Heterogeneity and Collective Action: Case Studies from the United States

Home , Accountability, Collective action, Conflict of interest, Transparency (behavior)

and India

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy

in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

Pranietha Mudliar

Graduate Program in Environment & Natural Resources

The Ohio State University

2016

Dissertation Committee:

Dr. Tomas Koontz, Advisor

Dr. Jeremy Brooks, Advisor

Dr. Cathy Rakowski

Dr. Eric Toman

Copyrighted by

Pranietha Mudliar

2016

Abstract

Past scholarship on community-based natural resource management and common- pool resource governance has provided insights into the conditions that facilitate self- organization to improve natural resource management outcomes. While some enabling conditions are clearly important across contexts, there remains considerable uncertainty about how socio-cultural heterogeneity affects collective action in rural communities.

Many scholars suggest that socio-cultural heterogeneity can prohibit collective action.

However, some studies find that socio-cultural heterogeneous groups can craft institutions that allow them to address the challenges that such heterogeneity can pose. In my dissertation, I explore the relationships among socio-cultural heterogeneity, institutions, and collective action in the context of watershed management in the United

States and in India. I employ a case study approach and in-depth interviews to examine the institutional arrangements and mechanisms that allow socio-culturally groups to act collectively to manage their watershed. My results suggest that socio-culturally heterogeneous communities can develop institutions that allow them to overcome any additional costs to collective action that may result from that heterogeneity. The analysis suggests that equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities are key features of institutions that allow heterogeneous groups to develop good governance practices. I also explore the dynamic interactions between the contextual factors (group attributes,

ii community attributes, and resource attributes) and institutional arrangements and how this relationship has shaped collective action in these communities. For instance, a group attribute of small size facilitated an institution of deliberative decision-making where every member contributes to decision-making. Institutions have also changed existing community attributes that prevented members from acting collectively. This study contributes to the debate about whether and in which contexts socio-cultural heterogeneity negatively affects collective action. These results further support other empirical and theoretical work that demonstrates that socio-cultural heterogeneity does not prohibit collective action in all contexts.

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Dedication

At the end of some seventy-two thousand words,

I dedicate this dissertation to my mother who taught me to write my first word.

Acknowledgments

The past five years have been an incredible journey and I would like to acknowledge the people who shaped my time at the School of Natural and Environment

Resources. My advisor—Dr. Tomas Koontz for his warm friendship, kindness, and the countless hours of academic meetings and Skype sessions as I struggled to make sense of the messy world of boxes and arrows, I owe it all. I am indebted to my co-advisor, Dr.

Jeremy Brooks, for giving me thoughtful feedback on my ideas and nudging me to think harder, even until the last minute. I am immensely grateful to Dr. Cathy Rakowski for her guidance, encouragement, and empathy. And finally, I am thankful to Dr. Eric Toman for his patient understanding and advice during my times of confusion.

I have been extremely fortunate in having an extraordinarily supportive network of friends, both in Columbus and in India. The security that their friendship has provided has been invaluable during my time in graduate school. My deepest thanks to Olga

Kondratjeva, Samyam Rajbhandari, Bishal Karna, Ania Stakun, Bala Subramani, Emily

Hutchins, Alex Heeren, Joe Campbell, Kelly Clayborn, Pranay Ranjan, Meenal Tatpati,

Shruti Mokashi, Shubhashree Patra, Zareen Khan, Nikhil Nair, Sidharth Mohan, Priyanka

Shetty, Navni Verma, Travis Jones, Ravi Jambhekar, Shraddha Mahadik, Rashmi

Mahajan, Gargi Chandane, Travonya Kenly, Sagar Sharma, and Dima Kondratjeva.

Finally, the biggest thanks to my mother and sister, without whom, I would never have dreamed of attending graduate school in the United States. Thank you. v

Vita

2009……………………………………………..……...…B.S. Biotechnology, University of Pune

2011…………………………………...... M.S. Environmental Science, University of Pune

2016 …………...... School of Environment and Natural Resources, The Ohio State

University

Publications

Koontz, T. M., Gupta, D., Mudliar, P., & Ranjan, P. (2015). Adaptive institutions in social-ecological systems governance: A synthesis framework. Environmental Science &

Policy, 53, Part B, 139–151

Koontz, T., Gabagambi, R., Marquis, C, Mudliar, P., and Zwickle, S. 2013. Human

Dimensions of Soil Degradation. Advances in Soil Science: Principles of Sustainable Soil

Management in Agroecosystems, Eds. Rattan Lal and B.A.Stewart. Taylor & Francis

Group.

Koontz, Tomas M, and Pranietha Mudliar, 2012. “Collaborative Watershed Planning

Experiences in Ohio: Survey Results from Members.” Columbus, Ohio: Environmental and Social Sustainability Lab, School of Environment and Natural Resources

Fields of Study

Major Field: Environment and Natural Resources

vii

Table of Contents

Abstract ...... ii

Vita ...... vi

Publications ...... vi

List of Tables ...... xi

List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………....xii

Chapter 1: Heterogeneity and Collective Action: A Literature Review ...... 1

Section 1: Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas…………………………………………2

Section 2: Heterogeneity and Collective Action for Natural Resource Governance...…4

Section 3: Theoretical Approach………………………………………………………12

Section 4: Methods…………………………………………………………………….13

Chapter 2: Collective Action in a Racially Heterogeneous Watershed Organization in

Montgomery, West Virginia ...... 24

Introduction……………………………………………………………………………24

Section 1: Prior Research……………………………………………………………...26

Methods……………………………………………………………………………….53

Section 3: Results……………………………………………………………………..58

Section 4: Discussion…………………………………………………………………94

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Section 5: Conclusion………………………………………………………………...111

Chapter 3: Institutions for Community-based Natural Resource Management in

Heterogeneous Community: A Case Study from Karnataka, India …………………….114

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………..114

Section 1: Prior Research: Watershed Development in India………………………..116

Section 3: Results…………………………………………………………………….130

Section 4: Discussion………………………………………………………………...166

Section 6: Conclusion………………………………………………………………...184

Chapter 4: A Dynamic Interaction of Context and Institutions in Shaping Collective

Action Outcome: Evidence from West Virginia and India ...... 187

Introduction…………………………………………………………………………..187

Section 1: Prior Research…………………………………………………………….189

Section 2: Methods…………………………………………………………………...194

Section 3: West Virginia, U.S. and Karnataka, India………………………………...195

Section 4: Discussion………………………………………………………………...224

Section 5: Conclusion………………………………………………………………..230

Chapter 5: Conclusion ...... 233

Section 1: Findings…………………………………………………………………..234

Section 2: Policy Implications……………………………………………………….242

Section 3: Future Research…………………………………………………………..249

Section 4: Concluding Thoughts……………………………………………………..254

References ...... 255

Appendix A: Notes……………………………………………………………………..283 ix

Appendix B: Interview Protocol ...... 287

Appendix C: Data Coding ...... 299

List of Tables

Table 1: Population by Race in Montgomery, West Virginia ...... 51

Table 2: Factors that Facilitate Collective Action in the OCWA ...... 60

Table 3: Theoretical Propositions versus Key Findings in the OCWA ...... 99

Table 4: Factors that Facilitate Collective Action in the ABPWA ...... 132

Table 5: Theoretical Propositions versus Key Findings in the ABPWA ...... 171

Table 6: Features of OCWA and the ABPWA ...... 205

Table 7: Comparing Factors that Facilitate Collective Action in the OCWA and the

ABPWA ...... 209

Table 8: Contextual Factors and Institutional Arrangements in the OCWA and the

ABPWA ...... 218

Table 9: A Sample of Categories and Sub-Categories that Facilitate Collective Action in the OCWA ...... 299

Table 10: Procedural Equity in the OCWA ...... 300

Table 11: Categories and Sub-Categories Facilitating Collective Action in the ABPWA

...... 301

Table 12: Benefits in the ABPWA ...... 302

List of Figures

Figure 1: Relationship between Context, Local Institutional Arrangements, and

Collective Action Adapted from Andersson & Agrawal (2011)...... 10

Figure 2: Factors that Facilitate Collective Action in a Heterogeneous Community: A

Theoretical Framework (Modified from Andersson & Agrawal, 2011)...... 39

Figure 3: Factors that Facilitate Collective Action in the OCWA ...... 107

Figure 4: Factors facilitating Collective Action in Socio-culturally Heterogeneous

Communities: A Theoretical Framework (Modified from Andersson & Agrawal, 2011).

...... 122

Figure 5: Factors that Facilitate Collective Action in the ABPWA ...... 172

Figure 6: Relationship between Context, Local Institutional Arrangements, and

Collective Action. Adapted from Agrawal (2003) and Andersson & Agrawal (2011). . 192

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Chapter 1: Heterogeneity and Collective Action: A Literature Review

Introduction

Scholars of common-pool resource (CPR) governance have made considerable progress in identifying factors that affect the prospects for sustainable resource governance. One theme within these studies that has received notable attention is the impact of inequality or heterogeneity on collective action. The effect of heterogeneity on collective action continues to be one of the most contentious and puzzling debates in CPR literature (Ostrom, 1997; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004). Scholars vary widely on whether heterogeneity facilitates collective action, hinders collective action, or has no influence on collective action. One thing is clear: heterogeneity does not have a uniform effect on collective action, and the effect of heterogeneity on collective action varies according to the context and the type of heterogeneity under consideration. Despite recent advances regarding resource user attributes conducive for collective action, no consensus exists about the relationship between heterogeneity and collective action outcomes, and the conditions that are conducive for collective action in heterogeneous groups.

To explain this puzzle, I examine socio-culturally heterogeneous communities in the United States (U.S.) and in India that are deemed successful at collective action for watershed management. Through in-depth case studies, I then examine the factors that

drive the success of these socio-culturally heterogeneous communities for resource governance. Not only does this provide insights into how communities self-organize, but also what kinds of institutional arrangements facilitate collective action in heterogeneous communities and how particular institutions emerge in these communities.

This chapter proceeds in four sections. First, I review common-pool resource

(CPR) dilemmas and contextual conditions that can resolve these dilemmas in Section 1.

Second, I demonstrate that the complexity of CPR dilemmas increases with socio-cultural heterogeneity. I then highlight the moderating role of local governance between socio- cultural heterogeneity and collective action. Third, I explain the theoretical outline and the research objective of the dissertation, including a roadmap for the chapters that follow. Finally, I describe the methods that are guiding my research questions.

Section 1: Common-Pool Resource Dilemmas

Subtractability of resources and excludability of resource users are the two main characteristics of CPRs. Subtractability of the resource means that consumption of the resource by one user reduces its availability for other users (Ostrom, 1990). Difficulty in exclusion means that high costs of denying access to potential resource users create challenges in excluding them. These two characteristics contribute to a CPR dilemma and can result in over-exploitation of the resource, whereby users withdraw resource units from the resource system without accounting for the availability of the resource units for other potential beneficiaries (Hardin, 1969). The amount of resource units available for consumption also decreases when a user pollutes a resource. Thus, a CPR dilemma results in a collective action problem because rational actors are more likely to continue

exploiting or polluting a resource and less likely to contribute to the maintenance of a resource if non-contributors also get the same benefits as contributors. Similarly, if incentives to appropriate from a resource are higher, individual resource users will expect to maximize their own resource use at the expense of the availability of the resource for other users leading to a collapse of the resource system (Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker,

1994).

Despite the grim predictions of the “tragedy of the commons”, enduring examples of CPR management systems suggest that CPR dilemmas can be successfully resolved.

Scholars have gathered empirical evidence through in-depth case studies from different kinds of resource regimes ranging from communal pastures (Netting, 1972) and irrigation systems (Maas & Anderson, 1986) to forest systems (McKean, 1992) and coastal fisheries (Berkes, 1986) to elucidate conditions where users are more likely to self- organize to sustainably manage access and use of CPR. Scholars largely agree on the set of variables that enhance the likelihood of self-organization (Baland & Platteau, 1996;

Ostrom, 1992). These variables can be grouped into two types: attributes of the resource and attributes of resource users. Attributes of the resource that improve chances of self- organization include resources that are short supply but can improve, reliable and valid indicators of the resource condition, predictability in resource units and resource health, and small resource boundaries (Ostrom, 2002). Attributes of the resource users include salience of the resource, a common understanding of how the resource system operates and how actions are inter-linked, low discount rate, trust and reciprocity, autonomy over crafting institutions, shared interest in the resource, and prior organizational and

leadership experience (Ostrom, 2002). Overall, the attributes of a resource and the attributes of the resource users that affect the costs and benefits of crafting institutions determine the ability of users to self-organize.

However, resource users rarely face conditions where the costs and benefits of self-organization are apparent. Furthermore, a theoretical consensus on variables that are conducive for self-organization does not mean that resource users will self-organize.

Resource users can continue overusing a resource unless efforts are made to change one or more variables that affect the perceived costs and benefits of institutional change.

Moreover, even when these variables are lacking, users can still self-organize if they have a common understanding about the benefits of self-organizing (Ostrom, 2002). External intervention can also play a role in enhancing or reducing self-organization by changing one or more variables that affect the perceived costs and benefits of self-organization.

Section 2: Heterogeneity and Collective Action for Natural Resource

Governance

Despite theoretical agreement about the variables conducive for self-organization, there remains considerable uncertainty about the effect of heterogeneity among resource users on their ability to self-organize. Heterogeneity can result from differences in economic as well as non-economic factors. Economic heterogeneity is inequality in wealth, income, assets, endowments, entitlements, and benefits derived from contributing effort towards resource production (Regmi, 2007). Economic characteristics also include how different skills and endowments affect resource extraction and the rate at which users discount the future (Regmi, 2007). Non-economic heterogeneities include socio-

cultural differences (the focus of this dissertation), ethnicities, location, political connections, social networks, values, norms, beliefs, and opinions (Baland & Platteau,

1996).

Groups with actors belonging to the same ethnicity are assumed to share values and norms, which is considered to increase the likelihood of successful collective action, while differences in ethnicities are considered to negatively affect the likelihood of collective action. Members of dominant castes may be well connected politically, and may use their connections to secure benefits for themselves and marginalize other castes, thereby undermining collective action. Economic and non-economic heterogeneities may also interact with each other. For example, a user group can be economically heterogeneous but culturally homogeneous, or both economically and culturally heterogeneous, which can have varied effects on collective action.

There has been considerable debate about the influence of economic and non- economic heterogeneity on collective action. This disagreement stems from a lack of uniform conceptualization of heterogeneity, the existence of non-linear relationships, and the mediating role of other variables such as biophysical resources, group size, and interest in the resource, to name a few (Poteete & Ostrom, 2004). Similarly, there is little understanding of what kinds of contextual features may influence such an outcome. Also, individuals may be homogeneous in one aspect, yet heterogeneous in another, creating multiple combinations of heterogeneities (Kurian & Dietz, 2004). Thus a researcher needs to examine a wide range of contextual factors and how the dimensions of different kinds of heterogeneity interact with each other.

Most studies argue that socio-cultural heterogeneity creates challenges for natural resource management because differences in social class, caste, and ethnicity create differences in preferences and interests; difficulties in building agreements and enforcing norms; distrust; social resentment; domination; discrimination; and notions of purity and superiority (Andersson & Agrawal, 2011; Baland and Platteau, 1997; Barros, 2007; Blair,

1996; Chakraborty, 2001; Kant 2000; Naidu, 2009; Neupane, 2003; Poteete & Ostrom,

2004; Shiferaw, Kedebe, & Ratna Reddy, 2009; Shiferaw, Tewodros, & Reddy, 2009;

Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). Heterogeneity along religious, social and ethnic classes is considered to have a negative effect on cooperation for natural resource management because of decreased social cohesion (Chakraborty, 2001; Shiferaw, Kedebe, & Ratna

Reddy, 2009). The relationship is complicated by empirical findings of a U-shaped relationship between social heterogeneity and cooperation (Naidu, 2009).

Even moderate levels of social heterogeneity with just two castes may result in political hegemony, social discrimination, and exclusion from decision-making and participation (Collier, 2001; Madan, 2002; Naidu, 2009; Srinivas, 1955). For instance, in

India, access to local CPRs and decision-making forums are restricted to privileged caste groups. Excluding and depriving lower caste groups such as Scheduled Castes or Dalits from decision-making forums may hinder the development of cooperative arrangements to manage the CPR (Beteille, 1983). In many villages, elites from the privileged caste provide an authority structure and impose rules that are in their favor, thereby disenfranchising lower caste groups who have no choice but to comply out of fear of retribution without being able to influence the decision-making process (Abraham &

Platteau, 2000). Not including lower castes in decision-making prevents them from contributing their knowledge to the CBNRM decision-making forum (Agarwal, 2001).

Socio-culturally heterogeneous groups may also be unwilling to abide by a single set of rules because different groups may interact with the resources differently and have different interpretations of rules, trust, reciprocity, and authority (Varughese & Ostrom,

2001). High levels of conflict within a user group with socio-cultural heterogeneity are considered to make institution building, rulemaking, and agreements difficult because of the inability to resolve conflicts ( Blair, 1996; Gaspart & Seki, 2003; Regmi, 2007). For example, Dayton-Johnson (2000) found that social heterogeneity led to lower levels of collective action for infrastructure maintenance of irrigation structures in Mexico because members of the group could not agree on common rules to maintain the irrigation structures. Thus, these studies find that there are difficulties in building, enforcing, and maintaining institutions because of socio-cultural heterogeneity.

Some scholars suggest that in the presence of socio-cultural differences, if members of user groups have similar interests, collective action is likely to emerge

(Kurian & Dietz, 2004; Regmi, 2007; Naidu, 2009; Salifu, Francesconi, & Kolavalli,

2010; Vedeld, 2000; Wade, 1994; Wangel & Blomkvist, 2013; White & Runge, 1994). In a study on south Indian farming communities, Wade (1994) found that members of user groups overcame socio-cultural differences to undertake cooperative activities by crafting institutions to accommodate the interests of members. In Haiti, White & Runge (1994) found that equity in the distribution of benefits created a uniformity of interests that overrode any differences within the groups. Kurian & Dietz (2004) also found similar

results in irrigation management in India, where caste and endowment heterogeneity did not prevent farmers from crafting and enforcing rules to meet common economic interests. Thus, if resource interests converge and resource users share a common understanding, cultural differences might not deter self-organization. Cooperation is more likely at high levels of social homogeneity and heterogeneity, while intermediate levels of heterogeneity are not conducive to collective action.

These findings indicate that socio-cultural heterogeneity is not necessarily an obstacle to collective action and that local governance can facilitate collective action.

Nevertheless, the mechanisms (i.e. the processes by which socio-cultural heterogeneity leads to a certain outcome) by which differences and similarities among users affect collective action are not fully understood. Similarly, the conditions under which socio- cultural heterogeneity may undermine or enhance collective action remain unexplored.

Studies show that socio-culturally heterogeneous groups, under some conditions, devise institutions that distribute costs and benefits fairly (Varughese & Ostrom, 2001).

However, research that carefully explores the relationship among social heterogeneity, institutional arrangements, and resource governance remains limited, despite important contributions (Adhikari & Lovett, 2006; Andersson & Agrawal, 2011; Varughese &

Ostrom, 2001).

Thus, it is necessary to examine different contexts where heterogeneity may be beneficial or detrimental for natural resource management, different kinds of heterogeneity and institutions for resource governance to build theory about the relationship between socio-cultural heterogeneity and collective action (Poteete &

Ostrom, 2004). The next section examines the role of local governance in influencing the relationship between socio-cultural heterogeneity and collective action.

Local Institutional Arrangements

Although the impact of heterogeneity on collective action is highly contested, scholars suggest that institutions can moderate the influence of heterogeneity on resource governance (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Andersson & Agrawal, 2011; Fearon & Laitin,

1996; Gibson & Koontz, 1998; Kurien & Dietz, 2004; Nagendra, 2011; Poteete &

Ostrom, 2000; Regmi, 2007; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001; Vedeld, 2000). In other words, the influence of social inequalities on collective action depends on the nature and the effectiveness of local governance institutions because such institutions may “dampen, enhance, or refract the effects of factors related to equality” for resource governance

(Andersson & Agrawal, 2011). Institutional arrangements are also useful for shaping the preferences of the actors within a community for resource governance (Gibson & Koontz,

1998). Thus, institutions may not only alter resource governance outcomes, but may also modify the social context or be modified by it (see Figure 1).

Ostrom defines institutions as enduring regularities of human action in situations structured by rules, norms, and shared strategies, as well as by attributes of the physical world. Institutions are regular patterns of behavior sustained by mutual expectations about the actions that other actors will take (Crawford & Ostrom, 1995). Moreover, institutions are highly abstract and fundamentally invisible to the analyst (Polski &

Ostrom, 1999). Each of these institutions serves a social coordination role in repetitive or frequently occurring situations (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995). Institutions may be in the

form of a written law, policy, or procedure, or they may emerge informally in the form of norms, standard operating practices, or habits (Polski & Ostrom, 1999).

Figure 1: Relationship between Context, Local Institutional Arrangements, and Collective

Action Adapted from Andersson & Agrawal (2011).

There are very few studies that examine the emergence of local institutions in heterogeneous communities for collective action. In a limited number of studies, scholars have found that where there is high heterogeneity, users design institutions that specifically take into account the heterogeneity that they face (Adhikari & Lovett, 2006;

Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). Andersson & Agrawal (2011) examine the relationship between inequality and forest conditions in 228 cases in South

Asia, East Africa, and Latin America, and find that effective local level forest institutions can reduce the negative effect of inter-group inequality on forest outcomes. They found that in forest groups in Nepal, institutions that alleviated inter-group inequality had more

positive forest outcomes than groups that did not address inequality. Conversely in

Bolivia, a failure to address inequality in a forest community led to the erosion of other institutions for forest management. On a similar note, Regmi (2007) found that weak collective activity or rule enforcement resulted in degraded forest conditions in Nepal, irrespective of whether the group was homogeneous or not. These examples suggest that strong institutions that address inequality can facilitate collective action to improve outcomes of natural resource management. Thus, these studies suggest the importance of institutions to reduce the negative effects of heterogeneity on forest conditions.

Scholars have found that rules of equity and accountability are effective for alleviating socio-cultural inequality (Adhikari & Lovett, 2006; Poteete & Ostrom 2004;

Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). These rules include provisions for distributing leadership positions in communities for forest management, designation of committee members, frequent meetings, unanimous decision-making, and equitable distribution of forest products to the community. Other studies have pointed to the presence of an external mediator to overcome potential caste problems. For instance, Kurian & Dietz (2004) found that an irrigation group with caste heterogeneity decided to appoint an external contractor to overcome problems of caste heterogeneity.

Other scholars show that a sense of community despite heterogeneity among community members can become a part of the symbolic capital1 of the community, enabling better distribution of benefits (Cochran & Ray, 2009). This “sense of

1 For a note on symbolic capital and its distinction from social capital, see Appendix A, page 181.

community” is different from social capital that consists of networks, norms of mutual trust and reciprocity. Symbolic capital is something that members of a group hold in common that distinguishes them from other groups (Cohen 1985: 12). Symbolic capital can include “feelings of community”, pride, honor, reputation, unity, and solidarity.

Poteete & Ostrom (2004) suggest that capacities of different members can override socio- cultural boundaries to facilitate collective action. Thus, local governance institutions that create equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and draw upon the capacities of members may facilitate collective action in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups. To further develop this hypothesis, I turn to an analysis of two socio-culturally heterogeneous communities involved in watershed management located in the United States and in India

(see Chapters 2 and 3) and a comparison of the two cases in Chapter 4.

Section 3: Theoretical Approach

Findings from prior studies reveal diverse thinking about the relationship between heterogeneity and collective action. Overall, this scholarship suggests that the relationship between heterogeneity and collective action is non-linear and context specific. Some studies have found that local governance and institutional arrangements can play an important role in shaping the interactions of the actors for initiating collective action for successful resource management.

The research presented in this dissertation has three broad goals. The first goal is to examine the factors that facilitate collective action in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups for watershed management in the U.S. and in India. The second goal is to identify the similarities and differences in the institutional arrangements for water management in

the heterogeneous communities in the United States (U.S.) and in India. The third goal is to understand the interaction between contextual factors and institutional arrangements.

To address these goals, in chapters 2-3, I investigate the following research questions:

• What are the factors that facilitate collective action in socio-culturally

heterogeneous groups in the U.S. and in India?

• What are the mechanisms through which these factors operate to facilitate

collective action?

In chapter 4, I examine the following research question:

• How do the institutional arrangements of socio-culturally heterogeneous

communities differ across the U.S. and India?

• How do contextual factors and institutional arrangements interact with

each other?

The reader will note some redundancy between Chapters 2, 3, and 4 as they refer to the same literature, but are intended to be stand alone journal articles.

Section 4: Methods

A Case Study Approach

Since my research questions pose a “how” question, I use an in-depth case study method. Case studies are the preferred strategy for answering “how” research questions with a focus on a contemporary event in a real life context (McGrath, 1981; Yin, 2003).

Case studies are used to bridge the knowledge gap between theory and practice of processes in a particular context to understand the causal mechanisms that drive those processes (George & Bennett, 2005). Case study researchers can choose a case that has a

particular outcome for an in-depth examination of designated variables to make inferences to theory (George & Bennett, 2005; Yin, 2003). This allows the researcher to gain a deeper insight into how socio-cultural heterogeneity affects collective action in two different contexts as well as explore conditions that may be necessary for self- organization to emerge in contexts with different kinds of socio-culturally heterogeneity.

A case study is a useful starting point for studying collective action, especially when all the manifestations of collective action and the key institutions are not understood

(Meinzen-Dick, Gregorio, & McCarthy, 2004). Although a case study approach follows a structured plan, case studies offer flexibility to incorporate relevant information that emerges from data collection. As such, an advantage of the case study approach is a continuous interaction between theoretical issues being studied and the data being collected (Yin, 2003).

Sampling and Case Selection

The cases for the study were selected through purposive sampling based on key variables of interest, i.e. socio-culturally heterogeneous communities (independent variable) that are deemed to be successful at collective action (dependent variable) indicated by having a functional watershed management group for at least 10 years. The case in the United States was selected by conducting an Internet research of watershed organizations in West Virginia and contacting the organizations to determine number of

Whites and African-Americans in the group. The OCWA was then selected based on the

African-American population in Montgomery, which is highest for any city in West

Virginia and the number of African-American members in the OCWA. The ABPWA was

selected by contacting a non-profit agency, the Mysore Rehabilitation and Development

Agency (MYRADA). Usually, watershed management organizations in India last for only five years, which is the time period for which the organization receive funding.

After funding is stopped, the organizations also stop functioning. The researcher spent approximately two months locating a functional watershed organization with sufficient levels of caste heterogeneity.

The case studies for this research have deliberatively been chosen based on the dependent variable of success to help identify variables that are necessary or sufficient conditions for the selected outcome (George & Bennett, 2005). In qualitative research, selecting a case based on the dependent variable can guide the identification of potential causal paths and variables leading to the dependent variable of interest (George &

Bennett, 2005).

In the U.S., the case is located in the Appalachian region in Montgomery, West

Virginia. The Orange Creek Watershed Association2 (OCWA) has been operating in

Montgomery since 2001. The second case is situated in India in the state of Karnataka.

The Arepalyam Bailur Watershed Association (APBWA) has been functioning since

2002, after splitting from the GM Doddi Watershed Association that was formed 1994.

By conducting case studies in the U.S. and in India, this research will illustrate the role of institutions for facilitating collective action in diverse, real world cases (Andersson &

Agrawal, 2011). Since this research also includes comparative analysis based on data

2 Name changed to maintain confidentiality. 15

from two countries, it can yield generalizations to theory about the relationship between socio-cultural heterogeneity and resource governance (George & Bennett, 2005).

Methodological Concerns

A methodological concern is about the representativeness of the case studies, based on local-level findings, with other watershed management groups in the U.S. and

India (Andersson & Agrawal, 2011; Flyvbjerg, 2006; George & Bennett, 2005; McGrath,

1981). However, this study does not claim to make the findings applicable to all watershed management groups in the U.S. and in India, but instead seeks to offer a rich explanation of the dynamics of socio-cultural heterogeneity, institutional mechanisms, and collective action to make inferences to theoretical propositions about how certain factors facilitate collective action (George & Bennett, 2005). Moreover, all studies of the commons are prone to concerns of generalizability because of a lack of a comprehensive list of watershed commons in any country (Andersson & Agrawal, 2011).

Furthermore, this research is designed as a single case study in the United States and in India in which there is no variance on the dependent variable of collective action.

Prior research suggests that collective action in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups is rare and unlikely. The OCWA is considered a unique case because it is racially heterogeneous with a functional watershed organization since 2001, which is one indication of the group’s success at collective action. The ABPWA is considered as a unique case because most watershed organizations in India are active only for five years, until the funding runs out, after which they stop functioning. Therefore, locating a watershed organization that has been functional for more than five years with caste

heterogeneity is rare in India. Thus, the uniqueness of these cases justifies the selection of a single case study design to provide an in-depth explanation of the conditions that lead to the emergence of collective action in these groups. Another rationale to undertake a single case study is test theory. I will be studying the same phenomena in two different case studies in the United States and in India to make analytical generalizations to theory instead of generalizations to a population.

An additional methodological concern arises because of the challenges associated with undertaking a comparative institutional analysis between countries that are categorized as First World and Third World because of the differences of economic and cultural realities (Rangan & Lane, 2001). However, the Appalachian region shares many aspects with developing economies where poor communities are located within sites of resource exploitation and uneven development (Nesbitt & Weiner, 2005). Existing research on heterogeneity and collective action has focused on single case studies, or statistical analyses of data from specific countries, leading to less success in generating conclusions from empirical evidence from multiple countries (Andersson & Agrawal,

2011). This research is intended to address this drawback by focusing attention on the similarities and differences in the institutional arrangements pertaining to socio-cultural heterogeneity and collective action for watershed management. However, due to different attributes of the resource users and different ecological characteristics, institutions that are relevant for one context may not be relevant to another context, but the mechanisms through which they address socio-cultural heterogeneity may be similar.

Operationalization of Variables

The independent variable of the study is socio-cultural heterogeneity, specifically race in the U.S. and caste in India.3 Scholars have previously measured heterogeneity by constructing indices of socio-cultural heterogeneity for measuring caste and race heterogeneity (Adhikari & Lovett 2006; Regmi, 2007; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001).

According to Adhikari & Lovett (2006), if any one ethnic group comprises more than

60% of the user group population, it is considered to be a homogenous group. The cut off is based on the following index of fractionalization:

A = 1 - ∑ (Pi)2, where Pi is the proportion of the total group population in the ith ethnic group, and i = 1 to n.

“A” is the probability that any two randomly selected individuals from a user group do not belong to the same ethnic group. If A=1, then the chances that the two individuals belonging to the same group is nil and if A=0 the chances are one hundred percent. So, a

60% cut off ensures that a group is marked homogenous only when the index of fractionalization is well below 0.5. However, this measurement of socio-cultural heterogeneity does not justify why the cut off of 60% is appropriate.

Varughese & Ostrom (2001) measure socio-cultural heterogeneity similarly, but they only calculate the index of heterogeneity if a minimum of three caste types are present in a group. They further categorize socio-cultural heterogeneity as high, moderate, and low where a proportion of 60% or more indicates high heterogeneity; a proportion of 40% to 50% indicates moderate levels of socio-cultural heterogeneity, and

3 For a note on similarities and differences between race and caste, see Appendix A, page 182. 18

less than 40% indicates low heterogeneity. This measure essentially divides communities on a unidimensional homogeneity–heterogeneity continuum i.e. on a single scale of homogeneous to mixed (Laurence, 2011). This measure is also unsatisfying because it does not provide a rationale for considering three caste types as heterogeneous.

Furthermore, research shows that difficulties in collective action can arise with even two caste types, if one caste is more dominant than the other (Naidu, 2009).

Thus, an index of heterogeneity will not be able to indicate heterogeneity if there are just two different socio-cultural groups in a community, or if a traditionally marginalized socio-cultural group has a higher proportion of members in the group than a socially powerful group. Other scholars have also raised questions regarding the importance of proportion as a measure of heterogeneity (Gibson & Koontz, 1998). For instance, what is considered heterogeneous? Is an equal proportion of ethnic groups such as 50% and 50% considered heterogeneous; or is a group with one majority ethnic group and a minority ethnic group such as 70% and 30% considered heterogeneous; or is a presence of a larger concentration of smaller ethnic groups required for a community to be identified as heterogeneous such as 40%-20%-15%-10%-10%-5%? Thus, information regarding the size of a group, the number of different groups, and the type of the group is needed capture the multidimensional nature of heterogeneity.

In measuring heterogeneity, there needs to be a recognition that different structures of heterogeneity can lead to different collective action outcomes (Laurence,

2011). Therefore, I identify cases that are both socio-culturally heterogeneous with less than 20 members. I then conduct an in-depth exploration of how the proportion of the two

socio-cultural groups and the type of the socio-cultural group affects collective action for resource governance. In the U.S., a key socio-cultural variable for considering heterogeneity is race, and in India, a key socio-cultural variable for considering heterogeneity is caste.

The dependent variable of the study is collective action. Although several studies have operationalized collective action, inconsistencies remain. For example, some scholars suggest that collective action requires the involvement of a group of people for a shared interest, and some kind of common action in pursuit of the shared interest

(Meinzen-dick et al., 2004). Others use indicators of resource conditions as a measurement of collective action, or participating in accessing and harvesting resource units from a resource system (Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). Since literature suggests that socio-cultural heterogeneity creates challenges in institution building that then affect resource conditions, for my research, I follow Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004) to measure collective action as collective decision-making, development of institutions, resource mobilization, coordination activities, information sharing, monitoring and enforcement, and assessment of resource conditions by resource users.

Data Collection

A major strength of case studies is the collection of multiple sources of data to aid triangulation of evidence (Yin, 2003). Data triangulation helps to address the problem of construct validity by providing multiple measures of the same phenomenon through multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2003). Thus, having multiple sources of data allows the researcher to corroborate and augment evidence. Within the in-depth case studies, I

collect and analyze multiple sources of data including semi-structured interviews with community members and external agencies and organizations, group discussions with community members, observations of watershed group meetings, and documents including meeting minutes, budgets, annual reports, watershed implementation plans, bylaws, and social media.

Fieldwork in the United States was conducted during October-November 2013,

June 2014, and March 2015. Fieldwork in India was conducted from December 2014-

January 2015 and from May-August 2015. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with members from the two watershed groups. These interviews lasted from 30 to 90 minutes each. Key informants were interviewed several times as new information emerged through document analysis and conversations. The semi-structured interviews allowed the watershed members to reflect on the functioning of the watershed organization and allowed the researcher to seek clarification and pursue a fruitful line of questioning (Marshall & Rossman, 1989).

Watershed members were asked questions regarding institutions that structure their interactions in the watershed group. These included themes such as decision-making in the group, rules for membership, attendance, mechanisms to represent everyone’s views and opinions, leadership, and rules that address heterogeneity in the group. In addition to interviews, data were also obtained by attending watershed meetings in West

Virginia and in Karnataka. A brief description of the interview protocols and the types of information collected is presented in Appendix B, page 287.

I also accessed documents relating to bylaws, watershed management plans, project planning documents, meeting minutes, accounting books, and the social media site such as the Facebook page for the OCWA. In West Virginia, I conducted 25 interviews with members of a watershed group and external agencies. Similarly, I conducted 27 interviews with members and external agencies in India. Semi-structured interviews with external agencies focused on their role in watershed management, resource mobilization, implementation, and monitoring, and perceptions of how socio- cultural heterogeneity affects resource management.

Data Analysis

Interview, document, and observational data were used to understand the mechanisms of institutions facilitate collective action. First, the main points of the interview were summarized into short notes. Next, the interviews were transcribed along with notations for comments to follow-up in future interviews. The transcribed data were hand-coded with broad categories to summarize excerpts that were observed during the initial reading of the transcript. Thus, the data was coded during data collection as well as after data collection (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Microsoft Excel was used to keep track of the codes as well as different iterations of the coding process. A set of 31 a priori codes developed from literature were used to guide the initial coding process. After the first iteration of coding, two additional coding cycles were employed where detailed attention was devoted to language. This process involved the refinement of several codes.

At the end of the coding process, codes were collapsed into sub-categories and categories that were guided by theory as well as categories that emerged while coding (see

Appendix C, pp.191-194). Following qualitative analysis techniques (Miles & Huberman,

1994), data were summarized and coded into a variety of themes that emerged. At the writing stage, these mechanisms were refined into narratives to allow the analysis to emerge. The researcher did not use qualitative data analysis software because of relatively few interviews in both cases.

In this chapter, I have presented an overview of my research focus and located it within the appropriate theoretical context by identifying relevant literature. Specifically, in this chapter I provided highlighted the research problem concerning socio-cultural heterogeneity and collective action. I then broadly described my methodological approach to answering the research questions and addressed the methodological concerns of the study. In the next chapter, I focus on an in-depth case study in West Virginia to examine how institutions moderate the influence of socio-cultural heterogeneity for successful collective action.

Chapter 2: Collective Action in a Racially Heterogeneous Watershed

Organization in Montgomery, West Virginia

Introduction

Collaborative watershed management has become a widely used strategy to address water problems by integrating the perspectives of diverse stakeholders such as government, non-government organizations, and citizens. In the 1990s, collaborative watershed management, a form of partnership between local communities and the state, supplemented the traditional policy approaches by federal and state government agencies.

A key assumption of collaborative watershed management is the notion that communities have common interests and attributes, which makes them better equipped to effectively manage their resources, resolve conflicts, coordinate and build coalitions, and leverage resources as opposed to state management of resources (Koehler & Koontz, 2008). In reality, communities are rarely homogeneous, but rather are heterogeneous across class, caste, race, gender, values, attitudes, skills, and interests and may possess limited capacity to bring together diverse actors to address common goals (Agrawal & Gibson,

1999).

Scholars of Community-based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) and common-pool resource (CPR) governance have studied and discussed multiple sources of heterogeneity resulting from income, wealth, assets, race, ethnicity, and other kinds of cultural attributes. Scholars of CPR and collective action have identified socio-cultural

heterogeneity as a factor that may both encourage and hinder community level collective action for natural resource management (Baland & Platteau, 1999; Gaspart & Platteau,

2007; Heckathorn, 1993; Joshi et al, 2004; Kurian & Dietz, 2004; Poteete & Ostrom,

2004; Varughese, 2000; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). Race, an important form of heterogeneity, is considered to decrease the predictability of interactions among resource users because people are more likely to interact with people that belong to their own race, thereby creating difficulties for self-organizing and undertaking collective action (Fearon

& Laitin, 1996). This suggests that CBNRM would largely be unsuccessful in racially heterogeneous communities.

Some studies find that factors of equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities can facilitate collective action in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups despite underlying divisions of race, caste, and ethnicity (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Cochran &

Ray, 2009; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; Varughese & Ostrom, 2000). However, there is a gap in CPR literature regarding the specific mechanisms through which these factors operate in heterogeneous communities for successful collective action. For example, how does equity result in successful collective action in a racially heterogeneous community?

Specifically, how do these factors operate in the face of racial heterogeneity for watershed management? Through an in-depth case study, I explore whether these factors are present in a racially heterogeneous citizen-led watershed organization in West

Virginia and whether they facilitate collective action. This study focuses on two overarching research questions:

1. What factors allow a racially heterogeneous group to achieve collective action?

2. What are the mechanisms through which these factors promote collective action?

This chapter is organized as follows. In Section one, I examine collaborative watershed management in the U.S. and studies describing the relationship between racial heterogeneity and collective action for natural resource and watershed management. I then argue that the lack of studies regarding racial heterogeneity in collaborative watershed management in the U.S. justifies the need to use theoretical constructs from

CBNRM studies situated in developing countries. These theoretical constructs can be applicable to the Appalachian Region in West Virginia because it shares several features of developing economies. This is followed by an illustration of the argument that racially heterogeneous groups can undertake collective action by creating institutions for equity and accountability, and symbolic capital such as community pride, sense of place, and feelings of community to sustain collective action despite racial heterogeneity.

Communities can also draw upon the capacities of their diverse members for initiating and sustaining collective action. Section two describes the field sites, methods, and data collection strategies employed to examine the research questions. Section three presents the analysis and results from a watershed organization in West Virginia. Section four discusses these findings and their implications for racial heterogeneity. Finally, section five summarizes this study and poses future research questions.

Section 1: Prior Research

Collaborative Watershed Management

A watershed is defined as an area that drains to a common waterway, such as a stream, lake, estuary, wetland, aquifer or ocean. As such, individuals or groups with a

personal or professional stake in the watershed comprise the community around which a watershed organization forms (Collins, Hunter & Selin, 1998). A watershed organization involves diverse stakeholders who design governance institutions to address multiple environmental problems such as resource exploitation and degradation of resources within a watershed. However, the effectiveness of these institutions depends on cooperation from diverse stakeholders in the watershed. Watershed management, therefore, presents a collective action problem because of challenges in eliciting cooperation from different stakeholders, especially when it is more beneficial for different types of stakeholders to free ride on the efforts of active participations. A CPR dilemma emerges when the individual action of each stakeholder (such as free riding behavior) leads to an inefficient outcome (Taylor & Singleton, 1993). Furthermore, scholars suggest that increased citizen participation leads to accomplishments such as developing watershed plans, issue identification, and group development. However, increased diversity may not lead to actual plan implementation (Koontz & Johnson,

2004). Thus, increased diversity can create Pareto inferior outcomes if different stakeholders are not able to design and enforce governance institutions to check free- riding behavior.

