AUTHENTIC TEAMmG: UNDISCUSSABLES, LEADERSHIP AND THE ROLE OF THE CONSULTANT
Mary Ann Archer
A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Education Department of Adult Education. Community Development & Counselling Psychology Ontario hstitute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto
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Mary Ann Archer, Doçtorate of Education, 2000 Department of Adult Education, Community Development & Counselling Psychology Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto
Abstract
This qualitative study explores the impact on a team and its members of leaming how to work with the underlying and hidden dimensions of their interpersonal interactions and behaviours. Using an action research approach, the researcher/consultant worked, over a ten month period, with the senior management tearn of a subsidiary Company in a large financial institution.
The expectation was that taking a tearn through such a process would result in members king able to have more honest conversations with fewer "undiscussables." It was further hoped that the increased openness would result in enhanced tearn performance and improved business results. The team was observed and members interviewed before and after an intensive psychodynamic teambuilding process. The latter included one and two-day offsite teaming sessions in which tools and concepts which would assist members in having more candid conversations were introduced. Process observation at team meetings was also included.
The impact of the teaming process was rnixed. Most members became more aware of their defensive patterns in team interactions. Some were already integrating their learnings in other tearn settings. At the tearn level, the results were less clear. Sorne felt that mernbers had been better able to corne together in a most challenging business environment because of the teaming process, and more specificaiiy, because of their increased abiiity to surface difficult issues and dialogue more openly. Al1 members saw the value of this type of work and those who questioned the benefit at the team level attributed the results to an extreme "life and death" business situation. Factors which influenced the tearn's level of success were the psychodynamic defenses that were operating, the role of and mental models attachai to the leader, and the tearn context including a flawed team structure. An in-depth analysis of the complex role of researc her/consultant was an integral part of the researç h,
A sirnilar study in a more stable business environment might yield additional information. Research into the readiness of organization development consultants and leaders to work at this level is also recornrnended.
iii Acknowledgments
The doctoral thesis journey has ken, for me, like no other. It has required starnina. determination, a will of iron and tremendous patience in the face of many obstacles. It has also offered me an opportunity both to expand professionally, and to rekindle the enthusiasm for learning that one sees in the young child who is discovenng the world for the fust tirne. WhiIe the journey was often a solitary one, 1 could not have reached my destination without the support and encouragement of many people.
My thesis supervisor, Dr. Marilyn Laiken, was instrumental in so many ways. 1 am indebted to her for encouraging me to enroll in the doctoral program, for king a gifted teacher in a number of courses, for leading the way as an organization development consultant, for always believing in me and for encouraging me to pursue what 1 was passionate about. Dr. Bill Alexander brought rigor to my wnting and unwavering enthusiasm and excitement for my topic. His lust for life and never-ending delight in and cornmitment to lifelong learning has been an inspiration to me. Dr. J. Gary Knowles was willing to take a risk and work with someone he barely knew on an unfamiliar topic. 1 will always appreciate that he msted his instincts that we would work weI1 together. Both Gary and Bill were instrumental in encouraging me to add "life" to my writing and tell my story. My thesis "buddies," Dr. Lorrie Clemes Treleaven and Dr. Susan Geary, were Iifelines at so many points dong the way. Their willingness to read and re-read. offer endless suggestions and "buck me up" when 1 was ready to give up, was instrumentai to my finishing.
1 owe much to Loretta Brill and Ray Gordezky, my organization development paruiers and close friends. Each of hem has influenced me in so many ways, and informed my thinking and writing significantly. Frances Harwood, my soul-sister, colleague and fiiend has marked so many of my life passages. Sharing our meditation practice throughout the course of the thesis writing has provided me with an unwavering cornmiunent to stay present to the experience. Sheila Legon, a longtirne fiend and colleague, was instrumental in helping me find my participant group. Other people who offered valuable support at points dong the way include Sue Griggs and John Freeman. My parents, Audrey and Floyd Honey, have been an inspiration to me throughout my life. Their thirst for knowledge and their unwavering commitrnent to learning and personal development is tmly a hard act to fouow.
1 will be forever indebted to my imrnediate farnily. Both Robin and Adam were my cornputer experts, bailing me out on countless occasions. Adam, espeçially in the final months, demonstrated patience and tolerance for the lack of home-cooked meals, and Robin becarne the expert grocery shopper. My gratitude to Rdis hard to express. 1 am thankful both for his supenor editing ability and for his willingness to take over many of the previously shared household tasks. More importantly, 1 am moved by and grateful for his unwavenng support of and confidence in my doing whatever 1 have needed, in my ongoing quest for personal and professional development. Finally, 1 am indebted to the members of my participant group for king willing to embark on this journey with me. In an environment of constant crisis and turbulence, they demonstrated a continuing commitrnent to my completing the research study. My hope is that they will take take away insights and leamings that will impact them both personally and pro fessionally. Table of Contents
.. Abstracr ...... -...... u
Tables ...... x
Figures ...... ,...... xi
CHAITER ONE: SETITNG THE STAGE...... 1 Beginning the Joumey ...... 1 How the Literature Supported my Thinking ...... 3 The Decision to Work at the Team Level ...... 8 Purpose of the Study...... 9 Limitations of the Study ...... 11
CHAPTER TWO: WHAT OTHERS HAVE SAID...... 12 Team Dynamics...... 12 Open Communication ...... 13 The Impact of Undiscussables ...... 17 Origin of Undiscussables ...... 19 Sensemaking and the Role of Mental Models...... 26 Individual Mental Models ...... 27 Tearn Mental Models...... 28 Working with Mental Models...... 31 Psychodynarnic Theory and Team Functioning...... -... 36 Concept of Self ...... 36 Defenses Against Anxiety ...... 38 Psychodynamics of Groups...... 38 Relevant Research ...... 41
CHAPTER THREE: CHARTING THE JOURNEY ...... 45 The Qualitative Paradigm ...... 45 Action Research ...... -46 Ethical Issues and Concerns...... -50 Research Design ...... 55 Selecting the Team and Negotiating Participation ...... 56 Data Collection...... 59 My Role as Researcher ...... 67 Analysis and Interpretation ...... 69
CHAPTER FOUR: THE INVESTIGATION BEGINS ...... 72 The Research Organization ...... -72 .. Interwewing...... 76 Degree of Openness ...... 77 Unacceptable Topics or Undiscussables ...... 78 Assumptions...... -82 Willingness to Challenge ...... 84 Unexpressed Secret Hopes and Wishes ...... 86
Perceived Impact of Surfacing Undiscussables ...... , ...... 87 Observation of the Team ...... 89 .. Summary of Findmgs ...... 91
CHAPTER EWE: JOURNEY ...... 92 The Early Sessions ...... 92 The Team Begins to Own its Process...... 96 The Honeymoon Period Ends ...... 97 Back on Track ...... 99
The Team Prepares to Go it Alone ...... ,...... 101 My Journey as Consultant/Researcher...... 103 Summary ...... 112
CHAPTER SIX: FINAL OUTCOMES ...... 113 . . Interviewmg...... 113 Degree of Openness ...... 115 Unacceptable Topics or Undiscussables ...... 116 Additional Undiscussables ...... 118 Assumptions...... 121 Willingness to Challenge...... 122 Unexpressed Secret Hopes and Wishes ...... 124 Impact of Dealing with the Undiscussables ...... 124
vii Observation of the Tearn ...... 133 . . Summary of Findings ...... 135
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE EPILOGUE ...... 136 ABC Fights for Survival...... 136 The Team Breaks Apart ...... 138 Final Reflections...... 139 Surnmary ...... 142
CHAPTER EIGHT: THE ENQUIRY CONTINUES...... 143 . . Positive Outcomes ...... 143 Psyc hodynarnic Issues...... 146 individual Defense Mechanisrns ...... 147 The ManagerISubordinate Reiationshîp ...... 149 Social Defenses ...... 152 Summary ...... 159 Leadership and the Role of the Leader ...... 160 A New Style of Leadership...... 160 Mental Modeis about the Leader ...... 162 Leader as Role Mode1 ...... 166 Leader as Catalyst ...... 168 Psychologicai Demands of Leaders ...... 171 Executive Tearns ...... 175 Summary ...... 177 The Team Context ...... 178 The Turbulent Environment ...... 178 Team Structure ...... 181 The Impact of Hierarchy ...... 186 Communities of Practice as a Teaming Tool ...... 190 Sumrnary ...... 192
My Role as Researcher/Consultant ...... 193 Countertransference Issues ...... 194
viii The Consultant as 4. Container" ...... 197 impact on Results ...... 198 Summary ...... 200
CHAPTER NXNIS: TO WARD THE FUTURE ...... 201 The Research Rationale and Process. Reiterated ...... 201 Surnmary of Findings ...... 204 Implications ...... -208 Personal Mastery for the OD Consultant ...... 208 Sustainability of Leamings ...... 210 The Authentic Tearning Mode1 ...... -213 Suggestions for Fwther Research ...... -216
REFERENCES ...... 219
APPENDICES ...... -237 Two-Column Research Method ...... 238 Action Map ...... 239 Ladder of Inference ...... -240 Left-hand Column Exercise ...... 241 Participant Consent ...... -242 Pre-study Questionnaire ...... 243 SYMLOG Consulting Group Survey ...... 246 Post-study Questionnaire ...... -247 Letter of Introduction ...... 250 ABC Team Proçess Schedule...... 252 ABC Senior Management Team (April . 1997) ...... 253 ABC Senior Management Team (February . 1998) ...... 254 List of Tables
Table 1 ABC Inc. Senior Management Team ...... - ...... - . -.-75 List of Figures
Figure 1 CLient/Consultan< Leaming Relationships ...... 48 Figure 2 Relationship and Responsibilities Matrix ...... 52 Figure 3 ABC Team'sUFight/Flight"Loop ...... 157
Figure 4 ABC Team's Cycle of "Stuckness" ...... 158
Figïre 5 The Authentic Teaming Mode1 ...... -214 CHAFïER ONE: SEl'TING TILE STAGE
Beginning the Journey The motivation for this inquiry can be found in the interconnections between my work as a psychotherapist and organization development (OD) consultant. For the past fifteen years, 1 have provided external consulting services to a variety of organizations, both large and smd. Prior to my entry into the field of OD, 1 was, for many years, a psychotherapist in private prac tice. in my consulting work, 1 had consistently observed the difficdty that individuals have in making significant changes in their behaviour patterns. While it was evident to me bat organizations establish cultures and systems which create and reinforce particular behaviours, 1 also believed that a significant factor was the lack of understanding that many individuals have as to why they behave the way they do. They are not given the opportunity to become aware of the psychological rationale for their actions. From my work with individuals in psychotherapeutic settings, 1 had observed that significant behaviourai change could not occur without this kind of insight.
One of my primary reasons for entering the doctoral program was that 1 would be given an opportunity, through my research, to bring together my two identities of psychotherapist and consultant. I had been aware for quite some time of my stmggle to find a bridge between myself as therapist and myself as consultant and was wrestling with the question of how much 1 could risk showing in the corporate world. 1 had a strong belief that it was important that 1 be authentic, and was aware of the cost to me personally of there king a gap between my values and my behaviours. Gradualiy, it becarne clear that my own uncertainty about how to be "me" in my work Iife was a cornpeliing motivational force in my choice of research topic. While 1 was, as yet, uncertain what form the research would take, in broad terms, 1 knew that 1 wanted to explore the impact of the psychological aspects of interpersonal interactions on organizationai effectiveness.
1 cm trace my acadernic interest in an exploration of this topic to a paper 1 wrote in my first course on Learning Values in Addthood, where 1 argued chat individuals need to feel a congruence between their personal values and the values of the organization. In my writing, I stressed the importance of individuals at al1 levels becoming more self-aware. 1 commented that:
. . . very little attention is king paid at the organizational level to encouraging people to know "who they are". We still spend far too much tirne leaming and teaching techniques - how to manage, how to communïcate, how to resolve contlicts, etc. In my experience, these techniques are of limited value until the person has first looked at why she* behaves the way she does. And it is in asking "why" 1 behave the way 1 do that I will discover my mevalues, what 1 tnily believe in and "who 1 am". (Archer. 1993. p. 9)
As I began to shape my studies to this area of interest, 1 discovered through my course work and my own research that rnany organizational theonsts and researchers had been looking at related fields.
How the Literature Supported My Thinking 1 recd my excitement at discovering the writings of Chris Argyris whose work dates back to the 1950s. Argyns differentiated between one's espoused theory of action and his actuai behaviour or theory-in-use (Argyris and Schon, 1978). An individual's espoused theory of action is that which generally reflects his values and how he believes he should behave. His theory-in-use is the theory that govems his actions; in essence, it describes what he actually does.
Argyris believed that where there is a marked gap between our espoused values and our behaviour, we will likely be uncornfortable. He went on to Say that the difference between our espoused values and our actual behaviow is often most marked in our work lives, where we are asked to take on the value system of the organization. When the conflict between the
* Henceforth. 1 will interchange the use of the masculine and ferninine pronoms. individuai's value system and that of the organization becomes severe, the result can be dienation and lack of cornmitment, resulting in decreased performance and productivity (Wright and Morley, 1989, chap. 1).
Argyris and Schon (1978) identified organizations as king either Model 1 or Model II in their operative values, assumptions and theories-in-use. Organizations that are led by people using Mode1 1 behaviours will develop cultures chat foster tight control over tasks and people, low risk-taking or freedom of choice and defensive interpersonal and group relationships-
Operating on McGregor's Theory X assumption that "people are lazy, irresponsible, passive and dependent" (Weisbord, 1987, p. 3,there will be little questioning of the way things are done, decisions that are made or underlying norms and assumptions. Such an organization will rely heavily on single loop leaniing, leamhg which involves a simple correction of error, while goveming norms and values are held constant. The underlying values of Model II behaviour are "to help people to produce valid information, make informed choices, and develop an intemal cornmitment to those choices"
(Argyris, 1977, p. 122). Model II organizations are built on McGregor's Theory Y assumption that people will take responsibility, care about their jobs, wish to grow and achieve, and, if given a chance, do excellent work (Weisbord, 1989, p. 5). Argyris emphasized that Mode1 II is not the opposite of Model 1. It does not advocate the emphasis on the emotional at the expense of the intellectual. Nor dœs it recommend the unilateral handing over of control by the manager to front-line staff. Mode1 II does, however, argue for the sha~gof information and power and for inviting others to confront both their own and the organization's operating values and nom, and it encourages risk-taking . A Mode1 II organization will utilize double loop leaniing, learning to detect and correct errors by the continual questioning of underlying assumptions, values and norms. Argyris called for the creation of new leaming systems where "people would advocate their views in ways that would invite confrontation, positions would be stated so that they could be challenged, and testing would be done publicly. Group and intergroup defenses would be dealt with as they arose. Games such as cmouflaging information would be discussed when they were relevant" (Argyris, 1977, p. 123). Argyris admitteci, however, that moving people from Model 1 toward Model II behaviour is difficult. He claimed that individuals are often unaware that they are operating from Model 1 values. Even when they do gain some insight into their behaviours, "understanding and believing in Model II did not ensure that they would be able to produce Model Il behaviour" (Argyris, 1977, p. 123). In Overcoming Organizational Defenses (Argyris, 1990), Argyris explored the ways in which organizations develop and maintain cultures which foster defensive routines and Model 1 theories-in-use. He postulated that people at all levels, in their fear of king embarrassed or feeling threatened, develop "fancy footwork" (p. 45) or protective behaviour that pennits them to be blind to inconsistencies in their actions.
As 1 delved Merinto the work of Argyris, 1 became clear that this was the area that 1 wanted to study. 1 began to wonder what would happen if one were to work with individuals in an organizational setting to understand some of the origins of their "fancy footwork." Additional reading led me to the work of Peter Senge and the ledgorganization, a concept that leading edge companies are moving towards in an attempt to remain cornpetitive.
Senge defined mental models as "deeply held intemal images of how the world works, images that limit us to familiar ways of thinking and acting" (1990, p. 174). They can be "simple generalizations such as 'people are untrustworthy,' or they can be complex theories, such as my assumptions about why members of my family interact as they do" (p. 175). Senge's mental models seemed to be sirnilar to Jack Mezirow's meaning perspectives which he defined as "the stmcture of assumptions within which new experience is assirnilated and transformed by one's past experience during the process of interpretation" (Mezirow, 1990, p. 2). Meaning perspectives, or what 1 have tended to cal1 self-limiting values or beliefs, are, for the most part, "uncritically acquired in chilcihocxi through the process of sociaiization, often in the context of an emotionally charged relationship with parents, teachers, or other mentors" (p. 3).
At this point in my reading. 1 was begiaaing to feel some validation around my own work in organizations. Prior to then, 1 had been quietiy talking about my beliefs regarding the impact of the psychological on organizational behaviour. Indeed, 1 often felt quite alone with no sense that others shared my perspective. At about the sarne time, a fellow student introduced me to Michael Diarnond's . . The unconscious Iife of or- (1993). 1 recall my tremendous excitement when I read his book. He seemed to be spealung duectly to my own experience of organizations in his insistence that understanding the psychological dimensions of organizational life is critical to individuals at al1 levels beiug able to make the changes that will take them through the turbulent nineties. Diamond chaiienged the notion found in some of the organizationd literature that subjective and emotional data are irrelevant to our understanding of organizational behaviour. On the conuary, he argued emphaticdy that many of the unmentionable issues which are suppressed in the workplace are often the most crucial problems and barriers to organizational resilience.
Diamond made a strong case for looking at the psychological issues af5ecting employees in organizations. Indeed, he believes that much of the dysfùnctiond behaviour exhibited by individuals is directiy attributable to their individual neuroses. He focused particularly on the impact which pathology in those in leadership positions can have on the organization.
In cen tralized authority structures, leaders have inordinate power and conuol over subordinates. Thus, individual pathologies (neurotic excesses) among leaders influence overail organizational character and operations. Moreover, organizational members thernselves reinforce their leaders' excesses by acting submissively and indulging the wbims of their bosses. (Diamond, 1993, p. 24) The organization operates as a dynamic system "whose elements 'hang together' because they continually affect each other over time and operate toward a common purpose" (Senge et al., 1994, p. 90) of sustaining the current culture. Diamond saw the psychoanalytic concept of transference as being particularly important when it cornes to looking at the relationship between superiors and subordinates. He defmed transference as "the experiencing of feelings, drives, attitudes, fantasies, and defenses toward a person in the present that are inappropriate to that person and are a repetition, a displacement of reactions originating in regard to signifcant persons of early childhooà" (1993. p. 35).
A subordinate may idealize his boss as a result of qualities in her that are ones that his parents never had. He may also transfer his fears of his parents' aggressive behaviour and power over him ont0 his superior and be afraid to confront her in the same way that he could not confront his parents. A superior, on the other hand, may need her subordinates to idealize her as a consequence of not king accepted by her parents. Again. the dynamics of the system are evident in the way in which the hierarchical suucmof organizations create the parent-child relationship which fosters this transference.
Diamond claimed that what is most relevant for organizational Lfe is not so much the childhood origins of individuals' neurotic defenses, but rather how those defensive behaviours affect their abilities to relate effectively with their colleagues in their day-to-day work Lives. Similady, Ferenczi's concept of 'introjective identification' (de Board, 1978. p. IR) is played out in everyday me. in this situation, an individual. wanting to be iike someone else, introjects that person into the ego. In an organizational sening, ''the members of a group, wishing to identify with the leader, incorporate his ideas and attitudes and make them their own." (p. 22) The problem with individual pathology king played out within organizations is that it is cumulative. If the majority of people in an organization are unaware of their neurotic, defensive behaviour, it will become more and more difficult for that behaviour to be confronted and elirninated. On the contmy, it would seem that individual pathology would iikely escalate into group pathology which would ultimately result in a whole culture whose "raison d'être" becomes the denial and continued suppression of very real, but difficult emotions. Wilfnd Bion believed that 'iinspoken attitudes and behavior patterns may hinder or further group tasks beyond the awareness of those concemed [and that a] greater understanding and heightened awareness of such [covert] processes cm lead to more effective participation in
group activities " (Banet and Hayden, 1977, p. 159). Bion distinguished between the "work group" and the "basic assumption group" (Shapiro. 1990, p. 762).The work group he saw as "behaving at a mature level in that it is working at its task, its relation to reality is good, and communication among group members is
logical and clear" (p. 762). In conttast, the basic assumption group exhibits behaviour "that suggests a level of regression dominated by unconscious assumptions on the part of members
that the group is gathered for quite different purposes than the realistic accomplishment of the work task" (p. 762). Bion saw these purposes as king the satisfaction of dependency needs. promotion of aggression toward, or flight from, reality tasks, issues and objects and hope and expectations related to pairing behaviour in the group. Diarnond distinguished between regressive and resilient work groups (1993, p. 109) and sets the latter as those in which group members are wiiling to confront their own defensive patterns. They are willing to engage in a reflective process that, while difficult to do, ultimately supports the emotional well-king of their members.
Diarnond coined the term "psychoanalytic organization consultant" (1993. p. 232). to describe an individual who works with individuals and work groups to assist them in uncovering the psychological components of their organizational behaviour. He differentiated between psychotherapy and psychoanalytic consulting by making it clear that in working with people within an organizationd context, one is not attempting to open up deep intrapsychic materiai that the individual has not contracted to reveal and is more appropnately dealt with through a psychotherapeutic process. Rather. the objective is to support them in gaining insight into the reasons for their actions so that they are able to alter those behaviours that act as barriers to their working effectively with others. Diamond argued that "gaining insights into the emotional dimensions of their relations can enable [individuals] with the help of a consultant to clarify and resolve differences. improve coordination, and thereby consider alternative ways of interacting at work" (1993, p. 36).
