Serb Integration in Kosovo After the Brussels Agreement This report was funded by the Government of Switzerland and the Government of Norway. Disclaimer: The views and analyses in this report are solely of the Balkans Group and do not reflect the views of the donors. Authors: Marko Prelec and Naim Rashiti Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................. I RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................. III INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 THE SERBS OF KOSOVO ................................................................................................ 4 NORTHERN KOSOVO .............................................................................................................................. 5 SOUTHERN KOSOVO MUNICIPALITIES ................................................................................................. 7 ENCLAVES IN ALBANIAN-MAJORITY AREAS ........................................................................................ 8 STATE INSTITUTIONS .................................................................................................. 12 BELGRADE IN KOSOVO ........................................................................................................................ 12 CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION ................................................................................................................. 14 THE PERSISTENCE OF PARALLELISM IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT ....................................................... 17 ORIGINS OF SERBIAN MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS ............................................................................. 18 CONFUSION IN NORTHERN KOSOVO ................................................................................................. 20 DOUBLE HATS IN SOUTHERN KOSOVO .............................................................................................. 20 THE SERBIAN PUBLIC SECTOR .............................................................................................................. 22 LOCAL GOVERNMENT INTEGRATION ................................................................................................. 24 COURTS, JUSTICE AND POLICE ............................................................................................................. 26 THE COMMUNITY OF SERB MUNICIPALITIES ..................................................... 29 LEGAL FOUNDATIONS .......................................................................................................................... 31 THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE COMMUNITY ........................................................................................ 33 THE SPECTRE OF SECESSION ............................................................................................................... 37 THE SERBIAN LEGAL ORDER AFTER THE BRUSSELS AGREEMENT ................................................. 38 VITAL ISSUES .................................................................................................................. 40 EDUCATION AND HEALTH CARE ......................................................................................................... 40 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 43 APPENDIX A: ESTIMATING THE SERB POPULATION ......................................... 45 APPENDIX B: COMPARISON OF THE RS AND THE COMMUNITY .................... 48 APPENDIX C: A NOTE ON NAMES ............................................................................ 49 Serb Integration in Kosovo after the Brussels Agreement Executive Summary Kosovo and Serbia have started an immense task, the integration of the Kosovo Serbs and Belgrade’s administrative and financial infrastructure on Kosovo’s territory into the latter’s system – in short, “Serb integration”. This builds on a hard-won agreement mediated by the EU and hailed as among Brussels’s best achievements. Yet its implementation on the ground has been and continues to be much more challenging. Integration raises deep, emotional issues among Albanians and Serbs, and small misunderstandings can easily produce a violent response. The array of institutions involved – municipal governments, schools, health care, courts, security services and others, with budgets of several hundred million euros – is daunting. There is no precedent, set of best practices or established road map. Pristina and Belgrade started this process for different reasons, the former to establish its sovereignty and territorial integrity, the latter to please the EU. Neither shows an appreciation of the scale of the task, or an inclination to commit the financial – and political – resources it calls for. With the support of international partners, Kosovo and Serbia should set a goal of full integration of Serb institutions into the Kosovo system by the end of 2015 and move quickly to make their agreement a reality. Previous rounds of dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, from UN-sponsored “future status” talks in 2005 to a EU-mediated “technical dialogue” in 2011, began promisingly but ran into trouble. Pristina claims that Serb rights were negotiated several times, with Belgrade asking for more each time and delivering little or nothing in return, and without a successful conclusion. Belgrade says all the concessions have come from its side, while Kosovo injects status issues – recognition of its independence – into every topic. Both sides try hard to get the EU mediators’ sympathies. There are many issues in play: Serb participation in Kosovo institutions, ending Serbia’s interference on Kosovo territory, Kosovo’s access to the international community, and the legacy of war. The overriding goal is for Kosovo and Serbia to cooperate normally, like good neighbours, and for each to treat its minority population with respect. The bilateral relationship is key and will determine the success of integration. The stakes and risks are high for all concerned, and the process is poorly understood on the ground. A minor confrontation between Albanians and Serb refugees in Gjakovë on 6 January, and a carelessly provocative comment by a Serb minister the same day, led a month later to riots in Pristina, the sacking of the minister and a boycott by Serb parliamentarians that, as this report goes to press, was ongoing. Albanians resent Belgrade’s role in their state and their disputed status; on the street many also chafe at years of mismanagement by an entrenched political elite. Serbs are being transferred against their will from one state to another and fear the consequences. The success or failure of Serb integration can resonate in the neighbouring multi-ethnic states. Kosovo’s Serb community can be divided into three distinct groups. Northern Kosovo is a homogenous Serb area that resisted Pristina’s authority since 1999; many of its residents have little or no experience with Albanians or the Kosovo government and view both with fear and mistrust. Serbian institutions were, until recently, the only governing bodies in this area. The Serb Integration in Kosovo after the Brussels Agreement 19 March 2015 second group comprises six Serb-majority municipalities scattered throughout the rest of the country; most Serbs here comply with Kosovo law but are on the Serbian payroll in one way or another. The third group are Serbs living in scattered villages and neighbourhoods elsewhere in Kosovo. Lacking control of a municipal government and the targeted services it can provide, they also lean heavily on Serbian institutions. All Kosovo Serbs have several overriding concerns. Jobs rank high – the security of the Serbian jobs many now have, and the availability of alternatives once they dry up. The labour market is not open to them. Older employees are anxious to remain within Serbia’s pension scheme. Access to Serbia’s health care system – its clinics, hospitals in Kosovo, referrals for specialist care in Serbia and its insurance scheme – is very important. Families rely on Serbian schools, and students need to receive diplomas that will be honoured whether they remain in Kosovo or move to Serbia. Without Serbian education they will leave. Lastly, physical security is a concern. Enclave Serbs especially are vulnerable to intimidation and occasional assault. For the past year, many local Serb officials have worn two hats, having won election to Kosovo offices and been appointed to other positions in Serbia’s network of parallel municipalities. This cohabitation varies in detail but exists in all Serb-majority areas. The parallel, Serbian system has little effective governing power, but commands a much larger purse; it covers much of Kosovo and employs tens of thousands. The payroll ballooned for political reasons – Belgrade kept the Kosovo Serbs both solvent and loyal – and after 15 years the population is dependent on these jobs. Some work directly for the parallel municipalities; many more for public companies and institutions they administer; and still others in schools and hospitals run from Belgrade. Belgrade should soon close its institutions and transferring employees from the Serbian to the Kosovo payroll will be a daunting and costly task. Belgrade and Pristina chose to frame their agreement in terms of a hybrid entity, an Association/Community of Serb municipalities.