The collaborative environmental management literature has focused on diversity of stakeholders within a watershed organization such as private citizens, landowners, water recreationists, federal and state government agencies, academic organizations, private industries, and nonprofits. Yet, the literature from the field of collaborative watershed management has not paid much attention to race and ethnicity, and how different races bear the costs and benefits of participating in watershed management. The

lack of scholarship on how race affects natural resource management outcomes is unfortunate, especially because studies of environmental justice, environmentalism among African-Americans, and outdoor recreation and leisure have developed a fairly large literature concerning race and ethnicity (Schellas, 2002). Furthermore, even though the U.S. is an ethnically and racially diverse country, this diversity is not always reflected in watershed groups (Born & Genskow, 1999; Koehler & Koontz, 2008).

In the next section, I examine how race affects environment and social outcomes by drawing upon studies from collaborative watershed management, recreation, and environmental justice.

Racial and Ethnic Diversity in Natural Resource Management in the United

States

The field of CPR and CBNRM has included (and still includes) contentious debates about the relationship between socio-cultural heterogeneity such as race, caste, and ethnicity and the outcomes of natural resource management. Most studies argue that socio-cultural heterogeneity may create challenges for natural resource management because differences in social class, caste, and ethnicity create differences in preferences and interests; difficulties in building agreements and enforcing norms; distrust; social resentment; domination; discrimination; and notions of purity and superiority (Andersson

& Agrawal, 2011; Baland & Platteau, 1997; Barros, 2007; Blair, 1996; Chakraborty,

2001; Kant 2000; Naidu, 2009; Neupane, 2003; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; Shiferaw,

Kedebe, & Ratna Reddy, 2009; Shiferaw, Tewodros, & Reddy, 2009; Varughese &

Ostrom, 200). A lack of studies on racial and ethnic diversity in planning and decision- making in CBNRM has created a gap in understanding how racial heterogeneity affects

CBNRM in the U.S. (Schelhas, 1998). A limited number of studies have examined racial diversity in collaborative watershed organizations (Koehler & Koontz, 2008; Lubell et al., 2002). Koehler & Koontz (2008) found that members of minority groups are underrepresented in watershed partnerships. For instance, 99% of the members in 12 watershed groups from Ohio were white compared to 85% of Ohio citizens (Koehler &

Koontz, 2008). These groups were purposefully selected to include 6 urban and 6 rural groups, with 4 groups falling into each of the 3 group-composition types (i.e., government-based, citizen-based, and mixed). A failure to account for the interests of underrepresented minority groups can undermine the functioning and effectiveness of watershed partnerships, creating conflict among competing interests at the expense of collaboration (Born & Genskow, 1999).

A small subset of collaborative environmental studies in the United States suggest that incorporating different racial groups in a collaborative group negatively affects collective action. For instance, including minority populations increases the transaction costs for developing governance institutions because of the need to account for factors such as environmental “bads” (such as toxic waste dumps and other waste treatment facilities) that are more often located in minority communities (Ringquist & Clark, 1997).

Another study found that an increase in the percentage of blacks and Hispanics in watershed communities decreased the partnership incidence rate defined as the number of partnerships or number of activities in a watershed by 15% and 31% respectively (Lubell et al., 2002). Evidence from CBNRM in Australia suggests that collaborative efforts entrench the dominance of local elites, deepen authoritarianism in governance, and increase intolerance toward minorities (Diamond, 1999).

A recent study have found that blacks were less likely than whites to report being physically active, exercising in the park, and exercising outside the park in Los Angeles

(Derose, Williamson, & Cohen, 2015). Other studies in urban watersheds indicate that poor and working-class whites, members of ethnic groups, and recent immigrants more often depend on fishing in contaminated waters for subsistence (Beehler, McGuinness, &

Vena, 2001). These findings are crucial for resource managers to adapt racial and ethnic concerns to promote equitable opportunities to interact with natural resources (Hunt &

Ditton, 2002). These studies therefore suggest that incorporating minority groups in planning and decision-making for natural resource management is important because people of different races interact in different ways with natural resources.

Studies of collaborative watershed management in the U.S. call for increased inclusivity of different stakeholders in decision-making because diverse stakeholders provide a broad range of skills and knowledge that aid in improving environmental quality, establishing legitimacy, building social capital, and resolving conflicts (Brasier,

Lee, Stedman, & Weigle, 2011; Koontz & Johnson, 2004). However, this inclusivity is not conceptualized in terms of racial differences. The literature also suggests that heterogeneity in participation leads to improved management outcomes. For example, heterogeneous watershed partnerships met the assessment and planning requirements of a watershed plan in Oregon, while more homogeneous watershed partnerships did not

(Bidwell & Ryan, 2006). One reason for this is because heterogeneous groups are more likely to wrestle with internal differences and establish new goals and strategies to achieve them, whereas homogeneous groups tend to serve the interests of a select few constituents (Bidwell & Ryan, 2006).

In West Virginia, studies have found that an active and inclusive watershed association can enhance the competitive advantage for acquiring resources from federal and state funding agencies and are effective in implementing activities (Collins et al.,

1998). This is especially relevant for rural communities with problems of Acid Mine

Drainage (AMD) from abandoned coalmines that are unable to generate sufficient local resources to solve the problem (Collins et al., 1998). Inclusive watershed organizations also provide a platform for different members of a community to express dissatisfaction about the lack of existing federal and state regulations to control nonpoint source pollution, educate members of a community about water concerns, and collaborate to take action to solve water problems (Collins et al., 1998). They also found that grassroots citizen-led organizations are more inclusive than non-grassroots organizations.

Furthermore, organizations that are inclusive are more likely to persist over time to address nonpoint source pollution because diverse resources such as finances and interested stakeholders are available to undertake restoration efforts (Collins et al., 1998).

However, even though West Virginia encourages inclusivity, racial diversity is not considered as a measure of inclusivity and most studies operationalize “diversity” as representatives from business organizations, farmer organizations, environmental organizations, private organizations, and academics (Innes & Booher, 2002).

Incorporating interests of minority groups in watershed management has implications for environmental justice (at least in demographically diverse areas) because collaborative watershed management can potentially address inequalities by coupling the social processes of decision making with geographical boundaries (O’Neill, 2007). By recruiting members of minority and disadvantaged groups, acknowledging the persistent

segregation of residents in the United States by class, race, and ethnicity, and creating a sense of purpose that cuts across these divisions, collaborative watershed management can develop goals that are consistent with the environmental justice movement to address inequalities (O’Neill, 2007). Moreover, creating inclusivity on the basis of race and ethnicity in resource management can give opportunities to people of color to participate in resource decisions that affect their communities (McAvoy et al., 2000). The lack of systematic research and practice of including racial and ethnic categories in CBNRM and collaborative watershed management studies in the United States has created a gap in understanding the effect of socio-cultural heterogeneity on watershed management outcomes. The positive and negative role of racial heterogeneity on collective action in different contexts has also created a gap in understanding how racial heterogeneity affects collective action.

To understand the factors that faciliate collective action in a racially heterogeneous group, I turn to the Appalachian region. The Appalachian region shares many aspects with developing economies where poor communities are located within sites of resource exploitation and uneven development. Therefore, I apply the theoretical constructs from CBRNM studies in developing economies to the field site in the

Appalachian region in West Virginia, which has been described as having features of a developing economy (Nesbitt & Weiner, 2005).

An investigation of racial heterogeneity and watershed management in West

Virginia would be incomplete without an examination of contextual factors. Next, I examine the contextual features such as the coal economy, legacy effects of coal mining,

the social and ecological destruction of Appalachia, construction, propagation of

Appalachian stereotypes by public officials, and the invisibility of blacks in Appalachia.

Coal Violence and the Invisibility of Racial Minorities in Appalachia

The coal industry and the drive to produce coal in a bid to “modernize” and transform West Virginia and the rest of Appalachia have resulted in a fundamentally altered human-environment relationship (Eldridge, 2015). Stereotypes such as the

“hillbilly”, “country bumpkin”, “illiterate”, “unruly Appalachian”, and “ill-suited to make decisions for themselves” were applied by developers, industrialists, public officials, and environmental organizations to appropriate resources and/or displace thousands of people from their homes to establish park systems and large-scale hydroelectric power projects

(McDonald & Muldowny, 1982; Powell, 2007; Weaver, 1996). These stereotypes have been accepted and reified by professionals working in this region and continue to influence theory and policy analysis even today (Lewis & Billings, 1997; Nesbitt &

Weiner 2000). Subsequent research has unearthed evidence that challenges such stereotypes. Prior to industrial development, the region was not as isolated or politically and economically “backward” as the stereotypes suggest, but consisted of various scales of farming, commerce, and even small-scale timber and salt industries (Eldridge, 2015).

A shift in landownership occurred after coal corporations made “obscure land deeds” with the locals that gave the coal corporations a right to the minerals beneath the land and significant decision-making power about economic development of Appalachia

(Eller, 1982). The shift in land-ownership from the locals to a few, large multi-national energy companies has had long-term consequences for Appalachia. A hierarchical relationship emerged with the ownership class having monopolistic control over

resources and land, a class of small professionals, and a labor class made up of locals and immigrants positioned at the bottom rung of society (Gaventa, 1980: pp. 55-58). Racial segregation was common and disparities between the “haves” and the “have-nots” continued to widen (Duncan, 2000). A system of controls and biases that favored political and economic elites over mountaineers or workers emerged (Gaventa, 1980). These political arrangements fostered profit maximization for coal corporations but social and ecological violence followed for residents who had to bear the costs of pollution.

Unevenly distributed externalities such as poor safety measures in the coalmines, unstable and hazardous work environments, poor pollution prevention measures and cleanup costs were passed on to workers, and frequent mine explosions created an era of vulnerability and fear that exists even today (Eldridge, 2015).

Frequent blasting in the coalmines led to displacement and death in the mines as well as in valleys. Foundations of homes were destroyed, with cracked walls, floors, and ceilings and consequently, a loss in home insurance (Eldridge, 2015). Communities, businesses, and schools were destroyed. Bulldozers destroyed not only physical structures, such as homes and cemeteries, but also the cultural and symbolic meanings embedded in them (Maples & East, 2013). Sometimes, people refused to sell their homes and they witnessed the decline of the community around them. Those who stayed became what Nixon (2011, pp. 19) refers to as “refugees in place” – a form of “displacement without moving.” Some scholars and activists call this the “resource curse”, but the

“curse” in Appalachia is not simply the result of its resource wealth, but is best understood in relation to historical processes and structural arrangements that have shaped knowledge, power, and access and control over those resources (Eldridge, 2015).

In the present day, coal related accidents continue to be active. On January 14,

2014, thousands of gallons of the chemical crude methylcyclohexyl methanol (MCHM) leaked into West Virginia's Elk River from storage tanks owned by Freedom Industries.

The spill left 300,000 residents without access to water supplies in and around Charleston and also led to hundreds of cases of illness and several hospitalizations from exposure

(CDC, 2015). The West Virginia governor attempted to distance this disaster from the coal industry, but MCHM is one of several chemicals used to remove impurities from coal prior to combustion (Parker, 2014). Such abrupt catastrophes, slow-seeping contamination, and inadequate access to clean and safe drinking water have become commonplace in West Virginia (Ghabra, 2015).

Political ecology scholars have documented the social and spatial marginalization of local people in Appalachia, but notable in the analysis is the absence of black people.

Scholarly work has omitted black struggles in Appalachia and this has resulted in invisibility of blacks such that “black Appalachians are as invisible to themselves as they are to white Appalachians” (Cabbell, 1980). Black people in Appalachia are a neglected minority within a minority, and racial and class exploitation are compounded with problems related to the structure of the coal economy (Cabbell, 1980; Hayden, 2005).

The effects of racism in Appalachia are apparent in segregated housing, unequal employment opportunities, under-representation on juries and in government, lack of government services, lack of health care services, and denial of meaningful educational opportunities (Eldridge, 2015). Even when black and white Appalachians may strongly assert that “everything is okay between the whites and the colored in their community”,

blacks still continue to live in dilapidated houses or in “colored” sections of the town

(Cabbell, 1980; Winkelmann, 2012).

There have been efforts to improve the quality of life in Appalachia concentrating on the development of “bottom-up” democratic structures for policy-making (Taylor et al., 2014), the promotion of “natural assets” (EKU, 2013), and youth-led initiatives to diversify the economy (Solomon, 2014). Watershed management in West Virginia, with a focus on community management of water and sustainable development, provides one such bottom-up opportunity to promote natural assets by increasing tourism, diversify the economy by creating tourism related jobs as well as create inclusivity in decision-making by incorporating minority groups such as African-Americans. However, a sense of powerlessness that is manifested through reproducing social myths to shape or control public opinions of situations or conditions influences programmatic efforts to support development in Appalachia and presents important challenges to local citizen efforts engaged in sustainable development.

Watershed management is a recent phenomenon in West Virginia. The

Abandoned Mines Land (AML) Program was implemented under The Surface Mining

Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) of 1977 to restore lands damaged by the legacy effects of abandoned coalmines. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also launched clean up efforts to address nonpoint source pollution through the watershed management approach by creating local level partnerships of communities with government agencies. In 1994, the West Virginia Watershed Assessment Program

(WVWAP) began working with local watershed organizations by providing a facilitator and organizational assistance to new watershed organizations. The existence of the

WVWAP led to the addition of two more programs. First, the West Virginia Stream

Partners Act of 1996 provides grants of $5000 to watershed organizations annually with a

20% match from local sources. Second, the Canaan Valley Institute inherited the

WVWAP’s organizational assistance to watershed organizations. The goal of this program was to “create sustainable watershed organizations that are inclusive of the interested parties in a watershed and would seek to build community consensus by engaging in collaborative planning among these parties” (Collins et al., 1998).

In the next section, I explore concepts described in CBNRM literature for addressing socio-cultural heterogeneity via institutional arrangements. I then apply these concepts to a racially heterogeneous watershed management organization in

Montgomery, West Virginia. Drawing from this argument, I use theoretical constructs from the CBNRM literature that is situated in developing economies and apply it to the

Appalachian region in West Virginia. Questions of sustainability and equity in natural resource management are particularly pertinent to the Appalachian region as sustainable community-based natural resource management has the potential for an equitable redistribution of power and access to natural resources and poverty alleviation (Agrawal

& Gibson, 1999). Thus, this study is similar to studies in political ecology that are situated in First World research sites but have characteristics of third world economies

(see Rikoon, 2006; Robbins, 2006; St Martin, 2006).

Collective Action in Heterogeneous Communities

Research suggests that socio-culturally heterogeneous groups face difficulties in devising institutions to facilitate collective action (Poteete & Ostrom, 2004). However, a few studies suggest that heterogeneous communities may be able to craft institutions that

enable them to compensate, or minimize the influence of heterogeneity by creating equity and accountability to build a successful foundation for collective action (Adhikari & Di

Falco, 2008; Adhikari & Lovett, 2006; Andersson & Agrawal, 2011; Poteete & Ostrom,

2004; Quiggin, 1993; Schlager & Blomquist, 1998; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). Others have argued that symbolic capital such as honor and pride can create “community” even in a heterogeneous group that facilitates collective action (Cochran & Ray, 2009). Some scholars have argued that the need to maintain common resources may override socio- cultural boundaries, and so different groups with different capacities may contribute their skills to facilitate collective action (Adhikari & Di Falco, 2008; Adhikari & Lovett, 2006;

Andersson & Agrawal, 2011; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001).

Overall, factors that can compensate or take advantage of socio-cultural heterogeneity for collective action can be grouped into four main types: equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacity of members (Andersson & Agrawal, 2011; Cochran & Ray, 2009;

Gibson & Koontz, 1998; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001) (see

Figure 1).

Below, I examine each of the variables and trace the causal pathways of how these variables facilitate collective action

Figure 2: Factors that Facilitate Collective Action in a Heterogeneous Community: A

Theoretical Framework (Modified from Andersson & Agrawal, 2011).

Equity: Equity is the distribution of decision-making responsibilities, rights, costs, burdens, benefits, and resources such as forests and water in social systems that are considered to be “fair” by the range of stakeholders involved (Cook & Hegtvedt, 1983).

Equity can be achieved by internalizing externalities, deploying all information available, and better matching service provision to needs (Ostrom, 1990). When users are more likely to gain substantial benefits from designing rules to cope with heterogeneities, they may invest more heavily in crafting rules that are fair, effective, and efficient for most

users (Brooks et al., 2012; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001; Waylen et al., 2010). There are two dimensions of equity: procedural and distributive equity.

Procedural Equity: Procedural equity refers to the processes by which stakeholders make their voices heard for decision-making (Sunam & McCarthy, 2010).

This takes the form of representation of marginal groups in resource management bodies, as well as opportunities for marginal groups to influence decision-making through deliberation, membership, authority, power, leadership, rules and regulations, customs and laws, and membership rights (Poteete, 2004). Procedural equity provides opportunities for members to enhance collective action (Pariyar, 2006). Thus, groups with socio-cultural heterogeneity are more likely to succeed at managing CPRs if they craft equitable rules and regulations that acknowledge and address socio-cultural heterogeneity in their institutions (Kurian & Dietz, 2004; Adhikari & Lovett, 2006).

Thus, an arrow leads from procedural equity to collective action in Figure 2. This leads to the following proposition:

Proposition 1a: Fair procedural institutions facilitate collective action.

Distributive Equity: The distribution of benefits from natural resource management, also known as economic or distributive equity, promotes collective action in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups (Anand & Sen, 2000; Jacobs, 1989; Poteete,

2004; Sunam & McCarthy, 2010). In Maharashtra, India, low caste herders were given fishing rights to the water bodies in the upper catchment to incentivize conservation of soil and water in the upper catchment and revegetation of the common lands (Kerr,

2001). Andersson & Agrawal, (2011) found that across two forest communities in Bolivia with similar levels of inequality, institutions that failed to address equity issues in one

community through incentives and benefits jeopardized collective action for forest management. Their study concluded that strong institutions for collective action such as organized structures, effective rule-making, and monitoring and enforcement systems can reduce the negative effects of inter-group inequality on resource conditions. Thus, an arrow leads from distributive equity to collective action in Figure 2. This leads to the following proposition:

Proposition 1b: Distributive equity facilitates collective action.

Procedures often determine outcomes (Scholsberg, 2007). Procedural equity strengthens the stake and voices of marginalized groups as well as well as ensures that marginalized members receive their share of benefits i.e. distributive equity (Jacobsen,

2008; Joy et al., 2006). For example, a lack of representation of marginalized groups in decision-making processes resulted in inequitable outcomes in community forestry in

Nepal (Suman & McCarthy, 2010). An absence of marginal groups in decision-making processes not only prevents marginal groups from influencing the outcome, but also undermines environmental goals. For instance a decision to close the common lands was made without consulting low caste herders. The herders violated the rules to access the commons, which undermined the environmental goals of the rejuvenating the common lands (Kerr, 2002). Thus, fair processes of decision-making also ensure equity in outcomes. This leads to the following proposition:

Proposition 1c: Procedural equity can create distributive equity.

Procedural equity plays an important role in shaping people’s attitudes, feelings, and cooperation because it shapes their identification with the group in such a way that members see the goals of the group as their own (Tyler & De Cremer, 2005). Procedural

equity can create group identity that encourages people to live by group rules and norms and to consider the group as an important aspect of their own self-definition (Ashforth,

1998; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994; Elsbach, 1999; Hogg

& Terry, 2000; Ibarra, 1999; Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001). In the social movements literature it is widely accepted that for an individual to actively participate in a social movement, her or his personal identity needs to correspond with the movement’s collective identity (Snow & McAdam, 2000) because doing so “accords with who they are” (Polletta & Jasper, 2001; pp. 284). These arguments are supported by other findings from experimental and field studies that suggest that fair procedural mechanisms lead to the merger of the self with the group (Koper, van Knippenberg, Bouhuijs, Vermunt, &

Wilke, 1993; Tyler, Degoey & Smith, 1996). By creating identification with a group, procedural equity can shape voluntary and willing cooperation even in groups with socio- cultural heterogeneity (De Cremer, 2004; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005). Group identity is a form of symbolic capital because it creates feelings of distinction, honor, and collective pride among members (Bourdieu, 1999). Group identity enables members of group to have something in common with each other, which also distinguishes them in a significant way from the members of other groups (Cohen, 1985). Thus, an arrow leads from procedural equity to symbolic capital in Figure 2. This leads to the following proposition:

Proposition 1d: Procedural equity can create symbolic capital to facilitate collective action.

Accountability: Several scholars have identified accountability as key condition to facilitate collective action (Baland & Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990). Accountability is

considered to be key to increasing citizen empowerment for sustainable natural resource management (Koontz, 2006; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Saravanan, 2002). Agrawal & Ribot

(1999) define accountability as “the exercise of counter power to balance arbitrary action.” Social justice, a goal of good governance, can be achieved through accountability mechanisms such as sharing information, transparency, independent monitoring, polycentricity, separation of powers, legal recourse, budget control, free media, regular meetings, and maintaining records and minutes of the meetings (Agrawal et al., 2006; Gruber, 2010; Kerr, 2002; Klooster, 2000; Pandit & Bevilacqua, 2011; Ribot,

2002). Accountability leads to a better understanding of roles and increases compliance of group members with group decisions facilitating collective action (Adhikari & Lovett,

2006; Saravanan, 2002). Thus, an arrow leads from accountability to collective action in

Figure 2. This leads to the following proposition:

Proposition 2a: Accountability mechanisms facilitate collective action.

Accountability is closely related to equity. When marginal groups have greater influence on local management strategies and decision-making, there is increased procedural equity and transparency (Carney, 1995; Kaimowitz et al., 1998; Margulis,

1999; Ostrom, 1990; Smoke, 2000). Accountability mechanisms are critical to monitor whether socially marginal groups receive a fair share of benefits i.e. distributive equity

(Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Hatfield-Dodds, Hughes, & Wilson, 2006; Lebel, Anderies, &

Campbell, 2006; Oyugi, 2000; Young, 2002). Thus, accountability can create procedural and distributive equity. This leads to the following proposition:

Proposition 2b: Accountability can create procedural and distributive equity.

Symbolic Capital: Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic capital enables an examination of non-material benefits or feelings that encourage collective action (Mosse,

2003). Symbolic capital—honor, pride, respectability, collective identity— is something that members of a group have in common with each other, which helps them distinguish their group from other groups (Cohen, 1985). Symbolic capital can be pre-existing in a group, or can be generated by institutional mechanisms as well as successful collective action outcomes. Symbolic assets such as pride, prestige, unity, and respectability or symbolic resources of the community such as village tanks and temples can be used to generate symbolic capital (Bourdieu & Thompson, 1991; Mosse, 1997). Symbolic notions of an “ideal village” consisting of indigeneity, fairness, self-sufficiency and a particular view of development have been used to construct “community” and overcome caste barriers for undertaking watershed development in India (Sangameswaran, 2008).

This “community” can bring together disparate actors, despite heterogeneity, for sustainable resource management, which creates a strong and unique identity in the newly formed community (Cochran & Ray, 2009; Dale & Onyx, 2010; Li, 2002; Mosse,

1997). Thus, symbolic capital has the potential to respond to and alter social structures and divisions in society, thereby changing the pre-existing culture of a society (Bourdieu,

1977; Dovey, 2002; Leach, Hillier & Rooksby, 2002).

A sense of place or place identity between an individual, or a group and a particular physical setting is also considered as another form of symbolic capital

(Stedman 2002; Williams & Patterson 1999; Williams et al., 1992). Symbolic capital in the form of sense of place can enhance participation and collective action in socio- culturally heterogeneous groups. Sense of place, in particular, is relevant to the

Appalachian region because it emerges as many families have generations-long connection to the landscape through familial roots and serves as a significant collective identity for Appalachians (Utz, 2001). Many Appalachian people have a strong sense of place due to their long history of threat from outside investors that is difficult for outsiders to understand (Rowles, 1983; Stewart, 1996; Utz, 2001). Studies of collaborative watershed management in the Appalachian region have therefore considered place-related factors such as place identity, place attachment, and place dependence as potential variables that encourage participation from residents (Jorgensen

& Stedman, 2006; Lukacs & Ardoin, 2013; Urquhart & Acott, 2014). A sense of place is important to overcome divisions of class, culture, and ideology, and to encourage deliberation and shared understanding of the environment (Taylor, 2009). For instance,

Taylor (2009) found that a sense of place was the basis of a shared engagement in the forest commons by diverse stakeholders, which led to the formation of a powerful bond among members of a community forestry group in the Appalachian region in North

Carolina. Several participants in watershed management groups in West Virginia cited sense of place as a motivating factor for their participation in these programs (Lukacs &

Ardoin, 2013). Thus, a collective stewardship of place creates a democratic space that cuts across social, political, and economic divides (Taylor, 2009). Communities with symbolic resources such as sense of place allow people to become more embedded in local networks of civic engagement, which enhances support for environmental cooperation (Lubell et al., 2002; Ostrom, 1990). This leads to the following proposition:

Proposition 3a: Symbolic capital such as “community”, community pride, and a sense of place to facilitate collective action.

Rules requiring shramdaan or voluntary labor have been used to build a symbolic

“community” by bringing together people for watershed development in India to create a sense of ownership and responsibility towards the resources within the watershed

(Government of Maharashtra, n.d.). Although people may have different motivations for contributing for shramdaan, it creates feelings of pride, unity and solidarity, which translate into cooperation in the village for collective activities (Sangameswaran, 2008).

“Community” in this case becomes a symbolic resource and members preserve it for future collective activities. Even the mere existence of an institution such as a village forum has a unifying effect to build “community” for initiating a watershed development program in a heterogeneous group with different castes (Jacobsen, 2008). Symbolic capital in the form of sense of place defined as sentiments or emotional ties one holds about a particular place also shape human-environment relationships (Eisenhauer et al.,

2000). Thus, symbolic capital can be generated through group building activities to facilitate the formation of “new” community to undertake resource management (White

& Vogt, 2000). This leads to the following proposition:

Proposition 3b: Institutions can create symbolic capital such as community, community pride, and sense of place.

Symbolic capital can also result from collective action outcomes. For instance, a sense of place can be constructed from visible results and broad evidence of progress as well as from new social spaces such as meeting places that spur new interactions. Places can be “re-made” by watershed groups that undertake hands-on, process-oriented activities such as tree planting and stream cleaning, which also encourage participation

(Lukacs & Ardoin, 2014). Visible outcomes of watershed groups serve as powerful

symbols to motivate local collective action in Appalachia to address water pollution caused by others (Lukacs & Ardoin, 2014). Thus, collective action outcomes can create a new sense of place and generate community pride to encourage participation and sustain collective action. The collective identity emerging from a new sense of place can become a source of bonding and symbol for one’s social group (Scannell & Gifford, 2010). Thus, the outcomes of collective action can generate community, community pride, and sense of place. This leads to the following proposition:

Proposition 3c: Positive collective action outcomes can contribute to community, community pride, and sense of place.

Symbolic assets in the form of prestige and renown can be converted to economic capital to mobilize actions to draw upon labor for common activities such as harvesting and “is perhaps the most valuable form of accumulation in a society” (Bordieu, 1977).

Similarly, economic capital can be converted to, and stored as symbolic assets by using expenditures from a harvest to pay for prestige-building activities (Cochran & Ray,

2009). Thus, these two forms of capital are inter-convertible (but not predictably so), which can maintain collective action (Cochran & Ray, 2009). The inter-convertibility is demonstrated in the link between economic capital and symbolic assets of pride and reputation in Figure 2. This leads to the following proposition:

Proposition 3d: Symbolic assets of community pride and reputation can be converted economic capital and vice versa to facilitate collective action.

Capacity: Like symbolic capital, a community may have pre-existing capacity, or it can be generated through activities. The need to invest in and take care of resources can override social-cultural boundaries if no single group has the capacity to take care of

resources or has access to all the resources needed for successful collective action

(Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). Heterogeneous communities can thus draw upon the capacities of people in a group, or utilize specialized skills such as writing, bookkeeping, and resources such as time and money, and knowledge to support collective action (Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; Quiggin, 1993; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001).

Members with skills of managing watershed funds, writing project proposals, monitoring construction works and payrolls for watershed development activities can support collective action in heterogeneous communities.

Leadership skills are useful in contexts where diverse stakeholders have competing values and interests with complex interdependencies (Pero & Smith, 2008).

Leaders can promote a common culture especially in the absence of trust and reciprocity between stakeholders (Scheffer et al., 2000). Leaders that enact procedural justice and fairness are more likely to be trusted by other members in a group, who as a result, are more likely to show a voluntary willingness to cooperate (Platow et al., 1998; Tyler & De

Cremer, 2005). Leading through fair procedures also encourages people to identify with their groups, and follow the rules of the group, leading to higher voluntary cooperation

(Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler & De Cremer, 2005). Thus capacity can facilitate collective action. This leads to the following proposition:

Proposition 4a: In heterogeneous groups members who pool together capacities such as leadership, literacy, bookkeeping, and knowledge facilitates collective action.

Capacity building is the enhancement of the skills of people and institutions in resources management (Wescott, 2002). Several CBNRM programs in communities begin with capacity-building activities such as education and training (Stedman et al.,

2009). These activities help to develop a long-term vision for the CBNRM program as well as strengthen the capacity of a community to participate in collective action for resource governance. In Appalachia several policy initiatives are focused on building the capacity of communities to undertake sustainable development programs (Glasmeier &

Farrigan, 2003). Thus, institutions can build the capacity of groups to facilitate collective action. This leads to the following proposition:

Proposition 4b: Institutions can build the capacity of groups.

Overall, equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities can facilitate collective action in socio-culturally heterogeneous group (see Figure 2). Thus, in this study, I investigate a watershed management group with two races that has been successful at collective action to understand the factors that enabled the group to sustain collective action. I base this study on the following specific research questions:

1) How does equity in a racially heterogeneous community facilitate collective

action?

2) How does accountability in a racially heterogeneous community facilitate

collective action?

3) How does symbolic capital in a racially heterogeneous community facilitate

collective action?

4) How does the capacity of members in a racially heterogeneous community

facilitate collective action?

Through theory and empirical findings from a case study of a racially heterogeneous watershed organization in West Virginia, this article aims at introducing race as a category in operationalizing diversity in the field of collaborative water management and

natural resource management in the United States. This study does not claim to make the findings applicable to all watershed management groups in the U.S., but instead explains the dynamics of heterogeneity and collective action in this particular case to make inferences to theoretical propositions about how equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities can facilitate collective action in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups.

Section 2: Study Context

The following quotes summarize the context of the research site, Montgomery in

West Virginia, which is very similar to the once booming coal towns of Appalachia:

A lot of times we didn't even know what was going on. I mean, we thought that water

was supposed to be orange… you would dig in the garden and dig up coal. I don't think

anyone felt tremendous loyalty to the coalmines because the way they were treated, but it

was what they depended on. So, I don't think anyone is really totally against mining and

wants to stop it. Still, the companies just took as much as they could and then they left

leaving behind destroyed mountains, orange water, and dying communities (Interviewee

5).

There were some concerns with outsider groups coming in. There's an Appalachian

culture and people are wary of strangers because there’s an image that they just come for

their own interests and for their own profit (Interviewee 4).

We didn’t know where to drink, how to cook, how to bathe when there was the chemical

spill in the Elk River. There have been two chemical contaminations. And somebody lied

that the water is safe. We know that that’s not true (Interviewee 13).

A socially and ecologically destructive resource extractive industry has shaped a distrust of outsiders that continues to manifest itself even today with recurrence of disasters in the form of chemical spills. Montgomery is also at risk of becoming economically distressed (Appalachian Regional Commission, 2014). According to the

2009 census, 48.7% of the population in Montgomery is below the poverty line. The median income of Montgomery is $27,124. Although Montgomery was once a prosperous town, today it is not. Poverty, population loss, and environmental degradation continue to plague Montgomery. Poverty is unevenly distributed by race, with substantially more African-Americans and other minority groups living in poverty than whites. The population of Montgomery is 1630, and African Americans make up 12.4% of the population, which is the highest African-American population of any city in West

Virginia. Montgomery falls within Fayette and Kanawha County, with a major portion in

Kanawha County. Demographic characteristics are shown in Table 1:

Race Population by race

White 73%

African American 12.4%

Native American 1.1%

Asian 1.1%

Table 1: Population by Race in Montgomery, West Virginia

Orange Creek in Montgomery is located approximately 25 miles southeast of

Charleston, West Virginia. The watershed spans a little over 5.2 miles, north to south, and covers approximately seven and a half squares miles. Acid mine drainage (AMD), a toxic mixture of chemicals from defunct coalmines and a previously active landfill, has been leaching out toxicants with low pH such as aluminum and iron precipitate into the

Orange Creek and the adjoining stream bed. AMD in the Orange Creek comes from mine

sites abandoned prior to the enactment of the SMCRA in 1977. These coal mines, active during the 19th and the 20th centuries have created an extensive network of underground tunnels, passages, and portals scattered throughout the watershed that seep AMD into the creek and its tributaries at various points. Red stained streambeds from iron depositions and white streaked rocks from aluminum precipitate have contributed to a decline in property value in Montgomery. Erosion and sedimentation is another problem in the watershed. The three major sources of sediment in Orange Creek are multiple mass wasting sites (landslides), abandoned dirt roads, and failing stream banks. Increased sediment in the Orange Creek leads to loss of aquatic habitat, increased risk of flooding, and increased water temperature.

In early fall of 2001, residents from Montgomery undertook several clean up and restoration activities in the watershed. On March 21, 2002 the Orange Creek Watershed

Association, Inc. (OCWA) was officially formed with four officers and twenty-two directors. Since then, the OCWA has carried out watershed cleanup, awareness, and restoration activities to reduce the AMD leaching out of defunct coalmines. The OCWA collaborates with government organizations such as West Virginia Department of

Environment Protection (WVDEP)- Abandoned Mines Land (AML) Program, Non-point

Source (NPS) Program, West Virginia Department of Natural Resources (DNR), West

Virginia Conservation Agency (WVCA), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA), Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), and the U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers; as well as non-profit organizations such as Trout Unlimited; and academic organizations including Marshall University, West Virginia University

Institute of Technology (WVUIT), and Bridgemont Community College. To date, the

OCWA has removed 172 tons of solid waste, remediated four AMD sites, completed

75% of their original stream bank projects, planted over 2,000 trees including 200 blight- resistant American chestnuts, introduced three species of trout to the stream, constructed five in-stream structures designed to improve stream pattern and profile, and increased trout habitat (Watershed Plan, 2013).

Currently, there are 17 members in the OCWA, of which six are African-American and 11 are white. The three appointed members represent the City of Montgomery,

WVUIT, and Bridgemont Community College. The index of heterogeneity4 in

Montgomery is 0.45, which is considered moderately heterogeneous (see Varughese &

Ostrom, 2001).

Methods

Data Collection: Data for this study was collected between October 2013 and

March 2015 through four field visits. A combination of semi-structured interviews, observations in watershed meetings, open-ended discussions, and informal conversations were used to collect data. Bylaws, watershed-based plan, and the social medial sites of the OCWA provided secondary data. The investigator attended three watershed meetings to observe decision-making processes and interactions of the members within the group, and shadowed watershed members as they went about their daily tasks and volunteer work to observe interactions of members outside the group. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 25 respondents, including 17 members of the OCWA and 8 from

4 To measure racial heterogeneity in the OCWA, I used the method suggested by Varughese & Ostrom, (2001), which 2 th computes heterogeneity as, � = 1 − (��) , where Pi is the proportion of the total population in the i race. A varies from 0 to 1 and measures the probability that two randomly selected persons will be from the same race.

external agencies. Follow-up interviews were conducted in-person during subsequent field visits.

Interviews typically lasted 45 to 60 minutes and took place at the OCWA office or other locations familiar to the interviewees. Starting with two OCWA leaders, snowball sampling was used to suggest additional people to interview. Interviews continued until the point of saturation, where little new information was generated. Interviews with people from external agencies were conducted over the phone. These interviews lasted 30 to 45 minutes with follow up emails as needed. The eight external agency interviewees were selected from the list of partners in the watershed-based plan of the OCWA. 14 agencies were contacted, out of which eight responded. Interviews were confidential and were documented via detailed notes.

A semi-structured interview protocol ensured discussion of key topics while allowing for insights from more tangential topics as they arose. Interview questions aimed at understanding what kinds of institutions structure the governance processes in the OCWA for collective action and whether these institutions account for the heterogeneity in the OCWA through procedural equity, distributive equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities. Questions included information about the formation of the group, group structure, membership into the group, decision-making mechanisms in the group, distribution of leadership positions in the group, monitoring and accountability rules in the group, coordinating activities, mobilizing resources, interactions of members within and outside of the group, skills of the members in the group, benefits of participation, environmental and social outcomes since the formation of the group and how race affects each of these components. Interviewees from external

agencies were asked questions about their perception of how successful the OCWA is in achieving its environmental goal of improved water quality and social goal of inclusivity.

I also collected data from documents such as the bylaws, “Ground rules”,

“Consensus”, the watershed plan, and social media sites of the OCWA such as its

Facebook page that provided additional information about the factors facilitating collective action. This approach enabled triangulating data about the history of the group, structure, goals, activities, partner organizations, and environmental and social outcomes.

The “Ground rules” document was created in 2002 as a means to establish appropriate behavior during meetings. The “Consensus” document was created in 2002 to facilitate inclusive decision-making. Members often referred to the “Ground rules”, “Consensus”, and bylaws while describing rules in the OCWA and as a source of guidance for meetings. The watershed plan was created in 2004 and updated in 2013. The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) - Non-point source program, initiated this document.

According to several members, the document served to document the major problems in the watershed, sites of acid mine drainage, water quality data since 1996, collaborators of the OCWA, and plans for the future direction of the OCWA. Taken together, these documents were 59 pages in length. Observational data came from attending meetings and clean up sessions, and field visits to monitor water quality. The investigator attended three watershed meetings, community events such as trash pickup and water quality monitoring. Following Kawulich (2005), notes were recorded following each event with respect to how members interact with each other and the activities that they carry out.

Data Analysis: The interview, document, and observational data were used to understand factors that facilitate collective action in the OCWA. First, the main points of

the interview were summarized into short notes. Next, the interviews were transcribed along with notations for comments to follow-up in future interviews. The transcribed data were hand-coded with broad categories to summarize excerpts that were observed during the initial reading of the transcript. Thus, the data were coded during data collection as well as after data collection (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Microsoft Excel was used to keep track of the codes as well as different iterations of the coding process. A set of 31 a priori codes developed for data analysis were used to guide the initial coding process.

After the first iteration of coding, two additional coding cycles were employed over the course of four months where detailed attention was devoted to language. As Mackey &

Gass (2005) explain, the researcher codes all the data. Then, after some lapse of time

(few weeks or months), the researcher re-codes the data to increase rater reliability. The rater reliability scores were almost 100% in all three coding cycles employed.

The coding process involved the rearrangement, revision, and refinement of several codes. At the end of the coding process, more than 251 codes were identified, which were collapsed into sub-categories and categories that were guided by theory as well as categories that emerged while coding (see Appendix C, pp. 299). Thus, an iterative approach was followed by using a theoretical lens to guide coding as well as identifying concepts in the data to link back to theory (Strauss & Corbin, 2008).

Following qualitative analysis techniques (Miles & Huberman, 1994), data were summarized and coded into a variety of themes that emerged. The categories were classified under the six main variables of equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities of members. In Table 9 (Appendix C, pp. 299), I present the categories under procedural equity, distributive equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacity. In

Table 10 (Appendix C, pp. 300), I present the sub-categories and codes that clustered around the category of “Procedural Equity.” In the results, I identify interviewees only by the number assigned to them during data collection to preserve confidentiality. In referring to the race of a particular interviewee, I remove the number so as not to link the number of a particular interviewee to a particular race.

Equity has two categories: procedural and distributive equity. Procedural equity involves inclusivity, impartiality, distributing leadership positions, representation of marginal groups, and responsiveness. Distributive equity involves educational, professional, social, environmental, and developmental benefits, and benefits from external agencies that are shared by members and the broader community. Accountability has five categories of face-to-face interactions, regular meetings, separation of powers, maintaining records, and external accountability. Symbolic capital has two categories of community building and community pride. Capacity has nine categories of grant writing, recruiting volunteers, networking, fund raising, financial accounting, and scientific knowledge, talking in the language of landowners, cooking and baking organizing events, and labor. At the writing stage, these mechanisms were refined into narratives to allow the analysis to emerge. Following Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004), collective action is defined as the involvement of a group of people with a shared interest within the group and some kind of voluntary common action, which works in pursuit of that shared interest.

Different forms of collective action include collective decision-making, setting rules of conduct of a group and designing management rules, implementing decisions, monitoring

and enforcing adherence to rules, information sharing, resource mobilization, and coordinating activities. Members can contribute in various ways to achieve the shared

goal: money, labor or in- kind contributions.

Section 3: Results

In the following section, I present an analysis of the mechanisms that create equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and draw upon the capacities of members to sustain collective action for watershed management in the OCWA. The OCWA has high levels of collective action through its monthly activities, weekly monitoring of water quality, conducting educational and awareness activities, and regular trash clean up events. The OCWA’s relative success as a watershed management group over the past 15 years in a region beset with poverty, distrust of outsiders, and environmental destruction makes it an attractive case for exploring the factors that facilitate collective action. Each mechanism is described in Table 2.