The Decision to Work at the Team Level It was when f saw how Diarnond made the link between individual, neurotic, defensive behaviour and the cumulative defensive routines that are then played out in work groups that my ideas for a research topic began to take shape. Because 1 had spent so much of my professional Iife working with groups, either in a therapeutic sening or in a consulting capacity facilitating team building sessions. I began to narrow my research focus to looking at the psychodynamic aspects of team functioning. Larry Hirschhorn (199 1) saw the shift from the team struchire where members conformed to top-management controls, systems and policies to one where members need to collaborate, think creatively and literally "get in each others' way" (p. 10). He made the ciaim that "to work and manage effectively in the new team environment, people must learn to use kirimer thoughts and feelings in the sewice of getting work done" (p. 1 1). He saw "the thoughts and feelings people typically suppress [as king] important guides and aids in helping the team accomplish its work" (p. 1 1). Marilyn Laiken (1997) cited the cmntchange in work structures as resulting in a need for employees to speak more directly and honestly with one another. With the emphasis on empowerment and accountability within the team, members must be able to deal with conflict and work through interpersonal issues at a deeper level than ever before. In a study with senior managers and tearn leaders in two private-sector organizations, Laiken (1993) found people unwiIling to truly engage and afraid to "trust in the likelihd of positive outcornes of both confronting others openly and exposing personal vulnerabilities" (1997. p. 36). My preliminary review of the literature indicated that there had been iittle research conducted in this area Further, because organizations are increasingly moving toward a team environment and the self-directed or high perfonning tearn is cited as the work strucnire of choice for the nineties, 1 was drawn to focusing my study on the psychodynamics of teams.
Marisa Guerin, in her doctoral dissertation ( 1995), investigated how a psychodynamic frame of reference contributed to an understanding of workplace team effectiveness. Using a case study methodology, she looked at two cross-functional project teams from one organization from the perspective of the coven or psychodynamic processes that were operating, and that may have affectai the teams' hctioning. While her work demonstrated the existence of psychodynamic processes at work within
teams, she did not go to the next level in examinuig the effect of actuaily working with those processes. It is my intention to do just this in looking at the impact that working at the psychodynarnic level might have on organizationai effectiveness.
Purpose of the Study The broad purpose of my research study was to examine the impact on tearn functioning, of uncovering the psychodynarnic, coven processes that operate within an intact workplace tearn. My intention was to look at what happened at both individual and team levels of leaming how to engage in candid, honest conversation. The actual investigation used an action research methodology which utilized a variet. of tools such as the left-hand column exercise based on Chris Argyris* and
Donald Schon's two-colurnn research method (Argyris and Schon, 1974), (see Appendix A), to uncover and work w ith these processes. Action research is differentiated fiom other forrns of research in its emphasis on involving participants both in identiwing the issues and in taking actions to resolve them in the "real" world. It is also unique in the relationship between researcher and participant where the notion of researcher as "expert" is downplayed. As such, the materid 1 collected as cesearcher became part of the teaming process itself, as it was fed back to the participants for them to work with during the sessions. The specific research question has been frarned as: "What is the impact on tearn members and on the team as a whole of Ieaming how to work with the underlying and hidden dimensions of their interpersonal interactions?"
My research objectives were: 1. To facilitate a teaming process which uncovers and works with defensive interpersonal patterns and behaviours; 2. To help team members understand and examine the impact of these patterns and behaviours on themselves, on other team members and on team functioning; 3. To explore the impact on individual team members and on the team as a whole of participating in such a process.
For the purposes of this study, when refemng to "defensive patterns," 1 used Argyris'
( 1990) definition of "defensive routines," narnely, "actions or policies that prevent individuals or segments of the organization from experiencing embarrassrnent or threat" (p. 25).
The original question was limited to examining the impact of such an approach to tearning . Ho wever, my fmdings revealed significantl y broader objectives. These related to understanding the process involved in taking such a journey. and the difficulty both in sustaining the learnings and in transfemng the insights and new behaviours to the day-to-day business environment. Finally, the study raised many questions about the impact of both the leader's and the OD consultant's roles in such a process, with paiticular emphasis on the dynarnics embedded in authority relationships.
My expectation was that taking a team through such a process would result in their king more able to surface the covert assumptions they make about each other and about what is and is not acceptable to discuss. 1 further expected that they would be more cornfortable in speaking honestly with one another about previously unmentionable issues and would use less "fancy footwork" (Argyris, 1990, p. 45) and fewer defensive routines in their team interactions. As a result, they would function more effectively in accomplishing their tasks and achieving their results. In Chapter Three, where the research methodology is presented, 1 will speciw how 1 tested these assumptions and assessed the impact of the actions taken. Limitations of the Study Because the study involved working intensively with only one team which was deaihg with a particular set of issues, it would be impossible to generalize to other teams in different organizations. Indeed, this team's unique situation of struggling to operate in crisis mode for the duration of the study, and the fact that the survival of the organization was in jeopardy, made it al1 the more unlikely that one codd readily apply the findings to many tearns.
A second Limitation relates to the role of the researcher. Because the methodology was action research, 1 played a dual role of consultant and researcher. Max van Manen (1990) suggested that the decision to do research arises out of a smng desire to know the world. Further, to know the world as a researcher requires one "profoundly to be in the world in a certain way . . . to [attach] ourselves to the world, to become more fully a part of it, to become the worid" (p. 5).
While such a committed and allconsuming passion for the topic and involvement in the snidy is central to the pmess, it is also critical that the researcher be cognizant of the potential for bias and subjectivity. Because 1 worked intensively with the team over an extended period of tirne (ten months), 1 was "profoundly in the world*' of the team. In becoming part of the system, 1 would undoubiedly have an impact on the outcomes in sorne way, no matter how much 1 engaged in a process of reflective inquiry. It is unlikely, therefore. that the same tearn working with a different researcher would experience exactly the same journey.
A final limitation relates to my attempt to demonstrate impact. As with any qualitative sh~dy,this is extremely dificuit, especially when one is dealing with human beings, al1 of whom bring their own histories and Life experiences to the process. The impact on any one person of participating in such a study wiii depend on the mental models she carries from other situations she has encountered, and on a variety of factors which may be unavailable to her conscious awareness. CEAPTER TWO: WHAT OTHERS HAVE SAID
The argument for research into the impact on team functioning, of uncove~gthe covert processes that operate within an intact workplace team, rests on two considerations - demonstrating that such research holds promise for producing new knowledge of value, and establiskg that this topic has not ben adequately studied to &te.
In this chapter, 1 wili examine the current literature that addresses three key areas relevant to this topic: team dynamics, particulariy as it relates to openness in interpersonal communication; sensemaking and the role of assumptions or "mental models" (Senge, 1990); and psychodynamic theory as it applies to team functioning. in the final section, 1 wiii reveal the research gaps that remah and demonstrate how this study will both add to the current body of knowledge and attempt to close these gaps.
Team Dyaamics Since the advent of the human relations movement in the early 1950s, the concept of tearn and teamwork has taken on greater and greater importance to the point where, today, it is a comerstone of organizational functioning. With this evolution has come an ever expanding volume of literature about team development and what constitutes an effective team. Researchers have studied teams in many different settings and developed numerous theories about how teams function (Ellinor & Gerard, 1998; Francis & Young, 1992; Schutz, 1984; Tuckrnan, 1977, cited in Laiken, 1998).
Whatever the rnodel, aU describe a stage where there is wariness, caution, lack of tmst or candor as group members first come together. This is followed by a period where issues of control and influence surface, where conflicts occur and alliances and sub-groups can form. The authors of each mode1 caution that it is in these early phases that teams will succeed or fail. Their success will be measured by the quality of team dynamics exhibited, particularly by the degree to which they learn to communkate honestly and openly to resolve conflicts and issues
of trust. In looking at tearn dynamics, 1will categorize the lierature into two main areas: the degree of openness and candor in team communication; and the impact of undiscussables - what they are, why hey occur and their impact on team functioning.
My review of current writing on tearnwork and team development reveals a wide body of literature that cites open communication and the developrnent of honest, candid conversation as
hallmarks of team effectiveness (Bohiander & McCarthy, 1996; Campion, Papper, & Medsker,
1996; Dominick, Reiily, & McGourty, 1997; Francis & Young, 1992; Harrington-Mackin,
1994; Katzenbach & Smith, 1993; Keen & ken, 1998; Parker, 1990; Quick, 1992; Scholtes,
Joiner, & Streibel, 1996). Virtuaiiy al1 models of team and work group effectiveness acknowledge that the interpersonal process is a crucial antecedent of team performance
(Gladtein, 1984; Hackrnan, 1983; Nieva, Fieishman, & Reich, 1978; Smdstrom, DeMeuse, & Futrell, 1990, cited in Dorninick et ai., 1997).
As far back as 1964, Harvard educator, Chris Argyris, was cl-g that organizational effectiveness was a function of the interpersonal cornpetence of team members and the extent to which the organization supported positive nom. The latter included the ability to be open and candid about ideas and feelings and to help others be open and candid. Car1 Rogers advocated that people be authentic or congruent in their interpersonal relationships (Sinetar, 1998). Sinetar Lnked the ability to be congruent to increased trust and ultirnately to improved interpersonal relationships which are required in an increasingly complex, cornpetitive, tearn- based envuonment. Bassin (1996) describeci true teamwork as involving partnership and the kind of tmsting relationships where members will air their differences openly with team rnembers as opposed to talking about thern behind their backs.
Leavitt and Lipman-Blume (1995) extolled the virtues of "hot groups," descnbed as "lively, high-achieving, dedicated group[s), usually small, whose members are tumed on to an exciting and challenging task. . . . They do great things fast" (p. 109). The authors achowledged that hot groups tend to grow natdy and are not cultivated, like plants. They described wide open communication - up. down, and across the group as a key factor in their successful task accompiishment.
Kasl, Marsick and Dechant (1 997) described a mode1 of tearn learning that was derived empiricaily from case saidies in ouo cornpanies. The authors made the iink between team learning as a process and the necessary conditions within the tearn for leamhg to occur, Results indicated that the quality and quantity of team iearning was directiy COM~C~~to the team dynarnics and, in particular, to the degree of openness exhibited in members' interactions and work together. One of the more recent areas of interest to researchers is conversation and its contribution to teamwork and ultimately to business results. Fernando Fiores has said that "an organization's results are determined through webs of human commitments, bom in webs of human conversations" (cited in Brown & Isaacs, 1996- 1997, p. 2). Acknowledging conversation to be a core business process which enables the generation of new insights and committed action, leading edge organizations are seeking to establish forums in which they can foster more productive diaiop.
Etienne Wenger (1998) and his colleagues at the Institute for Research on Learning (EU). an outgrowth of Xerox's pioneering Pa10 Alto Research Center. have observed interdisciplinary teams of anthropologists, sociologists. cognitive scientists. and technology specialists. Their conclusions have been that "knowledge creation is pnmarily a social rather than an individual process" (p. 2) requiring a free exchange of information and a candid exploration of concepts, ideas and processes. Anne Domeuon (1996) saw teamwork as essentially linguistic and conversational. The conversations may be face to face, fax to fax, over the phone, or through electronic mail, but regardless of the channel used, teams do their work through language. According to Donnellon, one can hear and assess the dynarnics of a tearn by Iistening to the language the rnembers use. Words provide a window into people's thoughts and feelings, even those they would prefer to hide; and words create thoughts and feelings in the listeners. Donneilon developed a team t. audit for assessing team dynamics based on six key dimensions of team interactions: identification, interdependence, power differentiation, social distance, coriflict management tactics and negotiation process. She suggested that team members thernselves conduct an audit of their own conversations dong these six dimensions. I would question the capability of a team to assess its own language unlw it were hctioning at a high level, without obvious problems in many of these six dimensions.
There is an increasing recognition of the importance of ensuring that people have a shared understanding of the maniag of the words they use in conversation. Where there is misunderstanding, openness tends to shut down and interactions become more guarded and less effective. in a case study involving an executive director and his team, Michael Brown (19%) used an analysis of dialogue to help members Say what they meant in order to facilitate shared meaning. His work involved assisting the team to look specifically at the intended meaning of abstract words or phrases used in the normal course of their work together. He gave the example of the word "responsibility" which may mean different things to each person. and suggested that a failure to communicate in a behavioural and concrete way may prevent the team from completing its task. The concept of dialogue as a discipline for enhancing the quality of conversation and collective leaming has been gaining greater acceptame in the corporate world. Dialogue is distinguished from discussion in its focus on the exploration of assumptions in order to build common understanding (Bohm,1989). It opens up communication and allows for differences of opinion, beliefs and values and indeed uses these differences as a staning point for conversation. Discussion tends to focus more on advocating a position in order to win people over to one's own viewpoint. The danger of relying ody on discussion is that members may reach false consensus where they "assume they mean the same thing in using certain terms. but only later discover subtie differences in rneaning that have major consequences for action" (Schein, 1994, p. 1). BU Isaacs' mode1 of "dialogic leadership" (1999) included speaking one's voice and encouraging others to do the same as one of its four practices.
A number of authors advocated the value of "straight talk'' in reducing misunderstandings and harnessing people's thoughts and feelings to the accomplishment of the team's work (Blanton, 1996, cited in Van Housen, 1997; Hirschhom, 1991; Hinsey, 1992: Schutz, 1984, 1994).
Schutz (1994) identified six levels of tmth moving from feeling something and not expressing it through expressing it without a great deal of self-understanding or awareness al1 the way to recognizing how one feels about oneself.
While there is clearly a wide body of literature that extols the virtue of open cornmunication in enhancing team iùnctioning, there is very Little that addresses the more dificuit issue of the process team members must go through to achieve such a level of candor.
Leavitt and Lipman-Blume's ( 195) acknowledgement that "hot groups" are bom out of a group of individuals' comrnon vision or interests raises the question of how to achieve that sarne ievel of excitement, sha~gand openness in other, more traditional organizationd settings. Isaac's (1996) concept of dialogue relies on the participants' abilities to examine assumptions and ask challenging questions of one another. WhiIe a search of the Literature does reveal a variety of tools which can be utiiized to faciiitate open tearn communication, it does not describe the often torturous journey that tearn members take in daring to speak their minds and risk exposing their own and others' vulnerabilities. Only Argyris (1964) appeared to have given significant attention in his writing to the difficulty individuals have in coming together in open, non-defensive communication. In much of his writing, he addresses the issue of individual and organizational defenses that collude to keep the undiscussables undiscussable (Argyris, 1964, 1977, 1986, 1990, 199 1, 1993, 1994;
Argyris & Schon, 1974, 1978). He acknowledged the degree of resistance that exists within organizations to make such a major culture change and in Knowledee for action (1993), recounted a stepby-step approach in c- study format of bis work over a five-year period with a professionai service organization. BIandon's concept of radical honesty (cited in Van Housen, 1997) ignores the question of the impact on people of such blatant candor. There would appear to be almost an evangelistic tone to his work, and 1 wonder about the cost to recipients of such unabashed honesty. It is my belief that one needs to be extremely careful to create a context of tmst and safety before one encourages a major shifi in culture from closed and guarded to open and honest communication.
e Impact of Und The same body of literanire that espoused the value of openness and candor citd closed, guarded communication as a signif~cantbarrier to effective teamwork. When barriers to openness develop, people censor what they Say; what is said, and deemed to be undiscussable, becomes even more important than the spoken word. What Are Undiscussables?
As indicated in the previous section, the concept of "undiscussables" reflects the work of Chris Argyns (Argyris, 1986; Argyris, Putnam, and Smith, 1985). He described them as the "underground dynamics that are activated whenever the business results are hot and threatening" (1990, p. 3). Ryan and Oestreich defined undiscussable as a "problem or issue that someone hesitates to tallc about with those who are essential to its resolution" (1998, p. 78) or in the setting where it needs to be explored and resolved. They are secrets that almost everyone knows about. Marshak and Katz (1994) used the tem "covert processes" to describe the underlying and hidden dimensions of their own, as well as others' behaviour. Others likened the concept to "undercurrents" (Scholtes et al, 1996) that pull team members away from their obvious tasks. Will Schutz labelled this team dynamic landscape as the "interpersonal underworld (cited in Scholtes et ai., 1996). Psychologist Marlin Potash (1990) described the "hidden agendas" or secret motivations lurking behind what people Say and do. Luft and Ingharn's Johari Window (Hanson, 1973) depicted a mode1 for giving and receiving feedback which acknowledges the existence of bidden or undisclosed information in two of its windows, the "blind spot" and the "facade". Reddy's iceberg mode1 of group dynamics (1994, in Curnming, 1999) identified five levels of interactions that occur in groups. Levels 1 and II are primariiy overt and above the surface. Level ïiI interactions are coven and include core group issues such as membership, control. cornpetence, intimacy and sexuality. At level IV, the focus is on the values, beliefs and assumptions members hold about the world. Level V is the unconsciousTincluding the "reservoir of one's basic instincts, motivations, impulses. and unacceptable wishes" (p. 5). Stone, Patton and Heen (1999) suggested that every dificult conversation contains three interna1 conversations which clearly reflect our thoughts and feelings. The "what happened?' conversation is concemed with disagreements over what actually occurred or should have occurred. The feelings conversation addresses the validity or appropriateness of my feelings. The identity conversation is the one we have with ourselves about what tkiis situation means to us from the point of view of our self-esteem and self-image. Whatever the label, dl who acknowledged the existence of this phenornenon described its occurrence in a similar way. When there is an undiscussable in the room, it is as if there were an
"elephant in the middle of the table." Everyone can see it, but no one wiil acknowiedge it; we look around it, over it anything to uy to avoid dealing with it. Undiscussables are taked about privately among colleagues who do vust each other in "the meetings after the meeting." The problem with undiscussables is that the longer they remain undiscussed, the bigger they get and the more fear and secrecy is generated. Argyns saw undiscussables as the first step toward the development of "organizational defensive routines" (1990). "actions or policies that prevent individuals or segments of the organization ftom experiencing embarrassrnent or threat" (p. 25). Indeed, he depicted a cyclical sequence in which the undiscussabiiity of the undiscussables becomes undiscussable. Mulvey. Veiga and Elsass suggested that tearn members engage in "self-limiting" behaviour in which they "raise a white flagT'by consciously choosing to reduce their influence on or contribution to the performance of a task
( 1996; Veiga, 199 1). Jerry Harvey named "the tendency for groups to embark on excursions that no group member wants, 'the Abilene Paradox"' (1988, p. 15). At the heart of this phenornenon is the tendency of individuals to fail to make expiicit hirthinking and preferences about a situation or course of action.
ianis coined the term "groupthink'* ( 197 1, cited in Allen, 1996) to describe the tendency of group mernkrs to engage in concurrence-seeking behaviour, ignore malistic appraisals of alternatives and avoid criticai thinking. In a study of 22 Amencan companies, Ryan and Ostreich (1991) interviewed 260 individuals to identify both the issues people tended to avoid and why they avoided them. Their findings revealed management performance to be by far the largest category with 49% of respondents identifying it as an issue. Management practice refemed to a variety of issues related io how managers behaved, including tec hnical cornpetence and people management. The latter was the item most ofien mentioned, and included how managers interacted with and provided leadership to their subordinates. If one included managerial and CO-worker performance, it was evident that almost 60% of undiscussabies related to interpersonal issues. Rather than identiwing the actual topics that were deemed undiscussable, Marshak and
Katz ( 1994) Listed five categories of covert processes: denied or under the table processes; repressed or unacceptable tu see processes; unexpressed or too goad tu be true processes or Our secret hopes and wishes; untapped or unacceptable ro imagine; and blind spots and blocks, including the filters through which we view and interpret the world.
. . of Undiscussables
in looking at the origin of undiscussables, why and how they occur, 1 will examine three aspects: the threat of embarrassrnent or appearing vulnerable; the role of emotions in organizational life; and the tendency to avoid conflict. The Threat of Emba-
Hargrove (1996) talked about the defensive patterns that individuais adopt when operating
in groups. He saw these as geared to managing impressions in front of others - not showing emotions to appear invulnerable, and avoiding the appearance of incompetence by covering up
mistalces. Ln a survey of 569 managers, Mulvey et al. (1996) found that 61% of respondents listed lack of confidence to contribute as a cause for limiting their involvement in team discussions. Chris Argyris (1990) differentiated between one's espoused theory of action and one's theory-in-use. While 1 beiieve 1 operate from one set of principles and precepts, in actual fact, others may see me, especiaiiy under stress, exhibiting behaviour in direct contrast to those principles. Argyris saw the purpose of theories-in-use as avoiding vuinerability, nsk, embarrassment, and the appearance of incompetence. He suggested that the moment the potentiai exists for threat or embarrassment, "rigorous reasoning goes right out the window and defensive reusoning takes over" (1994, p. 80). Argyris coined the phrase "skilled
incompetence" ( 1986) to describe the pattern of cornrnunicating inconsistent messages, acting as if the messages are not inconsistent, making the previous actions undiscussable and making the undiscussability undiscussable. In studies of more than 6,000 people, he has found this phenornenon to be universai, with no rneaswable ciifference by country, age, sex, ethnic identity, education, wedth, power or experience.
