Reforming Myanmar’s Military

BY ERIN MURPHY, MATTHEW TURPIN, AND PETER KUCIK

he developing relationship between the U.S. and Myanmar represents one of the most positive foreign policy shifts in recent memory. Myanmar is one of few former despotic T nations to have “unclenched its fist” and now enjoys generally positive international sup- port. With the U.S. actively engaged in civil capacity building efforts, the people of Myanmar are testing their new freedom of speech to debate nearly all facets of their public and private sectors. The path to democratic and economic reform, begun in 2011, will likely be rocky, but the positive momentum is clear. There is however one glaring omission in U.S. efforts to help Myanmar: assistance in reform- ing its military institutions. Critics of comprehensive military assistance suggest that conducting military-to-military engagement offers something for nothing, as the Myanmar military has shown few signs of reform. With ongoing human rights abuses, the U.S. should not provide any benefits to Myanmar’s military through enhanced ties. Additionally, some critics believe that U.S. military assistance will simply result in making Myanmar’s military better at abusing the civilian popula- tion and will give them the tools to undermine democratic and economic reforms. While these are legitimate concerns, direct military-to-military engagement with Myanmar is a critical part of the overall reform effort. Ignoring this crucial segment of Myanmar’s society risks undermining the long-term stability and development of the country. As the military is Myanmar’s most powerful institution, the U.S. government must engage with the military in a deliberate, long-term program to reinforce efforts to strengthen civil society, create civilian institutions, and ensure the military is under civilian control. As demonstrated in previous transitions from author- itarian to democratic rule, direct military-to-military assistance can play a critical part of making that a reality. Such assistance must be coordinated with broader civilian efforts, but experience has shown that the Country Teams within U.S. Embassies can manage this cooperation. While the stereotypical image of military assistance involves weapons training and battlefield tactics, the U.S. likely would focus on wider institutional issues like recruitment, pay, military justice,

Erin Murphy is the former Special Assistant to the office of the Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma and is currently the Principal and Founder of Inle Advisory Group. Matthew Turpin is an Army Lieutenant Colonel serving on the Joint Staff. Peter Kucik is a former Senior Sanctions Advisor at the Office of Foreign Assets Control and is currently a Principal at Inle Advisory Group.

PRISM 5, no. 3 FEATURES | 77 MURPHY, TURPIN AND KUCIK promotion, and retirement. Properly designed, must understand that the same holds true for these systems can reinforce principles of civil- the military. Expecting Myanmar’s military to ian control, and carve out a space for a profes- reform in isolation is a risky gamble. sional military to flourish while remaining Brief Background on U.S.-Myanmar subordinate to civilian political leadership. Military ties Depending on the roles that Myanmar wants its military to play, the U.S. can offer assistance Between 1942 and 2011, the U.S.-Myanmar on training for military medicine, disaster relationship shifted from cooperation to hos- relief, and securing the nation’s borders and tility and, in just the last three years, it has maritime resources. shifted back toward cooperation. During For those who wish to punish individuals World War II, groups of ethnic Kachins fought within the Myanmar military, withholding this alongside the U.S. in Northern Myanmar to kind of military assistance is not productive. In open supply routes for Chinese forces fighting fact, it makes it easier for them to resist efforts the Japanese. During and after the Chinese to reform. If we accept the premise that civilian Civil War, the U.S. provided support to institutions need assistance to build their Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang) troops set- capacity to perform new roles and change the tling in Northern Myanmar, and sought to way they serve Myanmar’s society, then we make Myanmar a bulwark against communist Global Journalist

Activists protest the death of freelance journalist Aung Kyaw Naing, also known as Pary Gyi, outside Yangon’s city hall. Detained 30 Sept 2014, Naing was shot and killed in military custody 4 Oct, and his death was announced 20 days later.

