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operations or “search-and-destroy,” or While Villard focuses on American that American forces overlooked the combat operations in a narrow timespan, need to build up the South Vietnamese these larger themes come through in a military and do so in a sustainable compelling way. In earlier military his- way. The overall effect is to restore tories, the North Vietnamese and Viet clarity and urgency to the Army’s Cong come across as a faceless, shadowy, efforts in Vietnam in that fateful year, alien, and unthinking force, like the mon- as MACV’s leaders fought against the soon rains. In Villard’s narrative they are clock to shield and secure the popula- a proper enemy with goals, strategy, plan- tion and build up the Republic of ning, command and control, logistics, Vietnam and its armed forces against a and every kind of operational constraint. thinking and reacting enemy with bur- And, like any enemy, they attempt to geoning plans of its own. adapt to American efforts, sometimes Villard’s approach fits within what successfully and sometimes unsuccessfully. might be called the New Revisionism in Detailed, careful analysis allows Villard Vietnam War military history, standing to usually present American, North alongside Greg Daddis’s Westmoreland’s Vietnamese, and South Vietnamese War (Oxford University Press, 2014), operations in ways that make them Lien-Hang T. Nguyen’s Hanoi’s War meaningful. Not only big events like the (University of North Carolina Press, Tet Offensive or the Battle of Khe Sanh, 2012), and Martin Clemis’s The Control but minor engagements like the battle War (University of Oklahoma Press, for the Special Forces camp at Kham Staying the Course: October 2018). Contra the orthodox historians of Duc or small-unit counterinsurgency in 1967 to September 1968 the Vietnam War, the New Revisionists II Corps in Summer 1968 seem like part By Erik B. Villard disclaim broad-brush characterizations of an actual campaign, where a tacti- U.S. Army Center of Military History, of American or South Vietnamese in- cal outcome plays a part in both sides’ 2017 competence, hubris, or connivance at strategies. While the level of detail can 773 pp. $35.00* every level. With careful evidence and be numbing, the payoff is an approxima- ISBN: 978-0160942792 access to new sources, they reconstruct tion of what Carl von Clausewitz labeled American strategy-making, operations, ortsinn—the sense of locality that enables Reviewed by Jon Askonas and tactics and put them in political and a commander to read the battlefield and international context. American leaders make sense of the enemy’s activities in the were generally sober, focused, informed, context of physical and human terrain. rik Villard’s new volume casts savvy, and sincere; in the field, American Villard helps us understand how William clarifying light on stubbornly units were usually disciplined, fero- Westmoreland and his chief subordi- held myths about the conduct and E cious, adaptive, and worked well with nates—men like Creighton Abrams, Fred strategy of America’s intervention in the Vietnamese. These historians view Weyand, William Rosson, Julian Ewell, Vietnam. Even more than the preced- the Vietnam War as a deeply complex and John Tolson—saw the war. ing volumes in the Combat Operations event, one that resists any kind of “meta- And their visions, generally, come series, Staying the Course incorporates solution” or silver bullet explanation of across as clear, nuanced, and contextual- the latest historiography, including victory or defeat. But while they have ized. MACV’s goals are unified across the extensive North Vietnamese sources built on some of the earlier revisionists’ country: maintain and expand popula- and newly released Military Assistance rehabilitation of U.S. military efforts tion security, in part by deterring North Command–Vietnam (MACV) docu- in Vietnam, the New Revisionists have Vietnamese conventional forces; support ments. By carefully linking American little sympathy for any simplistic notions development and pacification through strategic thinking to MACV 1968 that America “snatched defeat from the civic action; and train up the Republic of campaign goals and actual opera- jaws of victory” or that the Nation was Vietnam Military Forces. But how that tions, Villard, a historian at the U.S. betrayed by fickle politicians, military mission is carried out, and what matters Army Center of Military History, uses incompetence, a back-stabbing media, most, is a matter of physical and social careful analysis to dispel a variety of or the antiwar movement. By focusing geography. Up north in I Corps Tactical myths: that MACV was over-focused on the agency of the North and South Zone (CTZ), III Marine Amphibious on attrition, that the American mission Vietnamese in determining their fates, the Force and some Army elements sup- lacked a focus on counterinsurgency New Revisionists highlight the limitations ported the Army of the Republic of or