Harvard Law Review I

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Harvard Law Review I VOLUME 116 APRIL 2003 NUMBER 6 HARVARD LAW REVIEW I ARTICLE INMATE LITIGATION Margo Schlanger TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION r557 I. INMATE LITIGATION TRENDS r565 A. The Varied Subject Matter ofInmate Litigation r570 B. Inmate Litigation Rates r575 C. Inmate Filing Rates over Time: The "Deluge" r578 D. OfBabies and Bath Water: The Processing ofInmate Cases r587 II. OUTCOMES IN INMATE CASES (PRIOR TO THE PLRA) r590 A. Outcomes: The Data r593 B. Outcomes: Explanations r605 1. Limited Legal Rights/Exacting Decision Standard , r605 2. Easy Access to Courts r 607 3. The Absence of Counsel r609 4· Obstacles to Settlement. r6 r4 (a) The Impact of the Low Quality of the Docket r6r4 (b) Asymmetric Information r6r6 (c) Low Litigation Costs r6r7 (d) Perceived High External Settlement Costs r6r7 (e) Corrections Culture r620 5. Trial Win Rates r62r 6. Low Damage Awards r622 C. Conclusion r626 III. SEA CHANGE: THE PLRA (AND OTHER 1996 CHANGES) r627 A. Exhaustion r627 B. Filing Fees r628 C. Costs r629 D. Judicial Screening r629 E. No Obligation To Respond r630 F. Telephonic Hearings r630 1555 HeinOnline -- 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1555 2002-2003 1556 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 116:1555 G. Limitation on Damages 1630 H. Diversion ofDamages 1631 I. Limitation on Attorneys' Fees 1631 J. Coverage 1632 K. Other Legal Changes Concurrent with the PLRA 1632 IV. LITIGATION EFFECTS OF THE PLRA 1633 A. The Shrinking Inmate Docket.. 1634 1. State Court 1634 2. Habeas 1637 3. Jail and Prison Filings 1641 4. The Impact on Courts of Filing Declines 1642 B. Plaintiffs' Declining Success 1644 1. The Statute and Its Expected Effects 1645 (a) Imposition of a Filing Fee, Payable over Time, for All Civil Actions by Inmates 1645 (b) The Frequent Filer Provisions 1648 (c) Exhaustion 1649 (d) Limitations on Attorneys' Fees 1654 (e) Coverage 1657 (f) Summary of Expected Outcome Effects 1657 2. Observed Trends 1658 V. BROADENING THE FIELD OF VIEW 1664 A. Minimizing Litigation's Burden 1668 B. Reducing Liability Exposure: Overdeterrence, Antideterrence, Underdeterrence 1672 1. Overdeterrence 1672 2. Antideterrence 1677 3. Deterrence/Underdeterrence 1686 C. Operational Effects ofthe PLRA 1690 VI. CONCLUSION 1692 DATA ApPENDIX 1698 A. Putting Together the Dataset 1698 B. Accuracy ofthe Data 1699 1. Nature of Suit Codes 1699 2. Subsequent Activity 1700 3. Federal vs. Nonfederal Inmates 1700 4. "Judgment for" 17°2 5. Damages 1702 6. Class Actions 17°3 C. Grouping Case Categories 17°4 HeinOnline -- 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1556 2002-2003 INMATE LITIGATION Margo Schlanger· In 1995, prison and jail inmates brought about 40,000 new lawsuits in federal court ­ nearly a fifth of the federal civil docket. Court records evidence a success rate for inmate plaintiffs under fifteen percent. These statistics highlight two qualities long associated with the inmate docket: its volume and the low rate of plaintiffs' success. Then, in 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which dramatically altered the litigation landscape, restricting inmates' access to federal court in a variety of ways. This Article examines inmate litigation before and after the PLRA. Looking first at the litigation process itself, it brings together prior research, the results of new quantitative analysis of a comprehensive database offederal district court cases, and interviews and other qualitative inquiry. The Article canvasses filing trends, subject matter, and settled and litigated outcomes, exploring what is happening in each of these areas and why. Then it uses a variety of analytic tools to uncover and assess the PLRA's impact. Most obviously, the PLRA has shrunk the number of new federal filings by inmates by over forty percent, notwithstanding a large increase in the affected incarcerated population. Simultaneously, the statute seems to be making even constitutionally meritorious cases harder both to bring and to win. Finally, the Article looks beyond federal courthouses to the ways litigation affects jail and prison operations. Specifically, it explores agencies' efforts to respond efficiently to the high-volume, low­ probability docket and to reduce their liability exposure, and offers some tentative observations about the PLRA's likely impact on these efforts. The Article suggests in conclusion that use of the PLRA as a model for broader litigation reforms should proceed with enormous caution given the statute's problematic effects. INTRODUCTION n any given day there are over two million people in jail or prison Oin the United States, a population that has nearly quadrupled since 1980. 