Turkey's Cyprus Policy in the Context of Nicosia's Presidency of The
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Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik ments German Institute for International and Security Affairs m SWP Co 501962–2012 Turkey’s Cyprus Policy in the Context of Nicosia’s Presidency of the WP European Council S Turkey Intensifies Its Efforts to Create International Legitimation for the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”, to Date Recognised Only by Ankara Günter Seufert The Cypriot presidency of the EU Council has prompted Turkey to step up its efforts to boost international recognition for its self-administrated statelet in the north of the island, using the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) as an instrument in its endeavours. Ankara is concomitantly reacting to the current constellation of fronts in the Mediterranean, which has formed as a result of the dispute over access to recently detected gas deposits. If developments continue in the direction pursued to date, the European Union is likely to rue its indecisive policy on Cyprus and Turkey, left in the cold as far as the newly-discovered resources are concerned, while Russia increases its Mediterranean influence. From Turkey’s perspective, Cyprus’ EU This is because Turkey refuses to recog- Council presidency, which commenced nise the island’s current Greek-Cypriot on 1st July 2012, is as a red rag to a bull. state. According to its version of events, This is not only because Nicosia is blocking the emergence of proportional representa- the opening of six chapters in Ankara’s tion in the Republic of Cyprus as stipulated accession negotiations with the EU, and in its 1960 constitution proved that the Turkish accession appears likely to founder creation of a Cypriot nation was never the thanks to the conflict, which has been prime intention. On the contrary, the per- smouldering for nigh on sixty years. More manent autonomy of two ethnic groups or pertinently, the EU Council presidency is religious communities was assumed, which boosting the international reputation of both retained their cultural identities and the Republic of Cyprus, thus threatening to would not assimilate. Turkey holds that the negate the Turks’ central argument in the destruction of the proportional representa- Cyprus question. tion regime by the island’s Greek popula- Dr. Günter Seufert is a Senior Associates in SWP’s EU External Relations Division SWP Comments 34 October 2012 1 tion in 1963 effectively extinguished the Geological Survey (UGSG) is assuming that state based on this principle. Moreover, as the Basin’s total reserves amount to 3.45 bil- Cyprus’ two major ethnic groups had been lion cubic metres of gas and 1.7 billion bar- understood as political equals from the rels of natural oil. The Eastern Mediterra- start, the creation of any new state on Cyp- nean is deemed a terra incognita as far as oil riot soil consequently required the approval and gas are concerned. As a result, expec- of both groups. tations regarding future discoveries are rife, In addition, Ankara assumes that the and hopes that the sea region could develop island’s proximity to the Turkish mainland into an alternative source of supply to the – the distance is a mere 40 nautical miles – deposits in the former Soviet Union are run- gives Turkey a justified security policy- ning high. related interest in its foreign policy. The coastal states are demonstrating cor- As a result, Turkey has never accepted responding decisiveness when staking their the international view that the Republic of claims. However, valid bilateral agreements Cyprus, carried as it is by the Greek-Cypriot regarding the reciprocal demarcation of majority, represents the entire island. How- EEZs have only been concluded between the ever, precisely this claim receives renewed Republic of Cyprus and Israel and between international endorsement in the wake of Nicosia and Cairo to date. Relations be- Nicosia’s takeover of the EU Council presi- tween Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Egypt, dency. Lebanon and Syria and Syria and Turkey As early as July 2011, Turkish Foreign remain unclear. Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu announced that The EEZs are a source of open conflict his country would not participate in any between the Republic of Cyprus and Tur- meetings chaired by the Greek-Cypriot in- key. In December 2010, Nicosia and Tel Aviv cumbents for the duration of the EU Coun- clinched a deal regarding the demarcation cil presidency, this in order to consolidate of their mutual EEZs, which served only to Turkey’s position at international level. As exacerbate the existing tension in Ankara’s far as the Cyprus problem itself, no one on strained relations with both countries. the island is anticipating progress during As Turkey refuses to recognise the gov- this period in what can only be termed ernment in Nicosia, it also denies it the faltering negotiations between the two authority to conclude international trea- ethnic groups to overcome