Supreme Court of Athens

Civil No. 2019-1

IN THE Supreme Court of Athens

ELECTRA ATREUS, Petitioner, v. ORESTES ATREUS, Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Circuit of Athens

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT

ELIZABETH B. WYDRA MADISON A. NEEDHAM CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER 1200 18th Street NW, Suite 501 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 296-6889

Counsel for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...... ii QUESTIONS PRESENTED ...... 1 INTRODUCTION ...... 2 STATEMENT ...... 4 ARGUMENT ...... 6 I. Petitioner Was the Proximate Cause of Respondent’s Emotional Distress ...... 6 II. Respondent’s Pre-Existing Condition Does Not Diminish Petitioner’s Liability ...... 10 III. The Lower Courts’ Assessment of Damages was Appropriate ...... 11 CONCLUSION ...... 16

(i) ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) The Will of Athena Skullborn of the Brazen House, the First of Her Name, the Rightful Patron and Protector of Athens, the Goddess of Wisdom, War- fare, and Handicraft, She of Bright- Eyes, the Breaker of Tapestries, and Mother of Chariots ...... passim

Themis and Her Scales of Justice ...... passim

1 QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Is Electra Atreus liable to the emotional and reputational harms incurred by Orestes Atreus because she intentionally exploited his mental illness to cause him to engage in a distressing act? 2. If Electra Atreus is liable, is 100,000-talents an appropriate award for compensatory and punitive damages? 3. Would it be wise of this Court to deny the com- pensation of King Orestes of Mycenae, who has demonstrated a tendency toward delusion- driven vengeance and possesses the favor of Athena, Goddess of War and Turning Those Who Spite Her into Snakes and Spiders?

2 INTRODUCTION At the start of the Trojan War, King Agamemnon Atreus of Mycenae came to know the vile curse of his house. The blood spilt by his forefather, that Tantalus of Anatolia who stewed his own son, trickled down the family tree and set Agamemnon upon a wretched duty. In order to turn the wind and set his troops across the Aegean, Agamemnon was forced to sacri- fice his eldest daughter, Iphigenia. This task shat- tered Agamemnon’s soul, but for it he was rewarded. After ten long years, the Gods blessed him with tri- umph in Troy. However, Agamemnon was never permitted to en- joy his winnings—his wife, Queen Clytemnestra Atreus, was struck by envy like Aphrodite’s upon handsome Helen. Embittered by the presence of Cas- sandra, Agamemnon’s new “friend,” Clytemnestra furthered the bloody history of Mycenae’s royal house. Murdering both Agamemnon and Cassandra, the Queen set the amphitheater for the matter cur- rently before the Court. But where she may have set the scene, it was her daughter, Electra Atreus, who ultimately directed the act. A decade after the close of the war, Agamemnon and Clytemnestra’s son, Orestes Atreus, returned to Mycenae. Having been sent away after his father’s murder, Orestes arrived distraught. Overhearing his father’s dying screams had left Orestes in the grips of mental illness. He believed that Apollo, God of the Sun and Negligently Killing Your Boyfriend with a Discus,1 spoke in his mind. Upon learning this, his

1 See Apollo v. Estate of Hyacinth, 1 O. 123 (Court of Olympus 1490 BCE) (finding that “the use of godly strength” while play- ing sports with a mortal amounts to “negligence per se”).

3 sister, Electra, defied all moral principles. Reacting with excitement rather than concern, Electra es- chewed her brother’s well-being and set about a vile plot. Bitter over having been made a servant in her own house, Electra despised her mother. She sought Cly- temnestra’s death—and a means of having someone else behind the knife. Like a viper to the breast of Clytemnestra, Electra snapped at the opportunity her brother’s illness presented. She used him, exploiting his enfeebled state and coercing him into matricide. In her own words, Electra made clear that while Orestes held the knife that ended Clytemnestra’s life, it was “only because [she] handed it to him.” Ellen McLaughlin, The Oresteia at 63 (1258 BCE) [herein- after The Oresteia]. Immediately following Clytemnestra’s death, Ores- tes mental state further deteriorated. Though Athe- na, who has remarked that her “two greatest assets have been mental stability and being, like, really smart,”2 pardoned him of all wrong-doing, Orestes has been continuously plagued by sleepwalking, bad dreams, hallucinations, and a vehement fear of birds. His ailment has grown so severe that his delusional belief that birds are violent Furies, see The Oresteia at 61, has even prevented him from enjoying his fa- vorite restaurant, Thessaly Fried Chicken. Worse yet, The Helios, Daily Zodiac, and Mycenae Enquirer have run rampant with publications be- smirching Orestes’s good name, deeming him “The

