Paramount Communications V. Qvc Network
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Caution As of: December 12, 2017 3:26 PM Z Paramount Communications v. Qvc Network Supreme Court of Delaware December 9, 1993, Submitted ; February 4, 1994, Decided Nos. 427, 1993 and 428, 1993 (Consolidated) C.A. No. 13117 (Consolidated) Reporter 637 A.2d 34 *; 1994 Del. LEXIS 57 **; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P98,063 shareholders, misconduct, measures, PARAMOUNT COMMUNICATIONS INC., VIACOM INC., MARTIN S. DAVIS, GRACE J. implicated, defensive, bidders, invalid, FIPPINGER, IRVING R. FISCHER, decisions BENJAMIN L. HOOKS, FRANZ J. LUTOLF, Case Summary JAMES A. PATTISON, IRWIN SCHLOSS, SAMUEL J. SILBERMAN, LAWRENCE M. SMALL, and GEORGE WEISSMAN, Procedural Posture Defendants Below, Appellants, v. QVC Defendants, a target corporation, an acquirer NETWORK INC., Plaintiff Below, Appellee. IN corporation, and the target's board, appealed RE PARAMOUNT COMMUNICATIONS INC. the issuance of a preliminary injunction by the SHAREHOLDERS' LITIGATION Court of Chancery in and for New Castle County (Delaware), in consolidated actions by Subsequent History: [**1] Released for plaintiffs, stockholders of the target and an Publication March 11, 1994. Mandate offeror, to enjoin a proposed sale of control December 9, 1993. transaction between defendants. Prior History: Court Below: Court of Chancery Overview of the State of Delaware in and for New Castle Defendant corporations entered into County. C.A. No. 13208. Decided by Order: negotiations for the acquirer to purchase December 9, 1993. controlling stock in the target. Plaintiff offeror then made an unsolicited tender offer that Original Opinion of December 9, 1993, eventually exceeded the acquirer's final offer by Reported at: 1993 Del. LEXIS 440. over $ 1 billion. Due to a "no-shop" defensive Disposition: AFFIRMED. provision in the agreement between defendants, however, the target's board Core Terms declined to enter into negotiations with the offeror. The offeror sought and received a deposition, vice, stock, tender offer, preliminary injunction to prevent use of the "no- circumstances, merger, stock option, merger shop" and other defensive provisions, including agreement, reasonably available, negotiate, a termination fee and a stock option agreement bid, hac, fiduciary duty, enhanced, No-Shop, greatly favoring the acquirer. The injunction was proceedings, break-up, Rights, shares, affirmed. First, the court applied enhanced provisions, questions, termination fee, scrutiny to the sale of control transaction, Page 2 of 33 Paramount Communications v. Qvc Network rejecting defendants' contention that a "break- Business & Corporate up" of the corporation to be sold was required Law > ... > Management Duties & before such scrutiny applied. Second, the Liabilities > Fiduciary Duties > Business target's directors breached their fiduciary duty Judgment Rule by failing to adequately consider which tender offer was best for the stockholder; the defensive Business & Corporate Law > ... > Directors provisions could not alter this duty. & Officers > Management Duties & Liabilities > General Overview Outcome Issuance of injunction affirmed and case Business & Corporate remanded; enhanced judicial scrutiny of sale of Law > ... > Management Duties & control transaction between defendants Liabilities > Defenses > General Overview applied, regardless of whether corporation to be Business & Corporate Law > ... > Directors sold would be "broken up," and target's directors' fiduciary duty to maximize & Officers > Scope of Authority > General shareholder value in sale could not be altered Overview by defensive provisions in sale agreement. Business & Corporate Law > ... > Directors & Officers > Terms in Office > General LexisNexis® Headnotes Overview Business & Corporate Law > ... > Meetings & Voting > Annual Meetings > Director Elections & Removals Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > De Novo Review HN2[ ] Fiduciary Duties, Business Judgment Rule Civil Procedure > Remedies > Injunctions > Preli The management of the business and affairs of minary & Temporary Injunctions a Delaware corporation is entrusted to its directors, who are the duly elected and Civil Procedure > ... > Standards of authorized representatives of the stockholders. Review > Substantial Evidence > General Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a). Under normal Overview circumstances, neither the courts nor the stockholders should interfere with the HN1[ ] Standards of Review, De Novo managerial decisions of the directors. The Review business judgment rule embodies the deference to which such decisions are entitled. An appellate court's standard and scope of review as to facts on appeal from a preliminary injunction is whether, after independently Business & Corporate Law > ... > Directors reviewing the entire record, it can conclude that & Officers > Management Duties & the findings of the trial court are sufficiently Liabilities > General Overview supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process. Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Duties & Liabilities of Directors & Officers Page 3 of 33 Paramount Communications v. Qvc Network HN3[ ] Directors & Officers, Management Incorporation & Bylaws Duties & Liabilities Under the statutory framework of the Delaware There are rare situations which mandate that a General Corporation Law, many of the most court take a more direct and active role in fundamental corporate changes can be overseeing the decisions made and actions implemented only if they are approved by a taken by corporate directors. In these majority vote of the stockholders. Such actions situations, a court subjects the directors' include elections of directors, amendments to conduct to enhanced scrutiny to ensure that it is the certificate of incorporation, mergers, reasonable. Two such circumstances where consolidations, sales of all or substantially all of enhanced scrutiny will apply are: (1) the the assets of the corporation, and dissolution. approval of a transaction resulting in a sale of Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 211, 242, 251-258, control, and (2) the adoption of defensive 263, 271, 275. Because of the overriding measures in response to a threat to corporate importance of voting rights, Delaware courts control. have consistently acted to protect stockholders from unwarranted interference with such rights. Business & Corporate Law > Corporations > Articles of Business & Corporate Incorporation & Bylaws > General Law > ... > Management Duties & Overview Liabilities > Causes of Action > General Overview Governments > State & Territorial Governments > Elections Governments > Fiduciaries Mergers & Acquisitions Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Takeovers & Law > Mergers > Duties & Liabilities of Tender Offers > General Overview Shareholders Business & Corporate Law > ... > Directors Business & Corporate & Officers > Management Duties & Law > Corporations > Corporate Liabilities > General Overview Governance > General Overview Mergers & Acquisitions Business & Corporate Law > Mergers > Duties & Liabilities of Law > ... > Shareholders > Meetings & Directors & Officers Voting > General Overview HN5[ ] Management Duties & Liabilities, Civil Rights Law > Protection of Causes of Action Rights > Voting Rights > Vote Dilution The consequences of a sale of control impose Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Takeovers & special obligations on the directors of a Tender Offers corporation. In particular, they have the obligation of acting reasonably to seek the Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Takeovers & transaction offering the best value reasonably Tender Offers > General Overview available to the stockholders. The courts will apply enhanced scrutiny to ensure that the HN4[ ] Corporations, Articles of directors have acted reasonably. Page 4 of 33 Paramount Communications v. Qvc Network Business & Corporate Law > ... > Directors & Officers > Management Duties & Business & Corporate Liabilities > General Overview Law > ... > Management Duties & Liabilities > Fiduciary Duties > Duty of Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Takeovers & Loyalty Tender Offers > General Overview Governments > Fiduciaries HN7[ ] Governments, Fiduciaries Business & Corporate Law > ... > Directors In the sale of control context, the directors must & Officers > Management Duties & focus on one primary objective--to secure the Liabilities > General Overview transaction offering the best value reasonably available for the stockholders--and they must Business & Corporate exercise their fiduciary duties to further that Law > ... > Management Duties & end. Liabilities > Causes of Action > General Overview Business & Corporate Business & Corporate Law > ... > Directors Law > ... > Management Duties & & Officers > Management Duties & Liabilities > Fiduciary Duties > General Liabilities > General Overview Overview Mergers & Acquisitions Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Duties & Liabilities of Law > Mergers > Duties & Liabilities of Directors & Officers Directors & Officers Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Takeovers & Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Takeovers & Tender Offers > General Overview Tender Offers > General Overview HN8[ ] Directors & Officers, Management Duties & Liabilities HN6[ ] Fiduciary Duties, Duty of Loyalty The board of directors has the ultimate In pursuing the objective of securing the responsibility for managing the business and transaction offering the best value reasonably affairs of a corporation. In discharging this available for the stockholders in the sale of function, the directors owe fiduciary duties of control context, the directors