common cause failure to multiple with the proposed § 25.1705 would components associated with those essential systems. In many instances the require addressing those failure modes systems, from having to comply with its applicant could not identify what at the airplane level. This means that requirements. Specifically, ARAC airplane systems were associated with EWIS failures would need to be recommends that jamming of flight the wire in the bundles modified to analyzed to determine what effect they control surfaces or pilot controls route the IFE wiring. With the adoption would have on the safe operation of the covered by § 25.671(c)(3) be exempt of the proposed § 25.1705, this IFE airplane. from the requirements of § 25.1309. system, as designed and installed on an The proposed rule language is Single failures covered by § 25.735(b)(1) airplane with the proposed subpart H in consistent with § 25.1309 and is meant and the failure effects covered by its type certification basis, would be to work in conjunction with the §§ 25.810(a)(1)(v) and 25.812 would also subjected to a more rigorous safety § 25.1309 assessments performed on be excepted from the revision to assessment that would identify any airplane systems. It would require that § 25.1309(b) recommended by ARAC. inappropriate routing and force a design the probability of a hazardous failure This includes wiring or other EWIS change. condition be extremely remote and that components associated with those Many other examples of type design the probability of a catastrophic failure systems. In part, proposed § 25.1705 modifications provide evidence that condition be extremely improbable and would ensure coverage of the EWIS modifiers do not always give due not result from a single failure. The associated with those systems. consideration to the impact on safety terminology and meaning of the There are many examples of that installation of a new or modified classifications of EWIS failure inadequate EWIS designs that have later system may have. Modifiers continue to conditions are identical to those been determined to be unsafe. Adoption route the EWIS needed for proposed by ARAC in August 2002. The of proposed § 25.1705 would help modifications with, or in close proposed AC produced by that working ensure that those unsafe design proximity to, wiring from other airplane group discussing this, titled ‘‘System practices are not repeated in the future systems without identifying protection Design and Analysis,’’ is in the docket by requiring that EWIS failure mechanisms for those systems. The for this NPRM. The following table conditions affecting airplane-level safety current § 25.1309 and revisions to it identifies and explains the failure are fully considered. The current recommended by ARAC do not contain condition terms.

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CLASSIFICATION OF FAILURE CONDITIONS

Term Explanation

No Safety Effect ...... Failure conditions that would have no effect on safety; for example failure conditions that would not affect the operational capability of the airplane or increase flightcrew workload. Minor ...... Failure conditions that would not significantly reduce airplane safety, and involve flightcrew actions that are well within their capabilities. Minor failure conditions may include, for example: • a slight reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities; • a slight increase in flightcrew workload, such as routine flight plan changes; or • some physical discomfort to passengers or cabin crew. Major ...... Failure conditions that would reduce the capability of the airplane or the ability of the flightcrew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be, for example: • a significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities; • a significant increase in flightcrew workload or in conditions impairing flightcrew efficiency; • discomfort to the flightcrew; or • physical distress to passengers or cabin crew, possibly including injuries. Hazardous ...... Failure conditions that would reduce the capability of the airplane or the ability of the flightcrew to cope with adverse operating conditions to the extent that there would be, for example: • a large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities; or • physical distress or excessive workload such that the flightcrew cannot be relied upon to perform their tasks accurately or completely; or • serious or fatal injuries to a relatively small number of persons other than the flightcrew. Catastrophic ...... Failure conditions that would result in multiple fatalities, usually with the loss of the airplane. (Note: A cata- strophic failure condition was defined differently in previous versions of § 25.1309 and in accompanying advisory material as ‘‘a failure condition that would prevent continued safe flight and landing.’’)

The proposed § 25.1705 would being added for the modification would strategies can be developed and applied. complement the § 25.1309 assessments need to be routed separately from The process is repeated until all known by raising the quality of the safety existing airplane wiring. unsafe features are eliminated. The assessment with respect to EWIS Flowchart 1 and Flowchart 2, difference between the processes failures that would not be identified contained in Appendix E of this notice, identified in the two flowcharts is that using the traditional methods of illustrate the type of analysis necessary in Flowchart 1, all the systems and compliance with § 25.1309. The analysis to show compliance with the proposed associated functions whose wires are in required to show compliance with the § 25.1705. Two separate cases are a bundle are known. In Flowchart 2, proposed regulation is based on a considered. Flowchart 1 is applicable to new wire is routed separately from qualitative approach to assessing EWIS pre-type-certification work and to TCs existing wire. Otherwise, the analysis is safety as opposed to a numerical and STCs when the modifier has all the the same. probability-based quantitative analysis. data necessary to perform the analysis. In summary, the need for this new The intent is not to examine each If the analysis is conducted according to regulation is shown by experience on individual wire and its relation to other this flowchart, the available data must the part of the FAA and other wires, but rather to ensure that there are include identification of systems governmental regulatory authorities and no unacceptable hazards to the airplane. supported by the EWIS under by service histories. Many wire-related This does not preclude the possibility consideration for modification and the incidents and accidents have occurred. that, should the analysis identify a functions associated with them. The Post-TC modifications have repeatedly failure in a given wire bundle or original aircraft manufacturer has most introduced wiring safety problems. component(s) that may lead to a of this data and would normally follow Airplane manufacturers have delivered catastrophic failure condition, the the Flowchart 1 method. However, this airplanes that have wiring problems design mitigation process may lead to may not always be the case when the when they leave the factory, or such performing a complete analysis of each manufacturer modifies an airplane that problems have later developed in wire in the relevant bundle. has been previously modified by service, as evidenced by resulting another party. mandatory corrective actions. Adoption The type of analysis used to show of this proposal would ensure that such The analysis depicted in Flowchart 2 compliance with the proposed § 25.1705 problems are fully considered and would apply to modifiers for post-TC can vary depending on the knowledge of addressed as part of the type modification who cannot identify the the designers or modifiers of an EWIS. certification process. As stated earlier, it is important that systems or functions contained in EWIS there is thorough knowledge of what being considered for modification. Section 25.1709 System Separation: systems and functions the other wires in In both analyses, EWIS functional and EWIS the same and surrounding bundles physical failures are addressed. It is the Proposed § 25.1709 would require support. In the case of a post-TC physical portion that has been neglected applicants to design EWIS with modification, without this information in past system safety analyses. The appropriate separation to minimize the it would be impossible to state that the proposed regulation would require an possibility of hazardous effects upon the modified system could not fail in a way applicant to identify any physical airplane or its systems. that would cause a hazardous or failure of EWIS that can cause damage Safe operation of airplanes depends in catastrophic event. If this information is to co-located EWIS or other surrounding part on the safe transfer of electrical not available to the modifier, then the systems or structure, or injury to people. energy, a function provided by airplane EWIS system must be designed to Once those physical failures are EWIS. If an EWIS failure should occur, accommodate this lack of knowledge. identified, their severity can be the separation between the failed EWIS This would typically mean that wire determined and design mitigation and other EWIS and airplane systems

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plays an important role in ensuring that 2-inch separation from hydraulic lines performed by the signals in the EWIS any hazardous effects of the failure are is necessary. The manufacturer further and adjacent EWIS. mitigated to an acceptable level. Thus, decides that one clamp every 10 inches (2) Installation design features, it is vital to design and install wiring is needed to maintain that separation. including the number, type, and systems with adequate separation from However, there is one localized area location of support devices along the those systems whose interaction with where a single clamp failure would wire path. the wire could create hazardous effects. potentially create a hazard. This is (3) The maximum amount of slack Currently, part 25 certification rules do because the area in question is a high wire resulting from wire bundle build not adequately address wire system vibration, high temperature area, subject tolerances and other wire bundle separation. The rules currently used to to exposure to moisture. So the clamp manufacturing variabilities. require system separation are in this particular area is exposed to (4) Probable variations in the § 25.1353(a), (b), and (c), but service severe environmental conditions that installation of the wiring and adjacent experience has shown that compliance could lead to its accelerated wiring, including position of wire with these requirements, with regard to degradation. The manufacturer decides support devices and amount of wire wiring systems, has not always been that using just a single clamp every 10 slack possible. adequate. This is due in part to their inches in this area would not suffice to (5) The intended operating lack of specific wording about which preclude a hazardous event. The environment, including amount of wiring systems are covered and which manufacturer prescribes use of double deflection or relative movement systems those wires are meant to be clamps every 10 inches in that area. possible and the effect of failure of a separated from. The proposed rule The requirements of proposed wire support or other separation means. (6) Maintenance practices as defined corrects these inadequacies by stating § 25.1709 do not preclude use of valid by the airplane manufacturer’s standard specifically that it applies to each EWIS component failure rates if the applicant wiring practices manual and the ICA on the airplane, and mandating specific chooses to use a probability argument in required by § 25.1529 and proposed separation requirements for certain addition to the design assessment to § 25.1739. airplane systems known to have demonstrate compliance. It also does (7) The maximum temperature potential for creating a hazardous not preclude the FAA from requiring generated by adjacent wire/wire bundles condition. The term ‘‘hazardous such an analysis if the applicant cannot during normal and fault conditions. condition’’ in this proposed rule is used adequately demonstrate that hazardous The FAA recognizes that some in a different context than it is used in conditions will be prevented solely by airplane models may have localized the proposed § 25.1705. Proposed using the qualitative design assessment. areas where maintaining the minimum § 25.1705 uses the terms ‘‘hazardous’’ As used in the proposed rule, the term physical separation distance is not and ‘‘catastrophic’’ in the context of ‘‘separation’’ is a measure of physical feasible. In those cases, other means of assigning a numerical probability to distance. The purpose of separation is to ensuring equivalent minimum physical failures that can cause a failure prevent hazards of arcing between wires separation may be acceptable, if testing condition. Hazardous failure conditions in a single bundle, between two or more or analysis demonstrates that safe and catastrophic failure conditions are bundles, or between an electrical bundle operation of the airplane is not defined in the discussion of the and a non-electrical system or structure. jeopardized. The testing or analysis proposed § 25.1705. In proposed In some cases, the proposal would allow program must be conservative and § 25.1709, the term hazardous condition separation to be achieved with a barrier consider the worst possible conditions. means that the applicant must perform or other means shown to be at least Paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) of a qualitative design assessment of the equivalent to the necessary physical proposed § 25.1709 contain EWIS- installed EWIS. This assessment would distance. However, distance separation related requirements derived from the involve using reasonable engineering is preferred because service experience existing regulations applying to and manufacturing judgment and shows that use of barriers such as electrical power generation systems and assessing relevant service history to conduits can cause wire damage or lead electrical equipment and installations decide whether an EWIS, any other type to maintenance errors. In some cases, (§§ 25.1351 and 25.1353). Section of system, or any structural component wire bundle sleeving is used to provide 25.1351 does not need any revision to could fail in such a way that a condition separation, although the sleeving itself support the proposed § 25.1709, but affecting the airplane’s ability to is susceptible to the same types of § 25.1353 is amended to reference continue safe operation could result. A damage as wire insulation. § 25.1709. numerical probability assessment may Determining the necessary amount of The proposed requirements of still be required under the requirements physical separation distance is essential. § 25.1709(a) were derived from existing of the proposed § 25.1705 if the However, the proposed rule does not § 25.1353(a). While the requirements of airplane-level functional hazard mandate specific separation distances § 25.1353(a) are retained, the portion of assessment identifies failures that could because each system design and that requirement applicable to wiring affect safe operation of the airplane. airplane model can be unique, and has been moved to the proposed To illustrate the type of assessment because manufacturers have differing § 25.1709(a). Further clarification of the required by proposed § 25.1709, design standards and installation requirement is also included in the consider the following simple example techniques. Instead it requires that the proposal. Section 25.1353(a) states involving the use of wire bundle chosen separation be adequate so that ‘‘* * * wiring must be installed so that clamps. Clamps are used to secure a an EWIS component failure will not operation of any one unit or system of wire bundle to structure in order to hold create a hazardous condition. The units***.’’ Proposed section the bundle in place and route the following factors must be considered 25.1709(a) expands on the term bundle from one location to another when determining the separation ‘‘operation’’ to state that it means along a predetermined path. An airplane distance: ‘‘operation under normal and failure manufacturer, using the criteria (1) The electrical characteristics, conditions as defined by § 25.1309.’’ contained in the proposed advisory amount of power, and severity of failure Proposed section 25.1709(b) would material for 25.1709, determines that a condition of the system functions require that each EWIS be designed and

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installed so that any electrical with the same degree of attention as two come into contact. This can occur interference likely to be present in the other components of the system, such as either through vibration of the EWIS airplane will not result in hazardous the electrical generators. The proposal and/or mechanical cable or because of effects on the airplane or its systems. prescribes that any required physical cable movement in response to a system This proposed requirement is based on separation must be achieved either by command. A mechanical cable could new text recently added to § 25.1353(a) separation distance or by a barrier or also damage other EWIS components, to harmonize part 25 with the existing other means shown to be at least such as a wire bundle support, in a way text of the JAA JAR 25.1353(a).5 The text equivalent to an adequate separation that would cause failure of that of JAR 25.1353(a) requires that any distance. Paragraph (d)(1) would component. Also, if not properly electrical interference likely to be introduce a requirement to prohibit the designed and installed, a wire bundle or present in the airplane must not result airplane’s independent electrical power other EWIS component could interfere in hazardous effects on the airplane or sources from sharing a common ground with movement of a mechanical control its systems except under extremely terminating location. Paragraph (d)(2) cable by causing jamming or otherwise remote conditions. The proposed would prohibit the airplane’s static restricting the cable’s movement. An § 25.1709(b) is recognition of the fact grounds from sharing a common ground arcing fault could damage or sever a that electrical interference can be terminating location with any of the control cable, or a control cable failure introduced into airplane systems and airplane’s independent electrical power could cause damage to EWIS if not wiring by coupling between electrical sources. These two new requirements adequately separated. Therefore, cables or between cables and coaxial would help to ensure the independence proposed paragraph (i) would require an lines, as well as by the other equipment of separate electrical power sources and adequate separation distance or barrier that is the subject of § 25.1353(a). The to prevent introduction of unwanted between EWIS and flight or other proposed requirement does not adopt interference into airplane electrical mechanical control systems cables and the JAR clause ‘‘except under extremely power systems from other airplane their associated system components. It remote conditions.’’ This is because the systems. would further require that failure of an intent of the requirement is not to Paragraphs (e), (f), (g), and (h) of EWIS component must not create a require a numerical probability proposed § 25.1709 contain EWIS- hazardous condition and that the failure assessment of the likelihood of electrical related requirements from of any flight or other mechanical control interference or its consequences as § 25.1353(d)(3). These paragraphs systems cables or systems components described previously. Rather it is meant contain specific separation requirements must not damage EWIS and create a to convey that under failure conditions for the airplane’s fuel, hydraulic, hazardous condition. that may be caused by electrical oxygen, and waste/water systems. They EWIS in general and wiring in inference, the resultant effects should require that EWIS have adequate particular must be routed away from not be such as to prevent continued safe separation from those systems except to high-temperature equipment, hot air flight of the airplane. the extent necessary to provide any ducts, and hydraulic, fuel, water, and Proposed section 25.1709(c) contains required electrical connection to them. other lines. There must be adequate the wire-related requirements of the These paragraphs require that EWIS be separation distance in order to prevent current § 25.1353(b). These designed and installed with adequate damage to the EWIS caused by extreme requirements have been expanded to separation so a failure of an EWIS temperatures and so that an EWIS add that not only wires and cable component will not create a hazardous failure will not damage the equipment, carrying heavy current are covered, but condition and any leakage from those ducts, or lines. High temperatures can their associated EWIS components are systems (i.e., fuel, hydraulic, oxygen, deteriorate wire insulation and other covered as well. The proposal prescribes waste/water) onto EWIS components parts of EWIS components, and if the that any required physical separation will not create a hazardous condition. wire or component type is not carefully must be achieved either by separation The proposed requirements recognize selected, this deterioration could lead to distance or by barrier or other means the potential catastrophic hazard that wire or component failure. Similarly, shown to be at least equivalent to an could occur should an arcing fault ignite should an arcing event occur, the arc adequate separation distance. a flammable fluid like fuel or hydraulic could penetrate a hot air duct or line Proposed section 25.1709(d) contains fluid. An arcing fault has the potential and allow the release of high pressure, wire-related requirements of existing to puncture a line associated with those high temperature air. Such a release §§ 25.1351(b)(1) and (b)(2) and would systems if adequate separation is not could damage surrounding components introduce additional requirements. To maintained. If there is leakage from one associated with various airplane show compliance with § 25.1709(d), of those systems and an arcing event systems and potentially lead to a EWIS components associated with the occurs, fire or explosion could result. hazardous situation. Paragraph (j) would generating system must be considered Similarly, leakage from the water/waste require that EWIS be designed and system can cause damage to EWIS installed with an adequate separation 5 The JAA is the Joint Aviation Authority of components and adversely affect their distance or barrier between the EWIS Europe and the JAR is its Joint Aviation integrity. An EWIS arcing event that components and heated equipment, hot Requirements, the equivalent of our Federal punctures a water or waste line could air ducts, and lines. Aviation Regulations. In the time since these proposals were developed, in 2003, the European also introduce fluids into other airplane The needed reliability of some Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) was formed. EASA systems and create a hazardous airplane systems, such as an autoland is now the principal aviation regulatory agency in condition. system, requires that independent, Europe, and we intend to continue to work with To prevent chafing, jamming, or other redundant systems be used. Loss of one them to ensure our proposal is also harmonized with its Certification Specifications (CS). But since types of interference or other failures channel of a redundant system would the harmonization efforts involved in developing that may lead to loss of control of the not decrease the ability to continue safe this proposal occurred before EASA was formed, it airplane, EWIS in general and wiring in operation. However, if both channels of was the JAA that was involved with them. So while particular must be physically separated a two-channel system were lost because the JAR and CS are essentially equivalent, and in the future we will be focusing on the CS, it is the from flight or other control cables. of a common failure, the results could JAR that will be referred to in the historical Mechanical cables have the potential to be catastrophic. To maintain the background discussions in this proposal. cause chafing of electrical wire if the independence of redundant systems and

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equipment so that safety functions done to prevent modifiers from continued safe operation of the airplane. required for safe operation are unintentionally introducing unsafe When the zone containing the autoland maintained, adequate separation and design or installation features on system EWIS is undergoing inspections electrical isolation between these previously certified airplanes when they or maintenance, easy identification of systems must be ensured. Paragraph (k) install new or modified systems. the EWIS will alert inspection or would require that EWIS associated Component identification would also maintenance personnel to use extra with any system that requires make those performing maintenance caution in the area. redundancy to meet certification and inspections more aware of what Proposed § 25.1711(a) uses language requirements be separated with an systems are associated with specific that is similar to existing § 25.1301(b) adequate separation distance or barrier. EWIS in the areas undergoing but is specifically applicable to EWIS Paragraph (l) of proposed § 25.1709 maintenance or inspection. components. The proposal adds the would require that EWIS be designed When the FAA first certifies an word ‘‘consistent’’ to stress the need for and installed so they are adequately airplane type design, its systems are consistency in EWIS identification to separated from aircraft structure and designed and installed to ensure safe avoid confusion and mistakes during protected from sharp edges and corners. operation of the airplane. Systems airplane manufacturing, modification, The purpose of this proposal is to essential to that safe operation are often and maintenance. This means the FAA minimize the potential for abrasion/ designed and installed to ensure expects airplane manufacturers to chafing, vibration damage, and other redundancy of the system function. develop an EWIS identification method types of mechanical damage. Such They have two or more circuits, or that facilitates easy identification of the protection is necessary because over channels, that can perform the same systems that any specific EWIS time the insulation on a wire that is function in case one of them component supports and use that touching a rigid object, such as an malfunctions. Separate circuits identification method in a consistent equipment support bracket, will fail and (channels) typically have their own manner throughout the airplane. The expose bare wire. This can potentially sensors, wiring, and equipment. This consistent identification method must lead to arcing that could destroy that helps ensure that a common failure be used for new type certifications and wire and other wires in its bundle. cannot cause failure of the entire changes to those designs. Proposed Depending on the amount of electrical system. § 25.1711(e) would require that energy being carried by the failed wire, An example of this is the autoland modifications to type designs use EWIS structural damage may also occur. system on modern transport category identification methods that are airplanes. The autoland system allows consistent with the identification Section 25.1711 Component airplanes to land during adverse Identification: EWIS method of the original type design. The weather conditions that would proposed requirements of paragraph (e) Proposed § 25.1711 would require otherwise prevent landing with manual are discussed later in this document. applicants to identify EWIS components techniques that rely on the flightcrew’s Paragraph (b) would impose using consistent methods that facilitate ability to see the runway. Typically the additional requirements for easy identification of the component, its autoland system has three channels that identification detail, when assessed in function, and its design limitations. For are physically separated and electrically accordance with the proposed EWIS associated with flight-essential segregated, so if one channel fails, the requirements of § 25.1705, for EWIS functions, identification of the EWIS airplane can safely continue the components associated with: separation requirement would also be autoland procedure. The failure of an • Systems required for safe flight and required. autoland system at a critical phase of landing. An important aspect of ensuring safe flight can be catastrophic to the airplane • Systems required for egress. operation of airplanes is making sure and its passengers. The integrity of an • Systems with potential to affect the that EWIS components are properly autoland system’s design could be flightcrew’s ability to cope with adverse identified. This is necessary so that compromised by systems installed after operating conditions. modification designers, maintenance certification of the autoland system. One Paragraph (c) would require that personnel, and inspectors can easily way to prevent this is to clearly identify identifying markings required by determine the function of the associated EWIS associated with the autoland in a paragraphs (a) and (b) of the proposal system, together with any associated way that makes it easy to see that it is remain legible throughout the design separation requirements and design associated with a critical system. Such life of the component. As most wire limitations. Clear labeling of EWIS identification would aid the designers installations are designed to remain on components and easy-to-understand and installers of the new system by the airplane throughout the airplane’s identification aids allow installers, alerting them to the presence of the service life, this means the inspectors, and maintainers to readily critical system and allow appropriate identification marks must be able to be ascertain that correct system design and installation decisions, read to support the intended purpose of components are installed as designed, preventing degradation of the safety of the markings for the life of the airplane. and allow modifiers to add systems with the autoland system. The method of marking must take into due regard to the existing protection and The reverse is also true. For example, account the environment in which the separation requirements. suppose an in-flight entertainment EWIS component will be installed. The current part 25 certification system is installed on an airplane and, Paragraph (d) would require that the requirement for equipment after that installation, an autoland means used to identify an EWIS identification is § 25.1301(b) and it is system is to be installed. The designers component does not have an adverse applicable to ‘‘each item of installed and installers of the autoland system effect on the component’s performance equipment.’’ This rule is inadequate for would need to be able to identify EWIS throughout its design life. Certain wire EWIS because it does not provide the associated with the IFE system so they marking methods have the potential to specific requirements that have been do not mix IFE system EWIS with the damage the wire’s insulation. Hot-stamp determined necessary for identifying autoland system EWIS. The IFE system marking is one such method. According EWIS components. Specific EWIS is a passenger convenience item and its to SAE (Society of Automotive component identification needs to be functionality is not important to the Engineers) aerospace information report