2 Goddess Athena (@realGoddessAthena), Twitter (Jan. 6, 1302 BCE; 8:27 AM), https://twitter.com/realGoddessAthena/status/949618475877765 120.

4 Notorious KOA (King Orestes Atreus).” See Aeschy- lus, Rumors Fly Around Mycenae’s New King, Myc. Times, June 15, 1260 BCE, at A1. The press and gossip surrounding Orestes’s matricide—which include graphic comparisons to the failures of Oedipus—have furthered the young king’s distress and undermined his attempts at ruling Mycenae. Petitioner Electra alleges that she loves her brother and meant him no harm. She asks that this Court overlook her gruesome exploitation of his forsaken state and leave him without remedy for the anguish she wrought in inducing his matricide. But, if Electra loves Orestes, then she loves him as the sorceress Medea loved her brother, Absyrtus. Just as the witch cut her kin into pieces for the sake of thievery, Elec- tra has thrown her brother to madness in pursuit of wicked revenge. This Court should deny her request.

STATEMENT

From the very outset, Petitioner intended to cause her brother to kill their mother, irrespective of the distress it might cause him. She saw him as little more than a means to exert her will, stating that the murder would be done first, “through [her],” and then “through my brother,” -- a clear expression of her de- sire to employ him as a puppet. She cared little for his well-being, considering the fact that he might still be alive merely “useful” to her purposes. And, once it was apparent he was mentally feeble and easy to manipulate, she exploited his condition, interrupting his protests and insisting his visions meant he must kill their mother. Most wickedly, when Respondent expressed a de- sire to speak to their late father, Petitioner claimed to

5 have done so herself. She led her brother through a faulty ritual to contact Agamemnon, pretending that her own desires were in fact those of the ghosts and Gods, knowing that Orestes was a man with espoused delusions regarding the non-mortal. During this ritual, Petitioner was the first to call harm to Clytemnes- tra, setting her ill brother down the vile path she de- sired. She thrust the murder weapon in his hand both literally and figuratively, passing him the knife only once she’d shaped his fragile psyche to believe murdering their mother was his fated duty. That he, in his sickness, followed through can only be attributed to the Petitioner’s conniving machinations. Accordingly, Respondent sued, seeking compensatory and punitive damages against Petitioner on the basis that “her actions were the proximate cause of both his mental state and the damage to his reputation.” Scenario at 1. The jury, recognizing the vil- lainy of Petitioner’s conduct, found in favor of Re- spondent. They awarded him 100,000 Attic talents, finding that Petitioner had “intentionally and tortu- ously taken advantage of Orestes’s mental state to cause him to kill his mother.” Scenario at 2. Petitioner appealed to the Circuit Court of Ath- ens, arguing that the jury’s verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence, the law, and that its award was excessive. In his opinion, Chief Archon Garland asserted that “[t]o surrender to Petitioner’s demands would be to promote outrageous injustice” and that he “knew a thing or two about outrageous injustices.” Atreus v. Atreus, 4 F.3d 234, 255 (Ath. Cir. 1259 BCE). Consequently, Archon Garland af- firmed the lower court’s decision and award. This Court subsequently granted Petitioner’s timely filed petition for writ of certiorari.