partition. ties, deeming the agreements made by The discovery of major natural gas Nicosia regarding the demarcation of Ex- deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean lends clusive Economic Zones in the Mediterra- this political constellation additional eco- nean null and void. Ankara also denies nomic and strategic cause for conflict. Nicosia the right to exploit the natural gas deposits, referring to claims to this new- found wealth by Turkish Cypriots. In Sep- Eastern Mediterranean riches tember 2011, Turkey concluded an agree- and disputes over Exclusive ment regarding the mutual EEZs with its Economic Zones protégé, the self-declared Turkish Repub- By April 2012, 1.025 billion cubic metres lic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which only of natural gas had been located in the so- it recognises, after its protests fell on called Levant Basin, which lies between Is- deaf ears in Nicosia. The same month, the rael, Lebanon and Cyprus. Nine of the elev- TRNC commissioned the state-owned en fields discovered are located in Israel’s Turkish oil company TPAO with explora- Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), while the tions north of the island, in waters con- remainder falls within the boundaries of sidered by the Republic of Cyprus part of the EEZ of the Republic of Cyprus. But that its EEZ. The stage was set for further esca- is by no means the end of the story. The U.S. lations. SWP Comments 34 October 2012 2 These duly developed, with Turkey Crete. During the same period, military demonstratively dispatching a research units in the 6th fleet of the USA as well as vessel to the Aphrodite gas field, to which units from Greece and Israel performed an Nicosia lays claim. This triggered military air and naval exercise which tested, among reactions from both the Republic of Cyprus other things, protective measures in place and Israel, whose fighter jets besieged the for oil rigs, and which was clearly intended ship, violating Turkish-Cypriot airspace and to call Turkey’s attention to the limits of its eliciting the deployment of military aircraft sphere of influence in the Eastern Mediter- by Turkey in response. When Israel’s Prime ranean. When Nicosia’s dispute with An- Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, became his kara over the demarcation treaty for the country’s first premier to visit Nicosia in mutual EEZs between Israel and the Repub- February 2012, Turkey reacted with a naval lic of Cyprus hove into view, Washington exercise which involved shooting in the and Brussels immediately affirmed Cyprus’ area of block 12 of the natural gas fields, right to conclude international treaties as which had been claimed by the Republic the sole representative of the entire island. of Cyprus, with live ammunition. Ankara’s situation looks no better as far as international law is concerned. Tel Aviv and Nicosia drew up their agreement on New “frontlines” in the the EEZs in accordance with the guidelines Mediterranean stipulated in the United Nations Conven- Nicosia and Tel Aviv have concluded co- tion on the Law of the Sea. Its standards operation agreements for the exploitation have become international common law, and safety of the natural gas fields and plan and are, as a result, binding for those to collaborate on the issue of gas export. nations which, like Israel and Turkey, have U.S. company Nobel Energy, in which Israel not yet sanctioned the treaty. holds shares, operates in both countries. With this, Turkey is currently largely Greek-Cypriot and Israeli newspapers report isolated in the Eastern Mediterranean. an escalation in military cooperation be- Ankara is experiencing a discrepancy, tween the two countries. According to press unknown until now, between its claim to sources, Israel is interested in using Cyprus’ be a new leading, regulatory power and the Andreas Papandreou military airport, and reality of a front consisting of Israel, Greece is negotiating the establishment of an air- and the Republic of Cyprus, which is bol- base on the island. The Israeli air force used stered by those major Western players, USA Cypriot airspace for exercises as early as and EU. At the same time, Turkey remains October 2011. In May 2012, Cypriot Foreign embroiled in disputes with Syria and Iran, Minister Erato Kozakou-Markoulli declared and its relations with Iraq are becoming that her country was indispensable to Isra- increasingly conflict-ridden. el’s security ahead of the American Jewish Committee’s annual global forum. In the wake of its dispute with Turkey, Turkey’s Cyprus policy: Israel has been drawing nearer to Greece. A case of déjà-vu The two countries signed a military cooper- From Ankara’s perspective, the current ation agreement in Jerusalem in September situation in the Eastern Mediterranean 2011. In late March 2012, a Greek-Israeli- appears to confirm the worst as far as the Cypriot investment summit took place in intrinsic assumptions of Turkey’s Cyprus Athens with the involvement of the USA policy and the associated fears are con- and Noble Energy.