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AIR5575, ‘‘Hot Stamp Wire Marking would not be appropriate for a modifier Proposed § 25.1717(b) would require Concerns for Aerospace Vehicle to use purple wire to identify a specific that EWIS components used for any Applications,’’ a copy of which is flight critical system when the approved electrical bonding purposes (not just included in the docket, the hot-stamp type design used the color green, that used for protection against static marking method is not well suited for especially if the type design already electricity) provide an adequate today’s generation of aircraft wiring. As uses purple wire to identify non- electrical return path under both normal noted in the SAE document, wire essential systems. Such a scheme could and fault conditions. insulation has become markedly thinner cause confusion and lead future The buildup and subsequent over the years since the procedure was modifiers or maintainers to believe that discharge of static electricity has the first introduced in the 1940s. Because of the routing of purple wires with green potential to create hazardous conditions this, problems have arisen over wire wires is acceptable. This is just an for both airplane systems and people. damage from excessive penetration by example and should not be construed to Static electricity can injure people. It the hot-stamp process. The document say that flight critical systems should can also interfere with installed further states: ‘‘The frequent need for use green wire or non-essential systems electrical/electronic equipment and adjustments in temperature, pressure, purple wire. The regulation does not cause ignition of flammable vapors. We and swell time inherent to achieving prescribe a particular method for are proposing to adopt § 25.899 (as legible hot stamp wire marking provides identification, but is meant to ensure discussed in the section headed many opportunities for error. The that the consistency of the identification ‘‘Electrical System Harmonization controls, methods, and guidance method required by paragraph (a) is Rules’’) to highlight the importance of necessary to achieve satisfactory maintained throughout the life of the considering electrical bonding and static performance with hot stamp marking airplane. electricity as a full aircraft requirement are often not made available to operators and to prevent hazardous effects of Section 25.1713 Fire Protection: EWIS in smaller wire shops.’’ static electricity. The proper design and The FAA concurs with this Proposed § 25.1713 would require installation of EWIS components used assessment. If damage to the insulation that EWIS components meet the to accomplish such protection is critical occurs during the marking process, it applicable fire and smoke protection to ensure the hazardous effects of static may fail later in service after it has been requirements of § 25.831(c). It would discharge are minimized. For example, exposed to the sometimes-harsh further require that EWIS located in the cross-sectional area of bonding paths environmental conditions of aircraft designated fire zones be at least fire used for primary bonding paths is use. While the proposed regulation does resistant. Insulation on electrical wires important in ensuring that a low not prohibit use of hot-stamp marking, and cables would also be required to be electrical impedance is obtained, as is its use is not encouraged. To comply self-extinguishing when tested in the method in which the bonding with this paragraph, if the hot stamp accordance with the applicable portions connection is made to the airplane marking process is used, the guidelines of Appendix F, Part I, of part 25. structure. Thus, EWIS must be fully of SAE recommended practice During an emergency situation it is considered when designing and ARP5369, ‘‘Guidelines for Wire important that airplane systems needed installing protection from the adverse Identification Marking Using the Hot by the flightcrew to effectively deal with effects of static electricity. The proposed Stamp Process’’ or equivalent must be the emergency be operative. To help § 25.1717 highlights the importance followed. A copy of this document is in ensure this, § 25.869 requires that EWIS has in providing this protection the docket. electrical systems components meet and requires that EWIS components In some cases it may not be certain flammability requirements and meet the same requirements as other practicable to mark an EWIS component be designed and installed to minimize components used to show compliance directly, because of component size or probability of ignition of flammable with § 25.899. identification requirements. In this case fluids and vapors. Currently, § 25.869(a) The ARAC Electrical Systems other methods of identification such as is applicable to wiring. The proposal is Harmonization Working Group a label or sleeve must be used. to move the requirements of § 25.869(a) recommended the adoption of JAR Paragraph (e) would require that related to protection of wiring from fire 25.1353(e) as paragraph (e) of § 25.1353. EWIS modifications to the type design and put them into the proposed The JAR requires that electrical bonding take into consideration the § 25.1713. This will allow easy provide an adequate electrical return identification scheme of the original identification of the requirements for path under both normal and fault type design. This is to ensure that the fire protection of EWIS, because they conditions on airplanes with grounded consistency required by proposed will be found in the proposed new electrical systems. ATSRAC § 25.1711(a) is maintained when a subpart H, which is dedicated to EWIS recommended that the requirements of modification is installed. The intent of regulations. Requirements of § 25.869 JAR 25.1353(e) be moved in their this requirement is to provide dealing with isolation from flammable entirety to the proposed subpart H. We continuity in the methods used for fluid lines have been moved to the new agree with that recommendation and, EWIS identification on a particular § 25.1709 and requirements for instead of adopting JAR 25.1353(e) as model. It is not the intent of the allowance for deformation and § 25.1353(e), we are proposing to adopt requirement to impose on the modifier stretching have been moved to it as § 25.1717(b). the exact wire identification methods of § 25.1703. As a result, we are amending Section 25.1719 Systems and the airplane manufacturer. However, § 25.869 to accommodate this change. since the purpose of proposed § 25.1711 Functions: EWIS is to make it easy to identify those Section 25.1717 Electrical Bonding Proposed § 25.1719 would require airplane systems essential to the safe and Protection Against Static Electricity: that EWIS components be considered in operation of the airplane, it is in the best EWIS showing compliance with the interest of safety that designers of any Proposed § 25.1717(a) would require certification requirements of specific modifications to the original design that EWIS used for electrical bonding airplane systems. Many of the current consider the approved type design and protection against static electricity part 25 sections contain system specific identification methods. For example it meet the requirements of § 25.899. requirements that apply to EWIS in an

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indirect way. The EWIS associated with Section 25.1723 Instruments Using a contain any controls, wiring, lines, such systems play an integral role in Power Supply: EWIS equipment, or accessories whose ensuring the safe operation of the The proposed § 25.1723 would damage or failure would affect safe system and of the airplane. In general, require that EWIS components operation of the airplane unless they are the EWIS associated with any airplane associated with flight and navigation protected so that they cannot be system needs to be considered an instruments using a power supply be damaged by movement of cargo in the integral part of that system and must be designed and installed so that compartment and their breakage or given the same design and installation compliance with § 25.1331 is ensured. failure will not create a fire hazard. The attention as the rest of the system. The Section 25.1331 requires that flight proposed regulations would remove the proposed § 25.1719(a) contains this and navigation instruments using a word ‘‘wiring’’ from the current general requirement, while paragraph power supply must, in the event of the language and move those requirements, (b) of the proposal identifies specific failure of one power source, be supplied as they apply to EWIS, to the proposed sections of part 25 that are associated by another power source. No change is § 25.1727(a). Proposed § 25.855(j) would with airplane systems where wire and proposed to the wording of that section. mandate that cargo or baggage its associated components play an compartment EWIS components must important part in ensuring safety. These Section 25.1725 Accessibility meet the requirements of § 25.1727(a). specific part 25 sections contain Provisions: EWIS The proposed § 25.1727(b) and (c) are requirements that do not lend The proposed new § 25.1725 would new EWIS requirements that currently themselves to creating a separate EWIS- require that means be provided to allow don’t exist in part 25. Paragraph (b) based Subpart H requirement. for inspection of EWIS and replacement would require that EWIS be designed so It is the intent of the proposed of their components as necessary for that damage and risk of damage from § 25.1719 to require that EWIS be continued airworthiness. movement of people in the airplane designed and installed to support Currently, § 25.611 requires that during all phases of flight, maintenance, systems required for type certification or means must be provided to allow and service, be minimized. Paragraph by operating rules, including those inspection, replacement of parts, (c) would require designers to minimize systems addressed by the regulations adjustment, and lubrication as necessary damage and risk of damage to EWIS by specifically listed in paragraph (b) of the for principal structural elements and items carried onto the airplane by proposal. They must be considered part control systems. While wiring systems passengers, cabin crew, and flightcrew. of those systems, and be given the same are not specifically referred to in the These two new requirements are design and installation considerations existing rule, the ‘‘accessibility’’ concept justified by service experience that as the rest of the system. While is easily applied to EWIS. Many of the shows wires can easily be damaged by paragraphs (a) and (b) may seem wiring systems on airplanes today are movement of people on the airplane and redundant, we have listed specific very difficult to access and inspect. We by items carried on board. sections in (b) to ensure that applicants now have an increased awareness of the Paragraph (b) would require that are aware of the need to give EWIS importance of inspecting wiring for EWIS designers and installers consider associated with those systems the same separation and for contamination and such things as the routing of wires that consideration as the other components damage in order to ensure proper could be damaged by personnel in the of those systems. We consider the functioning, maintenance, and safety. cargo compartments. For example, EWIS general requirements of (a) necessary We also know that when adjacent would have to be designed and installed because there may be other regulations structures must be removed to allow in ways that prevent their use as hand- where EWIS must be considered in access to wire installations, new or footholds as much as practicable. It showing compliance with those possibilities for contamination, chafing, would further require that EWIS be regulations. It also ensures that EWIS is and other types of damage are protected from damage by people in the given full consideration for any system- introduced. Section 25.611 would be cabin or flight deck. More and more related regulation adopted in the future. amended to specify that EWIS must wiring is being routed to passenger seats meet the accessibility requirements of to support increasingly complex Section 25.1721 Circuit Protective passenger convenience features. If an Devices: EWIS § 25.1725. The intent of proposed § 25.1725 is to airplane is equipped with seat-back Proposed § 25.1721 would require ensure that EWIS components be monitors, for example, the electronic that electrical wires and cable be installed so that inspections, tests, components necessary to support the compatible with the circuit protective repairs, and replacements can be monitor are typically mounted devices required by § 25.1357. undertaken, and that these can be underneath the seat. This requires wire We recently adopted § 25.1353(d)(1) carried out with a minimum of aircraft routing to the seats, usually through the based on recommendations of ARAC, as disassembly. This proposal would seat tracks (structural channels used to part of the effort to harmonize the facilitate the proposed implementation fasten the seats to the floor) or from the requirements of JAA JAR 25 and FAA 14 of the new wiring inspection programs side wall directly next to the seat. Many CFR part 25. Paragraph (d)(1) requires developed under proposed § 25.1739 wires mounted on or under the seats that electrical cables be compatible with and the operating rules contained in this have been damaged by passengers. In the circuit protection devices required proposal. one case an airplane was operated with by § 25.1357, so that a fire or smoke wires lying on the floor in the area hazard cannot be created under Section 25.1727 Protection of EWIS where a passenger would put his feet. temporary or continuous fault Proposed § 25.1727 would require The wires had become dislodged from conditions. That requirement would be that cargo or baggage compartments not the seat track. This not only exposed the moved from § 25.1353(d)(1) into the contain any EWIS whose failure would wires to damage but also posed a proposed § 25.1721 in its entirety. The adversely affect safe operation. It would potential electrical shock risk to the proposal also adds the word ‘‘wire’’ to also require that all EWIS be protected passenger. In other cases, wires have the requirement. This is because this from damage by movement of people. been routed to the seats through holes requirement applies to all sizes of wire, Section 25.855(e) requires that no cut into the cabin side wall, exposing not just heavy-current-carrying cables. cargo or baggage compartments may them to damage from both passengers

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and carry-on items stored beneath the Section 25.1733 Flammable Fluid or overheat detector system in a fire seat or between the side wall and seat. Shutoff Means: EWIS zone meet the requirements of Proposed § 25.1733 would require § 25.1203. Section 25.1729 Flammable Fluid Fire The current § 25.1203 requires that EWIS associated with each Protection: EWIS approved, quick acting fire or overheat flammable fluid shutoff means and The proposed § 25.1729 would detectors in each designated fire zone, control be ‘‘fireproof’’ (as defined in require that EWIS components be and in the combustion, turbine, and § 1.1) or located and protected so that considered a potential ignition source in tailpipe sections of turbine engine each area where flammable fluid or any fire in a fire zone will not affect installations, to provide prompt vapors might escape by leakage of a operation of the flammable fluid shutoff indication of fire in those zones. The fluid system and must meet the means, in accordance with § 25.1189. present rule does contain requirements requirements of § 25.863. Section 25.1189 requires that each for wire used in the fire detection The current § 25.863 mandates that, in engine installation and fire zone have a systems. But to increase visibility of the each area where flammable fluids or means to shut off or otherwise prevent related EWIS requirements and to gather vapors might escape by leakage of a hazardous quantities of fuel, oil, deicer, them into one central place, a new rule fluid system, there must be means to and other flammable fluids from flowing devoted specifically to fire detector minimize the probability of ignition, into or through any designated fire zone. system EWIS is proposed. and resultant hazards if ignition does No change is proposed for that section. Existing § 25.1203 would be amended occur. Possible ignition sources, Section 25.1735 Fire Detector Systems, to reference the new § 25.1737, thus including overheating of equipment, General: EWIS effectively closing the loop on malfunctioning of protective devices, requirements. and electrical faults must be considered Proposed § 25.1735 would require in showing compliance with this rule. that EWIS associated with any installed Section 25.1739 Instructions for Many types of electrical faults could fire protection system be considered in Continued Airworthiness: EWIS cause ignition. Among them are sparks showing compliance with the applicable Proposed § 25.1739 would require emitting from an avionics component, requirements for that particular system. that applicants prepare EWIS ICA in overheated electrical component This would be a new requirement. It accordance with the requirements of surfaces, and arcing from electrical does not currently exist in part 25. The Appendix H to part 25. The proposed wiring. The wording of § 25.863 would current part 25 regulations contain fire EWIS ICA requirements are discussed in not change. detection system requirements for the next section of this document. powerplants (§ 25.1203), lavatories Section 25.1731 Powerplants: EWIS (§ 25.854), and cargo compartments B. Part 25 Subpart I—Continued The proposed § 25.1731 specifies that (§§ 25.855, 25.857 and 25.858). Each fire Airworthiness and Related Part 25 EWIS associated with any powerplant detection system requires electrical Changes must be designed and installed so that wire. Failure of this wire could lead to As discussed below, the following failure of an EWIS component will not inability of the detection system to proposals are applicable to holders of prevent continued safe operation of the function properly. The wire and other existing TCs for transport category remaining powerplants or require associated EWIS components must be airplanes and applicants for approval of immediate action by any crewmember considered an integral part of the fire design changes to those certificates. On for continued safe operation, in detection system and meet the July 12, 2005, we issued policy accordance with § 25.903(b). It would requirements of the applicable statement PS–ANM110–7–12–2005, also mandate that design precautions be regulation. The proposal would apply to ‘‘Safety—A Shared Responsibility—New taken to minimize hazards to the all required fire protection systems with Direction for Addressing Airworthiness airplane because of EWIS damage in the the exception of powerplants and APUs. Issues for Transport Airplanes’’ (70 FR event of a powerplant rotor failure or a Requirements for EWIS associated with 40166). The policy states, in part, fire originating in the powerplant that powerplant and APU fire detection ‘‘Based on our evaluation of more burns through the powerplant case, in systems are contained in proposed effective regulatory approaches for accordance with § 25.903(d)(1). The § 25.1737. certain types of safety initiatives and the purpose of this section is to ensure comments received from the Aging Section 25.1737 Powerplant and APU proper consideration of EWIS in Airplane Program Update (July 30, Fire Detector System: EWIS evaluating powerplant installation 2004), the FAA has concluded that we designs. Proposed § 25.1737 would require need to adopt a regulatory approach The current § 25.903(b) requires, that EWIS that are part of a fire or recognizing the shared responsibility among other things, that powerplants be overheat detector system located in a between design approval holders (DAH) arranged and isolated from each other to fire zone be at least fire-resistant, as and operators. When we decide that allow operation, in at least one defined in § 1.1. It would also require general rulemaking is needed to address configuration, so that failure or that EWIS components of any fire or an airworthiness issue, and believe the malfunction of any engine, or of any overheat detector system for any fire safety objective can only be fully system that can affect the engine, will zone may not pass through another fire achieved if the DAHs provide operators not prevent continued safe operation of zone unless: with the necessary information in a the remaining engines or require • They are protected against the timely manner, we will propose immediate action by any crewmember possibility of false warning caused by requirements for the affected DAHs to for continued safe operation. Section fire in the zone through which they provide that information by a certain 25.901(d)(1) requires that design pass, or date.’’ precautions be taken to minimize • Each zone involved is We believe that the safety objectives hazards to the airplane in the event of simultaneously protected by the same contained in this proposal can only be an engine rotor failure or a fire detector or extinguishing system. reliably achieved and acceptable to the originating within the engine that burns In addition, the proposal would FAA if the DAHs provide the operators through the engine case. require that EWIS that are part of a fire with the EWIS- and fuel-tank-system-

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related maintenance information In the past, we have issued a similar A theme common to this and other required by the proposed operational requirement in the form of a special possible subpart I proposed rules is that rules for parts 91, 121, 125, and 129. federal aviation regulation (SFAR). But the rulemaking projects include Our determination that DAH SFARs appear in various places in the proposals for changes to operational requirements are necessary to support CFR and are difficult to reference as a rules to require operators to implement the initiatives contained in this proposal whole. The FAA believes that placing programs or take other actions that the is based on several factors: these types of requirements in a new FAA has determined are necessary for • Developing EWIS and fuel tank subpart of part 25, which contains the safety. In several recent rules we have system ICA is complex. Only the airworthiness standards for transport adopted operational requirements airplane manufacturer, or DAH, has category airplanes, would provide a without a corresponding requirement access to all the necessary type design single, readily accessible location for for design approval holders to develop data needed for the timely and efficient this type of requirement. Therefore, we and provide the necessary data and development of the required EWIS and are proposing new subpart I to part 25 documents to support the operators’ fuel tank system maintenance tasks. to contain these requirements. compliance. The difficulty encountered • FAA-approved EWIS and fuel tank In preliminary discussions with by operators in complying with these system ICA need to be available in a foreign airworthiness authorities of the rules has convinced us that the timely manner. Due to the complexity of concept of this new subpart, they have corresponding design approval holder these ICA, we need to ensure that the expressed concerns that their regulatory requirements are necessary to enable DAHs submit them for approval on systems may not be able to operators to comply by the regulatory schedule. This will allow the FAA accommodate these types of deadlines. Oversight Office having approval requirements in their counterparts to Section 25.2 Special Retroactive authority to ensure that the ICA are part 25. While agreeing on the need for Requirements acceptable, are available on time, and these types of requirements, they have Section 25.2 currently contains can be readily implemented by the suggested that it may be more ‘‘special retroactive requirements.’’ affected operators. Additionally, appropriate to place them in part 21 or These requirements are ‘‘retroactive’’ in accurate and timely information is another location. As discussed below, the sense that they require applicants necessary to ensure alignment with the because we expect these new subpart I for changes to TCs to comply with requirements of the Fuel Tank Safety requirements to be similar to new part requirements that were not applicable to Rule (FTSR). The compliance deadline 25 airworthiness standards, we have the original TC. As discussed below, for the operational requirements of the tentatively decided to place them in part proposed subpart I would have a similar FTSR was extended to facilitate this 25. However, we specifically request effect, in that it would impose new alignment, as stated in the Federal comments on the appropriate location of requirements on both existing design Register notice ‘‘ Fuel Tank Safety these requirements, particularly from certificate holders and applicants for Compliance Extension (Final Rule) and the foreign authorities. If, based on changes to those certificates. Therefore, Aging Airplane Program Update comments received, we conclude that we are proposing to amend § 25.2 to (Request for Comments)’’ (69 FR 45936). another location is more appropriate, we make reference to proposed subpart I. • The proposals in this NPRM affect may move them in the final rule. a large number of different types of Because such a move would not affect Section 25.1801 Purpose and transport airplanes. Because the safety the substance of the requirements Definition issues addressed by this proposal are themselves, we would not consider this Paragraph (a) of this section states that common to many airplanes, we need to to be an expansion of the scope of this this subpart would establish ensure that technical requirements are rulemaking that would require requirements for holders of TCs to take met consistently and the processes of additional notice and comment actions necessary to address particular compliance are consistent. This will procedures. safety concerns or to support the ensure that the proposed safety Section 25.1 Applicability continued airworthiness of transport enhancements are implemented in a category airplanes. Such actions may standardized manner. As stated in § 25.1, part 25 currently include, but are not limited to, • The safety objectives of this prescribes airworthiness standards for performing assessments, making design proposal need to be maintained for the issuance of TCs, and changes to those changes, developing revisions to ICA, operational life of the airplane. We need certificates, for transport category and making necessary documentation to ensure that future design changes to airplanes. As discussed in more detail available to affected persons. the type design of the airplane do not above, with this NPRM the FAA is The specific applicability of each degrade the safety enhancements proposing to expand the coverage of subpart I rule will be established as part achieved by the initial incorporation of part 25 to include a new subpart I of the rulemaking adopting each rule. EWIS and fuel tank system ICA. We containing requirements that must be Generally this subpart would also apply need to be aware of future changes to complied with by current holders of to applicants for type certificates and the type designs to ensure that these these certificates. Therefore, we are changes that are pending as of the changes do not invalidate the proposing to amend § 25.1, effective date of this rule. It would also maintenance tasks assigned to a ‘‘Applicability,’’ to state that part 25 apply to future applicants for changes to particular type design when the ICA are also includes requirements for holders existing type certificates. Under first developed under the requirements of these design certificates. As discussed § 21.101, the FAA may determine that it of this proposal. in the FAA’s final rule, ‘‘Fuel Tank is not appropriate to require such Based on the above reasons and the Safety Compliance Extension and Aging applicants to comply with new stated safety objectives of FAA policy Airplane Program Update’’ (69 FR airworthiness standards, such as PS–ANM110–7–12–2005, we are 45936), this NPRM is one of several proposed new subpart H. However, it is proposing to implement DAH proposals for adoption of these kinds of appropriate for them to comply with the requirements applicable to EWIS and requirements for current holders of type same requirements as existing certificate fuel tank system ICA. certificates. holders. Otherwise, the safety

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improvements that result from type including this definition in this section of requiring holders of TCs for those certificate holder compliance with these to avoid having to repeat it in each airplanes to comply with these requirements could be undone by later section within this subpart. requirements. modifications. This proposed rule, as it applies to For example, in the case of this Section 25.1805 Electrical Wiring EWIS, is not applicable to holders of proposed rule, as discussed below, Interconnection Systems (EWIS) existing (already issued) STCs. Often, operators would be required to revise Maintenance Program the wire design for STC installations of their maintenance programs based on This proposal would apply to holders EWIS was based on operator or repair EWIS ICA developed by the type of TCs and to applicants for new TCs, station standard practices and therefore certificate holder. Unless future STC amended TCs, and supplemental TCs if details of the installation are not applicants are required to provide the application was filed before the available. In the cases where such similar ICA for their modifications, the effective date of this rule and the information is available, it would TC holder’s ICA could become obsolete certificate was issued on or after the usually indicate that the wiring for the or, in some cases, even provide effective date of this rule. It would also modification follows the same path, or incorrect and potentially unsafe apply to future applicants for approval is in the same airplane zone, as the information as applied to the STC of changes to existing TCs. wiring in the original type design. We holder’s modification. In other cases, Paragraph (a) states that this rule anticipate that operators would inspect because subpart I rules accompany would apply, with some exceptions, to those areas while performing the TC corresponding operating requirements, transport category turbine-powered holder’s EZAP program. We also expect failure of an STC applicant to comply airplanes with a maximum type- that any possible discrepancies will be with a subpart I rule could make it certificated capacity of 30 or more further mitigated by operators impossible for an operator to comply passengers, or a maximum payload incorporating applicable EWIS with the corresponding operating capacity of 7500 pounds or more maintenance tasks into the maintenance requirement. Subpart I does not apply to resulting from the original certification program for that zone. Accordingly, the future applicants for TCs, because those of the airplane or later increase in FAA has decided not to require applicants will be covered by other capacity. This would result in the compliance with this section for proposed changes to part 25, including coverage of airplanes where the safety existing STCs. However, if an existing Appendix H. benefits and the public interest are the STC is amended, this section would Therefore, adoption of a new subpart greatest. apply to the amendment. I rule would also necessitate new The reference to the originally TC holders, who design EWIS on requirements for certification of changes certificated capacity, or later increase in airplanes, are the technical experts who to TCs that are in addition to the capacity, is intended to address two possess information about those requirements that are specified under situations: systems. This proposal would apply to • § 21.101. Under that section, if a change In the past, some designers and the following: is ‘‘significant’’ and certain other criteria operators have tried to avoid applying • TC holders. are met, the applicant would have to requirements mandated only for • Applicants for TCs and for approval show compliance with the latest airplanes over specified capacities by of design changes to existing TCs whose airworthiness requirements. For getting a design change approval for a applications are pending when this rule example, an applicant applying for such slightly lower capacity. By referencing becomes effective. a change after this final rule becomes the capacity resulting from original • Future applicants for approval of effective would have to comply with the certification, this proposal would design changes to existing TCs. proposed EWIS requirements in subpart remove this possible means of avoiding Section 25.1805(b) would require TC H. Even if we determine that these compliance. holders to complete a comprehensive broader regulations do not apply, the • It is also possible that an airplane assessment of the EWIS of each applicant for a change must still comply design could be originally certified with ‘‘representative’’ airplane for which they with the subpart I rule. a capacity slightly lower than the hold a TC, develop inspection and Paragraph (b) of this section provides minimum specified in this section, but maintenance instructions for them, and a definition of the term ‘‘FAA Oversight through later design changes, the incorporate those instructions into the Office.’’ The FAA Oversight Office is the capacity could be increased above this airplane’s ICA. The ‘‘representative’’ aircraft certification office or office of minimum. The reference to later airplane is defined as the configuration the Transport Airplane Directorate with increases in capacity would ensure that, of each model series airplane that oversight responsibility for the relevant if this occurs, the design would have to incorporates all the variations of EWIS TC or STC, as determined by the meet the requirements of this section. used on that model, and that includes Administrator. As stated later in the Compliance is not proposed for all TC-holder-designed modifications discussion of the proposed operating airplanes with a certificated passenger mandated by AD, as of the effective date rules, the primary means for operators capacity of fewer than 30 passengers, or of this rule. to comply with those requirements having a maximum capacity of less than For example, for the Boeing Model would be by implementing programs or 7500 pounds payload resulting from 737, the representative airplane would taking other actions developed by the original certification, because it is not be the configuration of each of the TC and STC holders under this clear at this time that the possible airplane series, 737–100 through 737– proposed subpart. In each case, to benefits for those airplanes would be 900 that incorporates all the variations ensure compliance with the relevant proportionate to the cost involved. The of EWIS used in producing each subpart I rule, the TC and STC holder’s FAA intends to evaluate the merits of airplane series. The purpose of this compliance documentation (for applying these requirements to those definition is to ensure that the TC example, in this case, EWIS ICA) must airplanes. We are currently working holder considers the full range of EWIS be submitted to the FAA Oversight with ATSRAC to assess how these configurations that may affect the Office. Because we expect this will be issues might be addressed in those results of the EZAP. Further, AD 99–03– a standard approach to compliance with transport category airplanes. We request 04 applies to all Boeing Model 737–100, the requirements of this subpart, we are comments on the feasibility and benefits –200, –300, –400, and –500 series