Mechanisms Institution

A. Procedural Equity (Exclusivity) 1. Membership

B. Procedural Equity (Inclusivity) 2. Deliberative decision-

making

3. Talking to people outside

the meeting

C. Procedural Equity 4. Board Elections

(Impartiality) 5. Non-discrimination

6. Nepotism

7. Conflict of Interest

D. Procedural Equity (Distributing Leadership 8. Officers and committees

Positions)

E. Procedural Equity (Representation of 9. Meeting Time

Marginalized Groups) 10. Meeting Place

11. Professionalism

F. Procedural Equity (Responsiveness) 12. Addressing Concerns

Table 2: Factors that Facilitate Collective Action in the OCWA Continued

Table 2 continued 13. Cognizance of Local

Conditions

G. Distributive Equity 14. Benefits: educational,

professional,

environmental,

developmental social,

external agencies. These

benefits are collectively

shared by group members

and the community.

H. Accountability (Face-to-face interactions) 15. Quorum

16. Regular Meetings

I. Accountability (Separation of Powers) 17. Leadership Positions

J. Accountability (Maintaining Records) 18. Meeting minutes,

correspondence, and

financial Records

K. External Accountability 19. External Auditor

L. Symbolic Capital 20. Community-building

21. Community Pride and

Reputation

M. Capacity 22. Unique Skills

Table 2: Factors that Facilitate Collective Action in the OCWA

The OCWA has high levels of collective action. Members attend meetings every month as well as participate in monitoring water quality, organizing community events and awareness activities, fundraising, and recruiting new members. During the monthly meetings, members participate in making decisions regarding funding, water clean up activities, organizing community events, amending bylaws, and reviewing the budget.

Equity

Procedural Equity: Procedural equity is fairness in decision-making processes.

The six ways by which the OCWA creates procedural equity are: Exclusivity, inclusivity, impartiality, distributing leadership positions, representation of marginal groups, and responsiveness.

A) Exclusivity: Exclusivity helps to maintain the core values of a group.

1) Membership

Defining membership is one of the ways of creating procedural equity because it determines who will bear the costs and benefits of a group’s activities (Ostrom, 1990).

According to the membership rule in the bylaws, “Any resident, stakeholder or property owner within the geographic area served by the corporation is entitled to membership in the corporation. Businesses located and operating within the watershed area are entitled to membership in the corporation. Members may also be appointed from local/state government, educational facilities, or business entities having a vested interest.”

Interviewee 2 said, “We have a Board of Directors and set rules like you have to live in watershed to be on the Board.”

Interviewee 4 said,

We don't have any paid positions to avoid people who are just in it for the money.

There’s a minimum of 16 board members and max of 19, including the 3 appointed

members. You have to own property or business that is in the Orange Creek watershed or

drain into it to be voting member. The three appointed members are chosen by their

respective institutions: The City of Montgomery, WVUIT University, Bridgemont

community college. This structure was decided through a strategy meeting and by

looking at other groups’ bylaws.

This rule creates procedural equity by providing equal membership rights to all the residents living within the boundary of the Orange Creek watershed. However, members of the OCWA form a close-knit community. Not many outsiders move into Orange Creek and not all of them join the OCWA because they may be temporary residents or squatters

(Interviewee 5, Interviewee 13). Interviewees said that they are careful about socializing with new residents such as renters or squatters. Thus, the membership in the OCWA has largely remained consistent since 2002. Members said that people left the group only if they moved away from Montgomery. In 2013, two African-American members left the

OCWA. Other members indicated that they stopped attending the meetings of the OCWA because of health reasons. Interviewee 5 said, “Mr. xxx was the Vice-President for a long time, but he stopped showing up for the meetings. We would ask him if he wanted to be the Vice-President, and he would say yes, but then again would be absent during the meetings. Gradually, he and his wife just pulled away and have now not been a part of our group. We don’t really know what happened and if it was really health that kept them away.” These two members declined to participate in the interviews.

Thus far, only two current residents have withdrawn their membership from the

OCWA. The membership rule creates exclusivity by ensuring that only people living in the watershed can be members of the OCWA, irrespective of race. It encourages

membership by residency rather than by race, thus promoting collective action despite racial heterogeneity.

B) Inclusivity: Inclusivity promotes deliberative decision-making, which gives every member an opportunity to contribute to decision-making.

2) Deliberative Decision-making

Deliberative decision-making is one of the ways to resolve conflicts, foster inclusivity, and create procedural equity (Poteete, 2004). Interviewee 2 said, “We had conflicts about how and what to do in the watershed. For example, people who didn't attend the first meeting...some people had wrong impressions or ideas about what was best or what was going. But we talk about it if there is conflict.” Interviewee 5 said, “If it's a really deep issue, then we do more discussion. There was more of that going on when everything first started. Those were some long meetings...” Interviewee 8 said, “It’s a close group, so we can talk it out. We don't claim to know everything, but some matters in the past created trouble about how to use the grant, what to fix and so on.” Several members said that conflicts emerged from people not understanding that the grant money was only to be used for activities included in the project proposal.

Interviewee 3 said,

We make a decision based on a lot of discussion, and explanation about educational

topics. Like any organization, we have small conflicts. For instance, one small group saw

things a little differently. They felt that they didn’t want to change the old way. They

didn’t want to share their contribution of labor to repair some things. Eventually, we

persevered, we kept discussing it, did things right, and stuck to our basic goals and

objectives and our fundamental mission to resolve it.

Interviewee 4 said,

We have had conflicts like, yeah, like why do you need outside people, why don’t you let

us use the money that you got in grant, or that we put fish in the creek (think they’ll get

permits to fish even though never fished in the creek in their life). We’ve had people try

to overthrow the voting and threaten to get us out of office because we had money and

they couldn’t get a hold of it. One guy took his jacket off and wanted to fight! Most of

these people are the ones that caused trouble in the workplace like strikes and now want

to do it in a watershed setting. But we talk out these issues to resolve them.

The OCWA has bylaws and two documents, “Ground rules” and “Consensus” that lay down rules for appropriate behavior during meetings to foster inclusivity through deliberation and discussion during meetings. One ground rule is, “Each person has the responsibility to participate – to offer ideas, and to voice concerns. Don’t hope and expect that others will read your mind. Each person also has the responsibility to make space for others to speak, to listen carefully and respectfully to what others say, and to consider the concerns of others. Don’t try to read minds or speak for someone else.” Another rule in

“Ground rules”, says, “Speak freely and candidly but be prepared to be challenged and take responsibility for challenging oppressive language.” “Consensus” has a rule that requires participants to “suspend judgment- agree to discuss the matter again when the group can do so in a more helpful way” when the atmosphere gets unfriendly or in situations where members feel that they are under duress. Thus, a deliberative decision- making strategy enables every member to participate in decision-making irrespective of race.

3) Talking to people Outside Meetings

Interviewees mentioned that norms of talking to people outside of the meeting also create inclusivity in the OCWA. For instance, members talk to other members after meetings, or talk on the front porch, or visit people’s houses to solicit opinions about the

watershed and its activities. Interviewee 12 said, “People talk with each other on the front porches and something might come up over there.” Interviewee 1 said, “Giving your opinion is generally on a voluntary basis, but we do actually ask people sometimes and go around to the residents' homes and talk to them.” Interviewee 6 said, “People who couldn't actually give their opinions at meetings would instead go talk to others and be given an opportunity that way.” Interviewee 2 said, “Opinions could be given freely…if someone didn't say anything at a meeting they might tell their neighbors afterwards.

Everyone knows each other. There are no secrets in Orange Creek.” Norms of talking to people outside of meetings facilitate ease in sharing opinions and perspectives and also creates opportunities for members to develop relations with each other across race.

C) Impartiality: Impartial rules create a sense of fairness among members in heterogeneous groups and are associated with increased compliance with group activities

(Kurian & Dietz, 2004). In OCWA impartiality is achieved through four institutions:

Board elections, non-discrimination, nepotism, and conflict of interest.

4) Board Elections

Any person living within the geographic boundaries of the OCWA can run for elections for the Board of Directors. This rule creates procedural equity conferring equal and impartial rights on any resident living within the geographic boundaries of the

OCWA to be elected to the Board of Directors, regardless of race. One African-American woman is the secretary. Other African-American members said that they do not run for board elections because of their advanced age and inability to devote complete attention to the affairs of the OCWA. These rules do not prefer one race to the other for electing

board members in the OCWA. In practice, members nominate each other to run for board elections

5) Non-discrimination

The OCWA has a non-discrimination rule in the bylaws: “The Orange Creek

Watershed Association, Inc. does not discriminate in its programs on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, religion, age, disability, political beliefs or marital and familial status.” Another rule is: “Challenge ourselves and think about how our language and behavior might be sexist, racist, classist and/or otherwise intolerant.” Another rule encourages members to, “ be sensitive to inclusiveness and participation, noticing if oppressiveness i.e. racism, sexism, etc. is manifesting itself, reminding us to monitor ourselves, honoring ground rules, helping stay on subject and time, and cooperating with the facilitator.” The OCWA follows Robert’s Rules of Order that have sanctions in case rules are broken during the meetings. In case group members break rules, committee members also speak to them at their homes. However, interviewees said that they have not needed to speak to anyone about inappropriate behavior towards African-Americans in the OCWA. Interviewee 6 said, “It’s unfortunate that we have a non-discrimination rule in our bylaws. Although we have never treated anyone differently, we decided to put it in just in case.”

In addition to these rules, non-discrimination is furthered by the community norms and shared experiences outside of the organization. An African-American member said,

I hadn’t ever experienced racial tension or discrimination in Orange Creek and

Montgomery and had never even realized that racial tensions existed until leaving

Montgomery and moving to Kentucky. We have all been at the same station in life. Our

families worked in coalmines together and we all went through the same kind of

sufferings. We never realized or we were never made to feel that we were different than

the others. I remember that I was upset when segregation in schools was banned. I had to

go to a new school. But I was sad not because I was an African-American going to a

White school. I was sad because I had to leave my friends behind. But there wasn't any

prejudice in Montgomery. I have never faced that here. I haven't faced that kind of

mindset here. No one had more than the other.

Interviewee 17 said, “I moved away and the community is one of the things I missed. When I moved to South Carolina, it was very segregated, but not here. I mean you could probably find one or two people here that think otherwise...” Interviewee 12 said, “Our friends and family live here and we have always been close because our fathers, both black and white, worked in the coalmines together. They worked together and experienced the same kinds of losses and deaths in the coalmines.” A white member said, “Orange Creek has a lot of diversity in that we have African-Americans in our association. We are close to them and have lived here together, so when we decided to form OCWA, they supported our efforts.” According to Interviewee 5, “I think we've always been very close. [Here] white people and black people lived together like no

“black” or “white” even existed. With the younger generation maybe less so because they stay indoors more with video games or whatever, but the older generation is very close.”

Interviewee 8 said, “When our fathers or grandfathers entered coal mines, they all experienced the same kind of treatment from the managers, and they all came out as black. So even if we were “black” or “white”, while growing up it never occurred to us that just because someone is black or white they have to be treated differently.”

Interviewee 13 said, “There are several inter-racial couples, and we all have always got along with each other. We have been a close neighborhood. There are the newer folk

from Smithers who don’t understand our culture and our way of life. But blacks and whites here have always got along, even during the segregation days.” Interviewee 7 said,

“They may be close to each other, but racial segregation in housing is very much present.

Orange Creek is better than most places around here in terms of race relations. There are some places around here where even I wouldn’t step in.”

However, even though members expressed close race relations, Orange Creek

Drive is clearly marked in terms of White and African-American zones. Orange Creek

Drive is a hollow, and Whites inhabit houses deeper in the hollow, whereas the beginning of the hollow marks the houses of African-American members. Furthermore, two White members invoked seemingly liberal ideas of meritocracy to challenge affirmative action policies. Interviewee 4 said, “Everyone is poor here! The whites and the blacks! If we need to get forward, we need to create a meritocracy and not hand out benefits based on

“black” or “white.” Another white member adopted a patronizing attitude, “The African-

American participants come, too, and they might not think they are good at doing anything, but they really help out.” Not all members expressed these views, and the activities of the OCWA that focus on increasing engagement with the African-American community through recruiting African-American members and conducting programs with

African-American children are in opposition to these views. Thus, even with housing divisions, existing community norms of close race relations in the OCWA and the non- discrimination rule fosters procedural equity through impartiality.

6) Nepotism

A related rule, nepotism, also creates procedural equity in the OCWA. According to this rule, “No person shall be eligible to be considered for, or serve as, an officer of the

Board of Directors for any period of time in which a member of such person’s immediate family is serving as an officer of the Board of Directors. Immediate family is defined as a husband and wife, parent and child, or sibling relationship.” Interviewees said that board members serve for a period of one year and they do not nominate people from the same family to serve on the board to avoid nepotism. In the monthly meetings, family members of the board also attend the meetings to provide input, information, and their opinions for making decisions, but do not participate in voting. For instance Interviewee 5 said,

“Being treasurer is to be part of the board. xxx, my husband (the co-founder), isn't on the executive board because I am.” However, all the interviewees said that the co-founder continues to remain the “driving force” of the OCWA. Additionally, two members of the

OCWA are also related to each other through relationships of mother-in-law and daughter-in-law. Thus, although this rule is strictly enforced, members may be distantly related to each other and may also influence decision-making without having voting rights in the group. Members said that they allow relatives to serve on the board because of the relatively small size of the group and a lack of more members. The nepotism rule does not intersect with race, but fosters fairness through impartiality in the OCWA.

7) Conflict of Interest

The OCWA defines a conflict of interest as, “A conflict of interest arises when an individual represents the interests of two groups or parties and the interests of those groups or parties are not identical to one another. Conflict of interest also arises where the individual’s own interests are interrelated to, or dependent upon, the interests of the represented organization.” The OCWA bylaws state that a member with a conflict of interest is not permitted to participate in a discussion of any issues in which the conflict

exists. The member is, however, allowed to vote on such issues or to make motions regarding such issues. For instance, Interviewee 17 said that she often does not vote on issues concerning the external agency of which she is an employee. This rule creates impartiality by preventing the member with a conflict of interest from influencing decisions in the OCWA. While conflict of interest does not directly affect racial heterogeneity, it instead creates fairness in the affairs of the OCWA.

D) Distributing Leadership Positions: Distributing leadership positions in a group avoids the concentration of power in any one individual and creates procedural equity by giving every person a fair chance to hold a leadership position (Poteete &

Ostrom, 2004). In the OCWA, there are two rules for distributing leadership positions: officers and committees.

8) Officers and Committees

There are four officer positions in the OCWA: President, Vice-president,

Secretary, and Treasurer who run the day-to-day administrative and managerial functions.

Officers are elected to the Board of Directors to serve a term of two years. The OCWA has three committees—Leadership, Outreach, and Finance—to facilitate the daily operations of the corporation. The OCWA also forms special committees to undertake projects as they arise. The Board of Directors appoints members to the three permanent committees. The committee members elect committee Chairs for one year. Thus, even within the committees there is a distribution of leadership positions. By creating multiple leadership positions and committees for managing the activities in the OCWA, members have several ways to contribute in different positions to the functioning of the group.

Interviewee 5 said, “I am in the Finance Committee and that is my primary responsibility.

I don’t work in Outreach, but I can vote on proposals that are brought to the Board by different committees.” These positions and powers are granted regardless of race, and they promote collective action by providing multiple venues for member buy-in and participation in steering group activities.

E) Representation of Marginal Groups: The rules of meeting time and place, and professionalism in the functioning of the OCWA enable participation of African-

American members in the meetings of the OCWA.

9) Meeting Time

The bylaws of the OCWA have a rule for the meeting time and place that says;

“Regular Board of Directors meetings shall be held on the 2nd Monday of each month at

6:30 PM, unless otherwise scheduled.” The meeting times are also put up on the homepage of the website of the OCWA. 8 interviewees said that this rule was crafted to enable participation from the African-American in the monthly meetings. “Making sure meeting time is respected and meetings don't last too long”, “making sure that we don't extend the meeting time”, and “to accommodate everyone, we stick to a time of one hour and we conduct our meetings on the second Monday of every month” were some of the responses to “What rules encourage African-American members to participate in the

OCWA?” According to interviewees the implementation of this rule demonstrates to the

African-American community that the OCWA values their time. For instance, an

African-American members said, “I am a part of three other organizations apart from the

OCWA. Attending meetings and doing work outside of these meetings keeps me occupied and I need to keep a tab on my time. Because I know OCWA’s meetings don’t go on for more than an hour, I can make time to attend them.” Similarly, another African-

American members said, “I attend the Senior Citizen's Group on Wednesday, Women's

Club on the 2nd Friday, Missionary group of the Church on Thursday, and OCWA's meetings on the 2nd Monday of every month. It is a busy schedule, but they are good about keeping the meeting time constant.” Overall, the predictable meeting time encourages participation from the African-American community and creates procedural equity because it was crafted by specifically taking into account the availability of the

African-American members. This encourages fuller meeting participation and thus collective action.

10) Meeting Location

The meeting location was selected to enable participation of every member in the

OCWA because the watershed office is located within Orange Drive. While not specifically intersecting with race, the central meeting location encourages equitable access to the meeting location to all the members, thus promoting collective action.

11) Professionalism

Nine interviewees mentioned that a professional and business approach enables participation from the African-American community because professionalism creates a perception of fairness. Article 1 of the bylaws refers to the organization as a business and eight interviewees said that operating like a business with professionalism enables participation of the African-American community in response to “What factors enable participation from African-American members?” Interviewee 4 said, “Orange creek runs like a business, and values it volunteers.” Interviewee 2 said, “Orange creek calls itself a business because it is run professionally with laws and a constitution. Being professional is one way we get the African-Americans to participate.” Interviewee 5 said, “It is

important that we call ourselves a business and not get tied in favoritism. Our bylaws also address this. People will feel like participating when everyone has an equal say, and not if one community is favored over the other.” Interviewee 13 said, “The African American community is really represented [in the OCWA]. OCWA is such an anomaly compared to other watershed groups because they have the same kind of land but use different approaches that don’t really encourage participation from the African-American community. For example, we are unique in having a constitution for our watershed group and working like a business.” Thus this form of procedural equity creates a sense of fairness to encourage participation of African-American members.

F) Responsiveness: Community norms of responding to concerns of members support collective action. The OCWA is responsiveness in two ways: by addressing concerns and by being cognizant of local conditions.

12) Addressing Concerns

Interviewees consider the OCWA to be attentive to the needs and concerns of its members. For instance, Interviewee 1 said, “A member didn't know what the watershed group did, and some didn't understand that the group can't fix all the problems…that it takes some effort. The conflict with the lady was easily resolved because we basically had to just look into the problem and found out what she had a misunderstanding about. It turned out that a Board of Director had forgotten about a project and the lady did not know why it had been stopped.” Another way to address concerns is by being straightforward about it. Interviewee 1 continued, “We deal with it by politely telling them how the watershed group works and by checking on the specific issues. After figuring out the problem, we're just straightforward about it and talk to people.

Interviewee 16 said, “At meetings we increase voices of the marginalized. When people were giving opinions, the committee made sure to listen to them and address their concerns.” By responding to concerns, the OCWA demonstrates to the community that they are responsible about addressing the concerns of the members. This strategy does not intersect with race, but facilitates collective action by creating responsiveness through procedural equity.

13) Cognizance of Local Conditions

Cognizance of local conditions for crafting rules fosters procedural equity

(Ostrom, 1990). Interviewees said that there is an understanding that members in the

OCWA are too poor to donate funds to the group. Interviewee 4 said, “We can’t ask people in the area to donate because they’re so poor. It’s hard to be environmentally conscious when you don’t have money. I think that sometimes they think that they lack power to change, but recently they see that they can. Not everything takes money.”

Community norms of checking on each other also facilitate collective action. For instance, one African-American member said, “If someone is not seen for more than two days, someone will go look at their mailbox or knock on their doors, just to make sure that they are okay. Others don’t understand our need to rely on each other, but we know that if we don’t have a community to look out for each other, that’s the end of us. Being a part of the OCWA, gives us access to that community.” Interviewee 12 said, “OCWA does a lot of work to help the economically disadvantaged. XXX tore her house down when it was damaged and helped her get her trailer, and then helped her in the garden.

That is how we are, we look out for each other.”

Strategies that create procedural equity such as helping the disadvantaged members also create “community.” Interviewee 1 said, “It's hard being NPO [Non-Profit

Organization] (to help with poor population and economy), but we've done things like community gardens to help people in poverty be healthier, and we try to get the African-

American community involved and to clean up the area to make quality of life better.”

Existing community norms of checking on each other, repairing houses of the disadvantaged, and taking care of the community after disasters help to reinforce feelings of community. Interviewee 13 said,

I think the WSD has done a lot, they redid the park, planted trees, repaired the homes of

disadvantaged folks. That’s the thing about them; they go over and above of what a

watershed organization will normally do. xxx cuts my grass for me because I can’t afford

to pay a boy to cut my grass. They took care of everyone when there was the chemical

spill, opened the watershed office for showers and brought in bottles of water to

distribute in the community and Montgomery.

Being cognizant of local conditions facilitates collective action in the OCWA by creating a sense of belonging among the members. African-American members, in particular, indicated that this sense of belonging is one of the reasons that they participate in the OCWA.

G) Distributive Equity: Distributive equity is the equitable distribution of benefits from natural resource management (Poteete, 2004; Jacobs, 1989; Anand & Sen,

2000; Sunam & McCarthy, 2010) and impacts participation in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups (Buffum, Lawrence, & Temphel, 2010). In the OCWA, members reported receiving a range of benefits including educational, professional, environmental, developmental, social, and benefits from external agencies. These benefits facilitate

collective action by enabling implementation of decisions, coordinating activities, and resource mobilization.

14) Benefits: Benefits were classified into educational, professional, environmental, development, social, as well as benefits from external agencies. These benefits are shared by group members as well as the broader community in Orange

Creek. Only White members receive professional benefits because African-American members do not necessarily seek professional development opportunities through their participation in the OCWA.

Educational Benefits: A total of 14 members mentioned educational benefits out of which five were African-Americans. Educational benefits included skills, watershed conferences, and environmental awareness. The OCWA has a strategy of taking the entire group for the Watershed Celebration Day organized by the DEP. According to

Interviewee 21 from the DEP, “OCWA is one of the few watershed organizations that hires a bus to bring down all its watershed members to the Watershed Celebration Day.

This allows watershed members to learn about other watershed groups, which they probably would not get to attend if they could not travel to the Celebration Day.”

Interviewee 13 said,

[XXX] always makes sure to take us all for the watershed conference. We have a great

big trailer. Going to a new place is the best part. We have been able to learn about how

different watershed groups interact, what kind of technology they have, how advanced

they are, how can we learn from them, and what can we teach them? I’ve been able to

learn about watershed science, the need to keep the environment clean for our health.

Everything is dependent on how others use the environment and maintain it. I’ve learned

that the watershed is making a great impact and has gotten the kids here interested in

science. When I go to the conferences, I learn about fly-fishing, and painting.

This strategy ensures that benefits are available to every member in the group.

Additionally, the OCWA also organizes several educational and awareness events in the community that provides educational benefits to group members as well as residents of

Montgomery.

Professional Benefits: 10 members mentioned professional benefits because of their participation in the OCWA. Professional benefits included “getting jobs because of experience of volunteering with the OCWA”, “changing careers because of OCWA,

“networking and meeting with people”, and “giving awareness talks and leading field trips on aquatic life.” For example, Interviewee 16 said, “It was how I got my introduction to environmental work, hands-on experience in non-profit work, I got to go to state level and understood their challenges, and now I have a holistic view of watershed management.” Interviewee 15 said, “I get called up to talk to people all the time, so networking. Plus, this group pulls in people from around the country and even the globe. To me, they are also my family and friends, and the networking is great. The more people that they bring in, the more I get to teach and promote watershed programs, so people in other states will start doing it too.” According to Interviewee 1, “My community is cleaner, but where I really benefited was professionally. I struggled coming out of college when the economy was down. I couldn't get a job anywhere, but after doing VISTA [Volunteers in Service to American] with Orange Creek, I had job experience and skills. Before I never got calls back from applications, but after working with the watershed, I stood out and got a career started.” Interviewee 2 said, “It changed my whole life. I changed my entire career to work in the watershed. I wanted to make a difference in “white collar” crime and to stop the sucking out of resources from areas like

Orange Creek. I realized that every generation needs better, no more illegal timbering, and so on.” Interviewee 16 said, “I joined VISTA and was attracted by goals of Orange

Creek, and continued to be involved after program ended. I ended up working for the state, then DEP and did outreach with Orange creek.” However, none of the African-

American members mentioned professional benefits because of their advanced age and because they did not necessarily seek to develop professional skills through their participation with the OCWA.

Environmental Benefits: All 17 members of the OCWA mentioned environmental benefits. Environmental benefits included improving water quality, cleaner environment, and improvements in biodiversity in the Orange Creek. Interviewee

1 said, “Environmental benefits have included the passive treatment systems for improving the pH of the water and litter pick up. I grew up with a creek that was orange, had sewage and trash in it, but I realized I could do something about it.” Interviewee 2 said, “We have clean ups, do educational outreach, we improve biodiversity and quality of life in the community. Aesthetic improvements like trash, and water quality improvements were crucial.” Interviewee 13 said, “Once OCWA was formed, everyone had to get hitched to the sewage system. Previously, there used to be green slime in the river and the creek. We have come a long way from those days.” Interviewee 12 said,

“We have been able to stop sewage in the Orange Creek, stopped people from trashing the neighborhood. We take kids up to the creek and teach them about fishing and the plants. Kids like to do that sort of thing.” Interviewee 4 said, “There have been environmental benefits such as fish and micro invertebrates returning to the creek, mitigating the effects of AMD (raising pH back up), stream stabilization, less solid waste,

reintroducing native chestnut trees, and removing invasive species.” Interviewee 16 said,

“Water monitoring by Virginia Tech students and getting people doing environmental projects in Orange Creek because the word got out about the area. They started some adaptive management projects and increased flexibility in management.” Interviewee 10 said, “I started with volunteering, but have now become a regular at the meetings.

Sometimes, I can bring in my friends to help out during the clean up days.” Non- members said that environmental benefits such as improved aquatic diversity and wildlife has increased hunting and tourism opportunities in the region.

Developmental Benefits: All 17 members of the OCWA mentioned developmental benefits such as opportunities for tourism and recreation in Orange Creek that has increased the economic visibility of Montgomery. Interviewee 16 said, “More people came to Orange Creek like students, which increased networking, tourism, made the community more visible, and got people going to Capitol Hill for them and making changes.” Interviewee 1 said, “Improvements to community power and the future outlook in Orange Creek has changed. It's still a low economic community, but now we are getting economic benefits like development, people coming in, recreation, and local business.”

Social Benefits: All the members of the OCWA mentioned social benefits including “improvements in the quality of the life of the community”, “reinstalling community pride”, “building community”, “increased diversity”, “new ideas”, and

“building partnerships with outsiders.” Interviewee 2 said, “As for social benefits, we have more communication with the outside, better access with better resources and more community pride.” Interviewee 4 said, “Slow change in how people think about the

watershed and environment, reinstalling community pride, hopefully enticing young people to pursue STEM fields and college in general, especially through education and the way things are communicated/taught.” Other interviewees also mentioned that bringing in new people to OCWA increases ethnic and racial diversity, and infuses new membership and new ideas into the group. Interviewee 9 said, “The OCWA was on the lookout for new people to join the board and xxx coaxed me into joining the group. And now seeing what they do, we have decided to involve ourselves more in what they do.”

Interviewee 15 said, “The College tends to have ethnic diversity, so we try to reach out to the colleges too.” Interviewee 5 said, “I've met so many people that I would have never met before. Just the variety of people who come here is amazing, you see how small the world is.” Interviewee 1 said, “Recently, the community colleges/universities are becoming more active in bringing in ideas. Younger people and students have been more involved than they ever have been. The college [WVUIT] contributes to racial diversity.

If it disappears from Montgomery, then the community would really become a ghost town, so bringing people here and keeping them here has been one benefit. I think it’s more socially than economically.” Interviewee 4 said, “A way to make ourselves sustainable is to get more young people involved in the OCWA.” Interviewee 8 said, “We need more members and so we actively engage in getting people together. Dinners, watershed days, cookouts, or when the kids come from colleges to volunteer, or when it’s time to survey the fish in the streams. Trout in the Classroom is big. We get the kids to start caring early.” Interviewee 16 said, “There's a lack of young people, but we bring in tons of students.” Interviewee 24 said, “You get people with different experiences and

from different disciplines and backgrounds. It’s a much more rounded look at things and helps the group be more diverse in their thinking and planning.

The OCWA also has a board member in-charge of recruiting people who said:

As a board member [in the OCWA], my job is to represent the interests of Bridgemont

and as the Youth Action Committee chair, to find ways to engage the young people in the

community and find funding for it. I didn’t necessarily pay attention before going to

college, but after coming back I saw a lot of engagement with the community and with

kids than I never noticed before. For example, getting African-American and the poor

kids involved and trying to keep them from dropping out, and I really think it’s working.

Once they do it (getting involved in watershed activities, etc.), they’re hooked.

External Agencies: 20 interviewees mentioned benefits from external agencies.

External agencies provide human, technical, and financial resources, advice, and opportunities to develop partnerships with other external agencies.

Interviewee 1 said,

We'll ask them for advice about what we can do about a problem, and how we can do it.

They are technically “experts” so it would be bad not to include them. As for resources

provided… the watershed basin coordinators are probably one of the best resources. They

send us information about grants and the DEP also sends resources about programs and

grants. As for technical resources, experts have come to give workshops about stream

profiling and design of streams, for example. We have experts come out for a lot of

things.

xxx started talking to DEP and invited them to go and got advice on how to be

environmentally safe. The DEP, board, other watershed groups helped write the bylaws.

The DEP gave funding and support. DEP also sent a watershed coordinator and other

watershed groups such as Paint Creek gave advice from their experience. We got funding

from government and NGOs, and they provided help with engineering designs,

manpower, and expertise. The Surface and Mining Division and DNR acted more like

advisors than decision-making, and helped make sure the right information is out there

(Interviewee 2).

Interviewee 15 said, “The state government, who I work for, besides technical and scientific advising, provides funding and grants. There are a lots of grants, and the stream partner grant which is pretty much a given, provides up to $5000. There's also funding for water quality, abandoned mine lands, etc. Other interviewees also echoed these benefits from external agencies. For instance, Interviewee 14 said, “They [the DEP] help with water sampling, provide the funding and information about what might be needed in design of a plan. Basically manpower and funding.” Interviewee 1 said, “Agencies send interns to learn, and trout in the classroom programs always gets the entire community and the schools going.” Interviewee 3 said, “Lots of projects that were in collaboration/partnership with the government. They provide grants.” Interviewee 4 said,

“Grants from government $5000 from stream partners grant, we have project grants

(hydro, stream stabilization), etc. Interviewee 20 from the DEP said, “WVDEP provides me as their [OCWA’s] coordinator to help them with whatever they need help with.

Grants, supplies, scheduling, outreach, knowing who to contact…the list goes on and on.”

Some members felt that the state does not do enough to assist the OCWA.

Interviewee 5 said, “Getting the government to recognize this area is so hard. There's only a small population so they tend not to pay attention.” Interviewee 16 said, “They

[the OCWA] try explaining to the EPA that if they give us this land to work with, we can do all this stuff, but Orange Creek has such a low population that it doesn't necessarily show up on EPA’s radar.”

Interviewee 17 said,

I think the college could do more to engage with the local community and do things

there. A lot of things that they do goes toward Charleston and Fayetteville, but I think

they should be here in Montgomery. I feel like it’s a top down issue. Leadership gives lip

service to “engagement”, but they don’t follow through (with action). I feel like my

community gets written off a lot because it’s a small town. I’ve really tried to emphasize

that we need to focus here, on my town!

Other interviewees mentioned communication barriers in working with government agencies. Interviewee 2 said, “There are communication barriers: We were working on the Asbestos-Containing Material (ACM) sites with the DEP and the watershed coordinators, etc., but the engineers weren't so keen to come to meetings or listen to local knowledge. There was a lack of communication between “high professionals” and us. The groups would be doing something, but the DEP was doing something separate.” Interviewee 3 said, “Occasionally, they [the government agencies] often dictate certain specifics about the project.”

Interviewee 4 said,

They need to find people who they trust and don’t “BS” us. They need to find people to

disseminate information from people with PhDs to people who didn't graduate high

school. The PhDs in the government need to disseminate information in different ways,

especially to those who have low education. People with low education tend to be

intimidated by “smart” people or don’t/can’t use computers. That’s one reason we want

to use education and build an education center.

One interviewee from an external agency said, “They don’t articulate with grants— maybe because they work with volunteers, and therefore, they don’t get funded. They do not have a clear plan of focus and goals to accomplish for their watershed. But we go to

board meetings every month. [xxx]—referring to the founder— likes it if the person is present for the meetings.”

Bringing in people and cultivating partnerships is particularly important for the OCWA because historically members have had, and continue to have, tense relations and encounters with outsiders. For instance, several interviewees mentioned that there is an anti-outsider and anti-government rhetoric among residents in Orange Drive because of complex environmental histories of resource exploitation by outsiders. For instance,

Interviewee 2 said, “There were some concerns with outsider groups coming in. There's an Appalachian culture and people are wary of strangers because there’s an image that they just come for their own interests and for their own profit, but I believe that you have to have partnerships.” Interviewee 11 said, “we are careful with whom we socialize.

There are a lot of new people coming down to live here.”

Interviewee 4 said,

People are wary of outside culture (Buffalo creek mining disaster), and the government

just doesn’t care about people as individuals. They end up thinking that there’s any end to

that. We have people that still get mad if we have outsiders like college students coming.

Why? I don’t know, they just don’t understand why we need them. Maybe they think

they’re going to try to catch them doing something.

Other members of the OCWA had opinions along the lines of, “problems arise when the

OCWA brings in outsiders where they are not supposed to be”, “the government in the

White House is out to take what belongs to us” or “Obama is putting an end to coal-fired power plants in West Virginia, which means a loss of jobs for us and gain in jobs for

China. The hoax of climate change is just an excuse to move jobs to China.”

The OCWA is attempting to alter the “us versus them” attitude because it obstructs them from developing meaningful partnerships with government agencies. For instance, the OCWA works closely with the DEP to develop the watershed based plan for the OCWA. Interviewee 1 said, “Not having an “anti- outsider” attitude gets more work done for the OCWA.” Interviewee 3 said, “However, there are people from the community with the government agency, therefore we have a relationship with them.”

Thus, through an active engagement with different external agencies such as government and academic agencies, the OCWA is trying to change the anti-outsider attitude towards external agencies and has been fairly successful in developing partnerships with external agencies despite underlying norms of distrust towards outsiders. The ability to do so brings benefits that help promote collective action.

Thus the OCWA provides benefits that are collectively shared throughout the community. While all the members mentioned educational, social, external agencies, environmental, and developmental benefits, only White members mentioned professional benefits, suggesting this particular benefit may not overcome racial heterogeneity. But the other benefits encourage people of all races to work together so that they can obtain the benefits.

Accountability: Accountability mechanisms ensure that socially marginal groups receive their fair share of benefits. Accountability also checks on dominant groups who may coopt the decision-making process. The OCWA creates accountability through four mechanisms of face-to-face interactions, separation of powers, maintaining records, and external accountability.

G) Face-to-face interactions: This includes decision-making rules such as a quorum for conducting meetings and regular meetings.

15) Quorum: Meetings in the OCWA can be held only in the presence of a quorum. The OCWA bylaws define a quorum as, “A quorum of the Board of Directors must consist of the majority of the board, or nine members of the current Board prescribed by the Bylaws.” If a quorum is not present, the Board of Directors will adjourn the meeting and vote on a decision at a meeting in which a quorum is present.

Interviewee 5 said, “We take time and talk about things for a while. People have full time jobs and sometimes you miss meetings, but you have to have a quorum for a vote, so we can't do it if there's only 6 people.” While members did not mention this rule to specifically affect race, the quorum rule creates accountability by requiring the presence of at least nine members in conducting the meeting.

16) Regular meetings: Regular meetings are held once a month, general membership meetings are held quarterly, and the annual meeting is held on the second

Monday every January. Interviewee 3 said, “The board meetings are open, everyone is invited to voice their opinion, bring thoughts, and projects. There are always an opportunity for everyone to attend the meetings. Inviting people ensures transparency in how we conduct our affairs.” Interviewee 1 said, “Regular meetings allows everything to be brought up and everyone can ask questions and voice their opinions freely.” Thus, conducting regular meetings facilitates frequent face-to-face interactions with members across different races, which increase opportunities for collective action.

I) Separation of powers: A separation of powers creates different roles and responsibilities for different positions to avoid concentrating power in any one leader.

17) Leadership positions: The structure of OCWA includes a variety of leadership roles and committees. The OCWA has four individual leadership positions with different duties. The President is the Chief Executive Officer of the OCWA and

Serves as the Chair of the Board of Directors. The President can appoint special committees subject to the approval of the Board of Directors and is responsible for good public relations with the community. The Vice-President can assume the duties of the

President in the absence of the President and serve as assistant to the President. The

Secretary is responsible for keeping accurate minutes of the corporation, sending notices of meetings and confirmation letters of appointments to committees and offices, and maintaining membership and committee lists. The Secretary also maintains incoming and outgoing correspondence. The Treasurer is responsible for the receipt and deposit of contributions and income into the accounts at banks and keeps a record of funds received and expended. The Treasurer provides written financial reports at each monthly Board meeting, submits a yearly budget for the approval of the Board of Director and secures the services of a certified public accountant for an annual audit of the corporation’s financial records. The Treasurer is also the chair of the Finance/Grants committee

The leadership committee develops the skills of its members for decision-making, recruits and nominates members and Board of Directors for programs, enforces and implements election protocols and parliamentary procedures, and makes recommendations for rulemaking in the OCWA. The outreach committee is responsible for recruiting new members and organizing awareness activities. The financial committee monitors expenses, pays bills, provides reports, develops grant proposals, receives funding requests, and prepares a budget at the start of the fiscal year to present to the

Board of Directors. Separation of powers between the leaders and between the committees creates accountability in the OCWA and serves to check power from being wielded by a dominant group within the organization.

J) Maintaining records: Maintaining records create transparency in the affairs of an organization. Transparency of records is increased if members have opportunities to view the records.

18) Meeting minutes, correspondence, and financial records: The secretary maintains copies of all correspondence on behalf of the association, the corporation’s bylaws, books and records of its bank accounts and other assets, and correspondence and filings with the U.S. Internal Revenue Service. The treasurer is in charge of keeping a record and the receipts of all funds received and expended by the OCWA. The treasurer also presents a financial record of expenditures to the Board of Directors at every monthly meeting. According to the treasurer, “I have an OCD (obsessive compulsive disorder) where accounts are concerned. I need to know where every penny comes from and where it goes. If the accounts don’t tally, I will not sleep because when we submit our progress reports for our grants, it is crucial to have our accounts accounted for!”

Interviewee 1 said, “I got a lot of grants for OCWA and I got to see how it was all funded. All the grant money is used correctly for the community…the community comes first.” Thus, maintaining records contributes towards transparency in the affairs of the

OCWA.

K) External Accountability: External accountability increases transparency and creates a sense of fairness in the functioning of a group.

19) External auditors: The OCWA is also accountable to government organizations, and funding agencies. The OCWA monitors and collects water quality data every week for pH levels, iron and aluminum levels. Monitoring the water quality every week enables the OCWA to track the changes in water quality and generate long-term water quality data. These data are necessary for the OCWA to demonstrate the environmental impacts of their watershed group to funding agencies. Monitoring water quality creates accountability to funding agencies such as the DEP, the EPA and the DNR who provide financial as well as technical resources to the OCWA. The OCWA also hires a certified public accountant for performing an annual audit of the corporation’s financial records. Thus, it ensures accountability through independent third party monitoring. Overall, these accountability measures facilitate collective action by creating transparency in the functioning of the group.

L) Symbolic Capital: The OCWA uses two strategies to build symbolic capital.

Symbolic capital is built by community-building measures and community pride.

20) Community-building: The OCWA builds “community” by developing community gardens, dinners, and watershed celebration days. Interviewee 8 said,

“Dinners, watershed days, cookouts, or when the kids come from colleges to volunteer, or when it’s time to survey the fish in the streams. Everyone from the OCWA comes out on those days.” Interviewee 9, a newly joined member, said, “Seeing a community as close as theirs is great! They make an event out of everything to increase involvement and everyone ends up having a good time.” Interviewee 16 said, “I saw the value of building sense of community and working with local communities after coming to

OCWA. It really gets people excited for improving their community.” Thus, OCWA

builds feelings of “community” despite racial heterogeneity through organizing events and community gardens.

21) Community Pride: The OCWA generates community pride by creating visibility through strategies and outcomes of successful collective action. The OCWA achieves visibility through strategies of conducting community events, monitoring environmental quality, installing signboards highlighting its achievements throughout

Montgomery, social media, and conducting meetings in the watershed office.

The OCWA organizes several community events such as clean up events, where members pick up the trash in the neighborhood. Interviewee 17 said, “Outreach isn’t just about spreading information about the environment, it’s also about building pride and reaching out into the community. They go out and engage with groups and residents in the watershed.” Dumping trash along the Orange Creek has been a long-standing norm in the Orange Creek. Members said that generating community pride about a clean environment is one way to change prevalent attitudes towards illegal trashing.

Interviewee 5 said,

People don't have money, so they worry more about feeding their kids than paying the

trash bills. So the trash is dumped outside. But at the same time, for example, we were

cleaning up trash on the streets and started picking it up in someone's yard. They came

out to help and now they keep it better than before. Trash has been a big problem because

it was the culture… People would just throw a refrigerator over the mountain. I think

attitudes have changed a lot. I think it has a lot to do with the watershed group creating

community pride. Appalachian culture is a thing- the people think the mountain is theirs,

but it really isn't. It's private land owned by the companies and they didn't have to let

people hunt in the woods or use it. Still, a lot of people have an attitude that it's their land.