78 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 3 REFORMING MYANMAR’S MILITARY expansion during the Cold War. As the U.S. country’s sovereignty and protecting the new grew concerned with the drug trade in the government from dozens of ethnic and anti- “Golden Triangle” in the 1970s, it worked with government militias threatening secession or the government to disrupt production and out- coup. General Ne Win, a member of the Thirty flows. Bilateral ties sharply declined following Comrades, took power in 1958 to settle a the 1988 uprising and subsequent crackdown political stalemate and gain the ability to by the military junta as it consolidated its hold quash uprisings, and again in 1962, this time on power in Myanmar. The junta’s brutal tac- to stay in power. tics prompted the U.S. to levy a series of sanc- Myanmar has been in the throes of war tions and restrictions that prohibited new U.S. since its independence, fighting ethnic militias investment, exports to the U.S., and the provi- – some numbering between 20,000-40,000 sion of U.S. financial services, as well as drasti- troops1 – and anti-government armies. Waging cally limiting U.S. aid and diplomatic ties. counter-insurgency operations became the These measures were undertaken by both exec- foundation of Myanmar’s military, shaping its utive order and legislation. doctrine and institutions ever since. In the After nearly a quarter century of difficul- 1970s, Ne Win developed the “four cuts” strat- ties, the relationship began to warm in 2011. egy that cut off access to food and shelter, The Myanmar government took significant funds, intelligence, and recruitment, often steps to open the political and economic sys- resulting in a scorched earth policy in its tems, resulting in the rollback of some of the implementation. To this day, the four cuts strat- most restrictive U.S. measures, including broad egy remains the guiding principle behind the financial sanctions and diplomatic exchange military’s institutions and operations, which protocols. However, security ties remain largely contributes to ongoing human rights viola- frozen as debate rages in the U.S. on how best tions that include forced labor, child soldiers, to deal with Myanmar’s military. Some in land seizures, displacement, sexual violence, Congress and certain human rights groups and human trafficking. called for more stringent restrictions on U.S. Despite a sometimes rocky relationship engagement with Myanmar’s military as both during the Cold War, the U.S. concentrated its a punitive measure and as leverage for measur- support to Myanmar’s military on preventing able progress on human rights and military the spread of communism and drugs. Through professionalization. International Military Education and Training (IMET) and similar programs, select groups of Myanmar’s Military History Myanmar’s junior and middle ranking officers The Myanmar military was born out of a desire participated in professional military education for independence from the British in the after- in the .2 IMET’s purpose was to math of World War II. Aung San, father of pro- build interoperability with allied and partner democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi, along with militaries and to promote military profession- his “Thirty Comrades,” created the Burma alism. Within the context of the Cold War, and Independence Army (BIA). Following particularly during the Vietnam conflict, this Myanmar’s independence in 1948, the military centered on making Myanmar a reliable con- played a critical part in guaranteeing the tainment partner. As a frontline state in the