1 Driven at least in large part by the steep increase in the number of jail and prison inmates, and notwithstanding the nearly complete disappearance of what used to be an active and influential • Assistant Professor, Harvard Law School ([email protected]). Thanks to Harvard Law School, Dean Robert Clark, the Harvard University Center for Ethics and the Professions, and the Harvard University Milton Fund for time and resources to complete this project. And thanks to Elizabeth Alexander, Ted Eisenberg, Dick Fallon, Jerry Frug, Phil Heymann, Howell Jackson, Christine Jolls, Steve Martin, Dan Meltzer, Martha Minow, David Shapiro, Bill Stuntz, Guhan Subramanian, Michael Tonry, Kip Viscusi, Elizabeth Warren, Lucie White, David Wil­ kins, participants in the 2002 Law & Society Conference, and (especially and as always) Sam Bagenstos for helpful comments. Mike Bloch, Lara Garner, Beth Mellen Harrison, and H.L. Rogers provided excellent research assistance, as did Josh Kantor of the Harvard Law School li­ brary reference department. Finally, thanks to the dozens of people, listed below in note 21, who shared their time and thoughts with me in extensive interviews as I prepared to write this Article. 1 See infra Table I.A. 1557 HeinOnline -- 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1557 2002-2003 1558 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. II6:1555 prisoners' rights movement,z the amount of civil litigation brought by inmates in federal court increased steadily during the 1980s, and more steeply in the early 1990S. In 1995, inmates filed nearly 40,000 new 3 federal civil lawsuits - nineteen percent of the federal civil docket.4 About fifteen percent of the federal civil trials held that year were in inmate civil rights cases.S But in the mid-1990S, the state officials who were the most fre­ quent targets of the growing inmate docket were finally able to capi­ talize on the rightward move in American politics6 and mobilize a ma­ jor campaign against the lawsuits. Building on years of (noninmate) 2 See generally RONALD BERKMAN, OPENING THE GATES: THE RISE OF THE PRISONERS' MOVEMENT (1979); James B. Jacobs, The Prisoners' Rights Movement and Its Im­ pacts, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONS AND IMPRISONMENT 33 (1983) [hereinafter Ja­ cobs, Prisoners' Rights Movement]. 3 To compute the figures for 1995, I followed the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and used a fiscal year; fiscal 1995 runs from October 1,1994 to September 30,1995. This and all filing and outcome figures in this Article are derived from a database compiled by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and cleaned up by the Federal Judicial Center, the research arm of the federal court system. The database includes each and every case "termi­ nated" (that is, ended, at least provisionally) by the federal district courts since 1970. The data, that is, cover not just a sample but the entire universe of federal civil litigation (except for bank­ ruptcy filings in the bankruptcy courts). The Federal Judicial Center lodges this database for public access with the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, which main­ tains it at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu. See Federal Judicial Center, Federal Court Cases: Inte­ grated Data Base, 1970--2000 (pts. 38-55, 64-65, 73-74, 86-88, 98, 103-04, II5-17 (civil termina­ tions 1970--2000), II8 (civil pending 2000» (ICPSR Study No. 8429, last updated Apr. 25, 2002) [hereinafter Federal Court Cases Database, 1970--2000], at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu:8080/ ICPSR-STUDY/08429·xml; Federal Judicial Center, Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, 2001 (pts. 2 (civil terminations), 3 (civil pending)) (ICPSR Study No. 3415, last updated June 19, 2002) [hereinafter Federal Court Cases Database, 2001], at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu:8080/ ICPSR-STUDY/03415.xml. The Federal Judicial Center also publishes periodic reports culled from this dataset. Except where otherwise noted, my figures are not from these written reports, but are instead based on my extensive analysis compiling and manipulating the raw data. This work is discussed in the Data Appendix to this Article, which appears at its end, but the basic idea is not complicated: I put all the different years of data together and eliminated duplicates. I cite my compiled dataset and all other supporting analysis as Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation Technical Appendix (2003) [hereinafter Schlanger, Technical Appendix], available at http://www. law.harvard.edu/faculty/schlanger/projects/index.php. This website posts the code I used to com­ pile the dataset, run the charts, and perform other analyses discussed in this Article. 