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airplanes. It requires installation of requirements. That is why the two must • Specific task information, such as components to provide shielding and be reviewed for compatibility. inspections defined by pictures or separation of the fuel system wiring As discussed later in this section, the schematics. from adjacent wiring. It also requires ICA for fuel tank system electrical • Intervals for any repetitive tasks. installation of flame arrestors and wiring required by SFAR 88 will be • Methods, techniques, and practices pressure relief valves in the fuel vent determined in accordance with required to perform the task. system. Boeing would be required to guidance provided by Policy Statement • Criteria for passing inspections. • develop ICA for each of those series ANM100–2004–1129, ‘‘Process for Any special equipment or test Developing Instructions for apparatus required. airplanes as modified by installation of • these components and all other Maintenance and Inspection of Fuel Critical Design Configuration modifications mandated by ADs. Tank Systems Required by SFAR 88’’ (a Control Limitations—for example, wire The purpose of including these copy of which may be found in the separation or pump impeller material mandated design changes is to ensure docket), or other acceptable process. specifications—that cannot be altered, that the TC holder’s EZAP addresses the Compliance with Subpart I will require except in accordance with the existing configuration of airplanes in the ICA for the same wire to be determined applicable limitation. operating fleet, rather than just the using an EZAP. While these processes The information for EWIS ICA would generally include: configuration produced and delivered have similarities, they may result in • by the manufacturer. identification of different tasks and Identification of each zone of the airplane. Applicants for approval of design intervals. The ICA maintenance tasks • changes would be required to evaluate and intervals that result from these Identification of each zone that the effect of their proposed change on determinations are expected to be contains EWIS. • Identification of each zone the EWIS ICA developed by the TC additive. If there is a conflict in the task containing EWIS that also contains holder for the representative airplane or interval, for purposes of this section, combustible material. and to develop EWIS ICA to address the FAA Oversight Office will resolve • Identification of each zone in which those effects. For TC holders, this the conflict. EWIS is in close proximity to both requirement would apply to any design The ICA should be reviewed to ensure changes that may affect the ICA for the that any maintenance tasks for EWIS do primary and back-up hydraulic, representative airplane. This includes not compromise fuel tank system wire mechanical, or electrical flight controls service bulletins describing such design requirements, such as separation or and lines. • The location of the EWIS changes. Under § 21.113, these design configuration specifications. If there is components to be maintained or changes are amendments to the TC. an inspection or maintenance A description of what must be inspected and any access requirements. requirement for EWIS and the fuel tank • Any unique procedures required, included in those ICA, and the EZAP system within the same zone, there such as special, detailed inspections, or that must be used to develop them, is must be an effort to align the task a dual sign-off of maintenance records. contained in the section of this interval. In addition, design certificate • Specific task information, such as preamble discussing the proposed holder’s existing documents containing inspections defined by pictures or revision to Appendix H, part 25. EWIS and fuel tank system ICA should The requirement for ICA was effective schematics. be reviewed to either remove or cross- • Intervals for any repetitive tasks. on January 28, 1981. TC holders whose reference redundant information. • Methods, techniques and practices application was dated before that date The compliance plan required by this required to perform the task. are not subject to that requirement. This proposal must include identification of • Criteria for passing inspections. proposal would require TC holders who those common locations in the airplane • Any special equipment or test do not have ICA for specific airplane where EWIS and fuel tank ICA apply. apparatus required. models to create EWIS ICA for them. As The considerations for compatibility • Instructions for protection and discussed below, air carriers and and minimization of redundancy for the caution information that will minimize operators of those airplanes would then two systems will be reviewed and contamination and accidental damage to be required to revise their maintenance approved by the FAA Oversight Office. EWIS during performance of or inspection programs based on the The plan for documenting the required maintenance, alterations, or repairs. new ICA for EWIS and fuel tank ICA for EWIS and fuel tank system will • Guidelines for identifying wiring systems. also be reviewed as part of the discrepancies and assessing what effect As discussed earlier, SFAR 88 compliance plan. These documents are such discrepancies, if found, could have requires TC holders to develop critical to the effort that will be required on adjacent systems, particularly if maintenance and inspection of operators to show compliance with these include wiring. instructions to assure the safety of the the operational rules contained in this • Critical Design Configuration fuel tank system. Proposed § 25.1805(b) proposal. We intend that the ICA Control Limitations—for example, wire would require that TC holders align the information, both in content and format, separation specifications—that cannot fuel tank system instructions with the will be readily usable by the affected be altered, except in accordance with results of the EZAP applied to EWIS to operators for developing proposed the applicable limitation. ensure compatibility and minimize changes to their maintenance or Policy Statement No. PS–ANM100– redundancies. All EWIS would be inspection programs. Generally, the 2004–10029 provides guidance on subject to review in developing the information contained in the ICA for the acceptable processes for developing fuel EWIS ICA, and the appropriate fuel tank system required by SFAR 88 tank system ICA as required by SFAR instructions for their maintenance and would include: 88. The FAA expects that engineers inspection would be required. But some • The location of the fuel tank system from aircraft certification offices or from EWIS are also part of the fuel tank components to be maintained or the Transport Airplane Directorate will system. The requirements for their inspected and any access requirements. review and approve the results of the maintenance and inspection might be • Any unique procedures required, EZAP. more specific than those for wiring in such as special, detailed inspections or The three groups whose compliance general, and might contain additional dual sign-off of maintenance records. with this proposal would be required,

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and their required compliance dates, analysis of their representative type would be adopted by mid-2006. As a indicated in paragraph (c), are as design, the FAA considered the result, we set the compliance dates in follows: following: the proposal using the mid-2006 time • Existing TC holders: No later than • Input from industry. frame as the baseline. However, the December 16, 2007. • Current or planned compliance proposed rulemaking process took • Current applicants for TCs and periods of several aging-related longer than we had anticipated. amendments to TCs (including service rulemakings, such as the pending Aging Consequently, we expect that the time bulletins describing design changes) Airplane Safety proposed rule, Fuel frame for adoption of the final rule will whose applications are pending and Tank System safety initiatives (69 FR be sometime after mid-2006. We future applicants for TC amendments: 45936, 66 FR 23086), and the pending recognize that this delay will adversely No later than December 16, 2007, or the Widespread Fatigue Damage proposal. impact the compliance dates we date of approval of their application, • Safety improvements that will propose for TC holders and operators whichever is later. result from compliance with this rule. and we may need to adjust them. • Pending and future applicants for • Industry’s current efforts to Therefore, we request and will consider STCs: No later than June 16, 2008, or the incorporate some of these safety your comments on revising the date of the approval of their application, initiatives. proposed compliance dates. Once the whichever is later. ATSRAC recommended a compliance ICA are approved by the FAA Oversight Future applicants for changes to TCs time of 24 months for TC holders to Office, the submitter must make the ICA that comply with proposed § 25.1739 develop these ICA. To align this available to affected persons as required would not be required to comply with proposal with other rules in the aging by § 21.50. this section. As discussed previously, airplane program, the FAA has adjusted Because this proposal sets a precedent under § 21.101, applicants for the time frame to that of other rules in introducing part 25 requirements for ‘‘significant’’ changes that meet certain discussed earlier, so that operators can holders of existing TCs, it is the FAA’s criteria must comply with the latest more efficiently comply with expectation that they will work closely airworthiness requirements. If this requirements to revise their with the FAA Oversight Office in NPRM is adopted as a final rule, such maintenance programs. To support this putting together a compliance plan for a future applicant would have to realignment, compliance dates that developing the required ICA. Proposed comply with § 25.1739. Because the allow an 18-month time frame for TC section 25.1805(d) would require that proposed requirements of that section holders to develop the EWIS ICA and 12 the compliance plan be approved by the are more extensive than the proposed months for operators to implement them FAA Oversight Office as sufficient basis requirements of § 25.1805, requiring were determined to be appropriate and for showing compliance with the compliance with this section would be were included in this proposal. We proposed § 25.1805. redundant. believe these time frames are supported The following table lists the FAA In determining the compliance by the experience gained from the Oversight Offices, as currently schedules for the requirements covered EZAPs already performed. Since determined by the Administrator, that in this proposal, the FAA balanced the ATSRAC made its recommendation, oversee issuance of type certificates and safety-related reasons for the rule several manufacturers have applied an amended type certificates for against the need to give industry enough EZAP to their type design airplanes and manufacturers of transport category time to comply with it. Therefore, before have completed those reviews. airplanes with a passenger capacity of setting the proposed compliance times When we initially drafted this 30 passengers or a payload capacity of for the TC holders to complete their proposal, we assumed the final rule 7500 pounds or greater.

Airplane manufacturer FAA Oversight Office

Aerospatiale ...... Transport Airplane Directorate, International Branch, ANM–116. Airbus ...... Transport Airplane Directorate, International Branch, ANM–116. BAE ...... Transport Airplane Directorate, International Branch, ANM–116. Boeing ...... Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. Bombardier ...... New York Aircraft Certification Office. CASA ...... Transport Airplane Directorate, International Branch, ANM–116. deHavilland ...... New York Aircraft Certification Office. Dornier ...... Transport Airplane Directorate, International Branch, ANM–116. Embraer ...... Transport Airplane Directorate, International Branch, ANM–116. Fokker ...... Transport Airplane Directorate, International Branch, ANM–116. Lockheed ...... Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office. McDonnell-Douglas ...... Los Angeles Certification Office. SAAB ...... Transport Airplane Directorate, International Branch, ANM–116.

Development of a compliance plan is FAA to monitor progress towards show compliance with these necessary to ensure that TC holders compliance. These aspects of the plan requirements, as previously discussed, thoroughly understand the requirements will help ensure that the expected we are issuing AC 120.XX, and have of this proposal and produce on time outcomes will be acceptable and on issued a policy statement that describes appropriate ICA that are acceptable in time for incorporation by the affected an acceptable means, but not the only content and format in addressing the operators in accordance with the means, of complying with these maintenance and inspection tasks for operational rules contained in this requirements for developing EWIS ICA EWIS and the fuel tank system. Integral proposal. and the fuel tank system ICA required to the compliance plan will be the To help ensure that TC holders are by SFAR 88. AC 120-XX, ‘‘Program to inclusion of procedures to allow the fully informed of what is necessary to Enhance Transport Category Airplane

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Electrical Wiring Interconnection required deliverables, including all plan would enable the FAA Oversight System Maintenance,’’ provides an compliance items and all data to be Office to identify and resolve any issues enhanced zonal analysis procedure developed to substantiate compliance. If that may arise with the TC holder’s (EZAP) for completing a review of the any affected person has already initiated proposal without jeopardizing the TC representative airplane covering all compliance, the FAA Oversight Office holder’s ability to comply with this areas, including the flight deck (or will review the results of those efforts to section by the compliance time. cockpit), electrical power center, fuel ensure that the results are acceptable. As of the date of this proposal, certain tank wiring, and powerfeeder cables. • A detailed explanation of how the TC holders have voluntarily started to Policy Statement ANM100–2004–10029, proposed means will be shown to develop the EWIS EZAP that would be ‘‘Process for Developing Instructions for comply with this section if the affected required by proposed § 25.1805. An Maintenance and Inspection of Fuel person proposes a means of compliance EZAP has been completed on certain Tank Systems Required by SFAR 88,’’ that differs from that described in FAA transport category airplanes. Although provides guidance for identifying ICA, advisory material. the EZAP used by those TC holders may including any airworthiness limitations, • A proposal for how the approved not be the version outlined in AC120- as a result of the fuel tank system review ICA will be made available to affected XX, it is similar. The FAA would expect required by SFAR 88 and compliance persons. that after issuance of the final rule, these with Amendment 102 to part 25 It should be noted that this section TC holders would either submit a plan Appendix H and § 25.981. applies not only to domestic TC holders proposing revisions to the EZAP for Proposed § 25.1805(d) is intended to and applicants, but also to foreign TC those model airplanes to be consistent provide TC holders, applicants with holders and applicants. In this sense, with the guidance given in AC120-XX, pending TC-amendment or STC this section is different from most type or use the planning process to show that applications, and the FAA with certification programs, where foreign their EZAP complies with this section. assurance that they understand what applicants typically work with their The FAA Oversight Office will then means of compliance are acceptable and responsible certification authority, and review the results of those efforts to have taken necessary actions, including the FAA relies on that authority’s ensure that the results are acceptable for assigning sufficient resources, to findings of compliance under bilateral compliance with this section. achieve compliance with this section. airworthiness agreements. Since this Section 25.1805(e) requires that TC This paragraph is based substantially on rulemaking is not harmonized in all holders and applicants correct a ‘‘The FAA and Industry Guide to cases, the FAA will make all the deficient plan, or deficiencies in Product Certification,’’ which describes necessary compliance determinations, implementing the plan, in a manner a process for developing project-specific and where appropriate we may accept identified by the FAA Oversight Office. certification plans for type certification findings of compliance made by the Before the FAA formally notifies a TC programs. A copy of this guide may be appropriate foreign authorities using holder or applicant of deficiencies, found in the docket. This planning procedures developed under the however, we will have communicated requirement would not apply to future bilateral agreements. The compliance with them to try to achieve a complete applicants for TC amendments or STCs planning provisions of this section are mutual understanding of the because, as described in the guide, this equally important for domestic and deficiencies and means of correcting type of planning routinely occurs at the foreign TC holders and applicants, and them. Therefore, the notification beginning of the certification process. we will work with the foreign referred to in this paragraph should The guide recognizes the importance authorities to ensure that their TC document the agreed corrections. of ongoing communication and holders and applicants perform the Because operators’ ability to comply cooperation between applicants and the planning necessary to comply with the with the applicable operational rules FAA. Section 25.1805, while regulatory requirements of this section. will be dependent on TC holders’ and in nature, is intended to encourage One of the items required in the plan applicants’ compliance with § 25.1805, establishment of the same type of is, ‘‘If the proposed means of the FAA will carefully monitor their relationship in the process of complying compliance differs from that described compliance and take appropriate action with this section. In particular, in in FAA advisory material, a detailed if they fail to achieve compliance. addition to other necessary information, explanation of how the proposed means Failure to comply within the specified paragraph (d)(3) makes it clear that, to will comply with this section.’’ FAA time would constitute a violation of the the extent that they intend to use means advisory material is never mandatory requirements and may subject the of compliance different from those because it describes one means, but not violator to certificate action to amend, already identified as acceptable by the the only means of compliance. In the suspend, or revoke the affected FAA, it is imperative that they identify area of type certification, applicants certificate in accordance with 49 U.S.C. those differences at the earliest possible frequently propose acceptable § 44709. In accordance with 49 U.S.C. stage so any compliance issues can be alternatives to the means described in 46301, it may also subject the violator resolved without risk of unnecessary advisory circulars. But when an to a civil penalty of not more than expenditure of resources or, ultimately, applicant chooses to comply by an $25,000 per day per TC until § 25.1805 noncompliance. alternative means, it is important to is complied with. Proposed § 25.1805(d) would require identify this as early as possible in the TC holders and applicants to submit to certification process to provide an C. Other Proposed Changes to Part 25 the FAA Oversight Office the following opportunity to resolve any issues that As explained in the preamble within 90 days after the effective date of may arise that could lead to delays in discussion of the proposed subpart H, the rule: the certification schedule. some existing rules applying to EWIS • A proposed project schedule, The same is true for this requirement. would need revision in order to support identifying all major milestones, for As discussed earlier, TC holder the proposed new subpart. Those rules meeting the compliance dates of this compliance with this section on time is that would be changed by this proposal rule. necessary to enable operators to comply are: • A proposed means of compliance with the operational requirements of • 25.611 with this section, identifying all this NPRM. Therefore, this item in the • 25.855

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• 25.869 the fatal accident on September 3, 1998, applied to any airplane system that • 25.1203 of a Swissair Model MD–11, discussed requires having its power removed or • 25.1301 earlier in this document. reset during normal operations. The • 25.1309 After that accident, the FAA FAA agrees with this recommendation. • 25.1353 conducted a special certification review The proposed § 25.1357(f) would • 25.1357 (SCR) on the IFE system installed on the require that airplane systems needing a The changes proposed for them are airplane, and published its report capability for having their power discussed in the section-by-section (‘‘Federal Aviation Administration removed or reset during normal discussion for proposed subpart H. In Special Certification Review Team operations must be designed so that addition, this NPRM includes a number Report on: Santa Barbara Aerospace, circuit breakers are not the primary of other changes to part 25 requirements STC ST00236LA–D, Swissair Model means to do that. This is a new for electrical systems discussed later in MD–11 Airplane, In-flight regulation whose requirements have not the section headed ‘‘Electrical System Entertainment System,’’ June 9, 2000. A previously existed within part 25 and is Harmonization Rules.’’ The remaining copy of this report is contained in the a recognition that any airplane system, changes to part 25 are discussed below. docket). One of the team’s findings was including an IFE system, that requires Section 25.1357(f) System Power that the design of the IFE system did not regular power removal or resetting Removal allow the flightcrew or cabin crew to needs to have a means to do so. completely remove electrical power in Appendix H to Part 25—Instructions for ATSRAC has proposed adding a any other way than by pulling the Continued Airworthiness requirement that airplane systems system’s circuit breakers. The FAA normally requiring power removal have decided that this was an unsafe As previously noted, improper a power switch to accomplish this, condition, and we issued an maintenance, repair, and modifications instead of relying on using the circuit airworthiness directive prohibiting often hasten the ‘‘aging’’ of EWIS. To breaker. The FAA has decided that this operation of MD–11 airplanes with that properly maintain, repair, and modify requirement belongs in § 25.1357. particular IFE system installed. The airplane EWIS, certain information must It is not the intent of the proposal to FAA expanded its investigation and be available to the designer, modifier, require that every electrically powered reviewed previously issued STCs that and installer. This information should system in the airplane have a means to had approved installation of IFE be part of the ICA as required by current remove power from them other than a systems on transport category airplanes. § 25.1529 and the proposed § 25.1739. circuit breaker. ATSRAC used the That investigation identified over 20 This proposal would amend phrase ‘‘normally requiring power STC IFE installations that had the same Appendix H by adding a new section, removal’’ to distinguish between design characteristics as the one on the H25.5, to require TC applicants to airplane systems normally turned on accident MD–11 airplane (no means to develop maintenance information for and off during normal operations, such remove power other than by pulling the EWIS as part of the ICA as a as passenger convenience systems, and circuit breaker). We issued ADs to requirement for getting a design those systems normally powered at all correct those inadequate IFE system approval. The proposed rule would also times, such as the flightdeck multi- designs. As more IFE systems with the apply to applicants for design change function displays or the flight same design characteristic are approvals (supplemental TCs and management computer. But if, for identified, ADs will be issued to correct amended TCs). example, the flight-management the identified unsafe condition. The proposal would require computer did require power cycling On September 18, 2000, the FAA applicants for TCs to prepare ICA for regularly, for whatever reason, this issued a policy memorandum stating EWIS that are approved by the FAA system would then be required to have that a newly certified IFE system should Oversight Office, in the form of a a means to do this other than using the have a way for the flightcrew or cabin document that is easily recognizable as circuit breakers. crew to disconnect it from its source of an EWIS ICA. To prepare these For systems requiring this power power other than by using circuit instructions, they must use an EZAP removal design feature, power should be breakers. A copy of this memorandum, such as the one described in AC120-XX, removed from the system as closely as titled ‘‘Interim Policy Guidance for ‘‘Program to Enhance Aircraft Electrical practical to the source of power instead Certification of In-Flight Entertainment Wiring Interconnection System of simply deactivating the outputs of the Systems on Title 14 CFR Part 25 Aircraft Maintenance’’ to perform a review of systems power supplies. (Policy Number 00–111–160),’’ is in the their representative airplane covering all The ability to quickly remove power docket. Most airplane manufacturers are areas, including the flightdeck (also from an airplane system not required for now equipping IFE systems on their known as the cockpit), electrical power the airplane’s safe operation is newly delivered airplanes with a power center, fuel tank wiring and important if an emergency situation source disconnection means. powerfeeder cables, as well as the demands isolation of a known or Subsequent policy covering cabin video engine. Applicants for design change unknown source of fire or smoke. One surveillance systems also contains the approvals would have to perform a of the first things flightcrews are same guidance (Policy Number 01–111– similar review for their proposed design instructed to do when faced with a fire 196, ‘‘Interim Summary of Policy and changes. or smoke emergency is to remove power Advisory Material Available for Use in A zonal analysis procedure is an from the known source or from all the Certification of Cabin Mounted assessment of the structures and unnecessary systems if the source is Video Cameras Systems with Flight systems within each physical zone of unknown. This is to stop the fire or Deck Displays on Title 14 CFR Part 25 the airplane. It is used to develop an smoke from spreading. Currently, part Aircraft,’’ included in the docket). inspection program to assess the general 25 regulations do not require systems to ATSRAC (as recommended by the condition and security of attachment of have a separate shutoff feature. But the ATSRAC Wire Systems Harmonization all system components and structures need for the flightcrew to be able to shut Working Group and the ARAC Electrical items contained in the zone, using off unnecessary systems was tragically Systems Harmonization Working Group) general visual inspections (GVI). An illustrated during the investigation of believes that this philosophy should be enhanced zonal analysis procedure

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(EZAP) is an enhanced version of the would be leaks from connection sites of are being used. This would minimize zonal analysis procedure. It focuses on unshrouded pipes. For the purposes of the amount of fluid contamination of EWIS components. An EZAP-generated this new requirement, the term the EWIS components. Preventing fluid inspection program might call for the combustible does not refer to material contamination reduces the probability use of stand-alone GVI and detailed that will burn when subjected to a of other contaminants, like dust and inspections (DET). A stand-alone GVI is continuous source of heat as occurs dirt, accumulating on the EWIS one that is performed separately from when a fire develops. Combustibles, as components. If no task can be developed the regularly scheduled GVI (typically used here, will sustain a fire without a to prevent accumulation of more frequently) and is focused on a continuous ignition source. combustibles in a zone, such as the dust particular area or component. In this An EZAP must address: blown through the air by cooler fans, case, the focus would be wiring. So • Ventilation conditions in the zone then tasks must be developed to while the zonal analysis procedure and the density of the installations that minimize their buildup, such as would result in a regularly scheduled would affect the presence and build-up scheduled cleaning. GVI for the entire zone, in which each of combustibles and the possibilities for Developing an ICA to define such of its systems and structures are combustion. Avionics and instruments tasks would include assessing whether inspected at the same time, the EZAP located in the flightdeck and equipment particular methods of cleaning would could result in additional GVIs or DETs bays, which generate heat and have actually damage the EWIS components. for the EWIS in that zone, which occur relatively tightly packed installations, Although regular cleaning to prevent more frequently. These inspection require cooling air flow. The air blown potential combustible build-up would techniques are discussed later in this into the area for that cooling tends to be the most obvious task for an EWIS section. deposit dust and lint on the equipment ICA, other procedures might also be An EZAP identifies the physical and and EWIS components. called for. A detailed inspection of a environmental conditions contained in • Liquid contamination on wiring. hydraulic pipe might be appropriate, for each zone of an airplane, analyzes their Most synthetic oils and hydraulic fluids, instance, if high-pressure mist from a effects on electrical wiring, and assesses while they might not be combustibles by pinhole caused by corrosion could the possibilities for smoke and fire. themselves, could be an aggravating accumulate on a wire bundle in a low From such an analysis, maintenance factor for accumulation of dust or lint. ventilation area, creating a possibility tasks can be developed to prevent This accumulation could then present for electrical arcing. ignition sources and to minimize the fuel for fire. Moisture on wiring may Proximity of EWIS to both primary possibilities for combustion by increase the probability of arcing from and back-up hydraulic, mechanical, or minimizing the accumulation of small breaches in the insulation, which electrical flight controls within a zone combustible materials. Such a could cause a fire. Moisture on wires would affect the criticality of procedure would involve dividing the that contain insulation breaches can inspections needed, their level of detail, airplane into physical areas, or zones, also lead to ‘‘arc tracking.’’ As discussed and their frequency. Even in the absence including actual physical boundaries previously, arc tracking is a of combustible material, wire arcing such as wing spars, bulkheads, and phenomenon in which an electrical arc could adversely affect continued safe cabin floor, and access provisions for forms a conductive carbon path across flight and landing if hydraulic pipes, the zone, and identifying which of those an insulating surface. The carbon path mechanical cables, or wiring for fly-by- zones contain EWIS components. For then provides a short circuit path wire controls are routed close to other those zones with EWIS components, through which current can flow. Short wiring. characteristics and components of all circuit current flow from arc tracking The EZAP-generated ICA must be systems installed in the zone would be can lead to loss of multiple airplane produced in the form of a single listed. The EWIS in the zone would be systems, structural damage, and fire. document, easily recognizable as EWIS described, including information on the • EWIS in close proximity to both ICA for that specific airplane model. full range of power levels carried in the primary and back-up hydraulic, The single document is relevant to the zone. And the presence or possibilities mechanical, or electrical flight controls. maintenance and inspection aspects of • for ignition sources or accumulation of The type of wiring discrepancies the ICA, and not the standard wiring combustibles would be noted. that must be addressed if they are practices manual or electrical load Combustibles are any materials that identified by general visual or detailed analysis, etc. could cause a fire to be sustained in the inspections. A listing of typical wiring The ICA must define applicable and event of an ignition source. Examples of discrepancies that should be detectable effective tasks, and the intervals for combustible materials would be dust or during EZAP-derived EWIS inspections performing them, to: lint accumulation, contaminated is given in AC120-XXX, Section B • Minimize accumulation of insulation blankets, and fuel or other ‘‘Guidance for Zonal Inspections.’’ combustible materials. combustible liquids or vapors. Wire • Proper cleaning methods for EWIS • Detect wire contaminants. contaminants are foreign materials that components. • Detect wiring discrepancies that are likely to cause degradation of Once information about such may not otherwise be reliably detected wiring. Wire contaminants can also be contaminants and combustibles within by inspections contained in existing combustibles. Some commonly used an airplane zone is collected, each maintenance programs. airplane liquids, like engine oils, identified possibility for combustion As noted earlier, among the types of hydraulic fluids, and corrosion would then be addressed to determine tasks to be developed from an EZAP are prevention compounds, might be whether a specific task could be general visual inspections (GVI) and readily combustible, but only in vapor performed to reduce that possibility. An detailed inspections (DET). A GVI is or mist form. In that case, an assessment example of a specific task to reduce defined as a visual examination of an must be made of conditions that could build-up of combustibles on EWIS interior or exterior area, installation, or exist within the zone that would convert components is the use of temporary assembly to detect obvious damage, the liquid to that form. Combustibles protective covers (such as plastic failure, or irregularity. This level of appearing as a result of any single sheeting) over EWIS components in a inspection is made from within failure must be considered. An example zone where corrosion prevention fluids touching distance of the inspected