Interviewee 16 said, “OCWA made sure their activities are visible by conducting events in schools, getting concrete measurements of water quality … the streams were no longer orange, and they built community pride through their ability to show results. At the beginning people didn't see immediate results or wondered why X or Y wasn't being done, but after seeing the changes, they participated or became volunteers.” For instance, even an accountability mechanism of environmental monitoring to generate water quality data creates community pride because it demonstrates progress of the OCWA’s efforts.

The OCWA also creates visibility of its achievements by installing signs of

“Watershed of the Year, 2006” awarded to it by the DEP. Interviewees mentioned that having the physical space of the watershed office to conduct meetings provides

“visibility” and brings in the residents from Montgomery and the Orange Creek to the meetings. Interviewee 16 said, “We have our own building and people actually saw what was going on. We made sure our activities were visible so that people know where they have to go to attend the meetings.”

Another way of creating visibility is by documenting the activities of the OCWA on its social media page on Facebook. The OCWA diligently chronicles all the projects, events, and activities on its Facebook page along with awards, cleanup activities, and highlighting the achievements of the group as well as individual members. The OCWA also records its achievements of receiving funding and grants on its Facebook page, which creates community pride. Documenting grants on Facebook is another way of maintaining records of grants, which creates accountability.

Outcomes of collective action in the form of awards and recognition also generate community pride. For instance, the OCWA has also won several awards at the Watershed

Celebration Day organized by the DEP, along with awards for individual members in recognition of their contribution to the various activities. Strategies of building symbolic capital such as community and community pride are aimed at increasing the participation of community residents across race in activities of the OCWA. Symbolic capital builds a sense of community that can persist despite underlying racial differences.

M) Capacity of Members: Different capacities of members can override socio- cultural boundaries to facilitate collective action.

22) Skills: Strategies that draw on the various capacities of members play an important role in facilitating collective action. Interviewees suggested that the racial heterogeneity in the OCWA helps the group in organizing cookouts for various events such as the Watershed Celebration Day, Martin Luther King Jr. Day, and Earth Day. For instance, Interviewee 4 said, “The group sees great value in the participation of the

African-American ladies that do not consider themselves to be “experts” in anything, but they play supporting roles such as cooking food for events.” According to Interviewee

13, “Some [of the African-Americans] couldn’t participate regularly [in meetings], but they worked in different areas for example, making food, writing, etc. Interviewee 15 said, “Here we have an ethnic diversity that is kind of unique. Knowing where people are specialized, what people’s strengths are is really important and this group tends to really find those strengths, even if it's baking cookies. For example, they [the African

Americans] might do something like build bird boxes on Martin Luther King (MLK)

Day, and the college tends to have ethnic diversity, so they try to reach out to the colleges

too.” Interviewee 5 said, “Then there's the “African-American ladies” and they can't do physical labor, but they help cook and pass out food if there's a school group or something like that. They get really excited with the watershed celebration and they love to just have fun. They are in their 70’s and low income, so for them it’s a change of scene.” According to Interview 12, “We don’t do the office work but we have friends who help us for the days when we need to organize the celebration days, Make it Shine

Day, MLK day, Earth Day.” The advanced age of the African-American women prevents them from contributing to other tasks such as physical labor, and therefore, they contribute to the activities of the OCWA through cooking for community events.

Maintaining the financial accounts, talking to landowners, recruiting members, grant writing are other skills that encourage collective action. Interviewee 5 said, “My role has probably become more defined. I don't go out in the field but I do the paperwork, write the checks, and keep the balance.” Other members contribute to the OCWA with other skills such as recruiting volunteers, networking, talking to landowners and industries, or labor. For instance, Interviewee 5 said, “xxx is the driving force. He's out doing the groundwork, talking to people, getting some of the grants. Also xxx, the president, he does a lot of the behind the scenes stuff like talking to landowners and industries. He's good at that because he talks the language. For me, I make sure the funds go where they are supposed to go. There are lots of people who just show up, put in labor and go home.” Interviewee 1 said, “First, I was just helping with litter pickup, monitoring, and manual labor like mowing. I did capacity building: writing grants, getting volunteers, building the network, bringing people in, bringing money in. Now, I give professional advice and just volunteer for regular things like litter pick up.” Thus,

the OCWA utilizes the capacity of its members, irrespective of race, to further collective action.

Section 4: Discussion

The aim of this study is to contribute to the CBNRM literature to examine factors that facilitate collective action in a racially heterogeneous group. This case was chosen because of heterogeneous composition of the OCWA and its success at collective action.

In this particular case, race was not very important to the OCWA’s ability to act collectively. Results indicate that racial heterogeneity is not as problematic for watershed management in the OCWA than other features of the community. Features of the community such as attitudes towards trashing, poverty, “anti-outsider” perceptions of the community, lack of attention from government agencies, and a perception of a stereotypical Appalachian culture that is reinforced by external agencies are more problematic. These findings are consistent with empirical findings from studies conducted in developing economies that suggest that socio-cultural heterogeneity itself does not necessarily hinder organizing and sustaining self-governing activities (Poteete &

Ostrom, 2004; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). Below, I discuss the factors that facilitate collective action in the OCWA despite racial heterogeneity, in terms of the propositions derived from prior studies. In Figure 3, I then adjust the framework proposed earlier.

No. Proposition Supported Mechanisms

(Yes) /Not

supported

(No)

1a Fair procedural institutions Yes Exclusivity, inclusivity,

will facilitate collective impartiality, distributing

action. leadership positions,

representing marginalized

groups in the OCWA, and

responding to the concerns of

the community.

Table 3: Theoretical Propositions versus Key Findings in the OCWA Continued

Table 3 continued

1b Distributive equity will Yes The strategy of traveling

facilitate collective action. together for the Watershed

Celebration Day provides

everyone an opportunity to

participate in community

events. Educational,

professional, social,

environmental, and

developmental benefits are

collectively shared by the

members of the OCWA as

well as the broader

community.

1c Procedural equity will create No The procedural rule for

distributive equity. meeting time encourages

participation of the African-

American members. However,

findings did not support the

proposition that procedural

rule creates distributive equity.

Table 3: Theoretical Propositions versus Key Findings in the OCWA Continued

Table 3 continued 1d Procedural equity will create Yes Exclusive membership, talking

symbolic capital. to people outside of the

meeting, and cognizance of

local conditions reinforce

feelings of “community.”

2a Accountability mechanisms Yes Quorum, regular meetings,

will facilitate collective separation of powers,

action. maintaining records, and

external accountability

facilitate collective action.

2b Accountability will create Partially Accountability through

procedural and distributive supported separation of powers creates

equity to facilitate collective procedural equity. There are

action. no accountability mechanisms

to ensure distributive equity.

2c* Accountability mechanisms Yes Demonstrating results of

create community pride. improved water quality

generates community pride.

Table 3: Theoretical Propositions versus Key Findings in the OCWA Continued

Table 3 continued 3a Symbolic capital will Partially Existing community

facilitate collective action. supported facilitated self-organization.

Existing sense of place is

detrimental to the

environment goal of

collective action.

3b Institutions will create Yes Strategies of organizing

community, community dinners, community gardens,

pride, and sense of place and creating visibility

generate “community” and

community pride.

3c Collective action outcomes Yes Outcomes of collective action

will create community, in the form of awards and

community pride, and sense recognition also generate

of place to facilitate community pride.

collective action.

3d Symbolic assets such as Yes Community pride encourages

community pride are inter- voluntary labor for trash pick,

convertible with economic which generates more

capital to facilitate collective community pride.

action.

Table 3: Theoretical Propositions versus Key Findings in the OCWA Continued

Table 3 continued

4a In heterogeneous groups Yes Members contribute through

members who pool together grant writing, fund raising,

capacities such as leadership, recruiting volunteers,

literacy, bookkeeping, and organizing community events,

knowledge will facilitate and cooking and baking.

collective action.

4b Institutions can build the Yes Strategies of regularly

capacity of groups to participating in the Watershed

facilitate collective action. Celebration Day build capacity

in the OCWA.

Table 3: Theoretical Propositions versus Key Findings in the OCWA

Equity: The OCWA creates procedural equity through exclusivity, inclusivity, impartiality, distributing leadership positions, representing marginalized groups in the

OCWA, and responding to the concerns of the community. Studies suggest that fostering inclusivity in meetings, decision-making, and activities prevents exclusion of marginalized groups (Lockwood et al., 2009). The OCWA has institutions and procedures that specifically take into account racial heterogeneity and local conditions through meeting times, non-discrimination rules, norms of checking on each other, and helping disadvantaged members, which facilitate collective action in the OCWA. This is

in line with literature that suggests that rules that reflect local conditions create equity to facilitate collective action (Ostrom, 1990). Members are more likely to participate in the group’s activities if they perceive fairness in decision-making through impartiality and distributing leadership positions (Anand & Sen, 2000; Jacobs, 1989; Poteete, 2004;

Sunam & McCarthy 2010). These findings are as expected in Proposition 1a that procedural equity facilitates collective action.

For distributive equity, a strategy of traveling together for watershed conferences such as the Watershed Celebration Day provides members an opportunity to gain benefits from such events. Interviewees from the DEP mentioned that the OCWA is one of those rare organizations that bring its entire group to such events, which enables the members to gain benefits by participating in these activities. Members mentioned strategies for reaching out to the African-American community by focusing on African-American children through educational programs such as “Trout in the Classroom.” Educational, professional, social, environmental, developmental benefits, and benefits from working with external agencies are collectively shared by all the members in the OCWA as well as the broader community. For instance, social benefits such as “improvements in the quality of the life of the community”, “reinstalling community pride”, “building community”, “increased diversity”, “new ideas”, and “building partnerships with outsiders” facilitate collective action. The community shares environmental benefits such as improvements in water quality, cleaner environment, and improvements in biodiversity. Some community members volunteer with the OCWA as a result of these benefits. This finding supports studies that suggest that distribution of benefits promotes collective action in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups (Anand & Sen, 2000; Jacobs,

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1989; Poteete, 2004; Sunam & McCarthy, 2010). These finds are as expected to the theoretical proposition 1b that a fair distribution of benefits is associated with collective action.

According to Proposition 1c, procedural equity creates distributive equity to ensure that socially marginal groups receive their fair share of benefits. In the OCWA rules that specifically encourage participation of African-American members (e.g. meeting time) create procedural equity. While this rule creates procedural equity by providing equitable opportunities to participate and influence decision-making, it is not clear to what extent this rule creates equity in the distribution of benefits. Thus, findings did not support theoretical proposition 1c.

Literature suggests that procedural equity creates symbolic capital in the form of group identity and “community” (Ashforth, 1998; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Cohen, 1985;

Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994; Elsbach, 1999; Hogg & Terry, 2000; Ibarra, 1999;

Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001). While there was no evidence for procedural equity creating symbolic capital such as group identity, members said that community norms of checking on each other creates procedural equity, which reinforces feelings of

“community.” Community norms of talking to people outside of meetings allows people who do not participate in the group meetings to voice their concerns by providing an alternative avenue of participation. It creates inclusivity in the decision-making in the

OCWA and a perception of fairness because members are able to participate in decision- making even if they are not present for the meetings (Varughese & Ostrom, 2001).

Existing community norms of checking on each other reinforce feelings of community

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among members to facilitate collective action. These findings are in line with Proposition

1d that procedural equity creates symbolic capital in the form of “community.”

Accountability: Accountability mechanisms such as face-to-face interactions, regular meetings, separation of powers, maintaining records, and external accountability are essential to meet the goals of social justice and are also considered to facilitate collective action. These mechanisms are especially relevant in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups because of their ability to keep power asymmetries in check, distribute power and responsibilities equitably among the group members (Ribot, 1999), and avoid entrenching locally powerful elites (Lockwood et al., 2009).

In the OCWA, there are several institutions that create accountability through transparent processes such as a quorum to conduct regular meetings. Separation of powers of the President, Vice-President, Secretary, and the Treasurer, and the Leadership,

Outreach, and Finance Committees avoids the concentration of power in any one individual or committee. Literature suggests that separating roles and responsibilities in heterogeneous communities create accountability (Gruber, 2010; Kerr, 2002; Klooster,

2000; Lockwood et al., 2009; Ribot, 2002; Pandit & Bevilacqua, 2011). Maintaining records of meeting minutes, financial transactions, and water quality creates internal and external accountability. This finding is supported by literature suggesting that maintaining records and minutes of the meetings create accountability, which increases compliance of group members with group decisions (Adhikari & Lovett, 2006;

Saravanan, 2002). External agencies independently monitor water quality as well as assist the OCWA in conducting aquatic surveys. An external public accountant also audits the accounts of the OCWA. Creating accountability facilitates collective action because it

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enables the OCWA to conduct its meetings in a fair and transparent manner and to apply for government grants. Thus, an institutional environment that creates accountability for community-based projects in heterogeneous groups facilitates collective action for monitoring financial transactions and implementing decisions in the OCWA in line with

Proposition 2a.

Accountability mechanisms also create procedural equity. For instance, in the

OCWA, an accountability institution that creates a separation of powers also creates procedural equity because it distributes power equitably in the group. However, the

OCWA did not have any accountability mechanisms that ensure that benefits are distributed equitably in the community. This finding is in line with Proposition 2b that accountability creates procedural equity (Adhikari & Lovett, 2006; Agrawal & Ribot,

1999; Lebel et al, 2006; Ribot, 2002). However, the second part of the proposition that accountability creates distributive equity was not supported and was crossed out in Figure

Symbolic Capital: Feelings of community and community pride are a valuable source of symbolic capital for encouraging participation and can persist despite socio- cultural heterogeneity (Cochran & Ray, 2009; Sangameswaran, 2008). The creation of symbolic capital is a dynamic process and institutions as well as outcomes of collective action generate symbolic capital such as feelings of community and community pride in the OCWA. According to Proposition 3a, symbolic capital such as community and sense of place facilitate collective action. Literature suggests that symbolic capital in the form of sense of place also motivates people to participate in watershed management groups in the Appalachian region (Lukacs & Ardoin, 2003; Rowles, 1983; Stewart, 1996). In the

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OCWA, symbolic capital such as community pride is used to motivate members to participate in cleanup activities. However, symbolic capital in the form of a sense of place was not conducive to the environmental goals of the OCWA because the community had developed a norm of disposing trash in the creek. Interviewees said that many members of the community believe that they have a right to litter because the resources “belong to them.” Thus, even though a sense of place can facilitate self- organization, it can result in environmentally destructive behaviors. Thus, Proposition 3a that symbolic capital such as community and sense of place can facilitate collective action was partially supported in the OCWA.

The OCWA builds symbolic capital in the form of community pride by creating visibility of its activities. These include strategies of conducting events, community gardens, measuring water quality, installing signs highlighting its achievements in the watershed, and social media. The OCWA has been conducting events such as trash pickup, which is also aimed at changing the trashing behaviors of residents and creating community pride in a clean environment. An accountability mechanism of generating water quality data to submit to funding agencies also creates community pride. Improving water quality creates visibility of OCWA’s progress. Thus, an arrow was added in Figure

3 from accountability to symbolic capital because accountability mechanisms of monitoring water quality also generate community pride. The OCWA has also installed signboards all over Montgomery that records its 2006 achievement of “Watershed of the

Year”, which reinforces symbolic capital such as community pride and constructs a new sense of place. Reinforcing “community” is important because feelings of community are fragile in the face of changing circumstances (Appadurai, 1997; Mosse, 2003;

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Sangameswaran, 2008). These findings are supported by literature that suggests creating visibility of progress creates community pride, which motivates members to sustain collective action (Lukacs & Ardoin (2013). Scholars suggest that even with socio-cultural heterogeneity, a symbolic community can be present that facilitates collective action

(Cohen, 2013; Cochran & Ray, 2009). Thus, institutional arrangements generate symbolic capital despite heterogeneity supports Proposition 3b.

Outcomes of the group’s success also build symbolic capital. The OCWA’s reputation as a successful organization is reinforced through winning awards at the

Watershed Celebration Day organized by the DEP. Thus outcomes of collective action create symbolic capital in line with Proposition 3c. The OCWA also draws on community pride to mobilize voluntary labor for collective activities such as picking up illegal trash.

Thus, the OCWA is able to convert community pride into economic capital to mobilize labor from members and residents for common activities (Bourdieu, 1977;

Sangameswaran, 2008). Literature suggests that symbolic assets in the form of prestige can be converted to economic capital to mobilize voluntary labor for common activities such as harvesting (Bordieu, 1977). Similarly, economic capital can be converted to, and stored as symbolic assets by using expenditures from a harvest to pay for prestige- building activities (Cochran & Ray, 2009). Organizing such events reinforces a sense of community and pride that sustains collective action. Furthermore, harnessing community pride for voluntary labor demonstrates the inter-convertibility of symbolic assets of pride and economic capital. This finding is in line with Proposition 3d that states that symbolic assets are inter-convertible with economic capital.

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Capacity: Because of the relatively small size and close-knit nature of the

OCWA, members are aware of the skills and capacities of other members. The OCWA therefore uses strategies to pool together the capabilities of its members to support its objectives of recruiting members, fund-raising, organizing community events, labor for events, and financial accounting, baking and cooking, scientific information, grant writing, recruiting new members, and talking to landowners and industries. African-

American members contribute through cooking and baking because their advanced age and limited technical skills prevents them from contributing to activities such as grant writing. Several of the OCWA’s activities build capacity of the members through educational and professional benefits that has shaped their career. Thus, participating in collective action can also strengthen the capacity of members through providing educational and professional benefits to members. This finding is in line with studies that suggest that in socio-cultural groups, skills of members may complement the skills of other members for managing resources, which helps to cross socio-cultural boundaries

(Varughese & Ostrom, 2001) and Proposition 4a that capacity of members can override socio-cultural differences to facilitate collective action.

Strategies of participating in events conducted by external agencies also build capacity. For instance, the OCWA takes its members every year to the Watershed

Celebration Day organized by the DEP. This strategy not only creates distributive equity as mentioned earlier, but is also a capacity building strategy. This finding supports

Proposition 4b that institutions build capacity to facilitate collective action.

Thus, equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities facilitate collective action in the OCWA through institutions or collective action outcomes. While these

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factors are considered essential for the good governance of any organization, this analysis shows that they are equally relevant in a racially heterogeneous group and that even racially heterogeneous groups can undertake collective action. A point to note is that there may be other factors that contribute to collective action that were not a part of the study design. As previously stated, the concepts of procedural equity, distributive equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities were drawn from prior literature that suggests that these concepts are relevant for socio-culturally groups to undertake collective action. However, it is important to note that the relative importance of these factors may be more important in a racially heterogeneous group than a homogeneous group.

Figure 3: Factors that Facilitate Collective Action in the OCWA

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Implications for Racial Heterogeneity

Institutions in the OCWA have important implications for social justice by challenging oppression and removing structural barriers that marginalize African-Americans. The

OCWA has been able to develop institutions against discrimination by crafting rules that provide educational, social, environmental, and developmental benefits for African-

American members. The OCWA is cognizant of the marginalized and disadvantaged status of its African-American members and some institutions are specifically crafted towards increasing representation from the African-American community such as meeting time, recruiting African-American members, and reaching out to African-

American school and college students for volunteer-based activities.

Strong community norms of checking on disadvantaged members in times of need strengthen the community and encourage participation from the African-American members. By recognizing the capacity of the African-American community, the OCWA has crafted rules and strategies to take advantage of the skills of the African-American members in organizing community events for the OCWA. Thus institutions that specifically take racial heterogeneity into account have allowed the OCWA to meet its collective action goals (see Figure 3). Overall, the institutions for equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacity of members have largely been successful in facilitating collective action despite racial heterogeneity.

However, although interviewees suggested “closeness” between the African-

Americans and the Whites, micro-interactions between the two groups indicate the presence of unequal relationships. For instance, four out of six African-American members are old and retired women, who mainly contribute through cooking and baking,

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while other members contribute through grant writing, fund raising, recruiting volunteers, monitoring water quality, maintaining accounts, and talking to landowners and industries.

Out of these only one African-American woman has been the Secretary. Interviewees would frequently speak about African-American members as “they may not consider themselves to be good at anything”, or “they are not experts, but they really help out and they like to have fun.” This suggests three points. One, micro-interactions belie the nature of “close-knit community” that exists in the OCWA. Two, as Schelhas (2002) pointed out, black invisibility continues to be active in the OCWA. Interviews with African-

American members suggest that they feel a sense of gratitude towards the OCWA for

“checking on them regularly” and “taking care of the disadvantaged”, which indicates that they may be content with maintaining the status quo. Three, although African-

American women contribute through tasks of cooking and baking, these tasks can also be seen as continuing to maintain inequality. Thus, even though factors of procedural equity, distributive equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities facilitate collective action to improve water quality in racially heterogeneous groups, inequalities continue to be maintained between African-Americans and whites, and are even unintentionally reproduced by institutions (where African-American members are assigned tasks of cooking).

Interactions between African-Americans and Whites in the OCWA suggest that they are not relationships between equals and members are aware of this inequality.

Suppression of bias is considered as one of the factors associated with creating fairness or procedural equity for motivating participation (Webler & Tuler, 2001). In the OCWA, while overt bias is not expressed, some members interact with African-Americans

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through a color-blind frame that prevents them from acknowledging past, historic inequalities. Some scholars, therefore, argue for adding a third category for equity called interactional justice or recognition (Clarke & Agyeman, 2011; Guthman, 2008). This category is relevant because although there may be rules within systems for fair and equitable procedural and distributive equity, micro-personal interactions between unequals can undermine them. For minority, impoverished, and marginalized groups, personal interactions may not necessarily undermine participation in collective action, but continue to reproduce inequalities.

Overall, the factors of equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities facilitate collective action in the OCWA in line with previous literature. This study finds that the institutions that are indicative of good governance such as equity and accountability are also important in a racially heterogeneous organization. Moreover, institutions for creating procedural equity are reflective of community norms. Ostrom

(1990) suggests that institutions that are crafted according to local conditions are equitable. The finding that symbolic capital such as community pride facilitates collective action is in line with previous studies that suggest that symbolic capital has the potential to bring together diverse people despite socio-cultural divisions (Cochran & Ray, 2009;

Sangameswaran, 2008). This study finds that community pride can be generated through strategies as well as outcomes of collective action to sustain collective action.

Furthermore, findings indicate that community pride develops over time by creating visibility of events or as a group becomes more successful in its activities. Therefore, it may be the case that institutions of equity and accountability are more important to

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initiate collective action and symbolic capital is more important to sustain collective action.

Section 5: Conclusion

By building on existing CBNRM theory that is centered in developing countries, this study examines the factors that facilitate collective action in a racially heterogeneous watershed organization in West Virginia. Drawing from theoretical constructs from CPR, political ecology, and sociology, these findings suggest that racial heterogeneity does not necessarily hinder collective action. The OCWA has been able to sustain itself for 15 years and has been successful in improving water quality by crafting institutions that create inclusivity through equity and accountability. Institutions and collective action outcomes create and reinforce community pride that serves as a powerful motivator for collective action. The OCWA also utilizes the capacity of its members to address environmental problems through fund raising, recruiting members, and conducting educational and awareness activities.

The main theoretical contribution of this study is that it demonstrates that the factors of procedural equity, distributive equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities facilitate collective action in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups. For instance, institutions can be crafted to create procedural equity, distributive equity, and accountability. However, the factors of symbolic capital and capacities are dynamically produced by institutions as well as the outcomes of collective action. Symbolic capital such as community pride and capacities, thus, help to sustain collective action by continual reinforcement of pride and capacity building. Further research is needed to investigate to what degree these mechanisms are important in other contexts, and if some

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are more important than others to build knowledge about the interactions between heterogeneity, collective action, and institutions for successful CBNRM.

Selecting more cases with racial heterogeneity across a range of levels of collective action can further assess the validity and reliability of these findings. There is a crucial need to pay attention to contextual factors that affect institutional arrangements in heterogeneous groups because socio-cultural heterogeneity is a community attribute that is embedded in a specific context. An assessment of how contextual factors interact with institutional arrangements will provide a better understanding of how communities manage socio-cultural heterogeneity to undertake sustainable collective action. Future research can explore factors that motivate the participation of minority groups in watershed management as well as the relevance of place-based symbolic constructs (that are relevant for the Appalachian region) for creating inclusivity in heterogeneous groups in sustainable development efforts.

One caution is that this case study is not representative of watershed management groups throughout the United States. However, its relatively small size and isolation in terms of not being integrated with large-scale global markets are shared features of watershed groups in the Appalachian region, and the lessons from this study can be used to better shape watershed organizations in the Appalachian region. The OCWA was selected because it was deemed successful at watershed management and was racially heterogeneous. Furthermore, although the factors of procedural equity, distributive equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities facilitate collective action in the

OCWA, racial inequalities continue to be maintained. Contextual features such as detrimental environmental behaviors and negative perceptions of external agencies affect

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the ability of the OCWA to meet its collective action goals. The OCWA therefore uses institutional arrangements to change attitudes towards trashing and the negative attitudes towards outsiders. This ability of institutions to shape as well as be shaped by contextual factors is further explored in Chapter 4.

In light of decentralized initiatives in West Virginia for sustainable resource management, these findings also have policy implications. Although external agencies provide substantial financial, human, and technical resources, micro-interactions between the external agencies and the OCWA undermine community efforts for improving water quality. For example, roles of “experts” and “high professionals” adopted by external agencies intensify the historic distrust of outsiders. Furthermore, external agencies have not devoted attention to addressing racial inequality through watershed management, although watershed management is aimed at fostering inclusivity. Watershed management policies can explicitly adopt a focus on disadvantaged groups within communities because treating whole communities as disadvantaged eclipses the disadvantaged within an already disadvantaged community. Minority groups continue to be invisible, not only in literature on watershed management but also in watershed organizations in practice. Determining the causes and consequences of such invisibility has important implications for environmental justice.

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Chapter 3: Institutions for Community-based Natural Resource

Management in Heterogeneous Community: A Case Study from Karnataka,

India

Introduction

Decentralized natural resource management has been a policy trend in India since 1990. Watershed development, one such policy, encourages the formation of community-based organizations (CBOs) to implement watershed programs, construct structures such as check dams, bunds, and farm ponds to collect rain water and reduce soil erosion, allocate water, maintain these structures, and collect maintenance fees.

The focus on “community” is a result of debates in development theory and practice that argue for communities to be an alternative to functions that the state and the market failed to perform (Sangameswaran, 2008).

A focus on community has failed to recognize differentiation within communities— that communities are made up of multiple actors with multiple interests who interact across multiple scales with each other that affect the outcomes of natural resource management (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999). Studies of CBNRM and

CPR management that focus on community suggest that the relationship between community and natural resource management is complex. Most scholars find that socio-cultural heterogeneity in a community is likely to hinder natural resource management efforts (Baland & Platteau, 1997; Kant, 2000; Neupane, 2003, Shiferaw,

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Kedebe, & Ratna Reddy, 2009). However, a limited number of studies suggest that there is no association between socio-cultural heterogeneity and successful natural resource management, and that even socio-culturally heterogeneous communities can successfully manage resources through local governance (Adhikari & Lovett, 2006;

Andersson & Agrawal, 2011; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). A reason for the limited consensus on how heterogeneity affects resource management is because of the different dimensions of heterogeneity, the different impacts of heterogeneity on resource management, and the inconsistencies in measuring heterogeneity and outcomes of resource management (Andersson & Agrawal, 2011).

While a great deal of work on watershed development in India focuses on evaluating outcomes and best practices, very few studies have examined the relationship between socio-cultural heterogeneity and watershed development in India. Therefore, through an in-depth case study, I explore the factors that facilitate collective action in a group with caste heterogeneity for watershed management in Karnataka, India. This study focuses on two over-arching research questions:

1. What factors allow a group with caste heterogeneity to achieve collective action?

2. What are the mechanisms through which these factors promote collective action?

This chapter is organized as follows: In section one, drawing from prior research,

I examine the relationship between heterogeneity and collective action with a focus on watershed management in India. This is followed by an illustration of the argument that procedural equity, distributive equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities can facilitate collective action despite the presence of caste heterogeneity (Andersson &

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Agrawal, 2011; Cochran & Ray, 2009; Gibson & Koontz; 1998; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004;

Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). Outcomes of collective action can create community pride and develop capacities to sustain collective action. Section two describes the fieldwork, methods, and data collection strategies. Section three presents the analysis and the results from the Arepalyam Bailur Prakruti Watershed Association (ABPWA) in Karnataka. In section four, I discuss the findings and its implications for understanding caste heterogeneity. Finally section five concludes with policy implications and future research questions.

Section 1: Prior Research: Watershed Development in India

An outcome of the academic and policy debate on development in the 1990s was the revival of the “community” for natural resource management programs that had, until then, been implemented under heavy government management (Sangameswaran, 2008).

Conceived as a soil and water conservation measure in the 1970s and the1980s, watershed development in India was a highly regulated top-down program. In the 1990s, watershed development in India became one of the tools for rural development. While the main goal of watershed development is to construct water-harvesting structures such as check dams, farm ponds, and bunds to capture run-off water and halt soil erosion, a key element of watershed programs is to maintain these structures by coordinated investment from the resource users (Kerr, 2001). However, the sustainability of the benefits from the watershed program is questionable because of a poor record of community maintenance of the watershed structures after the termination of the watershed program (Kerr, 2002;

Koontz & Sen, 2013; Mansuri & Rao, 2004). The other objectives of the program were to

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alleviate rural poverty, support rural livelihoods, improve agricultural production, create alternative livelihoods through animal husbandry and dairy farming, community empowerment, sustainable use of natural resources, and improve social and economic conditions of disadvantaged groups (Government of India, 1994; Kerr & Chung, 2002).

A watershed is considered as the unit of operation and implementation of the watershed program. A watershed is a special kind of CPR, “defined by hydrological linkages where optimal management requires coordinated use of natural resources such as captured run-off water, pastures, and forests by all users” (Kerr, 2007). Resources such as agricultural land in the watershed are managed individually, but collective action is required among all resource users in the watershed to manage hydrologic processes for maximum productivity of the whole watershed system because of spatial inter-linkages related to the flow of water (Kerr, 2007; Kerr & Chung, 2001). These hydrological linkages make a watershed system a multiple-use CPR with diverse groups from different villages involved in generating agreements about resource access, allocation, and control

(Steins & Edwards, 1999).

Scholars and natural resource practitioners have suggested that homogeneity is a key factor that determines the success of natural resource management outcomes (Mehta,

1997). Similarly for watershed development, villages with “harmony” i.e., villages without factional relationships or radical social movements, were chosen over villages with caste heterogeneity to implement programs (Baviskar, 2001; Chhotray, 2004; De

Souza, 2001). Thus, watershed development programs were typically implemented in villages that had a common history and ethnicity with the assumption that common

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features, shared norms, and values will motivate communities to self-organize for carrying out water management activities. (Kerr, 2002; Leach, Mearns, & Scoones, 1999;

Sangameswaran, 2008). However, these assumptions downplayed the differences within

“homogeneous” communities and their effects on natural resource management (Agrawal

& Gibson, 1998).

In a country like India where socio-cultural divisions of wealth, caste, and gender are deeply rooted, they become a key issue in determining access to and control of natural resources (Mehta, 1997). These socio-cultural divisions affect various aspects of

CBNRM such as the participation of users in watershed programs, institutional development for resource management, decision-making, and benefit sharing within the group. For example, water rights for irrigation are tied to land ownership, which remains with upper castes. Upper caste members, generally the social elites, dominate decision- making in watershed development committees, although other social groups may be a part of such committees, and even hold leadership positions (Kafle, 2008; Mehta, 1997;

Tewathia, 2011). The nature of caste hierarchies and inequalities that have been socially legitimized over centuries allow the elite castes and classes to control natural resources unchallenged by other social groups (Mehta, 1997). Although the caste system and its practices are outlawed in India and are punishable offences, villages still practice various aspects of untouchability that disadvantage Dalits (considered to be untouchable) and tribal populations that form the most impoverished segment of Indian society. The structure and composition of caste hierarchies present considerable challenges in bringing

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about efficient and equitable watershed management (Agarwal, 2001; Arnold, 1998;

Bromley & Cernea, 1989; Oakerson, 1986; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004).

In the late 1980s, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in India started focusing on organizing socio-culturally heterogeneous communities to implement watershed management programs (Farrington & Lobo, 1997; Hinchcliffe et al., 1999).

For example, the Mysore Rehabilitation and Development Agency (MYRADA) only invested in watershed development after a village had achieved strong organizational skills and was able to negotiate with different groups such as low caste people, women, landless, and farmers in the village (Fernandez, 1994). However, these kinds of programs are scarce because of a lack of a national level watershed development policy for heterogeneous communities (Joy et al., 2006).

Socio-cultural Heterogeneity in India

The complex relationship between socio-cultural heterogeneity and collective action has generated contentious debates in the fields of CPR and CBNRM. Most studies argue that socio-cultural heterogeneity may create challenges for natural resource management because differences in social class, caste, and ethnicity create differences in preferences and interests; difficulties in building agreements and enforcing norms; distrust; social resentment; domination; discrimination; and notions of purity and superiority (Andersson & Agrawal, 2011; Baland & Platteau, 1997; Barros, 2007; Blair,

1996; Chakraborty, 2001; Kant, 2000; Naidu, 2009; Neupane, 2003; Poteete & Ostrom,

2004; Shiferaw, Kedebe, & Ratna Reddy, 2009; Shiferaw, Tewodros, & Reddy, 2009;

Varughese & Ostrom, 2001).

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Socio-cultural heterogeneity can increase discrimination and social exclusion of lower castes by depriving them of access to resources, and privilege “higher” castes. For example, in a watershed management program in Maharahstra, India, a decision to close the common lands in the village for rejuvenation was based on a majority-rule vote of elite groups. The majority vote did not reflect the interests of the low caste herders who were a small minority in the village and were in favor of keeping the commons open for accessing the pastures. Herders ignored these rules that restricted access, which undermined the project objectives of rejuvenating the common lands (Kerr, 2001). Thus,

“elite-biased” CPR management dominated by higher castes can exlcude lower castes from decision-making and limit the ability of the groups to achieve their CPR objectives

(Beteille, 1983; Boyce, 1994; Kant, 2000; Leach, 1992; Pandit & Bevilacqua, 2011;

Pariyar, 2006; Runge & Defrancesco 2006; Ruttan, 1998; Somnathan, Prabhakar, &

Mehta, 2002). Caste-based notions of impurity and hierarchy may prevent Scheduled

Castes such as harijans from using drinking water from taps, ponds, temples that are easily accessible to members of other castes (Kurian & Dietz, 2004). These oppressive customs can negatively affect resource management by discouraging Dalit cooperation

(Joy et al., 2006; Ruttan, 2006; Seabright, 1993).

These findings are complicated by empirical studies and agent-based models that suggest that caste heterogeneity does not hinder collective action (Chakraborty, 2001;

Gautam, 2002; Janssen & Ostrom, 2006; Somnathan et al., 2007; Varughese, 2000).

Some studies find that factors of procedural equity, distributive equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities can facilitate collective action in a socio-culturally

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heterogeneous group. I apply these concepts to examine whether communities can overcome the challenges of caste for undertaking collective action.

Collective Action in Heterogeneous Communities

I use the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2 to analyze the institutional arrangements that overcome caste heterogeneity in India. While these propositions are features of good governance in groups without socio-cultural heterogeneity, I draw these propositions from literature that examines how institutions facilitate collective action in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups. Please refer to Chapter 2, Section 2. I have summarized the 12 propositions below and illustrated them in Figure 4:

Equity

Proposition 1a: Fair procedural institutions facilitate collective action.

Proposition 1a: Distributive equity facilitates collective action.

Proposition 1c: Procedural equity will create distributive equity.

Proposition 1d: Procedural equity will create symbolic to facilitate collective action.

Accountability

Proposition 2a: Accountability mechanisms are associated with collective action.

Proposition 2b: Accountability will create procedural and distributive equity and is associated with collective action.

Symbolic Capital

Proposition 3a: Symbolic capital such as, community, community pride, and sense of place in a community are associated with collective action.

Proposition 3b: Institutions can create symbolic capital.

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Proposition 3c: Collective action outcomes will create symbolic capital such as community pride.

Proposition 3d: Symbolic assets of community pride and reputation are inter-convertible with economic capital and are associated with collective action.

Capacities

Proposition 4a: Members can pool together capacities such as leadership, literacy, bookkeeping, and knowledge to facilitate collective action.

Proposition 4b: Institutions that build the capacity of groups will facilitate collective action.

Figure 4: Factors facilitating Collective Action in Socio-culturally Heterogeneous

Communities: A Theoretical Framework (Modified from Andersson & Agrawal, 2011).

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In this study, I investigate a watershed management group with two castes that has been successful at collective action to understand what factors enable the group to facilitate collective action. I base this study on the following research questions:

1. How does equity in a group with caste heterogeneity facilitate collective action?

2. How does accountability in a group with caste heterogeneity facilitate collective

action?

3. How does symbolic capital in a group with caste heterogeneity facilitate collective

action?

4. How does the capacity of members in a group with caste heterogeneity facilitate

collective action?

Section 2: Study Context: The ABPWA

In 1991 the Mysore Rehabilitation and Development Agency (MYRADA) began capacity building and awareness activities to form the Guru Malayam (GM) Doddi

Watershed Association. In 1994 the GM Doddi Watershed Association was formed, composed of two castes: Lingayats and Scheduled Castes. However, even after the formation of the watershed organization, MYRADA interviewees said that it required 68 meetings and 6 participatory planning exercises over three years to finally implement the watershed program. Interviewees said that initial reluctance by both the Lingayats and the

Scheduled Castes to form the group stemmed from deeply rooted norms that structured caste interactions. Untouchability was, and still is, widespread in this region. A significant challenge for MYRADA was to convince the Lingayats, a politically powerful 123

and wealthy caste, to sit together with the Scheduled Castes, a historically marginalized caste. Interviewee 23 from MYRADA said,

It was difficult to convince people. We would ask them to accompany us for visits to

other watershed sites. But, even these visits did not do much to convince the farmers to

form a watershed organization. Later we realized, that it was not that they were not

interested in having a watershed program. Each caste had their own customs and the

biggest hurdle was getting them together. The Scheduled Castes would not come in front

of the Lingayats, they would not speak to them directly, and they would not eat together.

When we started conducting sessions on natural resource management, soil erosion, and

watershed structures, they did not have an option but to sit together. This was the first

time that they were sitting together on a carpet, eating together during breaks, and talking

to each other. Earlier, this was not the case. Now even though we have withdrawn from

the area, they have been enthusiastic about continuing with the group.

Three villages, GM Doddi, Arepalyam, and Bailur were included in this watershed management program. The watershed program was undertaken on a 70-30 component with MYRADA, an NGO, implementing the program through a 70 % grant from

Misereor, a German funding agency, and a 30% contribution from the farmers.

Additionally, Misereor provided a loan to farmers for the 30% contribution and instead of repaying the loan to Misereor; farmers pooled their repayments to create a common fund for post-project management activities. Thus, this “loan” was conceptualized to create community ownership over resources as well as post-project maintenance of the watershed structures. Much of this money was used for constructing watershed structures including check dams, wells, and bund. The construction of these watershed structures was subsidized for the farmers (and therefore privately rational to undertake), but the

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30% loan reflected the contribution of the farmers towards a common resource for construction, operation, and maintenance of the check dams and bunds between farms.

In 2002, residents from the villages of Arepalyam and Bailur decided to form a new watershed association by splitting from GM Doddi Watershed Association. Interviewees gave three reasons for this split. First, fortnightly meetings were held in GM Doddi, which was two kilometers (1.2 miles) away from Arepalyam and Bailur. Second, members from Arepalyam and Bailur claimed that members from GM Doddi rarely attended meetings. Farmers from GM Doddi owned land in the upper catchment of the watershed, whereas farmers from Arepalyam and Bailur had land in the lower reaches. A major bulk of the work concentrated on the upper catchment land developing individual irrigation facilities such as private wells in GM Doddi. On the other hand, work in the downstream catchment, where farmers from Arepalyam and Bailur had land, focused on constructing bunds and boulder dams that were shared by two or more farmers with adjacent land. Interviews revealed that farmers from GM Doddi were Lingayats who were relatively better off than farmers from Arepalyam and Bailur, and did not perceive any benefits from continuing the functioning of GM Doddi. Interviewees indicated that after the construction of the watershed structures, farmers from the GM Doddi stopped attending meetings. Interviewee 4 said,

There were 35 members in the original group. We used to go from Arepalyam and Bailur

to GM Doddi to attend the meetings. Only a few people from GM Doddi were interested

in attending the meetings. We couldn’t recover the loans from them, and there was no

response from them. Finally, MYRADA stepped in and settled the accounts. After the

split, the problems with them stopped. Our group was the driving force. It is not that

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everybody from GM Doddi was bad. We told them that we would be happy to continue

as one group, but they did not agree with us. In the past, our village [members from

Arepalyam and Bailur] used to go, there used to be participation, we got together for

discussions, but soon it deteriorated into useless talks. In GM Doddi, there is no

cooperation.

Interviewee 1 added,

There was also an issue of dominance because of caste. GM Doddi is made up of

Lingayats. One of the officers from MYRADA in charge of implementing the project at

that time was also a Lingayat and there were some instances where they were given

precedence over us. Most of the project funds went to them. Their land also lies in the

upstream region, so most of the work was concentrated in those parts. They received

private watershed structures and irrigation facilities. When other officers from MYRADA

found out, that officer was fired. By then it was too late. We decided to split from them

because we could not find it helpful for our group to be under their constant domination.