In the study by Ryan and Ostreich (1998) referred to previously, at least 70% of those interviewed hesitated to speak up because they felt threatened by possible repercussions. This remained tnie even where there was no evidence that repercussion was likely to occur. When asked to describe the nature of the repercussions they feared, the majority appeared to be directly linked to the threat of embarrassment or appearing vulnerable. These included loss of credibiiity or reputation, lack of career or financial advancement, darnage to one's relationship with the boss, loss of employrnent and interpersonal rejection. The Role of Emotiow The subject of emotions in organizations has been widely researched from a variety of different perspectives (Abrabms, 1988; Albrow, 1992; Hirsc hhorn, 1988; Mumby and Pumarn, 1992; Rafaeli and Sutton, 1987; Schwartz, 1987; Simon, 1989, cited in Berman Brown, 1997). The psychology of emotion hman organizational perspective has been investigated by the authors in books edited by Had(1986), Oksenberg Rorty (1980), and Fineman (1993. cited in Berman Brown, 1997). Al1 agreed that emotion, as 'Wie 'glue' that binds organizations together" (Brown, 1997, p. 249). plays a key role in organizauona.1Me, and that an understanding of emotion. both our own and that of other people, is critical to effective communication, the ability to influence others and collective action. Indeed, Hirschhorn ( 1993) argued that feeling Links meaning and intention and that in Listening to our intemal signais, we are likely to rnake better collective decisions. Yet Western society tends to idehrationality and denigrate emotionality. Phrases such as "the discussion fell to the emotional level, but 1 raised it back up to the rational plane" or "let's not get emotional" demonstrate this duality of reason versus emotion. Nowhere has this bias been more evident than in the corporate world where, until recently, managers have been rneasured on their ability to be in control and non-emotional. Daniel Goleman's concept of "emotional intelligence" (1995) represented a major shift in thinking about personal and professionai excellence. in his most recent book, Workinn with emotional intelligence (1998), he cited research conducted by dozens of different experts in more than 500 organizations into the skills that distinguish the star performers in every field and at every level. As well, he hirnself analysed cornpetence models for 18 1 different positions drawn from 12 1 companies woridwide. Finaily he commissioned a study by Hay/McBer, including in-depth interviews and extensive testing and evaluation of hundreds of workers. Goleman's findings revealed that rather than advanced degrees, IQ or technicai expertise, the single most important factor in detennining the truly outstanding from the "run-of-the- rniii" was the degree to which one had developed the key emotional cornpetencies or EQ. Indeed, in each study, the findings were consistent in citing emotional cornpetencies to be twice as important in contributing to excellence as pure intellect and expertise. His framework suggested that the most successful individuals wiii be emotionally self-aware and self-confident and also able to empathize and communicate openly with others. ïndeed, he described star teams as those whose members have high emotional intelligence and are able to balance lively, ngorous debate and the challenging of ideas with respect for ciifferences, empathy and cornmitment to the collective purpose.
What Goleman does not address is how very diEficult it is to develop and nurture one's emotional intelligence in a society and culture that continues to value reason and intellechml accomplishment over emotional competence. His description of the ideal team environment is enticing, but fails to provide answers to questions of how to assist individuals to become emotionally self-aware or how to develop emotional competence at the team level.
Hochschild (1983) used the term "emotional labor" to describe one's ability to be aware of, evaluate. and manage our own emotions and. to some extent those of others. It included knowing when to show emotions and when not to and assessing what are the appropriate expressions of emotion.
Fineman distinguished between "emotion work and "emotional labor" (1993, p. 249).
Emotion work is the effort one puts into suppressing one's txue feelings in order to be seen as socially acceptable, such as hiding one's boredom at an office party and feigning enjoyment. Emotional labor goes one step further in requiring employees to mask their true feelings and maintain an organizationdiy prescribed stance as part of the job. The increased emphasis on customer service where "the customer is always right" and where one always provides "service with a srnile" would be a clear exarnple of emotional labor.
The danger with emotional labor is that the individual may komeestran@ from her tme self as the gap widens between felt and expressed feelings. This in tum affects CO-worker and tearn member relationships. as the suppression of emotions results in a more stilted dialogue where much of the rich texture of one's "gut" responses to issues is hidden and deemed to be undiscussable. Stone, Patton, and Heen (1999) suggested that ignoriag the feelings in a conversation is almost impossible, that unexpressed emotions will leak into the dialogue and that it is really only at the level of feelings that many ciifficuit problems can be addressed.
Putnarn and Mumby (1993) argued for the replacement of emotional labor with the numiring of "work feelings," those emotions that naturally "emerge from human interaction rather than king imposed by instrumental goals and bureaucratie rationality" (p. 49). Like Goleman, Putnarn and Mumby failed to address the more difficuit issue of how to develop appropriate "work feelings" in a fundamentally rationai organizational environment. Kasl, Marsick and Dechant (1997) suggested that "emotions [continue to bel an anathema in the workplace" (p. 244) and called for fwther research to explore how work tearns cm reframe emotion as a resource for team leaming. The Tendencv to Avoid Conflict Closely linked to the role of emotions in organizational iife is the dificulty people have in dealing with conflict in the normal course of their interpersonal interactions with one another. Conflict, by its very nature, incites the surfacing of a variety of emotions such as fear, embarrassment, shame, anger and rejection. We have already established that the expression of emotion, while gaining greater credibility, is still viewed with some caution and skepticism in the
North Arnerican corporate world. One might expeçt to fmd a tendency to avoid conflict in a review of the relevant literature.
Argyris (1 990) saw people's tendency to avoid conflict and side-step the tough issues as resulting in a system of defensive routines that becorne institutionalized and undiscussable. Jane Mansbndge (1982) talked about the tendency in both larger society and srnaller cornrnunïties to avoid conflict. Indeed, she suggested that the hierarchy within organizations has a psychological function of serving to protect individual workers from excessive contact with others on potentially adversarial matters. She likened it to an "institutional buffer zone" (p. 126) that otherwise protects workers from one another and saw it as king threatened in egalitarian organizations where hierarchy is eiïminated. One could argue that a team-based environment, with its emphasis on collective decision-rnaking and collaborative processes, is similar to an egaiitarian structure in its lack of such a buffer zone. Mansbndge cited fears of appearing foolish, of personal attack, of losing friends or making enemies, and even subconscious fears of physical violence aü as contributors to confiict king ignored and actively avoided. In studies with a New England cornmunity group and staff in a hot line and crisis centre, she found the existence of a "mie of unanirnity" which stated
that "what consensus means here is that if you disagree with something, with what the majonty of people are saying . . . you keep your mouth shut" (p. 132). Brockrnan (1996) distinguished between cognitive and affective conflict. He suggested that cognitive conflict, which occurs with differences in perspectives and judgrnents, helps to identifi potential problem solutions and is therefore both useful and valuable. Affective conflict,
however, he considered to be dysfûnctional because it tends to be emotionai and is often aimed
at a person, not an issue. His study of 164 managers from 53 management tearns demonstrated that cognitive confict enhanced the quality of decisions made while affective confiict erded
decision quality. He cautioned tearn leaders to strive for conflict which is issue-focused and to be watchful for the possibility that cognitive confiict may tum into affective conflict. His suggestion that team leaders consider ending a meeting rather than risk a shift to affective conflict would seem to run counter to what the Iiterature is saying about the importance of bringing the exnotional dimension into team dynarnics. Further, it may cause difficult issues to go underground as members attempt to remain rational and civil to one another. In the extreme, it may short-circuit the group's attempt to move through the healthy "storming" phase of their development, and instead, keep them operating at a more superficial, polite and Iess effective level. Marilyn Men(1994) referred to her own consulting experience with teams in examining why conflict tended to be dealt with in covert ways. Despite the fact that team members could often provide a iist of the advantages of directly confronting conflict, they rarely did so because of fears of "opening up a can of wonns" (p. 4). She further reported that in adrninistering the Thomas Kihann Conflict Mode Instrument (Thomas & Kiimann, 1977, cited in Laiken, 1994)
to approxùnately 600 middie and senior managers, fuily two-thirds found their highest scores in "avoiding" or "accommodating" over "competing," " consensus" or "collaboration" as a description of their most frequently used style.
Smith and Berg's work (1987) on the paradoxical nature of group life and the impact of paradox on group dynarnics seemed to summarize much of what is revealed in the literature about the ongin of undiscussables. They suggested that "individual members experience the group as king fiiied with contradictory and opposing emotions, thoughts and actions that coexist inside the group" (p. 15). As group members struggle to manage the tensions generated by these contradictory and opposing forces, the essential process dynamics of the group are created. In ac know ledging the importance to group development of members' ability to disclose information about themselves and perceptions of each other, the authors revealed the paradoxes of disclosure and trust symbolized by the conundmm of "a cycle that depends upon itself to get started (p. 115). in order to disclose difficult information about oneself or others, one has to tmst that
others will be tnistworthy. The fear that they won't be prevents the individual from disclosing.
As a result, the information stays unshared and becomes undiscussable. When this dynarnic is
multiplied by the number of group members present, one can see how quickly a web of deception and hidden matenai is generated. indeed, the very expression of opposing reactions, conflicts and feelings may threaten the group's sense of its own viability and result in even greater resistance and repression of dificult, potentially threatening material.
Zohar ( 1995) distinguished between the paradoxical tensions that exist at both "surface" and "deep stmcturai" levels. He saw these "root paradoxes" (p. 12) as king embedded in the core values, beliefs and vision of the organization, and therefore more difficult to uncover. in a case study of a non-profit organization for the deaf and hearing impaired, he described an "analysis-paralysis" syndrome which was preventing the senior management tearn from
developing and irnplernentiog a new organizationai vision. It wasn't until the team had dealt with their unresolved, conflicting feelings about the previous Executive Director that they were able
to see the paradoxical tension between their desire for change and their belief that they were not
capable of effecting positive change. What the literature seems to suggest is that people believe that confiict is inimicable to teamwork. try unsuccessfully to avoid open discussion of their opposing views, and fail to
develop ways to integrate their positions to solve problems. A study of 60 self-rnanaging teams with 540 employees (Alper, Tjosvold & Law, 1998) indicated that disaping with each other's
ideas cm be used to strengthen teamwork. Through "constructive controversy" (p. 36), team members cm develop the confidence that they can deal with issues and create new solutions.
In summary, in this section I have looked at tearn dynamics, particularly as it relates to openness in interpersonal communication. In so doing, 1 have examined the literanire that links
an open, candid communication system to team effectiveness. I have also explored the topic of undiscussables, what they are and why they are formed. The latter would seem to be the threat of embarrassment, the tendency to value reason over emotion and the avoidance of conflict in workplace interactions.
Sensemaking and the Role of Mental Models In reviewing the literature that addresses this topic, the issue of how people make sense of their worid, including the role of the assumptions they make, surfaces repeatedly. In the section which follows. 1 will examine sensemaking at both the individual and tearn level. 1 will then look at a number of processes and tools that can be used to help team members become more aware of the impact that their unexamined assumptions have on their team functioning. in the preceding sections, 1have explored the difficulties that team members have in king explicit in their interactions about what they think or feel. 1 have concluded that people leam that king emotional is not valued in the corporate world. Further, they discover that king in conflict with others will iikely resdt in the surfacing of feelings they would rather ignore or keep pnvate. Findy, they leam to avoid showing their Milnerability or embarrassrnent in front of others. The question that seems to need answering is: where and how did people learn to hide this side of themselves? Robert Fritz (1989, cited in Senge et al., 1994) suggested that we each have a set of core beliefs, or "childhood lessons learned" (Marshak & Katz, 1994, p. 10 1) about how the world works and about our capacity to have impact on that world. Fritz believed that this worldview is learned from our parents and other prirnary figures early in our lives. Because these beliefs corne to us fiom perceiveci authority figures, they remain largely unchallenged and are often below the level of conscious awareness. As we interact in the world, we add to this body of core concepts und, as adults, we have developed a deep weil of untested, fdy enuenched assumptions or "mental models" (Senge, 1990) which determine our thinking and actions. This concept has been described in a variety of ways by many authors. Senge defined mental models as "deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures or images that influence how we understand the world and how we take action" (1990, p. 8). Argyris
( 1994) saw them as programs or "sets of rules we use to design our own actions and interpret the actions of others" (p. 80). We retrieve them whenever we need to diagnose a problem, invent or size up a solution or construct the socid world (Mead, 1962; Blurner, 1969; Goffman, 1974; Stryker, 1980; Walsh, 1995, cited in Carley, 1997). individuais have many mental models, utilize different mental models at different times. and adapt or alter their mental models over time. Other wnters have used the term "attributions" to refer to the opinions we hold about others based on our observations of them, coupled with some interpretation we make of what we have seen or heard (Brown. 19%, p. 27). Brookfield (1990) stayed with the more simple tenn "assumptions" and defined hem as "those taken-for-granted ideas, cornmonsense beliefs, and self-evident rules of thumb that inform our thoughts and actions" (p. 177). He saw them as the interpreûve glue that binds the variow meaning schemes compnsing our structures of understanding. As indicated in Chapter one, Mezirow labelleci mental models "meaning perspectives" ( 1990). Marshak and Katz ( 1994) talked about the "prism" through which we perceive and make sense of the world and saw it including: childhood lessons leamed; beliefs, assurnptions and values; formal theones and systems of thought; paradigms; and organizational and soc ietal cul tue.
Regardless of the tenninology used, what drives us to form attributions, make assumptions, adopt mental models or view the world through our fdtered lenses is our need to understand what is happening in the world we inhabit. Weick (1995) saw sensemaking as cyclicd, begiming "as individuais form unconscious and conscious anticipations and assumptions, which serve as predictions about future events" (Louis, M. 1980, as, cited in
Weick. 1995, p. 4). Sensemaking creates order out of chaos, makes meaning out of confusion and helps us to feel in control of our lives, Indeed, it is a natural process which cannot be cded. Team Mental Models The application of mental models to a team setting is clear. Individual mindsets corne together to form team mental models which represent shared or social knowledge (Carley ,
1997). Klimoski and Mohammed (1994) defined these as the shared cognitive structures that groups use to represent and make sense of knowledge and information. Group members collectively work to understand the issues and situations which confront them through these cognitive structures. They cited the variety of terms attached to the concept of a tearn mental model, including: cognitive maps (Axeirod, 1976); group cognition (Bonhman, Shapiro & Heradstveit, 1988); pupbelie f structure (Innami, 1992); and shared frames (Panzano, 1992, cited in Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994). Schein (1985) used the term "basic assumptions" to mean "a system of shared meaning that govems collective perceptions, tboughts, feelings, and actions" (cited in Schneider & Shrivastava, 1988, p. 494). He saw them operating unconsciously, mostly unexamined in a "taken-for-granted" fashion. Kiimoski and Mohammed (1994) addressed the question of what is meant by "shared and argued for some level of awareness of the degree of sharing in order for a team mental mode1 to be in existence. Levine, Resnkk and Nggins (1993, cited in Klirnoski & Mohammed, 1994) suggested that unless tearn members "know what their coiieagues 'know"' (p. 422), unless they consciously and exphcitly negotiate and agree on what they hold in cornmon, a tearn mental mode1 cannot exist. The tenn "cognitive map" (Carley, 1997) is used by researchers to refer to a forrn of network-based representation of an individuai's thought processes. In a study of eight different project teams and a total of 41 individuals, researchers used an approach called map analysis to extract, analyze and combine representations of individuals' mental models as cognitive maps. From the individual maps, researchers looked for similarities and combined maps to generate a tearn map. Using map analysis, they could look at the nature of team mental models and the extent to which sharing was necessary for effective teamwork.
Results indicated that there was, on average, greater sharing in the successful than in the non-successful groups, the tearn map of successful groups tended to be larger (more concepts were depicted) and the degree of sharing higher. Finally, members of successful groups tended to bring more ideas to the table than did non-successful groups. It would appear then, that successful teams are able to share more information, generate more ideas and build on one another's thoughts, ideas and opinions. They are able to make their individual mental models explicit, engage in dialogue about these and ultimately create a greater body of shared knowledge. It should be noted that although shared mental models are often viewed as functional (e.g. facilitating coordination, fostering effxiency, promoting predictability), they have their "dark side" as weii. The team may under-utilize its individual and diverse resources by over reliance on shared information (Levine et al., 1993, cited in Kiimoski & Mohammed, 1994, p. 4 19).
When there is too much sïmiiarity in tem members' thought processes and a reluctance to diverge from the majority opinion, the team may be operating in a "groupthink mode (Janis, 1982, cited in Allen, 19%). Gersick and Hackman (1990) used the term "habitua1 routines" to refer to the automatic, unexarnined. often unconscious ways in which a group responds or behaves in particular situations. They highlighted the tenacity with which these routines are held, particularly when they protect rnembers from feeling Milnerable or dealing with dificuit, potentially threatening issues. This point bars some siniilarity to Argyris' belief that individual defensive reasoning can result in collective defensive routines designed to protect members from embarrassrnent or threat. Argyris distinguished between Model I and Model U theories-in-use. Each theory operates from a very different mental mode1 about collective action. The fundamental goal for teams operating with Model 1 beliefs is to remain in control, to win and not to upset people (1 990, p. 13). The goveming values of Model II theory-in-use are "vaiid information. informed choice, and responsibility to monitor how well the choice is implemented (p. 104). While
Model 1 necessitates covering up errors and avoiding dificult issues, Mode1 LI is built on honesty and encouraging oneself and others to speak the tmth. even when it may make people feel vulnerable. Argyris used team action maps to depict a self-perpetuating pattern of interdependence among goveming values, mental models and group behaviour. Appendix B depicts an action map adapted from Argyris' model.
Ryan and Ostreich described a "'cycle of mistrust" ( 1998, p. 18) which begins with negative assumptions that drive self-protective behaviours in a self-reinforcing pattern between managers and their employees. The authors suggested that the cycle can start anywhere, but tends to begin with one person's negative assumptions or mental models about another. While they did not specificalty relate this cycle to that of a team environment, it is my experience that the spiral of negative assumptions/self-protective behaviour is rampant in teams and is often at the core of tearn mental models about what is or is not acceptable to Say or do in front of the leader or even other tearn mernbers. Kantor and Lonstein (1994) used "structural dynamics" to diagnose the invisible structures in the relationships among people. These stmctures are based not only on their histones together and separately, but on the assumptions they make about each other. Because they are usually operating below the level of consciousness, these stnictures are not readily accessible to tearn members for examination. Wor- with Mental Models While there is clearly a wide body of fiterature which supports the theory that individuais will engage with others through the fdter of their own lenses, the assumptions and attributions they make and the mental models they hold, much of this literature does not address the more difficult question of how to work with these structures to facilitate more productive interaction- The problem is not in making the assumptions or fonning the mental models; rather, it is in not testing their validity or accuracy with what is actually happening, with cmntreality.
In her research on language and its impact on tearn dynamics, Anne Domeiion ( 1996) suggested that fmt impressions often shape subsequent actions and conversations. Yet we rarely challenge these impressions or examine the conversations that resuh from these initial attributions we make. There is some difference of opinion as to the degree to whkh individuals are aware of the mental models they hold. Some consider them to be inherently unobservable, below the level of conscious awareness, tacit. Weick suggested that sense may be in the eye of the beholder and that "seeing what one believes and not seeing that for which one has no beliefs are centrai to sensemaking" (1995, p. 87). Others saw the mental mode1 as an "emergent structure" (Carley, 1997) which oniy comes into king as it is articulated. My own experience in working with individuals and teams would support the view chat rnany of our mental models operate below the level of everyâay awareness but that with the use of reflection and productive reasoning tools (Argyris, 1990), we can lemto make the tacit conscious. Argyns appears to support this view as evidenced in much of his writing on how to heip individuals becorne aware of their unexamined thinking. Senge's writing on the disciplines of the learning organization, particularly his concept of team ledgadds credence to this line of thought (1990). Marilyn Laiken suggested that the levei of authenticity and depth of self-awareness and disclosure required to achieve this is rarely seen in the "game-playing, politicized world of organizational life" ( 1997, p. 37). She identified four levels of readiness to demonstrate such authenticity: 1. Lack of awareness (unconscious incornpetence)* 2. Awareness without action (conscious incompetence) 3. Ability to act on awareness, with effort (conscious competence) 4. Ability to hold the polarities, and maintain the communication (unconscious competence) (p. 37) At ievel four, individuals are able to examine their own assumptions, listen to and value others' beliefs and viewpoints and engage in genuine dialogue to reach shared understanding. The ianer is considered unconscious because it happens naturally, without conscious effort. It has become theory-in-action. Laiken saw the movement fkom level one to four requiring the use of tools such as Chns Argyris' ladder of inference, David Bohm's concept of dialogue, examining mental models and engaging in "polarity management" (Johnson, 1992).
Will Schutz' six "levels of tnith" (1994) focus more on the depth of awareness an individual has about his feelings and less on the movement toward unconscious effort where his awareness has been intemdized into everyday behaviour.
* The original source of the unconscious/conscious cornpetence mode1 is credited to Bandura, A. (1974. Dec.). Behavior theory and the mdeis of man. nieAmerican29. 859-869. A review of the literature reveals a variety of these and other tools which can be utilized as vehicles for surfacing and working with unexamined and/or unconscious mental models and undiscussables.
As indicated in Chapter One, the lefi-hand column exercise was based on Chris Argyris' and Donald Schon's two-column research method (Argyris and Schon, 1974)- (see Appendix A). The concept involves distinguishing benveen what one says and does (what is directly observable) and what one is thinking and feeling (what is not directly obsewable).
Helping team members to distinguish between single and double-lmp learning (Argyris
& Schon, 1990) is another way of facilitating the examination of mental models which are either unknown or known but undiscussable. The Ladder of Inference (Argyris, 1990, p. 88) highiights the way in which individuals make quick judgments about one another based on unchailenged mental models. Argyris identified four mngs on the ladder which lead individuals from relatively observable data such as conversations, through culturally understood meanings and individual inferences or assumptions, all the way to theories of action based on these assumptions (See Appendix Cl.
Rick Ross has added to Argyris* mode1 (Senge et al., 1994, p. 243) to provide greater detail- Team memkrs can use the ladder to help them test their assumptions, name the undiscussables and enhance their understanding of one another.
