t8 THEMITRAILLEUSE IN THE FRANCO.PRUSSIANWAR By SteveShonn G.J. KennerleyhFranco-Prussian War aniclein issueno. 75 peculiar characteristicswoutd enable the effects of massed bemoansthe lack of detailed inJormation on this crucial 19th musketryor canisterfire to be a€hievedal rangesbeyond which Century campargn.Being a keen studentof this period myseff,I eitherhad been hitherto Dossible. know what he means,although the situation maynot be quite so desperateas he may imagine. Those with an inter€st in this period are, ashe rctes, admirably sened by Michael Howard's TECHITICALSPECIFICATION super history of the war; a combination of scholarship and Tlrc rveaponconsisted of a bank of 25 steel barels (mounted readabilitywhich I have never seen bettered.Until quite 5x5), of 13mmcalibre, enclosed in a bronzeenvelope and recently,this and a coupleof bookson thesiege of Pais (which mountedon a slightlymodified 4 poundercar age.The piece were more socio-political than military studies)have been the weigheda totalof350 kilograms.It wascharged by insedng a only easilyavailable sources. Things arenow a gooddeal better. block of 25 Dreloaded rounds. which were then fired GreenhillBooks have recently re-issued von Moltke'saccount consecutivelyin a bulst by rotating a handle. The maximum of the war, and althoughit mustrank ascomplete an exampleof sustainablerate of fire was five such bursts a minute. Muzzle selectiveamnesia as one might expectto find outsidethe pages velocitywas 475 metres per second (compared to 403m.p.s. for of Hansard,it is at leasteye\ritness material. Holmes's Ifte the Chassepot,whi€h was itself regardedas having an Road To Se&ln afld Adiance's Last Gaiter Button ^re both impressivelyflat trajectory).Each gun wasallotted a front-line excellent,whilst Ascoli\ Day O/Batle is alsoa finebook. The supplyof4l8blocks,ofwhich 81were carried on the limber, the organisationand uniforms of the French Army are coveredin rcmainderb.ing in the ammunitionwaggons. two volumes of the Osprey Men at Arms series, whilst Regulationfire tablesissued to artilleryoffrcers claimed that Gravelotte-StPrivat is the subjectof one of the Carnpaign the weaponwas efJectiveagainst skirmishers at anlthing up to Sedes.The battlesof wissembourgand Froeschwilerhave 1,000rnetres,whilst close orderlines could be engag€dat up to beencovered by Anschluss,who also do a wargamer'sguide to twice this distance.The maximumrange at which columnscould thewar. Evenso, Mr Kennerley'spoint is fair enough.There is be usefullyfired uponwas 2,400 metres, whilst enemy artillery still a real lackof the kind of detailedinformation which is of worthwhile target at an'thing up to 2,500 'interest was regarded as a to thewargamer. [n thisbrief article I hopeto beable to metres.The latterpresumably includes not only the gunsand go sorne way towards satistyinghis curiosity about the crewsin the front line, but alsothe ammuflitionand waggon Mitrailleuse. lines to the rear, who might be expectedto re€eiveany As with a numberof subjectsrelating to the war of 1870, "over-shoots",although this would obviouslydepend on the certain views regarding the Mitrailleuse have come to be pmctice was "Secret terlain. In this advice seen to be some*hat accepted as given truths. Summed up, the Frcnch bptimistic,with a maximumrange ofnearer 1,800 metres being Weapon"was a dismalfailure which was tactically misused by morerealistic. incomDetentofficels. To befair. thereis some truth inthis.lt is ln actiona numberofproblems presented themselves which extraordinary,but apparentlytrue, that Marshal Bazaine, further reducedthe weapon'seffectiveness. One of the most Commander-in-Chiefof the armyat Metzand one of France's important wasthe difficulty experien€edin obsen'ingthe fall of mostdistinguished soldiers, claimed never to haveset eyes on shot.In thesmoke of baltleit wasoften hard enough for gunners onebefore the campaignbegan! to obsevethe precisebursting of a she[. The lall of a burst of what were. in effect. rifle rounds was of couEe much more difficult.The Mitmilleusealso had no realtraversing ability. It DEVELOPMENTOF TI{E MITRAILLEUSE thereforehad a very narrowcone of fire. Thus,whilst it was On 7 May 1864,General Leboeuf, president of the Artillery decidedlydeadly within that cone(a numberofGennanswere vetting notedto havebeen hit severaltimes, one asmany as seven) it Committee, which had tbe responsibility for new "sweep" weapons,wrote a preliminaryrepon to the Emperorentitled could not effectively a targetas later machine-guns "Note su Ie Canon a Baller". ln Septemberof the following wereable to do. The firing mechanismwas also quite delicate year, the Ministry of War authorisedits production. Prior to this and liabte to malJunction.This waspanicdarty true of the firing all the