Interviewee 22 from GM Doddi, who had also been the president of the GM

Doddi Watershed Association, said, “People lost interest and they wanted to do their own thing. There was no problem from our side.” Interviewee 1 added a third reason for the split; “The local bank provides loans to groups with 20 members or less. Things were not working out with GM Doddi, so it made sense for us to split, reduce the number of members in our group and develop a linkage with the bank.” In 2002, the ABPWA was formed with members from Arepalyam and Bailur. Thus, the large size of the GM Doddi

Watershed Association, with a majority of the members (who were all Lingayats) from

GM Doddi, the heterogeneity of location and heterogeneity in the distribution of benefits in the watershed led to the split of the group.

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The AB Prakruti Watershed Association (ABPWA) began functioning in 2002 with 17 members, from two castes: the upper Lingayat caste, and the Scheduled Castes (a lower caste). Three Lingayat members have left the group since the split from the GM

Doddi watershed association. Out of these three members, two members left the group because they did not repay their loans and a third member left the group because of a misunderstanding regarding the common fund. At the time of the split all members of the

ABPWA were men, but now the group has a woman member, who took her brother’s position after his death. Today ABPWA has 14 members. Nine members in the group are small and marginal farmers with land ranging between two and five acres. All of these farmers are also Scheduled Castes. The five Lingayats have land ranging between six and twelve acres. The index of caste heterogeneity for Arepalyam and Bailur is 0.45, which is considered to be moderately heterogeneous (Adhikari & Lovett, 2006).

Since 2002, the ABPWA has been managing the check dams and bunds constructed on their farms by monitoring for damage. Every member in the ABPWA is responsible for the maintenance of the bunds and dams on his/her land. Members also occasionally team up with farmers with adjacent land to repair damaged bunds. These bunds prevent soil erosion and allow rainwater water to seep into the ground. In case the bunds develop holes, water passed through the holes, accelerating soil erosion. There are

30 acres of common land that hold three check dams. The members of the ABPWA visit the common lands thrice a year to check for damages to the check dams. If the structures are damaged, the ABPWA commissions repair works. The ABPWA also maintains the open-access lakes used by farmers to extract fertile silt for their fields.

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The ABPWA also provides loans to its members from the common fund. The

ABPWA sends its members for training in allied agricultural activities such as animal husbandry, or awareness events such as HIV/AIDS awareness, legal awareness, and agricultural fairs. Since 2013, the ABPWA has also been organizing training sessions on community-building and organic farming for other watershed management groups in other villages to generate additional income for the group. The ABPWA is also a conduit through which government agencies provide gas cylinders, saplings for composting, and medicines for cattle, community fishing, and health insurance to the members.

Furthermore, they also contribute to the overall development in Arepalyam and Bailur by constructing toilets in the villages, de-silting the lakes in the villages, repairing the temple roof, and organizing medical camps for cattle.

Methods: Data Collection

Data for this study were collected from December 2014 to January 2015 and June

2015-August 2015 in five visits to the field site. A combination of semi-structured interviews, open-ended discussions in watershed meetings, observations in watershed meetings, and informal conversations were used to collect data. Meeting minutes of the watershed meeting provided secondary data. The investigator attended four watershed meetings to observe decision-making processes and interactions of the members within the group, and observed watershed members as they went about their daily tasks to observe interactions of members outside the group. Four rounds of semi-structured interviews were conducted with 27 respondents. Of these, 14 are members of the

ABPWA, one is an ex-member of the ABPWA, one is an ex-member of the GM Doddi

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Watershed Association (pre-cursor organization to the ABPWA), five are residents from

Arepalyam and Bailur, and the other six are from external agencies. These include

Syndicate Bank (1), Mysore Rehabilitation and Development Agency (MYRADA) (3),

Community Managed Resource Center (CMRC) — an organization linked to MYRADA

(1), and the Department of Agriculture (DoA) (1).

Interviews typically lasted 45 to 60 minutes each and took place at the watershed office, homes of members, fields, or other locations familiar to the interviewees. Starting with an ABPWA leader, interviews were conducted until all the members and an ex- member were contacted. The watershed meetings provided an opportunity to discuss the findings with the watershed members. Interviews with external agencies were conducted in-person and over the phone. These interviews lasted for 30 to 45 minutes each.

A semi-structured interview protocol ensured discussion of key topics while allowing for more insights from tangential topics as they arose. Initial interviews were structured to understand the caste relations, activities and the institutions of the ABPWA, while follow-up interviews were based on the meeting minutes of the ABPWA.

Questions included information about the formation of the group, group structure, membership into the group, decision-making mechanisms in the group, distribution of leadership positions in the group, skills of the members in the group, coordinating activities, mobilizing resources, monitoring and accountability rules in the group, interactions of members within and outside of the group, benefits of participation, environmental and social outcomes since the formation of the group and how caste affects each of these components. The unit of analysis was the watershed management

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group. The interviews were conducted in Kannada and Tamil, recorded in a notebook, transcribed into a word document, and then into a spreadsheet. The principal investigator speaks fluent Tamil, and could translate the interviews into English. A Field Assistant, fluent in Kannada and English, translated interviews conducted in Kannada. Residents were asked questions about caste relations and interactions in the villages and between the villages, and whether they were aware of the existence of the ABPWA and its activities. Key informants from external agencies were asked questions about their perception of ABPWA’s success in augmenting groundwater and community building.

Documents consisted of meeting minutes from 2002 to August 2015 of the

ABPWA. The meeting minutes were originally in Kannada and were translated into

English by a Research Associate and totaled 55 pages in length. This document provided information about the decisions and discussions in the ABPWA, which were used to conduct follow-up interviews. Observational data came from attending watershed meetings, informal meetings, and observing interactions between the castes outside of the watershed meetings.

Data Analysis: Following standard qualitative data analysis techniques, interview, document, and observational data were summarized and coded into a variety of themes that emerged (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Please refer to Chapter 2, Section 3.2 for a description of the data analysis methods employed.

Section 3: Results

Institutional Arrangements in the ABPWA

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This section reports on the factors that facilitate collective action in the ABPWA through equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities of members for fostering collective action in a watershed organization with caste heterogeneity. Table 4 summarizes each factor and the institution.

Mechanism Institution

A. Procedural Equity (Exclusivity) 1. Membership

B. Procedural Equity (Inclusivity) 2. Deliberative decision-making

C. Procedural Equity (Impartiality) 3. Attendance

4. Loan distribution

5. Conflict resolution

6. Nepotism

D. Procedural Equity (Responsiveness) 7. Addressing concerns

8. Meeting time and place

E. Procedural Equity (Distributing 9. Leaders and members

Leadership Positions)

F. Distributive Equity 10. Benefits

G. Accountability (Face to face 11. Regular meetings

interactions)

Table 4: Factors that Facilitate Collective Action in the ABPWA Continued

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Table 4 continued

H. Accountability (Separation of powers 12. Duties of Leaders and members

I. Accountability (Maintaining records) 13. Financial records, meeting minutes

J. Accountability (External accountability) 14. External auditor

K. Symbolic Capital 15. Community-Building

16. Prayer

L. Symbolic Capital 17. Community Pride and reputation

M. Capacity 18. Information, book-keeping,

leadership

Table 4: Factors that Facilitate Collective Action in the ABPWA

Equity

Procedural Equity: Procedural equity is fairness in the decision-making processes. Procedural equity provides opportunities for marginal groups to influence decision-making, membership, authority, power, leadership, rules and regulations, customs and laws, and membership rights (Poteete, 2004). The five ways by which the

ABPWA creates procedural equity are: exclusivity, inclusivity, impartiality, distributing leadership positions, and responsiveness.

A. Exclusivity: Exclusivity helps to maintain the core values of a group.

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1) Membership: Only farmers who were members of the GM Doddi Watershed

Association are members of the ABPWA. The ABPWA does not allow other farmers to join the group, although there have been requests from other villagers to join the group.

(Even without joining, non-members may have benefited by improved groundwater in the region.) The only exception to this rule against new members joining is that when a current member dies, the next of kin inherits his/her position. This rule provides equal and exclusive membership rights to every member of the group irrespective of caste.

Interviewees said that other residents in the village have asked for membership into the group, but their requests have been denied “even if we are very good friends”

(Interviewee 2). Interviewee 3 said, we have accumulated a high amount of savings over the past several years, and we don’t feel comfortable allowing new members into the group because it might put our savings in jeopardy.” Interviewee 1 said that the reason for not allowing new members is that they need to explain the rules to the new members, and they aren’t sure that the new members will adhere to the rules of the group. He went on to explain, “It is hard to cultivate trust with new members, and if they have a different vision than the group’s vision, it may create a conflict in the group. We then have to resolve the conflict, which takes time and energy, which we’d rather devote to the functioning of our group. In follow-up interviews after six months, Interviewee 1 changed his view, “We are going to allow new members because our group is not based on a ‘commercial concept of profit-making.’ It is for agricultural and watershed development of the village.”

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Since January 2015, the ABPWA has been discussing a new rule to allow new members into the group if they fulfill two conditions: The first condition is to pay a membership fee of $15 (Rs. 1000) and the second condition is to make a regular contribution of $384 (Rs. 25,000) for six months. The inclusion of new members has been a contentious issue in the group. Interviewee 4 explained,

Only one new member was incorporated in the group because the watershed work was

carried out on his field a few years after the original program. He was included in 2003.

His sister attended the meetings on his behalf because he was not well, but she was not

allowed to vote on his behalf. We now have a new member: XXX is a part of our group

now after his father passed away. He is good at repaying the loan on time with interest.

MYRADA is encouraging us to add new members. But these are savings of more than 15

years. If it’s a new member, we will have to share our money with them. We are still

discussing whether we should add new members or not. xxx was added into the group

and then removed from the group just after two meetings. xxx lives in Kollegal. We will

try to help her but there is an attendance problem. She lives two hours away from here,

and does not attend the meetings regularly. How can we trust someone who does not

come regularly to the meetings?

Most of the members have rejected xxx’s membership. She is not able to deposit

membership fees, and so we cannot give her a loan without a surety. She has land here

and comes here to monitor the harvesting. But if she is not going to be regular at the

meetings, how can we trust her? (Interviewee 7)

We have given this issue a lot of thought and it has been on the agenda for every meeting

since January 2015. Some members agree that xxx should be incorporated as a new

member, while some disagree. I think that it is okay if she becomes a member on two 134

conditions. She should pay the membership fee of Rs. 1000 and deposit savings of Rs.

25,000 into our fund. Members are afraid that she will join our group and immediately

ask for a loan. But I think that if she joins the group, it will strengthen our savings as well

as strengthen the group. There will of course be problems with new members, but we

have to deal with it to continue the work that we have been doing (Interviewee 9).

The discussions noted in the meeting minutes also showed that some members strongly urged other members to support new membership “to strengthen the ABPWA.”

10 members voted for xxx to join the group, but we could not implement it because the

other four members voted against it. Any issue that does not have complete agreement

creates dissent in the group and there are no outcomes from such issues (Interviewee 8).

Other interviewees suggested less stringent solutions and argued that the rule to deposit Rs 25,000 was being discussed to prevent new members from joining the group.

For instance, Interviewee 13 said, “It is not possible to deposit savings of Rs 25,000 over six months. They need to extend the time to let her make regular savings. It is easy to make a rule like this to show that the group is ready to take in new members. In reality, they are just making it harder for new people to enter the group.”

Another member who is against xxx’s entry into the group threatened us saying that if we

allow her into the group, then what will stop him from making his wife a member of the

group. Where do we draw a line? There are already 10 ladies now requesting to join our

group (Interviewee 8)

For example, Interviewee 17 from Bailur said that she has asked the ABPWA to join the group because of its “well-functioning” nature. Thus the membership rule aims to retain the core values of the group and to protect its common fund from outsiders. The membership rule creates exclusivity irrespective of the caste of the members.

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B) Inclusivity: Inclusivity promotes deliberative decision-making, which gives every member an opportunity to contribute to decision-making.

2) Deliberative Decision-Making

Interviewees said that 90% members are required for decision-making. There are two parts in this process. First, decisions are voted upon. In case there is a 100% majority, the decision is passed. However, if there is dissent, the decision is discussed to identify disagreements and grievances. For instance, Interviewee 1 said, “If we have to take any decision, we ask everyone present about their opinion. The decision is then voted upon, and if there is a 100% majority, the decision is passed. If not, we discuss the issue and find out why members do not agree with a decision until we come to an understanding of the issue.” Deliberation upon deeper issues lasts for six months to a year. Members said that the decision to change the loan repayment rule lasted for six months. For instance, Interviewee 7 said, “If 5 people say yes, and 10 people say no, then we will not leave the issue unattended and unresolved. We find out why people may say yes or no, we find out their opinions about it, so that there is no chance of domination in the group.” Creating inclusivity in decision-making provides every member, irrespective of caste, an opportunity to participate in decision-making.

However, interviewee 1 mentioned that not all the Scheduled Caste members speak freely in the group because of fears stemming from their position of belonging to a

“lower caste.” Members only speak up when they are individually asked to contribute their opinion for decision-making. Nevertheless, several members indicated that there has been a change from the time when Scheduled Caste members did not speak up at all in

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the presence of the Lingayats. Thus, deliberative processes enable every member of the

ABPWA, irrespective of caste, to contribute to decision-making.

C) Impartiality: Impartiality fosters a sense of fairness in a group.

3) Attendance: All 14 members of the ABPWA mentioned the attendance rule during the interviews. The ABPWA has used different rules to encourage attendance in the meetings. In 2003, the ABPWA implemented a rule of meeting on the 6th day of every month at 8.00 am, but not all members would show up for the meetings. After three months, the ABPWA decided to impose a fine of Rs. 25 ($0.39) on members absent from the meetings, but this rule was not implemented. From 2003 to 2005, attendance in the watershed meetings was irregular. In 2004, a Lingayat member suggested disbanding the group because of irregular attendance. This suggestion acted as a trigger for the ABPWA to implement the sanction to encourage attendance. Interviewee 2 said,

Yes, initially there was an attendance problem because members felt that we were not

doing enough. But then some of them decided to take charge. So they decided to put a

fine on people who didn’t show up to get people to attend. Now, this has reduced. The

fine is Rs. 25. When it is time to pay the fine, the caste of the member, or the importance

of the member in the village does not matter. You break a rule; you pay the fine!

In case members do not pay the fine for missing meetings, the fine is added to the amount that members have to repay for loans. Even if members arrive late for a meeting, they are expected to pay a fine. During the meeting, the investigator observed two members pay fines for past absences from the meeting. Interviewee 1 said,

Members have to inform other members if they plan to be absent. There is a fine of Rs.

25 ($0.38) if you miss a meeting, or even if you are late. This is a strict rule that everyone

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follows no matter what. Usually, members miss 3-5 meetings every year during the

harvest season. If more than half decides to be absent for harvesting, we cancel the

meeting. If they [the members] don’t pay a fine, we cut it from the loan amount. If all

fines and past dues are not paid, loans are not given.

Interviewee 4 said, “If someone doesn't come for a meeting, they have to pay the fine.

If it is an emergency, they can leave early. However, even in case of emergencies, a fine has to be paid if one does not attend the meeting. You can see our meeting minutes. One member paid a fine of $11.17 (Rs 725) for missing 29 consecutive meetings.” The member who paid the fine said, “I paid up because although it was a high amount, I have received many benefits from the group. If I want to continue to be a part of the group, I need to follow the rules of the group. I did not attend the meetings because I was working as a construction laborer and had to travel to the city.” Thus an equal enforcement of the attendance rule creates procedural equity i.e. fairness in the functioning of the ABPWA because sanctions are implemented irrespective of caste.

4) Loan Distribution: Every member in the ABPWA is eligible to take a loan from the common fund. Interviewees said that loans are passed only after discussing the financial status and the credit history of the member. For example, Interviewee 3 said,

“We see the reality and take decisions about who gets a loan by examining the past credit history of the member. Since we know each other so well, we know who actually needs a loan and who does not need one. We all vote on giving someone a loan. If someone disagrees, we find out why, and then discuss it.” Interviewee 7 said, “When members disagree about who should be given a loan, we talk about it. We study the economic

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status of the person requesting a loan, if family members are sick and are suffering from health issues, or if they need a loan for funeral activities.”

There was one Schedule Caste member whose loan had been rejected thrice in the past one year. He earns $4.6 (Rs 300) per day by working as a construction worker and as a laborer on farms. He has 2 acres of land on which he cultivates potato, maize, sorghum, and finger millet. He had requested loans from the ABPWA for his son’s and daughter’s wedding, but the ABPWA denied his loan requests. He then turned to moneylenders in his village for loans, despite the prohibitive interest rate that ranges from 16% to 14%.

Interviewees commented:

We helped him as much as we could, but it was not sufficient because his expenses were

higher. He has been having financial trouble because of the weddings in the household.

He also would ask for a loan after immediately repaying his previous loan. Although he

was struggling financially, to be fair to the others, we could not keep favoring him for

loans. We had to distribute the loans among the other members in the group too

(Interviewee 9).

The Scheduled Caste member said,

I prefer to stay in the group despite the rejection of my loan because there are benefits

other than loans. I get access to information about schemes and subsidies and have a

supportive network of the ABPWA. And it is not that all my requests for loans will be

rejected. There is always the next time.

The above comments suggest that the ABPWA is attentive to creating impartiality in distributing the loans fairly to the members of the group irrespective of caste, which create procedural equity.

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5) Conflict-resolution mechanisms: There have been two conflicts in the

ABPWA since 2003 resulting in three members leaving the group. The first conflict took place after the ABPWA split from GM Doddi in 2002. Two members took a loan of Rs. 24, 000 ($380) from the common fund, but did not repay their loan because they argued that the funds were given by an external agency, and therefore the loan did not need to be repaid to the watershed group.

Both these members belonged to the Lingayat caste. In 2013, the two ex-members promised to repay the loan after the members of the ABPWA sent them a court notice. However, interviewees said that the two ex-members did not repay the loans even after receiving the court notice. On 10th January 2015, a heated discussion ensued during which the watershed members asked the chairperson to visit the lawyer once again. Currently, the members of the ABPWA plan to sue the two members for non-repayment of loans. Interviewees said that the lawyer needed the receipts of the loans taken by both the members, but the ABPWA does not have these receipts because the loan was issued before the split from GM

Doddi. The ABPWA still continues to include the names of these two members in its attendance roster. One of these ex-members is related to the three Lingayats in the ABPWA.

ABPWA members are now crafting a new rule to address the problem of defaulting on loans. They plan to create an agreement between the watershed association and the loan bearer in the presence of a lawyer about the sanctions in case a loan is not repaid. However, a majority of the members feel that the ABPWA does not need this new

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rule because “no member in the past 20 years has defaulted on the loan and it would erode the trust in the group.” Interviewees indicated that the brothers in the ABPWA have a strained relationship with the loan defaulter.

My own brothers keep cheating us by promising to repay the loans. The entire group is

affected when this kind of deceit takes place. If I speak to them about it, they [the

brothers] tell me not to interfere. They [the ABPWA] did not take it out on me, even

though my brothers cheated the group. I was not held responsible for their behavior

(Interviewee 7).

When the two ex-members did not repay the loans, we sent them court notices. Their

brothers continue to be a part of our group and they supported the decision to send a court

notice. We saw what happened in GM Doddi. One official started favoring the Lingayats

there and we were resentful about that. We cannot let that happen in our group. Yes, we

are related to one another either through marriage or through blood. But we keep these

relations at home, not in the group. When the split [with GM Doddi] happened, my Uncle

was the Chairperson of the group. He said that the right thing to do would to return the

savings of the members from GM Doddi. I opposed him at that time and questioned his

decision, even though he was my Uncle. Later I realized that his decision was right, and

we could not continue holding on to someone else’s money (Interviewee 1).

However, members said that they developed a strategy of not favoring family members in the ABPWA to create fairness in the group. Members said that the ABPWA distinguishes between not privileging family members and castes and being attentive to the needs of the Scheduled Castes, which creates procedural equity through impartiality.

The second conflict took place in 2010 when another Lingayat left the group because he felt that although he repaid his loans on time, the other members were too

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slow in repaying their loans and kept drawing more loans from the amount that he repaid.

He thought that the other members were drawing loans from his “repaid loan”, and he decided to leave the group. He said,

All the members took loans and did not repay the loans on time. For 2 years, no one

repaid the loans, but I repaid my loan regularly. Moreover, they kept passing loans from

the amount that I repaid. I asked them to provide me with interest for my savings. I

approached MYRADA, but no one responded to me. I got frustrated and withdrew my

membership in 2010. They gave my money back to me and I cleared all my dues.

Members consider these conflict-resolution mechanisms to be fair and impartial in their treatment towards the Lingayats or relatives in the group. Thus, this rule creates procedural equity in the ABPWA.

D) Responsiveness: Community norms of being attentive and responding to the concerns of members sustain collective action. The ABPWA is responsiveness in two ways: by addressing concerns and by being cognizant of local conditions for conducting the meetings.

6) Addressing Concerns (Loan Repayment): All interviewees mentioned that the loan repayment rules changed in 2013. Previously, the maximum principal amount was Rs 20,000 ($302) with an annual interest rate of

2%. The Scheduled Castes, who were also the poorest members in the ABPWA, requested the ABPWA to decrease the interest rate of 2%. After discussions that lasted for six months, the principal amount was increased to Rs 30,000 ($452) and the interest rate was decreased to 1%. Interviewee 1 explained,

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Members can take a loan of Rs 30,000. Initially it was a maximum of Rs. 20,000 and the

interest rate was 2%, but we wanted to accommodate the interests of everyone, so we

reduced the interest rate to 1%. This rule changed in 2013-2014. There are people in our

group who are very poor, so we wanted to reduce the burden on them.

People who take loans have to repay it with a 1% interest. Initially, it was stricter. To

accommodate the members we decreased the interest rate from 2% to 1%. We also had

enough funds to be able to do that. We did it because with the higher interest rate, the

poorer members were finding it hard to repay the loan. We did it because we want to

support everyone in our group because this group is for the members (Interviewee 4).

Until about two years ago, we had to pay a loan interest of 2% once a month. But because

we have small land to farm, we also double up as daily wage laborers, and work on other

people’s farms or as construction laborers in a town. Since yield from our land is

insufficient, and our jobs are not secure, it was difficult for us to repay the loan with the

interest of 2%. Therefore, the rule was changed to help us. It takes a year to repay loans.

If the yield comes earlier and we get a good price for it, we repay it faster and then we

also have to pay less interest (Interviewee 6).

Still, this is different than when we changed the loan repayment rule. We studied that

situation and made a decision not to favor a certain group, but to address a legitimate

concern of high interest rates (Interviewee 1).

These findings indicate that the ABPWA is attentive and responsive to the concerns of its Scheduled Caste members, which creates procedural equity. The ABPWA changed the rule for repaying loans to alleviate intra-group differences between the

Scheduled Castes who are relatively poorer than the Lingayats.

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7) Meeting Place: After the split of the ABPWA from the GM Doddi Watershed

Association, the ABPWA decided to conduct the meeting at the watershed group’s office, midway between Arepalyam and Bailur. The new meeting place was selected because of its convenient location for members from both the villages. This rule creates procedural equity and facilitates collective action because it does not make attending the meeting more convenient for one village, or a particular caste than the other.

E) Distributing Leadership Positions: Distributing leadership positions in a group avoids the concentration of power in any one individual and creates procedural equity by giving every person a fair chance to hold a leadership position (Poteete &

Ostrom, 2004). In the ABPWA, there are three leadership positions: one Chairperson and two representatives.

8) Chairperson and Representatives: The ABPWA has a Chairperson for one year and two Representatives for every meeting. These leadership positions are rotated serially in the group. Thus, every member has an opportunity to take a leadership position in the group, irrespective of caste, which creates procedural equity.

F) Distributive Equity: These benefits are equitably distributed among the members of the ABPWA through rules and strategies.

9) Benefits: Interviewees mentioned several benefits from being a part of the

ABPWA. Some of these benefits also spill over to the village residents who are not part of the group. These benefits were categorized into “Environmental”, “Financial

Benefits”, “Benefits as a Coop”, “External agencies”, “Social Benefits”, and “Capacity

Building”

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Environmental Benefits

Soil and Water Conservation: All 14 members mentioned that the watershed structures such as bunds and waste weirs helped reduce soil eroding from their farms.

These benefits are available to farmers as a result of their participation in the watershed program. For example, Interviewee 4 said,

We implemented watershed works such as boulder bunds, earthen bunds, gully checks,

plantations, and soil and water conservation activities. On the commons, we put in

banana plantations. We constructed gully checks, and check dams on farmlands. Now the

water is kept in place. It seeps into the ground instead of flowing away, and some farmers

have installed bore wells to tap it. There is water in the ground, which was not the case

before. Our land is rain fed, so having water in the ground decreases our dependency on

the monsoon.

Interviewees 5, 6, 9 also mentioned that the biggest benefit that resulted from their participation in the ABPWA was the construction of “bunds, gully checks, terraces, rock bunds, mud bunds, leveling of the land, and plantations.”

Interviewee 10 said,

I joined the group for nourishing the land. If all the farmers in the catchment area had not

participated, we would not have received all the benefits from the structures that we built.

If the farmer with land adjacent to mine had not been a member of the ABPWA, we

would not have had his support to construct the bunds that adjoin both our lands and none

of us would have been able to share the benefits of improved groundwater. Usually,

farmers now take loans to repair the watershed structures and sometimes they also take

loans as a group. There is an understanding between farmers, and until now we have been

able to avoid conflicts over who will repair a bund if it develops a crack. Farmers

understand that if they do not do it, they will suffer. If something needs to be repaired, we 145

will bring it up in the meeting and other members will tell the farmers to repair their

structures.

Interviewees also said that after the watershed program, agricultural yield significantly improved for the members of the ABPWA. Interviewee 2 said, “The watershed structures helped the groundwater to percolate into the soil, so we started getting better yield, which also improved the financial status of the farmers.” The ABPWA also purchases plants for composting and distributes the compost to its members as continuation of the watershed activities. Farmers with adjacent lands also share vermicomposting pits with each other.

The ABPWA also uses the common land of the villages for coconut plantations and shares the profits from the harvest among the group members. All the members are expected to contribute labor during the harvest season. Soil and water conservation benefits are available to members irrespective of caste in the ABPWA. Farmers now monitor the watershed structures for damages. Farmers follow a strategy of teaming with adjacent farmers to repair structures in case of damages.

Financial Benefits: A common fund was created for post-project maintenance of the watershed structures to provide financial benefits to the members in the form of loans.

All 14 interviewees mentioned the ability to request loans from the ABPWA as a factor that is crucial for continuing the benefits of the watershed program. Every member in the

ABPWA is eligible to apply for loans from the common fund. The ABPWA provides loans to watershed members for agricultural activities, undertaking maintenance of the check dams and bunds, purchasing livestock, soil fertilizers, seeds, micronutrients, and vermicomposting mixtures. For instance, Interviewee 1 said,

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I've used the funds for buying agricultural seeds, plowing my land, land repair and

constructing bunds. I’ve been able to take loans for horticultural purposes, agriculture,

sprinklers, pipes, and ploughs, polybags, seeds, vermicomposting, and fertilizers for the

farm. Yield has increased for the community and economic status of the farmers has

improved. We have been able to send our children to better schools because of increased

income.

Interviewee 3 said, “We take loans for agriculture, livestock and then return it back to the common fund with interest. If watershed structures are damaged, we take loans to repair them. We used to go to the moneylender who used to charge an interest rate of 16%. Now we don't need to go [to the money lenders]. We have knowledge now.

Interviewee 4 said, “I took a loan of Rs. 35,000 for agricultural purposes. Some members also take loans for de-silting the lake and they get their own crane.” All the other interviewees also mentioned taking loans for non-farm activities such as weddings, repairing homes, as well as emergencies such as medical expenses and funerals. Thus the presence of a common fund has ensured the continuation of the group because every member, irrespective of caste, has a stake in the common fund and can draw loans from it.

Social Benefits

Changes in Caste Relations: 11 interviewees mentioned two kinds of social benefits— that of fewer caste restrictions between the Lingayats and the Scheduled

Castes in the ABPWA and increased bonding between the two castes. Although strict rules structure the interactions between the Lingayats and the Scheduled Castes, interviewees perceived the ABPWA to be a forum where these rules cease to exist. Thus,

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this institution that provides a benefit of changes in caste relations also creates

“community” in the ABPWA. For example,

There is more bonding in the group now and there is no untouchability in the group. It is

different outside of the group. We are not allowed near worship points, and homes and

kitchens. In the past we were not allowed anywhere near them. Now it has changed

(Interviewee 14).

There are no overt problems in the village due to caste, but mentally there is the feeling that

we are not equals. Untouchability is practiced in the village. For example, I cannot enter a

Lingayat’s house. They will not eat at our weddings. But the group is different. In the group,

we sit down and eat together and it feels okay for at least that moment. The group system is

different from how things are in the village (Interviewee 2).

The Lingayats are not very friendly. It’s only an external demonstration of relationships.

There are restrictions on us [the Scheduled Castes], but outside we are free. During

marriages in the Lingayat community, we go to their weddings, and we eat the food served at

their weddings. But they do not come to our houses, or for weddings in our community.

Even if they come, they do not eat the food served at our weddings. But, there is equality in

the group. Somehow, in the group we were able to transcend these outlooks. For example,

we sit together and drink tea together. There are no restrictions in the group (Interviewee 10).

In the group, there are no feelings of caste. These things are restricted to homes and the

village life. MYRADA told us that no one is higher and no one is lower, we are equals. We

go to the marriages of the Scheduled Castes, but don’t eat food prepared at their weddings,

not even fruits. We invite them to our weddings, but serve them separately. In the village, we

are not allowed to eat food with each other. In hotels, it is different. Village rules are

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different. XXX is my best friend and we are members of the SHG. But XXX cannot enter my house. We are Lingayats and we have to follow these tradition. I cannot invite him inside my home. Nobody will allow that and there is no chance that that will happen! It will never happen, even though he is my best friend! (Interviewee 11)

In the past 25 years, things have changed. Now we can go to their [the Lingayat’s] house premises. We can work on their land, but we still have separate vessels for food and drinking and we are kept out of their houses as well as hotels. After MYRADA came, there have been a lot of changes, mentally and practically. Now we can go to near their house and talk to them boldly from outside. But we cannot go close. We can celebrate festivals together. They don’t eat food in our marriages. So these things still contribute to a feeling of powerlessness when we are with them. With the children it is different. They do not understand these divisions and they feel equal because they go to the same school (Interviewee 12).

Interviewee 1 explained this attitude,

We don’t differentiate between castes in the group. 25 years ago, we were not even allowed to sit near the Lingayats. Now it has changed, but there is untouchability. But I am free of their influence. We are still not allowed into their houses. We can only serve them food if someone from their community cooks the food. But I am free. People from my community are still fearful of them. I am now an expert in decorating stages for weddings. It is ironical. I am not allowed in to their [Lingayat’s] houses, but I am called to decorate the stages for their weddings. It is strange. We receive the same rainfall, we grow and eat the same food, and we have the same blood. But we were told that we are not good enough, that they are somehow better than us. We suffered for years and then there is the poverty. And the Lingayats told us that we are not good for them as equals. If we saw them approaching on the same road, we had to move aside, or turn back so that we would not cross them. Now, I walk with them together. In the group, xxx [lists 4 members] and I are active. The others speak, but not as

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much. Even that is a change from before when they would not speak up in meetings at all out

of fear of the Lingayats. These changes are slow. When we ask them for their opinions, there

is a chance for us to encourage them.

Thus, the Scheduled Caste members considered a change in the caste relations a benefit that emerged from their participation in the ABPWA. However, this change is restricted only to the ABPWA and not applicable to the village. Furthermore, the

Scheduled Caste members only spoke about untouchability in the absence of the Lingayat members, but in the watershed meetings, both members agreed that caste relations are

“good.” The change in social relations between the Lingayats and the Scheduled Castes is an important benefit that facilitates the participation of the members in the ABPWA.

Benefits as a Cooperative: The ABPWA also leverages its cooperative status to apply for group loans, health insurance, subsidy schemes, liaison with external agencies, and ban on alcohol were placed in this category. For group loans, Interviewee 4 said,

“Another benefit is the ability of the group to get loans through different departments such as the Agricultural Department and the Gram Panchayat (the local village government) rather than sending in an individual loan applications. We concentrate through the group rather than applying individually.” Interviews revealed that the members received benefits from government schemes because of their status as a cooperative. For instance, members are enrolled in the Birla Life Insurance Scheme meant for farmers in a cooperative group.

Members also are provided Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) Cylinders as a replacement for traditional firewood from the Forest Department at a subsidized rate. The

Forest Department also provided solar electric fences to the farmers to guard against 150

elephants and wild pigs that stray away from the nearby forest. The ABPWA regularly participates in schemes for obtaining cattle at a subsidized rate from the Department of

Agriculture. The ABPWA also buys seeds for its members from the Farmer Community

Center as well as provides services of ploughing at a lower cost for its members. The

ABPWA distributes medicine for cattle as prevention against Foot and Mouth disease prevalent during summer.

The ABPWA frequently partners with external agencies such as the Gram

Panchayat, local NGOs, the State Department of Agriculture in Karnataka, and banks for constructing toilets in the villages, desilting the lakes, community fishing, and organic farming. These activities benefit Arepalyam and Bailur, and not just the members of the

ABPWA. In 2004, the ABPWA decided to rejuvenate the Murad Lake near the village that had gone dry. Eight surrounding villages were dependent upon the lake for drinking and agriculture. The group contributed $77 (Rs. 5000) for de-silting the lake. Since then, members of the ABPWA regularly maintain the lake and contribute money for de-silting the lake. The fertile silt is given to any farmer who participates in de-silting the lake.

Interviewee 4 said, “We get highly fertile soil that accumulates in the check dam. Anyone is free to take the soil because it helps to clean the dam. There is no limit to how much soil each person can take.”

The ABPWA requested one of the members to stop selling alcohol in the village to decrease alcohol addiction. The ban on alcohol follows the Watershed Plus measures in India developed by the first “model” community-based watershed management organization in India (Sangameswaran, 2006). Interviewee 2 said, “There were two or

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three points where arrack [an alcoholic beverage] was being sold in the village. It was affecting families and polluting the village. We asked X to stop selling it in the village and applied pressure on him to shift his business away from the village.” Interviewees said that there has been an improvement in the village since the removal of the alcohol stores because of a reduction of inebriated men in the villages.” The Scheduled Caste owner moved his business outside of the village and said that he did not suffer a loss in income because of the shift. Thus, the ABPWA leverages its ability as a group to provide benefits from government schemes to all the members of its group irrespective of caste.

External Agencies: Interviews mentioned that one of the benefits of being a member in the ABPWA is the access to information and networks of external agencies.

For instance, interviewees said that officers from the CMRC share information about government schemes for agriculture, agricultural equipment, and insurance, subsidies for seeds, and new markets and stores for selling their produce. In one of the meetings, a

CMRC official shared information about a scheme for breeding indigenous livestock for the Scheduled Castes. Following this announcement, members of the ABPWA voted to nominate Interviewee 2 for a scheme on breeding indigenous cattle. Members said this scheme was directed at Scheduled Caste farmers who did not own any cattle and

Interviewee 2 fulfilled those criteria.

Interviews also said that the group has access to government agencies such as the

Department of Agriculture, banks, and other NGOs. For example, agricultural schemes from the Department of Agriculture are implemented through banks that provide loans at subsidized interest rates. Interviewee 1 said, “Whenever there is a new scheme, someone

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from the bank or the Agricultural Department informs us. This is how we got involved with Organic Farming, when Sahaja Samruddha [an NGO] contacted us.” Thus, benefits of working with external agencies are equitably distributed in the ABPWA.

Capacity Building: All 14 interviewees mentioned receiving training for agricultural activities, opportunities to travel to other parts of the country for agricultural exhibitions and farmer festivals, and training for non-agricultural activities. Members receive training for allied agricultural activities such as composting, honey collection, fertilizer application, and maintenance of watershed structures, organic farming, and animal husbandry. Interviewee 14 said, “We received training for vermicomposting and I am still doing composting on my farm. I use the compost for the farm section where I do organic farming.”

Interviewee 12 said,

The group regularly sends the members for training to different parts of India. These

opportunities come through the Agricultural Department. I, personally, benefited by

traveling for training to Coimbatore, and all over south India, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu

with xxx. During these training sessions we learned about implementing soil and water

conservation measures for our land. When our group was being formed, MYRADA

conducted several training sessions about community-building, forming groups, conducting

meetings, how to scribe, how to record the meeting minutes and its importance. Members

also regularly participate in agricultural fairs where they put up stalls to display their produce

from organic farming.

Interviewee 4 said, “People are sent serially for training and awareness activities. For long journeys, xxx, yyy, and zzz go. For short distances, we send other members depending on the interests of other members, and whose turn it is.” Interviewee 1 said, 153

“We go to other watersheds for exposure training and learn different farming methods.

Now our group has started training other farmer groups for techniques on organic farming”

Meeting minutes also revealed that members receive training for maintaining receipt books, check books, audit reports, training books, plans for the watershed, activity reports, maps, attendance registers, agricultural reports on yields, changes after fertilizer application, and market prices of crops. The CMRC—an organization set up by

MYRADA—provides post-project support to watershed organizations and regularly conducts training on these topics and alternative income generation methods such as dairy farming. Officers from CMRC attend the meetings of the ABPWA and conduct workshops on health as well as conduct camps for HIV/AIDS testing. The ABPWA encourages children from Arepalyam and Bailur to enroll for training on repairing computers, mobiles, TV sets, and cars at their office. The training center provides access to computers, sewing machines, financial information about loans and government schemes, and access to agricultural equipment such as tractors and plows. The ABPWA also brings in agencies that provide training on legal awareness to its members and the villages to inform residents about agricultural policies, and government schemes.

Interviewees also mentioned that they have been able to reduce their dependency on

MYRADA by conducting their own meetings, and working with the Department of

Agriculture without MYRADA’s support. The ABPWA is also invited by other farmer groups as well as government agencies and NGOs to provide training on community- building and organic farming.

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Thus the ABPWA equitably distributes benefits to its members. Some of these benefits are also available to village residents who are not a part of the ABPWA.

Moreover, these benefits have also enabled the ABPWA to sustain itself because every member is benefited from participating in the meetings and the activities of the ABPWA.

Accountability: The ABPWA creates accountability through four mechanisms of face-to-face interactions, separation of powers, maintaining records, and external accountability to facilitate collective action.

G) Face to Face Interactions: This includes rules of regular meetings.

10) Regular Meetings: The ABPWA meets twice a month. Members said that meeting regularly helps to generate predictability in the interactions. Predictably in interactions lays the ground for developing trust and mutual reciprocity, especially in groups with members from different castes that never interacted with each other prior to group formation.

H) Separation of Powers: Separation of powers facilitates collective action because it enables members to monitor the behavior of members and accounts of the

ABPWA.

11) Duties of Leaders and members

The ABPWA has two group representatives that change for every meeting and one chairperson that changes every year. Member become group representatives or a chairperson according to the serial number that is assigned to them. This rule was created in 2006 to “inculcate leadership skills and responsibility in all participating members”

(Meeting minutes and Interviewee 7). The duties of the chairperson entail taking

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attendance at the meeting, placing items for discussion on the agenda, collecting signatures in case a decision has to be implemented, collecting membership dues, and depositing the dues in the bank account. Duties of the group representatives involve signing checks for approved loans and depositing funds into the bank. The ABPWA has two group representatives so that each group representative can monitor the other to enhance accountability, and to share the responsibility of tasks (Interviewee 4). The presence of two representatives also helps to avoid conflicts regarding money within the group.

Every year one member gets to be a chairperson according to a number assigned to us

and for every meeting we have two group representatives. Currently, I am the

chairperson. My duties are to regularly attend the meetings, go to the bank to deposit, and

or remit checks. I have to sign the deposit book and provide loans. The meetings are held

in the school. Since I am the chairperson, I have to ensure that the members follow the

rules of our group. People will ask me why you passed the loan if the person did not pay

the fine. It is my job to keep an account of these infractions (Interviewee 4).

If I'm the chairperson, it is my duty to take the signature. After I sign, only then can

others withdraw money from the bank. The sign is important. The sign is done in front of

everyone during the meeting. The sign indicates that the loan is approved. We ask

questions for what and why is the money needed. The representative will then take the

money to the bank after the chairperson signs the check. The Chairperson is also

designated serially. It will change on 10th January (Interviewee 3).

Interviewee 14 said, “I am the group representative for today’s meeting. I have to implement loan repayment rules and check whether the other representative is doing his job. Everyone has a duty of becoming a leader. Members cannot get out of this 156

responsibility when their turn comes.” The Chairperson also reviews the meeting minutes to remind members about discussions conducted at the previous meeting. Interviewee 1 said, “We start the meeting by reviewing the minutes from last meeting so that everyone is up to date. If we might have missed adding something in the minutes, one of the members will remind us.”

All the members of the ABPWA are responsible for monitoring the behavior of other members for repaying loans. Members said that duties involved asking the chairperson and the representatives questions about loans that were passed. Members also regularly request the Chairperson to go over bank transactions and account statements of the group. Every member can contribute towards placing an item for discussion at the meeting of the watershed group. These items are discussed during the course of the meeting. If any member is absent from the meeting, members present in the meeting are responsible for informing the absent member about the discussions in the meeting. The involvement of all the members, irrespective of caste, creates accountability in the

ABPWA.

