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Petitioner, V No. In the Supreme Court of the United States ALFONSO IGNAClO VIGGERS, Petitioner, V. MARIA DE LA MERCED VIGGERS, Respondent. On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to The Supreme Court of Michigan PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI Alfonso Ignacio Viggers Petitioner in pro per 949 Valencia St, San Francisco, CA 94110 (415) 648-8990 [email protected] May 24, 2018 1 QUESTIONS PRESENTED Whether a plaintiff has been deprived of the equal protection of the laws where, under defendant's belated pretext of mental illness, a court favors the defendant despite evidence of (1) defamation per se made with actual malice; and (2) defendant's tortious interference in the forms of harassment and defamation as intervening -and perhaps proximate- cause in the loss of plaintiff's business relationship and expectancy. Whether deprivation of due process occurs where (1) discovery on a central non-party's heavily redacted records is precluded notwithstanding the non-party's silent fraud, its inconsistencies under oath, and the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege; (2) the court ignores the central non-party's deliberate failure to produce a key witness despite an order by the court; (3) discovery on Respondent's husband is precluded under pretext of spousal privilege notwithstanding (i) that some of the discovery transcends the scope of spousal privilege, and (ii) the husband's subsequent acts to harm Petitioner forfeit the privilege; (4) the court precludes for no actual reason the discovery on the header information of Respondent's email activity, which she uses for much of her unlawful activity; and (5) the trial judge should have recused herself from the instant case due to (i) her vested interests in the central non-party, and (ii) her domestic involvement in a situation similar to Respondent's mental illness. 11 PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING Alfonso Ignacio Viggers San Mamés is plaintiff-appellant below, and petitioner in this Court. MarIa de la Merced Viggers Anaya is defendant-appellee below, and respondent in this Court. Respondent is Petitioner's stepmother, currently married to Petitioner's father. For simplicity, Petitioner's father is herein referred to as Respondent's husband. The parties have not interacted since Petitioner was five (5) years old. Rule 29.6 statement does not apply to the instant petition. TABLE OF CONTENTS QUESTIONS PRESENTED..............................i PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING....................ii TABLE OF CONTENTS..................................ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES..............................v PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI...........1 OPINIONS BELOW........................................1 JURISDICTION.............................................2 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED.. .3 STATEMENT OF THE CASE...........................3 A. Legal Background.................................3 Defamation per se and Defamation with Special Damages.......................3 Tortious Interference with Business Relationship....................................4 m Factual Background .5 Proceedings Below..................................9 Respondent Pleads the Affirmative Defense of Truth, and the University Incurs Discovery Fraud.....................9 The University Drastically Changes Its Tactic, but Nonetheless Keeps Obstructing Discovery.....................11 The Trial Court Thwarts Discovery and Rushes to Dismiss the Case..............12 Newly Discovered Evidence Emerges During the Appellate Backlog, but the Appellate Court Rejects It................13 The Trial Judge's Misconduct Unveils An Unconstitutional Risk of Bias ...... 15 Michigan Upper Courts Leave All Rulings Unchanged........................16 REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION... 18 I. PETITIONER HAS BEEN UNDENIABLY HARMED BY RESPONDENT'S MISCONDUCT, WHENCE LAW ENTITLES HIM TO AN AWARD OF DAMAGES..........18 Defamation Per se Double Prejudices Petitioner, Yet the Michigan Appellate Court Eludes Review by Misrepresenting His Pleadings.....................................18 Respondent Made Her False and Defamatory Statements with Actual Malice...............................................20 iv Respondent's False and Defamatory Publications Harmed Petitioner's Reputation.........................................22 Respondent's Harassment of the University Constitutes Tortious Interference with Business Relation of Expectancy........................................24 Ms. Ranno's Effort to Negate the Effect of Respondent's Misconduct is Inapposite and Inconsistent.......................................25 II. THE ASCERTAINMENT OF THE TRUTH REQUIRES DUE PROCESS AND THE REVERSAL OF VARIOUS WRONGS COMMITTED OR PERMITTED BY MICHIGAN COURTS...............................26 A. The University's Conduct Forfeits Its Alleged Attorner-Client Privilege...........28 The Example of Stafford Trading, Inc. .............................................. 