The concept of dialogue, originating with the work of physicist David Bohm (1989), has been further developed by a number of people (Schein, 1994; Isaacs, 1996, 1999; Etlinor & Gerard, 1998). It is a communication practice that helps people change the way they think together so hat they can tmly hear one another, see the issues they are dealing with in a new way and take coordinated action to address them. Dialogue requires a specific set of skills, including suspending judgement, identiming and suspending assumptions, attentive Listening and inquiry and reflection. As indicated previously. dialogue differs from discussion in its emphasis on inquiry or seeking to understand as opposed to defending a position. Eliinor and Gerard (1998) suggested that most groups will cycle between the firs< two stages of group development - "pseudocornmunity" and "chaos" (p. 159). Groups who practise and use the skills of dialogue will be more able to move through these into the later phases of "emptying" and bbcomrnunity"where the deeper, more contentious issues tend to be raised. The formal and ofien lengthy process of dialogue emphasïzes open-ended conversation and de-emphasizes decision-making. As such, it may not be as adaptable to many of the cornplex issues requiring quick resolution tfiat teams deal with on a regular basis. The dialogue skiii-sets as listed above are seen to be critical in the new knowledge-based, networked economy where the abiiity to talk and think together is a vital source of cornpetitive advantage. Experts in organizational effectiveness are calling for a balance of inquiq and advocacy in business conversations. Ross and Roberts (1994) made the point that managers in Western corporations have received ample training and are highly skiiled in making their positions known, arguing points - in advocating. They have significantly iess training and capability in asking questions, seeking information - in inquiring. Effective conversations are ones where individuals "seek to understand before they seek to be understood (Covey, 1989, p. 235); they are conversations where people may express their points of view and explain their reasoning while aiso encouraging others to challenge their thinking. The problem in many team conversations aises when individuals operate from hi@ advocacynow inquiry, imposing their own viewpoints, without inquiring as to what others think.
These discussions tend to operate like ping-pong games, with the bail (Le. ideas. opinions) being volleyed back and forth at a rapid Pace with little time to reflect or respond. In this type of environment, mental models are not explored, people feel unheard, undiscussables fmd a fertile breeding ground and dialogue closes down.
For true leaniing and collaborative decision-making to occur, there needs to be two-way communication with a balance of advocacy and inquiry. Ross and Roberts (1994) outlined a number of protocols for bdancing advocacy and inquiry. Becorning skilied at advocacy involves making one's thinking pmcess visible by walking people up one's ladder of inference and publicly testing one's conclusions and assumptions (p. 256). irnproving one's ability to inquire includes asking others to make their thinking process visible by gently walking them down their ladders of inference with the use of open-ended questions such as: "What leads you to conclude that?"; "Mat causes you to Say that?"
Stephen Brookfield (1990) has used "critical incidents" in workshops on critical thinking by asking participants to wnte brief descriptions of significant events in their lives and then to engage in coliaborative inductive analysis of the assurnptions embedded in the descriptions. An adaptation of the cntical incident approach is Kleiner and Roth's (1997) "learning histones," a method of capturing organizational leaniing. The commentary or narrative of a company's ment set of critical events, product launches or change initiatives utilizes Argyris' two-column approach in order to enhance the learning and raise issues that people would like to tak about but have not had the courage to discuss openly. Roberts and Boswell(1994) described a "multiple perspectives" exercise used to open up or widen a tearn's perspectives or points of view from which team members regard a problem. The process involves members rotating between roles of key stakeholders in order to encourage them to see an important issue from as many vantage points as possible.
In surnrnary, in this section 1 looked at sensemaking and the role that assumptions and mental models play in detennining the quaiity of communication that exists in tearns. in particular, 1 exploreci the concept of mental models at both individual and team levels and their contribution to the proliferation of undiscussables. 1 then exarnined the variety of tools available for team members to use in order to raise the level of collective understanding and candor.
1 agree with the architects of each of these tools that they will, used effectively and over time, make a significant difference to the quality of team communication. My concem is in gaining the cornmitment of team members to engage in what is often a lengthy process at a tirne where teams form and refom quickly, mernbership changes are the mle rather than the exception and where the pressure to accomplish task goals is intense. My expenence with teams suggests that these skills are not easüy learned and that for many. the cornmitment to increased self-awareness through ongoing nflection and inquiry is not a high prionty. Further, 1 question whether the Western corporate culture is ready to embrace, to the extent required, the values inherent in takuig this type of journey.
Psychodynamic Theory and Team Functioning Because tearnwork is a social phenornenon, relying on the ability of individual rnembers to collaborate in accomplishing a cornmon goal, it tends to touch people where they are most vulnerable -- in their insecwities, fears and neuroses. As a result, there is a wide body of literature which attempts to make sense of the psychological dimensions of organizationd bfe. In this section, 1 will examine the psychodynamic literature as it relates to the formation and surfacing of undiscussables in teams. 1 wiU first examine the concept of self from a number of psychodynamic perspectives; this wiil be followed by a review of the psychological defenses against anxiety; finaüy, 1 wiii look at the application of this to groups and teams in organizations. Concgpt of Self Fundamental to a discussion of the psychodynarnics of tearn functioning is the concept of
"self." Given that a tearn is a collection of individuals, each of whom cornes to the group with a clearly defined sense of who he is, an exploration of what constitutes sense of self would seem to be a reasonable starting point. Freud's understanding of self rested on his concept of the ego. He saw self-esteern as direcdy related to one's ego ideal. He suggested that the greater the incongniity between a person's idealized version of herself and her actual self-image, the lower the self-esteem; the smaller the incongruity, the higher the self-esteem. The object-relations school of thought, modelled after the work of Melanie Klein (de Board, 1978) distinguished between the "tme self' and the "false self' (Czander, 1993, p.
70). Unable to meet her tme wishes and needs, the child shapes herself to what is expected of her; she becomes what her mother wants her to be and aàapts to her environment at the expense of her tme feelings and desires. Hirschhorn (1993) suggested that people bring their unresolved dependency issues into their work lives as they use one another as transitional objects. Kohut (cited in Czander, 1993, p. 75) proposed a theory of self psychology in which the self develops out of the child's relationship with his parents. When there is a good, nurturing relationship with the parents where the child is affirmed, and where the parent is seen as an
ideaLized image with whom he can identify, the child develops a healthy sense of self. Kohut links problems with work as reflecting underlying disorders of the self. These disorders are ciirec tly related to employees' experiences with their respective parents, and their parents' disorders. The concept of the shadow was bom out of Jung's "shadow personaiity" (Gemmill, 1986), encornpassing the belief that when one's sense of self is threatened, one learns to hide the part that is unacceptable. Abrams and Zweig (199 1) saw our shadow selves evolving out of a complex environment in which we leam from parents, teachers, clergy and friends, what is proper moral behaviour and what is not. This would seem to be aligned with Fritz* (1989) belief that our worldview and core assumptions about what we should and shouldn't be is shaped by our parents and other authority figures. Regardless of the origin, there is agreement that the individual's unconscious desires, needs and anxieties, her shadow, will surface in the form of uncontrollable impulses, slips of the longue, habits she simply can't break and contradictory tendencies moving her in opposition to the way she intended to go (Fortest, 1991; Sinetar, in Abrams & Zweig, 199 1). This last example bears striking similarities to Argyris' concept of "skilled incornpetence" ( 1986) with its emphasis on unintended consequences. Whatever the school of thought, the common thread seerns to be that problems with work are, in part, a reflection of underlying disorders of the self and the emergence of the shadow in defence of those disorders. Further, the Literature suggests that al1 individuais harbour
"wounds" related to their self images and that these wounds will surface and be played out in work relationships. Scbutz (1994) saw the self as being "at the hem of al1 human functioning"
(p. XV) and problems with self-esteem as a significant factor in what is wrong in the workplace.
Tearns do not fail because they disagree, or because they do not have cornmon goals, or because they do not include certain personality types. They don? work because one or more people are rigid, and a person is rigid because his or her selfconcept is threatened- (p. 1 17) fenses winst Anxiety
Centrai to the issue of sense of self is the anxiety the individual experiences when her self-esteem is threatened. The literature is unanimous in naming feelings of anxiety as the
fundamental rom of distorted or aiienated relationships at work (Czander, 1993; de Board,
1978; Diarnond, 1993; Fonest, 199 1; Gilmore & Krantz, 1985; Gould Wilkinson, Voyer & Ford, 1997; Hirschhorn, 199 1,1993; Menzies Lyth, 1989; Smith & Berg, 1987; Schneider & Shnvastava. 1988: Stein, 19%;). Individuals develop a variety of, often unconscious, defense
mechanisms in order to avoid experiencing these feelings, al1 of which find their mots in the work of Freud and Klein (deBoard, 1978).
"Repression" involves suppressing or burying, out of the conscious mind, thoughts, feelings, images and memories which create anxiety for the individual. "Splitting" happens when we separate the good aspects of our lives from the bad. We then "project" undesirable qualities ont0 others and "introject" desirable ones into ourselves. "Tramference" occurs when we project our unresolved feelings and attitudes from past relationships (parent, sibling, etc.) ont0 another person in the present. "Countertransference" is projection by the consultant (or therapist in a therapeutic relationship) ont0 the client. Al1 of these defense mechanisms are particularly prevalent in the context of author@ relationships such as those which exist between manager and subordinate or team leader and member. The Psvchodvnamics of Grou~s
At the core of the psychodynamic frarnework for looking at group functioning lies the notion that certain aspects of the functioning of work groups and their members operate at an unconscious level. A number of authors have suggested that groups manage their anxiety by developing and deploying a set of social defenses. In her siudy of nursing practices in a British hospital, Isabel MenWes fmt described social defenses as a senes of rituais which are estabiished as a way of inducing thoughtlessness or "not thinking" in order to avoid feeling anxious (Hirschhorn, 1993). Hirschhorn saw social defenses as depersonalizing relationships at work and distorting the group's capacity to accomplish its task. As indicated in Chapter One. Wilfred Bion (Rioch. 1975) disthguished benueen the work group and the basic assurnption group. The work group is that aspect of group functioning which has to do with the real task of the group. This exists in a cornmittee which has corne together to plan a program or staff an organization, or in an intact team which is developing its strategic plan for the upcoming year. The basic assumption group is that aspect of the group which is operating from unexarnined, tacit beliefs which ârive its behaviour. According to Bion, there are three distinct emotional States of groups from which one cm deduce three basic assumptions. The fight/flight assumption is that the group has to either fight or flee from an enemy; in a work setting, the enemy is often seen to be the manager or leader.
The dependency assumption is that the group needs to be dependent on a powerful leader, it is often demonstrated by silence, withdrawal and reliance on the leader- The pairing assumption suggests that two members of the group will join together to produce a powerful saviour or messiah; Hirschhorn (1991) used the tenn "fight/conformist1*(p. 64) to describe the group that operates from a pairing assumption; he described the dynamic as one in which, rather than passively withdrawing, group members rally behind a single point of view to the exclusion of others. Bion saw the basic assumption group operating unconsciously as a social defense against the group's anxiety about its work. The social defenses operate through the use of the psychodynamic concepts of splitting, repression, regression, projection and projective identification. Members of a dependent group split off their capacities and project them ont0 an individual or another group; in the pauing group, the splining and projective identification occur in relation to a couple: the fighvflight group offers the classic example of the splitting and projection of bad aspects onto anoher (Stein, 1996).
Diamond ( 1993) identifieci three types of regressive or defensive work groups,
homogenized, institutionaüzed and autocratie, each characterized by a predominant coping pattern designed tobbcontainanxious feelings of potential rejection and loss of affiiiation" (p. 99). He contrasted this with the resilient group which engages in a "reflective process that
prornotes membership awareness of fantasies and covert actions" (p. 109). The latter seems to be synonymous with Argyris and Schon's Mode1 Il organization with its emphasis on doubie- Ioop learning, sharing of information and minimal interpersonal defenses (Argyris, 1990).
Hirschhom ( 1993) described a "reparative culture" (p. 228) which appears to be similar to Diamond's resilient group. In a reparative culture, mernbers acknowledge both the good and
the bad direct1y rather than projecting the sense of badness ont0 others. As a resuit, a reflective environment is fostered where individuals learn from failures and successes. Regardes of the school of thought or terminology adopted, the social defenses serve to prevent both the individual and the group from experiencing anxiety. They are generaily tacit and, in remaining unexamined, result in the proliferation of undiscussable issues. Long and
Newton ( 1995) criticized the approach advocated in Senge's learning organization ( 1990) for its Iack of attention to the impact of unconscious processes on learning. They saw people's unresolved dependency issues increasing their resistance to working and learning together and resulting in the development of defenses against tmly collaborative working relationships. Menzies (1989) suggested that these defenses appear in the structure of the institution itself in the form of habituai and even ritualized behaviour and permeate its whole way of functioning. She described a complex web of self and other-deception as follows: . . . It is obvious that people do not Say what they really mean even when they honestly and sincerely Say what they consciously think, let alone when they do not. . . . In the institutionai setting it is not always unconscious thought and feelings one needs to understand, but also the implicit; what is not king said. Thoughts conscious in some people, or even shared in twos and threes, are not openly shared with everyone in a work situation where they could be realistically and constnictively used. (p. 286) Relevant Research In this section, 1 will look at the existing research that cornes closest to this snidy and identim the gaps that rernain. 1 will demonstrate how this approach wiil both add to the current body of knowledge and attempt to close the gaps. As indicated earlier, a variety of research studies have demonstrated the positive impact of open communication on team functioning. Equally as many have looked at the ways in which tearn memben engage in defensive processes in order to avoid difficult issues, thus rende~g hem undiscussable. Where the Iiterature appears to be lacking is in reporting on research which addresses the issue of how to achieve this level of openness or how to surface and deal effectively with the undiscussables. hdeed, there is Little acknowledgernent of the fa~tthat this is a truly difficult joumey and one successfully undertaken by few tearns. Chris Argyris highlighted the gap between knowledge and action and called on research which produces "actionable knowledge" (1993. p. 3 1). knowledge which can be readiiy applied in organizations. He applauded Hackrnan's (1987, cited in Argyris, 1993) normative mode1 of what is required for groups to be effective and his attempt to make explicit the challenges involved in moving toward actionable knowledge. At the same tirne, he criticized Hackman for his failure to identiQ explicit models for how groups could deal with the difficult stages of building the team and learn to deal with the challenging interpersonal issues which will inevitably arise. Argyris suggested that, as researchers "we have a responsibility to try to change defensive routines in order to develop empincal knowledge about their alterability" (1993, p. 40).
In studies by Stasser, Taylor and Hanna (1989, cited in Stasser, 1992) regarding the exchange of information.in groups. researchers found that the groups spent the majority of their time talking about information that ail members already had and relatively little time exchanging unshared information. In fact, most of the unshared information was never mentioned during their discussion. Equally disconcening was the finding that stmcturing discussion, which seemingly should improve matters, actually led to discussion king more dominated by information previously shared. Urging groups to discuss more or invoking procedures that would encourage a more systematic review of information did not necessarily aiieviate the problem and, in some cases, may have even aggravateci it. Stasser coined the term "hidden profiles" (p. 56) to refer to situations where individuals in the group cannot see that the collective profile of information favours an alternative that to each individuai appears to be inferior. Hidden profiles can be revealed if members do, in fact, pool their unshared infonnation. When faced with a hidden profile, the group potentially cari make a better decision than any one of the rnembers alone. Unfortunately, the information sarnpling mode1 suggested that groups will often fail to discover a hidden profile precisely because they tend to discuss already shared information and fail to exchange unshared information. Even when unshared information was mentioned during discussions, it tended to have little impact on a group's decision and was rarely repeated in a subsequent conversation. Kasl, Marsick, and Dechant (1997) called for further research into a number of areas related to group dyna~csand tearns, particularly in the area of how work tearns can refrarne emotion as a resource for team learning.
Gersick and Hackman (1990) acknowledged that the habitual routines that protect a group from having to deal with negative sociœmotionai issues are particularly difficult to change.
They suggested that action research may be required to investigate the conditions required for groups to develop meta-routines which assist them in learning and dealing with the consequences of their defensive processes.
in our view, additional research aimed at investigating further the ways in which groups succeed and fail at keeping their habitual routines under control is likely to result in greater knowledge not only about group-level habits, but also about the fundamental processes that operate when groups of people take collective action within larger social systerns. (p. 95)
A review of recent doctoral theses revealed that a variety of issues related to team dynamics were studied, some of which highlighted issues of openness and tacit processes (Davis, 1996;
Dionne, 1998; Gordon, 1992; Guerin, 1995; Isaacs, 199 1; Oktay-Fuat, 1997; Tulin, 1996; Zohar, 1994). With the exception of Joan-May Gordon (1992) who introduced organizational learning approaches into a suburban school district's decision-making practices, none of them atternpted to work with those processes using an action research approach.
The research study which most closely paraliels my own was Charles Henry Smith's
( 1985) examination of the effects of a psychodynamic training process on work groups. Experirnental groups underwent psychodynarnic training designed to surface unconscious issues. group myths, projections and other processes outside of awareness that appeared to be debilitating to group effectiveness. A comparison with control groups who were given no rraining indicated support for the use of a psychodynamic system model in explaining work task effectiveness. Where this study differed was in its lack of description of the journey the experimental groups took as they attempted to sucface these previously buried issues.
In Knowled~efor action (1993),Argyris describeci a five-year case study of his work with a senior management team in a professional service organization using many of the productive reasoning tools referred to earlier. He too suggested that few studies have been conducted about how to overcome organizational defensive routines. His research would seern to be sirnilar to mine in its intent to work, over tirne, with an intact team to help them uncover and deal with their defensive processes. The major difference was in the length of time he worked with hem, with my study king of shorter duration. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan School of Management Center for Organizational Leaming has also undertaken a research project which, while similar to my own, differed in its complexity and size. Their jowney, based on a joint project between MIT researchers and AutoCo Epsilon vehicle development program, is documented in a detailed leaming history which is designed to portray the project as participants experienced it (Roth & Kleiner, 1996).The MIT consultants worked with a core "learning team" of Epsilon managers as well as up to 10engineers involved in production over a 3 1/2 year tirneframe. The intent of the study was to examine the impact of applying the organizational learning concepts embedded in the work of Chris Argyris and Peter Senge to the design and production of the next model of the Epsilon luxury car. While Argyris (1993) cited positive results, including an increase in Model II and a decrease in Model I behaviours, this occurred over a five-year period during which he worked consistently and intensively with team members. Mïï"s results also indicated significant change
tow ard greater openness and honesty among project team members. Indeed, the researchers were able to demonstrate tangible business results relating to quality, production launch the and customer satisfaction. The Dialogue Project at MIT (Isaacs, 1996) has conducted research into the use of
dialogue in organizational seüings. These have involved action research with a variety of groups in the impact of dialogue in creating social change.
While these results are encouraging, in each case, they were achieved over a protracteci period of tirne (five and three and a half years respectively) with a team whose rnembership remained static. With the rampant change facing organizations today, few teams remain together for even one year. Consuitants who choose to work with teams must discover ways to assist
them in doing this important work in much shorter time frames. In addition, team members need to develop the capabiiity to transfer their leamings from one tearn environment to another.
It was my intention in this research study to examine the impact of a teaming process conducted over no more than one year. in addition, 1 hoped to provide the kind of detaikd description of the joumey, including the thoughts and feelings of tearn members that, aside from
Argyns' five-year study, is, as yet. not available in the literature. CEiAPl'ER TEIREE: CHARmG THE JOURNEY
This chapter outlines the research methodology us& to address both the broad purpose articulated and the specific questions posed. Justification will be gîven for placing this study within the qualitative research paradigm, and the rationale for choosing the action research approach will be presented. Ethical issues wiii be explored and the design outiined, including relevant background of the organization, selection of and negotiation with participants, description of the project design, the use of grounded theory and emergent design, the role of the researcher and the steps taken to deal with ethical issues and concerns.
The Qualitative Paradigrn The growing interest in qualitative inqujr in education represents more than a mere refining of existing rnodels of inquiry. It retlects the beginning of a new way of thinking about the nature of knowledge and how it can be created. (Eisner in Hunt, 1992, p. 11 1) The qualitative or interpretive mode1 sees "reality as socially constmcted, complex . . . everchanging" (Glesne & Peshkin, 1992, p. 6), and evolutionary. Qualitative research sees theory as generated from data which ernerges from the participants. "The researcher and [participant] interact to influence one another and are inseparably interconnecte# (Borg & Gall, p. 384).
Many social scientists see qualitative research as the approach of choice for understanding human behaviour" (Brieschke, 1992, p. 173). Oldfather and West compare qualitative research with its openness, unpredictability and interdependence between researcher and participant to jazz w ith its unique, unpredictable improvisations and the inter-connectedness between perforrner and audience ( 1994, p. 22). The assumption within the positivist tradition that it is possible for the researcher to be objective and unbiased and to remain detached fiom both the 'field' of study and the participants (Glesne & Peshkin, 1992; Borg & Gall, 1989) is not shared by many qualitative researchers. Indeed, the qualitative researcher often engages in a long-tenn interaction with her
participants in order to "interpret how the various participants in a social serting construct the world around them" (Glesne and Peshkin, 1992, p. 6). B y necessity, the focus shifts from enswing researcher objectivity to examining the impact of researcher bias and subjectivity on the research process.
My interests as a researcher led me to an area of inquiry which, by its very nature, was
subjective. It sought to understand the lived experience of participants, from their individual
points of view, as they participated in a teaming process which wouid assist them in understanding thernselves and their coiieagues more fully. Such an inquiry rquired an approach which aiiowed for openness to discover the nature of the phenomenon under investigation, as opposed to one in which the re-her already held a preconceived opinion about the issue. It asked the researcher to "understand the meanings that workers attribute to particular events, the feelings they harbor about their work world and the intentions that shape their relationships to CO-workers,bosses, and their own ambitions" (Hirschhorn, 1993, p. 244).
Action Research My decision to use Action Research was a natural one, as this is one of the research methodologies widely used in organization development. Indeed, it is an approach chat 1 have utilized extensively in my organization development consulting practice with a variety of client groups in working with them to deal with many organizational issues. French and Bell define action research as: . . .the process of systematically collecting research data about an ongoing system relative to some objective, goal, or neai of that system; feeding those data back into the system; taking actions by altering seiected variables within the system based both on the data and on hypotheses; and evaluating the results of actions by collecting more data. (1995, p. 138) This methodology fin& its roots in the work of Kurt Lewin, considered to be the "father of action research (McTaggart, 1991, p. 6). What distinguished Lewin's approach to social research from others was his insistence on the relation both between theory and practice and between researcher and researched. He saw the researcher as becorning "involved in creating change not in artificial settings where effects can be studied and repurted dispassionately, but in the real world of social practice" (Kemmis, 1982, cited in McTaggart, 1991, p. 7).