PRISM 5, no. 3 FEATURES | 79 MURPHY, TURPIN AND KUCIK containment of communism, the U.S. sought with both governments agreeing to resume a strong security partner in Myanmar to coun- the recovery of World War II remains, as well ter both Soviet and Chinese assistance to the as to cooperate on counter-narcotics. Since multiple communist insurgencies in Southeast then, Pentagon officials have traveled to Asia. Sharing a lengthy and mountainous bor- Myanmar in various capacities. When former der with the People’s Republic of , Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Myanmar held a pivotal position in preventing Human Rights, and Labor Michael Posner access to the Indian Ocean and protecting visited Myanmar for a two-day bilateral Thailand, a U.S. treaty ally. This interest human rights dialogue in October 2012, expanded after 1974, when the U.S. sponsored Lieutenant General Frank Wiercinski, an anti-narcotics program that provided heli- commander of the U.S. Army Pacific, and copters and pilot training. Narcotics produc- Vikram Singh, the Deputy Assistant Secretary tion and smuggling provided funding to many of Defense (DASD) for South and Southeast of Myanmar’s internal insurgencies, so this Asia, joined the U.S. delegation. The assistance aligned with Myanmar’s own four dialogue’s agenda covered a range of topics, cuts strategy. such as rule of law, the protection of human U.S. interest in maintaining Myanmar as rights, and the military code of conduct. a bulwark against communism declined dur- Following the human rights dialogue, the ing the 1980s as the U.S. policy toward China U.S. invited Myanmar to send observers to changed, and China shifted its focus to eco- Exercise COBRA GOLD in Thailand, the nomic development. Even after the downgrade largest multilateral joint military training of diplomatic relations following the military exercise in the Asia-Pacific.4 In June 2014, coup in 1988, the U.S. maintained a defense Lieutenant General Anthony Crutchfield, attaché office to monitor security develop- Deputy Commander of the U.S. Pacific ments. In the 1990s, the U.S. military con- Command, addressed Myanmar’s National ducted limited operations in Myanmar with its Defense College, the first U.S. military officer Joint Task Force – Full Accounting (JTF-FA) to do so. In January 2014, the second two- and the Central Identification Laboratory – day human rights dialogue took place, again Hawaii (CILHI) to identify and recover the with representatives of the U.S. military remains of soldiers lost during World War II. joining State Department colleagues to In 2004, this recovery effort ended when the discuss a range of topics, including military Myanmar government suspended the work on reform. the ground.3 Despite these initial steps to restart the relationship, there are still Myanmar-specific Current State of U.S.-Myanmar Military Ties and non-country specific legislative and execu- tive restrictions that prevent real assistance to Following Myanmar’s reforms beginning in address the challenges faced by Myanmar’s 2011, the Obama administration began to security establishment. The 2012 Defense Act consider re-starting military cooperation. prohibited funding for IMET, foreign military Discussions began during Secretary of State financing, or excess defense articles.5 The pro- ’s 2011 trip to the country, vision of counter-terrorism and stability

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operations assistance, commonly known as directly or indirectly, imported, exported, re- 1206 funding, is also prohibited.6 exported, sold or supplied arms or related Additionally, the U.S. restricts direct commer- materiel from or the Government cial sales of military equipment or peacekeep- of North Korea to Burma [Myanmar] or the ing operations in Myanmar (as well as other Government of Burma [Myanmar].”8 The U.S. selected countries) if funds “may be used to has since added the Directorate of Defense support any military training or operations Industries, Lieutenant Colonel Kyaw Nyunt that include child soldiers.”7 Since October 1, Oo, and Lieutenant General Thein Htay, to the 2010, Myanmar is also prohibited from receiv- SDN list for engaging in such trade with North ing aid under IMET due to the provisions of Korea.9 the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008. The President, under the Arms Export The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94- 329), can pro- Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has the author- hibit all arms exports to a country “in further- ity to sanction individuals and entities pursu- ance of world peace and the security and for- ant to the criteria outlined in relevant presi- eign policy of the United States.” In 1988, dential Executive Orders (E.O.s) and the President Ronald Reagan invoked his powers Burmese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part under this law to impose an arms embargo on 537. The Myanmar military’s holding compa- Myanmar. In 1993 the Department of State nies, Myanmar Economic Corporation and (DoS) issued a public notice implementing an Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings immediate ban on exports of defense articles Limited, have been included since 2008 on and services to Myanmar. The U.S. continues OFAC’s list of sanctioned individuals and enti- to maintain an arms embargo on Myanmar.10 ties, the Specially Designated Nationals and Myanmar security forces also fall under Blocked Persons list (SDN list). All U.S. indi- the vetting requirements specified in section viduals and companies worldwide are prohib- 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 ited from dealing with the individuals and (FAA), as amended, the “Leahy Amendment.” entities specified on the SDN list. In 2012, The DoS vets beneficiaries of its assistance to President Obama issued an Executive Order foreign security forces, as well as certain adding designation criteria to target individu- Department of Defense (DoD) training pro- als or entities determined “(i) to have engaged grams, to ensure that recipients have not com- in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the mitted gross human rights abuses. When the peace, security, or stability of Burma vetting process uncovers credible evidence that [Myanmar], such as actions that have the pur- an individual or unit has committed a gross pose or effect of undermining or obstructing violation of human rights, U.S. assistance is the political reform process or the peace pro- withheld. The obligation to vet DoS assistance cess with ethnic minorities in Burma and DoD-funded training programs for foreign [Myanmar]; (ii) to be responsible for or com- security forces is in both the Leahy plicit in, or responsible for ordering, control- Amendment and a comparable provision in ling, or otherwise directing, or to have partici- the annual DoD Appropriations Act. While the pated in, the commission of human rights DoS legislation applies to all “assistance” abuses in Burma [Myanmar]; (iii) to have, under the FAA and the Arms Export Control