6 ARGUMENT I. Petitioner was the proximate cause of Respondent’s emotional distress. It matters not whether Electra intended for her actions to bring Orestes dismay, only that she intended to cause him to kill their mother. It is a well-founded principle of Athenian law that a prima-facie case of infliction of emotional distress lies where a defendant, demonstrating a reckless disregard for the prob- ability of causing emotional distress, engages in outrageous conduct that is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s emotional distress. See eg., Nally v. Grace Community Temple, 47 Cal.3d 278 (1398 BCE); Re- statement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1396 BCE). This, then, is a prima-face case of infliction of emotional distress, the peculiar feature of matricide mere Coli- seum dressing. The matters of whether Petitioner’s conduct was “outrageous” and “recklessly performed” need not de- tain us long. Where a defendant “knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress” or acts unreasonably “with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress,” their actions are clearly outrageous. Clark v. United States aka Athens, 120 F.3d 268 (Ath. Cir. 1412 BCE). Respondent, by her own admission, rec- ognizes that her brother was vulnerable— “disturbed,” to use her parlance—upon his return to Mycenae. Scenario at 1. Moreover, Orestes made his affliction plain to his sister immediately upon reun- ion, detailing the “never-ending” voices that rung out in his mind and their and Delphic messages. The Oresteia at 50-51. Thus, Respondent knew her brother was in a diminished mental state and cajoled him into the distressing act of matricide, anyway. If this is not outrageous conduct, then even Medusa’s insult

7 of Aphrodite would pass muster. Further, Petitioner cannot claim that she was igno- rant that her conduct posed a substantial risk of causing Orestes distress. The madness experienced by her cousin, Oedipus, see Sophocles, Oedipus the King (429 BCE),3 illustrated the impacts of familicide upon a prince. As knowledge of Oedipus’s story was common in Mycenae at the time, see Scenario at 1, it is unthinkable that Electra was unaware that inducing Orestes to matricide could damage his fragile psyche. Therefore, her conduct was taken up with reckless disregard to the evident emotional harms it posed to Orestes. So long as it can be demonstrated that she was the proximate cause of Orestes’s matricide, Petitioner is liable for that act’s distressing results. And, fortunately for Respondent, such a demonstration is easy as stealing candy from a Cu- pid. Contrary to his sister’s allegations, Respondent was not, upon arrival in Mycenae, set on murdering Cly- temnestra. Rather, he was uncertain of his course of action, proclaiming, “[A]nything I do will be wrong.” The Oresteia at 48. When Petitioner referred to him as “Justice” and a “ghost with a knife,” Respondent declined to take up her murderous mantles—he remarked that the boy she mistook him for, the boy she cast as her “avenging stranger,” was dead. Id. at 49- 50. Further, prior to the onset of his delusional epi- sode, Respondent refused to answer in the affirma- tive when asked if embodying these murderous roles

3 This brief includes references to the texts delivered to us from the future—the far-flung centuries of 800, 700, and 400 BCE—by the Oracle of Delphi. These histories and works are preferable to their modern counterparts, as they are free from the contemporary’s “Fake News” epidemic.

8 was “what [he] came back for”—indeed, the testimony suggests this allegation made him uneasy. Id. at 50. These are not the actions of a man resolved to murder. Nor were Respondent’s many calls for his sister to “wait” and cease urging him to kill so he might do what he came to do— “mourn [his] father”—the words of one committed to matricide. Id. at 51-52. Ra- ther, they entail the conduct of a noble Prince of My- cenae bearing a heart as heavy as the globe on Atlas’ shoulders. Nothing of his conduct, prior to Petition- er’s exploitation of his illness, suggests the Respond- ent was imminently, certainly, and undeterrably about to kill Clytemnestra. Additionally, this Court must reject the Petitioners attempt to blame fate. See Scenario at 1. An act of fate and the Gods is one “arising from the force of the elements which human intelligence cannot predict nor the ingenuity of man foretell...it excludes all ide- as of human agency.” Uniroyal, Inc. v. Hood, 588 F.2d 454, 460 (Theb. Cir. 1497 BCE). While the agency of mankind may be in dispute, see Sophocles, supra, a Court must presume its existence, lest each of its judgements pass onto men with no say in their conduct. As the Chorus said, “There is always a choice. . . We saw it all but we never saw Apollo. We only saw [Electra] and [her brother] and what [they] did.” See The Oresteia at 74. Clytemnestra did not have to be murdered; indeed, she might still be alive had Electra not actively coerced a mentally ill man into carrying out matricide on her behalf. The matter before this Court is not of fate, but of human agency and human decisions for which only one human—Electra Atre- us—can be held accountable. Even accepting that Clytemnestra’s fate was murder by family member, as is common in House Atre- us, there is no evidence to indicate that fate required

