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Consequences, Norms, and Inaction: a Critical Analysis

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Consequences, Norms, and Inaction: a Critical Analysis Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 15, No. 3, May 2020, pp. 421–442 Consequences, norms, and inaction: A critical analysis Jonathan Baron∗ Geoffrey P. Goodwin† Abstract Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf and Hütter (2017, GACFH) presented a model of choices in utilitarian moral dilemmas, those in which following a moral principle or norm (the deontological response) leads to worse consequences than violating the principle (the utilitarian response). In standard utilitarian dilemmas, the utilitarian option involves action (which causes some harm in order to prevent greater harm), and the deontological response, omission. GACFH propose that responses in such dilemmas arise in three different ways: a psychological process leading to a deontological choice, a different process leading to a utilitarian choice, or a bias toward inaction or action. GACFH attempt to separate these three processes with new dilemmas in which action and omission are switched, and dilemmas in which the utilitarian and deontological processes lead to the same choice. They conclude that utilitarian and deontological responses are indeed separable, and that past research has missed this fact by treating them as naturally opposed. We argue that a bias toward harmful inaction is best understood as an explanation of deontological responding rather than as an alternative process. It thus should be included as an explanation of deontological responding, not an alternative response type. We also argue that GACFH’s results can be largely explained in terms of subjects’ unwillingness to accept the researchers’ assumptions about which consequence is worse and which course of action is consistent with a moral norm. This problem is almost inherent in the attempt to switch act and omission while maintaining equivalent norms. We support this argument with data from experiments with new and old scenarios, in which we asked subjects to judge both norms and consequences. We also find that GACFH’s results are not as consistent as they appear to be in the paper. Keywords: utilitarianism, deontology, omission bias, process dissociation 1 Introduction some individuals, refraining from directly causing this harm thereby becomes more attractive than causing it, even though A great deal of research has now established that many peo- the overall consequences are worse. These cases are called ple’s moral judgments do not follow utilitarian principles. “sacrificial dilemmas.” In one sort of demonstration (among many), subjects are The usual analysis of these dilemmas is that they pit utili- asked to compare two options, one of which leads to a better tarian responding (responding in terms of the greater good) result than the other, e.g., fewer deaths, but many subjects against deontological responding, where deontology refers choose the other option, thus violating the utilitarian prin- to a category of moral theories that emphasize properties of ciple of doing the most good, or the least harm, aggregated action other than their consequences, such as whether an ac- across those affected. In order to get this result, the more tion violates basic rights, or whether an action conflicts with harmful option must be made attractive in some way that is a required duty. Deontological theories can justify not push- irrelevant to the utilitarian calculation.1 Usually this involves ing the man in a variety of ways, but most of them involve a telling subjects that the harm from the utilitarian option must prohibition of active killing, whatever the consequences. be actively and directly caused by the decision maker, e.g., Gawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf & Hütter pushing a man off of a bridge, to his death, in order to stop (2017, henceforth GACFH) report an experimental analy- a trolley that will otherwise kill several other people. For sis of sacrificial dilemmas, using a new method, which they call the CNI model because it considers three possible deter- minants of responses: Consequences, Norms, and Inaction. We thanks Andreas Glöcker, the reviewers, and Ilana Ritov for helpful comments. The model is similar to, and builds upon, an earlier model Copyright: © 2020. The authors license this article under the terms of based on the idea of process dissociation (PD; Conway & the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. Gawronski, 2013). In this paper, we discuss largely the sin- ∗Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, 3720 Walnut St., Philadelphia, PA, 19104. Email: [email protected]. ORCID: 0000- gle paper that introduces the CNI model, but some of our 0003-1001-9947. comments apply to other papers using the CNI model or the †Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania. PD model as applied to moral judgments. We do not at- 1 We use the term “utilitarian” rather than “consequentialist” because the tempt to discuss or even enumerate all these papers (many latter is a broader class of principles, some