4 The "civil docket" I refer to does not include habeas corpus petitions and other like actions by prisoners seeking collateral criminal review. If such filings were included, both the number of inmate filings and their proportion of the docket would be much higher. I omit them because I think they are properly conceptualized as part of the criminal, rather than civil, justice system. S More precisely, of trials in federal nonhabeas civil cases "terminated" in 1995, fifteen percent were in inmate civil rights cases. The figure remains consistent whether the set of trials includes only cases whose recorded judgments are trial verdicts, or any case ended by any procedural means during or after a trial.
Recommended publications
  • Rethinking the Boundaries of the Sixth Amendment Right to Choice of Counsel
    RETHINKING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO CHOICE OF COUNSEL I. INTRODUCTION Criminal defense is personal business. For this reason, the Consti- tution’s ample procedural protections for criminal defendants are writ- ten not just to provide a fair trial, but also to put the defendant in con- trol of his own defense. Courts and commentators alike have rec- ognized that the constitutional vision of liberty requires not only protection for the accused, but also the right of the accused to speak and act for himself.1 The Sixth Amendment also reflects the common understanding that the assistance of counsel can be crucial — even necessary — to effective defense,2 but its language and structure nev- ertheless make clear that the rights and their exercise belong to the de- fendant himself, not his lawyer.3 The right to the assistance of counsel has many facets, but its most ancient and fundamental element is the defendant’s right to counsel of his own choosing. Indeed, the Supreme Court has identified choice of counsel as “the root meaning of the constitutional guarantee.”4 Yet ac- tual choice-of-counsel doctrine gives the state broad authority to inter- fere with the exercise of this right. For example, a defendant may not choose an advocate whose representation creates a potential conflict of interest for the defendant, even if the defendant knowingly and intelli- gently waives any objection to the potential conflict,5 and a defendant has no right to be represented by an advocate who is not a current member of a state bar association.6 The remedy for a choice-of- ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 1 See, e.g., Faretta v.
    [Show full text]
  • The Socratic Method in the Age of Trauma
    THE SOCRATIC METHOD IN THE AGE OF TRAUMA Jeannie Suk Gersen When I was a young girl, the careers I dreamed of — as a prima ballerina or piano virtuoso — involved performing before an audience. But even in my childhood ambitions of life on stage, no desire of mine involved speaking. My Korean immigrant family prized reading and the arts, but not oral expression or verbal assertiveness — perhaps even less so for girls. Education was the highest familial value, but a posture of learning anything worthwhile seemed to go together with not speak- ing. My incipient tendency to raise questions and arguments was treated as disrespect or hubris, to be stamped out, sometimes through punish- ment. As a result, and surely also due to natural shyness, I had an almost mute relation to the world. It was 1L year at Harvard Law School that changed my default mode from “silent” to “speak.” Having always been a student who said nothing and preferred a library to a classroom, I was terrified and scandalized as professors called on classmates daily to engage in back-and-forth dia- logues of reasons and arguments in response to questions, on subjects of which we knew little and on which we had no business expounding. What happened as I repeatedly faced my unwelcome turn, heard my voice, and got through with many stumbles was a revelation that changed my life. A light switched on. Soon, I was even volunteering to engage in this dialogue, and I was thinking more intensely, independently, and enjoyably than I ever had before.