I) Maintaining Records: Maintaining records create transparency in the affairs of an organization. Transparency of records is increased if members have opportunities to view the records.

12) Records of Financial and Meeting Minutes

A Scheduled Caste member is responsible for noting down meeting minutes.

Maintaining meeting minutes ensures transparency in the affairs of the ABPWA because all the discussions and decisions are recorded. Members can refer to the meeting minutes

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to update themselves on previous discussions and decisions. Transparency through maintaining meeting minutes enables members to check that no particular caste is preferred for loan distribution.

One of the outcomes of accountability measures in the ABPWA generates community pride among the members. For example, while describing the activities of the ABPWA to the investigator, the members of the ABPWA showed the meeting minutes, bank accounts and the bank statements to the investigator. Members demonstrated considerable pride and emphasized the “neat” and “meticulous” maintenance of the transactions, bank account books, and the receipts. Furthermore, from the ABPWA’s perspective, the meticulous maintenance of accounts is evidence of their success and reinforcing this “success” also reinforces the sense of community pride in the ABPWA.

Although the ABPWA has not intentionally crafted such a strategy to generate community pride, accountability strategies that create visibility of success can be advantageous to generate community pride in a heterogeneous community.

J) External Accountability: External accountability increases transparency and creates a sense of fairness in the functioning of a group.

13) External Auditor: Interviewees and meeting minutes revealed that an external auditor from the CMRC audits and reviews the account books of the ABPWA every six months. In 2005, the members of the ABPWA discovered discrepancies in the audit done by the external auditor. Members then requested the auditor to audit the account books in the presence of all the members of the ABPWA. Since then, the

ABPWA invites the auditor every six months to their group to audit the books during the

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meeting times. The process of creating accountability by including a third-party auditor provides opportunities to reinforce transparency in the ABPWA. Such accountability measures provide a heterogeneous community of resource users means to ensure that no one caste has more power, or receives more benefits than the other.

Symbolic Capital: The ABPWA builds symbolic capital through two mechanisms. One is community building and the other is by creating community pride.

K) Community-Building Strategies: MYRADA developed two community- building rules in the GM Doddi Watershed Association to overcome untouchability between the Lingayats and the Scheduled Castes.

14) “Community”: In 1994, MYRADA developed a rule that the Lingayat and the Scheduled Castes should sit together during the meetings. The aim of this rule was to foster a sense of equality between the two castes and create a sense of “community.”

Interviewee 12 said, “MYRADA brought us together and it encouraged us to continue working in the group. They also gave us examples where they had tried this approach of bringing different castes together.”

In the initial days when MYRADA would conduct their meetings to conduct

their programs on community building, we were told not to put out chairs either

for them or for the Lingayats. They told us to bring out the carpets and spread it

out so that everyone can sit together. They sat down with us like equals. We sat

on the same land together for the first time. It would have been so different if the

Lingayats sat on the chair, and we sat on the ground (Interviewee 10)

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Interviewee 1 said, “Now the practice of sitting together during the meetings is ingrained in us. The meetings are one place where feelings of high caste and low caste are not considered, even though the rules in the village may make us behave otherwise.”

There is a boundary that divides the watershed meetings and the rest of the village. If

there is a special occasion, such as when we host a guest at our watershed organization, I

am in-charge of making the tea. Normally, the Lingayats will not eat food prepared by a

Scheduled Caste, but in the watershed group, those rules do not hold. But when a guest

visits our groups, everyone, i.e. the guest, the Lingayats and the SCs, will have a cup of

tea together sitting on the same carpet. Or we might order tea from the store outside of

the village. No one cares about the caste of the storeowner during that time (Interviewee

Outside of the watershed meetings, the Lingayats referred to their caste with considerable pride. For instance, Interviewees 11 and 18 frequently referred to the illustrious lineage of the Lingayat caste and frequently made a hand gesture of dominance while pointing the hand toward them. Other Lingayats said that they maintain distance from the Scheduled Castes outside of the watershed meetings. A member from the

Scheduled Caste community offered to take the investigator to a Lingayat’s home for an interview. On reaching the home, this member stayed behind the investigator so that his face would not be visible to the Lingayats inside the house. The lady of the house did not come outside until the Scheduled Caste member announced our arrival to her and left.

These interviewees and observations suggest that the rules of caste that structure interactions in the village do not apply in the ABPWA. The absence of caste rules in the

ABPWA facilitates collective action by enabling members to work together, despite caste differences. 160

15) Prayer: Another strategy that MYRADA used to build community was an invocation to nature. According to MYRADA, beginning every meeting with a prayer to nature, or a deity that represents nature develops a sense of attachment to nature because of dependence of the farmers on resources such as water, compost, and wood. It is not clear whether this strategy helped to create a cohesive group, but members still begin the meeting with a prayer. Interviewee 1 said:

Prakruti (nature) is the hills, forest, animals, and water. If the environment is good, then

we are benefitted. We need to get good climate and water. We humans are also a part of

nature. If there is no forest, there is no nature. If there is good rainfall, there will be good

yield and good money. God has given life to animals and we shouldn't kill them.

Chemicals harm earthworms. It was like this before we started using chemicals. We are

trying to go back to that now. We are trying to change the mindset. Therefore, we are

doing organic farming. The prayer reminds us that we all are here together to take care of

nature.

We are located in nature. We are farmers and we need nature. If nature is healthy, we will

be benefited. There will be more rainfall, which will help agriculture. Plantations in forest

such as the Cassiasepia tree are beneficial to us. We use the leaf for compost, and the

wood for fuel and fences for our fields. Rain here is higher than Odeyarpalya. We think

about these aspects of nature when we pray (Interviewee 4).

Interviewee 6 said, “Prakruti is the surrounding trees, rain, animals, soil, climate, and greenery. Since we are all nestled in this, we kept the name Prakruti for our organization and start our meeting by invoking it as a reminder.” Interviewee 24 from

MYRADA said that, “We have found that thinking about deities of nature helps farmers develop a bond because all of them, be it the Lingayats or the Scheduled Castes, all are 161

dependent on a good rainfall for their crop. It was a strategic way for us to begin our intervention in this region.” Thus, according to MYRADA, the rule of beginning every meeting with a prayer builds cohesiveness even in a group with different castes.

L) Community Pride: The ABPWA relies on the outcomes of its activities to generate community pride.

16) Collective Action Outcomes: One of the collective action outcomes of the

ABPWA’s success is community pride. The ABPWA’s reputation as a unique, self- sustaining, watershed group generates community pride in the group. Interviewees from the ABPWA, MYRADA, and the DoA frequently referred to the ABPWA as a “model group” because of its long-lasting nature. The ABPWA has received several awards honoring its achievements in community building, watershed development, and organic farming. Interviewee 1 said, “Our group activities shone. We could function despite having two different castes in our group. Government officials from the agricultural department and from the watershed department saw what we were doing and tried to emulate it in other parts of the state. They started inviting us for developing community- building exercises. The state government gave us awards for our work.”

In 2005, the Government of Karnataka spearheaded the National Program for

Organic Farming to encourage organic farming through Sahaja Samruddha (SS), a NGO.

The ABPWA was chosen to implement organic farming by the NGO because of its reputation. SS provided funds to the ABPWA to buy indigenous varieties of seeds and local varieties of livestock. Today, the farmers undertake organic farming along with chemical farming.

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Interviewee 3 said,

We are trying to diversify into other kinds of farming techniques. With the support and

backing of our group, we decided to try out organic farming. Organic farming provides

fewer yields, but it is good to taste and has high demand. For example, ragi (finger

millet) is supposed to be beneficial for diabetic patients and there is a high demand in the

market for it. After we took it up, we were featured in several magazines and newspapers.

After the ABPWA started organic farming, they also began to collect and preserve indigenous varieties of seeds resulting in the formation of a seed bank. Several local newspapers featured the ABPWA, highlighting its community-building efforts and the seed bank. Interviewees said the media attention helped generate pride in the

ABPWA. Members of the ABPWA maintain newspaper articles and their certificates about them in a file. Members were eager to point out to the investigator that they are featured in newspapers at least once every year. Interviewee 3 said, “It is a great honor to be recognized for the work that we do. We take more pride in the activities and efforts of our group.”

Interviewees invoked the theme of reputation and pride on several other occasions too. Members of the ABPWA said that the issue of new membership has created a problem in the group because of their “reputation.” For instance, Interviewee 17 from

Bailur said that she wanted to join the ABPWA because of its “well-functioning” nature, but this has resulted in a disagreement in the ABPWA over whether to open up its group to new members or not.

Another consequence of the ABPWA’s success is that it has been able to generate economic gains for the group. Other watershed management groups frequently approach

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the ABPWA to provide training on community-building and organic farming. The

ABPWA charges Rs. 500 ($7.5) to Rs. 1000 ($15) for such services. Conducting such events generates even more reputation, community pride, and economic capital for the

ABPWA. Interviewee 1, in particular, is contacted to provide training to other farmer groups as well as government agencies and MYRADA and is paid Rs. 200 ($3) to Rs.

500 ($7.5) depending upon the kind of training he provides. He said, “I get called for talking about organic farming and benefits of working as a group by the Agricultural

Department. Through my activities, I can show my community that knowledge can help them overcome their fear.”

Interviewee 1 has been able to capitalize on the symbolic capital of reputation of the ABPWA of a “model” organization into economic capital by organizing and developing training sessions, which in turn increases the reputation of the ABPWA. “We provide training on vermicomposting, fertilizer application for organic farming, and other activities organized by MYRADA. When I am called to provide training, I am not called because I am from the Scheduled Caste community, but because I have knowledge. I can show people from my community that even though I am from the Scheduled Caste, I can remove fear from my mind and be free despite of the restrictions on us.” Thus

Interviewee 1 has been able to acquire symbolic capital to broaden his capability because of his skills and knowledge. Furthermore, activities that generate symbolic and economic capital have helped to sustain collective action efforts, irrespective of caste, and allowed the group to diversify into other income generating activities.

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M) Capacities: Capacities of members enable members to maintain accounts of the group and to conduct community-building sessions in other villages.

18) Skills: Interviewee 1 has been the bookkeeper since the initiation of the group. He writes down the meeting minutes and reviews them at the next meeting. He attends the meetings of the Panchayat (local government) and informs the ABPWA of the discussions that occur in the meeting. He works at the Agricultural Department and represents the group at press meetings, provides training to other groups across India for organic farming, and maintains the organic seed bank. He also provides information to the ABPWA regarding policies and schemes for farmers. Interviewee 1 is considered influential in the group because of the information that he shares with the group. For example, all 14 interviewees mentioned his name in response to the question, “Name the most influential person in your watershed group.”

XXX is our main source of information: he keeps going to different offices”

(Interviewee 2).

XXX can lead because of his education. He has relationships with different government

agencies and we hear of schemes that benefit us because he brings in that information to

the group (Interviewee 10). He attends the Panchayat meetings and keeps us informed

about their plans for the villages (Interviewee 7).

My confidence improved in 8th and 9th standard. MYRADA staff came to the nearby

villages, two people in particular, XXX and his wife. They called me and I went. They

taught me and gave me guidance. I gained knowledge of how to interact with people. I

got involved with the work that they were doing. I went to different parts of India. The

fear in my mind started vanishing. I gained knowledge through my training and I learned 165

to note the minutes of meetings. I met people from different countries. I interacted with

people from Germany, France, Somalia, China, and South Africa. My skills developed

and I bring that to the group. The abilities that I have matter more to the group than my

caste, and I haven’t experienced discontent because of what I do from the Lingayats.

People can see what I do, I a Scheduled Caste could do, and hopefully, it sets an example

that we can also have a chance of doing better, even if we do not belong to a powerful

caste. (Interviewee 1)

Thus, Interviewee 1 is an influential leader in the group and other members perceive him to lead through fair procedures in the group. Interviewees also mentioned that another member (Interviewee 4) is an influential member in the group because of his connections. Interviewee 7 said that they needed the support of Interviewee 4, a powerful

Lingayat, to keep the group together because “people listen to him. He helps people and knows people well.” Furthermore, the representatives are in-charge of depositing funds in the group’s bank account. Since every member has developed banking skills, they can contribute to the group whenever it is their turn to become the group’s representative.

Some members now actively undertake organic farming and contribute to the ABPWA by organizing events to spread awareness about organic farming. Thus, these skills of members from different castes facilitate collective action for diverse activities in the

ABPWA.

Section 4: Discussion

The aim of this study is to contribute to the CBNRM literature to examine the conditions and institutional arrangements that enable socio-culturally heterogeneous groups to successfully manage natural resources. A constant refrain of studies of

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watershed management in India is the collapse of institutions and the failure of watershed development organizations to maintain the benefits of the watershed programs not just in heterogeneous groups, but also even in homogeneous groups (Kerr, 2002). Scholars have examined the relationship between heterogeneity and collective action (see Poteete &

Ostrom, 2004; Naidu, 2009; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001), but several aspects of this relationship are not well understood. In particular, there is a knowledge gap in the relationships between socio-cultural heterogeneity, institutions, and collective action

(Andersson & Agrawal, 2011). To address these gaps, I examine the factors of procedural equity, distributive equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities that are considered to facilitate collective action in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups.

No. Proposition Supported Mechanisms

(Yes) /Not

supported

(No)

1a Fair procedural institutions Yes Exclusivity, inclusivity,

will facilitate collective impartiality, distributing

action. leadership positions, and

responding to the needs of the

Scheduled Caste community.

Table 5: Theoretical Propositions versus Key Findings in the ABPWA Continued

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Table 5 continued

1b Distributive equity will Yes Distributing loans fairly among

encourage collective action the members, and benefits of

soil and water conservation

activities are available to all the

members in the group.

1c Procedural equity will Yes Opportunities to participate in

create distributive equity training activities are rotated

serially among the members so

that everyone gains benefits of

training.

1d Procedural equity will Yes The exclusive membership rule

create symbolic capital maintains the core values of the

group. Being responsive to the

needs of the Scheduled Castes

maintains a sense of community

by shaping the group’s feeling

for fairness and impartiality.

Table 5: Theoretical Propositions versus Key Findings in the ABPWA Continued

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Table 5 continued

2a Accountability Yes Regular meetings, separation of

mechanisms will powers, maintaining records,

encourage collective and external accountability

action. facilitate collective action.

2b Accountability will create Yes Separation of powers creates

procedural and distributive procedural equity. Maintaining

equity to facilitate records about loans enables a

collective action. fair distribution of loans in the

group.

2c Accountability Yes Maintaining accounts is an

mechanisms create indication of the well-

community pride functioning nature of the group

that generates community pride.

3a Existing symbolic capital Yes Symbolic capital that had

will carried over from the original

facilitate collective action group facilitated collective

action in the ABPWA.

Table 5: Theoretical Propositions versus Key Findings in the ABPWA Continued

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Table 5 continued

3b Institutions will create Yes An institution of both castes

community, pride, and sitting together generated

sense of place that can community that facilitates

initiate and sustain collective action.

collective action.

3c Collective action outcomes Yes Successful collective action

will create community, outcomes of community have

pride, and sense of place generated more reputation and

that can sustain collective pride in the ABPWA.

action.

3d Symbolic assets such as Yes ABPWA conducts community-

community pride are inter- building sessions, which

convertible with economic generates economic capital,

capital to strengthen and community pride, and

maintain collective action. reputation. These symbolic

constructs again generate

symbolic capital.

Table 5: Theoretical Propositions versus Key Findings in the ABPWA Continued

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Table 5 continued

4a In heterogeneous groups Yes Members contribute through

members who pool bookkeeping, knowledge,

together capacities such as networking, performing their

leadership, literacy, duties of representative and

bookkeeping, and Chairperson.

knowledge will facilitate

collective action.

4b Institutions can build the Yes Members are regularly sent for

capacity of groups to training opportunities to build

encourage collective capacity and skills.

action.

Table 5: Theoretical Propositions versus Key Findings in the ABPWA

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Figure 5: Factors that Facilitate Collective Action in the ABPWA

Results indicate that while social asymmetries continue to exist between the

Lingayats and the Scheduled Castes, rules that create equity and accountability facilitate collective action. Practices of creating symbolic capital such as “community”, community pride, reputation, and capacities of members sustain collective action. These findings are consistent with other empirical studies that find that socio-cultural heterogeneity itself

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does not affect organizing and sustaining self-governing activities, but that institutions can facilitate collective action in socio-culturally heterogeneous communities (Poteete &

Ostrom, 2004; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). The specific contribution of this study is that it identifies the particular features of these institutions that facilitate collective action in a socio-culturally heterogeneous group. The theoretical propositions were supported by findings from this case study with one additional proposition (see Figure 5).

Equity: Scholars suggest that institutions that create equity can minimize the problems of socio-cultural heterogeneity (Adhikari & Lovett, 2006; Andersson &

Agrawal, 2011; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). Literature suggests that resource users are more likely to participate in resource governance and engage in cooperative behaviors if institutions for making decisions are fair and provide equitable outcomes (Ostrom, 1990). Fair rules such as exclusivity, inclusivity, and impartiality, distributing leadership positions, and responding to the needs of the

Scheduled Caste community create procedural equity. The ABPWA creates exclusivity through the membership rule that maintains a stable membership and reinforces the core values of the group to protect the common fund. The ABPWA follows a deliberative decision-making model to create inclusivity. Literature suggests that deliberative decision-making creates inclusivity by soliciting every member’s opinion (Lockwood et al., 2009; Webler & Tuler, 2001). Deliberative decision-making provides a buffer against powerful individuals, develops group solidarity, develops mutual respect, active listening and honesty, and prevents manipulation and distortion (Cleaver, 2000; Lockwood et al.,

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2009). Thus, procedural equity promotes equitable solutions, and empowers disadvantaged groups by sharing decision-making (Fung & White, 2001).

Impartial rules have particularly been important to create a sense of fairness in the group. Meroka (2006) argues that community trust and cohesiveness can erode because of small failures and betrayals inevitable in community life. The ABPWA drew upon the experience of preferential treatment of the Lingayats that created resentment among the members in the GM Doddi Watershed Association to craft impartial rules. These findings are in line with Proposition 1a that fair procedural institutions will facilitate collective action.

Equitable distribution of benefits to all the members of the group creates distributive equity. For instance, only farmers in the watershed group are permitted to take loans from the common fund. Opportunities to participate in training activities or to provide training to other community groups are rotated serially among the members so that every member participates in these sessions i.e. a procedural rule ensures that every member receives opportunities to participate in training activities. These benefits are crucial for members to continue their participation in the ABPWA. These findings are as expected to Proposition 1b that distributive equity will facilitate collective action.

Procedural rules such as impartiality in loan distribution ensure an equitable distribution of loan to every member in the group. Distributing leadership positions also helps to ensure that every member receives the opportunity to develop leadership skills by acting as the representative or the chairperson. Thus procedural rules also create distributive equity, in line with proposition 1c (Jacobsen, 2008; Joy et al., 2006)

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Rules of exclusivity foster a sense of community in the group. For instance, the membership rule creates an exclusive group to maintain the core values and norms of the group, thereby reinforcing the sense of “community” in the group, a form of symbolic capital that sustains collective action. Impartiality in resolving conflicts, being responsive to the concerns of the Scheduled Caste members by changing the loan repayment rules also maintain “community” in the ABPWA by shaping the group members’ attitudes and feelings of fairness and impartiality. Thus, proposition 1d, procedural equity will create symbolic capital such as a sense of community to facilitate collective action is supported by these findings.

Accountability: For successful CBNRM, accountability mechanisms help to keep power asymmetries in check and distribute power and responsibilities equitably in the group (Ribot, 1999). The ABPWA has several institutions that create accountability through transparent procedures of maintaining meeting minutes, recording bank transactions, having two group representatives for every meeting and one chairperson for one year, and responsibilities of members to look over accounts and meeting minutes.

These institutions avoid the concentration of power in a particular group of members and enable members to keep a check on other members, creating transparency in the group.

Prior studies have found that regular meetings and discussions create a shared understanding of how to manage the resource and increase trust because of face-to-face interactions (Adhikari & Lovett, 2006; Andersson & Agrawal, 2011; Kurian & Dietz,

2004). Distributing leadership positions avoids the possibility of concentrating power

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with one group of members and improves accountability by increasing engagement in decision-making procedures (Adhikari & Lovett, 2006; Lockwood et al., 2009).

Maintaining records of meeting minutes create accountability in a group also leads to a better understanding of roles and responsibilities and increases compliance of group members with group decisions (Adhikari & Lovett, 2006; Saravanan, 2002). An external auditor audits the account books of the ABPWA every six months. These rules of accountability facilitate collective action through fairness in decision-making. This finding is in line with Proposition 2a that accountability facilitates collective action.

Thus, the members are able to hold each other as well as an external auditors accountable through the interactions of multiple processes at different scales suggesting that an articulate democratic system that has evolved despite caste heterogeneity (Chhatre,

2008).

Proposition 2b states that accountability will create procedural and distributive equity. Separation of powers between the Chairperson, representatives, and members creates a sense of fairness because every member can monitor the behavior of the other and every member has an opportunity to hold a leadership position, which creates procedural equity. In the ABPWA, rules for maintaining records creates transparency in the information about which members receives loans and how many times so that they can distribute the benefit of loans fairly among other members. This is in line with other findings that suggest that fair procedures create equitable distribution of benefits (Kerr,

2002; Sunam and McCarthy, 2010). Thus, Proposition 2b was supported in the ABPWA.

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An unintended outcome of an accountability mechanism of maintaining records is community pride. Accountability can be another way to develop a symbolic asset of community pride that facilitates collective action. Furthermore, members perceive the meticulous maintenance of their accounts as a visible sign of the groups’ success.

Reinforcing such notions of “success” and creating visibility of these successes can be an effective prestige-building institution to reinforce a sense of community in a heterogeneous group. This finding is in line with Lukacs & Ardoin (2013) who suggest that creating visibility and evidence of progress is an important factor for developing community pride. Thus, an arrow was added in Figure 5 from accountability to symbolic capital.

Symbolic Capital: Most evaluations of watershed development are based on a narrow, economic view with a focus on material outcomes to create equity and address rural poverty in India (see Joy et al., 2006). This view has ignored the non-material benefits or feelings accrued by communities participating in watershed organizations

(Mosse, 2003). According to Proposition 3a, symbolic capital such as community or sense of place can facilitate collective action. Since the members of the ABPWA were a part of the GM Doddi Watershed Association, they possessed existing symbolic capital in the form of community that facilitated the formation of the ABPWA. These findings support the idea of symbolic capital in the form of sense of community can facilitate collective action despite underlying divisions of caste (Cochran & Ray, 2009; Van Vugt,

2002). However, findings did not suggest the creation of a sense of place in the ABPWA.

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Scholars suggest that a community can be symbolically constructed through community-building strategies, which can also persist through time (Cochran & Ray,

2009; Cohen, 2013). For the ABPWA the meetings are one facet of social life where all castes come together for three to four hours twice a month without the structure of the rules of untouchability. Here, different castes can sit together and share food, which is against the norms of how castes usually interact in the village. Thus a rule of both castes sitting together has led to the creation of symbolic capital in the community. This supports Proposition 3b that institutions can generate symbolic capital such as

“community” to facilitate collective action. This finding is similar to Lansing’s study in

Bali where people were actively prevented from referring to caste because it resulted in conflicts and discord in the village (Lansing, 2006). This muting of caste facilitated collective action by uniting the residents for managing the water temples. Thus strategies to generate “community” can be consciously crafted in heterogeneous communities to sustain collective action is in line with Proposition 3b.

Another way that symbolic capital is generated is through its success of collective action outcomes. Successes in activities such as organic farming and providing training to other organizations, and being featured in the media have created community pride in the

ABPWA. The ABPWA’s reputation helps to reinforce community pride in the members.

Although, the ABPWA did not specifically craft institutions to generate community pride, significant symbolic capital in the form of community pride has emerged because of the group’s success, which maintains collective action. Instances of symbolic capital such as notions of pride, unity, and idealness to create a new sense of community has

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been found in other instances of community-based natural resource management (Gibson

& Koontz, 1998; Sangameswaran, 2008; Cochran & Ray, 2009). This finding is in line with Proposition 3c that outcomes of collective action will create community and community pride. This kind of symbolic capital, which is the result of a successful group, helps to maintain the functioning of the ABPWA. Sustaining community pride is important as people may be unwilling to join a group because of the loss in public esteem, which can hinder cooperation (Meroka, 2006). This finding is in line with

Appadurai (1997) and Mosse (2003) who suggest that feelings of community are fragile and need to be continually reinforced in the face of changing circumstances.

The ABPWA has become well known after being featured in the local media and winning awards at government functions. This reputation enables it to earn income by conducting training sessions on community building. Thus, the ABPWA has been able to convert their symbolic capital of reputation into economic capital. Sometimes, only

Interviewee 1 receives invitations to conduct workshops on community building. Thus, the specific means of deriving symbolic capital and converting it into economic capital has been dependent on Interviewee 1’s position within the community- mediated by factors such as knowledge, skills, and networks. This finding is in line with Sen (1992, pp. 49) who argues that individuals can broaden their capabilities by acquiring symbolic capital, where “capability represents a person’s freedom to achieve well-being.” The newly gained economic capital is also interchanged to build different kinds of symbolic capital such as reputation, honor, and community pride in societies with caste prejudices to improve collective action efforts for managing water (Bourdieu, 1977; Cochran & Ray,

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2009; Mosse, 1999; Sangameswaran, 2008). This finding is in line with proposition 3d where symbolic capital and economic capital are inter-convertible.

Capacity: Skills of literacy, bookkeeping, and knowledge are crucial for maintaining collective action in the ABPWA. For instance, Interviewee 1’s skills of literacy and bookkeeping enable the ABPWA to keep a record of meeting minutes and financial accounts. The ABPWA has also benefited because of the knowledge of

Interviewee 1. Members consider Interviewee 1 to be an influential member of the group because he provides information about government schemes and benefits to the group.

Other members support the functioning of the group by conducting meetings, organizing awareness events for organic farming, and depositing money in the bank. Skills of maintaining accounts and meeting minutes help the group to conduct its meetings. This finding is in line with Proposition 4a and prior literature that capacities of members can facilitate collective action (Poteete & Ostrom, 2004). The ABPWA has an institution where every member is required to attend capacity building workshops on soil and water conservation in different parts of the country. This institution is in line with proposition

4b that institutions can build the capacity of its members.

Implications for Caste Heterogeneity

Overall, factors of procedural equity, distributive equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities facilitate collective action in the ABPWA despite caste heterogeneity. Moreover, some institutions have implications for removing structural barriers that marginalize the Scheduled Castes. For instance, a rule was crafted to bridge caste inequalities between the Lingayats and the Scheduled Castes by sitting together for

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watershed meetings. Thus, at least in the watershed meetings, norms of untouchability are not applicable. Although caste notions of untouchability are active in the daily village life in Arepalyam and Bailur, such an institution can potentially eradicate caste-related norms of untouchability. However, as in Arepalyam and Bailur (and also a majority of villages in India) where even housing is segregated on the basis of caste, abolishing caste will be considerably challenging because of age-old traditions and customs.

Drawing from the past experience of caste domination and caste preference in the

GM Doddi Watershed Association, members of the ABPWA also said that they have been careful about not preferring any one particular caste for preferential treatment. Until now, the institutions of impartiality have been reflective of this experience, which furthers the sense of fairness in the ABPWA to facilitate collective action. Rules of distribution of leadership positions and separation of power prevent any one caste from coopting the group through elite-capture of the institutions.

With respect to caste, both the Lingayats and the Scheduled Castes said that

“caste relations are okay” in the villages and that “there is no conflict.” However, the absence of conflict does not mean that caste privileges and power are not manifested in daily interactions. Scheduled Caste members only spoke about norms of untouchability and other caste related grievances in the absence of Lingayat members. Moreover,

Interviewee 1 mentioned that not all the Scheduled Caste members speak freely in the group because of fears stemming from their position of belonging to a “lower caste.”

Members only speak up when they are individually asked to contribute their opinion for decision-making. However, members indicated that there has been a change from the

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time when Scheduled Caste members did not speak up in the meetings at all. Although a sense of community is present in the ABPWA, it continues to mask internal differences within the group. Thus, although procedural equity, distributive equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities facilitate collective action, feelings of powerlessness stemming from caste positions are still active in the ABPWA. Scholarship suggests that fairness in benefits leads to sustainable institutions, but Agrawal (2001) points out that in a social context characterized by racial and caste inequalities, inequitable institutions may be sustainable even if they are entirely unfair.

Thus, even with the presence of inequalities stemming from positions of caste,

Scheduled Caste members do not want break away from the group. For instance,

Scheduled Caste members indicated that their watershed group is different from the village as well as other groups in the region that have emerged and stopped functioning, and indicated a sense of pride at belonging to such as group. Thus, even in the presence of caste heterogeneity and inequality, there is a sense of community pride in the

ABPWA. In the absence of overt caste conflict, reification of the sense of community and community pride, in spite of the drawbacks, is still beneficial to the members in terms of benefits such as improved soil and water conservation measures, increased income, improved access to government schemes and subsidies, or pride at belonging to a well- known watershed organization. Thus, local community members cooperate with each other, despite the presence of caste inequalities because of the realization that only cooperation will fulfill the interests of all the members.

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An exclusive membership rule that prevents outsiders from gaining membership into the group also creates a sense of community among the members. However, this rule is currently under debate in the ABPWA, and even though the ABPWA may allow new members into the group, it might impose high costs of entry to deter individuals who may not be serious about their membership into the group. Thus, institutions in the ABPWA have potential for minimizing caste inequalities. However, it is hard to say to whether and how the rudimentary sense of equality that has developed in the ABPWA will be carried over to the village life.

Different studies have indicated that institutions that create equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacity can facilitate collective action in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups (Andersson & Agrawal, 2011; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; Naidu,

2009; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). The finding that institutions of equity and accountability facilitate collective action in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups is consistent with literature. However, this study also found that not just institutions, but also the outcomes of collective action that generate symbolic capital and improve capacities of members facilitate collective action in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups. Prior studies have found that symbolic capital can be created through rules of voluntary labor (Sangameswaran, 2008) and creating visibility of events (Lukacs &

Ardoin, 2014). Similarly, the rule of building “community” between the Lingayats and the Scheduled Castes supported these findings from literature. However, this study also found that symbolic capital could be created through the successful outcomes of a

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group’s activities without developing institutions to maintain feelings of “community” that facilitate collective action.

Section 6: Conclusion

This study set out to examine the propositions that equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities of members can facilitate collective action for watershed management in India. The ABPWA has sustained itself over the past 15 years, and members have had relations with each other dating back to 1994. The main theoretical contribution of this study is that it demonstrates that equity, accountability, capacities, and more importantly, symbolic capital in the form of a sense of community can facilitate collective action. However, institutions for creating community pride were missing in the

ABPWA. On several occasions members referred to community pride, but this has largely developed because of successful collective action outcomes. This indicates the potential of successful outcomes of collective action to generate community pride that can help to sustain collective action. As such, community pride can therefore become more valuable in stages after the initiation of collective action to sustain the collective action effort. For instance, in the ABPWA, community pride developed after the

ABPWA started receiving awards from government agencies, being featured in local medial, and after conducting workshops in other communities. Furthermore, institutions may not be needed to generate community pride, but can be developed as a by-product of collective action.

From undertaking watershed management, the ABPWA has now also transitioned into a micro-credit group along with performing its functions for monitoring the

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watershed structures. This indicates a real-life situation where it is difficult to expect groups formed for a certain activity to only carry out that activity. As the capacity of the group improves or as external market or population pressures increase, they may be able to branch out into different aspects of resource management. Thus, there is a need to develop theoretical tools to examine the transformation of groups and its implications for sustainable resource management and socio-cultural heterogeneity.

These findings have significant policy implications particularly for decentralized natural resource programs in India that ignore internal differentiations in communities.

Socio-culturally heterogeneous groups are seldom a part of development programs because of the assumption that caste heterogeneities will hinder self-organization. This analysis indicates that institutions that foster equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities have potential to intersect with local caste factions and challenge them.

Obviously, the process of community construction cannot be replicated because of contingent factors such as conflict-laden communities, or intractable caste problems.

Some groups may also be present in regions with significant caste conflict and divergent interests that deter any efforts of self-organization. Institutions may also reproduce and reinforce social dominance by powerful castes that may be detrimental to resource governance, but an attention to features such as cultivating symbolic capital among socially marginal groups can foster collective action in heterogeneous communities.

Symbolic capital can create homogeneity of identities in the presence of inequalities to facilitate collective action. For instance, in the ABPWA, homogeneity of identities can reduce the dominance of the higher castes in a group with lower castes, but this reduction

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in dominance is not carried over into the village where the norms of untouchability are active. Thus, while symbolic capital may reduce dominance in the watershed group, it does not reduce social inequalities between the Lingayats and the Scheduled Castes.

External agencies such as government agencies and NGOs have a crucial role to play in attending to inequalities and social hierarchies for implementing natural resource management activities. Social organization is often neglected by external agencies because of the challenges in bringing together disparate groups, but it is also one of the most critical components of watershed programs because of interdependencies of farmers due to spatial inter-linkages due to flow of water. Therefore, creating equity, accountability, and symbolic construction of community despite heterogeneity become important features of institutions to address caste heterogeneity. Although external agencies are crucial in bringing together different castes to create a sense of community in a group, groups also need to have sufficient capacity to reinforce this sense of community through a variety of strategies such as creating community pride.

One caution is that this case study may not be representative of watershed management groups in India. The ABPWA was selected because it was deemed successful as it had been functioning for the past 14 years. The validity and reliability of these findings can be further assessed by studying more cases to assess the contextual factors that affect institutional arrangements in heterogeneous groups. By identifying the role of local institutional arrangements, particularly those that fostered equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacity, it is possible to explain how institutions might foster collective action in heterogeneous communities.

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Chapter 4: A Dynamic Interaction of Context and Institutions in Shaping

Collective Action Outcome: Evidence from West Virginia and India

Introduction

The role of socio-cultural heterogeneity in collective action is one of the most contentious and puzzling debates in common-pool resource (CPR) literature (Baland

& Platteau, 1996; Kant, 2002; Keohane & Ostrom, 1995; Kurian & Dietz, 2001;

Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; Quiggin, 1993; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001; Vedeld, 2000).

Scholars vary on whether heterogeneity aids, hinders, or has no influence on collective action. Most studies find that socio-cultural heterogeneity negatively affects natural resource management. Some studies find that institutions can help overcome the negative effects of socio-cultural heterogeneity. One thing is clear: socio-cultural heterogeneity does not have a uniform effect on collective action, and the effect of socio-cultural heterogeneity on collective action varies according to the context. Much of collective action research focuses on demonstrating positive, negative, or no-association relationships between heterogeneity and collective action through statistical analyses of data from specific developing countries leading to less success in generating evidence from multiple countries (Andersson & Agrawal,

2011). Consequently, there is not much literature available on socio-cultural heterogeneity and collective action from developed and developing economies. 187

This article is intended to address this gap in the research by examining the similarities and differences between the institutional arrangements that facilitate collective action in two socio-culturally heterogeneous groups in the United States and in India. Literature suggests that equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacity of members can lead to successful collective action in groups with socio- cultural heterogeneity (Andersson & Agrawal, 2011; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; Naidu,

2009; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). These four concepts guide the analysis for examining how socio-culturally heterogeneous watershed management groups in the

U.S. and in India undertake collective action. In particular, in this chapter I focus on two research questions:

1. How do institutional mechanisms for overcoming challenges of racial/caste

heterogeneity differ between a case in West Virginia, USA and a case in

Karnataka, India?

2. How do institutions shape and are shaped by contextual factors?

Methodologically, undertaking a comparative analysis between First World and Third

World countries is challenging because of differences in economic and cultural realities (Rangan & Lane, 2001). Academicians and policymakers have also avoided comparing watershed policies of both countries because of strikingly different contexts and the stakeholders involved in the process. However, even though watershed management policies in the U.S. and in India conceptualize diversity differently, policies in both countries are concerned with increasing diversity to increase stakeholder influence in different activities of watershed management such

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as decision-making, crafting institutions, and monitoring and sanctioning to improve watershed management outcomes. Thus, there is an opportunity to learn about different approaches for facilitating collective action, even with the variance in the governance institutions across the U.S. and India.

Section 1: Prior Research

Heterogeneity and Collective Action

Heterogeneity of resource users in terms of socio-cultural attributes of race, caste, and ethnicity has been highly contested as to its positive or negative influence on resource governance outcomes. Several scholars argue that socio-cultural heterogeneity negatively affects prospects for collective action (Baland & Platteau,

1999; Heckathorn, 1993). For a full literature review see Chapter 1, Section 2.

However, some scholars argue that institutions that specifically account for the socio- cultural heterogeneity in a community can create successful resource governance outcomes despite socio-cultural heterogeneity (Adhikari & Lovett, 2006; Andersson

& Agrawal, 2011; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). Socio- cultural heterogeneity then becomes a challenge as well an opportunity to devise institutions that can distribute benefits costs and benefits in a way that is perceived as legitimate, effective, and fair by the community of resource users. Thus, there need not necessarily be a deterministic relationship between socio-cultural heterogeneity and collective action, but institutions can moderate the relationship between socio- cultural heterogeneity and collective action (Andersson & Agrawal, 2011; Poteete &

Ostrom, 2004; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). Socio-cultural heterogeneity can also be

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helpful for collective action when institutions incorporate the different skills and knowledge of members in a community, especially when no single sub-group has access to all the resources needed for successful collective action (Poteete & Ostrom,

2004; Quiggin, 1993). While members in homogenous groups may also contribute their skills to facilitate collective action, in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups contributing capacities has the potential to override socio-cultural boundaries. Thus, in this chapter, I examine similarities and differences in the institutional factors and the mechanisms of equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities that facilitate collective action in a racially heterogeneous group in the U.S. and a group with caste heterogeneity in India.

Contextual Factors and Local Governance Institutions

While the relationship between contextual features and institutions has been well examined, relationship between contextual factors and local institutional arrangements in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups has not been closely studied

(see Figure 6). The context can be defined as “the encompassing variable that remains constant for a given study but not across studies” (Agrawal, 2003). Contextual factors are not closely examined for precisely this reason that they vary across different settings, but contextual factors may affect the impact of institutions being studied and vice versa. Research has focused on the impact of specific rules on outcomes, while not paying attention to how contextual factors impact or are impacted by institutions.

Thus while important contributions have been made in examining institutions for natural resource management, these studies have also downplayed the importance of

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contextual factors within which institutions are embedded (Mehta et al., 1999). An examination of how contextual factors shape institutions or are shaped by institutions presents an opportunity to build knowledge regarding two issues:

1) How do contextual factors shape institutions?

2) How can institutions shape contextual factors to make them more

amenable to collective action?

Contextual factors can be sometimes consciously changed by rules to facilitate collective action (Ostrom, 2014). Agrawal (2003) describes contextual factors identified by Baland & Platteau (1996), Ostrom (1990), and Wade (1988) that are considered important for achieving institutional stability of commons. These factors include group characteristics and resource system characteristics. Group characteristics include small size (Baland &Platteau, 1996; Wade, 1988), past successful experiences (Baland & Platteau, 1996; Wade, 1988), appropriate leadership (Baland & Platteau, 1996), interdependence among group members

(Baland & Platteau, 1996; Wade, 1988) heterogeneity of endowments, homogeneity of identities and interests (Baland & Platteau, 1996), and low levels of poverty

(Agrawal, 2003). Resource characteristics include small size (Wade, 1988), well- defined boundaries (Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1994), low levels of mobility, possibilities of storage of benefits from the resource, and predictability (Agrawal, 2003). While

Agrawal (2003) includes shared norms (Baland & Platteau, 1996) as a group characteristic, I include shared norm as a community characteristic because community norms can be beneficial or detrimental to a group ability to undertake

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collective action. I, therefore, add an additional circle in “Context” to include shared norms in community attributes. Moreover, a group can be embedded in a certain community, which has certain norms that become a part of the group.

Figure 6: Relationship between Context, Local Institutional Arrangements, and

Collective Action. Adapted from Agrawal (2003) and Andersson & Agrawal (2011).

While these factors are considered important for the emergence and sustainability of institutions, there is a gap in scholarship regarding how institutions influence contextual factors (see Figure 6). Some scholars have found that institutions can shape community attributes to faciliate collective action (Gibson & Koontz, 1998;

Gregorio et al., 2008; Sangameswaran, 2008). For instance, Gibson & Koontz (1998) found that institutions of membership created homogeneity of preferences in a forest 192

community in Indiana. The group that had relatively high costs of membership, restricted the use and transfer of land, and limited the recovery of investments upon exit maintained highly homogeneous attitudes towards forest conservation over more than twenty years. The other community that had lower cost of entry and exit created a heterogeneity in preferences, which led to the destruction of the forest and the membership dwindled over the years. Thus, institutions that created a homogeneity of preferences in the community also improved forest conditions, despite underlying religious, ideological, and socio-economic heterogeneity. In a similar vein,

Sangameswaran (2008) found that rules of shramdaan or voluntary labor in India brought people together for a watershed development project and, also, developed a

“community” which has lasted beyond the duration of the project itself by promoting a communitarian vision of an ideal village.

Institutions can also affect inequalities in a community of resource users. In a study of an interaction of institutions of property rights with poverty and collective action, Gregorio et al (2008) argue that institutions that increase tenure security decrease vulnerability of the poor and can enable them to make changes in the contextual conditions that keep them in poverty. Shiferaw, Kedebe, & Reddy (2008) found that local institutions that increase participation of socially mariginal groups can contribute towards the empowerment of these groups. Evaluations of watershed management programs in India show that some institutions exacerbate existing inequalities and widen disparities between members in communities. For instance, rules may restrict the access of socially marginalized groups such as pastoralists and

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women to resources, which widen disparities between socially marginal group and powerful groups (Ahluwalia, 1997; Gregorio et al., 2008; Kerr, 2002).