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object unless otherwise specified. It is identification requirements, and EWIS is adequately separated from other made under normally available lighting electrical load data for the airplane EWIS, airplane system components, and conditions such as daylight, hangar undergoing modification. The proposed structure so they do not damage the lighting, flashlight, or droplight and Appendix H 25.5 would also require added EWIS, and that the addition of may require removal or opening of that the following information be the new EWIS does not invalidate access panels or doors. It may be included in ICA applicable to EWIS: separation for previously certified necessary to use a mirror to improve • Standard wiring practices data. EWIS. visual access to all exposed surfaces in • Wire separation design guidelines. Electrical load data and the the inspection area. Stands, ladders, or • Information to explain the instructions for updating that data are platforms may be required to gain airplane’s EWIS identification method necessary to help ensure that future proximity to the area being checked. It required by the proposed § 25.1711. modifications or additions of equipment • is expected that the area to be inspected Electrical load data and instructions that consume electrical power do not is clean enough to minimize the for updating that data. Such information exceed the generating capacity of the possibility that accumulated dirt, grease, will help ensure that those modifying, onboard electrical generation and or other contaminants might hide repairing, or installing new EWIS will distribution system. The existing unsatisfactory conditions that would not perform any action that will § 25.1351(a)(1) mandates that the otherwise be obvious. It is also adversely affect previously certified required generating capacity, and the expected, as an outcome of the EZAP systems and unintentionally introduce number and kinds of power sources, applied to EWIS, that any cleaning potential hazards. must be determined by an electrical considered necessary would be Standard wiring practices are defined load analysis. Typically, after an performed in accordance with as standards developed by the specific airplane is delivered and enters service, procedures that minimize the possibility airplane manufacturer or industry-wide it is modified numerous times of the cleaning process itself standards for the repair and throughout its service life. Each introducing anomalies. The EZAP must maintenance of EWIS. They include addition or deletion of an electrical- identify guidelines to assist personnel procedures and practices for the power-consuming system changes the performing a GVI in identifying wiring installation, repair, and removal of electrical load requirements. The only discrepancies and in assessing what EWIS components, including way to ensure that the capacity of the effect such discrepancies, if found, information about wire splices, methods overall generating and distribution could have on adjacent systems, of bundle attachment, connectors and system, as well as individual electrical particularly if these include wiring. As electrical terminal connections, buses, is not exceeded is to have an up- discussed previously, a list of typical bonding, and grounding. Although a to-date electrical load analysis. The best wiring discrepancies that should be standard wiring practices manual is not way to ensure that an up-to-date addressed is contained in proposed a design manual, and those designing a electrical load analysis is maintained is AC120–XX, Section B, ‘‘Guidance for new EWIS modification for a specific for the type certificate holder to include Zonal Inspections.’’ model airplane should not use it as such data in the ICA provided with the A DET is an intensive examination of such, it does provide the designer with airplane when it is first delivered to a a specific item, installation, or assembly insight into the types of EWIS customer, along with recommended to detect damage, failure, or irregularity. components used by the TC holder and practices for keeping it updated as Available lighting is normally the procedures recommended by the electrical loads are deleted and added. supplemented with a direct source of manufacturer for maintenance or repair D. Part 25 Electrical System good lighting at an intensity considered that supports continued airworthiness Harmonization Rules appropriate. Inspection aids, such as of the components. mirrors, magnifying lenses, or other EWIS separation guidelines are At the time the EWIS certification means, may be necessary. Surface important for maintaining the safe requirements contained in this proposal cleaning and elaborate access operation of the airplane. Maintenance were being developed, several existing procedures may be required. A DET can and repair personnel need to be aware part 25 certification requirements were be more than just a visual inspection. It of the type certificate holders’ also undergoing revision under a may include tactile assessment to check separation requirements so they do not separate joint harmonization effort with a component or assembly for tightness compromise separation in previously the European JAA. The FAA had tasked and security. Such an inspection may be certified systems. In fuel tank systems, ARAC to develop recommendations for needed to ensure the continued integrity the separation of certain wires may be harmonized rules (64 FR 66522). The of installations such as bonding critical design configuration control intent of that harmonization effort was jumpers, terminal connectors, etc. items and therefore qualify as an to develop a common set of standards A DET would be required when the airworthiness limitation. Maintenance between 14 CFR part 25 and JAR–25. As developer of the EZAP determines that personnel need to be aware of these mentioned previously, JAR–25 is the a GVI is inadequate to reliably detect guidelines and limitations because European counterpart to part 25. anomalies or degradation of EWIS many times wire bundles must be When ATSRAC began developing the components. Any detected moved or removed to perform necessary EWIS requirements proposed in this discrepancies must be corrected maintenance. They must be able to NPRM, the process of developing according to the operator’s approved readily identify EWIS associated with harmonized proposals was essentially maintenance procedures. It is not systems essential to the safe operation of complete, although NPRMs had not yet intended that the EZAP ICA identify the airplane. been published in the Federal Register. how to correct detected discrepancies. Similarly, those who design and So ATSRAC worked on the assumption To prevent improper modification install new EWIS need to be aware of that the harmonized rules would be in and repair of existing EWIS or the separation requirements so they can use effect by the time this proposal was improper installation of a new EWIS, the same methods to develop the published, and used the new proposed modification designers and modification required separation for the EWIS they harmonized part 25 as the baseline for personnel must know the applicable are adding to the airplane. This would the proposed EWIS requirements. This standard wiring practices, EWIS help to ensure both that newly added NPRM revises several of the harmonized

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rules to accommodate the proposed new Proposed § 25.899 maintains the same line with current design practices and EWIS requirements. level of safety as currently exists will have a minimum effect on the Three of those harmonized part 25 because it reflects and codifies current airplane operators and manufacturers. proposals, § 25.869(a), § 25.1353(a), industry practices. The proposed change There is no current published FAA (c)(5), (c)(6), (d), and § 25.1431(d), have would affect airplane manufacturers by advisory material for the proposed rule. already been adopted as final rules (69 requiring compliance with the new ARAC has recommended that the JAR FR 12526). We’re revising the new sections of the regulations. However, ACJ to 25.1310(a) be adopted as FAA 25.1353(a) in this NPRM. Some of the this would have a minimal effect in advisory material because it provides a remaining harmonized rules have been practice because airframe manufacturers useful, acceptable means of compliance. published as NPRMs. But several others must comply with proposed standards The FAA plans to adopt it. have not. Therefore, to ensure when seeking joint FAA–JAA Section 25.1357 Circuit Protective consistency in the proposed EWIS certification of their products, so there Devices requirements, those harmonized would be little change required from the requirements on which ATSRAC standards they have been using to Section 25.1357 specifies standards recommendations are based, and which comply with the existing proposed JAR for use, functional requirements, and have not yet been published as final 25X899. installation requirements for electrical rules, are included in this NPRM. These The FAA has developed advisory circuit protective devices. These are: §§ 25.899, 25.1309, 25.1310, material about the requirements for standards protect the airplane’s wiring 25.1357, 25.1360, 25.1362, and 25.1365. bonding and static electricity protection from electrical faults or malfunctions. The following discusses the proposed in transport category airplanes. This JAR paragraph 25.1357(d) contains a harmonization rules that must be material is contained in proposed AC requirement to provide sufficient spare adopted to support the addition of the 25.899–1. fuses, formerly located in paragraph (f). proposed part 25 EWIS certification The reason the JAA moved this text requirements. We believe the public Section 25.1309 Equipment, Systems, from paragraph (f) to (d) was to make it should be aware of the background and and Installations and Section 25.1310 clear that the spare fuse requirement Power Source Capacity and full reasoning behind each change to does not apply to fuses that are Distribution. these standards. inaccessible in flight. We propose to Proposed new § 25.1310 is composed revise § 25.1357 to move the spare fuse Section 25.899 Electrical Bonding and of material now covered in § 25.1309(e) Protection Against Static Electricity requirement of paragraph (f) to and (f). The current standards define an paragraph (d) to harmonize with the JAR Proposed § 25.899 would contain ‘‘essential load’’ on the power supply requirement. requirements for electrical bonding and and the conditions under which those The proposed standard continues to protection against static electricity. loads must be supplied. An ‘‘essential address the underlying safety issue by Current §§ 25.581, 25.954, and 25.1316 load’’ is each equipment installation providing protection for the airplane’s contain requirements for protecting the whose function is required for type electrical system from wiring faults or airplane and its systems from the effects certification or by operating rules and malfunctions, and by ensuring that there of lightning strikes. But the current that requires a power supply. These is no confusion about use of spare fuses requirements do not address the hazards paragraphs require that power sources in flight. It would maintain the same that could occur because of the must be able to supply those loads level of safety relative to the current accumulation of electrostatic charge. under a number of specified failure regulations and is in line with current Static electricity can cause electrical conditions. These requirements are not industry practice. shock hazards to people, ignite fuel directly related to the safety and Manufacturers and operators of vapors, and cause electromagnetic analysis requirements of § 25.1309. For transport category airplanes could be interference of airplane systems. that reason, and to make them more affected by the proposed change. But Proposed § 25.899 would require that accessible, we propose to move them to since it is in line with current industry electrical bonding and protection a new section where they would stand practice and does not result in any against static electricity be designed to alone. There is no current § 25.1310. practical changes in requirements or minimize accumulation of electrostatic The goal of harmonization was to practice, such effects would not be charge that could cause human injury ‘‘envelope’’ to the more stringent significant. from electric shock, ignition of requirements, which in this case are The JAR paragraph 25.1357(a) flammable vapors, or interference with those contained in the current references advisory material, ACJ electrical and electronic equipment. § 25.1309(e) and (f). The proposal is to 25.1357(a), which states that the effects Compliance could be shown by bonding adopt as § 25.1310 the more stringent of variations in ambient temperatures on the components properly to the airframe current § 25.1309(e) and (f). The JAA either the protective device or the or by incorporating other acceptable has agreed to adopt the same equipment it protects must not result in means to dissipate static charge. requirements in a new JAR 25.1310 (JAR hazards. We intend to revise our current This proposal would adopt a modified NPA25df-317). Current § 25.1309(g) AC 25–1357 to include this ACJ version of the current proposed JAR would be redesignated as § 25.1309(e). material. The announcement of a new 25X899. As currently written, the JAR The proposed new § 25.1310 and JAR AC on the effects of temperature duplicates some of the lightning 25.1310 would not be completely variations will be published in the protection requirements of JARs 25.581, harmonized because JAR 25.1310 Federal Register once it is available to 25.985, and 25.1316. That proposed JAR contains requirements for maintenance the public. Comments on the proposed 25X899 will be revised as well, and of airworthiness essential services after AC will be invited in that notice. those duplications removed, for the failure of any two engines on a three- purposes of this harmonization. engined airplane and makes reference to Section 25.1360 Precautions Against There is currently no § 25.899. This two JAR Advisory Circular Joint Injury new requirement is necessary to ensure materials (ACJ). But the proposed Also to harmonize with the standards electrical bonding and static protection standard maintains the same level of of JAR, the FAA proposes to add a new is fully addressed as a design standard. safety as the current regulations. It is in section, § 25.1360, concerning electric

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shock and burn protection. Currently, (AFM) procedure or design appliances. It would also require that there is no part 25 requirement for implementation to achieve compliance electric motors and transformers be precautions against injury from with the standards. provided with a thermal protection electrical shock and burns. Adding the This proposal addresses the device unless it can be shown that the JAR requirement to part 25 would underlying safety issue by ensuring that circuit protective device required by increase safety. The proposed JAR appropriate electrical power supplies § 25.1357(a) would be sufficient to show 25X1360, with its related ACJ material, are maintained to emergency services compliance with the requirements of would require that the electrical system after the main power sources have been § 25.1309(b). and equipment must be designed to switched off by the flightcrew. The Adoption of the proposal would minimize risk of electrical shock and proposal increases the level of safety by address concerns that faulty galley burns to the crew, passengers, and focusing on appropriate methods to heating equipment (ovens) often cause maintenance and servicing personnel ensure that electrical power is provided smoke or fire in the cabin, and that during normal operations. The ACJ for emergency functions during circuit protection devices used in motor provides advisory material for high emergency landing or ditching power supplies for those appliances voltages and high temperatures and a conditions. It is in line with current have not always provided enough means of compliance to the industry practice. Another option protection against failures. requirements. considered was to adopt the existing The proposed standard would be an The proposed action is to harmonize JAR and ACJ into 14 CFR. But revising improvement over current safety the regulations by the adoption of JAR the JAR and the ACJ material and practices because current part 25 does 25X1360 and its ACJ material in its creating a new § 25.1362 and AC 25– not specifically address electrical entirety. The proposed standard is more 1362 results in a harmonized standard appliance motors and transformers. The stringent for part 25 because it adds a that would provide greater flexibility for FAA considers that a new § 25.1365 new requirement and new advisory compliance. specifically addressing domestic material. But it is in line with current Since this proposed change is in line appliances is the most appropriate way industry practice, and therefore would with current design practices, the effect to increase the level of safety. The JAA maintain the level of safety. is considered to be minimal for aircraft is adopting the same requirement as JAR The FAA intends to publish advisory operators and manufacturers affected by 25.1365. material that adopts the existing JAA this change. Aircraft operators and manufacturers, advisory material. There is no FAA advisory material together with suppliers of galley and available. This proposal would create a electrical equipment, could be affected Section 25.1362 Electrical Supplies for new AC 25–1362 harmonized with ACJ by this change. Since newly certificated Emergency Conditions. 25X1362. aircraft may have to be supplied with The FAA proposes to add a new newly designed galley equipment, Section 25.1365 Electrical Appliances, section, § 25.1362, about electrical airplane operators may elect to Motors, and Transformers supplies for emergency conditions. introduce the same new equipment into There is no part 25 standard addressing The FAA proposes to add a new their existing fleet to maintain fleet electrical supplies for emergency section, § 25.1365, within the commonality. conditions equivalent to JAR 25.1362. ‘‘Miscellaneous Equipment’’ section of A new AC 25–1365 will be developed Partial coverage is provided by subpart F, concerning design and and an announcement of its availability §§ 25.1189, 25.1195, 25.1309, and installation of domestic appliances. The for comment will be published in the 25.1585. term ‘‘domestic appliance’’ is used to Federal Register. The JAR 25.1362 and associated ACJ refer to those items placed on the material were created to ensure that airplane to provide service amenities to E. Proposed Changes to Part 91, 121, electrical supplies for emergency passengers. Examples of domestic 125, and 129 Operating Rules for Fuel functions (such as fuel and hydraulic appliances are cooktops, ovens, Tank Systems and EWIS and Other shut-off valves) are maintained so they microwave ovens, coffee makers, water Existing Continued-Airworthiness- are operable after the flight crew has heaters, refrigerators, and toilet flush Related Rules switched off the main power sources. systems. In turn, domestic systems are As discussed earlier, the proposed This is necessary so emergency those such as lavatories or galleys, that alignment of the ICA requirements for procedures can be performed. Since may contain one or more domestic EWIS and the fuel tank system is a there is no equivalent standard to JAR appliances. IFE equipment, however, is result of an FAA review and 25.1362 in part 25, but partial coverage not considered equipment that falls realignment of the Aging Airplane is provided by §§ 25.1189, 25.1195, under the definition of a domestic Program. We have determined that 25.1309, and 25.1585, application of appliance. Proposed § 25.1365 is now certain compliance dates in the existing JAA standards by U.S. manufacturers covered by § 25.1309(b), which does not rules and pending proposals could be and aircraft operators has sometimes specifically address electrical appliance better aligned. Other changes to the resulted in different designs for the motors and transformers. rules and proposals are necessary to powering of appropriate emergency The proposed § 25.1365 would increase the cost-effectiveness of these functions. require that domestic appliances be rules and proposals. Therefore, we have The proposed action would adopt a designed and installed so that in the decided to revise those requirements new § 25.1362 harmonized to a revised event of failures, the requirements of and proposals and to align the JAR 25.1362. The new harmonized §§ 25.1309(b), (c), and (d) would be compliance schedules as nearly as standard would provide for a consistent satisfied. It would further require that possible. This effort also includes a application of the standards. The ACJ galleys and cooking appliances be such proposal to create new subparts in parts would be revised and adopted as a new as to minimize risk of overheating or fire 25 (subpart I, discussed earlier), 91, 121, AC by the FAA. This proposed rule and and that they be installed to prevent 125, and 129. These new subparts advisory material would provide damage or contamination of other would contain certain rules in this flexibility by allowing either an equipment from fluids or vapors proposal and other existing and future appropriate airplane flight manual resulting from spillage during use of the rules that pertain to the support of

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continued airworthiness, in particular, The table below illustrates what the airplane. Unless we say otherwise, rules addressing aging airplane issues. proposed and existing requirements will our purpose in moving requirements to The FAA believes that inclusion of be included in these new subparts. Each these new subparts is to ensure easy certain rules under the new subparts of these new subparts is titled visibility of those requirements will improve the reader’s ability to ‘‘Continued Airworthiness.’’ The applicable to the continued readily identify rules pertinent to proposed new subparts consist of airworthiness of the airplane. We do not continued airworthiness. relocated, revised, and new regulations intend to change their legal effect in any pertaining to continued airworthiness of other way.

NEW CONTINUED AIRWORTHINESS SUBPARTS FOR PARTS 25, 91, 121, 125, AND 129

Part 25 new/relocated rules Part 91 new/relocated Part 121 new/relocated Part 125 new/relocated Part 129 new/relocated within proposed rules within proposed rules within proposed rules within proposed rules within proposed Subpart I Subpart L Subpart Y Subpart M Subpart B

§ 25.1801—Purpose and § 91.1501—Purpose and § 121.901—Purpose and § 125.501—Purpose and (Proposed Subpart A definition (new). definition (new). definition (new). definition (new). would contain a revised § 129.1 and all of exist- ing part 129 except §§ 129.16, 129.32, and 129.33). § 25.1803—Reserved ...... § 91.1503—Reserved ...... § 121.903—Reserved ...... § 125.503—Reserved ...... § 129.101—Purpose and definition (new). § 25.1805—Electrical wir- § 91.1505—Repairs as- § 121.905—Aging airplane § 125.505—Repairs as- § 129.103—Reserved. ing interconnection sys- sessment for pressur- inspections and records sessment for pressur- tems (EWIS) mainte- ized fuselages (formerly reviews (formerly ized fuselages (formerly nance program (new). § 91.410(a)). § 121.368). § 125.248(a)). § 91.1507—Fuel tank sys- § 121.907—Repairs as- § 125.507—Fuel tank sys- § 129.105—Aging airplane tem maintenance pro- sessment for pressur- tem inspection program inspections and records gram (new) (replaces re- ized fuselages (formerly (new) (replaces require- reviews for U.S.-reg- quirements of § 121.370(a)). ments of § 125.248(b)). istered multiengine air- § 91.410(b)). craft (formerly § 129.33). § 121.909—Supplemental ...... § 129.107—Repairs as- inspections (formerly sessment for pressur- § 121.370a). ized fuselages (formerly § 129.32(a)). § 121.911—Electrical wir- ...... § 129.109—Supplemental ing interconnection sys- inspections for U.S.-reg- tems (EWIS) mainte- istered aircraft (formerly nance program (new). § 129.16). § 121.913—Fuel tank sys- ...... § 129.111—Electrical wir- tem maintenance pro- ing interconnection sys- gram (new) (replaces re- tems (EWIS) mainte- quirements of nance program (new). § 121.370(b)). § 129.113—Fuel tank sys- tem maintenance pro- gram (new) (replaces re- quirements of § 129.32(b)).

As previously stated, other future Until the new subparts have been same time. The language setting up the rules pertaining to the support of established in 14 CFR as part of a final operational rule subparts will be the continued airworthiness would also be rule, each of several proposals same in each rulemaking. But the contained in these proposed new containing new continued airworthiness language setting up subpart I of part 25 subparts. Several such proposals are rules will include language needed to will vary slightly because of differences currently under development. But set up the proposed subparts. Once one in the applicability of each rule. The because of uncertainties in the timing of of those proposals becomes final, and proposed applicability in proposed adoption of final rules, it is not always the new continued airworthiness §§ 25.1 and 25.1801 will be correct for possible to estimate which of the subparts are thus established, then other each NPRM. Otherwise, commenters proposals currently being developed continued-airworthiness-related addressing each NPRM might be will reach final rule stage first. In order proposals will delete any language confused by an inconsistency between to ensure that the proposed new relating to setting up the new subparts. the applicability of the subpart and the They will retain only the rule language applicability of the individual proposed subparts for continued airworthiness pertinent to that specific proposal. rule sections. And until final decisions have been established in 14 CFR to A result of this ‘‘building block’’ are made on the content of each later contain whichever of several new NPRM, it would be inappropriate and continuing airworthiness proposals is strategy of proposed rulemaking is the possibility that two or more NPRMs may potentially misleading for this NPRM to adopted, the FAA has decided to use a propose that content. ‘‘building block’’ strategy to establish appear in the Federal Register the new subparts. proposing the same new continued If this NPRM, which has the airworthiness subparts for 14 CFR at the narrowest applicability of several

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proposals in development, is adopted FAA Oversight Office is the aircraft proposal is adopted by mid-2006, this first, then as each of the other final rules certification office or office of the proposal would give operators 30 is adopted, §§ 25.1 and 25.1801 would Transport Airplane Directorate with months after the effective date of the be amended to expand the applicability oversight responsibility for the relevant final rule to make these changes. to cover what’s added in the new rule. type certificate or supplemental type Because the proposed compliance date For instance, one proposal might cover certificate, as determined by the in § 25.1805 for holders of existing TCs holders of existing supplemental type Administrator. As discussed previously, is December 16, 2007, operators would certificates (STCs), so § 25.1 and the primary means for operators to have one year after that date to comply § 25.1801, as adopted in this NPRM, comply with the requirements of these with this section. would be amended to reference those subparts would be by implementing For pending and future design holders. If a proposal applying to them programs or taking other actions changes approved after December 16, is adopted first, then when this proposal developed by the TC and STC holders 2008, operators incorporating such a is adopted, we can remove the proposed under proposed subpart I of part 25. In § 25.1 and § 25.1801 from the final rule, each case, to ensure compliance with change would have to revise their because those provisions would already the relevant subpart I rule, the TC and maintenance program to incorporate be included in the previously adopted STC holder deliverables must be EWIS ICA before returning the airplane rule. approved by the FAA Oversight Office. to service. When all the proposals currently Because we expect this will be a Paragraph (d) would require that under development are issued as final standard approach to compliance with operators keep their EWIS maintenance rules, § 25.1 and § 25.1801 will be as the requirements of these subparts, we programs current as they modify their broad as they need to be to cover all of are including this definition in these airplanes. As discussed earlier, the the rules. If any of those rules currently sections to avoid having to repeat it in proposed changes to part 25 would under development is not issued, then each section within these subparts. ensure that, for modifications affecting those sections would be only as broad Proposed Changes to Parts 121 (Subpart EWIS, the applicant for the design as is needed for the rules that are approval will provide necessary adopted. Because the language in each Y) and 129 (Subpart B)—EWIS Maintenance Programs revisions to the ICA. This paragraph NPRM will have been appropriate for would ensure that operators installing that specific NPRM, the public will have Paragraph (a) states that these sections those modifications on their airplanes been given adequate notice for all of the would apply to transport category, would revise their maintenance program provisions in the final versions of those turbine powered airplanes with a to incorporate these ICA revisions. sections. maximum type certificated passenger Paragraph (a) of the ‘‘Purpose and capacity of 30 or more, or having a Paragraph (e) would require that the definition’’ sections of part 91, subpart maximum payload capacity of 7500 maintenance program changes required L, part 121, subpart Y, part 125, subpart pounds or more resulting from the by these sections be approved by the M, and part 129, subpart B generally original certification of the airplane or operator’s principal inspector. We are in describes the applicability of these later increase in capacity. This the process of developing guidance for subparts and states that the purpose of applicability provision coincides with principal inspectors to ensure that their the various sections in these subparts is that of proposed § 25.1805 and is reviews are consistent and focused on to prescribe requirements to support intended to ensure that, if a TC or STC the key implementation issues. continued airworthiness. While most of holder is required to develop EWIS ICA Assuming this proposal is adopted by the requirements of these subparts for an airplane design, the operator of mid-2006, this proposal would give the would address the need for improved that airplane is required to implement affected air carriers and operators 30 maintenance, these subparts may also them. As discussed previously, certain months after the effective date of the include requirements to modify vintage airplanes would be excluded final rule to incorporate those ICA for airplanes or take other actions that we from these requirements. This EWIS into their manuals. Thereafter, consider necessary for continued applicability would result in the inspections and maintenance of EWIS airworthiness. coverage of airplanes where the safety and fuel tank systems must be carried Historically, the only means used by benefits and the public interest are the out at the intervals specified in the the FAA to impose these types of greatest. This action would affect operator’s maintenance program. requirements was the AD process. approximately 7,000 U.S. registered Under part 39, ADs address unsafe airplanes in parts 121 and 129 Many problems caused by inadequate conditions that we determine are likely operations. wire maintenance practices have been to exist or develop on other products of Paragraph (b) of these sections would discussed previously in this document. the same type design. In recent years, add requirements for maintenance Much effort has been devoted to the FAA has identified a number of programs for EWIS for part 121 identifying the maintenance practices fleet-wide continued airworthiness certificate holders and part 129 foreign that could either prevent such incidents issues, particularly relating to aging air carriers and foreign operators of U.S. and accidents from occurring again or airplanes, that are not limited to registered aircraft. Paragraph (c) would mitigate their causes. The purpose of particular type designs. Under these require them to develop a maintenance this new section is to ensure that circumstances, general rulemaking may program for EWIS based on ICA for enhanced EWIS and fuel tank system be a more efficient and appropriate way EWIS prepared by TC or STC holders. maintenance techniques are put into to address these types of problems than As discussed previously, the changes to practice on a continuing basis in ADs. These new subparts provide part 25 would require both holders of airplane maintenance programs. Proper locations for these types of existing TCs and future applicants for use of existing methods, techniques, and requirements. TCs and design changes to provide practices, combined with knowledge Paragraph (b) of these sections affected operators with these ICA. gained through ATSRAC activities, provides a definition of the term ‘‘FAA The compliance date for adopting service history, research, and analysis, Oversight Office.’’ As stated in the these maintenance program changes is will result in improved wire system discussion of proposed § 25.1801, the December 16, 2008. Assuming this safety.