researchcarried out in the Meudon workshopsby the pins, which tended to break. (The Prussiansexperi€nced the talented Verchere de Reffye (after whom the weapon was sane Droblemwith the Needle-Gun.)The Bavariansused a eventuallynamed), had been privately financed, mu€h ofit by Mitraiileuse captured at Frceschwiller, which was soon ren- the Emperor pe$onally. In July 1866,the adoptionof the dered virtually useless,with only four barels working. At weaponwas finaly confirmed.Between 1866 and 1869,215 Coulmiers they had a complete four gun battery which had wereproduced Gone sourcessay 190), in conditionsof great similardifficulti€s. secrecy.The gunswere stored at Meudon, Mont Valerien and Training with the weapon was hamperedby excessive thefortsat IssyandMoDtrouge.Theoriginalintention hadbeen secrecy.The initial trials were carried out in front of a selected to issueone to eachinfantry battalion,at a time when the few, who wereobliged to signa declarationpromising not to French inJanfy was still equipped with rifled muzzleloaders. disclosewhat they had seen. The gunitself was hidden in a tent The devastationwrought by the PrussianNeedle-Gun on the in order to avoidprying eyes. Other nalionswerc, of cou$e, Austrians, who were also still carrying muzzle-loaderswas no awaleof theexistence of machine'guns,which had been used to doubt an important factor. The infoduction of the Chassepot a limited extentin the AmericanCivil War. The Prussians, that sameyear obviatedthe needfor this enhancementof a whilst acknowledging their usefulness in fixed defences' battalion\firepower and the decisionwas taken to employahe renainedunimpressed conceming their use in the field,feeling Mitrailleuseas a battery weapon.It was envisagedthat its that a battervof fieldeunswouldbe more effective overall. At unit level training was made more difficult by rcstricting detailedfamiliarity with the weapon,one source claiming that only eightmen per batteryhad anyreal knowledgeof it. This wasexacerbated by the factthat Mitrailleuse batteries, as such, didnot existin pea€e-time.Instead theywereputtogetherwhen operationsbegan. Officers assigned to commandthese bat.edes didnot themselvesreceiveany rraining in itsuse until1869. Bya pieceof extraordinaryincompetence ai the Ministryof war, manyofthese officeNwere then postedtonormalfield batteries whenthe war brokeout. Not surprisinglysome of thosewho replacedthem were unfamiliar with the gunand its capabilities andlimitations. In actionthis lack ofexperience made effective tacticaluse of theweapon difficult. This was made worse by the anomalyofbrigading a Mitrailleusebattery with two batt€ries offield guns,as the standarddivisional a ileryalotment. The rangesat whicha 4 pounderwas expected to engagethe enemy, were often considerablygreater than rhose at which the Mitrailleusewas effective. All too often thesebatteries took their placein the main gun-line,where they were unableto contributemu€h in a counter-batteryduel, but themselvestook lossesfrom thefar-ranging and mor€ accurate German pieces. Despitethis theMitrailleuse was a popularweapon. This was particularlytrue afterthe fall of the Enpire, whensome 2,000 piecesofvarious types were built, soneofwhich were p vately made.A numberof other machine-gunswere alsoimported ftom abroad,including the AmericanGatling. Such weapons wereparticularly popular with the variousJ?dncr't/eulbatter- ies.The Imperialarmies had only 24 batteriesavailabl€ at the startofthe war,most infantry divisions having one. There was also a Mitrailleuse-armedhorse battery attached to the 2nd Resere Cavalry Division. I1 is interestingto note that a tr^r'h*ft*,"*b..**-*"*,".-,** *L€ Comnissionof Enquiry held after the war by the Artillery Comniitee produced a repo that was almost entirely favoumble.The Germansalso developed a healthyrespect for theweapon, but weregenemlly able to avoidits*orsteffects by suppressingit with their own artillery. TIIE MITRAILLEUSE IN ACTION At the Battleof Spicheren,Laveaucoupet's divisional battery founditself engaged by the four batteriesofthe Prussian14th CHELIFERBOOKS Division.At 1,800metresitforced one ofthemiocease fire, but Mike Smith wasthen counter'bombardedby the other three.The battery Todd Close,Curthwaite, Wigton, Cumbria commanderthen limberedup andwithdrew some 400 metres Tel:0228 711388 before unlimbering and firing on some Prussian infantry. MILITARY BOOKS Comingunder fire againfrom the Prussianguns, the battery Boueht and Sold send sae for cata againlinbered upand advanced l00metresin order to confuse the enemyrangeJinding, before opening fire oncemore. The battery accountof the engagementnotes that they were of the exposedHessian gun-line. The left-handbattery was disadvantagedby the greengrass which covered that part of the decimatedwithin