Thus, these findings suggest that institutions can shape features of community, group, and biophysical resoruces. Therefore, I argue that institutional arrangements can shape the existing socio-economic context, and/or be shaped by it. Andersson &

Agrawal (2011) similarly argue that local institutions may simultaneously respond to and affect socioeconomic and biophysical factors in the local context (see Figure 6).

Thus, there needs to be careful attention to the contextual factors to understand the processes of structural change of a particular situation i.e. how contextual factors shape or are shaped by institutional arrangements (Ostrom, 2014) (see Figure 6).

Section 2: Methods

For this qualitative comparative case study, the following criteria determined case selection: 1) watershed management groups exhibit racial heterogeneity in the

United States and caste heterogeneity in India, and 2) the watershed management groups should be more than 10 years old (indicative of a long-lasting, sustainable resource system). (For a full description of methods and data analysis techniques employed to answer the first research question for this study, please refer to Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.) For the second research question, contextual factors of community attributes and resource attributes guided the analysis to examine how they shaped or were shaped by institutional arrangements. Data pertaining to group attributes, community attributes, biophysical attributes, and institutions were collected through semi-structured interviews conducted in the OCWA, West Virginia and the ABPWA,

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Karnataka. I examined the relationship between contextual factors and institutional arrangements (George & Bennett, 2005). These data were then coded for group attributes, community attributes, and biophysical attributes and matched to a particular institution to identify the causal direction of the interaction between contextual attributes and institutional arrangements.

Section 3: West Virginia, U.S. and Karnataka, India

Focus of Activities

The two groups examined in this study are the Orange Creek Watershed

Association (OCWA), in West Virginia, USA, and the Arepalyam Bailur Prakruti

Watershed Association (ABPWA). Table 6 describes the broad contextual features of both the organizations. The OCWA was formed in 2002 in response to acid mine drainage (AMD), a mixture of chemicals leaking out of defunct coalmines. The

OCWA focuses on remediating streams with acid mine drainage (AMD) leaching out of coalmines. The primary goal is to improve water quality, stabilize streams, reduce sedimentation, and restore the streams for recreational use. The ABPWA was formed in 2002 after it split from the original organization, GM Doddi Watershed

Association that was formed in 1994. The GM Doddi Watershed Association was formed to undertake soil and water conservation to augment groundwater and reduce soil erosion in a water scarce region in Karnataka, India. The watershed program in

India focused on constructing check dams, percolation ponds, and bunds on private lands to stabilize the slope of the land and “capture” rainwater runoff from the fields.

Group Formation

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A shared concern about the water quality in Orange Creek facilitated the formation of the OCWA and the WVDEP helped the residents of Orange Creek to form the OCWA. Agency personnel from the WVDEP helped the community develop its bylaws and within six months, the OCWA was formed.

On the other hand, the ABPWA faced considerable challenges and transaction costs in group formation. MYRADA, an external agency, was instrumental in forming the GM Doddi Watershed Association in 1994. MYRADA selected the area for watershed intervention based on low soil fertility, depleted water table, high poverty levels, and high social divisions. Notions of caste purity and norms of untouchability between the Lingayats (higher castes) and the Scheduled Castes–a historically marginalized caste– had prohibited any interactions between both the castes. In 1991, MYRADA, an external agency, identified a group of farmers from different castes occupying land in the same watershed. A challenge for MYRADA was to convince the farmers in the watershed to self-organize although deeply rooted community norms of untouchability prevented any such interactions. Thus, caste norms forbade interactions between the Lingayats and the Scheduled Castes, which precluded the community from self-organizing until the intervention of MYRADA.

MYRADA developed a rule to alleviate inequalities between the Lingayats and the Scheduled Castes. According to this rule, every member, irrespective of caste, should sit together and this rule is implemented in the ABPWA even today. The GM

Doddi Watershed Association was officially formed in 1994 after three years of community building to alleviate social differences between the Lingayats and the

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Scheduled Castes. However, the watershed management program was finally implemented only in 1998 after members from both the castes agreed to work together. MYRADA officials said that it took a total of 68 meetings and 6 participatory planning exercises from April 1995 to March 1998 to implement the watershed program. After seven years of community-building efforts, farmers from three different villages agreed to implement the watershed management program.

Thus, although rural societies in India are generally more cohesive than those in rural areas of the U.S., it follows that there should be fewer transaction costs for building institutions in rural India than in rural areas of the U.S. (Koontz & Sen, 2013).

However, with an investment of seven years in organizing the community, the costs of self-organization were extremely high in the GM Doddi Watershed Association.

In 2002, the GM Doddi Watershed Association disbanded because of heterogeneity in location and interests. Farmers from GM Doddi were located in the upstream region and had individual irrigation facilities whereas farmers from

Arepalyam and Bailur were located in the downstream region and shared watershed structures such as check dams and bunds between two or more farmers. Farmers from

GM Doddi in the upstream reaches of the watershed did not perceive benefits in contributing to the maintenance of watershed structures in the downstream reaches of the watershed. Thus, farmers from the Arepalyam and Bailur decided to form the

ABPWA because they were located in the downstream region and depended on the shared maintenance of check dams and bunds to prevent soil erosion and sustain groundwater augmentation.

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Kin-based Group

Two members of the OCWA are related to each other through relationships of mother-in-law and daughter-in-law. Other family members attend the meetings and can provide input and voice their concerns, but they do not have voting rights in the group. For instance, the founder of the OCWA is not on the board because his wife is the treasurer, but all the interviewees said that the founder continues to remain the

“driving force” of the OCWA. However, nepotism through immediate family defined as “parent-child, husband-wife, or sibling relationships” are forbidden in the OCWA.

Similar to the OCWA, the ABPWA has members that are related to each other. Three Scheduled Castes are related to each other. Before the split, seven

Lingayats were related to each other. Out of these, one Lingayat was from GM Doddi and therefore he was no longer a part of the ABPWA after the split. From the six related Lingayats, two left the group because of a refusal to repay their loans and one left the group because of a misunderstanding about the funds. Currently, the ABPWA has two Lingayat brothers and a woman member related to them distantly through marriage. Three Scheduled Castes are also related to each other. However, members mentioned that they “keep family relations at home and not in the group” because preferential treatment of the Lingayats by the MYRADA officials in the GM Doddi

Watershed Association created resentment among the members.

Poverty levels

In discussions with key informants in the OCWA, members suggested that there were no differences in wealth among members, but agreed that African-

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American members are more disadvantaged than White members. Interviewees agreed, “All members are poor here.” In the ABPWA, along with caste inequalities, there are also differences over land size. The nine Scheduled Caste members in the group are small and marginal farmers with land ranging between 2 to 5 acres who also earn money as daily wage laborers. The five Lingayats have land ranging between 6 to 12 acres in the upper reaches of the watershed. One of the Lingayats has a fertilizer business in a nearby town.

External Agencies

The OCWA works with external agencies that include West Virginia

Department of Environment Protection (WVDEP)– Abandoned Mines Land (AML)

Program, West Virginia Department of Natural Resources (WVDNR) Natural

Resources Council Agency (NRCA), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, non-profits such

Trout Unlimited, and academic organizations such as West Virginia University

Institute of Technology (WVUIT), and Bridgemont Community College. The

ABPWA is supported by external agencies such as the Syndicate Bank, MYRADA,

Community Managed Resource Center (CMRC), and the Department of Agriculture.

Funding Source

The OCWA applies for funding to several organizations such as the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), WVDEP- AML Program, and WVDNR to install passive water treatment structures and stabilize stream banks. In contrast, the watershed program in India was funded through MYRADA, which implemented the program through a 70 % grant from Misereor, a German funding agency, and a 30%

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contribution from the farmers. Much of this money was used for constructing watershed structures including check dams, wells, and bund to decrease soil erosion and facilitate water retention into the ground. Additionally, Misereor provided a loan to farmers for the 30% contribution and instead of repaying the loan to Misereor, farmers pooled their repayments to create a common fund for post-project management activities. This “loan” was conceptualized to create community ownership over resources and reflected the contribution of the farmers towards a common resource for construction, operation, and maintenance of the check dams and bunds between farms. Now the ABPWA supports itself through the common fund and also provides loans to its members for purchasing seeds, agricultural equipment, and hiring tractors during the harvest season.

Group Size

Currently, the OCWA has 17 members out of which 11 are White and six are

African-Americans. The index of heterogeneity in Orange Creek is 0.45, which is considered moderately heterogeneous (Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). The ABPWA was formed in 2002 with 17 members after splitting from the GM Doddi that had 35 members. The ABPWA consists of two castes: the Lingayats who are a politically, economically, and socially powerful caste, and the Scheduled Castes, a historically marginalized caste. The group has only one woman who became a member after her brother passed away. There are currently 14 members in the ABPWA, out of which five are Lingayats and nine are Scheduled Castes. The index of heterogeneity in the

ABPWA is also 0.45.

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Level of Collective Action

The OCWA has high levels of collective action with members attending meetings every month as well as participating in monitoring water quality, organizing community events and awareness activities, and fundraising and recruiting new members. The ABPWA also has high levels of collective action. Members participate in meetings twice every month, draw and repay loans from the common fund of the watershed organization, monitor damages to water retention structures such as check dams and bunds, and conduct outreach activities for community-building and organic farming.

Thus, the OCWA and the ABPWA differ on several aspects such as group formation, focus of activities, funding, and external agency involvement. The only similarities between both the organizations are the indices of heterogeneity and the high levels of collective action. Thus, exploring the similarities and the differences between the institutions in organizations that differ on almost every aspect will enable theory building about how institutions facilitate collective action in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups.

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Characteristic OCWA ABPWA

Focus of activities Focuses on restoring water Focuses on groundwater

quality to a condition augmentation, reduction of

capable of supporting soil erosion, creation of

aquatic life, flood alternative livelihood assets

prevention, stream bank and alternative income

stabilization, acid mine generation activities, and a

drainage remediation, common watershed fund.

sediment reduction,

maintenance and water

quality testing, creation of a

safe and healthy

environment, and support

for local recreational

activities.

Table 6: Features of OCWA and the ABPWA Continued

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Table 6 continued

Group formation and Residents of Orange Creek MYRADA selected the

Transaction costs self-organized to address area based on criteria of

acid mine drainage. Low low soil fertility, depleted

transaction costs for self- water table, high poverty

organizing (6 months) levels, and social divisions.

High transaction costs for

self-organizing (7years) for

GM Doddi. Social

differences and norms of

untouchability hindered

self-organization. After 8

years, ABPWA split from

GM Doddi due to a lack of

interest and inequitable

distribution of benefits.

Kin-based Some evidence of kin-based The group has three

relationships. Lingayats related to each

other and three Scheduled

Castes related to each

other.

Table 6: Features of OCWA and the ABPWA Continued

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Table 6 continued

Poverty levels Interviewees said that there All the six Lingayats are

are no significant differences large farmers with land

in wealth, but African- ranging from 6 to 12 acres.

American members are more Scheduled Castes are small

disadvantaged. farmers with land ranging

from 2 to 5 acres.

Role of external External agencies supported External agencies formed

agencies the formation of the OCWA. the GM Doddi and

External agencies collaborate supported the formation of

with the OCWA to undertake the ABPWA. MYRADA

improvements in water and the CMRC now play an

quality. advisory role and provide

information regarding

government schemes to the

ABPWA. Government

agencies and MYRADA

occasionally invite the

ABPWA to conduct

community-building

exercises and workshops.

Table 6: Features of OCWA and the ABPWA Continued 204

Table 6 continued

Funding source Applies for competitive The watershed program

funding to government and was implemented through a

non-government agencies. grant. Post-project

maintenance is carried out

through the common fund.

Group size 17 members (11 white and 6 14 members (6 Lingayats

African-American) and 9 Scheduled Castes)

Levels of collective High. Members attend High. Members attend

action meetings every month, and meetings twice a month,

regularly organize draw and repay loans from

community events and the common fund, monitor

awareness activities. damages to watershed

structures, participate in

organizing community

events such as training

workshops and agricultural

festivals.

Table 6: Features of OCWA and the ABPWA

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Section 3: Results

Comparing Factors enabling Collective Action in the OCWA and the ABPWA

In this section, I explore the similarities and the differences in the factors that facilitate collective action in the OCWA and the ABPWA.

Overall, the levels of collective action in the OCWA and the ABPWA are similar, as evidenced by high levels of member participation over time. In the

OCWA, the proximity to the resource and the urgency to improve water quality due to associated health problems has led to high levels of collective action among the members of the OCWA. Key factors for success have been fair decision-making mechanisms that reflect local conditions, shared benefits, accountability, community pride, and the capacities of members in the group.

In India, the livelihood link to watershed management has resulted in high participation that has sustained the organization. Ostrom (1990) argued that the likelihood that stakeholders will contribute to solving common pool resource problems is related to their level of dependence on the resources. However, the survival of most watershed organizations in India is poor after the withdrawal of external funding despite the livelihood link (Koontz & Sen, 2013). The ABPWA is unique in that it has been able to sustain itself by developing and maintaining the common fund, even after its split from GM Doddi. This success has been made possible primarily by institutions that have created a sense of community despite caste differences that forbid interactions between the Lingayats and the Scheduled

Castes. Other institutions important in the functioning of the ABPWA are equity and

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impartiality in decision-making procedures, equity in the distribution of benefits, and accountability within the group. Below, I examine the specific institutional factors of procedural equity, distributive equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities in the OCWA and the ABPWA.

Institutional Arrangements OCWA, United States ABPWA, India

Procedural equity Exclusive membership, Exclusive

(Exclusivity) but allows new members membership, does not

allow new members

Procedural equity Deliberative decision- Deliberative decision-

(Inclusivity) making making

Talking to people -

outside of meetings

Procedural equity Board elections Serial rotation of

(Impartiality) leaders

Non-discrimination -

Nepotism -

Conflict of Interest -

- Attendance

Table 7: Comparing Factors that Facilitate Collective Action in the OCWA and the

ABPWA Continued

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Table 7 continued

- Loan distribution

- Conflict resolution

Procedural Equity Officers Officers

(Distributing leadership Committees -

positions)

D. Procedural Equity Meeting time and place -

(Representation of Professionalism -

Marginalized Groups)

Procedural Equity Addressing concerns Addressing concerns

(Responsiveness) Cognizance of local Local conditions

conditions (Meeting time and

place)

Distributive equity Benefits Benefits

Accountability (Face-to-face Quorum -

interactions) Regular meetings Regular meetings

Accountability (Separation of Leadership positions Leadership positions

Powers)

Table 7: Comparing Factors that Facilitate Collective Action in the OCWA and the

ABPWA Continued

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Table 7 continued

Accountability (Maintaining Financial records Financial records

Records)

External Accountability External auditor External auditor

Symbolic Capital Community building Community building

Community Pride and Community Pride and

Reputation Reputation

Capacity Unique Skills Unique Skills

Table 7: Comparing Factors that Facilitate Collective Action in the OCWA and the

ABPWA

Procedural Equity: Although the mechanisms through which they operate are different, membership rules in the OCWA and the ABPWA serve the same purpose of creating exclusivity (see Table 7). Only landowners within the watershed can seek membership in the OCWA. This rule allows the possibility of new people entering the group. However, not many outsiders move into Orange Creek and not all of them join the OCWA because they may be temporary residents. Interviewees said that they are careful about socializing with temporary residents such as renters or squatters. Thus, the membership in the OCWA has largely remained consistent since 209

2002 and the membership rule ensures that only people living in the watershed can participate in the OCWA, creating an exclusive group.

New membership is actively discouraged in the ABPWA even if requests for membership come from “family, relatives, and best friends.” The possibility that new members will erode the group’s institutions by breaking rules, or by drawing loans from the common fund without repaying it back are concerns that members expressed for allowing new members. Some members argued that bringing in new members would strengthen the savings of the group. The ABPWA is debating whether to craft a new rule to include new members in the group. Discussions indicated that they plan to impose high costs of entry i.e. a deposit of Rs.1000 ($15) and a savings Rs. 25,000

($374) for six months for new members. Thus, the OCWA and the ABPWA are careful about whom they allow into their group to maintain the community dynamics and the group norms (Ostrom, 2009). Creating exclusivity in membership is also key mechanism for groups to maintain, manage, and defend resources from outside threats (Gibson & Koontz, 1998).

Both the OCWA and the ABPWA create inclusivity through deliberative decision-making. Although both organizations have rules that require a 2/3rd majority in the OCWA and a 70% majority in the ABPWA for passing decisions, both organizations make decisions through deliberative discussions that last for several meetings. Furthermore, the ABPWA uses the majority vote to find out if there is a dissent in the group and then discusses issues to examine the source of the dissent and arrive at a common understanding of the issue. The OCWA also has a community

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norm of talking to members outside of the meeting by visiting neighbors or talking on the front porch. Interviewees said that “talking to people” outside of meetings enables members to give their opinions if they were absent for the meetings.

The OCWA and the ABPWA use very different rules for creating impartiality.

The OCWA creates impartiality by holding annual elections for leadership positions and also has rules against discrimination, nepotism, and conflict of interest. In the

ABPWA, mechanisms for creating impartiality include equal enforcement of the attendance rule, impartial loan distribution to all the members in the group, and conflict resolution strategies that do not favor any particular caste. Both groups also distribute leadership positions in the group to avoid the concentration of power in any one individual. Additionally, the OCWA has three committees—Leadership,

Outreach, and Finance—to manage the affairs of the OCWA.

The OCWA and the ABPWA use similar rules to encourage representation of socially marginal groups and responsiveness. The OCWA crafted a rule on meeting time to enable a representation of African-American members. The rule of meeting time and place in the ABPWA was crafted to reflect local conditions and its convenient location for members from both the villages. Additionally the OCWA has two other rules that create responsiveness i.e. institutions that are attentive to the needs of the members by addressing concerns of members and being cognizant of local conditions such as poverty of the members. The ABPWA fosters responsiveness by being attentive to the concerns of the Scheduled Caste members and being cognizant of local conditions in deciding the meeting location. For instance, it

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amended its loan repayment rule because of its high interest rate after requests from the Scheduled Caste members. Thus, institutions in the OCWA and the ABPWA are responsiveness to the concerns of its socially marginalized members.

Distributive Equity: Benefits from external agencies as well as environmental, educational, professional, social, and developmental benefits are shared by the members on the OCWA as well as the broader community. The OCWA also hires a bus to take all its members to the Watershed Celebration Day (WCD) organized by the DEP. Interviewees from the DEP said that the OCWA is one of the few organizations that brings all its members for the WCD, which provides every member an equal opportunity to attend the WCD. Similarly, in the ABPWA benefits such as improved soil and water quantity are shared by the members as well as other farmers because watershed intervention also results in spill over benefits such as improved groundwater table in the watershed. Members also benefit financially through loans, government subsidies and schemes, and conducting community building workshops in other villages.

Accountability: Mechanisms for creating accountability such as quorum, conducting regular meetings, separation of powers across leadership positions, maintaining records, and external auditing were identical in the OCWA and the

ABPWA. Furthermore, in both the organizations an accountability mechanism of maintaining records creates community pride. For instance, in the OCWA, collecting water quality data creates community pride in the improved environmental conditions. The OCWA has developed a strategy of creating visibility of improved

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water quality in the Orange Creek by displaying this information on its Facebook page. In the ABPWA, a meticulous maintenance of accounts creates community pride because according to members maintaining accounts is indicative of a well- functioning organization.

Symbolic Capital: Another difference between the OCWA and the ABPWA is in the factors that create symbolic capital. While the OCWA consciously uses community building and prestige building measures to build community pride, the

ABPWA generates community pride as an outcome of its achievements as a successful watershed organization. The only community-building institution in the

ABPWA was crafted by MYRADA to bring the Lingayats and the Scheduled Castes together. Thus, the ABPWA does not have any institution to build community pride, but community pride is generated as an outcome of collective action through participating in educational and awareness events, and farmer festivals. The ABPWA has won several awards by government agencies for its long-enduring nature despite caste differences. The ABPWA has also been featured in the local media because of its community-building workshops and initiatives in organic farming. These activities generate additional symbolic capital in the form of community pride. The ABPWA has not developed any strategy to develop community pride, but relies on its success as a well-functioning watershed group to generate community pride. Thus, in both the organizations, community pride helps to sustain collective action. While the OCWA has developed a strategy to create visibility of improved environmental conditions to generate community pride, no such institution exists in the ABPWA.

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Thus, even though there are no institutions for creating community pride in the ABPWA, community pride has a similar function in the OCWA and the

ABPWA—that of reinforcing “community” to sustain collective action in the group.

Capacity: Both the OCWA and the ABPWA utilize the capacities of their members for organizing awareness activities, fund raising, grant writing, networking, maintaining accounts, cooking and baking, and talking to landowners and industries.

Collective action outcomes also increase the capacity of members through opportunities to develop contacts, which leads to professional benefits for members.

Thus, the institutional factors and the mechanisms through which they operate for equity and accountability in the OCWA and the ABPWA are largely similar even though the contexts are vastly different. An important difference is in the factors that create symbolic capital such as community pride. The OCWA develops community pride through strategies, whereas the ABPWA relies on the outcomes of collective action to develop community pride. Next, I explore the dynamic relationship between contextual factors and institutional arrangements in the OCWA and the ABPWA.

The Interaction between Contextual Factors and Institutions

In this section, I examine the interaction of the context i.e. group attributes, community attributes, and resource attributes with institutions to demonstrate how institutions shape and are shaped by particular contextual features (see Table ).

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I) Group Attributes Institutional Institutional

Arrangements in Arrangements in the

the OCWA ABPWA

1. Small size a) Strategy of a) Rule of deliberative

deliberative decision-making.

decision-making.

b) Strategy of

talking to people

outside of

meetings.

2. Past successful experiences NA a) The experience of

caste domination and

preference has led to

impartial strategies in

the ABPWA.

Table 8: Contextual Factors and Institutional Arrangements in the OCWA and the

ABPWA Continued

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Table 8 continued

3. Interdependence among a) Members a) Rule of every

group members contribute member participating in

different skills to community events and

the group that farmer festivals creates

creates interdependence.

interdependence.

4. Appropriate leadership a) Rules of a) Rules of distribution

distribution of of leadership positions

leadership positions and separation of

and separation of powers

powers

5A. Heterogeneity of NA NA

endowments, 5B i) Strategy of

5B. Homogeneity of identities creating community

and interests pride through

visibility of progress

Table 8: Contextual Factors and Institutional Arrangements in the OCWA and the

ABPWA Continued

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Table 8 continued

II) Community Attributes Institutional Institutional

Arrangements in Arrangements in the

the OCWA ABPWA

6. Shared norms a) Strategy of a) Norms of

applying social untouchability.

pressure on

residents who

litter.

b) Strategy of

building

partnerships with

external agencies.

III) Biophysical Attributes Institutional Institutional

Arrangements in Arrangements in the

the OCWA ABPWA

7. Small size NA NA

Table 8: Contextual Factors and Institutional Arrangements in the OCWA and the

ABPWA Continued

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Table 8 continued

8. Well-defined boundaries a) Watershed a) Only members of the

boundaries are well ABPWA can access the

defined, but rules common fund.

that forbid access are

not implemented.

9. Low levels of mobility NA NA

10. Possibilities of storage NA NA

benefits

11. Predictability a) Environmental a) Environmental

monitoring monitoring.

b) Maintaining

financial accounts.

Table 8: Contextual Factors and Institutional Arrangements in the OCWA and the

ABPWA

I) Group Attributes

1. Small size: The small size of the OCWA of 17 members facilitates

deliberative decision-making and community norms of talking to people

outside of the meetings. Interviewees mentioned that the “everyone knows

everybody” in the OCWA and that there are “no secrets in the OCWA”, which 218

enables members to contribute to decision-making in meetings as well as

outside of the meetings. The small size of the community reduces transaction

costs by making it easier to have deliberative decision-making processes and

communication outside of meetings.

Poteete & Ostrom (2004) suggest that small size of a group is reflective of prior heterogeneity and conflict. Similarly in the GM Doddi, a large group of 35 members with heterogeneity of caste, location, assets, and endowments split to form the

ABPWA, which is now heterogeneous only along the dimensions of caste and assets.

Thus, although the small size in the ABPWA is indicative of prior conflict, a smaller group facilitates deliberative decision-making because every member has an opportunity to contribute to decision-making.

1) Past successful experiences: The OCWA had previously organized clean up events in the Orange Creek and the success of these events played a role in forming the OCWA. However, no institutions were found to be emerging from past successful experiences of the OCWA. A past, albeit unsuccessful, experience of cooperation in the GM Doddi Watershed Association, the experience of preferential treatment to the

Lingayats in the GM Doddi Watershed Association, and the subsequent resentment among the members led them to adopt strategies that create impartiality in decision- making in the ABPWA. Thus, past experiences of the members in the GM Doddi

Watershed Association created impartial strategies and rules in the ABPWA.

2) Interdependence among group members and appropriate leadership:

Members pool their capacities for activities such as recruiting volunteers, fund-

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raising, grant writing, organizing educational and awareness events, and “talking in the language of landowners and industries” that creates interdependence among the members. Thus, the OCWA uses a strategy that creates interdependence among the members.

Members of the ABPWA regularly participate at agricultural fairs and farmer festivals. Every member is required to participate in such events. Thus, the ABPWA has created a rule that creates interdependence among the members.

4) Appropriate leadership: Both the OCWA and the ABPWA have rule for distributing leadership positions and a separation in the powers of these positions.

Thus, rules create opportunities for leadership in the group. In this case, an institution is shaping a group attribute of appropriate leadership by creating opportunities for leadership in the OCWA and the ABPWA.

5) A Heterogeneity of endowments: No interaction was found between the heterogeneity of endowments and institutional arrangements in the OCWA.

Interviewees mentioned that “everybody is poor in Orange Creek” and “no one has more than the other.” In the ABPWA, heterogeneity in terms of endowments such as farm size has not led to the creation of any institution.

5) B) Homogeneity of identities and interests:

Community Pride: Interviewees in the OCWA frequently referred to the need to

“reinstate community pride” implying that community pride, once a default condition in the community, has since been lost. Institutions that create a visible sign of progress of the OCWA’s efforts at improving water quality are used to build

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community pride and draw participation from other residents in the activities of the

OCWA. Strategies of conducting community dinners, installing signboards in the community to highlight the OCWA’s achievements and uploading picture of successful grants and projects on social media such as a Facebook page are some of the ways that the OCWA creates community pride. These institutions create community pride that persists despite racial differences among the members in the

OCWA. Thus, in this case, an institution is shaping a group attribute by creating community pride. The ABPWA does not have institutions that create community pride.

II) Context- Community Attributes

6. Shared norms in the OCWA: Existing community features such as attitudes towards littering and distrust of outsiders have given rise to specific institutional arrangements in the OCWA.

6. A) Littering: A shared norm of littering hinders the OCWA from achieving its environmental goal of improving water quality. Interviewees frequently mentioned that the Appalachian culture creates a unique sense of place among members where the community believes that the resources belong to them. However, this sense of place coupled with poverty has resulted in environmentally detrimental behaviors such as illegal disposing of trash in the creek. To change this behavior, the OCWA has adopted a strategy of applying social pressure on residents who dispose trash in the neighborhood and the Orange Creek. Social pressure such as talking to them, or by organizing clean up days to pick up the trash, has resulted in a cultural change in

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trashing attitudes in the community. Thus, institutional arrangements have been able to alter baseline conditions of environmentally harmful behaviors in the community to achieve collective action goals of a clean environment. The tactic of applying social pressure has been successful because when OCWA members pick up trash disposed in the Creek and on the hillsides, other residents come out and start helping them.

6. B) Distrust towards outsiders: Existing community norms of distrust towards outsiders create challenges in working with external agencies. A historic distrust of outsiders emerging from complex relationships between the “outsider” coal industry and the locals is widely prevalent among the community members even today. Members frequently mentioned resource exploitation such as “outsiders are here to take what belongs to us.” This attitude has impeded the OCWA from working closely with government agencies or even volunteer groups such as VISTA and

AmeriCorps because community members are suspicious of outsiders. To change perceptions of suspicion towards outsiders, the OCWA board has three positions reserved for external agencies who can vote on decisions in the meetings. The OCWA actively recruits volunteers to change community perceptions of outsiders. Thus, institutions for developing relations with external agencies indicates the potential of institutional arrangements to alter community features. Thus institutional variables can modify contextual variables and/or be influenced by contextual variables to shape collective action.

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6. Shared norms in the ABPWA: The presence of the community norm of untouchability forbade any contact between the Lingayats and the Scheduled Castes.

However, MYRADA, an external agency, crafted an institution of bringing both the castes together for the watershed meetings. In these watershed meetings, rules of untouchability did not apply and members from both the castes sat together on a carpet. However, outside of the watershed meetings, rules of untouchability are again applicable. Thus, a community norm of untouchability was altered through an institution for the purpose of watershed management.

III) Context- Resource Attributes in the OCWA and the ABPWA: No clear interaction was found between the resource attributes of small size, low levels of mobility, and possibilities of storage of benefits from the resource in the OCWA. A statement in the bylaws describes the boundary of the watershed, but it does not have any institutional prescription attached to it. For predictability of resource conditions, the OCWA has institutions to undertake environmental monitoring through checking improvements in water quality. External agencies also conduct independent surveys that complement the data collected by the OCWA. The data collected is used to demonstrate progress to funding agencies and is an important institution to generate more funds for the OCWA’s activities. Thus, institutions of environmental monitoring create predictability in environmental conditions.

Two types of resources were considered for this analysis–the watershed and the common fund of the ABPWA. There are no institutions that interact with resource attributes of small size and low levels of mobility. With respect to creating

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predictability in resource conditions, if members notice damages in a watershed structure, they repair the structures to maintain the benefits of reduced soil erosion from the check dams and bunds. Farmers share check dams and bunds between their lands, and sometimes may also pool their funds to repair the structures. There are clearly defined rules to create predictability in the common fund by maintaining transparency in the accounts with details of members who draw loans, the amount of the loan, and the number of times that they draw loans.

Section 4: Discussion

The purpose of this chapter was twofold: First, to examine the similarities and differences in the institutional arrangements of the OCWA and the ABPWA despite the underlying differences in the type of socio-cultural heterogeneity and the contexts in which the heterogeneity operates. Second, to examine the interaction between contextual attributes and institutional arrangements. In response to the first question, although some studies have found evidence that socio-culturally heterogeneous groups undertake collective action (see Varughese & Ostrom, 2001; Adhikari &

Lovett, 2006; Andersson & Agrawal, 2011), there are several aspects of the factors that facilitate collective action in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups that were not well understood. In particular, this analysis draws attention to three issues. First, it suggests that the factors such as procedural equity, distributive equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities that enable socio-culturally heterogeneous group to undertake collective actions are largely similar in both the contexts despite underlying differences and the differences in the focus of the watershed management activities.

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Second, the analysis notes that procedural equity and accountability mechanisms were largely similar across both the contexts. The mechanisms for accountability such as regular interactions, separation of powers, maintaining records, and external auditing, in particular, were identical. Procedural equity, i.e. equity in access to decision-making forums and accountability, are considered to be a pillars of good governance for achieving social justice (Agrawal et al., 2006; Gruber, 2010;

Kerr, 2002; Klooster, 2000; Pandit & Bevilacqua, 2011; Pariyar, 2006; Ribot, 2002) and helps to keep a check on arbitrary action (Agrawal & Ribot, 2002), and at the same time increases citizen empowerment (Koontz, 2006; Mansuri & Rao, 2004;

Saravanan, 2002).

Third, evidence from both cases suggest that collective action can be sustained not only through institutional arrangements, but by also the outcomes of successful collective action. An accountability mechanism of maintaining records generates community pride in both cases. In the OCWA, collecting and maintaining data about water quality is a visible evidence of progress of the OCWA’s efforts, which generates community pride. In the ABPWA, members demonstrated pride in the maintenance of their accounts—which they perceived as an indication of the well- functioning nature of their organization. While the OCWA has developed strategies to generate community pride by creating visibility of its actions, the ABPWA has not developed any such strategies and primarily relies on the outcomes of collective action–in this case–an outcome of accountability to generate community pride. These findings are in line with literature that suggests that visibility is a powerful motivator

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for collective action (Lukacs & Ardoin, 2014). Thus institutions for achieving one outcome can also unintentionally result in another outcome. Community pride is a collective action outcome in both organizations, the only difference being that the

OCWA has now developed strategies to generate community pride. The ABPWA, on the other hand, relies on its success as a watershed organization to generate community pride. One explanation for this difference could be that the OCWA actively recruits volunteers to work with the OCWA and has also focused on efforts such as altering littering attitudes that affect not just the members of the OCWA, but also the broader community in Orange Creek. Developing community pride, therefore, enables the OCWA to recruit volunteers. On the contrary, the ABPWA does not seek to involve the other residents in its group activities. Members of the

ABPWA are largely committed to the activities of the ABPWA because of financial benefits, and therefore, do not need to reinforce notions of community pride through institutions, especially since community pride is generated through the outcomes of collective action.

Another important difference that emerged from the findings between the

OCWA and the ABPWA is the importance of use of community norms for shaping collective action. Such norms can be a bridge or barrier to collective action. In the

OCWA, community norms towards littering and a distrust of outsiders was a challenge to the collective action goals of the OCWA. Institutions of applying social pressure and developing meaningful relationships with external agencies have been critical in changing these norms. In the ABPWA, the norm of untouchability was a

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barrier to collective action. The rule of castes sitting together at meetings was critical for overcoming this barrier, and in fact it has now become ingrained in the group such that it resembles a norm. This indicates a change in social preferences among the members of the ABPWA towards their attitude towards caste, at least in the setting of the group meeting, because it provides financial and agricultural benefits of participating in the watershed management program. Thus, individuals have a tendency to learn new social norms and change their behavior in light of an objective payoff (Ostrom, 2009).

Furthermore, the rule of sitting together was an externally imposed rule, which the ABPWA has now internalized into a norm. Literature suggests that cooperation imposed by externally imposed rules can disappear very quickly

(Ostrom, 2009). However, in the ABPWA, an externally imposed rule has evolved into a group norm. This brings up an interesting point of the evolution of social norms from rules and the possibility of altering norms that do not support cooperative behavior through institutional arrangements and external intervention. Future research can examine questions of how institutions evolve. How and when do rules turn into norms and vice versa?

With respect to the second focus of this study how institutions shape and are shaped by contextual factors, several points of discussion emerge. First, the analysis identifies several features of the community that gave rise to specific institutions. For instance, scholars suggest that prior experiences of engaging in cooperative groups and behaviors result in the emergence of equitable rules (Kazemi & Eek, 2008;

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Ostrom, 2000; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). Findings from both the OCWA and the

ABPWA supported these propositions. For instance, norms of closeness and reciprocity create a sense of fairness to facilitate collective action in the OCWA. On the other hand, a prior negative experience of caste preference and an unsuccessful attempt at collective action in the GM Doddi Watershed Association resulted in the crafting of impartial rules in the ABPWA. Theoretically, institutions facilitate cooperative CPR management as they provide the community with institutional memory, preserving the lessons of past collective action attempts and can foster trust and reputation (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom & Crawford, 1995; Schlager, 2002; Seabright,

1993; Simmons & Schwartz- Shea, 1993). Thus, not just positive experiences contribute towards maintaining cooperation, but the memory of failed attempts at cooperation also provide lessons to craft better institutional arrangements.

Second, the analysis shows that institutions and contextual factors interact with each other and that institutions can play an important role in shaping community attributes to facilitate collective action, which supports Gibson & Koontz’s (1998) argument that institutions can shape preferences in a community. Institutions have shaped the preferences of a community (for example, by changing trashing attitudes and altering norms of distrust towards outsiders) in the OCWA, or created a new

“community” to undertake collective action despite underlying differences of caste

(for e.g. feelings of community) in the ABPWA. Thus, institutions can alter community conditions that are unfavorable for collective action.

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This analysis also leads to another pertinent question of how institutions construct feelings of community in a group. Can “community” be generated in groups where it is previously lacking? What is the role of external interventions in generating

“community”? How can “community” be maintained over time? The concept of community has received tremendous attention from scholars in the field of CBNRM with scholars asserting the centrality of community for resource management, but even now there is no clarity about what is community. This is because scholars seldom devote attention to analyzing the concept of community or explaining precisely how community affects institutions (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999). These results show that what constitutes a community and how institutions build community depends on a variety of other factors. For instance in the ABPWA, merely demarcating the farmers as a community based on the watershed boundaries was not enough and did not automatically lead to feelings of community such as togetherness and belonging among the farmers, especially because their caste rules discouraged interaction between them. Instead, MYRADA had to invest many years on a non- materialistic aspect of feelings of community between the Lingayats and the

Scheduled Castes through institutional arrangements.

CBNRM research and policy has failed to focus on these non-material aspects of CBNRM for initiating as well as maintaining collective action (Sangameswaran,

2008). Moreover, in the face of changing circumstance, feelings of community need to be continually reinforced by communities that are fragile because of out-migration, in-migration, or external market pressures (Appadurai, 1997; Mosse, 2003).

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Sangameswaran (2008) identifies various ways such as developing a vision of a community, an ‘ideal village’, community pride, and visions of self-sufficiency, and self-reliance or by community-building activities such as voluntary labor to construct and strengthen feelings of community (Sangameswaran, 2008).

However, there is no easy way to construct community and in a context with deeply entrenched caste norms, substantial investment may be required in terms of time and effort through an external mediator, and even this may not guarantee success in building and maintaining a sense of community if the institution is not accepted by the resource users. The experience of the OCWA and the ABPWA can obviously not be replicated, but an understanding of how the institutional arrangements in these two socio-culturally heterogeneous groups shaped the outcomes of resource governance is useful to understanding how a “community” shapes and is shaped by institutions in two very different contexts.

Section 5: Conclusion

Researchers of common-pool resources have found that socio-cultural heterogeneity affects resource governance outcomes negatively, and under some conditions, positively. Scholarship on socio-cultural heterogeneity suggests that institutions can be crafted to manage these inequalities for improving resource outcomes (Andersson & Agrawal, 2011). The findings from this analysis are twofold:

One, the analysis of the two cases from United States and India identifies factors that enable a socio-culturally heterogeneous group to successfully undertake collective action and finds that they are largely similar across the two contexts with minor

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differences in the specific mechanisms through which they facilitate collective action.

Two, the analysis underscores the importance of examining institutional arrangements in conjunction with the context, because contextual factors shape and are shaped by institutions for collective action. Thus, community features that are detrimental to collective action can be made more amenable to facilitate collective action through institutional arrangements. Moreover, it is not enough to understand how institutional arrangements lead to specific outcomes, but there is a need to understand how these institutions arise from a certain context to avoid the tendency of imposing seemingly

“successful” institutions to different contexts by external experts (Evans, 2004). Thus, an examination of how contextual features give rise to certain institutions and how institutions shape community attributes can potentially circumvent the problem of

“institutional mono-cropping” (Ostrom, 2014).

In light of continued decentralized watershed policies in the Appalachian region and in India for natural resource management, a policy implication is that attending to the context in which the community is embedded is as important as attending to the differences within a community that shape and are shaped by institutions. Even with socio-cultural differences in a community, natural resource management can achieve successful outcomes if the institutions are matched to the specific heterogeneity in a certain context. In many instances, communities may lack the capacity to bridge differences and may require intervention from external agencies to attend to inequalities to not just avert negative resource outcomes, but to even initiate resource governance. Although bridging differences is a time-consuming

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activity (e.g., it took seven years to convince the Lingayats and the Scheduled Castes to form a group), these bridges need to be continually reinforced to sustain collective action along with a steady stream of benefits from resource governance. For instance, community pride is a major reason for the sustenance of collective action in the

OCWA and the ABPWA because institutions in the OCWA and the outcomes of activities in the ABPWA continually reinforce community pride. Thus, paying attention to factors such as community pride concurrently with issues of equity and accountability can assist in sustenance of collective action.

On a methodological note, these two case studies are not representative of watershed management organizations in the U.S. or in India. The two cases were chosen to qualitatively examine the similarities and differences in the institutions for collective action in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups and how these institutions shape and are shaped by contextual factors. Consistency between the factors and the mechanisms that enable heterogeneous groups undertake collective action in two different contexts increases the reliability of the findings. Future research can examine groups with varying levels of heterogeneity in the Appalachian region and in

Karnataka, India to examine whether these factors remain consistent or vary across other watershed management groups. Furthermore, although contextual factors will continue to vary across each group, understanding how institutions shape contextual factors to carry out collective action can help in theory building of how institutions impact the context for achieving successful resource governance outcomes.

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Chapter 5: Conclusion

Overview

The success of collaborative watershed management in the United States and in India largely depends on the ability of diverse stakeholders living within a watershed to self-organize to improve water quality and/or undertake soil and water conservation efforts. An important factor that affects the success of collaborative watershed management is that of institutions and the ability of groups to make their own rules relating to the inclusion and exclusion of participants, appropriation strategies, obligations of resource users, monitoring and sanctioning, and conflict resolution (Regmi, 2007). Scholarship that examines the impact of local institutional arrangements on the outcomes of natural resource management spans several decades

(Ostrom, 1990). Missing in this scholarship is an understanding of how the attributes of a community such as socio-cultural heterogeneity affect the outcomes of natural resource management.