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Proposed Changes to Parts 91 (Subpart that must be incorporated into models, must develop the ICA as L), 121 (Subpart Y), 125 (Subpart M), operators’ and air carriers’ inspection or required by SFAR 88. We are also and 129 (Subpart B)—Fuel Tank maintenance programs in the following proposing to make it clear that the Maintenance Programs ways: operator is required to develop the • These proposals would require part The FAA Oversight Office must maintenance instructions for field- approve ICA for the fuel tank system, 91 and part 125 operators, part 121 approved auxiliary fuel tanks. Because and the operator’s principal inspector or certificate holders, and part 129 foreign there is no other design approval holder Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) air carriers and foreign persons for these tanks, there is no other person must approve the operator’s program operating U.S. registered airplanes to in a better position to develop these changes incorporating those ICA. incorporate fuel tank system ICA into instructions. As with the original The current rule requires the ACO to requirements of the Fuel Tank Safety their inspection or maintenance approve individual operator fuel tank programs. As discussed earlier, one of Rule, we expect that operators who do maintenance programs. The FAA not have the expertise to develop these the main objectives of this rulemaking is recognizes that, as long as the ICA are instructions will be able to contract with to align the operational requirements for approved by the ACO, ACO approval of experts to help them. fuel tank maintenance programs with the operators’ maintenance program The proposed operational rules also the proposed requirements for EWIS changes incorporating those ICA make it clear that they apply to ICA maintenance programs. To that end, imposes unnecessary burdens on both developed under SFAR 88, to ICA except as discussed below, the current the operators and the ACOs. With this developed for new or amended fuel tank requirements would be revised proposed change, principal inspectors certificates under § 25.1529 Amendment to be parallel with the EWIS operational or the cognizant FSDO would be 102, and to any later revisions to those requirements discussed earlier. We responsible for reviewing and approving ICA. These proposed operational rules provide the justification for these program changes to address fuel tank would require that operators revise their parallel provisions in the earlier safety. But, as stated, the ICA on which maintenance and inspection programs discussion of the EWIS proposal, and it the operator’s program is based must be to incorporate ICA changes associated is not repeated here. approved by the FAA Oversight Office. with alterations affecting the fuel tank Part 91 and part 125 operators are • The instructions for fuel tank ICA. This is necessary because an required to have an inspection program. maintenance and inspection developed alteration may invalidate existing fuel Part 121 air carriers are required to have by the TC holders will be referenced as tank system ICA, and compromise the an inspection program and a program the ‘‘fuel tank ICA.’’ The previous rule safety objectives of the proposed rules. covering maintenance, preventive language referred to ‘‘instructions for maintenance, and alterations for their maintenance and inspection of the fuel H. Advisory Circulars airplanes. As provided by § 43.13(a), tank system,’’ even though it was widely As indicated in the discussion of operators may choose to follow the understood throughout the industry that ATSRAC recommendations that maintenance instructions developed by these instructions would be contained appeared earlier in this document, the the TC holder or they may develop their in the ICA. Because these requirements advisory committee has produced four own maintenance instructions, as long are now being aligned with the guidance documents as products of the as they are acceptable to the proposed requirements for EWIS to working group activities that have Administrator. But they must comply facilitate operator compliance, and the contributed to this proposed rule. Those with the airworthiness limitations EWIS requirements refer to ICA as the guidance documents are on section of the ICA. Foreign persons or place where EWIS maintenance maintenance, training, and standard foreign air carriers operating a U.S. instructions may be found, the FAA wiring practices manuals, as well as on registered aircraft are required to have a believes that using a consistent term to the proposed new subpart H. We have maintenance program approved by the refer to the required information in both used these documents as the basis for Administrator. rules would clarify the common intent developing the accompanying advisory Because of the Fuel Tank Safety Rule, of the requirements and make them circulars. Notices of availability for the above-listed operators and air easier for operators to understand. comment for the training, standard carriers must now incorporate • The fuel tank ICA must address the wiring practices, and subpart H ACs are instructions for inspection and fuel tank system as defined by the published elsewhere in the Federal maintenance of the fuel tank system into airplane’s TC, any supplemental TCs, Register. Notice of availability for the their inspection or maintenance and any field approved incorporated maintenance AC will be published as programs. These instructions must auxiliary fuel tank systems. The current soon as possible. address the actual configuration of the requirements mandate that the ICA must Advisory materials for the design fuel tank systems and they must be be developed for the ‘‘actual approval holder (DAH) requirements of approved by the FAA aircraft configuration of the fuel tank systems of subpart I and for the part 25 electrical certification office (ACO) having each affected airplane.’’ That wording, system harmonization rules are also cognizance over the TC for the affected however, proved to be unclear to many made available in notices of availability airplane. The compliance time for in the industry. The changed language for comment published elsewhere in the incorporation of the fuel tank system is proposed to clarify the original intent. Federal Register. instructions for inspection and To further clarify what STCs should In addition, guidance material maintenance into the inspection or be included, the FAA has created a list entitled ‘‘Process for Developing maintenance programs was changed on by airplane model of STCs affected by Instructions for Maintenance and July 30, 2004 to December 16, 2008. The this proposed rule. That list has been Inspection of Fuel Tank Systems reasons for that change were briefly placed in the docket for this rulemaking Required by SFAR 88’’ was made outlined earlier in this document in the and may also be viewed at http:// available as a policy statement on May discussions about rule alignment. This qps.airweb.faa.gov/QuickPlace/ 28, 2004 at http://www.airweb.faa.gov/ proposal would change the current sfar88ops/Main.nsf. rgl. Comments have been received and requirements for the instructions for The holders of those STCs, as well as are being reviewed. Advisory Circular fuel tank inspections and maintenance the TC holders for the affected airplane 25.981–1B, ‘‘Fuel Tank Ignition Source

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Prevention Guidelines,’’ gives guidance persons who would be required to maintenance program would be used by on showing compliance to certification provide that information are described maintenance personnel to maintain the requirements for prevention of ignition below. integrity of airplane wiring systems. sources within the fuel tanks of This requirement would be necessary to Required Information, Use, and ensure that wiring is properly transport category airplanes. It also Respondents gives guidance on developing ICA for maintained and inspected to avoid fuel tank systems. It can be found in the (1) Proposed § 25.1711 would require problems that could affect safety. docket for this NPRM. that electrical wiring interconnection (5) As a result of the revised systems (EWIS) components be labeled maintenance programs that would be VI. Regulatory Analyses and Notices to identify the component, its function, required for airplanes operating under Authority for This Rulemaking and its design limitations, if any. If the part 121, maintenance personnel will be EWIS is part of a system that requires performing inspections and The FAA’s authority to issue rules redundancy, the labeling would also maintenance procedures to address regarding aviation safety is found in include component part number, safety issues specific to wiring systems. Title 49 of the United States Code. function, and separation requirements Although this NPRM does not Subtitle I, section 106 describes the for bundles. This specificity of labeling specifically require new training, authority of the FAA Administrator. would be required to ensure that existing § 121.375 requires that Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, maintenance can be handled properly certificate holders or persons describes in more detail the scope of the and with the appropriate caution for performing maintenance have a training agency’s authority. This rulemaking is maintaining the safety features the program to ensure that persons promulgated under the authority wiring system was designed to provide. determining the adequacy of such work described in subtitle VII, part A, subpart The information marked on the wires (including inspectors) are fully III, section 44701, ‘‘General would be used by maintenance informed about the procedures and requirements.’’ Under that section, the personnel for repair and cautionary techniques involved and are competent FAA is charged with promoting safe tasks, and by modifiers so that original to perform them. To comply with this flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by safety features are retained during requirement in relation to proposals for prescribing— modifications. The future airplane revised maintenance programs for EWIS • Minimum standards required in the manufacturer and anyone who modifies included in this NPRM, certificate interest of safety for the design and the airplane would bear the burden of holders would be required to develop performance of aircraft; this labeling requirement. any additional training program needed • Regulations and minimum (2) Proposed § 25.1805 would require to ensure that the appropriate personnel standards in the interest of safety for that existing TC holders develop are adequately prepared to carry out the inspecting, servicing, and overhauling Instructions for Continued revised maintenance programs. aircraft; and Airworthiness (ICA) for EWIS. (6) The proposed revision to part 25 • Regulations for other practices, Applicants for approval of design Appendix H would require that future methods, and procedures the changes would be required to develop manufacturers include acceptable EWIS Administrator finds necessary for safety revisions to those EWIS ICA for any practices in their ICA, presented in a in air commerce. modifications to the airplane that might standard format. This information This regulation is within the scope of affect them. Proposed § 25.1739 and would be used by maintenance that authority because it prescribes— Appendix H would apply the personnel for wiring maintenance and • New safety standards for the design requirement for EWIS ICA to future repairs. The requirement is necessary of transport category airplanes, and applicants for TCs. EWIS ICA would be because information about cautionary • New requirements that are used by operators to prepare their tasks during maintenance that can necessary for safety for the design, maintenance programs. This prevent situations that could production, operation, and maintenance requirement would be necessary to compromise safety need to be available of those airplanes, and for other ensure that wiring is properly to maintenance personnel. Standard practices, methods and procedures maintained and inspected to avoid wiring practices manuals, in which this relating to those airplanes. problems that could affect safety. information is presented, often differ (3) Proposed subpart I would also Paperwork Reduction Act from manufacturer to manufacturer and require that TC holders submit to the so are difficult for maintenance This proposal contains the following FAA a plan detailing how they intend personnel to find specific information new information collection to comply with its requirements. This in. The requirement for a standard requirements. As required by the information would be used by the FAA format is meant to correct this. Because Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 to assist the TC holder in complying of this proposal, manufacturers would U.S.C. 3507(d)), the Department of with requirements. The compliance change their Standard Wiring Practices Transportation has submitted the plan would be necessary to ensure that Manuals (SWPM). information requirements associated TC holders fully understand the with this proposal to the Office of requirements, correct any deficiencies Annual Burden Estimate Management and Budget for its review. in planning in a timely manner, and are To provide estimates for the burden Title: Enhanced Airworthiness able to provide the information needed associated with this NPRM, the FAA Program for Airplane Systems/Fuel by the operators for the operators’ developed categories corresponding to Tank Safety (EAPAS/FTS). timely compliance with the rule. information collection impacts of Summary: This proposal consists of (4) Anyone operating an airplane requirements contained in the proposal. regulatory changes applying to wiring under part 121 would be required to The summary table below contains the systems and fuel tank systems in revise their existing maintenance impacted entities, average annual hours transport category airplanes. Some of program to incorporate the maintenance and hardware costs, and the those changes would require new and inspection tasks for EWIS contained corresponding average annual cost. information collection. The proposed in the EWIS ICA required by subpart I. Details of the estimates are in the new information requirements and the The information incorporated into the paragraphs below.

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Average Average Entities impacted Proposed requirement Hardware cost annual hours annual cost

Airplane Manufacturers ...... Wire identification (30 seconds per label) ...... 12,046 $430,524 Airplane Manufacturers ...... Label ...... 5 cents per label ...... 72,275 Airplane Modifiers ...... Wire identification (30 seconds per label) ...... 18,417 658,224 Airplane Modifiers ...... Label ...... 5 cents per label ...... 110,500 Existing TC Holders ...... Develop ICA ...... 15,743 868,699 Future TC Applicants ...... Develop ICA ...... 3,578 197,434 Future STC Applicants ...... Develop ICA ...... 57,828 3,190,949 Airplane Manufacturers ...... Revise SWPM ...... 1,035 57,111 Airplane Manufacturers ...... Develop Compliance Plan ...... 132 7,284 Airplane Operators ...... Revise Maintenance Program ...... 2,744 151,414 Airplane Operators ...... Develop Training Program ...... 2,376 131,108

Total ...... 113,899 5,875,522

Proposed § 25.1711 would affect identification requirements would Operators would be required to revise airplane manufacturers by requiring require roughly 2,210,000 labels their existing maintenance program to additional labeling. Over the 25-year annually. With the cost of each label incorporate the maintenance and period of analysis, manufacturers would approximately 5 cents, the estimated inspection tasks for EWIS contained in label on average 413 airplanes yearly. average annual corresponding cost is the EWIS ICA. Over the period of The FAA estimates that an additional $110,500. analysis, the FAA estimates 68,607 total 3,500 labels might be added to wires in The proposal would require that hours, or 2,744 average annual hours each part 25 airplane, for 1,445,500 existing TC holders develop ICA for required to revise existing maintenance labels annually. The additional EWIS. Over the period of analysis, the programs. Using the fully burdened identification requirement would take FAA estimates the proposal would labor cost for an engineer, the average roughly 30 seconds, requiring require 15,743 average annual annual planning cost would be approximately 12,046 annual hours. engineering hours, resulting in an $151,414. Using the fully burdened hourly cost of average annual cost of $868,699 (using The estimated cost to develop training a mechanic ($35.74), the average annual the fully burdened hourly rate of $55.18 considers the industry’s standard hourly burden for the wire for an engineer). training factor of 200 hours per one hour identification requirement on Proposed §25.1805 would also require of prepared training material. 600 hours manufacturers is $430,524. future TC applicants to develop ICA for is the estimated training development The estimated cost resulting from EWIS. The FAA estimates roughly .5 time for the 3-hour training course for information collection from TC holders part 25 TCs yearly, with average annual each operator. When combined with 99 also considers the additional cost of estimated labor hours to perform the operators, the total hours would be labels. The additional manufacturer analysis of 3,578. This would result in 59,400 or 2,376 annually. Combined identification requirements would average annual costs of $197,434. with the burdened hourly cost of require roughly 1,445,500 labels The proposal would require future $55.18, the average annual cost for annually. Industry representatives applicants for STCs to develop ICA for training development would be provided the FAA with cost estimates EWIS as well. Over the period of $131,108. for each label of approximately 5 cents. analysis, the FAA estimates it would The agency is soliciting comments to The estimated annual corresponding take 948 annual STC applicants 61 (1) evaluate whether the proposed cost is $72,275. hours to perform the analysis. With collection of information is necessary Section 25.1711 would also affect engineering costs of $55.18 per hour, the for the proper performance of the airplane modifiers when electrical average annual burden would be functions of the agency, including wiring supplemental type certificates $3,190,949. whether the information will have (STC) are installed on airplanes. The Because of this proposal, practical utility; (2) evaluate the FAA estimates there would be an manufacturers would change their accuracy of the agency’s estimate of the additional 200 labels added each time Standard Wiring Practices Manual burden; (3) enhance the quality, utility, an affected STC is installed on an (SWPM). The FAA calculates 1,035 as and clarity of the information to be airplane. Using 170 as the average the average annual hours required to collected; and (4) minimize the burden annual affected number of STCs, and 65 update manuals, resulting in an average of the collection of information on those as the number of installations per STC, annual burden of roughly $57,111. who are to respond, including through the corresponding total annual number Manufacturers would present a plan the use of appropriate automated, of labels for STCs is 2,210,000. The for approval describing how they intend electronic, mechanical, or other identification requirement would take to comply with the requirements. The technological collection techniques or about 30 seconds for each additional FAA believes the data contained in this other forms of information technology label, requiring an annual burden of plan would be submitted electronically (for example, permitting electronic roughly 18,417 hours. Using the fully with no cost to submit the plan. We submission of responses). burdened hourly cost of a mechanic estimate 60 labor hours (per airplane Individuals and organizations may ($35.74), the annual burden on airplane model) to develop a plan and submit submit comments on the information modifiers for the wire identification data to the FAA. We estimate 3,300 collection requirement by December 5, requirement is $658,224. hours for roughly 55 models. The 2005, and should direct them to the Estimated costs resulting from average annual hours are 132, with address listed in the ADDRESSES section information collection from STC corresponding average annual costs of of this document. applicants consider the additional cost $7,284 (using the fully burdened hourly According to the regulations of labels. The additional STC cost of $55.18). implementing the Paperwork Reduction

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Act of 1995, (5 CFR Part In conducting these analyses, FAA Regulatory Programs 1998 1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an agency may not has determined this proposal: Has Articles Referenced conduct or sponsor, and a person is not benefits that justify its costs, is not an required to respond to, a collection of economically ‘‘significant regulatory Wright, T.P. ‘‘American Methods of information unless it displays a action’’ as defined in section 3(f) of Aircraft Production,’’ 1939. currently valid OMB control number. Executive Order 12866, and is Wojcik, Leonard A., ‘‘Models To The OMB control number for this ‘‘significant’’ as defined in DOT’s Understand Airline and Air Traffic information collection will be published Regulatory Policies and Procedures; Management Authority Decision- in the Federal Register after it is would not have a significant economic Making Interactions in Schedule approved by the Office of Management impact on a substantial number of small Disruptions: From Simple Games to and Budget. entities; would not have an effect on Agent-Based Models,’’ Handbook of International Compatibility international trade; and would not Airline Strategy, 1992. impose an unfunded mandate on state, Irrgang, M.E., ‘‘Airline Irregular In keeping with U.S. obligations local, or tribal governments, or on the Operations,’’ Handbook of Airline under the Convention on International private sector. These analyses, available Economics, 1995. Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to in the docket, are summarized below. comply with International Civil Alternatives We Considered Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards Total Costs and Benefits of This Alternative 1—Require operators to and Recommended Practices to the Rulemaking maximum extent practicable. The FAA clean & inspect each airplane every C- The estimated cost of this NPRM is check or every three years, causing an has determined that there are no ICAO $474.4 million ($209.2 million present Standards and Recommended Practices additional $192.5 million ($79.9 million value) over 25 years. The total estimated present value) in cleaning and that correspond to these proposed benefits are $755.3 million ($340.7 regulations. inspection costs, and an additional million present value) over 25 years. $104.0 million ($38.6 million present Regulatory Evaluation Summary Who Is Potentially Affected by This value) in downtime. This portion of the preamble Rulemaking? This option would result in additional summarizes the FAA’s analysis of the • Manufacturers of part 25 airplanes. costs of $296.5 million ($118.5 million economic impacts of this NPRM. It also • Operators of large transport present value) with no commensurate includes summaries of the initial category airplanes operating under FAR increase in benefits. regulatory flexibility determination. We Parts 121 & 129. Alternative 2—Require EWIS training suggest readers seeking greater detail • Applicants for amended type for four groups of people in addition to read the full regulatory evaluation, a certificates and supplemental type maintenance workers. The groups and copy of which we have placed in the certificates. additional costs are: docket for this rulemaking. • Electrical/avionic engineers—$4.0 Changes to Federal regulations must Cost Assumptions and Sources of million ($2.4 million present value). Information undergo several economic analyses. • Individuals involved in engineering First, Executive Order 12866 directs that Discount rate—7% or planning work—$0.4 million ($0.4 each Federal agency shall propose or Period of analysis—25 Years, 2005 million present value). adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned through 2029 • Flight deck crew—$260.0 million determination that the benefits of the Burdened labor rate (as shown in key ($126.1 million present value). intended regulation justify its costs. assumptions & labor rates in • Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act Cabin crew-$91.5 million ($44.4 regulatory evaluation)— million present value). of 1980 requires agencies to analyze the • Aerospace engineers—$55.18/hour economic impact of regulatory changes • Maintenance personnel—$35.74/ To train these individuals, operators on small entities. Third, the Trade hour would develop additional courses. The Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 2531–2533) Value of fatality avoided—$3.0 million FAA estimates an additional $25.2 prohibits agencies from setting (Source: ‘‘Revised Departmental million ($24.1 million present value) to standards that create unnecessary Guidance, Treatment of Value of Life develop the necessary training material. obstacles to the foreign commerce of the and Injuries in Preparing Economic The total estimated additional cost of United States. In developing U.S. Evaluations,’’ Office of the Secretary this alternative is approximately $381.1 standards, this Trade Act requires of Transportation Memorandum’’, million ($197.4 million present value) agencies to consider international January 29, 2002) with no commensurate increase in standards and, where appropriate, to be Fleet—FAA Flight Standards (SPAS benefits. the basis of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Database) Benefits of This Rulemaking Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 Fleet Growth (3.82% per year) & (Pub. L. 104–4) requires agencies to Passenger Occupancy Rates The FAA estimates $755.3 million prepare a written assessment of the (75%)—FAA Aerospace Forecasts ($340.7 million present value) as the costs, benefits, and other effects of Years 2003–2014 total benefits of this proposal. proposed or final rules that include a Failures, Incidents and Accidents— In the table below, categories of Federal mandate likely to result in the The National Aviation Safety Data benefits are shown. The middle column expenditure by State, local, or tribal Analysis Center gives the nominal values of quantified governments, in the aggregate, or by the Aircraft Value—Economic Values for benefits, while the right-hand column private sector, of $100 million or more Evaluation of Federal Aviation gives the total incremental present value annually (adjusted for inflation). Administration Investment and benefits broken down by category type.

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Nominal Benefits values Present value (millions) (millions)

Non Fatal & Fatal Accidents: Non Fatal events ...... $56.0 $26.1 Fatal events ...... 507.0 236.3

Total ...... 563.0 262.4

EWIS Operational Improvements: Averted delays ...... 21.2 8.3 Averted unscheduled landings ...... 152.4 62.4 Averted IFE failures ...... 18.7 7.6

Total ...... 192.3 78.3

Total—All Benefits ...... 755.3 340.7

Costs of This Rulemaking In the table below, the left-hand column gives the total incremental The FAA estimates $474.3 million column specifies the cost component by present value costs by 14 CFR part. ($209.2 million present value) as the 14 CFR part, the middle column gives total cost of this proposal. the nominal cost, and the right-hand

Nominal Present Cost component values value (millions) (millions)

Part 25 Harmonization ...... 0 0 Part 25 Subpart H ...... $131.9 $53.8 Part 25 Subpart I ...... 23.3 20.3 Part 121 ICA ...... 319.1 135.1 Parts 91/121/125—Fuel Tank ...... (*)

Total ...... 474.3 209.2 * De minimus.

Initial Regulatory Flexibility entities, section 605(b) of the 1980 RFA manufacturers would incur type Determination provides that the head of the agency certificate (TC) and amended TC costs. may so certify and a regulatory Because all U.S. transport-aircraft The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 flexibility analysis is not required. The category manufacturers have more than (RFA) establishes ‘‘as a principle of certification must include a statement 1,500 employees, none are considered regulatory issuance that agencies shall providing the factual basis for this small entities. endeavor, consistent with the objective determination, and the reasoning should Future supplemental type certificate of the rule and of applicable statutes, to be clear. (STC) applicants would incur additional fit regulatory and informational This proposed rule would not have a compliance costs. These STC applicants requirements to the scale of the significant economic impact on a would incur the cost only if the business, organizations, and substantial number of small entities for expected revenue from the STC would governmental jurisdictions subject to the following reasons. exceed the expected cost. While future regulation.’’ To achieve that principle, Entities potentially affected by this STC costs would be passed on to the RFA requires agencies to solicit and proposal include part 25 manufacturers, airplane operators, it is not possible to consider flexible regulatory proposals applicants for future amended and determine when and which operator and to explain the rationale for their supplemental type certificates, and part would purchase and install such a actions. The RFA covers a wide-range of 121 operators of large transport category future STC. Because a future STC small entities, including small airplanes. applicant would incur the additional businesses, not-for-profit organizations, The FAA uses the size standards from compliance cost only if the STC would and small governmental jurisdictions. the Small Business Administration for generate profits, the FAA believes there Agencies must perform a review to Air Transportation and Aircraft would not be a significant impact on a determine whether a proposed or final Manufacturing, which specify substantial number of STC applicants. rule will have a significant economic companies having less than 1,500 The FAA calculated the economic impact on a substantial number of small employees as small entities. impact on small-business part 121 entities. If the agency determines that it The current United States part 25 operators by dividing the annual will, the agency must prepare a airplane manufacturers include: Boeing, compliance cost by the firm’s annual regulatory flexibility analysis as Cessna Aircraft, Gulfstream Aerospace, revenue. The annual estimated average described in the Act. Learjet (owned by Bombardier), annual cost of the proposal would However, if an agency determines that Lockheed Martin, McDonnell Douglas (a approach 1⁄2 of 1 percent for only two a proposed or final rule is not expected wholly-owned subsidiary of The Boeing small entities. For the others, the cost to have a significant economic impact Company), Raytheon Aircraft, and impact would be a few hundredths of 1 on a substantial number of small Sabreliner Corporation. These percent of revenue.