29 Crime-Fraud Exception in Furtherance of Future Breach of Contract............30 Silent Fraud and Undue Hardship... .31 Discovery on Respondent's Husband......34 Discovery on Respondent's Email Activity.............................................36 Disqualification of the Trial Judge Is Warranted .......................................... 37 CONCLUSION.............................................39 APPENDIX..................................................la V Order (Mar. 5, 2018) by The Michigan Supreme Court denying Plaintiffs Application for Leave toAppeal................................................la Unpublised Opinion (Aug. 10, 2017) by the Michigan Court of Appeals .......................2a Order (Jul. 25, 2017) by the Michigan Court of Appeals denying Petitioner's Motion to Reassign The Case to Another Trial Judge upon Completion of the Appellate Review.................................................13a Order (Mar. 27, 2017) by the Washtenaw County Trial Court Denying Plaintiffs Motion for Relief from Judgment.............................14a Plaintiffs Motion (Mar. 2, 2017) for Relief from Judgment..............................................17a Order (Feb. 21, 2017) by the Michigan Court of Appeals denying Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration (re Motion to Expand the Record).................................................38a Order (Jan. 20, 2 017) by the Michigan Court of Appeals denying Plaintiffs Motion to Expand . the Record ............................................. 39a Order (Mar. 23, 2017) by the Washtenaw County Trial Court denying Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate Summary Disposition...................40a Order (Mar. 16, 2017) by the Washtenaw County Trial Court granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Disposition.............................43a Excerpt of the transcript (starting from page 15, line 16) of the court hearing on March 16, 2016....................................................44a MCL 600.2162 (excerpts).............................44a MCL 750.157a (excerpt) .46a MCL 750.209..............................................47a MCL 750.410a (excerpt)...............................48a MCL 750.540 (excerpt).................................49a MCL 768.21a..............................................51a MCR 2.612(C) (excerpts)...............................52a MCR 7.216(A) (excerpt)................................53a MRE 404(b)(1).............................................53a Dean & Longhofer, Michigan Court Rules Practice (4th ed), Author's Commentary, § 2612.20, pp 487-488.................................................54a REFERENCES TO THE RECORD OF THE CASE...................................................55a in TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Case law Associated Builders v. City ofLansing, 499 Mich. 177; 880 N.W.2d 765, 772 (2016).................................................18,19-20 Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Churchman, 440 Mich. 560; 489 N.W.2d 431 (1992)...............5 Bank ofAm. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 499 Mich. 74, 878 N.W.2d 816,. 831-833 (2016) ...................................................... 31-32 Brewer v. Office ofEmployee Appeals, 163 A.3d 799, 804 (2017).................................35 Brady v. Klentzman, 515 S.W.3d 878, 887 (2017).........................22-23 Burden v. Elias Bros. Big Boy Restaurants, 240 Mich.App. 723; 613 N.W.2d 378, 382 (2000).. .4 Cottrel v. Smith, 788 S.E.2d 772, 81-82 (2016)...........................20 Edwards v. State, 2017 Ark. 207; 521 S.W.3d 107 (2017).................5 Greer v. Abraham, 489 S.W.3d 440, 444 (Tex. 2016)......................21 Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).................................19 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).............................33,34 Lakin v. Rund, 873 N.W.2d 590 (2016)...........................3, 18-19 Lakin v. Rund(on remand), 318 Mich.App. 127; 896 N.W.2d 76, 83 (2016)... 19 Lawrence v. State Tax Comm., 286 U.S. 276, 283 (1932)................................2-3 Mains v. Whiting, 87 Mich. 172,180; 49 N.W. 559 (1891)......3, 19-20 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964)..................................4 Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 104 Mich.App. 59, 64-65; 304 N.W.2d 814 (1981)..........................................................20 ix People v. Carpenter, 464 Mich. 223, 236; 627 N.W.2d 276 (2001).........5 People v. Oelerich, 2017 IL App (2d) 141281; 78 N.E.3d (2017).........5 Pollard v. Lyon, 91 U.S. 225, 226.........................................3, 20 Rajspic v. Nationwide Mu t. Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 729; 718 P.2d 1167, 1170 (1986)..........5 Shifflet v. Shifflet, 891 S.W.2d 392, 394 (1995)..............................34
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