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Act, the DoD requirements are specific to without assistance. Isolating the military “training programs” funded under Defense leadership during this transition process Department Appropriations Acts. Security can only encourage the status quo or, in forces subject to Leahy vetting generally the worst case, prompt backsliding. The include foreign militaries, reserves, police, and military is the most powerful institution internal security forces such as border guards, in Myanmar; active military officers head customs police, prison guards, and other units three ministries (Defense, Home Affairs, or individual members of units authorized to and Border Affairs), hold 25 percent of use force.11 parliamentary seats, and manage significant business interests throughout Myanmar’s The Need to Pursue a Relationship with economy. Additionally, little is known about Myanmar’s Military the intentions or attitudes toward reform Action on developing military ties with of the Commander-in-Chief, Vice Senior Myanmar is critical at this pivotal moment General Min Aung Hlaing, and other top in the country’s democratic transition. military officials. Given this environment, It is unreasonable to expect Myanmar’s the U.S. stands to gain in several ways military to professionalize and subordinate from developing bilateral military ties with itself to a new civilian government Myanmar. Comprehensive and long-term Robert Coles

2007 anti-government protesters in Yangon; the banner reads “non-violence: national movement.”

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U.S. military engagement, paired with context of removing or imposing new sanc- ongoing efforts by the U.S. government and tions, “(i)t [discussions] wasn’t, ‘If you don’t non-governmental organizations to build do this, we won’t do that.”13 civilian governance capacity, can help foster a The same applies to their military. If the peaceful and lasting democratic transition. international community, including the U.S. Decades of ethnic strife, internal conflict, and the human rights non-governmental orga- and dysfunctional governance have left nizations, wants Myanmar’s military to change Myanmar unable to make the necessary in a positive way, they must have “skin in the reforms alone. There is broad understanding game.” Withholding assistance as a form of that Myanmar needs help reforming its econ- punishment only undermines the objectives omy, infrastructure, and civil society. The U.S. sought: a military in Myanmar that respects is actively engaging in outreach to Myanmar’s human rights, follows the rule of law, and “cronies,” the businessmen on OFAC’s SDN operates under civilian control. There is list that have been pilloried for benefiting domestic support for such assistance, includ- financially from their ties to the former junta. ing from the political opposition and civil The U.S. government has identified ways for society groups that recognize the need for these business tycoons to reform their prac- reform and professionalization of the military. tices in order to have the sanctions against Within the international community and in them lifted. Assistant Secretary for Democracy, certain human rights groups however, there is Human Rights, and Labor , a lack of trust in the Myanmar military and traveled to Myanmar in June 2014 and met concern that expansion of military coopera- with several sanctioned individuals to start a tion could lead to a greater ability or willing- dialogue on ways to change. The delegation ness to commit abuse. While this is a legiti- explained that removal from the SDN list is a mate concern, the only real way to stop legal, not a political, process managed by Myanmar military abuses is for the military to OFAC, for which petitioners must demonstrate undergo internal reforms to change its culture fundamental behavior change. “Those still on and actively prevent these activities. During our sanctions list have a chance to build a new her initial months in parliament, pro-democ- legacy for themselves and their country by racy icon Aung San Suu Kyi supported military showing that they have cut business ties with professionalization, noting her fondness for the military and started respecting human the armed services due to her father’s role in rights in the communities where they operate,” the creation of the BIA. She expressed concern said Assistant Secretary Malinowski.12 with the military’s presence in parliament and The U.S. is also moving away from a trans- the constitutional powers it granted itself, and actional foreign policy where the U.S. will only has repeatedly called for assistance in reform- take action, whether to reward or punish, in ing the military, particularly its role in business response to moves the Myanmar government and politics.14 Assistant Secretary Malinowski makes. Following the August 2014 Regional has also stated that “(t)he only path to a pro- Forum meetings of the Association of fessional and modern [Burmese] military is Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a senior through discipline, accountability, transpar- U.S. government official said that in the ency, and civilian oversight by a democratically