    [Show full text]
  • John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University Faculty Research Working Papers Series Is Satisfaction Success? Evaluati
    John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University Faculty Research Working Papers Series Is Satisfaction Success? Evaluating Public Participation in Regulatory Policymaking Cary Coglianese September 2002 RWP02-038 The views expressed in the KSG Faculty Research Working Paper Series are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the John F. Kennedy School of Government or Harvard University. All works posted here are owned and copyrighted by the author(s). Papers may be downloaded for personal use only. Is Satisfaction Success? Evaluating Public Participation in Regulatory Policymaking Cary Coglianese* Harvard University Dispute resolution seeks to find satisfactory solutions to conflicts, and researchers who evaluate dispute resolution procedures understandably want to consider whether disputants using these procedures are eventually satisfied with the resulting outcomes. A similar emphasis on satisfaction pervades the literature on techniques for resolving disputes and involving the public in regulatory policymaking. These techniques include the broad range of procedures and methods available to government for allowing input, feedback, and dialogue on regulatory policymaking, including comment solicitation, public hearings, workshops, dialogue groups, advisory committees, and negotiated rulemaking processes. Researchers evaluating these various techniques have often used participant satisfaction as a key evaluative criterion. While this criterion may seem suitable for evaluating private dispute resolution techniques, those who disagree in policy-making processes are not disputants in the same sense that landlords and tenants, creditors and debtors, or tortfeasors and victims are disputants in private life. Disputes in regulatory policymaking arise over public policy, not * Associate Professor of Public Policy and Chair of the Regulatory Policy Program, Harvard University, John F.
    [Show full text]
  • Recent Publications
    RECENT PUBLICATIONS THE TRIALS OF ACADEME: THE NEW ERA OF CAMPUS LITIGA- TION. By Amy Gajda. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 2009. Pp. x, 334. $35.00. In this well-written new book, Professor Amy Gajda delves into the explosion of university-related litigation and questions why judges have moved away from their previous wil- lingness to allow the academy to regulate itself. Gajda argues persua- sively that this litigiousness creates a strange academic environment in which “[c]ollege administrators may . wish to check with counsel before assigning teaching packages” (p. 104). Of particular note is the incredible range of subjects touched on by campus litigation — most of which receive their own chapters in this work — including lofty subjects such as free speech, tort law, and privacy, but also more ab- surd claims seeking the regrading of papers or promissory estoppel ac- tions to prevent expulsion. Gajda lays blame for this trend fairly even- ly at the feet of litigants, legislators, and courts, decrying the ultimate outcome: a “trajectory of court decisions [that] . encourages and channels ever more campus controversies into court” (p. 109). While ultimately a work of retrospection and not a prescription for the fu- ture, this book is a useful primer on the legal challenges facing higher education. THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES. By Roberta Rosenthal Kwall. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press. 2010. Pp. xviii, 247. $24.95. Ameri- can copyright law attempts to strike a balance between protecting au- thor’s rights and preserving the public domain. In an insightful new book, Professor Roberta Rosenthal Kwall offers a new perspective to this ongoing conversation.
    [Show full text]
  • Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?