of which ignore the number of people affected (e.g., Rawls’s [1971] “difference principle”). For most of of which have appeared while the present paper was under the dilemmas at issue here, numbers are highly relevant to the conflict. review.). Instead, we intend this paper as an expression of 421 Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 15, No. 3, May 2020 Consequences, norms, and inaction: A critical analysis 422 general concern about the use of both methods to study moral from a preference for inaction, for the other (in which both judgment. norms and consequences prescribe action). In a typical sacrificial dilemma, consequences favor act- In this paper, we discuss two general concerns with this ing, e.g., pushing the man, a bias toward inaction opposes approach. We begin with the main philosophical assumption action, and moral norms usually also oppose action (e.g., made by GACFH, which is that a bias against action is not “don’t kill people”). GACFH further suppose that deontolog- deontological. We argue that whether an option involves ical and utilitarian responses are not simply poles of a single action or omission, in itself, is a feature of the sort that dimension but, rather, alternative and independent ways of deontology can take into account but utilitarianism cannot. thinking about the dilemmas. In particular, GACFH assume We then discuss the difficulty of constructing items that meet that the basic utilitarian principle is based on consequences the new requirements, and other problems with assessing the and the basic deontological principle is based on norms. In relationship between model parameters and other variables. their view, a preference for inaction (or action) is separate, We then present evidence that the apparent results of the different from either approach. In standard sacrificial dilem- CNI model are affected by subjects’ lack of agreement with mas, they argue that an apparent utilitarian response could the experimenters about which norms and consequences are arise either from a focus on consequences or from a bias relevant for the choice, as well as by inconsistencies in the toward action, and an apparent deontological response could data. arise either from a norm or a bias toward inaction. However, we agree that the CNI model raises an impor- To assess the role of each of the three components of the tant question about the kind of deontological judgments that model, GACFH use a design in which they manipulate the lead to apparent rejections of utilitarian options, specifically pairing of norms and consequences with action or inaction. whether they arise from norms that concern action vs. omis- In this design, the consequences of action are manipulated sion as well as other features. We review other literature that so that action is better than inaction in half of the items, and tries to answer this question along with related questions worse in the other half. Orthogonally, norms either forbid about the nature of apparent deontological responses. (proscribe) or require (prescribe) action. These manipula- tions give rise to three new versions of the standard sacrificial dilemma. In the standard version of a sacrificial dilemma, ac- 2 Omission bias and deontological tion has better consequences than inaction, but it is forbidden reasoning by a norm. In a new, reversed version, action is worse than inaction, but it is required by a norm. In cases of this sort, Utilitarianism, as a principle of choice, says that we should the action in question is one of preventing someone else’s choose the option with the best overall consequences. A action, or reversing an action already chosen, or reversing minimal definition of deontology, consistent with the litera- its effects. In two further versions, norms and consequences ture in both philosophy and psychology, is that it consists of align — such that both dictate either action, or alternatively, moral rules or principles about choices (acts or omissions) inaction. Thus, consequences and norms are congruent for other than those concerned with consequences. Most char- two of the four resulting cases and incongruent (conflicting) acteristically, it concerns properties of acts that make them for the other two. The pattern of subjects’ responses to the proscribed or forbidden. It can also concern properties of four dilemmas indicates how much each principle is driving acts that make them prescribed (required), as in the case of their responses. If action is always chosen, or inaction is al- duties. The rules may be, but need not be, absolute; some of ways chosen, then the responses are driven by a bias toward them may be overridden by other rules or by consequences action or inaction, not by either norms or consequences. (Ross, 1930). Some philosophers add additional specifica- The PD model, on which the CNI model builds, uses tions to what they count as deontology. But, in general, we only one type of congruent case, in which both norms and can think of deontology as consisting of rules that must be consequences prescribe inaction. For example, the act of considered in addition to, or instead of, utilitarian outcomes.
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