Lewin's core principle that "we are likeiy to modiw our own behavior when we participate in problem analysis and solution and are Iikely to carry out decisions we have helped rnake" (Weisbord, 1987, p. 89) evolved from his collaboration with Margaret Mead during
World War II to reduce the consumption of rationed f&. Lewin and Mead discovered that when women were given the facts about food availability and nutrition, and offered the opportunity to decide for themselves how to handle the situation. they changed their food habits significantly more often than those who were lecaired and told what to do by expert nutritionists. Lewin's work with Ronald Lippitt. a pioneer of leadership theories, group dynamics and hture-oriented planning, and his collaboration with Douglas McGregor at MIT added to the body of knowledge chat was evolving about group dynamics and action research.
Additional, paralle1 origins of action research can be found in the work of the Tavistock instinite of Human Relations formed fiom the original Tavistock Ciinic, a mental health treatment and training facility in London, England, where the psychoanalyst, Wilfrid Bion developed a theory of group dynamics. Researchers such as Trist and Emery built on Lewin's work in defining the Institute's focus as "teaming with client-sponsors to use social science knowledge for a wide spectrum of human problerns, intending dong the way to make new theories about what works" (Gray, 1970, cited in Weisbord, 1987. p. 146). Tavistock researchers devised an industrial action research program in Yorkshire coal mines looking at the differences between productivity and motivation in shortwdl autonomous rnining tearns and longwall mining where workers laboured on repetitive tasks under close supervision with no opportunity for decision-making. Since the 1950s. action research has been adapted to increasingly complex and broad organizational envùonments. The ideas of Lewin and bis followers have been developed through group dynamics and the human relations movement and are now applied to the fields of organization development and planned change (French & Bell, 1995). The Tavistock Institute has branched out into open systems theory. sociotechnical systems design and quality of working life.
A defining characteristic of Lewin's work is the collaborative relationship between the researcher and the participants where the researcher is considered to be a "CO-worker doing research with and for the people concerned with the practical problem" (Zuber-Skerritt, 1991, p.
xiv). This aspect of co-leaniing by the participants and the consultant (researcher) is fundamental to action research. The consultant does not play an "expert" role in the process. nor is she a disinterested observer, but rather a self-reflective faciiitator or "conduit" who
assists the clients in making their own decisions about the actions that they need to take. Susan Wright (1989, p. 61) has adapted Gilmore, Krantz and Ramirez' mode1 (1986, p. 164) comparing action research with other Iearning relationships.
Consultant's Learning Lo High
Low Expert Consulting Traditional Researc h
Client's Learning Data Feedback Surveys
High Training Action Research
Fimre 1 . Client/Consultant Leaming Relationships The mode1 demonstrates the high degree of leaming on the part of both the participants (client) and researcher (consultant) with action research as comparexi with other fomof research andlor ieaming relationships. Cmand Kemmis describe action research as airning at the "improvement of a practice, . . . the derstanding of the practice by its practitioners; and . . . the situation in which the practice takes place" (1986, p. 165). 1 would add "and by the researcher" in order to demonstrate the reciprocal nature of the learning which occurs.
Recent writing in action research technologies has placed an even greater spotlight on the learning that occurs during the process. Action reflection leaming emphasizes double loop learning and the examination of people's pet assumptions by "probing below the surface with incisive questions that challenge these assumptions" (Watkins and Marsick, 1993, p. 125). A third action technology that this study drew on was action science with its emphasis on seeking "knowledge that will serve action" (Argyris, Putnam, Smith, 1985, p. 36). Watkins and Marsick see action science as going beyond action research and action reflection learning. Action science focuses on interpersonal action, on helping "people see their behavior from a systems view - that is, how their actions are shaped by culture and organization" (1993, p. 13 1). Action science is based on Argyris* work on theories of action. He differentiated between an individual's espoused theory [what one says] and one's theory-in-use [what one does] "
(Argyris, Putnam, Smith, 1985, p. 82). Espoused theory and theory-in-use may or may not be consistent and the individuai may be unaware of any inconsistency. A significant volume of Argyris' writing centres on helping individuals and groups examine their theories of action in order to decrease the confusion and defensive functioning that occurs when their theories-in-use do not match their espoused theories (Argyris, 1990, 1993, 1977, Argyris, Putnam, Smith, 1985.
Argyris & Schon, 1974). His focus on critical enquiry and self-reflection carries elements of heuristic research with its in-depth investigation into the self. This study has drawn heavily on the work of Chris Argyris in encouraging participants from the study tearn to examine the discrepancies between their espoused theones and their theones-in-use. hdeed, one of the tools that was introduced to the team early in the process and used regularly is commonly referred to as "left-hand column" (Watkins and Marsick, 1993, p. 134) (see Appendix D) and is an action science tool developed by Argyris and Schon. Because of the descriptive and observational nature of the study, the methodology contained elements of the case study approach to research. Merriam defines a qualitative case study as "an intensive, holistic description and analysis of a single instance, phenomenon, or social unit" (1988, p. 21). She distinguishes between descriptive, interpretive and evaluative case studies. The latter seems to include elements of description and interpretation and adds the concept of judging or evduation (p. 28).
In the case of this research, my intent was to describe the impact on tearn members of participating in a psychodynamic teaming process. In the analysis of the data cokted both before and after the snidy, 1 have described team members' experiences, developed theories and examined the impact of the actions taken on the team's behaviour. This study's description and interpretation of the process dong with its assessrnent of outcomes locates it in the evaluative case study genre.
Ethical Issues and Concerns Conducting research of any nature requires carefùl attention to issues related to the ethics of the research process. Codes of ethics have ken developed by a variety of professional groups in order to attend to these issues. Within the field of quakative research, where the relations hip between researc her and researc hed is often intense and long-term, and where intrusive research methods are used, attention to ethical considerations becomes even more cri tical. Many researchers use infonned consent as a safeguard against potential ethical concerns. Participants must agree in writing to participate in the study and details of their participation are
carefully outiined. Because 1 was working with a team of individuals, 1 received individual consent from each member (see Appendix E) and had agreed at the outset to eliminate any tearn where there was not full agreement to participate. In order to ensure that people were not pressured by others into participating, 1presented the research study to team members individuaily and ensured that responses to the request to participate were kept confdential.
With this study team, two members were initidy hesitant and concemed about an "acadernic" bringing irrelevant issues to their work as a team. As a result, 1 carefully outline my role as CO-learner,and emphasized my expertise as a consultant, with years of experience in working with teams in organizational settings. I assured members that my researcher role would always be secondary to their needs as a tearn, and any "academic" inquiry would be related to the analysis dermy work with them. 1 ais0 assured them that I would share my findings with them, soiicit their input and encourage them to read any drafts of my wntings. The diffkulty with infonned consent in qualitative research is that the openended nature of the research process precludes the assurance that either the participant or the reswcher knows exactly what is king consente. to (Burgess, 1989; Diener & Crandall. 1978, cited in
Glesne & Peshkin. 1992). Sieber (1993) caiis on researchen to cornmunicate "respectfully and openly with participants . . . throughout the project. respecting autonomy and Life-style. and providing useful debriefing about the nature, fmdings and value of the research and its kely dissemination" (p. 18). Panicularly in this study, where participants were revealing hidden aspects of themselves, carefùl consideration was given to ensuring that they were aware of the possible ramifications of their participation. While acknowledging that there may be some level of risk-taking, they were assured that they would never be "forced to reveal anythng, and that my role (shared with team members) would be to ensure that group nomof confiidentiality and respect for privacy were upheld. In their work with teachers, Cole and Knowles argue for a researcher-teacher partnenhip model that calls for a tnily collaborative relationship between researcher and participant, where there is mutuality and ongoing negotiation at each phase of the research process (1993). My intention was to use their matrix (p. 480) for considenng relationships and responsibilities in my research study in order to ensure that 1 was adhenng to my ethical obligations. An adaptation of their model is shown (see Figure 2) with the word "teacher" replaced by "team memkr" and with an additional research phase of "Taking Action" (based on data coilected)
in keeping with the action research methodology employed in this study. The phases of Information Gathering, Interpretation and Representation, and Taking Action would be repeated in a cycle of iterations as required, untü the team felt that they were at a place where their issues had ben adequately addressed.
Phases of Research Activity
Planning and Information Interpretation Taking Action Reporting and Pre paration Gathering and Represen, Use tation (action (purpose, (participation, planning, (voice, control. procedure, observation, (verification. determination benefits, public / access, roles, interviews, validation, of objectives private use) logistics of taping, written voice) and how to get time and accounts ) there, actions, place) new behaviours)
Tearn Negotiated Identification Responsive to Participates in Negotiated member participation in of information preliminary process representation in terms of sources and analyses; leading to report and (person perceived negotiation of mutual development editing of affiliated benefit, appropriate interpretation of a plan, persona1 with an commitment strategies leading to fina involved in accounts; institution and procedure analysis implementa- perceived mutual primarily tion, e-g., benefi t oriented trying out new toward behaviours practice)
Researcher Primary Identification Preparation Facihtates a Pri mary responsibility of possible and process responsibility for (person for articulation strategies and presentation 01 w hereby writing account: affil iated of purpose, primary preliminary participants responsive to with a coordination responsi bility analysis; develop action team mernbers' research of research, for gathering mutual plan, provides editorial and institution) and mutually interpretation safe representational negotiation of agreed upon of preliminary environment zomments; per- activities information analysis For trying out zeived mutua1 leading to fina new benefit analysis behaviours
Figure 2. Relationship and Responsibilities Matrix (adapted from Cole & Knowles, 1993, p.
480). Because the action research approach required me to take on the role of "psychodynamic
organization consultant" (Diamond, 1993, p. 232), it was important for me to consider the ramifications of that role on the research process. Diarnond sees the consultant in this capacity working with individuals and groups to assist them in uncovering the psychologicai components of their organizational behaviour. He argues that "gaining insights into the emotional dimensions of their relations can enable [individuals] with the help of a consultant to cl* and resolve ciifferences, impmve coordination, and thereby consider alternative ways of interacting at work" (p. 36).
Diarnond cautions, however, that psychodynamic organization developrnent must not be confused with psychotherapy. Dealing with emotions in any setting requires sensitivity; in an organizationai context. this becomes even more important. Simply encouraging individuals to disclose their feelings could, in fact, unleash emotions which are not appropriate to reveal in a workplace setting. Indeed, the result could be devastating both to the individuais involved and to the ultirnate productivity of the work group. Marshak and Katz (1994) caution those who are working to uncover "coven processes" to consider the readiness of the system (in this case, the tearn) to deal with the issues that may be surfaced. They remind us that "the purpose of addressing a covert process is to facilitate desired movement; not to uncover or expose as an end to itself*(p. 141). They see the intent of
most covert processes as protecting the individual, group, andlor organization from real or perceived threat. While these hidden thoughts or feelings may be preventing the team from dealing effectively with important issues, it is criticai that we adhere to our contracts with the group to collaborate at every stage in the process. This implies enswing that both individuals within the group and the group as a whole are ready to move into previously uncharted temtory. Victoria Marsick urges the focus to be on "examining and challenging beliefs and behaviors and . . . . trying out new behaviors through role play and critique" (Mezïrow, 1990, p. 38). It is important to emphasize actions, once the feelings have been confronted and not to put the emphasis exclusively on personality issues. Marsick and Diamond both argue emphatically that the consultant who works at this
deeper level must have simcant experience and training in interpersonal dynamics and be
aware of the temtory into which she is moving. Diarnond insists that the consultant must be
highly sensitive to the readiness of her clients (in this case, research participants) to look at their defensive behaviour or to uncover the psychological dimensions of that behaviour (1993).
Sieber makes the point that sensitivity and the perception of risk are highly subjective. What
the research participant or gatekeeper perceives as a risk or as a sensitive matter may not be perceived as such by the ïnvestigator" (1993, p. 18).
In the case of this research study, it was important for me to utiiize my knowledge of
psychodynamic theory during the initial observation and interview phase in order to amine myself to the readiness of the individual team rnembers to open up previously unmentionable subjects. From my experience in working with groups in organizations, 1 had found that 1 had
ken able to draw on my psychodynamic background to ascertain how far to probe and when it was appropriate to encourage the conversation to shift away from areas which could cross the
line between teaming and psychotherapy. It had also been rny experience that team members who had learned how to speak about the previously unmentionable team issues or covert processes developed their own interna1 barometers which assisted them in knowing how far to open up or how much to probe one another.
Gilmore and Krantz (1985) and Menzies (1989)caution OD consultants to be aware of their own defensive reactions in the form of projections, transference and counter-transference
and the impact which these cm have on both the client and the consulting process. The sensitive nature of this research topic and the potential for the researcher's own psychological issues and biases to surface required that I engage in an ongoing process of reflection and self-examination. I will examine this issue at length under the heading, The Role of the Researcher. Research Design The design of the study followed the four traditionai phases inherent in any action research process. These are: (a) data gathering and diagnosis with feedback to the participant group: (b)joint action planning by researcher and participants; (c) irnplementation of the action plan; and (d) evaluation of the action (French & Bell, 1995). "The sequence tends to be cyclical, with the focus on new or advanced problems as the client group learns to work mom effectively together" (p. 139).
in summary, the research plan called for an intact workplace team to be assessed before and afier a psychodynamic teaming process in order to evaluate the impact which surfacing and dealing with their covert processes had on team members' perceptions, both of thernselves individuaily and on their fwictioning as a team. For the purposes of this study, psychodynamic teaming refers to a process of team development that aims to deai with the underlying, often unconscious and emotional content of the interaction patterns among team members.
In the fmt phase of data gathering and diagnosis, the team was observed and video-taped during a tearn meeting. Participants were interviewed individuaily using a series of prepared questions (see Appendix F) in order to obtain data that would relate specificaily to the research question and objectives. Questions 5,6 and 7 related to the first objective in identifying the interpersonal defensive patterns and behaviours that existed within the team at the beginning the study. Questions 7 and 8 related to the second and third objectives regarding the impact of these patterns, both when they are kept under wraps and when they are surfaced and dealt with by the tearn. The research interviews were audio-recorded for later transcription. The data gathered from the observations and interviews were fed back to the team with opportunity for their further input into the interpretation of the results. While the research design called for the use of a number of specific tools that would facilitate surfacing undiscussables, opportunities were provided for the participantsTinput into the design of the sessions, including content areas, timing, location, length of sessions, operating noms, roles of researcher and participants and next steps. Every effort was made to engage them in the planning stage in order to ensure that there was full ownership of the process.
Four months after the teaming process was concluded, the team was again observeci in a meeting and team members ïnterviewed individuaiiy. This provided a second evaiuation of their perceptions of the level of openness in their interactions and of the tearn's strengths and weaknesses (see Appendur H). They were aiso questioned about their experience of participating in this type of teaming approach where covert processes were surfaced and worked. The data were analyzed and interpreted with ongoing feedback to and input from the participants.
Selecting the Team and Negotiating Participation
The nature of the question king explored and the length of time required to cornplete the study necessitated a sample of only one workpiace team. Furthemore. the study was not intended to yieid broad generaiizations, but to look intensively at one tearn's experience. The question of replication and additional research arising frorn this study will be addressed in Chapter Nine. Whde current licerature reveals that there are many kinds of workplace teams, frorn functional and cross-functional teams, multiskilled teams to self-directe& self-designing, project and virtual teams (Dunphy & Bryant, 1996; Harrington-Mackin, 1994; Seers, Petty &
Cashman, 1995; Quick, 1992; Scholtes, Joiner & Streibel, 1996). the research plan called for the study of an intact functional or cross-functional tearn with a leader. Because the current economic and corporate climate was such that the majority of organizations were dealing with change at al1 levels on an ongoing basis, it was recognized that it would be difficult to ensure that tearn membership remained unchanged throughout the research process. Every intention was made to select a team that was not likely to undergo significant restmcturing during the tenure of the study and had neither previously done nor, during the course of the research period, intended to engage in a teaming process or training program (other than that involved in the study itseif). Because of the nature of the research question, it was important to choose a team whose members had been together long enough to generate defensive interpersonal dynamics. Katzenbach and Smith (1993) have indicated that the majority of effective teams nurnber fewer than ten members (p. 1 14). Because the researcher's experience in working with intact teams had demonstrated that the average effective work group consists of eight to ten members, the intent was to select a team that was close to this size. The team that was chosen for the study was a senior management team of a subsidiary company, ABC inc.,' of a large financiai institution, Axworthy Global. 1 had worked in an external consuiting capacity with Axworthy for a pend of three years. In Febmary, 1996,I was approached by the interna1 organization development consultant to meet with Sandra, the President and Chef Executive Offxer of ABC ïnc. regarding the possibility of working with her team of twelve vice-presidents.
In the initial meeting with Sandra, the request was that 1 work with the group over an extended period of time in order to facilitate their becorning a high performing team. ABC was not performing well and was in danger of king shut down because of significant fuiancial losses. There was a split between the two very distinct lines of business, the team functioned poorly and there was no cornmon direction. Sandra was concemed that unless this group could develop into a cohesive, highly functioning team, the company had linle chance of improving its bottom line results and would be closed.
When 1 describeci my research study with its emphasis on faciiitating team memkrs' abilities to surface and work with the hidden dimensions of their interpersonal interactions, Sandra was exuernely interested in my approaching the team about participating in the study. She commented on the lack of trust arnong members and on the many undercurrents that she
- All names of persons. companies, and/or propnetary information have been disguised.
57 felt prevented the team from deaihg effectively with the ver-serious business challenges they were facing. After prelirninary discussions with the Vice-President, Human Resources, it was agreed that Sandra would present the offer to the tearn at their next senior management meeting. Sandra felt that they would be more likely to register their concerns if 1 were not present. The initial offer was viewed as positive with two exceptions. As previously rnentioned, two team members were concemed that the "academic" nature of my research might interfere with their own issues and goals and asked to rneet with me individually. In each case, once they heard more about my background and experience in working with teams, they were reassured that my prïmary motivation would be to serve their own particular needs. The result was that they too were ready to participate. in order to ensure a collaborative partnership researcher/participant relationship (Cole 8r
Knowles, 1993), each participant was given a letter outlining the purpose of the study and the ramifications of their participation (see Appendix I). The letter ensured their confidentiality by the use of fictitious names both for the Company and for individual tearn members. Al1 raw data. including audio and video tapes. would be kept in locked files and would be desuoyed within two years of completion of the doctorate. 1 furtfier agreed to share with participants my fîndings and analysis with opportunities for their input throughout the process. Each participant signed a letter of consent (See Appendix E) which ensured that they could at any time withdraw from the snidy if they were unhappy with the direction it was taking.
A contract was drawn up between Sandra and me for the tenure of the process and number and length of sessions. 1 had suggested to Sandra that the tirneframes and schedule would likely need to change as the tearn began to work together and surface their issues. We agreed to use the initial proposal as oniy a guide and to re-contract as the process unfolded. Appendix J outlines the actual number of sessions and tirneframes involved. Including the initial interviews, 1 worked with the team from March, 1997 through to Febniary, 1998. During this tirne, the team participateci in four twoday sessions and four one-day sessions. In addition, 1 attendeci five senior management team meetings and provided hour-long individual coaching sessions with each team rnember. Four months afier the last session and foliowing the second round of individual interviews and observation session, 1 inîended to rneet again with the tearn in order to feed back and receive input into the preliminary results of the study. While 1 was ultimately unable to arrange a second feedback session, 1 did meet with the President and the two Senior Vice-Presidents.
Da ta Collection bserva t ion
While observation of the participant group was a specific data gathering methodology at two defined points in the study, this was an ongoing tool used throughout the process. Observation provided me with a rich and varied source of material from which to extract relevant information.
Memam (1988) outlines a checklist of elements likely to be present in an observation. These include the setting or physical environment, the participants themselves, the activities and interactions, issues around fiequency and duration of the situation being observed, and important subtle factors such as non-verbal communication and symbolic gestures or words used (p. 90). In this study, 1 was Iooking for concrete examples of interaction patterns which would demonstrate the degree of openness and trust among members. This would include observable data such as ability and willingness to show emotions, (e-g., angry outbursts, tears,) checking of assumptions (e-g., "It sounded as though you weren't happy with what just happened. 1s that true?") and ensuring clarity of understanding (e-g., "1 don't understand what you just said; would you explain your thinking to me?"or "Why did you Say that?") Such observations would link to my research objectives of establishing the level of openness that existed both before and afler the tearning process. The role of the researcher in doing participant observation ranges dong a continuum from mostly observer to mostly participant (Glesne & Peshkin, 1995, p. 40). While 1 never became a
team member or participant and would always remain outside of the group either as researcher
or as consultant/facilitator, my involvement with the group would change over the. In the early stages of observation, my role ranged from pure observer to "observer as participant*' (Memarn, 1988, p. 93) where my participation in the group would be secondary to my role as
information gatherer. In this early stage, 1 was familiarizing myself with the environment and sening and observing the way the team currently functioned and interacte& At a later stage in the process, because of my invotvernent wirh the participants as the "consultant" working with the team. 1came closer to king what Gans calis a researcher participant, one who "participates in a socid situation but is persondy only partiaüy involved, so that he can function as a researcher" (1982, cited in Merriam, 1988. p. 93)- The intensity of my involvement made this dificult to do and 1 needed to engage in an ongoing reflexive process
(described under the heading, My Role as Researcher) in order to ensure that 1could fulfffl bth roles of researcher and participant. My background in this type of work and my familiarity with the topic made it critical that
I "make the farniliar strange" to combat the tendency to make assumptions about what 1 was observing. 1 needed at every stage to be aware of my beliefs and intentions, and describe explicitiy how 1 proposeci to remain "open to surprise, that is to disconfmation or elaboration of [my] beliefs" (Hunt, 1992, p. 129). One of the ways 1 ensured that this occur~edwas to use another consultant/researcherto work with me in a coaching capacity (see My Role as Researcher). There were two points during the teaming process. before and several months afier my work wiih the team, where 1 was in a fonnal observer role. In addition. 1 attended a number of regdar team meetings, because some aspect of the tearning process was an item on the agenda, because 1 was asked to attend as a "process observer" to comment on their functioning, or at my own request sirnply to observe their interactions. The observation sessions before and after the study were video-taped in order to dow for in-depth analysis. AU members seemed cornfortable with the arrangement and commenteci that rny presence would minimaiiy impact their discussions. Where possible, field notes were made during al1 observations of team meetings in order to capture in-the-moment thoughts and interpretations. . Intewiewing Interviewing is one of the most basic modes of inquiry. "At the root of indepth interviewing is an interest in understanding the experience of other people and the meaning they make of that experience" (Seidman, 1991, p. 3). The interview affords the researcher the opportunity to sit face-to-face with the participant(s) and "hear" with eyes, ears, and intuition, the other's story.
in this study, aii participants were interviewed both before and after the snidy in order to help make meaning of their experience of themselves and team members within the team. The interviews were audiwrecorded, transcribed and anaiyzed, dong with the observations, in order to understand and interpret the data,
It was important to give carefùi consideration to the questions used during the interviews.