    CORPORATE POLITICAL SPEECH: WHO DECIDES? Lucian A. Bebchuk∗ and Robert J. Jackson, Jr. ∗∗ For Professor Victor Brudney, who long ago anticipated the significance of corporate law rules for regulating corporate political speech. I. INTRODUCTION The Supreme Court spoke clearly this Term on the issue of cor- porate political speech, concluding in Citizens United v. FEC1 that the First Amendment protects corporations’ freedom to spend corpo- rate funds on indirect support of political candidates.2 Constitutional law scholars will long debate the wisdom of that holding, as do the au- thors of the two other Comments in this issue.3 In contrast, this Comment accepts as given that corporations may not be limited from spending money on politics should they decide to speak. We focus in- stead on an important question left unanswered by Citizens United: who should have the power to decide whether a corporation will engage in political speech? Under existing law, a corporation’s decision to engage in political speech is governed by the same rules as ordinary business decisions, which give directors and executives virtually plenary authority. In this Comment, we argue that such rules are inappropriate for corporate po- ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– ∗ William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics, and Finance and Director of the Corporate Governance Program, Harvard Law School. ∗∗ Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Although Professor Jackson recently served as an advisor to senior officials at the Depart- ment of the Treasury on matters related to corporate governance and Professor Bebchuk recently served as an advisor to the Department of the Treasury’s Office of the Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation, their work on this Comment commenced after their government affili- ations ended, and the views expressed in this Comment are solely their own.
    [Show full text]
  • LAURA ANN ROSENBURY Washington University School of Law Campus Box 1120 One Brookings Drive St
    LAURA ANN ROSENBURY Washington University School of Law Campus Box 1120 One Brookings Drive St. Louis, MO 63130 718-909-0173 (cell) [email protected] EMPLOYMENT Washington University Law School, St. Louis, MO (2002-present) Professor of Law (tenure effective July 1, 2008) John S. Lehmann Research Professor (2013-2014) Affiliated Faculty, Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies Program (2007-present) Administrative Appointments Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development (2010-2012) Association of American Law Schools Membership Review Committee (2014-present) Courses Children and Law, Employment Discrimination, Family Law, Feminist Legal Theory, Property, Public Law Theory Seminar, Trusts and Estates Awards David M. Becker Professor of the Year Award, 2006 Best Paper in Family Law, Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty Forum, 2006 Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA (2012-2013) Sullivan and Cromwell Visiting Professor of Law Taught Children and Law, Feminist Legal Theory, Property. University of Illinois College of Law, Champaign, IL (spring 2010) Visiting Professor of Law Taught a short course on the Regulation of Intimacy. University of California, Los Angeles School of Law, Los Angeles, CA (winter 2010) Visiting Professor of Law Taught a short course on Relationships at Work. University of Chicago Law School, Chicago, IL (winter and spring 2009) Visiting Professor of Law Taught Family Law and Employment Discrimination. Stanford Law School, Palo Alto, CA (fall 2008) Visiting Professor of Law Taught Children and Law and Feminist Legal Theory. Laura A. Rosenbury curriculum vitae / page 2 Fordham University School of Law, New York, NY (2001-2002) Adjunct Associate Professor of Law Taught Feminist Legal Theory as an evening seminar.
    [Show full text]
  • Nicholas Stephanopoulos
    NICHOLAS O. STEPHANOPOULOS Professor of Law, Harvard Law School Areeda Hall 230, 1545 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02138 (781) 248-8145 | [email protected] EMPLOYMENT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, Cambridge, MA Professor of Law, 2020-Present Austin Wakeman Scott Visiting Professor of Law, Fall 2018 Research interests include election law, constitutional law, legislation, administrative law, and comparative law. Classes taught include Election Law; Constitutional Law; The Future of Voting Rights; and Law & Politics Workshop. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL, Chicago, IL Professor of Law and Herbert and Marjorie Fried Research Scholar, 2017-2019 Assistant Professor of Law, 2012-2017 Classes taught included Election Law; Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; The Future of Voting Rights; Canonical Ideas; The Comparative Law of Democracy; and Public Opinion, Public Policy, and the Law. Helped organize Public Law & Legal Theory Workshop. Committee memberships included Appointments and Clinical and Experiential Learning. COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, New York, NY Associate-in-Law, 2010-2012 Taught Legal Practice Workshop to first-year law students. Coordinated weekly Associates’ and Fellows’ Workshop. Contributed to DrawCongress.org redistricting project. JENNER & BLOCK LLP, Washington, DC Associate, 2007-2010 Practice focused on complex federal litigation, appellate advocacy, and election law. Drafted sections of ten Supreme Court briefs, on subjects including Voting Rights Act, Establishment Clause, and criminal procedure. Election law work included redistricting and campaign finance matters. OBAMA FOR AMERICA, Washington, DC Volunteer Attorney, 2007-2008 Carried out legal work for Obama presidential campaign. Served in Election Day legal “war room.” HON. RAYMOND C. FISHER, NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, Pasadena, CA Law Clerk, 2006-2007 Wrote bench memoranda addressing all aspects of federal appellate cases.
