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Revving up the Deportation Machinery: Enforcement and Pushback Under Trump

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Revving up the Deportation Machinery: Enforcement and Pushback Under Trump REVVING UP THE DEPORTATION MACHINERY Enforcement and Pushback under Trump By Randy Capps, Muzaffar Chishti, Julia Gelatt, Jessica Bolter, and Ariel G. Ruiz Soto REVVING UP THE DEPORTATION MACHINERY Enforcement and Pushback under Trump By Randy Capps, Muzaffar Chishti, Julia Gelatt, Jessica Bolter, and Ariel G. Ruiz Soto May 2018 Acknowledgments The authors would like to thank U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for contributing to the research for this report. ICE leaders in Washington, DC, and staff at seven field offices gave generously of their time, experience, and expertise. They also responded to Migration Policy Institute (MPI) Freedom of Information Act data requests in a timely fashion, and ICE experts met with MPI researchers to help them better understand the data. Thanks also go to the more than 120 elected officials, law enforcement officials, immigrant service providers, immigration defense attorneys, former immigration judges, community leaders, community organizers, and advocates who met with MPI researchers across the study sites. They shared generously of their time in describing their work and responses to urgent new needs they face in carrying out their varied missions. The authors are grateful too for the cooperation and interviews they were able to have with the networks of Mexican, Honduran, and Salvadoran consulates that are assisting their nationals in communities around the United States. The authors appreciate the time that three external immigration policy experts devoted to reviewing and giving comments on the first draft of the report, as well as that of MPI colleagues Michael Fix, Doris Meissner, and Mark Greenberg, who provided advice throughout the research and writing and served as internal reviewers. All contributed immensely to the final shape of the report. The authors want to especially recognize Michelle Mittelstadt, MPI’s Director of Communications, whose ability to help hone and organize the presentation of massive amounts of material is unique and invaluable. They are deeply grateful to her for the skill and commitment she gave. Also at MPI, Sarah Pierce reviewed legal material in the report, and Faye Hipsman helped plan the study and conduct the Los Angeles and Houston site visits. Former MPI interns Jonathan Beeler and Jennifer Schulz analyzed the ICE data on arrests and detainers. Finally, for their generous support for this work and for MPI, the authors are deeply grateful to the Russell Sage Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Open Society Foundations, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Unbound Philanthropy, and the ILGWU Heritage Fund. © 2018 Migration Policy Institute. All Rights Reserved. Design and Layout: Sara Staedicke, MPI Cover Image: Josh Denmark/DHS No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Migration Policy Institute. A full-text PDF of this document is available for free download from www.migrationpolicy.org. Information for reproducing excerpts from this report can be found at www.migrationpolicy.org/about/copy.php. Inquiries can also be directed to: Permissions Department, Migration Policy Institute, 1400 16th Street, NW, Suite 300, Washington, DC 20036, or by contacting [email protected]. Suggested citation: Capps, Randy, Muzaffar Chishti, Julia Gelatt, Jessica Bolter, and Ariel G. Ruiz Soto. 2018. Revving Up the Deportation Machinery: Enforcement and Pushback under Trump. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. Table of Contents Executive Summary ....................................................................................1 A. Findings: The First Year of Interior Enforcement under Trump ............................................1 B. Responses by States, Localities, Consulates, and Immigrant Communities .......................4 C. A Heightened Climate of Fear ...................................................................................................5 I. Introduction ..........................................................................................6 A. Purpose of the Report ..................................................................................................................8 B. Research Methods .........................................................................................................................9 II. Continuity and Change in Federal Immigration Enforcement: From Clinton to Trump ..................................................................... 11 A. The Legislative Framework in the Clinton Administration .................................................11 B. September 11 and Immigration Enforcement in the Bush Administration .....................12 C. Expanded Interior Enforcement During the Early Obama Years.......................................14 D. Narrowing of Enforcement During the Latter Obama Years .............................................16 E. A New Era of Immigration Enforcement under Trump .....................................................19 III. By the Numbers: ICE Arrest, Detainer, and Removal Activity ....... 24 A. An Increase in ICE Arrests .........................................................................................................24 B. Varying Cooperation Affects Arrest Trends by ICE Field Office .......................................26 C. ICE Arrests by Gender and Origin Country .........................................................................29 D. Trends in Use of Detainers at the County Level ..................................................................29 E. Trends in Removals from the Interior United States ...........................................................37 IV. Changing ICE Arrest Patterns: New Targets, New Locations ........ 38 A. At-Large Arrests: A Growing Share of Overall Arrests .......................................................39 B. Intensifying Arrests in Jurisdictions that Limit ICE Cooperation ......................................39 C. Arrests in Courthouses and Near Sensitive Locations .......................................................40 D. Arrests of Immigrants with Criminal Convictions ...............................................................42 E. Collateral Arrests of Immigrants without Criminal Convictions ......................................43 F. Arrests by the Local Police for Traffic Violations ..................................................................44 G. Expanding the Ability to Target Based on Contact Information .......................................44 H. Arrests of Individuals Checking in with ICE for Regular Appointments .........................45 I. Enforcement Against Those with Special Status: DACA Recipients, Refugees, Asylum Seekers, and Unaccompanied Children ....................................................................47 V. Reduction in Use of Prosecutorial Discretion After Arrest ........... 51 A. Increased Detention of People in Removal Proceedings ....................................................53 B. Pursuing Cases All the Way to Deportation ..........................................................................53 C. Deporting People with Old Removal Orders .......................................................................54 D. Limiting Options to Review ICE Enforcement Decisions ...................................................55 VI. Responses by States, Localities, Consulates, and Immigrant Communities ...................................................................................... 56 A. Responses of States and Localities to ICE’s Changed Enforcement Activities ...............57 B. Consulates Across United States Expand Outreach, Services, and Protection ..............61 C. Increased Representation for Detained Immigrants ...........................................................64 D. Visiting Programs for ICE Detainees .......................................................................................64 E. Community Rapid Response Teams .........................................................................................65 F. Efforts to Stop New ICE Detention Facilities .......................................................................66 VII. Impact of the New Enforcement Climate on Immigrant Communities ...................................................................................... 66 A. Limited Mobility Outside the Home .......................................................................................67 B. Declines in Crime and Domestic Violence Reporting .........................................................68 C. Declines in Health and Human Services Program Participation .......................................69 D. School Enrollment, Attendance, and Participation in Educational Activities ...................70 VIII. Conclusions ........................................................................................ 71 Appendices ................................................................................................ 74 Appendix A. Detailed Description of ICE Enforcement Activities ............................................74 Appendix B. Variations in Enforcement Cooperation with ICE among the Study Sites .......77 Appendix C. ICE At-Large Operations Using Fugitive Operations Teams ...............................86 Works Cited .............................................................................................
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