9 Respondent be its vehicle. Petitioner herself alleged that the Gods would enact their vengeance “through [her],” The Oresteia at 43. She stated that “someone ha[d] to correct this thing” and that she would “seem to have to” because “[n]o one else” would. Id. at 46. If fate demanded that Clytemnestra die by familicide, there was no clause preventing Petitioner from ful- filling that mandate directly. Daughters are just as capable as sons, even in the department of butchering their parents. See The Daughters of Pelias, Lean In: Women, Work, and the Will to Kill Our Dad (3d ed. 1348 BCE). That Petitioner opted to coerce her ill brother into wielding the blade was a conscious and self-serving decision, one whose consequences she must recompense. Fate and Orestes’s prior dedication dispensed, Elec- tra’s conduct is the only remaining explanation for Orestes’s matricide. While Petitioner would attempt to blame Respondent for the matricide and its results, Athenian law knows better than to blame the mentally ill for the harms they incur at the instruction of others. See, e.g., Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735 (1300 BCE) (finding defendant liable to the emotional harms incurred when he exploited a woman’s delusional belief in buried treasure to cause her to engage in distressing activities). The chain of causality is clear. But for Petitioner’s intentional manipulation of Respondent’s illness, Re- spondent would not have killed his mother. But for killing his mother, Orestes would not have suffered a post-murder meltdown. And, but for the murder, Orestes would not have been forced to suffer gossip referring to him as “Crooked Orestes” and the “Moth- er Murdering Mycenean.” This chain mirrors that of Nickerson, in which the defendant, recognizing the plaintiff was delusional, buried fake treasure in her

10 yard and encouraged her to parade it through town— an act, but for which, the plaintiff would not have suffered distressing humiliation. Id. Just as that plaintiff would not have suffered without the defendant’s placement of the treasure and the instructions to go into town, nor would Respondent have suffered without Petitioner’s placement of the knife and her ma- nipulative inducements to murder. II. Respondent’s pre-existing condition does not diminish Petitioner’s liability. Respondent calls the Court to dismiss her tortfea- sance because her brother’s illness preceded her inducements to matricide. In this, she renders herself as serpentine as the gorgon McConnell, weaponizing pre-existing conditions against the innocent. The Court must reject her request under the most basic principle of tort law, which even Koalemos, the God of Stupidity, knows. The brittle-amphora skull doctrine demands that tortfeasors “take the victim as [they] find [the victim], extraordinarily sensitive or not.”4 Thus, Orestes’s pre-existing mental distress is irrele- vant so long as it can be demonstrated that Respond- ent’s conduct exacerbated or “hurried up” his affliction. See e.g., Shaver v. United States aka Athens, 319 F. Supp. 2d 649, 664 (Ath. 1400 BCE) (finding that “when [the plaintiff’s] injuries are aggravated or activated by a pre-existing. . .mental condition, [the] defendant is liable…to the extent that his wrongful act proximately and naturally aggravated or activated [the] plaintiff's condition”). Respondent suffered a worsening or “aggravation” of his mental state due to his sister’s conduct. The