    [Show full text]
  • Provocation Frank’S Way
    PROVOCATION FRANK’S WAY Robert Post∗ I know that Dean Martha Minow would like me to begin with a provocation, but I can’t help beginning instead with an acknowledg- ment. Throughout my career as a legal academic, I have always had two guiding lights, two pole stars whose integrity and depth I have trusted to steer me in the right direction. One is Owen Fiss, and the other is Frank Michelman. No one would ever confuse these two scholars. Owen’s style is di- visive and pugnacious. His MO is to enter a controversy, the way that Clint Eastwood might enter a saloon, clarify the dispute, and adopt a position. Whether you agree or disagree, you are guaranteed to come away with a better sense of the stakes in question. Frank’s style, by contrast, is anything but swaggering. Frank is empathetic, polite, generous (almost to a fault), indirect, and tentative. His archetypical article worries a question. And when I say worries, I mean the way that a terrier might worry a rat — by turning it over every which way, by attacking it from every possible angle, and by tasting its every implication. In the end Frank may (or as likely may not) reach some provisional conclusions. But in the process the reader will certainly have reaped rich rewards, for he will have experienced how a deep scholarly mind, exercising perfect scholarly integrity, illu- minates depths hitherto unseen and unimagined. He will have been inspired by the gift of insight. Frank’s writings offer wisdom in the service of a passionate fidelity to the intractable complexity of legal issues.
    [Show full text]
  • Kenneth W. Mack
    KENNETH W. MACK Harvard Law School 522 Hauser Hall 1545 Massachusetts Ave. Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-5473 [email protected] EMPLOYMENT 2013- Lawrence D. Biele Professor of Law, Harvard University 2015- Affiliate Professor of History, Harvard University 2006-13 Professor of Law, Harvard University 2000-06 Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard University 2015- Affiliate, Committee on Higher Degrees in American Studies, Harvard University 2015-19 Visiting Professor of Law, Stanford University 2014 Frank Boas Visiting Professor of Law, University of Hawai’i 2013 Senior Visiting Scholar, Joint Centre for History and Economics, Magdalene College and King’s College, Cambridge University 2010-11 Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University 1992-1994 Associate, Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C. 1991-1992 Law Clerk, Hon. Robert L. Carter, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 1987-1988 Member of Technical Staff, AT&T Bell Laboratories, Whippany, N.J. EDUCATION Princeton University, M.A., 1996, Ph.D., 2005, History Harvard Law School, Juris Doctor, cum laude, 1991 Drexel University, B.S., Electrical Engineering, high honors (magna cum laude), 1987 Harrisburg University of Science and Technology, D. Pub. Serv. (honorary), 2010 PUBLICATIONS Books: Representing the Race: The Creation of the Civil Rights Lawyer (Harvard University Press, 2012) Washington Post Best Book of the Year Honorable Mention, J. Willard Hurst Prize, Law and Society Association National Book Festival Selection Finalist, Julia Ward Howe Award, Boston Author’s Club Kenneth W. Mack - Page 2 (Books, cont’d) The New Black: What Has Changed – And What Has Not – With Race in America (New Press, 2013) (co-editor, with Guy-Uriel E.