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elected government. This may not happen what they term as “backsliding” on reforms overnight, but in the meantime we encouraged there. Certainly dealing with an institution the military to take concrete, visible steps to associated with a litany of atrocities comes demonstrate its commitment to human rights, with reputational costs. There is a real question for example by issuing and making public on whether the Myanmar military can in fact orders to cease land confiscations, and the use reform. There have been reports of continued of forced labor and child soldiers.”15 abuses, particularly in conflict areas in Kachin As in all other states, the Myanmar mili- and Shan States, which put in doubt trust of tary is not a monolithic institution. There have the military. However, while such critics serve been calls by soldiers in the lower ranks to an important role in exposing human rights reform, and there are those in the military who abuses perpetrated by the military, particularly remember when there was cooperation with in ethnic minority areas, they have offered few the U.S. and would like a return to that status. alternatives to punitive measures, or viable rec- Finally, the military wants the domestic and ommendations for reforming the institution. international respect that professionalization Congress has also expressed deep concern brings, and has the willingness to do what it in re-engaging with Myanmar’s military. takes to earn that respect. On almost every offi- Representatives Steve Chabot, former cial trip, senior government and military offi- Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs cers acknowledge their participation in IMET Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, and Joe and fondly recall their experiences. As an edu- Crowley, in December 2013 introduced the cational development program, IMET is Burma Human Rights and Democracy Act of designed to promote professionalization and 2013, H.R. 3889. This bipartisan measure U.S. military values as part of a long-term strat- places conditions on U.S. military assistance egy that properly nests and complements other to Myanmar, including prohibiting the use of engagement policies, especially those targeting FY2014 Department of Defense funds to assist human rights violations. Myanmar until the U.S. Secretary of State certi- It also is critical to provide the military a fies the country has taken steps toward estab- stake and a role in the government’s reform lishing civilian oversight of the armed forces, efforts. Thus far, this key part of Myanmar’s addressing human rights abuses by the mili- political system has been further isolated, with tary, and terminating military relations with increased public calls for more punitive mea- North Korea.16 In January 2014 Senators sures. Failing to assist the military with carving Marco Rubio and Robert Menendez intro- out a legitimate role in Myanmar society only duced The Burma Human Rights and strengthens the notion that the democratic Democracy Act of 2013, a parallel bipartisan experiment offers the military nothing and Senate measure that would prohibit U.S. mili- increases the risk that it will seek to undermine tary aid to Myanmar, except in cases of basic the reform efforts. training on human rights and civilian control of the military. The bill offers no waivers and Obstacles to Greater Ties would lift the prohibition only if Myanmar Human rights organizations oppose expand- takes concrete actions to measurably improve ing military ties to Myanmar, highlighting human rights conditions, including:

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establishing civilian oversight of the armed program did little to change the course of mil- forces, addressing human rights violations by itary reform. Human rights groups argue that their military, and terminating military rela- the U.S. should withhold IMET until all cul- tions with North Korea. The amendment pable parties are held accountable and the rel- would also request an annual report on the evant institutions undergo drastic reform. Obama Administration’s strategy to engage the Getting it Done Right, Not Getting it Done Myanmar military.17 Tomorrow Additionally, it is unclear the degree to which strengthened military ties with the U.S. Resuming military-to-military ties does not can influence a reforming a military. A 2011 mean training and arming the Myanmar Government Accountability Office report con- military to become better at committing cluded that the effectiveness of IMET is largely abuses. Given its history since independence, unsubstantiated and that confidence is based it is unrealistic to assume that Myanmar on anecdotal data at best due to significant can organically develop civilian control of data gaps and a lack of rigorous analysis.18 its military or turn away from entrenched Critics of reinstituting IMET in Myanmar note doctrines, like the four cuts strategy, without that alumni of the IMET program have com- assistance. The nations of Eastern Europe mitted human rights abuses and that the faced similar challenges in the 1990s Mikhail Esteves

Burma is home to at least 2 million IDPs of various ethnicities, and at least 2 million others have found refuge in neighboring countries. Shown here is the Mae La refugee camp in Tak, Thailand, which houses a number of Karen refugees; the Karen Conflict has been termed the “longest civil war in the world” (1949-present).

PRISM 5, no. 3 FEATURES | 85 MURPHY, TURPIN AND KUCIK following the collapse of communism. The PfP Program. The objective of both WIF and U.S., along with NATO partners, played an PfP has been to advance democratic reforms of active and positive role in helping those defense establishments and military forces in countries reform their militaries. At the time, the former communist-bloc countries of there was similar concern over the human Eastern Europe, as well as the former Soviet rights violations perpetrated by members Republics. The program has involved 35 coun- of those militaries and their involvement tries, 12 of which have become NATO mem- in the political process (military leaders bers. It supports a wide range of activities, were often communist party members). from military-to-military engagements and However, instead of being aloof and insisting training exercises, to education programs for on full internal reform before assistance uniformed military leaders and civilian leaders could begin, the U.S. and NATO took steps, occupying positions within newly established although potentially risky, to positively shape ministries of defense. The program has been a that reform process through a proactive, resounding success for a number of the PfP long-term and comprehensive security participants, and countries like , cooperation program called Partnership for Bulgaria, Romania, and the Baltic States have Peace (PfP). reformed their militaries and established For 20 years, the annual Congressional robust civilian control after decades under appropriation for the Warsaw Initiative Fund authoritarian regimes. Obviously, much of the (WIF) has enabled the DoD to support NATO’s credit goes to the people of these nations, but Youtube

TV footage following Myanmar military attack on Kachin rebels

86 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 3 REFORMING MYANMAR’S MILITARY the far-sighted legislative decision to provide infrastructure places its citizens at even greater assistance early in the reform process enabled risk from flooding, cyclones, and earthquakes. this success.19 Cyclone Nargis in 2008 devastated the There is a range of options to bring about Ayeyarwady Delta and the city of Yangon, kill- the changes in the Myanmar military that the ing close to 130,000 people. Myanmar’s mili- U.S. wants to see. The concept in resuming ties tary could be trained to quickly mobilize to is to slowly and methodically do so, building aid victims of natural disasters, evacuate them the institutions with civilian control first, and to safer areas, and support reconstruction then working through to other issues. We rec- efforts. More importantly, Myanmar could use ommend the following: its military to focus on disaster risk reduction Human Rights Dialogue: The Human and other preparedness efforts, something Rights Dialogue offers a chance for a higher- Bangladesh has done to great effect. The U.S. level dialogue with U.S. and military officials, government could offer military-to-military and should be continued on an annual basis. training programs and technical assistance in After more than a two-year hiatus, the second an effort to begin to transform the military’s Human Rights Dialogue was held in January role in Myanmar. Given the effort expended 2015. Human rights are the central theme of since Hurricane Katrina to develop the doc- this program, and institutionalizing the dia- trine and conceptual foundation of Defense logue would present a regular opportunity for Support to Civil Authorities, the U.S. military policymakers from various departments, could use these lessons to help Myanmar’s including DoD and DoS, to explain the need military turn away from the four cuts strategy for and ways to implement a human rights and adopt a strategy focused on protecting policy for Myanmar’s military. citizens from significant environmental risks. Track 1.5 and Track 2 Exchanges: In addi- Additionally, the U.S. could include Myanmar tion to the Human Rights Dialogue, a combi- in its annual Pacific Partnership and Pacific nation of Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues can Angel operations, which focus on bringing bring in the appropriate human rights and civil engineering and military medicine pro- military scholars, foreign policy practitioners, grams to countries in the region. These pro- and retired military officials to discuss ways to grams assist host nation militaries develop professionalize the military, as well as offer capacity in these areas, and provide humani- first-hand experiences of how senior military tarian assistance to civilian populations officers serve under civilian leadership. Retired through the construction of schools and other U.S. military officers and civilian defense offi- public buildings and the provision of basic cials can speak in military parlance while offer- health and dental care. ing constructive advice on professionalization Security Cooperation Programs: The U.S. and appropriate roles for military officers in has a number of security cooperation pro- both governance and national security institu- grams that could be used in combination to tions. bring about positive changes and accountabil- Disaster Relief and Humanitarian ity. The first and probably most important for Assistance Capacity Building: Myanmar is Myanmar today is the Defense Institutional prone to natural disasters and its fragile Reform Initiative (DIRI). The goal of this