4 McKinnon v. Kwong Wah Restaurant, 83 F.3d 498, 506 (Pyl. Cir. 1599 BCE).

11 trauma of the murder exacerbated his delusions, tak- ing him from a Prince perfectly capable of conversa- tion and introspection, see The Oresteia at 48-49, to a madman calling out for his dead “Daddy,” incapable of recognizing his sister, terrified of birds, and taken to fits of crying on the floor. See id. at 64-67. Further, there was no delay between the matricide and the aggravation of Respondent’s ailment. Petitioner cannot suggest there were intervening factors— Respondent collapsed and developed his paranoid fear of birds immediately following his mother’s de- mise, sobbing about the act he’d just been coerced in- to committing. Id. at 61-62. While Petitioner may not be liable for Respondent’s underlying illness, she is liable for the aggravation she incurred and its associ- ated damages. III. The lower courts’ assessment of damages was appropriate. When a defendant's tortious conduct aggravates a pre-existing condition, the defendant must compensate the victim for the full extent of the aggravation. See, e.g., Logan v. Brink’s Inc., 16 So. 3d 530 (Myc. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1500 BCE). Similarly, a defendant whose tortious conduct damages a victim’s reputation must compensate the victim for the full extent of that damage—even where their victim’s reputation is of unusually high value. See, e.g., Cantu v. Flanigan, 705 F. Supp.2d. 220, 228 (E.D. Theb. 1410 BCE) (finding that a jury should consider the prior value of a plaintiff’s reputation when calculating reputational damages). Thus, Respondent’s mental anguish, medical expenses, and damaged reputation necessitate a substantial compensatory award. Additionally, in order “to punish [Respondent] and to deter [her] and others from similar conduct in the future,” considerable punitive damages are in order. Lee v. Edwards,

12 101 F.3d 805, 809 (Sal. Cir. 1596 BCE). Taken together, these sums more than justify the 100,000 At- tic talents awarded by the lower courts. As the result of Petitioner’s conduct, Respondent will be incurring the high costs of medical treatment for years. See Scenario at 1. To make him whole, the Court must recognize the “reasonable value” of his past, present, and future medical expenses and grant a commensurate compensatory award. Simms v. United States aka Athens, 839 F.3d 364, 369 (Mene. Cir. 1501 BCE). Industry standard suggests that a fair month’s wage for a 200-man rowing team is a single Attic talent. See Torr Cecil, Triremes, 20 CLAS- SICAL R. 137 (1460 BCE). Thus, 100,000 talents would fund a 200-man rowing team for 8,333 and a third years. But, as noted by the great Trojan war hero King Idomeneus, “[a] physician is worth more than several men put together.” Homer, The Iliad at XI (800 BCE). Courts, recognizing that physicians are far more expensive than lowly rowers and that treatment often requires costly tinctures and animal sacrifices, often grant substantial awards of this na- ture. See, e.g., Ray v. Lesniak, 294 F. Supp.3d 466 (D.S.C. 1518 BCE) (awarding future medical expenses, including therapeutic counsel and medicinal herbs). This Court should continue in this tradition, recognizing that much of the lower courts’ award is rightly comprised of Respondent’s present and ex- pected medical expenses. Additionally, courts have long recognized that the killing of a plaintiff’s family member is a most outrageous act which often necessitates hundreds of thou- sands of talents in emotional distress damages. See, e.g., Valencia v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 774 F.Supp.2d. 1, 15 (D.D.C 1550 BCE). While Respond- ent was his mother’s killer, it was only because of his

13 sister’s wrongful exploitation of his illness. The calcu- lation of damages, then, should be performed as in any wrongful death case—which means that sums some might consider to be “egregious” are permissi- ble. See, e.g., Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F. Supp.2d 299 (D.D.C 1550 BCE). There- fore, the Petitioner’s complaints of “excessiveness” are unfounded. Further, Petitioner’s employment of Respondent as a tool in the killing demands greater than normal emotional distress damages. Egregious emotional distress claims “generally involve either ‘outrageous or shocking’ discriminatory conduct or a significant im- pact on the physical health of the plaintiff.” Duarte v. St. Barnabas Hosp., 341 F. Supp.3d 306, 320 (S.D. Theb. 1512 BCE). As demonstrated by the factual record, being a coerced party to the killing has had an excessively detrimental effect on the Respondent’s health. See The Oresteia at 64-67. His symptoms are not dissimilar from those deemed appropriate for an egregious award in other instances. See, e.g., Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 774 F.3d 140, 146, 151-52, 163 (Ath. Cir. 1556 BCE) (upholding award a large award for emotional distress manifesting as PTSD, depression, a panic disorder, and multiple hospitali- zations). It would be unthinkable to describe “manip- ulating your mentally ill brother into killing your mother” as anything but the most outrageous conduct. Accordingly, this Court should uphold the 100,000-talent award granted below. The compensatory damages for the Respondent’s besmirched reputation also play a considerable role in the 100,000-talent award. In Kennedy v. McKesson Co., the Court of Appeals for Thebes found that a tooth physician could recover for reputational damages from his herb supplier after the supplier negligent-