Thus, the overarching focus of my dissertation is to examine how socio- culturally heterogeneous groups undertake collective action in the United States and in India. Specifically, I focused on:

1) Examining factors and conditions that facilitate collective action in a racially heterogeneous group in the United States and a group with caste heterogeneity in India that have been successful at watershed management, and 233

2) An examination of how contextual factors interact with institutional arrangements.

This concluding chapter is organized as follows: In section one, I review the main findings from the analyses. In section two, I discuss the policy relevance of the findings for designing institutions in socio-culturally heterogeneous communities. In section three, I pose questions for future research. Finally, in section four, I conclude by linking together the main points of this research.

Section 1: Findings

Socio-cultural Heterogeneity and Collective Action

The Orange Creek Watershed Association (OCWA)

Factors of procedural equity, distributive equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities facilitate collective action in the OCWA. A major factor for the self-organization of the group was the benefit of improved water quality. For years residents had been living alongside a creek that carried toxicants such as iron and magnesium leaching out of defunct coalmines. Concerned with high cancer rates among the residents and few recreational opportunities, residents self-organized to form the OCWA to improve water quality.

The factors of procedural equity and accountability were important because of their role in creating a sense of fairness in the functioning and the activities of the group. This is consistently reflected in literature that in groups with socio-cultural heterogeneity, institutions that create procedural equity and accountability promote fairness and increase the prospects of cooperation (Quiggin, 1993; Schlager &

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Blomquist, 1998; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001; Poteete & Ostrom, 2004; Adhikari &

Lovett, 2006; Adhikari & Di Falco, 2008; Andersson & Agrawal, 2011).

The third factor of symbolic capital had an interesting role to play in the

OCWA because it is not only generated from institutions designed to create community pride, but also from the successful outcomes and activities of the watershed group. For instance, an improvement in water quality generates community pride, which motivates residents and volunteers to participate in the activities of the

OCWA as volunteers. This is consistent with research suggesting the importance of increasing the visibility of environmental actions in serving as a symbolic resource of community pride that also motivates participation (Lukacs & Ardoin, 2013). The

OCWA has also developed strategies of organizing community events such as dinners that provides them with opportunities to recognize and commend the achievements of its members. Additionally, the OCWA uses social media such as Facebook to generate community pride over its accomplishments. Thus along with creating procedural equity and accountability, community pride is a factor that draws in participation from the broader community. Literature suggests that symbolic capital such as community and community pride can facilitate collective action despite the presence of socio-cultural heterogeneity (Sangameswaran, 2008; Cochran & Ray,

2009).

Finally, capacity was also important for facilitating collective action because different members are able to contribute to the activities of the OCWA with their different skills. For instance, some members contribute through grant writing, fund

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raising, and recruiting volunteers, maintaining accounts, organizing community events, and cooking. Scholars suggest that different groups with different capacities may contribute their skills to initiate and maintain collective action, which can override socio-cultural boundaries (Varughese & Ostrom, 2001; Poteete & Ostrom,

2004; Adhikari & Lovett, 2006; Adhikari & Di Falco, 2008; Andersson & Agrawal,

2011). Interviewees said that African-American women contribute through cooking and organizing events, and other members contribute through tasks such as grant writing, fund raising, and maintaining accounts. The relegation of cooking to African-

American women can be viewed as gendered as well as racial division of labor. Even though procedural equity, distributive equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities facilitate collective action to improve water quality in the OCWA, inequalities continue to be maintained between African-Americans and whites. Thus, the racial composition of the OCWA does not hinder the ability of the residents to self-organize and undertake improvements in water quality. This result is in line with other studies that do not find an association between socio-cultural heterogeneity and collective action (Varughese & Ostrom, 2001; Somnathan, 2002; Adhikari & Lovett,

2006).

The Arepalyam Bailur Prakruti Watershed Association (ABPWA)

Similar to the OCWA, procedural equity, distributive equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities facilitate collective action for soil and water improvements as well as provide financial benefits to the members of the ABPW.

Caste heterogeneity did not impede the ability of the resource users to undertake

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improvements of soil and water conservation in the watershed (Varughese & Ostrom,

2001; Somnathan, 2002; Adhikari & Lovett, 2006). However, caste differences were a major impediment to self-organizing and an external agency was crucial in crafting an institution to bring the Lingayats and the Scheduled Castes together to form the

GM Doddi Watershed Association, which later disbanded and led to the emergence of the ABPWA. Thus, in the case of the ABPWA, institutions that created procedural equity, distributive equity, accountability, and symbolic capital were crucial to initiate self-organization. This could be because of the need to maintain a sense of fairness and equality in light of unequal caste and power relations between the politically and economically powerful Lingayats and the socially marginalized Scheduled Castes.

Unlike the OCWA, there were no institutional arrangements that create community pride in the ABPWA. This could be because the ABPWA is a closed group that does not rely on the wider support of other residents to facilitate collective action. Therefore, the ABPWA has not crafted any institutions to generate community pride, but depends on the outcome of its activities such as maintaining accounts, conducting community-building workshops, being featured in the local media, and being recognized by government agencies by winning awards. The ABPWA invests significant effort in developing the capacity of its members, not just to facilitate collective action, but also to develop alternate livelihood skills in allied agricultural activities such as animal husbandry, dairy farming, and organic farming.

Thus, in the ABPWA, caste differences did not affect the ability of the members to undertake improvements of soil and water. Furthermore, when the

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original group disbanded, caste differences were not as important as the heterogeneity in the location of the members in the GM Doddi Watershed Association (upstream- downstream) and heterogeneity of endowments (farmers from GM Doddi received private irrigation facilities and farmers from Arepalyam and Bailur received communal irrigation facilities). Thus, a lack of a common interest and an asymmetric distribution of resources led to the dissolution of the GM Doddi Watershed

Association. These findings are consistent with literature that suggest that socio- culturally heterogeneous and homogeneous groups are equally likely to succeed or fail at self-organization and that common interest in the resources and the location of the users from the resource play an important role in self-organization (Ostrom,

1994).

Contextual Factors and Institutional Arrangements

A second focus of this dissertation is an examination of the interaction of contextual factors with institutional arrangements. An examination of the factors that facilitate collective action in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups suggests that these factors are not just a result of institutional arrangements, but also can result from collective action outcomes that shape the context in dynamic ways (see Chapter

4). Moreover an examination of institutional arrangements provides insight about how institutions lead to successes or failures in watershed management, but it does not tell us about the emergence of these institutions and how contextual factors interact with institutions to produce certain outcomes. Although the importance of the context is acknowledged, research designs do not capture the different contextual

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factors because they vary across different settings and are not generalizable (Agrawal,

2003). Thus, examining contextual factors can provide insight about how the context shapes and is shaped by local institutional arrangements to facilitate collective action.

Furthermore, merely examining “successful” institutions leads to a blueprinting of institutions by imposing successful rules from one context to another (Ostrom, 2014).

An examination of the context provides insight about how successful institutions in one context might succeed or fail in another context.

Literature suggests that shared norms can initiate self-organization and facilitate collective action (Ostrom, 1994; Agrawal, 2003). However, a shared norm may not always facilitate collective action because a community can be close, but share environmentally exploitative or destructive norms (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999).

For instance, residents in the Orange Creek share a norm of disposing trash illegally on the hillsides and the creek, which undermine the collective action goals of the

OCWA. Another shared norm of distrust towards outsiders stemming from their previous interactions with an exploitative coal industry affects the ability of community members to engage effectively with external agencies and volunteers who may not be from the Appalachian region.

The OCWA has developed strategies to alter pre-existing norms of littering and distrust towards outsiders. For instance, a social shaming strategy of picking up trash disposed by other residents, or talking to people who dispose trash in the neighborhood has resulted in an attitudinal change towards illegal littering in the

OCWA. Furthermore, interviewees said that this strategy also develops community

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pride. Other studies from Appalachia confirm this finding that cleaning up the streambeds and roadways are actions that create community respectability, self- respect, and a desire to improve and enhance the places for people participating in collaborative watershed management groups and their communities (Glasmeier &

Farrigan, 2003; Lucaks & Ardoin, 2014). Similarly, the OCWA actively recruits volunteers to work in the OCWA to alter norms of distrust towards outsiders among the community members. Thus, these examples illustrate the dynamic interaction of contextual attributes and institutional arrangements in the OCWA.

In the ABPWA, prior experience of engaging in collective action in the GM

Doddi Watershed Association were significant in forming the ABPWA and crafting impartial rules in the ABPWA. Interviewees said that an official from the nongovernmental organization MYRADA, who was also a Lingayat, started providing preferential treatment to the Lingayats from GM Doddi by sanctioning the bulk of the watershed funds, including individual irrigation facilities to the Lingayats from GM

Doddi. This preferential treatment generated resentment among other members who were not from GM Doddi. Therefore, when the ABPWA formed its group, a conscious decision was made to craft impartial rules that did not prioritize one caste over the other. However, recognizing that the Scheduled Castes are socially as well as economically disadvantaged, the ABPWA is also responsive to the needs and concerns of the Scheduled Castes. For instance, changes were made in the loan repayment rule after Scheduled Caste members requested a change in the high interest rates of the loans.

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Furthermore, when farmers from Arepalyam and Bailur decided to form the

ABPWA, they did not have to face challenges of overcoming caste differences because this particular problem had been addressed prior to the formation of the GM

Doddi Watershed Association. A rule of both castes sitting together, while not completely alleviating caste inequalities, had made in-roads in developing a sense of community between the Lingayats and the Scheduled Castes. Members said that this rule of sitting together has become “ingrained in us” such that it resembles a norm.

Thus, during the formation of the ABPWA, the shared norm of sitting together had developed sufficient community between both the castes to avoid complications arising from caste differences. The shared norm of untouchability is still prevalent in the villages, but the watershed management group is one place where this norm ceases to exist. Lansing’s (2006) study on water temples in Bali had similar findings where rules of caste, or even the mention of caste were abolished in the meetings for water management in one village. Thus, unlike the ABPWA, in Lansing’s study, the ban on caste rules was applicable to not only the water temples, but also extended to the village. However, findings from the ABPWA illustrate the ability of institutions to moderate the effects of community attributes in the pursuit of collective action.

Findings from the OCWA and the ABPWA indicate that the relationship between the context and the institutions is dynamic, and that just as institutions reflect the context in which they are embedded, the context can also be shaped and altered by institutional arrangements. This is in line with a study by Gibson & Koontz (1998), which found that institutional arrangements shaped the homogeneity of preferences in

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a forest community to maintain and improve forest conditions. Thus, to understand the success of a certain institution, understanding the factors that lead to the emergence of the institution will avoid the tendency to externally impose “successful” institutions to other contexts. Examining contextual features also provides a better understanding of how to match institutions to a specific problem embedded in a specific context.

Section 2: Policy Implications

1) Community Building

Breen et al., (2004) define capacity building as “a process whereby people are enabled to better perform defined functions either as individuals, through improved technical skills and or professional understanding, or as groups aligning their activities to achieve common purpose”. Prior research has identified three categories of capacity building—individual capacity by developing knowledge and skills, organizational capacity of an organization implementing the watershed program, and institutional capacity to improve coordination between resource users (Chandra &

Bhatia, 2000). Findings from the OCWA and the ABPWA point to another category that is relevant to socio-culturally heterogeneous groups as well as homogeneous groups undertaking watershed management—that of community building. Community building also needs to be viewed as a capacity building measure, and not just to initiate self-organization of local watershed groups, but also to sustain collective action by developing group cohesiveness, solidarity, and feelings of community to maintain the benefits from a watershed management program. Thus, for watershed

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management policies in the United States and community building and reinforcing feelings of community to sustain collective action efforts can be incorporated into watershed management policy. Community building is a time-intensive procedure and requires a significant commitment of time and resources to construct community, especially in regions where none exists, or in regions with intractable conflicts.

The concept of community building is particularly relevant to the Appalachian region in light of policies that focus on building sustainable community capacity from the ground up (Glasmeier & Farrigan, 2003). The historical legacy of resource extraction in Appalachia, coupled with the effects of outside ownership of resources, produced a citizenry deeply suspicious of outside interests residing in an ecologically fragile landscape (Glasmeier & Farrigan, 2003). Scholars working in the Appalachian region have advocated for community-based development strategies with a capacity building approach focusing on citizen empowerment, capacity to organize and to build lasting citizen-based organizations that broaden the local base of participants.

This base should include new groups, citizens, nongovernmental organizations, churches, and private funders in planning for development (Gaventa, 1995; Glasmeier

& Farrigan, 2003).

In recognition of the severity of the problems in Appalachia, several initiatives have been undertaken to address them. For instance, the Appalachian Regional

Commission (ARC) identifies “distressed counties” defined as poverty rates of at least 150 percent of the U.S. average, unemployment rates of at least 150 percent of the U.S. average, and per-capita market income not more than two-thirds of the U.S.

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average to provide aid. However, despite more than 40 years of government involvement, little has changed in Appalachia where “citizens still live in a state of permanent impermanence, land ownership is continually contested, the natural resource-based economy is in a persistent state of decline, and political cronyism is still the major means by which decisions are made” (Glasmeier & Farrigan, 2003).

Reinforcing notions of community and community pride through community dinners was an important strategy in the OCWA. The OCWA, therefore, uses strategies of building community and community pride to encourage participation and sustain collective action for its activities that require participation from not just its members, but also the broader community.

In watershed programs in India, capacity building is treated differently. The programs typically invest enormous amounts of money for constructing watershed structures, very little on capacity building, and almost nothing on community building. Moreover, for government funded watershed programs, capacity building almost never occurs, or if it occurs, a local non-profit organization is responsible for it. Some scholars have also documented that even if non-profits are serious about capacity-building, the available budget for capacity building is not received or released by the District Rural Development Agency (DRDA) when it is required

(Samuel et al., 2007; Kerr & Kolavalli, 2002). Moreover, capacity-building, when it occurs, takes place in a perfunctory manner with no plan to implement capacity building activities, a lack of integration with the project progress and processes, and no set milestones on the expected capacity of the project actors (Samuel et al., 2007).

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There have been several calls for increasing funds allocated for capacity building because of the high rate of success of watershed programs that include capacity and community building measures in watershed management programs.

However, implementation agencies in India focus on the technical aspect of watershed management–that of constructing bunds– because of immediate returns on improved agricultural yields (Chandra & Bhatia, 2000; Samuel et al., 2007).

However, this approach results in intense activity for four to five years, during the construction phase, and then watershed management groups cease working because of inability to sustain the benefits of the watershed program, a lack of ownership over the newly created watershed structures, a lack of funding to continue the maintenance of the watershed structures, and a lack of group cohesiveness (Koontz & Sen, 2013;

Samuel et al., 2007). The Hariyali watershed guidelines of 2008 reduced the budget for capacity building from 10 percent to five percent, and such measures have since then been sidelined with the latest watershed management policy emphasizing construction of irrigation projects (Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchayee Yojana,

(PMKSY), 2015).

In these guidelines, capacity building includes “training and exposure visits, demonstrations, farm schools, skill development in efficient water and crop management practices (crop alignment) including large scale awareness on more crop per drop of water through mass media campaign, exhibitions, field days, and extension activities through short animation films etc.” Thus, a focus on capacity development only includes skill and knowledge building. In general, watershed

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development policies downplay the importance of capacity building and presume the existence of sufficient “community” to develop institutions that would enable differences to be resolved and common ground to be found for co-operation

(Sangameswaran, 2008).

In India, MYRADA had to invest seven years in capacity building measures and one of them was to develop “community” in a region where interactions between the two castes was forbidden. Although, seven years is a long time to invest for community building, the benefits have been substantial. Even though the original group —GM Doddi Watershed Association—does not exist anymore, an outcome of community building was that a subset of the group could form another organization to continue to sustain the benefits of soil and watershed management. Furthermore, the group has also become financially self-sufficient, which is almost a rarity in watershed management programs in India. Thus, there also cannot be any one measure for developing community because it would be contingent on several contextual factors such as willingness of the community to engage in watershed management, degradation of the resources, and scope for improving the condition of the resources through self-organization. However, the ability to make use of factors such as community pride, solidarity, and a well-functioning organization can be used to build community. Moreover, Sangameswaran (2008) argues, “community that is not imposed from above but is adopted and shaped as a result of a variety of local factors makes it more nuanced and textured.” This idea again draws attention to the importance of context and that the concept of community building can potentially

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take different forms in other locales and can be used in other community-based efforts.

2) External Agencies

External agencies have a crucial role to play in addressing the challenges of socio-cultural heterogeneity, especially in communities that may lack the capacity to self-organize because of village mores and norms that may be antithetical to cooperation between different castes and ethnicities. In the OCWA, external agencies do not have a prominent role in community building. External agencies support local efforts of collective action by providing financial assistance in the form of grants, technical resources such as scientific information and data, engineering equipment, and human resources such as expert personnel and watershed coordinators.

Nevertheless, relations between the community and external agencies are still viewed with distrust by the community shaped by the complex relationship of the locals with outsiders. Communication barriers continue to exist and interviewees perceive that external agencies adopt roles of “high professionals” or experts in engaging with the

OCWA. Thus, even though government agencies collaborate with local watershed organizations, an “us vs. them” attitude continues to exist. Moreover, interviewees mentioned instances where external agencies did not incorporate local knowledge, did not communicate decisions with communities on time, or did not pay heed to concerns of local communities. This precludes the formation of a deeper relationship between the community and external agencies and reinforces the “us versus them” attitude among the community. Therefore, external agencies need to be more attentive

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to not just developing a relationship based on a role of a funding agency, or an external expert, but also to their particular means of interacting with local communities.

In the case of the GM Doddi Watershed Association, while farmers agreed to implement the watershed management program, a challenge was to convince them to cooperate with farmers from another caste to implement the program. MYRADA agreed to implement a watershed management program only if the farmers assented to cooperate with each other. While the commons literature has an unfavorable view of externally imposed institutions (Ostrom, 1990), an externally imposed institution of sitting together to bridge caste inequalities was successful in the ABPWA. There is a substantial body of literature that argues that oppressive local norms and customs need to be transformed through positive discrimination measures (Agrawal, 1999;

Sunam & McCarthy, 2010). Other scholars suggest that if a group lacks sufficient amount of “community”, third party coercion may be facilitated to strengthen the community in the group (Singleton & Taylor, 1993). Thus, the decision to impose external institutions needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis.

3) Socio-cultural Heterogeneity

Finally, an important policy implication for socio-cultural heterogeneity is that its effect on resource governance depends on a wide range of contextual factors and the efficacy and strength of institutional arrangements. However, socio-culturally heterogeneous groups get less attention and development aid because of the assumption that heterogeneity negatively impacts resource governance (Gibson &

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Koontz, 1998; Pradhan & Patra, 2012). This is not entirely true because, while transaction costs are higher for initiating collective action in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups, socio-cultural heterogeneity provides an opportunity and a challenge to communities to craft institutions that match the specific type of heterogeneity (Poteete & Ostrom, 2004). Socio-cultural heterogeneity also results in institutions that pay more attention to creating equity and accountability, which in turn can foster more sustainable resource regimes (Ostrom, 1990; Agrawal, 2003).

Therefore, paying attention to institutions that create equity and accountability, despite the challenges of agreeing to what is equitable and how to create accountability in a socio-culturally heterogeneous group, has improved prospects of creating a sustainable resource regime.

Section 3: Future Research

The research objective of this dissertation was to examine factors that facilitate collective action in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups in two different contexts. I selected two cases of socio-cultural heterogeneity in the United States and in India and conducted an in-depth examination of the relationships among socio- cultural heterogeneity, institutional arrangements, and collective action. This research approach allowed me to devote sufficient attention to the interaction between contextual factors and institutional arrangements.

A major drawback of this study is the small sample size, which raises concerns about the reliability and the validity of the findings. To increase the reliability and validity of the findings, a future research program would have to

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consider increasing the number of cases in the same region with variation in the outcomes of collective action. However, even while increasing the number of cases, sufficient attention would be needed to collect data on contextual factors because as the findings suggest, institutions can shape contextual factors for achieving successful collective action outcomes.

A fruitful data collection strategy for follow on work would be to focus in- depth on the Appalachian region. There are approximately 64 watershed management groups in West Virginia focusing on remediation and restoration of water bodies impaired due to acid mine drainage. Most interviewees mentioned that neighboring towns are very different from the OCWA in terms of race relations and the nature of the community. Therefore, examining the factors that facilitate collective action in other groups would allow for comparisons to be made on how groups with varying levels of heterogeneity undertake collective action in a similar region to address the problem of acid mine drainage.

There are two strands of research that I am especially interested in pursuing in the future. First, Andersson & Agrawal (2011) examine the hypothesis that the effect of socio-cultural heterogeneity on resource conditions depends on the strength of institutional arrangements. Based on the findings of my study, I would modify the hypothesis as “the effect of socio-cultural heterogeneity on resource governance depends on the strength of institutional arrangements as well as the outcomes of collective action.” While improving resource conditions is also a collective action outcome, based on the findings from this study, I would include variables of

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community and community pride that are generated as outcomes of collective action that can moderate the relationship between socio-cultural heterogeneity and resource conditions. Thus, the independent variables of the study would include, i) socio- cultural heterogeneity, ii) local institutions, iii) collective action outcomes, and iv) control variables.

Measuring socio-cultural heterogeneity is still problematic. As explained in

Chapter 1, there is still no scholarly consensus of what counts as heterogeneous and whether the proportion and distribution of different ethnicities, races, or castes matter or not. For this study, I would measure socio-cultural heterogeneity by counting the number of different races in a group, size of the different racial groups, and the type of the racial group to measure not just socio-cultural heterogeneity, but also the structure of socio-cultural heterogeneity.

There is a vast body of literature concerning the importance of local institutions in shaping resource conditions (Baland & Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990;

Wade, 1988). Andersson & Agrawal (2011) only measure local institutions that directly affect resource governance. These institutions pertain to whether users (i) organize resource conservation activities; (ii) create rules for management; (iii) undertake resource improvement activities; (iv) maintain records of rule violations and sanctions; and (v) enforce rules that a local expert considers to be adequate for achieving sustainable resource use. Additionally, I would measure institutions for creating procedural equity, distributive equity, accountability, symbolic capital, and capacities because the commons literature as well as findings from this study suggests

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that they are important for facilitating collective action in socio-culturally heterogeneous communities. For measuring collective action outcomes, I would use the measure of community and community pride that are considered as non- materialistic aspects of community-based management.

Important control variables to consider would include the socio-economic context and the biophysical attributes of the resource that have been regularly cited in the commons literature as influencing environmental conditions. Using variables modified from Agrawal &Andersson (2011), I would characterize the socioeconomic and biophysical contexts in which the local user groups carry out their activities and include demographic characteristics (number of group members, number of other groups that the user group shares access with, the age of the user group), socioeconomic development (literacy rate), and several biophysical attributes of the locality (watershed size, topography, commercial value of the watershed, and distance from nearest town).

Finally, for measuring the dependent variable resource conditions, I would construct a measure of resource conditions including i) local users’ perceptions of water quality, ii) local users’ assessments of aquatic diversity, iii) their overall opinion of water quality in their region compared to other regions. This measure would be supplemented by data available with the DEP and local watershed groups regarding i) Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDL) that include load reductions in iron, manganese, and aluminum from abandoned mines, ii) pH values of the water, iii) and sedimentation loads from stream bank erosion.

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This second research focus would involve examining the different stages of a watershed management group and identify which factors become more important as the group proceeds from self-organization to sustained collective action. Findings from the dissertation suggest that institutional arrangements of equity and accountability are important to initiate collective action because they lay the groundwork for creating a sense of fairness in the functioning of the group. However, as a group becomes successful other factors come into play such as community pride that is a result of the group’s success, which further help to sustain collective action.

Thus, not just material benefits, but also non-material benefits may be important in sustaining collective action. Furthermore, because there was a difference in how the

OCWA and the ABPWA made use of community pride (OCWA developed institutions to generate community pride and the ABPWA relies on collective action outcomes to generate community pride), future research can also examine if there is a difference in the kinds of groups that develop institutions to generate non-material benefits, or those that rely on collective action outcomes to generate non-material benefits. Other differences could also include the type of resource regime, whether the resource is used for consumptive or recreational purposes, and whether groups are looking to expand their participation base or not.

Based on the above discussion, two rudimentary propositions are: 1) Groups that are at an initial stage of self-organization will rely on equity and accountability to facilitate collective action, and 2) Groups that are well-established will rely on equity, accountability, as well as symbolic capital to facilitate collective action. This research

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would bring to light factors that help to move an organization from initiation of collective action to sustained collective action. Identifying critical factors such as social, ecological, and symbolic benefits for developing long-term watershed management strategies can improve the future outlook of communities in Appalachia.

Section 4: Concluding Thoughts

One of the key questions in common-pool resource management is how a socio-culturally heterogeneous community of resource users can self-organize to manage resources. Overall, the main contribution of the study is the finding that even socio-culturally heterogeneous groups can succeed at watershed management, despite the presence of heterogeneity and unequal race and caste relations. I identified factors that facilitate collective action in a socio-culturally heterogeneous group of users in

West Virginia and India. I demonstrated the interactions between contextual factors and institutional arrangements in shaping collective action outcomes in heterogeneous communities. This research provides new insights into collaborative watershed management literature and community-based natural resource management in heterogeneous communities for theory as well as policy to better manage natural resources.

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Appendix A: Notes

Social capital and Symbolic capital

There are several overlapping similarities between social and symbolic capital. Social and symbolic capitals are invisible, unless efforts are made to inquire about its presence and how it is manifested (Ostrom, 1994). The basic idea of social capital is that is that one’s family, friends, and associates constitute an important asset, one that can be called upon in a crisis, enjoyed for its own sake, and/or leveraged for material gain (Woolcock & Narayan,

2000). Social capital is made up on relationships of trust, reciprocity and exchange, common rules, norms and sanctions, and connectedness in groups and is important for or shaping individual action to achieve positive environmental outcomes (Pretty & Smith, 2004).

Symbolic capital, on the other hand, is the set of distinctive properties that confers tokens of authority and power on an individual or a group that are perceived and recognized in social interactions (Bourdieu, 1984). Symbolic capital consists of prestige, community pride, community identity, renown, feelings of community, village unity, and solidarity

(Cochran & Ray, 2009). Symbolic capital is thus a strategic power of an individual, or a group of individuals and can influence how social preferences are adopted as common knowledge in a community (Ishihara & Pascual, 2008). Ballet et al., (2015) consider symbolic capital as the key to transforming other forms of capital. Symbolic capital also helps to distinguish different groups from each other and becomes a “badge of distinction”

(Bourdieu, 1984). For instance, feelings of group identity and community pride create a distinction in the minds of community members and they feel a sense of community to distinguish members from their community from other communities (Cohen, 1985). Thus symbolic capital is a form of commonality that is present even though there may be diverse

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components in a community. A community becomes a symbolic resource that provides identity to people and its reality lies in the perception of the members of the community

(Cohen, 1985), and their lived experiences and knowledge stored in memory (Johnston,

Larana & Gusfield, 1994). While the basis constitution of social and symbolic capital are different, they serve a similar purpose–that of providing leverage and benefits in terms of material gain, power, confronting poverty and vulnerability (Moser, 1996; Narayan, 1996), resolve disputes (Schafft, 1998; Varshney, 1999), and/or take advantage of new opportunities

(Isham, 1999), creating a right to aspire to equality (Cochran & Ray, 2009). Moreover, the boundaries between symbolic and social capital start blurring because symbolic capital can establish and strengthen social relations, creating social capital (Burton & Paragahawewa,

2011).

Both concepts are particularly relevant to natural resource management. Social capital is important for shaping individual action on the outcomes of natural resource management (Pretty & Smith, 2004). Social capital lowers the transaction costs of working together because of relations of trust and mutual reciprocity (Pretty & Smith, 2004). Natural resource management programs with a focus on participation, community, and collective management also build trust, new norms, emphasize the creation of social capital within groups through bonding capital and also between groups through bridging social capital

(Pretty & Smith, 2004).

Environmental and social movements in the Appalachian regions have made use of symbolic capital based on an image of respectability and honorability (Bourdieu 1984:291) such as land, family and regional history, and local and regional identity to galvanize people against environmentally destructive projects. Place identity in particular that is based on an individual’s interaction with a place, rather than his/her gender, ethnicity or sexual preference

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has been used to motivate people’s participation (Utz, 2001). The strength of the group’s collective identity is important for its success.

Interestingly, in the literature examined, social capital did not emerge as a factor that facilitates collective action in socio-culturally heterogeneous groups. Instead, symbolic capital was consistent in most studies focusing on “feelings of community”, community pride, and a sense of place. However, there has been a tendency to conflate different kinds of symbolic capital such as community pride and feelings of community as social capital, but it is important to treat social capital and symbolic capital as two separate concepts.

Similarities and Differences between Race and Caste

Social stratification is the ordering of social differences based on a set of criteria or just one single criterion (Gupta, 2000). Caste, class, race, ethnicity, and gender are some of the pertinent categories of social hierarchy and differentiation in many societies. If race is a system of ascriptive or color-based disparities, caste is a system non-ascriptive or non-color based disparities (Deshpande, 2005). Caste in India and race in the U.S. are often compared for their institutional similarities, and also because these categories form the social basis on which the affirmative action program in the two countries is based. While disadvantage and discrimination produce similar outcomes for certain groups within caste- or race-divided societies, it is important to understand the differences between the two systems.

The caste system is defined as a “hierarchy of endogamous divisions in which membership is hereditary and permanent” (Berreman, 1960). Hierarchy includes inequality in status and access to goods and services. The caste system relies to a large extent on religious values to regulate the behavior of different caste groups. Rigid rules of behavior avoid contact between high castes and lower castes, which is considered taboo because these contacts may

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be “contaminating.” A lack of deference from lower castes can be promptly punished because it implies equality. Identity is created and maintained by imposing restrictions on social intercourse and marriage with those who “do not belong”, primarily those being inferior in terms of honor and prestige (Subedi, 2013). The official Scheduled Caste category in India encompasses the “untouchables” or Dalits, who are considered to be at the bottom of the caste system.

Race is a socially constructed category, embedded in history and social context

(Brewer, Conrad, & King, 2002). However, since disparities in color-based societies such as the U.S. are crucially defined by race, it is a very real phenomenon in everyday life, particularly for those at the receiving end of racial discrimination (Deshpande, 2005). Race, unlike caste, is not guided by a rigid set of religious principles that determine social stratification.

Thus, the question is whether race is caste. Technically, the answer is no because but the caste system is based on descent, and the major caste structure in India correlates with skin color. However, the Dalits, or untouchables, face tremendous social barriers that are closely akin to racial apartheid (Human Rights Watch, 2001). A similarity between caste and race is the institutionalization of inequality through symbols of dwelling area, occupation, and place of worship. Other similarities are segregation, denial of education, restricting

Blacks to low-paid, menial jobs, social and economic discrimination, negative stereotyping and violence: arson of Black properties, including churches, murder of Black individuals: the most organized expression of this was in the formation and activities of the White supremacist racist organization, the Ku Klux Klan. Although race and caste are institutionally dissimilar, the end result is persistent disparity and continuing discrimination for Dalits as well as Blacks.

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Appendix B

Heterogeneity and Collective Action: Interview Protocol

“Hello my name is Pranietha Mudliar. I am a graduate student at The Ohio State

University in the School of Environment and Natural Resources, and I am undertaking research that will be used in my dissertation. I am studying factors that lead to successful collective action in collaborative watershed groups. Specifically, I would like to ask you a series of questions in order to know what kinds of rules, decisions, and strategies are adopted for collective action, and your interactions with group members. The information that you share will not pose any legal, social, or reputational risk to you, and I will not collect any potentially sensitive information. If you feel that any of your responses poses a risk to yourself or others, feel free to withhold that information from me.

The information you share with me will be helpful in completing this study. The interview should take less than an hour. Your response is not being recorded. I will transcribe your responses and later use it for analysis. Of course, your participation is voluntary, and you may refuse to answer any questions you wish not to answer. Additionally, you may withdraw at any time, without penalty, in which case any information from you will be deleted from the study. To assure the confidentiality of any information you provide, neither your name nor identifying information will be included in any reports. They will not be known outside the research team. If you have any questions, you can contact the Principal

Investigator, Pranietha, at [email protected] or (614) 377-3608, or the Ohio State Office of

Responsible Research Practices at 614-688-8457 or 800-678-6251. For questions about your

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rights as a participant in this study or to discuss other study-related concerns or complaints with someone who is not part of the research team, you may contact Ms. Sandra Meadows in the Office of Responsible Research Practices at 1-614-688-4792.

Do you have any questions about this research? Do you agree to participate? If so, let’s begin….”

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The following questions have been designed to understand how and why your group was formed, group membership, decision-making in your group, group activities, interactions with group members and with external agencies, and social and environmental outcomes since the formation of your group. Please feel free to stop me in case you need to take a break.

Group Formation

1) Can you tell me a little about the formation of your group?

Probes: When was the group formed and why? How was this group formed?

2) What are the problems/concerns in Orange Creek?

What are the goals of your organization?

2) How do you plan to achieve these goals?

3) What goals have you achieved until now?

4) Can you tell me about the organization of this group?

5) How was it decided to operate the

a. decision rules

b. meeting agenda

c. Meeting times- why did you decide this meeting time? Has it changed?

d. Meeting place- why did you decide this meeting place? Has it changed?

e. Committee of the group- why this particular structure?

f. Leadership positions- can you describe each leadership role to me? How often do

leadership positions change? How do they change?

g. Bylaws- who wrote the bylaws? Who can revise the bylaws? What is the procedure

for revising the bylaws?

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6) What happens if someone breaks a rule in the group? How do you deal with it?

7) Are there any sanctions or penalties in case someone breaks a rule? What is the

sanction? Can you give me an example?

8) What are the different ways in which residents can participate in your group?

Probes: Do you have to be a member to participate in the activities of the group?

9) Who owns the land where activities related to watershed management are carried

out? Private/public/communally owned?

Group Membership

10) How did the group decide whom to invite to be a part of the group?

11) How are decisions about membership made in the group? Who decides who can be a

part of the group?

12) How can someone leave the group? Has this occurred? For what reasons?

13) How can residents who don’t attend meetings participate in the group?

14) Why did you join the group? Since when?

Probes: What was your interest in joining the group?

15) How often do you miss meetings? For what purposes?

16) Is there a fine for missing meetings? What is the fine for missing meetings? How

many times have you paid the fine?

17) Do you give your opinion in meetings? Can you give an example?

18) What was the outcome of your opinion? Was it incorporated for decision-making?

19) Is there an attendance rule? How does the attendance rule affect you?

Probes: Can you miss meetings?

20) For what reasons are you most likely to remain absent from the group? Can someone

attend the meeting on your behalf?

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21) Do you still have to pay a fine if you miss a meeting, but if a family member attends

the meeting for you?

22) Have you ever held a leadership position in the group? How many times?

23) What was your duty when you were the president/secretary/treasurer?

24) Are you accountable to other members of the group? How? In what way? Can you

give me an example?

25) What are the skills do you bring to the group? How useful are these skills to the

group? Other than this, is there any other contribution that you make to group?

Decision-Making- Collective Action

26) How does the group make decisions? Consensus/majority vote/quorum? Who decides

how the group makes decisions?

27) What kinds of decisions do you make in your group in the meetings?

28) Who are the most active members in decision-making?

29) Who can participate in decision-making? How can members participate?

30) If someone is not present for decision-making, how can they participate? What are

the reasons for someone not attending the meetings?

31) In situations where the group has been unable to reach an agreement, how does the

group resolve the issue?

32) Were there any conflicts or disagreements in the group? What kinds of

disagreements?

33) How did you resolve the disagreements?

34) How were everyone’s views and opinions taken into account?

Probes: How do you make sure that everyone’s opinions/voice is represented in the decision- making process?

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35) What mechanism does your group have to take into account everyone’s concerns?

36) Were any stakeholders left out in decision making? Why were they left out?

Probes: Why did some stakeholders not participate?

37) Can you tell me if there are any decision rules that specifically help the marginalized

people in the community? How?

38) What about rules that help the African-American community? How? Can you

provide an example?

39) What kind of decisions have been implemented?

40) What are the constraints in implementing the decisions of the group?

41) Was there anyone who was dissatisfied/didn’t agree with the decisions done by the

watershed group? Why were they dissatisfied?

42) How did the group convince them to participate?

43) Did they participate in any decision-making?

Group Activities- Collective Action

44) What activities does the watershed group carry out?

45) Who bears the costs for these activities?

46) How do you keep an account of the funds for these activities? Who does this? What

happens if this is not done?

47) How do you reach out to the community for carrying out these activities? Who is in-

charge of community outreach?

48) Which activities did you participate in? Why?

49) How often do you participate in these activities?

50) What is your role during these activities?

51) How do you distribute tasks during these activities?

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52) How do you engage with the African-American community? How well does this

work for the group?

53) How do African-American members contribute to the group?

Probes: Can you tell me about something that they contribute that others don’t?

Interactions with Group Members

54) What were relationships between the whites and the African-Americans before the

formation of the group? How are race relations in the community now? Has it ever

been a problem? What kinds of problems?

55) Can you tell me a little about your community?

Probes: During the coal mining era…

After the coal mining era...

During segregation…

After segregation...

56) Do people from different races intermingle during group activities?

57) Do you go to each other’s homes?

58) Are you friends with each other outside of the group?

59) Since when have you been friends? How often do you meet? For what purposes?

60) What are the other groups that you are a part of?

61) Are members from the watershed group also a part of these groups? What is the

nature of the activities in the other groups?

62) Do any other tasks come to mind when you have to interact with your neighbors?

63) To whom do you turn first in times of need? Who usually helps you out? Can you

describe these situations?

64) Where do you go if you are not well or need help? Who helps you then?

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65) Who are your friends? How often do you meet? When and where do you meet?

66) What do you usually talk about? Do you all talk about what happens in the group

when you meet with your friends?

67) Has your relationship changed over the years with the members of the group? In what

way?

Interaction with External Agencies

68) With which organizations do you partner for your activities?

69) What are these activities?

70) How do you get in touch with these organizations?

71) Does the government provide resources to the watershed group? What kind of

resources? How do you apply for these resources?

72) How did these resources help you?

73) Did the resources provided by government agencies help you in decision-making?

How well did this work for your group?

74) Can external agencies influence your

a. topics of discussion, agenda

a. group structure

b. decision-making

c. decision-making mechanisms

75) Did government agencies or NGOs assist the group in decision-making? How?

76) How often do you meet with external agencies?

77) Can you describe the nature of your interaction with external agencies?

78) What is the role of external agencies in improving environmental outcomes?

79) What is the role of external agencies in improving social outcomes in the?

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80) What are the advantages of working with external agencies?

81) What are the disadvantages of working with external agencies?

82) What are the barriers to working with external agencies? How can these be

improved?

Outcomes- Collective Action

83) What are the environmental outcomes since the formation of the group?

84) How do you evaluate environmental outcomes?

85) What are the social outcomes since the formation of the group? What are the positive

aspects of being a part of this group?

86) Personally, what benefits do you receive from your participation [in the group]?

87) What benefits does the community receive because of the [group]?

Probes: What kinds of changes have occurred in the community because of the [group]?

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Codebook.

Procedural equity: Equity in decision-making processes

• Representation of marginal groups in resource management bodies

• Opportunities for marginal groups to influence decision-making through

o Deliberation (this includes discussions as a way of decision-making)

o Membership (what are the rules for gaining membership into the group, for

accessing and using the resource, who decides these rules?)

o Authority

o Power (what sort of power, and do all members have an opportunity to hold

power)

o Leadership (do all the members in the group have an opportunity to hold

leadership positions, what are the rules for doing so?)

o Rules and regulations

o Customs and laws (what are the local customs, are these reflected in the rules

for functioning of the group?) (Poteete, 2004)

• Equitable rules and regulations that acknowledge and address socio-cultural

heterogeneity

Distributive equity: Equity in distribution of benefits (this includes any benefits that is an outcome of the group’s activity)

• What are the benefits and how are they equitably distributed among the members?

Accountability: Balancing power and/or creating transparency

• Sharing information (how is information shared in the group, who shares

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information, how is it used?)

• Transparency (do the rules reflect openness? are all the members involved in

decision-making, in what ways?)

• Independent monitoring (do members monitor each other and how, do external

agencies undertake monitoring and how?)

• Separation of powers (do different leadership positions have different powers?)

• Legal recourse (do groups have legal rights, do they have access to a legal authority

in case of conflict?)

• Regular meetings (how often are the meetings held?)

• Maintaining records and minutes of the meetings (Ribot, 2002; Kerr, 2002; Gruber,

2010, Pandit & Bevilacqua, 2011; Klooster, 2000; Agrawal et al., 2006).

Symbolic Capital:

Symbolic assets such as:

• Pride

• Prestige/Reputation

• Unity

• Symbolic resources of the community such as village tanks and temples (Bourdieu &

Thompson, 1991; Mosse, 1997)

• New community (Cochran & Ray, 2009)

• Sense of place (Lukacs & Ardoin, 2014)

Capacity: Specialized skills such as

• Writing

• Bookkeeping 297

• Resources such as time and money

• Knowledge to support collective action (Quiggin, 1993; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001;

Poteete & Ostrom, 2004).

• Writing project proposals

• Monitoring construction works

• Monitoring payrolls for watershed development activities

• Leadership (Scheffer et al., 2000)

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Appendix C: Data Coding

Table 9: A Sample of Categories and Sub-Categories that Facilitate Collective Action in the OCWA

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Table 10: Procedural Equity in the OCWA

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Table 11: Categories and Sub-Categories Facilitating Collective Action in the ABPWA

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Table 12: Benefits in the ABPWA

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