For the pre-study interviews, 1 prepared a set of questions (se Appendix F) that were formulated with the intention of clanfying the participants' perceptions of themselves, the team dynarnics and the level of openness and honesty in their communication interactions. These questions were tested prior to the research interviews with two individuals who were not part of the study in order to assess their effectiveness in generating the desired information. 1 also wanted to allow for digression from the stmctured interview questions to an open discussion of other relevant issues that surfaced during the course of the interview. As with any action research process, the data from these interviews were fed back to the participants in the first teaming session and the issues which arose from the data were incorporated into the design of the teaming sessions. In the second series of interviews at the conclusion of the work with the team, 1 posed many of the sarne questions in order to ident@ any shifts which had occurred. As weiI, 1 sûuctured the interviews to aUow for an exploration of members' perceptions of the experience of participating in such a process (see Appendix H). This allowed for disclosure of a broad range of topics in order to fùliy understand participants' perceptions of the impact of such a process both on thernselves individually and on the tearn as a whole. It was important to consider my role during the interview process, especially in this case, where 1, as researcher, was also operating in a consultative capacity, and, as such, became integrally involved with the tearn. Issues of ethics and subjectivity needed to be considered as the potential for both researcher and participant bias was increased. Because 1 had been working with the tearn for some tirne, and had therefore fomied a relationship with members both individually and collectively, there was pater iikelihood for them to want to provide me with the "correct" answers during this second set of interviews. Indeed. at several points during my work with them, especially when the team had been stmggling and, in their mincis, making littie progress, comments were made, in a joking manner, about the possibility of me "failing my thesis."
Ln order to decrease the likelihood of 'double subjectivity" (Renzetti & Lee, 1993, p.
185), two independent researchers each conducted one of the second series of interviews. The data gathered and themes identified were compared with those generated from the interviews 1 had conducted, in order to look for differences that might be attributed to bias. Psvchodvnamic Teamine Process The psychodynamic teaming process entailed working with the participant group in an intensive initiative which would assist them in uncovering the covert processes that were operating within the team and having an impact on their effectiveness.
The actual design was done in collaboration with the tearn members in order to adhere to the researcher-partici pan t pamership model. As researcher, 1 presented a preliminary design to the participants for their feedback and consideration. The final design reflected their priorities and issues and was negotiated in a collaborative way to ensure their cornmitment to the process. The teaming involved using a variety of tools and concepts which have bendesigneci to facilitate the surfacing of assumptions. beliefs and unspoken thoughts and feelings. These included the left-hand column exercise (Ross & Kleiner, in Senge et al.) based on Chris Argyris' and Donald Schon's two-column research method (Argyris and Schon, 1974), (see
Appendix A). The latter was fmt used to construct models of theories-in-use which were then analyzed to determine effectiveness in interaction. The process involved red-life case studies written by participants according to a common format. They were asked to wnte case studies that fûcused on what was actually said, how the participants actually behaved and how others responded. The focus in the debrief was on examining the data for inconsistencies between what people said or did and what they were thinking or feeling.
The two-column merhod was adapted for use with the research team. It involved participants leaniing how to use the left-hand column tool individually in order to better understand their own thinking and assumptions. Each participant fmt individuaily used the left- hand column technique to wrïte up her perceptions of the interpersonal dynarnics in a portion of one of the teamhg sessions (see Appendix D). Team members debriefed the individuai exercise by sharing some of their left-hand column thoughts and feelings in an attempt to increase understanding of each other and the tearn. 1 facilitated the process with the intent of surfacing assumptions, increasing understanding and raising some of the previously hidden "unmentionables" that may have been inhibiting the team's effective functioning.
As indicated previously, it was critical that 1, as researcher, be aware of the temitory into which I was delving. Robert Putnam (1994, p. 250) cautions that the learning potential of using the left-hand column tool is Lirnited by the abilities of both the participants and the facilitator to deal with the sometimes very sensitive issues raised. This requires careful attention to the design of a process that takes into account the potential both for learning and for delving into emotiondly loaded personal issues that may not be appropriately surfaced in a work environment. Diamond's (1993) waming to make a clear distinction between psychodynamic organization developrnent consulting and psychotherapy is worth repeating here. Once the team was familiar with the concept of "left-hand column", the term was used frequently during teaming sessions. Initially 1, as facilitator, would ask the question, "What's in your lefi-hand column?" in order to support people in saying what they were thinking or feeling. Evennially. as the team became more open and trust increased, tearn members began to ask the question of each other or to preface a comment with "1 have something in my left-hand column that 1 need to say". A concept that was used frequently during the sessions was Argyris and Schon's double- loop learning (IWO), the "surfacing and chdenging [ofl deep-rmted assumptions and noms . . . that have previously been inaccessible, either because they were unknown or hown but
undiscussable" (Kim, 1993). Team members were encouraged to challenge their beliefs, attitudes and mental models or "deeply held intemal images of how the world works" (Senge, 1990, p. 174) both of each other and of the way they needed to function as a team.
A second tool that was used to examine theories-in-use and hidden assumptions, thoughts and feelings was Argyris' Ladder of inference (Argyris, 1990. p. 88) (see Appendix C).This tool highlighü the way in which individuals ~gularlyconstruct "a comrnon mental pathway of increasing abstraction, often leading to rnisguided beliefs" (Senge et al. 1994. p. 243). Team members were chaîienged to become aware of the mental models they held and the "ladders" they consuucted in order to justify their beliefs and actions. They were shown how to "walk back down the ladder" using double-loop leaniing and inquiry questions such as "Why do 1 think that way?", "What data is there to support my reasoning?", and "What assumptions am
1 making?". The SYMLOG Consulting Group values-based team assessrnent instrument was used as a method of opening up the dialogue among tearn members (see Appendix G). SYMLOG is both a theory of group dynamics and a method for measuring important attitudes and perceptions people have about themselves and others. It was developed by Dr. Robert Freed Bales, through 45 years of research and validation at Hanrad University and has been used in a wide variety of settings throughout the world. In my own consdting practice, 1 had used it extensively over a five-year pend with a variety of participant groups and had found it to have the psychological depth and ability to uncover underlying issues ihat 1 needed to explore to Miil my research objectives. Because the SYMLOG instrument measures one's perception of the values demonstrated by the individual or team as a whole through kirbehaviour, it works at a deeper level in demonstrating the gap between espoused theory and theory-in-use.
In my experience, the SYMLOG instrument provided tearn members with an opportunity to engage in dialogue about the unintended consequences and undiscussed aspects of their behaviours. As such, my expectation was that it would be a useful tool in assisting paxticipants to understand and examine the impact of their defensive interpersonal patterns on one another and on their effectiveness as a team.
in addition to the above tooIs, in-the-moment process checks were used regularly in order to assist participants in looking at their functioning and share their unspoken thoughts and feelings. Questions such as "What's happening?", "Why did you Say that?" or "What does the silence mean?" and observations such as "1 notice that many of you aren't involved in this conversation" or "The room is suddenly very quiet", encourage team members to speak more honestly about subjects or issues that they would otherwise gloss over. While team mernbers were encouraged to do process checks themselves, as with the other tools. initiaily, as facilitator.
1 tended to be the one to ask the questions and make the observations. Again, as the team matured and trust deepened. team members began to take on this role.
A High Performance Team Model, incorporating vision, mission, operating guidelines, roles and responsibilities, and measures for continuous improvement was used as a foundation for much of the team's work, particularly in the early sessions. Emphasis was aiso placed on
Tuckman' s mode1 of team development ( 1965, cited in Laiken, 1994) and on balancing advocacy with inquhy as outlined in Bohrn's concept of dialogue (1989). While the above models, tools and concepts fonned a foundation for the teaming sessions. the actual content for each session was determined in collaboration with the team. With the exception of the initial session which had a fairly stnictured and predetennined agenda, the agendas for al1 subsequent sessions were agreed upon at the end of the previous session. In order to adhere to the action leaming principle of collaboration and involvernent of participants in defining the problem and planning for action. it was important that 1not set the agenda for the sessions. While 1 might make suggestions based on my expenence with teams, the team was always Uivolved in making the fmd decision. Indeed, there were thes when they would choose to go in a different direction because of their own perceived needs. often driven by their business issues and concerns.
As well, 1 was careful to "hold the agenda lightly" and be prepared to shift directions or drop agenda items in the middle of a session, depending on the stated objectives of team rnembers. In fact, this became an ongoing joke with the group as it becarne apparent that what we often agreed to cover or deal with just didn't happen. Team memben would tease me when 1 reviewed the agreed-upon agenda at the beginning of a session. They also commented that my agendas became more and more "fluid" with less structured time allotments as 1 realized that they needed to dictate the content. sometimes in an organic, "as needed manner. In order to facilitate the transfer of learnings back to their day-to-day business environment, 1 incIuded a nurnber of design features in my work with the team. Each session began with the team talking about both what had gone weli since we last met and what had not gone well. This allowed for hem to build on their successes and acknowledge their ongoing suuggles or concems. It also provided a time at the beginning of each session to surface the difficult, often undiscussable issues. Indeed. 1 would encourage them to include any such issues in their lists so that they could be addressed dunng that session.
In my work with tearns, 1 had become aware of how diffïcult it is for people to deal with the unmentionables on an ongoing basis. There is a natural tendency to fa11 back into old more cornfortable patterns of avoidance. Team members will typically be driven by agendas and concrete results and will tend to ignore process issues related to how those resuits are achieved. often the focus of "off-site" teaming sessions. In order to deal with this phenomenon, 1 sat in on a number of their regular tearn meetings where they were dealing with mal-life business issues. My role in these meetings was to comment on process issues, including the team dynamics which were not king attended to, such as rnissed non-verbal cues, body language and tone of voice which often signais unspoken thoughts or feelings. As well, 1 encourageci members to conduct process checks as previously described and meetings assessments which inciuded attention to left-hand column material and unchecked assumptions.
Towards the end of my involvement with the team, the emphasis was on preparing them to take on the role 1 had played as process consultant. Greater attention was paid to action plans for transfemng the ledngs from the "off-site" sessions to their everyday work envuonment.
MyRole as Researcher In any piece of qualitative research, careful consideration needs to be given to the role of the researcher. Because of the recognition that the researcher will become an integral part of the research process and because of the acknowledgment that researcher subjectivity is a given, it is crucial for the qualitative researcher to explore herself and the parts she plays in the study.
Hunt calls for the researcher to take the "inside-out approach" (Hunt, 1992, p. 3) to research by looking first at herself. He coins the phrase "research as renewal" (p. 1 1 1) and stresses the importance of the researcher paying attention to the three R's, reflexive, responsive and reciprocal (p. 12 1). He acknowledges the absolute interdependence between the researcher and the researched and sees "the results of inquiry [as being] influenced by the intentions and expectations of both the researcher and the persons king researched, as well as by the relationship between them" (p. 1 1 1). This relationship becomes even more important where one is examining the impact of the psychodynamic processes on the functioning of the group. The research that has already been done on groups suggests that individuals within groups take on roles which may be determineci by the unconscious psychodynamic needs of group members @iamond, 1993; Hirschhorn, 1993; Gould,, cited in Kets de Vries, 199 1). William Czander (1993) examines the impact that the consultant has on the consultee in a psychoanalytic consultation and suggests that the consultee's perception of the consultant as an authority figure will have an impact on the process of consultation. Indeed, he claims that the "information given to the consultee from an 'awesome' authority figure" (p. 189) will most likely be taken in without question. He cails on the consultant to be acutely aware of the potential for this dynamic interplay between krnself and the client to occur and claims that many consultations fail because of the inabitity of the consultant to do so. Margaret Rioch (1975, cited in Colman & Geiler, 1985) asks the question, "What are "they," the people, the group, making of this person and this role? And do not their perceptions influence how the person perceives himself and his role?"(p. 366).
Because 1 was playing a dual role in this study of both researcher and consultant, it was even more critical that 1 engage in an ongoing reflective process. In her doctoral dissertation. Wright (1989) comrnents on this "insider/outsider" role when one attempts to operate in two worlds as researcher and consultant. This boundary position is a diffrcult methodo1ogicai one, and there are necessaq trade-offs in walking the fine Line. The risk is in not completely satisQing anyone; the benefit is in contributing in a "bothhnd way that creates a different, and perhaps more authentic view of the complex reality of organizational life. (p. 78.) in order to walk this fuie line between researcher and consultant, 1 needed to build in ways to examine consistently my own biases, assumptions and psychological defenses. In order to ensure that 1 fostered my own "critical reflection" (Brookfield, cited in Mezirow, 1990), 1 kept an ongoing reflective journal in which 1 recorded my thoughts, feelings and reactions to the process. in addition, 1 used the left-hand column tool myself to surface my own assumptions and coven processes. Because it was impossible for me to work with my own material objectively, 1 used "trimgulation" (Glesne & Peshkin, 1992) in contracting with two consultant/colleagues who were fdarwith this consulting appmacti, to work in a coaching/supervision capacity with me. They would talk with me about both the teaming process and my fmdings, and would read my initial thesis drafts, in order to help me look at my boundary issues around the dual researcher/consuitant role. As weii, 1examined my own projections and countertransference issues with the support of a psychotherapistlcolleague. Excerpts from the reflective journal will be included with the fmdings sections to illustrate the stresses and experiences inherent in this kind of research. The process of recording my feelings and thoughts was cnticai in helping me clarm my own countertransferences and emotional "baggage" and make sense of what was really happening. It also assisted me in becomuig clearer about my role and about what course of action was appropriate at different points along the way. As with any qualitative study, it was important for me to narne my assumptions and biases and to deal directiy with the issues around subjectivity in my anaiysis and interpretation of the data. This use of trimgdation along with the reflective process 1 engaged in, enhanced the potential for the vaiidity and txuthfulness of the snidy.
Anal ysis and Interpretation "The process of data collection and analysis is recursive and dynarnic" (Memarn, 1988, p. 123). The researcher attempts to make sense of what she is seeing and hearing throughout the data collection process in order to iden@ patterns, formulate interpretations and develop theories about what she is studying.
Because my data collection continued over a period of 16 months, it was important to capture my observations, thoughts and feelings as they arose. For this reason, 1 relied heavily on a pocket audio recorder before and after interviews, team sessions, observations, and client meetings or even late at night when questions or insights often swfaced. The resulting tapes and trianscripts provided me with a reflective journal of information about what had happened during my sessions with the tearn, and valuable insights about my role as researcher/consultantt The latter were critical in my assessrnent of my biases. rny tendencies toward over-involvement with the participants and any desire 1 might have to influence the research results. Coding is "a progressive process of sorting and defining and defining and sorting those scraps of collected data (i.e., observation notes, interview transcripts, memos, documents, and notes from relevant literame) that are applicable to our research purpose" (Glesne & Peshkin,
1992, p. 133). Using a grounded theory approach (Glaser, 1978; Rennie, Phillips & Quartaro, 1988). the interviews were analyzed and coded with each uanscript veriwing and building on the previous one. Mer 1 read the fmt transcript, the key thernes which were present in response to the interview questions were identified. Each theme was given a code name and colour. Whenever that theme occurred in the interview, a coioured dot or "pst-it flag" was placed on the transcript. Each successive transcript was reviewed for evidence of these and additionai themes which had not been identified. This process was repeated several times in order to verify both the themes chosen and where they occurred.
Afier my initial scan of the interview transcripts, 1 had identified seven themes which closely followed the intent of the research questions. While my initiai themes were based on the research purpose and my assumptions of what would arise out of the interviews and observations, as my analysis deepened, these were refined with some taking on more prominence than others and additional themes king added. Two of these themes, "undiscussables" and "impact of surfacing undiscussables" were subdivided into sub-themes and assigned their own names and colour codes.
Because 1 was analyzing observations and interviews which occurred both before and after the teaming work, the final process of sensemaking involved comparing and contrasting the two sets of findings. Issues that had been identified as undiscussable at the beginning of the study were compared with those named in the second round of interviews. The goal of data analysis, according to Taylor and Bogdan (1984) is "to come up with reasonabie conclusions and generalizations based on a preponderance of the data*' (p. 139, cited in Merriam, 1988, p. 130). This stage of the process, what Wolcott (1994) terrns "interpretation" is subject to "errors of excesses" (p. 36) where one offers too much unwarranted personal opinion or too Little tdy insightfùl comrnentary. At this point, 1 was constandy looking for what, in my view, was the main concem or problem for the tearn members, for what a pattern of behaviour, as revealed in the data, was teiling me about the
question 1 was asking. Here, it was important to use my colleagues and pers as sounding
boards for my ideas as a safeguard against researcher bias. As well, I was challenged to trust the data to speak to me over time, rather than rush to premature conciusions based on my assumptions and desired outcomes. "Qualitative researchers need to be storytellers" (Wolcott, 1994, p. 17). Because this study followed the journey taken by a participant group over a significant period of time. it was important to relate the story as accurately as possible. The team had been given a tirneframe of one year in which to tum the business results around. As such, the story seemed to build to an inevitable climax as the months went by. For this reason, 1 chose to tell their story in the order in which events oçcurred.
As the research progressed, it became apparent that the path traveled by the individuai members, with both its high and low points, was as significant as the before and after fmdings. Because the research objectives involved examining the participants*experiences of participating in such a journey, it was important that the story be told in their own words. As such, the description depended heaviiy on direct quotations from the interview transcnpts. As well, 1 was careful to make detailed notes of team dynamics and significant events and conversations during or immediately after tearning sessions. CHAITER FOUR: THE INVESTIGATION BEGINS
Because the research involved studying tbe impact on the team and tearn mernbers of leanring how to surface and work with their previously unspoken issues, it was important to identify these issues at the outset of the tearning process. As indicated previously, this was done both by observing the team in action and by conducting individual interviews with each team rnember.
In this chapter, 1 will report on the themes which surfaced during these interviews or were evident while observing the team. 1 wïli begin by providing some background about ABC Inc., the business context, its organizational cuiture and a profde of the senior management team.
The Research Organization Histow of ABC Inc. ABC hc. was a subsidiary company of Axworthy Global, a large financial services institution with over 40,000 employees. EstabLished in 1994 as a strategic alliance between Axworthy Global and Westport Financial Services Inc., ABC was composed of two main businesses, one dealing with leasing agreements and one with smdbusiness loans.
Prior to August, 1997, Axworthy was a 45% partner of ABC Inc. In August, 1997, as a result of ownership changes within the other ABC shareholders, Axworthy acquired the shares of ABC held by the other non-Axworthy shareholders and becarne 100% owners. The Business Context The leasing and loans businesses were very separate in their goals and objectives and there was considerable concern as to their compatibiiity in one company. At the point where the research began, Axworthy Global was considering the strategic fit of ABC with its core business. [A decision as to whether to purchase the remaining shares was to be made when the option came up late in 1998. At that tirne, it owned 45% and had 90% voting equity.] The company was swggling financially with the loan loss exposure being substantid. In
addition, the leasing business was operating at a huge deficit wiih issues around high costs, high
risk and a focus on sales at the expense of quality. There was serious concem as to whether the company would survive and a number of options were identified. These were: 1) main the two businesses within ABC inc. under the umbrella of Axworthy Global; 2) separate the two businesses and have the leasing and loans businesses each enter into joint ventures with another company; 3) sel1 the two businesses outright and close down ABC Inc. In order for either the
fmt or second options to occur, ABC would have to significantly improve its financial performance within one year. In interviews conducted witb the senior management team shortly after Sandra came on
board as President, one person described the environment as "a constant 'high wire act ' with
aii of the change going on - - a very turbulent environment." ABC Climate and Culture
ABC Inc. was initially built on the work of four vice-presidenu and grew from a small operation to a company of 700 employees over four years. Axworthy resources were not utiIized because of the arm's length relationship it had with the parent company. Indeed, there was a history of not teiiing Axworthy about the problems at ABC and an entrepreneurial spirit of "making it on ow own" developed. Those who were there from the beginning suffered through the challenges of setting up a new company with limited resources and sub-standard technology with a resulting culture of pride of ownership. Members included in their accomplishrnents the establishment of a Human Resources department, the development of a strong sales force and culture, an employee-driven Employee Recognition program and the establishment of a National Loans Centre. Yet the existence of two vexy disparate businesses with separate goals and objectives made it difficult for those at senior levels to be objective about the "other" business and a cohesive strategic direction was seen to be lacking. Xndeed, the 1997 strategic plan was not completed as a team, but rather by individual members. The environment was one of "fm-fighting" with mernbers dealing tactically with their own crises on a day-to-day basis.