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The FAA has determined that: No part Executive Order 13132, Federalism Executive Order 12866, and it is not 25 manufacturers are small entities, The FAA has analyzed this proposed likely to have a significant adverse effect there would not be a significant impact rule under the principles and criteria of on the supply, distribution, or use of on a substantial number of amended TC Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We energy. or STC applicants, the estimated determined that this action would not The following Appendices will not appear in the Code of Federal Regulations. operator compliance cost as a percent of have a substantial direct effect on the annual revenue would not be States, on the relationship between the Appendix A significant. national Government and the States, or List of Acronyms Accordingly, pursuant to the on the distribution of power and AC—Advisory Circular Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. responsibilities among the various ACJ—Advisory Circular Joint 605(b), the Federal Aviation levels of government, and therefore ACO—Aircraft certification office Administration certifies that this would not have federalism implications. AD—Airworthiness directive AFM—Airplane flight manual proposed rule would not have a Plain English significant impact on a substantial ARAC—Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee number of small entities. Executive Order 12866 (58 FR 51735, Oct. 4, 1993) requires each agency to ASTF—Aging Systems Task Force Initial International Trade Impact write regulations that are simple and ATA—Air Transport Association Assessment easy to understand. We invite your ATSRAC—Aging Transport Systems comments on how to make these Rulemaking Advisory Committee CFR—Code of Federal Regulations The Trade Agreement Act of 1979 proposed regulations easier to prohibits Federal agencies from CS—Certification Specifications understand, including answers to CWT—Center wing fuel tank establishing any standards or engaging questions such as the following: DET—detailed inspection in related activities that create • Are the requirements in the EAPAS—Enhanced Airworthiness Program unnecessary obstacles to the foreign proposed regulations clearly stated? for Airplane Systems commerce of the United States. • Do the proposed regulations contain EASA—European Aviation Safety Agency Legitimate domestic objectives, such as unnecessary technical language or EUROCAE—European Organization for Civil safety, are not considered unnecessary jargon that interferes with their clarity? Aviation Equipment obstacles. The statute also requires • Would the regulations be easier to EWIS—Electrical wiring interconnection consideration of international standards understand if they were divided into systems EZAP—Enhanced zonal analysis procedure and, where appropriate, that they be the more (but shorter) sections? • Is the description in the preamble FAA—Federal Aviation Administration basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has FQIS—Fuel quantity indicating system assessed the potential effect of this helpful in understanding the proposed FSDO—Flight Standards District Office proposed rule and determined that it regulations? GVI—General visual inspection would impose the same costs on Please send your comments to the ICA—Instructions for Continued domestic and international entities and, address specified in the ADDRESSES Airworthiness thus, would have a neutral trade impact. section. ICAO—International Civil Aviation Organization Initial Unfunded Mandates Assessment Environmental Analysis IFE—In-flight entertainment FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA IIWG—Intrusive Inspection Working Group The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act actions that are categorically excluded JAA—Joint Aviation Authority JAR—Joint Aviation Requirements of 1995 (the Act) is intended, among from preparation of an environmental other things, to curb the practice of MS—Military specification assessment or environmental impact NPRM—notice of proposed rulemaking imposing unfunded Federal mandates statement under the National on State, local, and tribal governments. NTSB—National Transportation Safety Board Environmental Policy Act in the OMB—Office of Management and Budget Title II of the Act requires each Federal absence of extraordinary circumstances. RTCA—Radio Technical Commission for agency to prepare a written statement The FAA has determined this proposed Aeronautics assessing the effects of any Federal rulemaking action qualifies for the SAE—Society of Automotive Engineers mandate in a proposed or final agency categorical exclusion identified in SCR—Special certification review rule that may result in an expenditure paragraph 312f and involves no SFAR—Special federal aviation regulation SFAR 88—Special Federal Aviation of $100 million or more (adjusted extraordinary circumstances. annually for inflation) in any one year Regulation 88—Fuel Tank System Fault by State, local, and tribal governments, Regulations That Significantly Affect Tolerance Evaluation Requirements—TC- Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use and STC-holder requirements included in in the aggregate, or by the private sector; the FTSR such a mandate is deemed to be a The FAA has analyzed this NPRM STC—Supplemental type certificate ‘‘significant regulatory action.’’ The under Executive Order 13211, Actions SWAMP—Severe wind and moisture FAA currently uses an inflation- Concerning Regulations that problem adjusted value of $120.7 million in lieu Significantly Affect Energy Supply, SWPM—Standard wiring practices manual of $100 million. This proposed rule Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). We TC—Type certificate does not contain such a mandate. have determined that it is not a TSB—Transportation Safety Board of Canada Therefore, the requirements of Title II of ‘‘significant energy action’’ under the WHCSS—White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of executive order because it is not a 1995 do not apply. ‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under Appendix B

CORRELATION BETWEEN PROPOSED NEW PART 25 REGULATIONS AND EXISTING REGULATIONS

Based on existing Proposed new regulation and title Section requirements in

§ 25.1701 Definition ...... (a) ...... none

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CORRELATION BETWEEN PROPOSED NEW PART 25 REGULATIONS AND EXISTING REGULATIONS—Continued

Based on existing Proposed new regulation and title Section requirements in

(b) ...... none (c) ...... none (d) ...... none § 25.1703 Function and installation: EWIS ...... (a)(1) ...... § 25.1301(a) (a)(2) ...... § 25.1301(c) (a)(3) ...... § 25.1301(d) (a)(4) ...... none (b) ...... none (c) ...... § 25.869(a)(3) (d) ...... none § 25.1705 System safety: EWIS ...... (a)(1) ...... § 25.1309(b)(1) (a)(2) ...... § 25.1309(b)(1) (b) ...... § 25.1309(b)(2) § 25.1709 System separation: EWIS ...... (a) ...... § 25.1353(a) (b)(1) ...... § 25.1353(a) (b)(2) ...... none (c) ...... § 25.1353(b) (d)(1) ...... § 25.1351(b)(1) (d)(2) ...... § 25.1351(b)(2) (e)(1) ...... § 25.869(a)(3)(i) (e)(2) ...... § 25.869(a)(3)(ii) § 25.1353(d)(3) (f)(1) ...... § 25.869(a)(3)(i) (f)(2) ...... § 25.869(a)(3)(ii) § 25.1353(d)(3) (g) ...... § 25.1353(d)(3) (h)(1) ...... § 25.1353(d)(3) (h)(2). (i)(1) ...... § 25.1353(d)(3) (i)(2). (i)(3). (j)(1) ...... § 25.1353(d)(3) (j)(2). (k) ...... none (l) ...... § 25.1353(d)(3) § 25.1711 Component identification: EWIS. (a) ...... § 25.1301(b) (b)(1) ...... none (b)(2) ...... none (c) ...... § 25.1353(d)(2) (d) ...... none (e) ...... none § 25.1713 Fire protection: EWIS ...... (a) ...... § 25.869(a)(1) (b) ...... § 25.869(a)(2) (c) ...... § 25.869(a)(4) § 25.1717 Electrical bonding and protection against static electricity: EWIS ...... (a) ...... § 25.899 (b) ...... none § 25.1719 Systems and functions: EWIS ...... (a) ...... none (b)(1) ...... § 25.773(b)(2) (b)(2) ...... § 25.981 (b)(3) ...... § 25.1165 (b)(4) ...... § 25.1310 (b)(5) ...... § 25.1316 (b)(6) ...... § 25.1351 (b)(7) ...... § 25.1355 (b)(8) ...... § 25.1360 (b)(9) ...... § 25.1362 (b)(10) ...... § 25.1365 (b)(11) ...... § 25.1431(c) § 25.1431(d) § 25.1721 Circuit protection devices: EWIS ...... § 25.1353(d)(1) § 25.1723 Instruments using a power supply: EWIS ...... § 25.1331(a)(2) § 25.1303(b) § 25.1725 Accessibility provisions: EWIS ...... § 25.611 § 25.1727 Protection of EWIS ...... (a)(1) ...... § 25.855(e)(1) (a)(2) ...... § 25.855(e)(2) (b) ...... none (c) ...... none § 25.1729 Flammable fluid fire protection: EWIS ...... § 25.863(b)(3) § 25.1731 Powerplants: EWIS ...... (a) ...... § 25.903(b) (b) ...... § 25.903(d)(1)

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CORRELATION BETWEEN PROPOSED NEW PART 25 REGULATIONS AND EXISTING REGULATIONS—Continued

Based on existing Proposed new regulation and title Section requirements in

§ 25.1733 Flammable fluid shutoff means: EWIS ...... § 25.1189(d) § 25.1735 Fire detector systems, general: EWIS ...... none § 25.1737 Powerplant and APU fire detector system: EWIS ...... (a) ...... § 25.1203(e) (b)(1) ...... § 25.1203(f)(1) (b)(2) ...... § 25.1203(f)(2) § 25.1739 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness: EWIS ...... § 25.1529 The term ‘‘none’’ in the above table indicates that the section in the proposed regulation is a new rule.

Appendix C

CORRELATION BETWEEN EXISTING PART 25 REGULATIONS AND PROPOSED NEW REGULATIONS

Proposed new Existing regulation and title Section regulation

§ 25.611 Accessibility provisions ...... § 25.1725 § 25.773 Pilot compartment view ...... (b)(2) ...... § 25.1719(b)(1) § 25.855 Cargo or baggage compartments ...... (e)(1) ...... § 25.1727(a)(1) (e)(2) ...... § 25.1727(a)(2) § 25.863 Flammable fluid fire protection ...... (b)(3) ...... § 25.1729 § 25.869 Fire protection: systems ...... (a)(1) ...... § 25.1713(a) (a)(2) ...... § 25.1713(b) (a)(4) ...... § 25.1713(c) (a)(3)(i) ...... § 25.1709(e)(1) (a)(3)(ii) ...... § 25.1709(e)(2) § 25.1709(f)(1) § 25.1709(f)(2) (a)(4) ...... § 25.1713(c) § 25.899 Electrical bonding and protection against static electricity ...... § 25.1717(a) § 25.903 Engines ...... (b) ...... § 25.1731(a) (d)(1) ...... § 25.1731(b) § 25.1165 Engine ignition systems ...... § 25.1719(b)(3) § 25.1189 Shutoff means ...... (d) ...... § 25.1733 § 25.1203 Fire detector system ...... (e) ...... § 25.1737(a) (f)(1) ...... § 25.1737(b)(1) (f)(2) ...... § 25.1737(b)(2) § 25.1301 Function and installation ...... (a) ...... § 25.1703(a)(1) (c) ...... § 25.1703(a)(2) (b) ...... § 25.1711(a) (d) ...... § 25.1703(a)(3) § 25.1303 Flight and navigation instruments ...... (b) ...... § 25.1723 § 25.1309 Equipment, systems, and installations ...... (b)(1) ...... § 25.1705(a)(1) § 25.1705(a)(2) (b)(2) ...... § 25.1705(b) (e) ...... § 25.1707 (f) ...... § 25.1707 § 25.1316 System lightning protection ...... § 25.1719(b)(5) § 25.1331 Instruments using a power supply ...... (a)(2) ...... § 25.1723 § 25.1351 General ...... (b)(1) ...... § 25.1709(d)(1) (b)(2) ...... § 25.1709(d)(2) § 25.1353 Electrical equipment and installations ...... (a) ...... § 25.1709(b)(1) (a) ...... § 25.1709(a) (b) ...... § 25.1709(c) (d)(1) ...... § 25.1721 (d)(2) ...... § 25.1711(c) (d)(3) ...... § 25.1709(e)(1) § 25.1709(e)(2) (d)(3) ...... § 25.1709(f)(1) § 25.1709(f)(2) (d)(3) ...... § 25.1709(g) (d)(3) ...... § 25.1709(h)(1) § 25.1709(h)(2) (d)(3) ...... § 25.1709(i)(1) § 25.1709(i)(2) § 25.1709(i)(3) (d)(3) ...... § 25.1709(j)(1) § 25.1709(j)(2) (d)(3) ...... § 25.1709(l) § 25.1355 Distribution system ...... § 25.1719(b)(5)

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CORRELATION BETWEEN EXISTING PART 25 REGULATIONS AND PROPOSED NEW REGULATIONS—Continued

Proposed new Existing regulation and title Section regulation

§ 25.1360 Precautions against injury ...... § 25.1719(b)(6) § 25.1362 Electrical supplies for emergency conditions ...... § 25.1719(b)(7) § 25.1365 Electrical appliances, motors, and transformers ...... § 25.1719(b)(8) § 25.1431 Electronic equipment ...... (c) ...... § 25.1719(b)(9) (d) ...... § 25.1529 Instructions for Continued Airworthiness ...... § 25.1739

Appendix D accommodate the new certification requirements and which will remain the The tables below indicate which of the same. current rules will need to be changed to

EXISTING PART 25 REQUIREMENTS REQUIRING REVISION TO SUPPORT NEW PROPOSED REGULATIONS

Revision to existing Existing regulation regulation required?

§ 25.611 ...... Yes. § 25.773 ...... No. § 25.855 ...... Yes. § 25.863 ...... No. § 25.869 ...... Yes. § 25.899 ...... No. § 25.903 ...... No. § 25.1165 ...... No. § 25.1189 ...... No. § 25.1203 ...... Yes. § 25.1301 ...... Yes. § 25.1309 ...... Yes. § 25.1310 ...... No. § 25.1316 ...... No. § 25.1331 ...... No. § 25.1351 ...... No. § 25.1353 ...... Yes. § 25.1355 ...... No. § 25.1357 ...... Yes. § 25.1360 ...... No. § 25.1362 ...... No. § 25.1365 ...... No. § 25.1431 ...... No. § 25.1529 ...... No.

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

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BILLING CODE 4910–13–C

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Discussion of the EWIS Safety Analysis physical analysis is to protect against aircraft, historical data), inspections and Process as Depicted in Flowcharts 1 single common cause events or failures analyses (e.g., 1st article inspection, and 2 (Excerpt From Proposed AC that may involve single or multiple design review, particular risks, zonal 25.17XX, ‘‘Certification of Electrical physical failures. Multiple common safety assessments, zonal inspections, Wiring Interconnection Systems on cause events or failures need not be common mode analysis, as applicable) Transport Category Airplanes’’) addressed. should be performed to validate that The analysis described here is based In relation to physical effects, it design and installation criteria are on a qualitative approach to assessing should be assumed that wires are adequate to the zone/function, EWIS safety as opposed to numerical, carrying electrical energy and, in the including multi-systems impact. Also, probability-based quantitative analysis. case of an EWIS failure, as defined in the inspections and analyses should be The intent is not to examine each the preceding paragraph, this energy used to assess whether design and individual wire and its relation to other may result in hazardous or catastrophic installation criteria were correctly wires. Rather, it is to ensure that there effects directly or when combined with applied. Special consideration should are no hazardous combinations. other factors (fuel, oxygen, hydraulic be given to those areas of the airplane However, in case the ‘‘top down’’ fluid, or damage by passengers, for that are known problem areas based on analysis process described in this AC example). These failures, for example, service history and historical data (e.g., determines that a failure in a given may result in fire, smoke, emission of arcing, smoke, loose clamps, chafing, bundle may lead to a catastrophic toxic gases, and damage to co-located arc tracking, interference with other failure condition, the mitigation process systems and structural elements or systems, etc.). Special considerations may lead to performing a complete injury to personnel. This analysis should also be given to cases where new analysis of each wire in the relevant considers all EWIS from all systems (previously unused) material or other bundle. regardless of criticality, (autopilot, auto technologies are used. The analysis described may be throttle, PA system, IFE system, etc.). Deviations from installation and accomplished in conjunction with the Functional Failure Analysis: The component selection criteria identified required aircraft system safety functional failure analysis assumes that by these activities should be evaluated assessments of §§ 25.1309, 25.671, etc. electrical wires are carrying power, and a determination made about their The classification of failure signal, or information data. Failure of acceptability. Alternative mitigation conditions is given in Table 1 (found in EWIS under these circumstances may strategies should be developed as the section-by-section discussion of lead to aircraft system degradation necessary. effects. proposed § 25.1705). Boxes F & G There are two flowcharts contained in Descriptive Text for Flowchart 1 this appendix: Development and Validation of • Flowchart 1 applies to applicants Box A Mitigation Strategy: Identify and for pre-TC work and for amended TCs, The functional hazard assessment develop a mitigation strategy for the and STCs when the applicant has all (FHA) referred to in this box is not a physical failures and their adverse data necessary to perform the analysis stand-alone separate document effects identified in BOXES D and E. • Validation and verification of the per Flowchart 1. If Flowchart 1 is used specifically created to show compliance for post-TC modifications the available mitigation solution should ensure that: with § 25.1705. It is the aircraft level • Hazardous failure conditions are data must include identification of the FHA that the applicant will have systems in the EWIS under extremely remote. developed in compliance with § 25.1309 • Catastrophic failure conditions do consideration for modification and the to help demonstrate acceptability of a not result from a single common cause system functions associated with that design concept, identify potential event or failure. EWIS. problem areas or desirable design • This mitigation solution does not • Flowchart 2 applies to applicants changes, or determine the need for and introduce any new potential failure for post-TC modifications when the scope of any additional analyses (refer conditions. applicant cannot identify the systems or to AC/ACJ 25.1309–1B). systems functions contained in EWIS Box H Physical Failures under consideration for modification Incorporate newly developed The analysis process is initiated by a Box B mitigation strategies (BOX F) into functional hazard analysis performed at EWIS Characteristics: Use the results guidelines (BOX B) for further design aircraft level identifying catastrophic and inspection and analysis process. and hazardous failure events. of the FHA (BOX A) to identify EWIS The processes in both Flowcharts 1 installation criteria and definitions of Box I component characteristics. Results of and 2 identify two aspects: physical and From the EWIS physical failure BOX B are fed into the preliminary functional failures. analysis, document the physical failures system safety analysis (PSSA) and that were addressed, their effects, and Note: For this discussion the following system safety analysis (SSA) of BOX J. definitions apply: the mitigation strategies that were Validation: Determination that Boxes C, D, and E developed. This information supports requirements for a product are sufficiently Validation and Verification of the final analysis documentation (BOX correct and complete. Installation Criteria: Ensure that the P). Verification: Evaluation to determine that requirements have been met. EWIS component qualification satisfies Functional Failures the design requirements and that Physical Failure Analysis: Only single components are selected, used, and Box J common cause events or failures need to installed according to their qualification System Safety Assessment: Use results be addressed during the physical failure characteristics and the aircraft of the aircraft level FHA (BOX A) to analysis as described in this AC and constraints linked to their location. guide the system level FHA (BOX J). shown on the left hand sides of Using available information (e.g., EWIS failures identified by § 25.1705 Flowcharts 1 and 2. The objective of the digital mockup, physical mockup, are to be incorporated into the system

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level and aircraft level FHA, as existing EWIS. In either case, physical requirements and that components are necessary, the PSSA, the common cause analyses should be performed (similar selected, used, and installed according analysis (CCA), and the SSA. These to the physical failures part of to their qualification characteristics and analyses are performed to satisfy Flowchart 1). the aircraft constraints linked to their requirements of § 25.1309. location. Use results of these analyses to update Box A Using available information (e.g., the EWIS definition (BOX B). Aircraft level effects must be digital mockup, physical mockup, considered for modified systems or aircraft, historical data), inspections and Boxes K, L, and M systems added to the aircraft. If the analyses (e.g. 1st article inspection, Hazardous and Catastrophic Failure applicant has the aircraft level FHA it design review, particular risks, zonal Conditions: Use the analyses in BOX J should be examined to determine the safety assessments, zonal inspections, to determine if the EWIS associated airplane-level effect of the proposed common mode analysis, as applicable) with the system under analysis can modification. If the applicant doesn’t should be performed to validate that contribute (in whole or in part) to the have the aircraft level FHA, then the design and installation criteria are failure condition under study. A applicant must generate an aircraft level adequate to the zone/function, determination needs to be made about FHA based on the proposed including multi-systems impact. Also, whether the EWIS failure needs to be modification. This aircraft level FHA inspections and analyses should be used mitigated. If yes, a mitigation strategy would be limited to just those aircraft to assess whether design and needs to be developed, validated, and systems affected by the proposed installation criteria were correctly verified. If no, the appropriate safety modification. If it is determined that no applied. Special consideration should assessment should be completed (e.g., aircraft level functional effects are be given to those areas of the airplane per § 25.1309, § 25.671, etc.). introduced, a statement to this effect that are known problem areas based on and the supporting data is sufficient to service history and historical data (e.g., Boxes N and O satisfy BOX A. arcing, smoke, loose clamps, chafing, Development and Validation of arc tracking, interference with other Mitigation Strategy: Identify and Physical Failures systems, etc.). Special consideration develop a mitigation strategy for the Box B should also be given to cases where new functional failures and adverse effects EWIS Characteristics: Use results of (previously unused) material or other identified in BOX J. the aircraft level FHA (BOX A) to technologies are used. Validation and verification of the Deviation from installation and identify EWIS installation criteria and mitigation solution should determine if component selection criteria identified definitions of component initial objective is fully reached and by these activities should be evaluated characteristics. Results of BOX B are fed confirm that this mitigation solution is and a determination made about their into the PSSA and SSA of BOX J. compatible with existing installations acceptability. Alternative mitigation and installation criteria. If the EWIS was Box C strategies should be developed as the failure cause, the subsequent Separate the EWIS to be added from necessary. mitigation strategy developed may other existing airplane EWIS since it Boxes F and G introduce new adverse effects not cannot be determined what systems or previously identified by the analysis. A system functions are contained in the Development & Validation of Mitigation check for any new adverse effects existing EWIS. Physical separation Strategy should be accomplished and the aircraft between the new and existing EWIS Identify and develop a mitigation level FHA and other system safety must be achieved through separation strategy for the physical failures and assessments should be updated as distance or an appropriate barrier or their adverse effects identified in Boxes necessary. other means shown to be at least D and E. Box P equivalent to the physical separation Validation and verification of the distance when allowed by § 25.1709. mitigation solution should ensure that: After the mitigation strategies have • Hazardous failure conditions are been validated and verified, document Methods given in the proposed advisory material for § 25.1709 provide an extremely remote. the results of the § 25.1705 analysis. • acceptable way to determine adequate Catastrophic failure conditions do Update as necessary the aircraft level not result from a single common cause FHA that has been developed in support separation. In cases where separation cannot be event or failure. of certification of the proposed • maintained because of physical This mitigation solution does not modification, in compliance with constraints (e.g., terminal strips and introduce any new potential failure § 25.1309, (BOX A). connectors, etc.), the applicant should conditions. Descriptive Text for Flowchart 2 accomplish the appropriate analysis to Box H show that no adverse failure conditions The main objectives are to ensure that Incorporate newly developed exist because of sharing the common the proposed modification will be mitigation strategies (Box F) into device. This requires that the applicant correctly designed and installed and guidelines (Box B) for further design have knowledge of the systems or will not adversely affect existing and inspection and analysis process. systems. system functions sharing the common As far as EWIS is concerned, correct device (e.g. terminal strips and Box I incorporation of the modification connectors etc.). From the EWIS physical failure should be ensured by both good Boxes D and E analysis, document the physical failures knowledge of original aircraft that were addressed, their effects, and manufacturer (OAM) installation Validation and Verification of mitigation strategies that were practices and their correct Installation Criteria developed. This information supports implementation or by adequate Ensure that the EWIS component the final analysis documentation (Box separation of the added EWIS from qualification satisfies the design P).