population security, that the Army of American military power, even when Vietnam in defending major cities along was overcommitted to “conventional” applied with wisdom and insight. the coast, while trying to maximally JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Book Reviews 95 disrupt the flow of North Vietnamese strategy, politics, or other aspects of the men and materiel southward along the war. The result is necessarily a truncated New Ho Chi Minh Trail, vitally important to view of American engagement with the MACV’s strategy in the rest of the coun- Vietnam War. Nevertheless, Villard has from NDU Press try. In sparsely populated II CTZ, First set out not to write a general history for the Center for the Study of Field Force placed a heavy emphasis on but to fill the gap of operational-level Chinese Military Affairs security, presence, and development oper- military history in Vietnam, and he fulfills Strategic Forum 299 ations in the hamlets surrounding Dak To his mission. China’s Future SSBN Command and (60 percent of the provincial population), While Villard’s narrative ends well Control Structure but saw taking the fight to the enemy in before the war concludes, one can discern by David C. Logan its highland strongholds as a means of in the shadows of 1968 what is to come. China is de- avoiding additional civilian casualties. In The North Vietnamese are far more veloping its III CTZ, Second Field Force shielded resolute, patient, and adaptable than the first credible the approaches to Saigon and used air initial American strategy had given them sea-based mobility to disrupt main force units, credit for; even when faced with stag- nuclear forces. while applying maximum support to both gering losses, they maintain the strategic This emer- American and South Vietnamese coun- initiative. The Republic of Vietnam, gent nuclear terinsurgency efforts in the provinces though growing steadily, faced substantial ballistic mis- ringing Saigon. In the populated delta handicaps, building up its military and sile submarine of IV CTZ where the enemy was mostly counterinsurgency infrastructure essen- (SSBN) force will pose unique chal- Viet Cong living among the people, 9th tially from nothing. Moreover, the enemy lenges to a country that has favored Infantry Division commander Julian had the strategic initiative and could tightly centralized control over Ewell placed a heavy emphasis on opera- disrupt pacification progress whenever it its nuclear deterrent. The choices tions with and the training of local South wanted, using conventional offensives, China makes about SSBN command Vietnamese forces. In any case, whatever terrorism, rocket attacks, and other and control will have important plans MACV had for steady progress in means to seize territory, assassinate ef- implications for strategic stability. 1968 were thrown into disarray by the fective local officials, recruit new troops, China’s decisions about SSBN com- Tet Offensive. Although Tet created as and generate destabilizing refugees. mand and control will be mediated many opportunities as constraints—and Moreover, little could be done to avert by operational, bureaucratic, and ended up being a real operational victory the social and economic destabilization political considerations. A hybrid for MACV—it also created new demands caused by the mere presence of nearly approach to command and control, on MACV’s limited resources and pushed 700,000 foreign soldiers. And while with authority divided between the the American public toward withdrawal. many Americans came to believe that navy and the Rocket Force, would In a book as long as Staying the they could not “win” the war after Tet, be most conducive to supporting Course, having a clear structure makes all even more began to question whether strategic stability. the difference. Villard tracks corps- and they could trust their leaders to tell them division-level activites in each of the the truth about it, and whether it was four CTZs from October 1967 through worth the substantial cost. JFQ September 1968. The book is roughly divided into three sections: before Tet, the Tet Offensive, and the aftermath. Dr. Jon Askonas is an Associate Professor at Catholic University. The before and after Tet sections are short scene-setting chapters overviewing * This book is available for free download in important political and strategic dynam- PDF format at <https://history.army.mil/html/ books/091/91-15-1/index.html>. It is also ics (both in America and Vietnam), and available for purchase in hardcopy from the within each section is roughly a chapter Government Publishing Office online bookstore on each CTZ. The clear but dense text at <https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/combat- operations-staying-course-september-1967- is accompanied by scores of photos and october-1968>. over 50 maps that help to breathe a little life into page after page of operational detail and after-action anecdote. Villard sticks to his ambit, perhaps to a fault.