The management style of the previous President, Paul, was "decide and announce" with the result that people were accustomed to king told what to do with minimal input into decisions. Yet, he was well known îhroughwt the company, and generally weii-liked.
e Senior. Mwement Team
In December, 1996, Paul, the President and Chief Executive OfFicer of ABC was fued and replaced by Sandra. In addition to the President, two Vice-Presidents and six General Managers also lost their jobs. Over the next few months, a new senior management team was assembled with some corning from the existing team, some from Axworchy Global and some from external sources. When 1 began my work with ABC Inc. in March, 1997, the new team had been in place for only two months and several members had not yet joined. The executive team structure as it existed at that tirne is depicted in Appendix K. The majority of members reported to Don, Senior Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer. At the beginning of the process. Ted, as Senior Vice-President, Marketing and Leasing, had only one person reporting directly to him. Later, as the leasing business was further deveioped. the number reporting to him was expanded to the. Because it wiil be important in later chapters to understand each member's history with the company, the following is a list of senior management team rnembers in order of their start date with ABC: Table 1 ABC hc. Senior Manwment Tew
Name Title Start Date with ABC
------Barbara Vice-Resident, ban Roduct Management 1994 Susan Vice-President, Technology November, 1994
Mary Vice-President, Finance September, 1995 Bill Vice-President, Business Unit FA, 1995 Eric Vice-President, Human Resources March, 1996 Don Senior Vice-President & Chief Operating Offker September, 1996 Vince Vice-President, Risk Management December, 1996
Sandra President & Chief Executive Officer December, 1996 Roger Vice-President, Operations January, 1997 Richard Vice-President, CLient Services March, 1997 Ted Senior Vice-President, Marketing and Leasing April, 1997 Douglas Vice-President, Finance August, 1997 Frances Vice-President, Project Management Office November. 1997 Keith Vice-President, Marketing February, 1998
In looking more closely at the Table 1, it becomes evident that there were a number of changes in team rnembership during the tirne the research was conducted. The Vice-President.
Finance, Mary, left in July, 1997 and was replaced in August by Douglas. Susan, the Vice-
President, Technology, left in September, 1997. Her position was not replaced and the technology portfolio was added to the responsibilities of the Vice-President, Operations. In November, 1997, Frances joined the tearn as Vice-President, Project Management Offlce, to lead the change management reengineering process for the leasing business. in February, 1998, Keith came on board as Vice-President, Marketing, also on the leasing side. The team stnichire as it existed at the end of the research study is iiiustrated in Appendix L.
As Chief Operating Oficer for ABC Inc., Don had managerial responsibilities for members who reported into both the leasing and loans businesses. Ted however, had responsibilities oniy on the leasing side. This structure proved to be a significant issue for the team and contributed to the conflict which occurred between Ted and Don during the research period and which will be reported on in subsequent chapters.
Intewiewing
As previously outiined, the intemews with team members were conducted using a series of questions (see Appendix F) designed to obtain data that would relate specifically to the research question and objectives. Because 1 was acting in the role both of researcher and consultant, some of the questions were posed to reveal information which would be used in any teamhg proçess with a new team but which would not be relevant to this study. For the purposes of this research, the questions which were relevant to the study were numbers 5 - 10 and the final question about unexpressed secret hopes and wishes. In reporting on rny findings, 1 wiU categorize the discussion into the themes which surfaced in a content analysis of the interviews relative to the research objectives. The fust objective of surfacing the existing defensive interpersonal patterns was met by an exploration of the foliowing themes which my experience in working with teams indicated would be significant to this research topic: degree of opemess, unacceptable topics or undiscussables, assumptions, wïiiingness to challenge and unexpressed secret hopes and wishes. The second and third objectives (regarding the impact of these defensive patterns), was met by explonng team members' perceptions about the impact that surfacing undiscussables might have on them both individudy and collectively. In order to achieve the research objectives, it was important to establish the team's
perception of their level of openness before the study began. This would form a baseline for cornparison following the teaming process. While responses to a nurnber of the interview questions would provide additionai data about the team's openness with one another, my belief
was that a question that addressed this issue directly would stimulate participants' thinking about some of the more specific questions posed to them about their abïiity to taik about potentialiy difficult issues.
The degree of openness expressed by individuais with other team rnembers vaxied depending on personal comfort level and upon who was in the room. There was general consensus that some would be very open while others would be tight-lipped. People acknowledged individual differences, stating that the more assertive team members would net tend to hold back, while those who are more cautious would likely be more constrained.
What 1 actuaily find is . . . I would suggest that there are probably a nurnber of people who would be tight-lipped around the table, and 1 would go back to the 'old eard' [those with the company for a longer time]. (Richard) And there are some team members that you know are not going to stand behind you. So, you do a Iittle more covering . . . . But that is okay too as long as you know what the rules of the garne are. (Susan)
There was also acknowledgment that because the team was new and members didn't know each other well, there was a tendency to hold back. The difficult part is not knowing al1 the players and their background, where they carne from. A lot of them will bring their baggage. Just as 1 wiil bring [mine] to the team. You have not opened up al1 the bags yet. People are stdl keeping . . . things inside their bags, because they are not cornfortable yet and they are not sure of al1 the players. It is only once that environment is created that it is okay to open up your bag that you have - good, bad or ugly - and share it. Until that happens, people will not do it. (Ted)
There seemed to be consensus that people's openness was very dependent on whether Sandra (President) or Don (Senior Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer) were present.
At the time of the interviews, Sandra had oniy been with the company for three months and had spent very little time with the team. Because the perception was that she had been parachuted in either to make or break the company, people were very cautious around her. I fmd that in the meetings, people are stiil trying to figure out what Sandra's direction is, where she is coming from, what dœs she want to do with the company. So, siAl people are a Little more reserved. (Susan) Redy, these people still don't know whether Sandra is . . . here to wind this company down and put hem al1 out of work. (Don) When it came to Don, people were clear. When he was present, openness tended to disappear. Mary commented, "Well, if he is in the room, you don't bring up certain things you
may if he wasn't there because you don't want that person pounced on." A number of people commented on their reluctance to ask questions of, or challenge others when Don was present for fear that they would be attacked by him. Unacceptable To~icsor Undiscussables Participants were asked to identify the unacceptable, illegitimate, andor questionable
topics, behaviours, attitudes and feelings in the group. Specificaily, these would be the topics,
issues or feelings that they avoided talking about, that tended to be dixusseci privately or in "meetings after the meeting". Andysis of the interview data revealed these to be "the past", work and Lifestyle, feeiings and one member's behaviour. The Past
The topic that everyone considered to be undiscussable was "the pst" when the previous
President, Paul, was still with the company. Paul had been fired three months previously afier
king with the organization from its inception. A nurnber of the team members had been there during this period and others had ken hired either after or close to the time of his departure. As a result, team members were labeled as either "old guard" or "new guard". Almost everyone interviewed agreed that it was not okay to talk about the past or about Paul and his leadership. In particular, it was not acceptable to make positive remarks about Paui or to give hm and previous tearn members any credit, Paul was referred to by Sandra as the bbpredece~~~r"and the unspoken norm, as labeled by Roger, seemed to be "don't speak well of the dead." Roger went on to Say, "1 have never heard a single good thing said about [Paul] since I have been here."
Tearn members who had been with the organizattion dwing Paul's tenure were fearful of king assoçiated with him and therefore blamed for the organization's poor performance. As a result, those who had enjoyed a positive working relationship with him or who felt that he had made positive contributions were unwilling to express their opinions. Susan admitted, "1 guess 1 have noticed lately his name is never mentioned. He is refend to as the predecessor. It sounds like you wouldn't want to Say he did anything weli." Barbara suggested that you couid talk about the past but you knew that "you [would] get a zinger eventually." She wondered whether the "old guard" were seen to be "of the sarne caliber, had the same problems or we are just going to keep hem around because it would look bad if we came in and fdthe whole group." Another member commented on: . . . the lack of appreciation and understanding as to what [ABC Inc.] has gone through over the last couple of years . . . . Sandra's made it quite clear that what's gone on in the past, she really doesn't have any interest in wanting to know about. And there are certain members of the team that fëel very slighted by that. (Bill) Sandra herself spoke of "needing to focus forward and not backward and seemed to see this as a positive step as opposed to the interpretation of the "old guard who saw it as ignoring the accomplishments of those who had been there in the tough times just past. Those who anived after or close to the tirne that Paul left were reluctant to speak of him, to question decisions that were made or to ask for information for fear that other members would feel blamed.
I've got to think that Barbara feels a bit uncornforcable. . . . . 1 would never Say anything that would sort of let Barbara think that I was like 'Barbara, God, where were you in this?' because 1 know that she didn't have any influence on it. (Vince)
1 think I actudy find myself trying to walk a very narrow line mtween] not makhg assumptions . . . [and] not asking questions that are going to be so fundamental that people think you are actually king somewhat insulting by asking. (Roger) Work and Lifatvle
A second topic which was seen to be undiscussable was work and lifestyle. It doesn't seem to be okay to have fun any more. . . . you would almost feel guilty . . because everybody is focused and working so hard that there's really not an opportunity. . . . [working really hard] is an expected behaviour. (Eric) Eric told the story of another team member. Vince. who's wife had called at 9 p.m. the previous night to say that she had prepared a candlelight dinner. Vince did not go home then and. indeed. ended up staying all night with several of his colleagues who were preparing a crucial report for a board meeting. Eric acknowledged that even though Sandra has stated that "we are all grown-ups and if there is a need for some personal space, then you would take that". most team members would not feel they should take it without asking permission. Indeed. the unspoken norm for the team seemed to be to work until 10 or 11 o'clock at night and on weekends. Comments ranged from: "It is not okay =to stay . . . because it is not okay ntto deliver" to "everythmg else in your life goes on hold." Bill reported walking into two people's offices in the middle of the week. one of whom broke down in tears and the other who said "Oh, it's Wednesday, the arrangement at home is, we see each other [my spouse. children] on Saturday and Sunday". Another member commented, "If someone was having difficulty with his children because of the 14 hour days that we're putting in. that topic would be unacceptable to raise in a team meeting."
While several acknowledged that Sandra said the politically correct things about maintaining a balanced lifestyle. she also made it clear that you must deliver. Bill acknowledged that despite the fact that Sandra claimed to be a very family-oriented person. there had been "absolutely no discussion on family at any time, with any team member. It's strictly business.
She may very well hold very strong family values . . . but I don't see it." As well, both Sandra and Don. two of the three senior executives, consistently worked very long hours and weekends, thus serving as powerful role models for the rest of the team. Indeed. Don commented:
Because we both work the hours that we work. it is tough on everybody else. . . . If you had someone in either of those two roles who [had] . . . a better balance between [work and lifestyle], you would have more push back. One of the issues which surfaced during the interviews was people's resentment that the teaming session was to be held on a Friday and Saturday, thus cutting into a weekend. It appeared that Sandra did not consult the team about this and no one felt it could be raised
despite the fact that the issue was discussed at a team meeting when she was not present. Feelings
Talking about one's feelings was deemed to be unacceptable by a number of team members. While there was no question that it was okay to talk about business issues, demonstrating emotions of any sort was not seen to be acceptable. Eric admitted. "Well we don? talk about our feelings at dl. There's not a lot of sensitivity from my point of view in tems of how people are feeling." When 1 asked Roger if he had any sense from his peers as to how they were feeling or experiencing their jobs, he comrnented that people were "too highly focused right now, on the problem at hand and it is what they are good at, that is what they are comfortable at." The following remark by Roger was indicative of a number of participants' admissions that it seemed to be unacceptable to talk about one's feelings about how decisions might affect them personally. "Maybe it is too personal a thing for someone to Say, 'Well, what does this mean for me?'." Sandra felt that one team mernber who seemed more willing to talk about her personal needs and feelings was "seen as an outsider" by her pers because of her wihgness to do this. Another member commented that bringing one's emotions into a meeting was considered unacceptable and that one of the members of the team who did this was described as overly emotional by others. One person claimed that 90% of the tearn members would not be comfortable talking about personal situations at dl.
One Member's Behaviour In almost al1 the interviews, Don's behaviour was cited as king problematic for the team. He was described as the driver of the team who held very strong opinions as to where the organization needed to go. While most saw this in a positive light as indicated by Richard's description of hirn as "a very strong individud. very knowledgeable, very capable," he was also seen as abrasive, dominant and disrespectful in his interactions with people. It was clear that his
behaviour was talked about by most team members one-on-one. but was never chaiienged in
front of the tem. Richard, a relatively new team rnember. commented: 1 was with Barbara when Don came in and said, "1 know you are showing Richard around but you are going to get fried if you don't fm that problem." . . . And a day later, when 1 ran into her, she said, "Well, 1 am still king fried." Indeed, many commented that when Don was in the rmm, any openness closed down. Tearn members were protective of each other and fearful not only of king attacked themselves, but also of tuming the spotlight onto others who rnight then be attacked by Don.
Well, if he is in the rwm, you don? bring up certain things you may if he weren't there because you don't want that person pounced on. So you might ask them off- line. (Mary) It depends on whether Don is in one of his stressful moods or whether it is a stressful situation.(Barbara) One team member who would challenge Don's behaviour was the President, Sandra. On observing him "[take] a piece out of [someone] in public in front of the tearn". Sandra reponed that she had taken Don aside after the meeting and made it clear that she would not tolerate that of unsupportive, disrespectfd behaviour. Despite this. she acknowledged that she believed it still went on when she was not in the room or in more subtle, non-verbal ways when she was present. This opinion was later validated by another comment from Barbara, "And 1 would bet you, on this weekend that's corning up . . . that you won't see that side of Don at al1 because Sandra will be there, and you will be there." Assum~tions Many of the assumptions that team members made tended to fall into one of the categories covered under unacceptable topics. It was assumed that one was expected to work long hours and to deliver at dl cost. Members of the "old guard" assumed that newer team members blamed them for the mistakes of the past. Members of the "new guard assurned that older members were overly sensitive about raising the pst; as a result. they avoided talking about it or asking questions about what had been done previously or why. Everyone assumed that Sandra blamed Paul for the organization's financial failures; they
also assumed that Sandra thought there was nothing to be learned from the past, that nothing in the past had been done right. Several rnembers assumed that it was unacceptable to admit to not howing things or to making mistalces. Barbara commenteci, "If you . . . admit there is something you don't know or there has ken a mistake, you are going to get shit."
Because the iiterature supports the notion that members wiii tend to make assumptions
about the team leader (Berg, 199?; Gersick & Hackman, 1990; Krantz. 1989; Ryan & Ostreich,
19%; Senge, 1998)' I included questions in the interviews about people's perceptions about Sandra and her leadership, The responses indicated that team members already held strong rnindsets about Sandra, most of which had not been chaiienged. People saw Sandra as extremely comptent, bright, hard-working and capable of delivering. There seemed to be a great deal of speculation as to why Sandra was put into this position. Many of the team members assumed that she was there to clean up the business. close
down the Company and get out. Others saw this as a carmove for Sandra which would position her to take on an even more significant move within Axworthy Global. Roger remembered that "she indicated that this was very much in line with . . . her ideal position, ideal role, subsidiary of something that she could run end to end, take full ownership of."
WhiIe many members had not spent a great deal of time with Sandra, she was still seen as demanding, hard-nosed and a perfectionist. Bahara felt that people's perceptions about her were shaped by the kuid of comments that were sometirnes made by other team members: "Sandra is a fanatic about this kind of sniff. . . . The reason Sandra hasn't called is because she is pissed off."
Sandra felt that people saw her a superwoman with al1 the answers. She herself claimed to have challenged many of the assumptions people heid about her, particularly the assumption that she had a hidden agenda as to the future of the organization. "1 think they al1 figure that
[Axworthy] has put me in here with a very specific mandate that is secret and they don't know about." When asked if she had addressed these perceptions, she responded: W eU, when I'm asked . . . I'm wry andid. My short-term mande is to stop the bleeding. . . . My longer terrn manda is to [decide wtieaier] we are going to exit a growthis hisines. S he expressed som frustration with aie fact that people hold swh smgmental &ls aba~ther
as kader aid achowledged her error in " not realizing tht 1 haw to be cardu1 wtia I Say as President md Chkf Exeaitiw Officer. If 1flippanly say sornething, t*s dme. And it*s Re. whakwr 1 Say k the gxpel."
In asking particf ants about kirability lo challenge, 1 made it clea that 1 was referrhg to the
chaiienging of idividuds around ideas, befiefs, atitudes and behaviairs. In addition, 1asked about thei readiness a chaknge any assumptions they diemsehes weie holdng, ixduding their tendency to check out nawerbd fomof communicaion.
W hik there were a number of excepticms, in generai, team rnembers agreed that there was not
a lot of challenging of each oher' s ideas cx behaviours or of die assmnptiors they held. ï'his w=
in part because they weIe still a new team utio didn' t knaw each other ueU but also because of tk
CO& agrement that theweE certain thmgs thq just didn' t talk &ut.
We don? have the ground des, we don't have any kind of history to cal1 on, even the core team mernbers that were here pnor to this kind of expansion of the team . . . 1 don? think it is sornething they spent a lot of time doing. (Roger) Roger went on to explain his thinking:
1 am aiso very cognizant of the idea of building relationships with the people on the team, and often getting off on the wrong fwt can be just hell to try and rebuild from. 1 think 1 would say 1 am king driven by that, and 1 want to make sure that 1 don? have to go through a lengthy recovev process because that cmbe hannful to the individual. Susan cornrnented that there were several team members with whom she had developed the kind of relationship where they could challenge one another "because [they are] dealing with the issues and not the persondity. So [they are] not jumping al1 over me and saying. 'how could you have let this happen?"' She acknowledged, however, that she does not have the sarne level of comfort with other members. Roger expressed the smeviewpoint in stating that "there hasn't been a lot of challenging around the lines of comfort." The interviews contained many references to people's abiiity to 'read' or pick up on non- verbal forms of communication. When asked how he could tell tfiat others were uncornfortable with inappropriate team member behaviour, Vince commented, "1 think some of it comes fiom body language, you can see it." When speaking about the tendency to blame 'older' team members for the problems that existeci within the organization, Bill stated that whiie it was never said directly "you pick it up through body language."
A number of people talked about Don's "loud non-verbal communication such as roUing of the eyes, sighing, sbnigging of shouiders or even waiking out of the room. It was clear that despite this ability to understand the intended message in ail of these non-verbal signals, the team nom was to ignore them rather than to comment or ask for clarification.
One opinion shared by aii team members was that any challenging of individuais that might involve personai feedback or checking out of body language should be done one-on-one rather than in front of others or in a meeting. The rationale seemed to be to avoid embarrassing people or to avoid confrontation or conflict. To raise that type of issue in an open forum, we already know the answer would end up king confrontational, and there would perhaps be some bittemess that would corne out from various team members that wouldn't be productive at the end of the day. . . . But I would never just raise it in an open forum and embarrass or put someone on the spot-(Bill) Barbara again pointed out that whether to challenge or mention non-verbal cues would depend on Don's presençe in the room.
If we are sitting in a meeting and sorneone kind of goes . . . al1 red or something, we will go back and Say afterwards, "was there something wrong, is there something 1 can do, were you stniggling to respond to that?" When asked if that wouid ever happen in-the-moment when it actually occurred, she comrnented, "not if Don were there." Richard, as a new rnember, noted that "because 1 am new, I have no baggage. So, I am going to be cleariy willing to speak openly and aggressively on issues that are important to this business". He was clear, however, that when it came to giving individuals feedback on how they were behaving or interacting in a meeting, he would do that derthe meeting, one-on-one. Even Sandra, who was seen to be one of only a few who would challenge people was cautious about
how her cornments might be perceiveci.
By the response, and a few times, it's been so obvious I've said, "Hey, hmg on, this isn't an attack. 1asked you what 1thought about something," or "1 asked if you have Iooked at it this way. I'm not saying my request for information is the reasonable way or you should have thought of this or whatever. I'm throwing something out [for consideration]." Two individuals cnticized Sandra for letting Don's disrespecdul behaviour go unchecked
in meetings. They wondered if she was uying not to embarrass him, but felt that she was
irnplicitiy giving the message that such behaviour was acceptable. Even though 1 have already reported that Sandra did take Don aside and speak to him privately about his behaviour, she and Don were the only members who were seen to regularly challenge others in meetings. Indeed, people saw Don's abrasive and aggressive style as a deterrent to anyone else c hailenging people publicly .
1 am not sure that if 1put something on the table that 1 am going to get an honest reaction from anybody if Don is in the room. . . . . Well, he can make your Iife pretty miserable or he can make your life great. (Barbara)
1 have already commented on people's reluctance to be candid when Sandra was present. Most had spent very little tirne with her and were unsure about her hidden agendas. One
memkr commented, "1 think the team is very cautious . . . with Sandra king here . . . about how they appear in front of her."
Unexpresseci Secret Homs and Wishes Many groups or teams have secret hopes or wishes which they do not feel cornfortable sharing. These "unexpressed or zoo good zo be pue processes" (Marshak & Katz, 1994, p. 24) include a desire to exceed expected achievements, pride in one's accomplishments or contentment with the status quo. They remain unspoken out of fear of ridicule, or king seen as
When asked about these secret hopes and wishes, some participants could not respond.
One person wished for a better worMife balance. A few stated the obvious wish for the Company to be saved. Susan commented: 1 think everybody wants to be on a winnuig tearn. 1 think we have spent the last two and a half years realiy trying to pull it al1 together, and 1 think the whole team really wants to see it work. Barbara said, "1 am sure hoping like hell that the business tums around sornehow." Sandra seemed to summarize many of these comments using the metaphor of Beauty and the Beast.