    [Show full text]
  • The Statistics
    THE STATISTICS a TABLE I (A) ACTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES Opinions Writtenb Dissenting Votesc In Disposition by Opinions Concur- Memo- of Courtd rencese Dissentse Total Opinion randumf Total Roberts 6 1 4 11 5 0 5 Kennedy 6 5 2 13 6 0 6 Thomas 7 15 9 31 14 1 15 Ginsburg 6 3 6 15 18 0 18 Breyer 7 3 9 19 20 0 20 Alito 7 2 6 15 15 1 16 Sotomayor 7 7 9 23 21 2 23 Kagan 6 2 1 9 16 0 16 Gorsuch 7 4 6 17 11 0 11 Per Curiam 12 — — 12 — — — Total 71 42 52 165 126 4 130 a A complete explanation of how the tables are compiled may be found in The Supreme Court, 2004 Term — The Statistics, 119 HARV. L. REV. 415, 415–19 (2005). Table I, with the exception of the dissenting-votes portion of section (A) and the memorandum tabulations in section (C), includes only full-opinion decisions. Twelve per curiam decisions contained legal reasoning substantial enough to be considered full-opinion decisions in October Term 2017. See Sause v. Bauer, 138 S. Ct. 2561 (2018); Sexton v. Beaudreaux, 138 S. Ct. 2555 (2018); North Carolina v. Covington, 138 S. Ct. 2548 (2018); Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018); Azar v. Garza, 138 S. Ct. 1790 (2018); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018); Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018); CNH Industrial N.V. v. Reese, 138 S. Ct. 761 (2018); Tharpe v. Sellers, 138 S.
    [Show full text]
  • On the Ethics of Exporting Ethics: the Right to Silence in Japan and the US
    John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University Faculty Research Working Papers Series On the Ethics of Exporting Ethics: The Right to Silence in Japan and the U.S. Kenneth Winston June 2003 RWP03-027 The views expressed in the KSG Faculty Research Working Paper Series are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the John F. Kennedy School of Government or Harvard University. All works posted here are owned and copyrighted by the author(s). Papers may be downloaded for personal use only. ON THE ETHICS OF EXPORTING ETHICS: The Right to Silence in Japan and the U.S. Kenneth Winston Kennedy School of Government In The Question of Hu, Jonathan Spence tells the story of a French missionary in China in the eighteenth century, who set out to prove that certain ancient Chinese documents confirmed his idiosyncratic Christian theory of world history.1 It is the story of a foreigner’s shabby and insensitive treatment of the Chinese people encountered in his spiritual quest, and equally of a European unable to reflect on the limitations of his own intellectual cocoon. The missionary failed to exercise two types of reflection—what I shall refer to as double reflection. He failed to discern what something could mean to the Chinese, especially when at variance with his own understanding, and he was unable to contemplate the contestability of his own worldview. These are difficult abilities to cultivate, and most of us fail to some degree. Yet they are indispensable in a world of increasing communication and interdependence across cultures.
    [Show full text]
  • 400 When Hemi Is Understood in This Light, Justice
    400 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:179 When Hemi is understood in this light, Justice Ginsburg’s concur- rence emerges as the most laudable of the three opinions issued by the Court. Refusing to engage in the exercise of defining proximate causa- tion, Justice Ginsburg expressly stated her reasons for dismissing the City’s claim: she was reluctant to allow the City — an entity that, as a first matter, could not constitutionally impose a tax on out-of-state sel- lers like Hemi — to recover damages for a violation of an Act in which Congress declined to include a private right of action.75 In so doing, she provided a measure of transparency. One might argue, of course, that allowing the judiciary to make policy judgments in lieu of strict legal analysis undermines the rule of law and has antidemocratic im- plications.76 But while the Court might attempt to define proximate causation and the state-city relationship in a way that provides less in- terpretive flexibility, such definitions have proven elusive for genera- tions of jurists. Some legal questions may always be indeterminate. In such cases, courts can and should rely on policy considerations. When they do so, however, they need not mask their thought process, but should, as Justice Ginsburg did in Hemi, lay bare their reasons for holding as they do.77 Such transparency increases the legitimacy of judicial decisions made in areas “not amenable to bright-line rules.”78 G. Sherman Act Quick Look Rule of Reason. — Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act famously makes illegal any “contract, combination .
    [Show full text]