PRISM 5, no. 3 FEATURES | 87 MURPHY, TURPIN AND KUCIK program is to develop effective, accountable, focused their military doctrines and training to professional and transparent security establish- provide the with forces capa- ments, something that all assess is lacking in ble of fulfilling peacekeeping operations in Myanmar. DIRI would place U.S. subject mat- other parts of the world. The U.S. could use its ter experts within Myanmar’s military institu- extensive experience in training other peace- tions to develop a common assessment of keeping forces to help shape the Myanmar organizational weaknesses and a plan for mak- military for this role, if the government desires. ing reforms. Another is the Ministry of Defense Conducting such training would have the Advisor (MoDA) program that seeks to build added benefit of establishing interoperability civilian ministerial capacity. It partners U.S. between the U.S. and Myanmar militaries, DoD civilians with foreign counterparts to making it easier to integrate Myanmar into help them develop specific programs for bud- multilateral exercises and regional security geting and programming, acquisition pro- efforts, like the ASEAN initiatives on maritime cesses, and running personnel systems for security, counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, and recruitment, pay, promotion and retirement. disaster relief. These are decisions that do not While the DoD currently operates MoDA only need to be made today, but their consideration in Afghanistan, it represents the kind of pro- could suggest a path for the U.S. and Myanmar gram that could be employed to assist to follow if both choose to establish a long- Myanmar. As policy makers discuss increased term, comprehensive military relationship. military engagement with Myanmar, DIRI and Conclusion MoDA should be among the first consider- ations. It is tempting to think that Myanmar’s military Over time and in line with legislative and leadership could just snap their fingers and executive restrictions, the IMET program can immediately institute civilian control or aban- educate and influence future military leaders don the four cuts strategy. Unfortunately, such and establish a rapport between U.S. and efforts require comprehensive institutional Myanmar military officers. As progress is made changes and would be difficult even under the and reforms are undertaken, the U.S. has a best conditions. If the U.S. wants and expects number of programs designed to assist in pro- change, then it must actively work to realize viding military resources, whether through that change, including by providing training, financing (Foreign Military Financing - FMF) resources, and support to the individuals try- or direct sales (Foreign Military Sales -FMS), to ing to reform that space in Myanmar’s society. purchase new equipment or pay for specialized The same holds true for Myanmar’s military training for new roles and missions. and security sectors. The U.S., in cooperation Peacekeeping Operations: As Myanmar with the wider international community, must reforms its military institutions, the U.S. could be willing to engage Myanmar’s military to begin providing assistance to build peacekeep- develop a comprehensive program that does ing capacity, so that Myanmar can be a net not simply focus on how not to act, but pro- contributor to stability. This effort is likely vides resources and assistance in adopting new years off in the future, but a number of coun- roles and missions, as well as the new doc- tries like Mongolia and Bangladesh have trines, processes, and systems that will