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Functional Failures 14 CFR Parts 25, 91, 125 § 25.611 Accessibility provisions. (a) * * * Box J Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting (b) EWIS must meet the accessibility and recordkeeping requirements. System Safety Assessment requirements of § 25.1725. 7. Amend § 25.855 by removing the Use the results of the aircraft level 14 CFR Parts 121, 129 word ‘‘wiring’’ from paragraph (e) FHA (Box A) to guide the system level Air carriers, Aircraft, Aviation safety, introductory text and adding new FHA (Box J). Reporting and recordkeeping paragraph (j) as follows: EWIS failures identified by § 25.1705 requirements. are to be incorporated into the system The Proposed Amendments § 25.855 Cargo or baggage compartments. level and aircraft level FHA, as * * * * * necessary, the PSSA, the CCA, and the In consideration of the foregoing, the (j) Cargo or baggage compartment SSA. These analyses are performed to Federal Aviation Administration electrical wiring interconnection system satisfy requirements of § 25.1309. proposes to amend Chapter I of Title 14, components must meet the Use results of these analyses to update Code of Federal Regulations parts 1, 25, requirements of § 25.1727. the EWIS definition (Box B). 91, 121, 125, and 129 as follows: 8. Amend § 25.869 by removing paragraph (a)(4) and revising paragraphs Boxes K, L, and M PART 1—DEFINITIONS AND (a)(2) and (a)(3) as follows: Hazardous and Catastrophic Failure ABBREVIATIONS § 25.869 Fire protection: systems. Conditions 1. The authority citation for part 1 Use the analyses in Box J to determine continues to read as follows: (a) * * * if the EWIS associated with the system (1) * * * Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. (2) Equipment that is located in under analysis can contribute (in whole designated fire zones and is used during or in part) to the failure condition under 2. Amend § 1.2 to add the following emergency procedures must be at least study. A determination needs to be abbreviation in alphabetical order: fire resistant. made about whether the EWIS failure § 1.2 Abbreviations and symbols. (3) EWIS components must meet the needs to be mitigated. If yes, a requirements of § 25.1713. mitigation strategy needs to be * * * * * developed, validated, and verified. If no, EWIS means electrical wiring * * * * * the appropriate safety assessment interconnection system. 9. Amend part 25 by adding a new should be completed (e.g., per * * * * * § 25.899 to read as follows: § 25.1309, § 25.671, etc.). PART 25—AIRWORTHINESS § 25.899 Electrical bonding and protection against static electricity. Boxes N and O STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES (a) Electrical bonding and protection Development and Validation of against static electricity must be Mitigation Strategy 3. The authority citation for part 25 designed to minimize accumulation of Identify and develop a mitigation continues to read as follows: electrostatic charge that would cause— strategy for the functional failures and Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, (1) Human injury from electrical adverse effects identified in Box J. 44702 and 44704. shock, Validation and verification of the (2) Ignition of flammable vapors, or 4. Amend § 25.1 by adding a new mitigation solution should determine if (3) Interference with installed paragraph (c) to read as follows: initial objective is fully reached and electrical/electronic equipment. (b) Compliance with paragraph (a) of confirm that this mitigation solution is § 25.1 Applicability. compatible with existing installations this section may be shown by— * * * * * (1) Bonding the components properly and installation criteria. If the EWIS was (c) This part also establishes to the airframe; or the failure cause, the subsequent requirements for holders of type (2) Incorporating other acceptable mitigation strategy developed may certificates and changes to those means to dissipate the static charge so introduce new adverse effects not certificates to take actions necessary to as not to endanger the airplane, previously identified by the analysis. A support the continued airworthiness of personnel, or operation of the installed check for any new adverse effects transport category airplanes. electrical/electronic systems. should be accomplished and the aircraft 5. Amend § 25.2 by adding a new 10. Amend § 25.1203 by revising level FHA and other system safety paragraph (d) to read as follows: paragraph (e) and adding a new assessments should be updated as paragraph (h) as follows: necessary. § 25.2 Special retroactive requirements. § 25.1203 Fire detector system. Box P * * * * * (d) In addition to the requirements of * * * * * After the mitigation strategies have this section, subpart I of this part (e) Components of each fire or been validated and verified, document contains requirements that apply to— overheat detector system in a fire zone the results of the § 25.1705 analysis. (1) Holders of type certificates; and must be at least fire-resistant. Update as necessary the aircraft level (2) Applicants for type certificates, * * * * * FHA that has been developed in support changes to type certificates (including (h) EWIS for each fire or overheat of certification of the proposed service bulletins describing design detector system in a fire zone must meet modification, in compliance with changes), and supplemental type the requirements of § 25.1727. § 25.1309, (Box A). certificates. 11. Amend § 25.1301 by designating List of Subjects 6. Amend § 25.611 by designating the the introductory text as paragraph (a), existing paragraph as paragraph (a) and redesignating paragraphs (a) through (d) 14 CFR Part 1 adding new paragraph (b) to read as as (1) through (4), and adding a new Air Transportation. follows: paragraph (b) as follows:

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§ 25.1301 Function and installation. (b) EWIS components must meet the event of failures of the electrical supply * * * * * requirements of § 25.1357, § 25.1703, or control system, the requirements of (b) EWIS must meet the requirements § 25.1709, § 25.1711, and § 25.1721. § 25.1309(b), (c), and (d) will be of subpart H of this part. (c) * * * satisfied. Domestic appliances are items 12. Amend § 25.1309 by removing (d) Electrical bonding must provide such as cooktops, ovens, coffee makers, paragraph (e) and redesignating an adequate electrical return path under water heaters, refrigerators, and toilet paragraph (g) as paragraph (e) and both normal and fault conditions, on flush systems that are placed on the revising paragraph (f) as follows: airplanes having grounded electrical airplane to provide service amenities to systems. passengers. § 25.1309 Equipment, systems, and 15. Amend § 25.1357 by revising (b) Galleys and cooking appliances installations. paragraphs (d) and (f) to read as follows: must be installed in a way that * * * * * minimizes risk of overheat or fire. (f) EWIS must be assessed in § 25.1357 Circuit protective devices. (c) Domestic appliances, particularly accordance with the requirements of * * * * * those in galley areas, must be so § 25.1705. (d) If the ability to reset a circuit installed or protected as to prevent 13. Amend part 25 by adding a new breaker or replace a fuse is essential to damage or contamination of other § 25.1310, to read as follows: safety in flight, that circuit breaker or equipment or systems from fluids or § 25.1310 Power source capacity and fuse must be located and identified so vapors which may be present during distribution. that it can be readily reset or replaced normal operation or as a result of spillage, if such damage or (a) Each installation whose in flight. Where fuses are used, there contamination may create a hazardous functioning is required for type must be spare fuses for use in-flight condition. certification or under operating rules equal to at least 50% of the number of fuses of each rating required for (d) Unless compliance with and that requires a power supply is an § 25.1309(b) is provided by the circuit ‘‘essential load’’ on the power supply. complete circuit protection. * * * * * protective device required by The power sources and the system must § 25.1357(a), electric motors and be able to supply the following power (f) For airplane systems for which the ability to remove or reset power during transformers, including those installed loads in probable operating in domestic systems, must have a combinations and for probable normal operations is necessary, the system must be designed so that circuit suitable thermal protection device to durations: prevent overheating under normal (1) Loads connected to the system breakers are not the primary means to operation and failure conditions, if with the system functioning normally. remove or reset system power unless (2) Essential loads, after failure of any specifically designed for use as a switch. overheating would create a smoke or fire one prime mover, power converter, or hazard. * * * * * 19. Amend part 25 by adding new energy storage device. 16. Amend part 25 by adding a new subpart H to read as follows: (3) Essential loads after failure of— § 25.1360 to read as follows: (i) Any one engine on two-engine Subpart H—Electrical Wiring airplanes; and § 25.1360 Precautions against injury. Interconnection Systems (EWIS) (ii) Any two engines on three-or-more- (a) Shock. The electrical system must Sec. engined airplanes. be designed to minimize risk of electric 25.1701 Definition. (4) Essential loads for which an shock to crew, passengers, and servicing 25.1703 Function and installation: EWIS. alternate source of power is required, personnel and to maintenance 25.1705 System safety: EWIS. after any failure or malfunction in any personnel using normal precautions. 25.1707 [Reserved] one power supply system, distribution 25.1709 System separation: EWIS. (b) Burns. The temperature of any part 25.1711 Component identification: EWIS. system, or other utilization system. that may be handled by a crewmember 25.1713 Fire protection: EWIS. (b) In determining compliance with during normal operations must not 25.1715 [Reserved] paragraphs (a) (2) and (3) of this section, cause dangerous inadvertent movement 25.1717 Electrical bonding and protection the power loads may be assumed to be by the crewmember or injury to the against static electricity: EWIS. reduced under a monitoring procedure crewmember. 25.1719 Systems and functions: EWIS. consistent with safety in the kinds of 17. Amend part 25 by adding a new 25.1721 Circuit protective devices: EWIS. operation authorized. Loads not § 25.1362 to read as follows: 25.1723 Instruments using a power supply: required in controlled flight need not be EWIS. 25.1725 Accessibility provisions: EWIS. considered for the two-engine- § 25.1362 Electrical supplies for emergency conditions. 25.1727 Protection of EWIS. inoperative condition on airplanes with 25.1729 Flammable fluid fire protection: three or more engines. A suitable electrical supply must be EWIS. 14. Amend § 25.1353 by revising provided to those services required for 25.1731 Powerplants: EWIS. paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) as follows: emergency procedures after an 25.1733 Flammable fluid shutoff means: emergency landing or ditching. The EWIS. § 25.1353 Electrical equipment and circuits for these services must be 25.1735 Fire detector systems, general: installations. designed, protected, and installed so EWIS. (a) Electrical equipment and controls that the risk of their causing a fire under 25.1737 Powerplant and APU fire detector system: EWIS. must be installed so that operation of these emergency conditions is any one unit or system of units will not 25.1739 Instructions for Continued minimized. Airworthiness: EWIS. adversely affect the simultaneous 18. Amend part 25 by adding a new operation of any other electrical unit or § 25.1365 to read as follows: Subpart H—Electrical Wiring system essential to safe operation. Any Interconnection Systems (EWIS) electrical interference likely to be § 25.1365 Electrical appliances, motors, present in the airplane must not result and transformers. § 25.1701 Definition. in hazardous effects on the airplane or (a) Domestic appliances must be (a) As used in this chapter, electrical its systems. designed and installed so that in the wiring interconnection system (EWIS)

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means any wire, wiring device, or (2) Be installed according to (1) Airplane independent electrical combination of these, including limitations specified for the EWIS power sources must not share a termination devices, installed in any components. common ground terminating location. area of the airplane for the purpose of (3) Function properly when installed. (2) Airplane system static grounds transmitting electrical energy between (4) Be designed and installed in a way must not share a common ground two or more intended termination that will minimize mechanical strain. terminating location with any of the points. Except as provided for in (b) Selection of wires must take into airplane’s independent electrical power paragraph (c) of this section, this account known characteristics of the sources. includes: wire in relation to each installation and (e) Except to the extent necessary to (1) Wires and cables. application to minimize the risk of wire provide electrical connection to the fuel (2) Bus bars. damage, including any arc tracking systems components, the EWIS must be (3) The termination point on electrical phenomena. designed and installed with adequate devices, including those on relays, (c) The design and installation of the physical separation from fuel lines and interrupters, switches, contactors, main power cables, including generator other fuel system components, so that: terminal blocks and circuit breakers, cables, must allow for a reasonable (1) Any EWIS component failure will and other circuit protection devices. degree of deformation and stretching not create a hazardous condition. (4) Connectors, including feed- without failure. (2) Any fuel leakage onto EWIS through connectors. (d) EWIS components located in areas components will not create a hazardous (5) Connector accessories. of known moisture accumulation must condition. (6) Electrical grounding and bonding be adequately protected to minimize (f) Except to the extent necessary to devices and their associated any hazardous effects due to moisture. provide electrical connection to the connections. hydraulic systems components, EWIS § 25.1705 System safety: EWIS. (7) Electrical splices. must be designed and installed with (8) Materials used to provide Each EWIS must be designed and adequate physical separation from additional protection for wires, installed so that: hydraulic lines and other hydraulic including wire insulation, wire sleeving, (a) Each catastrophic failure system components, so that: (1) Any EWIS component failure will and conduits that have electrical condition— not create a hazardous condition. termination for the purpose of bonding. (1) Is extremely improbable; and (2) Any hydraulic fluid leakage onto (9) Shields or braids. (2) Does not result from a single EWIS components will not create a (10) Clamps and other devices used to failure. hazardous condition. route and support the wire bundle. (b) Each hazardous failure condition is extremely remote. (g) Except to the extent necessary to (11) Cable tie devices. provide electrical connection to the (12) Labels or other means of § 25.1707 [Reserved] oxygen systems components, EWIS identification. § 25.1709 System separation: EWIS. must be designed and installed with (13) Pressure seals. adequate physical separation from (b) The definition in paragraph (a) of (a) Each EWIS must be designed and oxygen lines and other oxygen system this section covers EWIS components installed so that under normal components, so that any EWIS inside shelves, panels, racks, junction conditions and failure conditions as component failure will not create a boxes, distribution panels, and back- defined by § 25.1309(b)(1) and (b)(2), it hazardous condition. planes of equipment racks, including, will not adversely affect the (h) Except to the extent necessary to but not limited to, circuit board back- simultaneous operation of any other provide electrical connection to the planes and wire integration units. systems necessary for continued safe water/waste systems components, EWIS (c) Except for the equipment indicated flight, landing, and egress. Unless must be designed and installed with in paragraph (b) of this section, EWIS otherwise stated, for the purposes of this adequate physical separation from components inside the following section, adequate physical separation water/waste lines and other water/waste equipment, and the external connectors must be achieved by separation distance system components, so that: that are part of that equipment, are or by a barrier that provides protection (1) Any EWIS component failure will excluded from the definition in equivalent to that separation distance. not create a hazardous condition. paragraph (a) of this section: (b) Each EWIS must be designed and (2) Any water/waste leakage onto (1) Electrical equipment or avionics installed so that any electrical EWIS components will not create a that are qualified to environmental interference likely to be present in the hazardous condition. conditions and testing procedures when airplane will not result in hazardous (i) EWIS must be designed and those conditions and procedures are-(i) effects upon the airplane or its systems. installed with adequate physical Appropriate for the intended function (c) Wires and cables carrying heavy separation between the EWIS and flight and operating environment, and current, and their associated EWIS or other mechanical control systems (ii) Acceptable to the FAA. components, must be designed and cables and associated system (2) Portable electrical devices that are installed to ensure adequate physical components, so that: not part of the type design of the separation and electrical isolation so (1) Chafing, jamming, or other airplane. This includes personal that damage to essential circuits will be interference are prevented. entertainment devices and laptop minimized under fault conditions. (2) Any EWIS component failure will computers. (d) Each EWIS associated with not create a hazardous condition. (3) Fiber optics. independent airplane power sources (3) Failure of any flight or other must be designed and installed to mechanical control systems cables or § 25.1703 Function and installation: EWIS. ensure adequate physical separation and systems components will not damage (a) Each EWIS component installed in electrical isolation so that a fault in any the EWIS and create a hazardous any area of the aircraft must: one airplane power source EWIS will condition. (1) Be of a kind and design not adversely affect any other (j) EWIS must be designed and appropriate to its intended function. independent power sources. In addition: installed with adequate physical

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separation between the EWIS during emergency procedures must be at § 25.1723 Instruments using a power components and heated equipment, hot least fire resistant. supply: EWIS. air ducts, and lines, so that: (c) Insulation on electrical wire and EWIS components associated with (1) Any EWIS component failure will electrical cable, and materials used to any instrument required by § 25.1303(b) not create a hazardous condition. provide additional protection for the that uses a power supply must be (2) Any hot air leakage or heat wire and cable, installed in any area of designed and installed so that failure of generated onto EWIS components will the airplane, must be self-extinguishing the EWIS components would not affect not create a hazardous condition. when tested in accordance with the that instrument’s compliance with (k) For systems for which redundancy applicable portions of Appendix F, part § 25.1331(a)(2). is required, by certification rules, by I, of 14 CFR part 25. operating rules, or as a result of the § 25.1725 Accessibility provisions: EWIS. assessment required by § 25.1705, EWIS § 25.1715 [Reserved] Access must be provided to allow inspection and replacement of any components associated with those § 25.1717 Electrical bonding and systems must be designed and installed protection against static electricity: EWIS. EWIS component as necessary for continued airworthiness. with adequate physical separation. (a) EWIS components used for (l) Each EWIS must be designed and electrical bonding and protection § 25.1727 Protection of EWIS. installed so there is adequate physical against static electricity must meet the (a) No cargo or baggage compartment separation between it and aircraft requirements of § 25.899. structure, and so that the EWIS is may contain any EWIS whose damage or (b) Electrical bonding provided by failure may affect safe operation, unless protected from sharp edges and corners, EWIS components must provide an to minimize potential for abrasion/ the EWIS is protected so that: adequate electrical return path under (1) It cannot be damaged by chafing, vibration damage, and other both normal and fault conditions, on movement of cargo or baggage in the types of mechanical damage. airplanes having grounded electrical compartment. § 25.1711 Component identification: EWIS. systems. (2) Its breakage or failure will not (a) EWIS components must be labeled § 25.1719 Systems and functions: EWIS. create a fire hazard. (b) EWIS must be designed and or otherwise identified using a (a) EWIS associated with systems consistent method that facilitates installed to minimize damage and risk required for type certification or by of damage to EWIS by movement of identification of the wire, its function, operating rules must be considered an and its design limitations, if any. people in the airplane during all phases integral part of that system and must be of flight, maintenance, and servicing. (b) For systems for which redundancy considered in showing compliance with is required, by certification rules, by (c) EWIS must be designed and the applicable requirements for that installed to minimize damage and risk operating rules, or as a result of the system. assessment required by § 25.1705, , of damage to EWIS by items carried onto (b) For systems to which the following the aircraft by passengers or cabin crew. EWIS components associated with those rules apply, the components of EWIS systems must be specifically identified associated with those systems must be § 25.1729 Flammable fluid fire protection: with component part number, function, considered an integral part of that EWIS. and separation requirement for bundles. system or systems and must be EWIS components located in each (1) The identification must be placed considered in showing compliance with area where flammable fluid or vapors along the wire, cable, or wire bundle at the applicable requirements for that might escape by leakage of a fluid appropriate intervals and in areas of the system. system must be considered to be a airplane where it is readily visible to (1) § 25.773(b)(2) Pilot compartment potential ignition source and must meet maintenance, repair, or alteration view. the requirements of § 25.863. personnel. (2) § 25.981 Fuel tank ignition (2) If an EWIS component cannot be prevention. § 25.1731 Powerplants: EWIS. marked physically, then other means of (3) § 25.1165 Engine ignition systems. (a) EWIS associated with any identification must be provided. (4) § 25.1310 Power source capacity powerplant must be designed and (c) The identifying markings required and distribution. installed so that the failure of an EWIS by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section (5) § 25.1316 System lightning component will not prevent the must remain legible throughout the protection. continued safe operation of the expected service life of the EWIS (6) § 25.1351 General. remaining powerplants or require component. (7) § 25.1355 Distribution system. immediate action by any crewmember (d) The means used for identifying (8) § 25.1360 Precautions against for continued safe operation, in each EWIS component as required by injury. accordance with the requirements of this section must not have an adverse (9) § 25.1362 Electrical supplies for § 25.903(b). effect on the performance of that emergency conditions. (b) Design precautions must be taken component throughout its expected (10) § 25.1365 Electrical appliances, to minimize hazards to the airplane due service life. motors, and transformers. to EWIS damage in the event of a (e) Identification for EWIS (11) § 25.1431(c) and (d) Electronic powerplant rotor failure or a fire modifications to the type design must be equipment. originating within the powerplant that consistent with the identification burns through the powerplant case, in § 25.1721 Circuit protective devices: EWIS. scheme of the original type design. accordance with the requirements of Electrical wires and cables must be § 25.903(d)(1). § 25.1713 Fire protection: EWIS. designed and installed so they are (a) All EWIS components must meet compatible with the circuit protection § 25.1733 Flammable fluid shutoff means: the applicable fire and smoke protection devices required by § 25.1357, so that a EWIS. requirements of § 25.831(c) of this part. fire or smoke hazard cannot be created EWIS associated with each flammable (b) EWIS components that are located under temporary or continuous fault fluid shutoff means and control must be in designated fire zones and are used conditions. fireproof or must be located and

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protected so that any fire in a fire zone (2) Applicants for type certificates and bulletins describing design changes), if will not affect operation of the changes to type certificates (including the date of application was before flammable fluid shutoff means, in service bulletins describing design [effective date of final rule] and the accordance with the requirements of changes). Applicants for changes to type certificate was issued on or after § 25.1189. certificates must comply with the [effective date of final rule]: December requirements of this subpart in addition 16, 2007, or the date the certificate is § 25.1735 Fire detector systems, general: to the airworthiness requirements issued, whichever occurs later. EWIS. determined applicable under § 21.101 of (3) Unless compliance with § 25.1739 EWIS associated with any installed this subchapter. of this part is required or elected, fire protection system must be (b) For purposes of this subpart, the applicants for amendments to TCs, if the considered an integral part of the system ‘‘FAA Oversight Office’’ is the aircraft application was filed after [effective in showing compliance with the certification office or office of the date of final rule]: December 16, 2007, applicable requirements for that system. Transport Airplane Directorate with or the date of approval of the § 25.1737 Powerplant and APU fire oversight responsibility for the relevant application, whichever occurs later. detector system: EWIS. type certificate or supplemental type (4) Applicants for supplemental type (a) EWIS that are part of each fire or certificate, as determined by the certificates (STC), if the date of overheat detector system in a fire zone Administrator. application was before [effective date of final rule] and the certificate was issued must be at least fire-resistant. § 25.1803 [Reserved] (b) No EWIS component of any fire or on or after [effective date of final rule]: overheat detector system for any fire § 25.1805 Electrical wiring interconnection June 16, 2008, or the date of approval zone may pass through another fire systems (EWIS) maintenance program. of the application, whichever occurs zone, unless: (a) Except as provided in paragraph (f) later. (5) Unless compliance with § 25.1739 (1) It is protected against the of this section, this section applies to of this part is required or elected, possibility of false warnings resulting transport category, turbine-powered applicants for STCs, if the application from fires in zones through which it airplanes with a type certificate issued was filed after [effective date of final passes; or after January 1, 1958, that, as a result of rule]: June 16, 2008, or the date of (2) Each zone involved is the original certification, or later approval of the application, whichever simultaneously protected by the same increase in capacity, have— detector and extinguishing system. occurs later. (1) A maximum type-certificated (d) Each person identified in (c) EWIS that are part of each fire or passenger capacity of 30 or more or overheat detector system in a fire zone paragraphs (c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(4) of (2) A maximum payload capacity of this section must submit to the FAA must meet the requirements of 7,500 pounds or more. § 25.1203. Oversight Office for approval a (b) Each person identified in compliance plan by [insert date 90 days § 25.1739 Instructions for Continued paragraph (c) of this section must after effective date of final rule]. The Airworthiness: EWIS. develop and submit for review and compliance plan must include the approval by the FAA Oversight Office The applicant must prepare following information: Instructions for Continued Instructions for Continued (1) A proposed project schedule, Airworthiness for the representative Airworthiness applicable to EWIS in identifying all major milestones, for airplane’s EWIS in accordance with accordance with Appendix H sections meeting the compliance dates specified Appendix H paragraphs H25.5(a)(1) and H25.4 and H25.5 to this part that are in paragraph (c) of this section. (b) of this part in effect on [effective date approved by the FAA. (2) A proposed means of compliance 20. Amend part 25 by adding new of final rule] for each affected type with this section, identifying all subpart I to read as follows. design. For purposes of this section, the required submissions, including all ‘‘representative airplane’’ is the compliance items as mandated in Subpart I—Continued Airworthiness and configuration of each model series Safety Improvements Appendix H paragraphs H25.5(a)(1) and airplane that incorporates all variations (b) of this part in effect on [effective date Sec. of EWIS used on that series airplane, of this final rule], and all data to be 25.1801 Purpose and definition. and that includes all TC-holder- 25.1803 [Reserved] developed to substantiate compliance. designed modifications mandated by (3) If the affected person proposes a 25.1805 Electrical wiring interconnection airworthiness directive as of the systems (EWIS) maintenance program. means of compliance that differs from effective date of this rule. Each person that described in FAA advisory Subpart I—Continued Airworthiness specified in paragraph (c) of this section material, a detailed explanation of how and Safety Improvements must also review any fuel tank system the proposed means will be shown to Instructions for Continued comply with this section. § 25.1801 Purpose and definition. Airworthiness developed by that person (4) A proposal for submitting a draft (a) This subpart establishes to comply with SFAR 88 to ensure of all compliance items required by requirements for support of the compatibility with the EWIS paragraph (d)(2) of this section for continued airworthiness of transport Instructions for Continued review by the FAA Oversight Office not category airplanes. These requirements Airworthiness, including minimizing less than 60 days before the compliance may include performing assessments, redundant requirements. time specified in paragraph (c) of this developing design changes, developing (c) The following persons must section. revisions to Instructions for Continued comply with the requirements of (5) A proposal for how the approved Airworthiness, and making necessary paragraph (b) of this section before the Instructions for Continued documentation available to affected dates specified. Airworthiness will be made available to persons. This subpart applies to the (1) Holders of type certificates (TC): affected persons. following persons, as specified in each December 16, 2007. (e) Each affected person must section of this subpart: (2) Applicants for TCs, and implement the compliance plan as (1) Holders of type certificates. amendments to TCs (including service approved in compliance with paragraph