14 ly provided him with the wrong root, resulting in a client’s death and the ruin of the physician’s profes- sional image. 58 N.Y.2d 500 (1583 BCE). Similarly, the Supreme Court of Pylos found that reputational damages are recoverable “in actions alleging intentional or wanton misconduct.”5 In this case, Petition- er’s intentional exploitation of her brother to cause his matricide has in turn caused him great reputational harm. Respondent can hardly leave his home without being called “Queen Slayer,” diminishing his ability to act as Mycenae’s king. Insofar as Respond- ent, being mentally ill and manipulated, was not re- sponsible for his matricide, he is no different from the physician, incurring reputational harms because of another’s misconduct. Petitioner, whose wrongdoing caused the matricide and its resulting gossip, should be made to pay her due in reputational damages. Regarding the valuation of reputational damages, Respondent’s prior status as an unsullied prince of Mycenae must be considered. See, e.g., Cantu v. Flan- igan, 705 F.Supp.2d. at 228. As the great poet Hesiod explains, “[b]ad reputation is grievous to bear and hard to get rid of.” Works and Day at 762 (700 BCE). Prior to the matricide, the people of Mycenae viewed Orestes as either dead, see The Oresteia at 46, or as out in the world, waiting to assume his throne, see The Oresteia at 55, 57. He was in the perfect position to become King, to capture the public imagination as a rightful heir restored. After the murder, he was reduced to being “only his crime.” See The Oresteia at 70. Thus, he has lost the favor of his people and the ability to sway them as a legitimate king. This dimin- ishment of reputation has tangible harms; how will

5 Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, 306 S.E.2d 340, 341 (1583 BCE), aff'd, 311 S.E.2d 818 (1584 BCE).

15 he collect the tax or direct his armies to defend his lands? Moreover, being reduced to a murderer in the public imagination has obvious and demonstrated psychological impacts. Thus, for compensatory damages to fully compensate Respondent, they must include the sizeable reputational damages suited to the ruined reputation of a rightful king. Finally, given the blatant outrageousness of Peti- tioner’s conduct, a large punitive damages award is appropriate. Punitive damages exist for the purpose of reinforcing Athens’ most vital norms and deterring the most egregious conduct. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 54, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1639, 75 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1612 BCE). They are awarded at the discretion of the jury and are called for when compensatory damages, alone, cannot appropriately punish the tortfea- sor or deter others from engaging in similar tortfea- sance. See id. Where the jury below has made their disapproval clear by granting a large punitive damages award and where the Petitioner’s inducement to familicide must be punished, this Court should not revoke a clearly appropriate measure of damages. If anyone thinks to weep for Electra at the great cost of this award, they should take pause. With re- spect to punitive damages, “the wealth and size of the defendant are relevant considerations.” Deters v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc., 202 F.3d 1262, 1273. (Orch. Cir. 1524 BCE). A punitive award cannot serve its function of punishment and deterrence if it does not scale to the wealth of the person or class of per- sons it means to effect. Id. Petitioner is a Mycenean princess and the recent bride of her cousin, Crown Prince Pylades of Phocis. If this Court does not strike her with an award that will meaningfully dent her substantial wealth, our law will be nothing more than a farce under which the rich may freely transgress

16 against others. If Electra does not pay today, then we all pay tomorrow.

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals should be upheld. Respectfully submitted,

ELIZABETH B. WYDRA MADISON A. NEEDHAM CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER 1200 18th Street NW, Suite 501 Washington, DC 20036

Counsel for Respondent