88 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 3 REFORMING MYANMAR’S MILITARY ultimately create a new military foundation in 14 http://www.voanews.com/content/burmas-army- Myanmar. That is a daunting and scary pros- defends-involvement-in-politics-vows-continued-re- form/1629420.html. pect for any institution. In the end, the people 15 http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/NewsArticleView/ of Myanmar, both civilian and military, will tabid/7464/Article/9877/press-release-on-assistant-secretary- have to do the hard work of reforming; we malinowskis-visit-to-burma.aspx#.U7YVGwRIMdI.twitter. 16 https://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/ should help them in that effort. house-bill/3889. As Assistant Secretary Malinowski said, 17 http://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/ “(t)his country’s transition has just begun, and serve/?File_id=9e19299f-0019-44e7-80dc-1b1623aa16c4. 18 the hardest work is still ahead – but there is http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d12123.pdf. 19 NATO’s PfP Program has “graduated” 12 unlimited potential. And the United States is nations into NATO membership (1999 – Poland, committed as a partner and as a friend to see- Hungary, and the Czech Republic; 2004 – Bulgaria, ing that potential fully realized.” PRISM Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia; 2009 – Albania and Croatia). 20 http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/NewsArticleView/ tabid/7464/Article/9877/press-release-on-assistant-secretary- malinowskis-visit-to-burma.aspx#.U7YVGwRIMdI.twitter. Notes Photos

1 http://cogitasia.com/burma-preview-2013-united-wa- state-army-the-challenge-to-peace/. Page 76 photo by Mohd Nor Azmil Abdul 2 From 1950-1962, 972 Myanmar officers Rahman. 2008. Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar. Views to participated in the IMET program and during show the effects of the wind and rain on 3 May 2008. 1980-1988 another 255 participated. “Burma/ From http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cyclone_ Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know,” David Nargis_-Myanmar-3May2008.jpg licensed under the Steinberg, 2009, p. 116. Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license. 3 “Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/deed.en. Photo Know,” David Steinberg, 2009, p. 116. reproduced unaltered. 4 Jim Garamone, “U.S. Open to Thais Inviting Page 82 photo by Robert Cole. 2007. Monks Burma to Observe Cobra Gold,” American Forces Protesting in Burma (Rangoon, Shwedagon pagoda). Press Service, October 19, 2012. From http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:2007_ 5 Section 8128 of Division A of the Myanmar_protests_7.jpg licensed under the Creative Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74). Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license. http:// 6 Section 1206 of the National Defense creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/deed.en. Photo Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163). reproduced unaltered. 7 http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43035.pdf. Page 85 photo by Mikhail Esteves. 2007. Mae La 8 https://www.federalregister.gov/arti- camp for Burmese refugees, Tak, Thailand. From http:// cles/2012/07/13/2012-17264/blocking-property-of-persons- commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Mae_La_refugee_camp2.jpg threatening-the-peace-security-or-stability-of-burma. licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 9 http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2013/12/17/ 2.0 Generic license. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ us-targets-burmese-companies-over-north-korean-links/. by/2.0/deed.en. Photo reproduced unaltered. 10 http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42939.pdf. 11 http://www.humanrights.gov/issues/leahy-vetting/. 12 http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/NewsArticleView/ tabid/7464/Article/9877/press-release-on-assistant-secretary- malinowskis-visit-to-burma.aspx#.U7YVGwRIMdI.twitter. 13 http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-backs-myanmar- reforms-no-threat-to-resume-sanctions-1407586417.

PRISM 5, no. 3 FEATURES | 89 AUTHOR

Presidency of the Nation of Argentina

Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and Medvedev in the Casa Rosada, Buenos Aires, Argentine, 2010

90 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 1