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(d) of this section. If either paragraph H25.5 Electrical Wiring Subpart L—Continued Airworthiness and (e)(1) or (2) of this section applies, the Interconnection System (EWIS) Safety Improvements affected person must submit a corrected Instructions for Continued Sec. plan to the FAA Oversight Office and Airworthiness. 91.1501 Purpose and definition. implement the corrected plan within 30 91.1503 [Reserved] days after such notification. (a) The applicant must prepare Instructions 91.1505 [Reserved] for Continued Airworthiness applicable to 91.1507 Fuel tank system maintenance (1) The FAA Oversight Office notifies program. the affected person of deficiencies in the EWIS as defined by § 25.1701 that are approved by the FAA and include the proposed compliance plan and how to following: Subpart L—Continued Airworthiness correct them. (1) Maintenance and inspection and Safety Improvements (2) The FAA Oversight Office notifies requirements for the EWIS developed with the affected person of deficiencies in the the use of an enhanced zonal analysis § 91.1501 Purpose and definition. person’s implementation of the plan and procedure that includes: (a) This subpart requires operators to how to correct them. (i) Identification of each zone of the support the continued airworthiness of (f) This section does not apply to the airplane. each airplane. These requirements may following airplane models: (ii) Identification of each zone that include, but are not limited to, revising contains EWIS. (1) Convair CV–240, 340, 440, if the inspection program, incorporating (iii) Identification of each zone containing modified to include turbine engines. design changes, and incorporating EWIS that also contains combustible revisions to Instructions for Continued (2) Lockheed L–188 materials. (3) Vickers Armstrong Viscount (iv) Identification of each zone in which Airworthiness. (4) Douglas DC–3, if modified to EWIS is in close proximity to both primary (b) For purposes of this subpart, the include turbine engines and back-up hydraulic, mechanical, or ‘‘FAA Oversight Office’’ is the aircraft certification office or office of the (5) Bombardier CL–44 electrical flight controls and lines. (v) Identification of— Transport Airplane Directorate with (6) Mitsubishi YS–11 (A) Tasks, and the intervals for performing oversight responsibility for the relevant (7) British Aerospace BAC 1–11 those tasks, that will reduce the likelihood of type certificate or supplemental type (8) Concorde ignition sources and accumulation of certificate, as determined by the (9) deHavilland D.H. 106 Comet 4C combustible material, and Administrator. (10) VFW-Vereinigte Flugtechnische (B) Procedures, and the intervals for Werk VFW–614 performing those procedures, that will § 91.1503 [Reserved] effectively clean the EWIS components of (11) Illyushin Aviation IL 96T combustible material if there is not an § 91.1505 [Reserved] (12) Bristol Aircraft Britannia 305 effective task to reduce the likelihood of § 91.1507 Fuel tank system maintenance (13) Handley Page Herald Type 300 combustible material accumulation. program. (14) Avions Marcel Dassault—Breguet (vi) Instructions for protections and Aviation Mercure 100C caution information that will minimize (a) Except as provided in paragraph (15) Airbus Caravelle contamination and accidental damage to (g) of this section, this section applies to EWIS, as applicable, during performance of transport category, turbine-powered APPENDIX H TO PART 25— maintenance, alteration, or repairs. airplanes with a type certificate issued INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONTINUED (2) Acceptable EWIS maintenance practices after January 1, 1958, that, as a result of AIRWORTHINESS in a standard format. original type certification or later (3) Wire separation requirements as 21. Amend H25.1 by revising increase in capacity, have— determined under § 25.1709. (1) A maximum type-certificated paragraph (a) to read as follows: (4) Information explaining the EWIS identification method and requirements for passenger capacity of 30 or more, or H25.1 General. identifying any changes to EWIS under (2) A maximum payload capacity of (a) This appendix specifies requirements § 25.1711. 7,500 pounds or more. for preparation of Instructions for Continued (5) Electrical load data and instructions for (b) For each airplane on which an Airworthiness as required by §§ 25.1529, updating that data. auxiliary fuel tank is installed under a 25.1739, and applicable provisions of subpart (b) The Instructions for Continued field approval, before December 16, I of this part. Airworthiness must be in the form of a 2007, the operator must submit to the * * * * * document appropriate for the information to FAA Oversight Office proposed be provided, and they must be easily 22. Amend H25.4 by revising maintenance instructions for the tank recognizable as EWIS Instructions for that meet the requirements of Special paragraph (a)(1) and adding new Continued Airworthiness. paragraph (a)(3) to read as follows: Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (SFAR 88) of this chapter. H25.4 Airworthiness Limitations section. PART 91—GENERAL OPERATING AND (c) After December 16, 2008, no FLIGHT RULES (a) * * * operator may operate an airplane (1) Each mandatory replacement time, identified in paragraph (a) of this 24. The authority for part 91 structural inspection interval, and related section unless the inspection program structural inspection procedures approved continues to read as follows: for that airplane has been revised to under § 25.571. Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 1155, 40103, include inspections, procedures, and (2) * * * 40113, 40120, 44101, 44111, 44701, 44709, limitations for fuel tank systems. (3) Any mandatory replacement time of 44711, 44712, 44715, 44716, 44717, 44722, (d) The proposed fuel tank system EWIS components as defined in section 46306, 46315, 46316, 46504, 46506–46507, inspection program revisions must be 25.1701. 47122, 47508, 47528–47531, articles 12 and based on the following documents: * * * * * 29 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (61 stat. 1180). (1) The applicable type-certificate- 23. Amend Appendix H to part 25 by holder-developed fuel tank Instructions adding new paragraph H25.5 to read as 25. Amend part 91 by adding new for Continued Airworthiness, developed follows: Subpart L as follows: under SFAR 88, or under § 25.1529 in

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effect on June 6, 2001, approved by the PART 121—OPERATING airplane identified in paragraph (a) of FAA Oversight Office. REQUIREMENTS: DOMESTIC, FLAG, this section unless the maintenance (2) The applicable supplemental-type- AND SUPPLEMENTAL OPERATIONS program for that airplane includes certificate-holder-developed fuel tank inspections and procedures for 28. The authority citation for part 121 Instructions for Continued electrical wiring interconnection continues to read: Airworthiness, if any, developed under systems (EWIS). SFAR 88, or Instructions for Continued Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 40119, (c) The proposed EWIS maintenance Airworthiness developed in accordance 41706, 44101, 44701–44702, 44705, 44709– program changes must be based on the 44711, 44713, 44716–44717, 44722, 44901, with § 25.1529 in effect on June 6, 2001, following documents: 44903–44904, 44912, 45101–45105, 46105, (1) The applicable EWIS Instructions approved by the FAA Oversight Office. 46301. (3) The applicable operator-developed for Continued Airworthiness, developed 29. Amend part 121 by adding new inspection instructions for field- by the type certificate holder and subpart Y to read as follows: approved auxiliary fuel tanks, if any, approved by the FAA Oversight Office. (2) The applicable EWIS Instructions approved by the FAA Oversight Office Subpart Y—Continued Airworthiness and for Continued Airworthiness, if any, for the type certificate. Safety Improvements Sec. developed for supplemental type (e) After December 16, 2008, before certificates, approved by the FAA returning an airplane to service after any 121.901 Purpose and definition. 121.903 [Reserved] Oversight Office. alterations for which fuel tank 121.905 [Reserved] (d) After December 16, 2008, before Instructions for Continued 121.907 [Reserved] returning an airplane to service after any Airworthiness are developed under 121.909 [Reserved] alterations for which EWIS Instructions SFAR 88, or under § 25.1529 in effect on 121.911 Electrical wiring interconnection for Continued Airworthiness are June 6, 2001, the operator must include systems (EWIS) maintenance program. developed, the certificate holder must in the inspection program for the 121.913 Fuel tank system maintenance program. include in the airplane’s maintenance airplane inspections and procedures for program inspections and procedures for the fuel tank system based on those Subpart Y—Continued Airworthiness EWIS based on those Instructions for Instructions for Continued and Safety Improvements Continued Airworthiness. Airworthiness. (e) The EWIS maintenance program (f) The fuel tank system inspection § 121.901 Purpose and definition. changes identified in paragraphs (c) and program changes identified in (a) This subpart requires persons (d) of this section and any later EWIS paragraphs (d) and (e) of this section holding an air carrier or operating revisions must be submitted to the and any later fuel tank system revisions certificate under part 119 of this chapter Principal Inspector for review and must be submitted to the cognizant to support the continued airworthiness approval. Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) of each airplane. These requirements (f) This section does not apply to the for review and approval. may include, but are not limited to, following airplane models: (g) This section does not apply to the revising the maintenance program, (1) Convair CV–240, 340, 440, if following airplane models: incorporating design changes, and modified to include turbine engines. (1) Convair CV–240, 340, 440, if incorporating revisions to Instructions (2) Lockheed L–188 modified to include turbine engines. for Continued Airworthiness. (3) Vickers Armstrong Viscount (4) Douglas DC–3, if modified to (2) Lockheed L–188 (b) For purposes of this subpart, the ‘‘FAA Oversight Office’’ is the aircraft include turbine engines (3) Vickers Armstrong Viscount certification office or office of the (5) Bombardier CL–44 (4) Douglas DC–3, if modified to Transport Airplane Directorate with (6) Mitsubishi YS–11 include turbine engines oversight responsibility for the relevant (7) British Aerospace BAC 1–11 (5) Bombardier CL–44 type certificate or supplemental type (8) Concorde (6) Mitsubishi YS–11 certificate, as determined by the (9) deHavilland D.H. 106 Comet 4C (10) VFW-Vereinigte Flugtechnische Administrator. (7) British Aerospace BAC 1–11 Werk VFW–614 (8) Concorde § 121.903 [Reserved] (11) Illyushin Aviation IL 96T (9) deHavilland D.H. 106 Comet 4C (12) Bristol Aircraft Britannia 305 (10) VFW-Vereinigte Flugtechnische § 121.905 [Reserved] (13) Handley Page Herald Type 300 (14) Avions Marcel Dassault—Breguet Werk VFW–614 § 121.907 [Reserved] (11) Illyushin Aviation IL 96T Aviation Mercure 100C (15) Airbus Caravelle (12) Bristol Aircraft Britannia 305 § 121.909 [Reserved] (13) Handley Page Herald Type 300 § 121.911 Electrical wiring interconnection § 121.913 Fuel tank system maintenance (14) Avions Marcel Dassault—Breguet systems (EWIS) maintenance program. program. Aviation Mercure 100C (a) Except as provided in paragraph (f) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (15) Airbus Caravelle of this section, this section applies to (g) of this section, this section applies to 26. Designate the text of current transport category, turbine-powered transport category, turbine-powered § 91.410 as new § 91.1505, removing airplanes with a type certificate issued airplanes with a type certificate issued and reserving paragraph (b), and after January 1, 1958, that, as a result of after January 1, 1958, that, as a result of revising the section heading to read as original type certification or later original type certification or later follows: increase in capacity, have— increase in capacity, have— (1) A maximum type-certificated (1) A maximum type-certificated § 91.1505 Repairs assessment for passenger capacity of 30 or more, or passenger capacity of 30 or more, or pressurized fuselages. (2) A maximum payload capacity of (2) A maximum payload capacity of 7500 pounds or more. 7500 pounds or more. § 91.410 [Reserved] (b) After December 16, 2008, no (b) For each airplane on which an 27. § 91.410 is reserved. certificate holder may operate an auxiliary fuel tank is installed under a

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field approval, before December 16, (11) Illyushin Aviation IL 96T certification office or office of the 2007, the certificate holder must submit (12) Bristol Aircraft Britannia 305 Transport Airplane Directorate with to the FAA Oversight Office proposed (13) Handley Page Herald Type 300 oversight responsibility for the relevant maintenance instructions for the tank (14) Avions Marcel Dassault—Breguet type certificate or supplemental type that meet the requirements of Special Aviation Mercure 100C certificate, as determined by the Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (15) Airbus Caravelle Administrator. (SFAR 88) of this chapter. § 121.368 [Redesignated as § 121.905] (c) After December 16, 2008, no § 125.503 [Reserved] 30. Redesignate § 121.368 as new certificate holder may operate an § 125.505 [Reserved] airplane identified in paragraph (a) of § 121.905 and reserve §121.368. this section unless the maintenance § 121.368 [Reserved] § 125.507 Fuel tank system inspection program. program for that airplane has been 31. § 121.368 is reserved. revised to include inspections, 32. Designate the text of current (a) Except as provided in paragraph procedures, and limitations for fuel § 121.370 as new § 121.907, removing (g) of this section, this section applies to tanks systems. and reserving paragraph (b), and transport category, turbine-powered (d) The proposed fuel tank system revising the section heading to read as airplanes with a type certificate issued maintenance program revisions must be follows: after January 1, 1958, that, as a result of based on the following documents: original type certification or later (1) The applicable type-certificate- § 121.907 Repairs assessment for increase in capacity, have— holder-developed fuel tank Instructions pressurized fuselages. (1) a maximum type-certificated passenger capacity of 30 or more, or for Continued Airworthiness, developed § 121.370 [Reserved] under SFAR 88 or under § 25.1529 in (2) a maximum payload capacity of effect on June 6, 2001, approved by the 33. § 121.370 is reserved. 7500 pounds or more. FAA Oversight Office. § 121.370a [Redesignated as §121.909] (b) For each airplane on which an auxiliary fuel tank is installed under a (2) The applicable supplemental-type- 34. Redesignate § 121.370a as new field approval, before December 16, certificate-holder-developed fuel tank §121.909 and reserve § 121.370a. Instructions for Continued 2007, the certificate holder must submit Airworthiness, if any, developed under § 121.370a [Reserved] to the FAA Oversight Office proposed SFAR 88, or under § 25.1529 in effect on 35. § 121.370a is reserved. maintenance instructions for the tank June 6, 2001, approved by the FAA that meet the requirements of Special Oversight Office. PART 125—CERTIFICATION AND Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (3) The applicable certificate-holder- OPERATIONS: AIRPLANES HAVING A (SFAR 88) of this chapter. developed maintenance instructions for SEATING CAPACITY OF 20 OR MORE (c) After December 16, 2008, no field-approved auxiliary fuel tanks, if PASSENGERS OR A MAXIMUM certificate holder may operate an any, approved by the FAA Oversight PAYLOAD CAPACITY OF 6,000 airplane identified in paragraph (a) of Office for the type certificate. POUNDS OR MORE; AND RULES this section unless the inspection (e) After December 16, 2008, before GOVERNING PERSONS ON BOARD program for that airplane has been returning an aircraft to service after any SUCH AIRCRAFT revised to include inspections, alteration for which fuel tank procedures, and limitations for fuel tank Instructions for Continued 36. The authority citation for part 125 systems. Airworthiness are developed under continues to read: (d) The proposed fuel tank system SFAR 88 or under § 25.1529 in effect on Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701– inspection program revisions must be June 6, 2001, the certificate holder must 44702, 44705, 44710–44711, 44713, 44716– based on the following documents: include in the maintenance program for 44717, 44722. (1) The applicable type-certificate- the airplane inspections and procedures 37. Amend part 125 by adding new holder-developed fuel tank Instructions for the fuel tank system based on those subpart M to read as follows: for Continued Airworthiness, developed Instructions for Continued under SFAR 88, or under § 25.1529 in Subpart M—Continued Airworthiness and effect on June 6, 2001, approved by the Airworthiness. Safety Improvements (f) The fuel tank system program FAA Oversight Office. changes identified in paragraphs (d) and Sec. (2) The applicable supplemental-type- 125.501 Purpose and definition. certificate-holder-developed fuel tank (e) of this section and any later fuel tank 125.503 [Reserved] system revisions must be submitted to Instructions for Continued 125.505 [Reserved] Airworthiness, if any, developed under the Principal Inspector for review and 125.507 Fuel tank system inspection approval. program. SFAR 88, or under § 25.1529 in effect on (g) This section does not apply to the June 6, 2001, approved by the FAA following airplane models: Subpart M—Continued Airworthiness Oversight Office. (1) Convair CV–240, 340, 440, if and Safety Improvements (3) The applicable certificate-holder- modified to include turbine engines. developed inspection instructions for (2) Lockheed L–188 § 125.501 Purpose and definition. field-approved auxiliary fuel tanks, if (3) Vickers Armstrong Viscount (a) This subpart requires operators to any, approved by the FAA Oversight (4) Douglas DC–3, if modified to support the continued airworthiness of Office for the type certificate. include turbine engines each airplane. These requirements may (e) After December 16, 2008, before (5) Bombardier CL–44 include, but are not limited to, revising returning an aircraft to service after any (6) Mitsubishi YS–11 the inspection program, incorporating alteration for which fuel tank (7) British Aerospace BAC 1–11 design changes, and incorporating Instructions for Continued (8) Concorde revisions to Instructions for Continued Airworthiness are developed under (9) deHavilland D.H. 106 Comet 4C Airworthiness. SFAR 88, or under § 25.1529 in effect on (10) VFW-Vereinigte Flugtechnische (b) For purposes of this subpart, the June 6, 2001, the certificate holder must Werk VFW–614 ‘‘FAA Oversight Office’’ is the aircraft include in the inspection program for

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the airplane inspections and procedures Subpart A—General (1) A maximum type-certificated for the fuel tank system based on those passenger capacity of 30 or more, or Instructions for Continued § 129.1 Applicability and definitions. (2) A maximum payload capacity of Airworthiness. * * * * * 7500 pounds or more. (f) The fuel tank system program (b) Operations of U.S.-registered (b) After December 16, 2008, no changes identified in paragraphs (d) and aircraft solely outside the United States. foreign person or foreign air carrier may (e) of this section and any later fuel tank In addition to the operations specified operate an airplane identified in system revisions must be submitted to under paragraph (a) of this section, paragraph (a) of this section unless the the Principal Inspector for review and §§ 129.14 and 129.20 and subpart B of maintenance program for that airplane approval. this part also apply to U.S.-registered includes inspections and procedures for (g) This section does not apply to the aircraft operated solely outside the EWIS. following airplane models: United States in common carriage by a (c) The proposed EWIS maintenance (1) Convair CV–240, 340, 440, if foreign person or foreign air carrier. program changes must be based on the modified to include turbine engines. * * * * * following documents: (2) Lockheed L–188 Subpart B—Continued Airworthiness and (1) The applicable EWIS Instructions (3) Vickers Armstrong Viscount Safety Improvements for Continued Airworthiness, developed (4) Douglas DC–3, if modified to by the type certificate holder and include turbine engines Sec. 129.101 Purpose and definition. approved by the FAA Oversight Office. (5) Bombardier CL–44 129.103 [Reserved] (2) The applicable EWIS Instructions (6) Mitsubishi YS–11 129.105 Aging airplane inspections and for Continued Airworthiness, if any, (7) British Aerospace BAC 1–11 records reviews for U.S.-registered developed for supplemental type (8) Concorde multiengine aircraft. certificates, approved by the FAA (9) deHavilland D.H. 106 Comet 4C 129.107 Repairs assessment for pressurized Oversight Office. (10) VFW-Vereinigte Flugtechnische fuselages. (d) After December 16, 2008, before Werk VFW–614 129.109 Supplemental inspections for U.S.- returning an airplane to service after any (11) Illyushin Aviation IL 96T registered aircraft. 129.111 Electrical wiring interconnection alterations for which EWIS Instructions (12) Bristol Aircraft Britannia 305 for Continued Airworthiness are (13) Handley Page Herald Type 300 systems (EWIS) maintenance program. 129.113 Fuel tank system maintenance developed, the foreign person or foreign (14) Avions Marcel Dassault—Breguet program. air carrier must include in the Aviation Mercure 100C maintenance program for that airplane (15) Airbus Caravelle Subpart B—Continued Airworthiness inspections and procedures for EWIS 38. Designate the text of current and Safety Improvements based on those Instructions for § 125.248 as new § 125.505, removing § 129.101 Purpose and definition. Continued Airworthiness. and reserving paragraph (b), and (e) The EWIS maintenance program (a) This subpart requires a foreign revising the section heading to read as changes identified in paragraphs (c) and person or foreign air carrier operating a follows: (d) of this section and any later EWIS U.S. registered airplane in common revisions must be submitted to the § 125.505 Repairs assessment for carriage to support the continued Principal Inspector or cognizant Flight pressurized fuselages. airworthiness of each airplane. These Standards International Field Office for requirements may include, but are not § 125.248 [Reserved] review and approval. limited to, revising the maintenance 39. § 125.248 is reserved. (f) This section does not apply to the program, incorporating design changes, following airplane models: and incorporating revisions to PART 129—OPERATIONS: FOREIGN (1) Convair CV–240, 340, 440, if Instructions for Continued AIR CARRIERS AND FOREIGN modified to include turbine engines. OPERATORS OF U.S.-REGISTERED Airworthiness. (2) Lockheed L–188 (b) For purposes of this subpart, the AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN COMMON (3) Vickers Armstrong Viscount ‘‘FAA Oversight Office’’ is the aircraft CARRIAGE (4) Douglas DC–3, if modified to certification office or office of the include turbine engines 40. The authority citation for part 129 Transport Airplane Directorate with continues to read: (5) Bombardier CL–44 oversight responsibility for the relevant (6) Mitsubishi YS–11 Authority: 49 U.S.C. 1372, 40113, 40119, type certificate or supplemental type (7) British Aerospace BAC 1–11 44101, 44701–44702, 44705, 44709–44711, certificate, as determined by the (8) Concorde 44713, 44716–44717, 44722, 44901–44904, Administrator. (9) deHavilland D.H. 106 Comet 4C 44906, 44912, 46105, Pub. L. 107–71 sec. 104. § 129.103 [Reserved] (10) VFW-Vereinigte Flugtechnische Werk VFW–614 41. Amend part 129 by: § 129.105 [Redesignated from § 129.33] (11) Illyushin Aviation IL 96T A. Designating the existing sections, § 129.107 [Redesignated from § 129.32] (12) Bristol Aircraft Britannia 305 except §§ 129.16, 129.32, and 129.33, as (13) Handley Page Herald Type 300 ‘‘Subpart A—General’’; § 129.109 [Redesignated from §129.16] (14) Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet B. Revising paragraph (b) of § 129.1; Aviation Mercure 100C C. Redesignating §§ 129.16, 129.32, § 129.111 Electrical wiring interconnection (15) Airbus Caravelle and 129.33 as §§ 129.109, 129.107, and systems (EWIS) maintenance program. 129.105, respectively, and revising the (a) Except as provided in paragraph (f) § 129.113 Fuel tank system maintenance heading for newly designated § 129.107 of this section, this section applies to program. and removing and reserving paragraph transport category, turbine-powered (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b); and airplanes with a type certificate issued (g) of this section, this section applies to D. Adding a new subpart B. after January 1, 1958, that, as a result of transport category, turbine-powered The revisions and additions read as original type certification or later airplanes with a type certificate issued follows: increase in capacity, have— after January 1, 1958, that, as a result of

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original type certification or later (2) The applicable supplemental-type- Flight Standards International Field increase in capacity, have— certificate-holder-developed fuel tank Office for review and approval. (1) A maximum type-certificated Instructions for Continued (g) This section does not apply to the passenger capacity of 30 or more, or Airworthiness, if any, developed under following airplane models: (2) A maximum payload capacity of SFAR 88, or Instructions for Continued (1) Convair CV–240, 340, 440, if 7500 pounds or more. Airworthiness developed in accordance modified to include turbine engines. (b): For each airplane on which an with § 25.1529 in effect on June 6, 2001, (2) Lockheed L–188 auxiliary fuel tank is installed under a approved by the FAA Oversight Office. (3) Vickers Armstrong Viscount field approval, before December 16, (3) The applicable maintenance (4) Douglas DC–3, if modified to 2007, the foreign person or foreign air instructions for field-approved auxiliary include turbine engines carrier operating the airplane must fuel tanks, if any, developed by the (5) Bombardier CL–44 submit to the FAA Oversight Office foreign person or foreign air carrier (6) Mitsubishi YS–11 proposed maintenance instructions for operating the airplane and approved by the tank that meet the requirements of (7) British Aerospace BAC 1–11 the FAA Oversight Office for the type (8) Concorde Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. certificate. 88 (SFAR 88) of this chapter. (9) deHavilland D.H. 106 Comet 4C (c) After December 16, 2008, no (e) After December 16, 2008, before (10) VFW-Vereinigte Flugtechnische foreign person or foreign air carrier may returning an airplane to service after any Werk VFW–614 operate an airplane identified in alteration for which fuel tank (11) Illyushin Aviation IL 96T paragraph (a) of this section unless the Instructions for Continued (12) Bristol Aircraft Britannia 305 maintenance program for that airplane Airworthiness are developed under (13) Handley Page Herald Type 300 has been revised to include inspections, SFAR 88, or under § 25.1529 in effect on (14) Avions Marcel Dassault—Breguet procedures, and limitations for fuel June 6, 2001, the foreign person or Aviation Mercure 100C tanks systems. foreign air carrier must include in the (15) Airbus Caravelle (d) The proposed fuel tank system maintenance program for the airplane inspections and procedures for the fuel Issued in Washington, DC on September maintenance program revisions must be 22, 2005. tank system based on those Instructions based on the following documents: James J. Ballough, (1) The applicable type-certificate- for Continued Airworthiness. holder-developed fuel tank Instructions (f) The fuel tank system program Director, Flight Standards Service. for Continued Airworthiness, developed changes identified in paragraphs (d) and John J. Hickey, under SFAR 88, or under § 25.1529 in (e) of this section and any later fuel tank Director, Aircraft Certification Service. effect on June 6, 2001, approved by the system revisions must be submitted to [FR Doc. 05–19419 Filed 10–5–05; 8:45 am] FAA Oversight Office. the Principal Inspector or cognizant BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

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