"Everybody thinks we're ugly, awfd and grotesque, but one day they are going to see us the way we really are."
Perceived Im~actof Surfacinn Undiscussables One area that was explored during the interviews was related to team rnembers' perceptions of the impact which surfacing previously unmentionable issues might have on the tearn. The question was posed from two points of view: a) the impact of not talking about the undiscussables, and b) the impact of "spaking the truth" (see Appendix F. #'s 8 and 9).The intent was to uncover people's mincisets about talking about difficult, sometirnes emotionaily charged topics. 1 was also interested in comparing their perceptions before the teaming process to those they held af'ter they had compkted the sessions.
In order to ensure that members did not provide me with what they might believe to be the
"politically correct" answers, participants were asked to comment on the potentiaüy positive, negative or neutral effects both of not swfacing and of surfacing these issues. Generally, people tended to see value in uncovering the previously unmentionable issues. Most team members acknowledged that not deaiing with their undiscussable issues would likely have a negative impact on the tearn's performance. People spoke about the danger of making assumptions about team members without checking them out. Ted seemed to regret that "we never make assurnptions, unfortunately, on the positive side. . . . we label." With respect to a tearn member's disrespectful behaviour, one person cornmented that "for the individual that it is happening to, it is personally puliing down the respect that we have for him". There was also a sense that as "fences go up" more and more issues are aired "off-iine" with a resulting decrease in honesty and openness within the team. Several people felt that as this pattern became entrenched, creativity would be dampened and, as Richard noted, "eventually you end up with people who are not really piaying to their full potential." Barbara suggested that, "if you continue with asswnptions that are personal without checking them out, . . . you are not working as a team." Some felt that there could be sorne potentiaily negative impacts on the team of airing the undiscussables as evidenced by Roger's comment, "There are some things that, even in a good team, are actually best left unsaid." Roger went on to Say:
Sometimes 1 think there are things people are fundamentally going to disagree on; there is really no middle ground and [it] really is a personal choice; it doesn't impact the other individual: it dœsn't impact the interaction between the people.
A number of people expressed the opinion that team rnembers must be assured that there would be no repercussions for speaking the tnith. Barbara suggested that "there has to be some kind of a contract or agreement chat there [wiil bel no backlash." This topic was raised in the early sessions and Sandra, Don and Ted (ail of whom had members reporting to them) agreed that what was said during these teaming sessions would not be held against them in their day-to day interactions with their managers. Participants acknowledged that there would be different levels of openness to hearhg or speaking the tnith. Vince indicated that "1 just think that we have some different personalities within the group and some would be more cornfortable doing that than others."
People cornrnented on the importance of "doing it [speaking the tnith] the right way" so that people can tmly hear what is king said. Susan expressed her anxiety that "if it is not done nght, it may end up creating walls between people. So if somebody is insecure, this [rnay make] them feei more insecure." Bill tabled a concern that when dealing with feedback and airing of difficult issues, one can sometimes hit at the "core of an individual," at himer basic self- concept. Vince felt that, in his experience with tearning processes, there is often an attempt to change the individual. "1 never want to be involved in something where somebody is trying to change me. I am very happy with me." When asked about previous experiences with teamuig processes, most recognized the value, as indicated by Richard's remark, "Building the team is a critical component to the success of this business." A couple of mernbers expressed skepticism as to whether this team was capable of taking advantage of such a process because of the barriers outlined previously and the incredible business challenges they were facing. A few had been involved in processes that didn't go far enough in ensuring that there was adequate foliow-up and monitoring of results. Don summarized his thoughts in this way:
The group needs to give itself permission to do this kind of stuff, to establish noms around the way you do this; [they need ] to raise issues and hold each other's feet in the fire around things in a non-dixounting way, and in a way that is not focused on the individual but focused on the better results of the team.
Observation of the Team
In addition to conducting individual interviews with tearn members, 1 observed the team in action during a regular two-hour senior management meeting. The fmdings from this session tended to confithose fiom the interviews.
The meeting was a few minutes late gettuig started and 3 out of 1 1 rnembers were absent.
The team had recently put in place a new meeting structure with a rotating chairperson. timekeeper and scribe and a predetexmined agenda with specific time dotrnents for each item. Sandra, the President, sat at the head of the table, contributed freely and, while not dominating, tended at times to look more frequently at Don than at others. Whde people did taik to other team members, more comments were addressed to Don than to other team members-
Don was the most vocal person and expressed strong opinions on almost al1 topics. There was no evidence during the meeting of the kind of disrespectfil or abrasive behaviour ascribed to him in the interviews. There were four team members who said very little, and there was no attempt by other members to draw them out- Early in the meeting, there seemed to be a level of politeness and formality. At other times, jokes were told with a great deal of what appeared to be forced laughter. There was no checking of assumptions or picking up on non-verbal cues. Sandra and Don challenged ideas most frequently. While people were careful to attend to the new meeting structum and task process, there was littie attention paid to relationship process issues. Only Eric, the Vice-President, Human pesources, made any such process interventions, picking up on other people's comments. Even though Mary was the thekeeper, when her own agenda item was king discussed, she ignored &e time ailotment even when reminded by another member that they should be moving on. No one raised any of the undixussable issues which had been explored during the interviews.
The oniy tirne that there was any obvious discornfort was wkn I taked about the teaming process. Mary expressed her preference that the team do "business" work during the session as opposed to the more traditional team-onented issues. 1 shared my experience with tearns and suggested that they may need to do some foundation-building work around their vision of what ideal team would look like and how it would operate before they launched into some core business issues.
There was initiaiiy iittle comment and there seemed to be some tension and resistance in aeroom with people looking down, avoiding eye contact. When 1 commented on this and
*ked for feedback, there was iittle response.
Because 1 was already doing a considerable arnount of consulting work within Axworthy
Global, 1 felt that it might be difficult to conceal fkom my colleagues the fact that ABC Inc. was my research team. When 1 asked for permission to share this information, one person expresseci some reservation with a concem that, despite my use of pseudonyms, team members rpjght be identified in the thesis write-up. Because the team felt that it was important to honow even one member's concexn, 1 agreed not to reveal the narne of the Company to my colleagues. In summary, in the pre-study observation session, team members followed a prescnbed agenda, participation was uneven, there was liale attention given to process issues and Don appeared to be the focus of much of the conversation. Summary of Findiags
In summarizing the findings hmthe pre-study assessment, it appeared that this was a tearn with many unresolved issues. Because members were a mix of "new to the company" and longer-tenured, with some history. there was "baggage" which had not been acknowledged. The resuit was that levels of trust were low. The arrivai of a new leader who was detemiined to move on and "put the past behind us" seemed to accentuate the rift between new and old.
As with any new team, members were not yet clear as to what they expected of one another and the expression of feelings in general. and in particular, around work and lifestyle issues and acceptable behaviour patterns had not been established. People made assumptions about these issues and about each other without verifjing their validity. and the ability to challenge one another was limited to a few members, deemed to have greater authority.
Indeed, this appeared to be an ideal participant group with which to conduct research into the impact of undiscussables or covert processes on team îünctioning. CHAPTER FIVE: TEmJOURNEY
While the original research question involved assessing the impact of surfacing the difficult issues, particularly those which go underground and become undiscussable, my findings revealed broader objectives related to understanding the process involved in taking such a joumey . This included the difficulty both in sustaining the learnings and in transfemng the insights and new behaviours to the &y-to-day business environment. lndeed, the process itself of working with the team as they attempted to become more
candid and to address these undiscussables was a rich experience. It provided a window into just how torturous a jowney this can be as mernbers stmggled with speaking the tmth and with deciding what to Say and how to Say it. The sessions were fded with illustrations of how very dificuit the process of working with tearn dynamics can be in a business environment
In this chapter, 1 wiil dexribe the joumey by providing exarnples of the tearn's attempts to uncover the undixussables and to become more candid. In so doing, I wiii share excerpts from my journal which reveai my observations of a number of critical incidents which were pivotal to my findings. As weil, 1wiiI include a section which describes my own personal joumey as researcher/consultant, the difficult choices 1 had to make and my attempt to remain unbiased in the face of ofien conflicting emotions. Appendix 3 provides a schedule detailing the dates and Iength of sessions as well as any additional involvement 1 had with the team.
The Early Sessions
The fmt two off-site sessions with the team provided me with a nch source of information, both about the tearn dynamics and about the process of uncovenng and dealing with the taboo topics. Because I had contracted with the team to provide them with feedback fiom the interviews, a sigmcant amount of time in the fmt session was spent revealing and working with these data. Participants were given a summary of the cornmon themes and introduced to rnany of the conversation tools (such as left-hand colurnn, ladder of inference, balancing advocacy with inquiry) which were then used as a foundation for their dialogue around the data.
As might be expected, the atmosphere was emotionally charged and there was considerable tension in the room as participants, for the fmt time while together in a face-to- face situation, listened to a recounting of the undiscussables identified in Chapter Four. A few excerpts kom my journal entries following the fmt two-day session convey the tone of the conversations: The= was çome apologizhg, rdownership of that issue [denial of the sigriificanœ of " the past" 1. Saidra krseîf apologéed ptblicly to Susai, Mary and Barbara Them weretears dl around and al1 thebmke dow. This aftemoon, Roger apologized to them and sad he really felt maed by what they had said: he reanzed that he had also been part d the@koblem and waited to adcires the issue with his owteam
This aftemoon, Don owned the Wbadc about his abrasimess with gr- humility and asked for moie specific exanples. He acknowledged tha he was aware of that s ide of hinseif, but clearly needed mrefeedbzk aid enoouraged people to chanenge him. He had becorne quite siient wkn 1 frst p~sentedthe daand in a joking tone of voie conmented before lunch," Well I need to ad&ess tk issue of my abrasiwess," but it wasn't reaüy pickd up until Iaer. (Reflectk Journal. April4,1997)
During the second sessicn, the= appeared to be a greaer degree of opennas and members began to challenge one another on tfieir own with significantly less aicouragpnent on my part One of the mstobiously painful issus to be raised concerned die fact that two tearn mernbers, Ridiard adTed, who had both just jcined aie Company, had not been aweof the sewrity of die debt carried by ABC nor of the wxy leal possibility that the Company wuld not surviw its fmancid downum.
W hen Richard reded k extent of lis sense of barayal and anxiety about his own future, Ted shared his crwn sidaraction to the news. As in he first session, emtions were running high, as this journal aitry will aiest: Richard then broke down in tears and talked about how devastating it had been for him to discover the seriousness of the company's financial problems. He cornmented on his sense of responsibility for supporthg his fdyand his belief that he had made a big mistake in his career choice to corne to ABC. Ted then spoke with great deal of emotion as well about his own shock. They clearly shared a shilar reaction and both chaiienged Sandra, Don and Eric (Vice-President, Human Resources) about the job interview process in which the whole truth about the Company had not been revealed.
Subsequently , there was a long working through of the issue, with team members really taking ownerstiip for their parts in the deception. (Reflective Journal, May 2, 1997)
Team members who stiii had pb seauity with Axu~rthyGlobal in the ewent that ABC were to " go under,*' were accused of hdgkss " shin the garriv" than those who had no ties with ihe pamt corrpany. Sandra,in paxticular, was chailengeà on this point and respaided with the comment that skhad m guarantees of any future positbn with Axworthy. One incident that occurred on the second &y illustroted the impact on rnembers of not speaking the inth, even about apparently trivial in-the-moment occurrences. It revolved around a suggestion that one member had made as to a process for recording their cornrnents on an issue. The following is a journal entry of rny observations: Mary got up, went to the fiip &art md took owr. S he began to sugges t a process that involvxi a bt of witing; she mka bt of time to do this and ue had aiready agrdto take ody one4alf hair in totai for this discussion. There appeared to be a ptded of " left-haid colmin" thoughts and feelings in the room with peuple looking dom, not saying anythhg and generdly appearing uncornfortable
My assumpbn was that a lot of people belidit was taking too long, but nobody was challenging HAiat was happening. Later, mhen we debriged and 1 asked what had been happening with the rest of the grolp, Sandra acknowledged that she had felt the p-s was gomg to take tw long. Houever, because of her rde as leader and the mental models that migh be atached to her, she decided not to intetfere. Don said thai he too dih't want to be seen as interfering. As dl,he had sorne history with Mary that oontribued to his decision not to speak up. Othms agreed tha they had beai feeling the same =y, bunobody had acknowledged this. The impact hr the team wds that they had spart a laof unnecessary time doing sornething that nobody was canmitted to. When 1 asked Mary about her reaction, s he rrsponded that s he would ha= preferred that people be direct aid hones t wiai her-
the^ followed a li~lydialogue abou the need for them to be mrehonest in expnssing what they need from one another in their discussions. (Reflective Journal, Apnl4, 1997) As a result of this issue king surfami, the team aigageci in a kngthy conwmiîion about how hones t they should be with future managuial caidid~.On the one hand, in rewxiing the tmth about the mmpany's fmam5a.i situaticn, they would risk bsing highiy quaiifid, expaienced peopk. On aie other hanci, in nat king candid, they were n dansr of Golating their own iitegriy and causing peopk to feel deceid as had Richard and Ted. In the end, they drafted som gui&hes to be rsed in inteniews of all people nto key manasment positions. These were utiliæd in subsequait newhire pocesss.
Team members commented on the progress they had made during these initial sessions as evidenced by these journal entries:
When 1 asked for people's responses to the day, thele was a lot af appreciation for whaî they had done as a team. Mary, who had initialy appeared k~ be one of the most cynical tean members, adcnowledged that s he was suiprised at how much wrk &y had done ami how vaiuabt it had been There seemed to be generd consensus ihat they had cane a bng way.
My sense at the aid of aie session wa that they had done some powerful work in adhsingtheir cown processes, advery quickly, there had been a great &al of opemess, 4th tkm begmning to make process checks on theu ouni. (Reflectiw Journal, A@ 5,1997)
Mary cornmented on the cmÿersaiion tk team had engaged m with respect to tk lexi of honesty they needed to dernonsaate about the company' s fnancial consnaints: " This is the first time 1' ve seen us take an issue and rdywark to resolw it, really iisten IO each other, talking in a rational way but dso expressing our feehp." S he specifidy referaiced tk fact that people said what kywere feeling andothers resporded. Sksaw bat as the reason hy were able to work the issue through mre smmthly . Yet, des pik their obviais progress, the tean conhued D s tniggle wiih king candid.
The= were many points ii the process where there qpeared to be unspoken thaights md feelings as illustrateci by this incident:
Whik there was atremedous muntof openriess, they remin tentatix about chalenging each other without my pranpting and support In the afternmn wh working with the issue of work and iifestyle, emotions were running high, es pesiail y with Mary who broke into wsseveral times . At ais poht, Smdra tak the kad in diraaing the con~atim.Sbc made a nu* of ad- statmmnts such as, "1 tHnk uied nœd to ainlr about wbat uive can do md wha ue cai't,*' and "1 t)iink you need to al1 be phpared b gix up thmgs that arent absokiely ai- ta yair own functbn, tha you dlybe abkto [acknowkd~th4 you on't do e-g. "
The combinaion d a pancntal @neof wict and ber tend- to pccr at peopb owr her reading giasses gave me the iqnssion bac she was aiking to chikiren md not to a group of addts. kk she newu checkad out hmpcopk wae fehrg. The room becam wry quiet, pcopk appcad to k uncodortabie, lodllag dam and awiding escon-
When I askd thcgroup vhat was happening, ppkaontinmi to be sileut. 1 hm made the observation tha Sancûa had taktn cntr and was piaying a strong ad\nracy mie. W bile Sandra aicknowiee&d tha this was mie, the rcst d the group laughed. no one @ked his up or chaücngd Sanàra and tic mattr was droppai. (ReflectitcJounial, A@ 5,1997) The foiiowing exazp from my jdillustrates the struggle people fclt in chlknging one
While thcy aclaiowledged that they still had a gmat @dof anger, they were unwilling to bc specific about who was the target of thtir anger. Thcm was a tendency to blame onestlf, Uicn name Sandra and Don, only to quickly pull back and deny thaî they were really to blame. (Rcfltctive Journal, May 7, 1997)
The Team Begins to Own its Process Following the fust two sessions, whcrc the original undiscussables had been surfaced, the work of teaming continueci with a combination of additional off-site sessions and process observation at their bi-weekiy senior management team meetings.
There was a sense that pmgrcss was king made and tcam members began to take more ownership of tbeir own issues. As might ôe expected, this appeared to be more difficult for them to do when nrnning thtir own business meetings than in an off-site session where 1was the designated fxilitator.
At the conclusion of the June teaming session, members had decided to restructure their meetings to a~6wfor grrater attention to their own process. The Ïntent had knto use a revised meeting formait., rotahg chair, reguiar process checks and a meeting evaluation at the end. At the fmt meeting with this new fonnat, bene were obvious points of discornfort and some members appeared to be holding ont0 unspoken thoughts and feelings. Foliowing a presentation he had made about the restructuring of one area of the business, Richard asked for feedback fiom the group. Whiie he seemed excited about the changes he was suggesting, as a relatively new member to the group, he also appeared to be somewhat Milnerable and in need of support, When his request for feedback was met with silence, the meeting chair med to move on quickly rather than check out what the silence had ken about. There were several other examples where members clearly were uncornfortable with what was happening, but did not express their concerns. At the end, the chair did not suggest a meeting evaluation, but ended the session abruptly and was not challengeci by other members. At the next off-site session, 1 shared my observations with the team and there was agreement that more attention needed to be made to check out assurnptions and non-verbal be haviour.
Over the next two rnonths, the work continuai with the team workhg steadily to irnprove their ability to work effectively together.
1 see the team stnigghg with their issues. 1 see them trying to be more direct but 1 still see their difficulty in dealing with "process" rather than "content" and their extreme carefulness when dealing with process issues. 1 would say that there is movement and they are beginning to speak more honestiy. (Reflective Journal, July 7, 1997)
In terms of evaluating the session, there were a lot of positive comments about how valuable these days they spend together are and how much they've accomplished. . . -1have a sense that they are more and more owning the process thernselves and I'm less actively engaged in "facilitating" the process. . . . As far as their readiness to be honcst with one another, 1 think it's coming; it's a slow build. . . . They certauily taiked about needing to trust each other and acknowledged that they are not there yet. 1 hear that kind of comment, but 1 also sense a hunger to increase it. 1 felt less concemed that they weren't going to own their own issues. (Reflective Journal, July 8, 1997)
The Honeymoon Period Ends Over the summer months, because of holiday schedules and other business pressures, we did not meet in an off-site session. During this time, 1conducted one-hou individual coaching sessions with team rnembers to assist them in understanding their personal SYMLOG feedback. The latter was a fairiy complex report which provided them with detailed feedback on their own self-perceptions with regards to the 26 SYMLOG team effectiveness values.
While the intent of the coaching sessions was to work with the SYMLOG reports, 1 also encouraged members to talk about their own participation in the teamhg process. The general consensus seemed to be that while the team was making strides toward more honesty, there continued to exist pockets of unshared material with many "meetings after the meeting." My rote in these coaching sessions was to challenge people's assumptions about what they could and couldn't say and to encourage them to take the risk to raise the issues which continued to be avoided.
Ted feels that there are dos still operating within the team a lot of the the. 1 asked him why he wasn't raising that in the team. . . . He also expressed a concern with his own role. He saw hirnself and Don and, to a lesser extent, San& as probabty the most dominant members, who speak the most. Yet, as one of the most the senior people, he is concemed about being perceived as taking over. When 1 asked him why he hadn't raised that in the team, if that is a concern of his, why he hadn't put it out there, he replied. "Oh 1 hadn't thought of that." (Reflective Journal, July 18, 1997) She [Barbara] feels there's a tremendous amount of progress king made in the sessions . . . but she does still feel that there's still a lot of hidden stuff that isn't king said. She daims that people are still not quite trusting enough and feels that she talks too much. Because she doesn't want to take over, she sometimes doesn't Say things that she would like to say. . . . So, it appears that, while the tearn is making progress, they all seem to be acknowledging that there is still a level of anxiety, there's still a lot of left-hand column matenal. People are not as cornfortable with each other as they need to be. (Reflective Journal, July 15, 1997) Many of the undiscussables at this point were related to challenging Sandra and Don as evidenced by the following journal excerpts following a meeting with severai team members in which 1 had been asked to participate: Both Eric and Susan talked at great length about Sandra. They feel that they can't be honest with her and have a lot of resenunent about her style. She is seen to Say the nght things in the teaming sessions, but to order people around and issue comrnands when it cornes to the day-to-day pressures of mnning the business. (Reflective Journal, August 7, 1997) Dunng this meeting, 1 learned that Susan had deçided to leave the Company, largely because of her dissatisfaction with Sandra and Don's leadership styles and the feeling chat she was not considered by them to be a vdued team member. Later, when the team learned of her
decision, there were many attempts, especiaiiy by Sandra, to convince her to stay. In Susan's fuial inte~ewwith me, she commented:
Well, the basic feedback 1 got was that 1 gid bring a lot of value to the team itself, not just fiom a technology perspective, but hmwho 1 was, as well as what 1 brought to the table. . . . Whiie 1 felt redy good about that, 1 was also disappointed because it took something like the fact that you're leaving to have people Say thank you." This period seemed to be about taking "three steps forward" and coming "two steps
back." The team appeared to be making progress at points; yet, 1 would then be privy to stories of issues king buried and dealt with in sub-groups and whispers as opposed to with the whole group. The following excerpt from my journal reflects my own attempt to understand w hat was happening: The question that arises for me is, "Does a team ever get to the place where there are no covert processes?" 1 think not. 1 was inclined to feel discouragcd when 1 heard some of the things people were saying initially, until 1 realized that what 1 am seeing is what one would expect for a new team who have only ken together for 4 months. They're still fuiding their feet with each other and a lot of their coVeR stuff is deeply embedded. 1 guess the question 1 ask is, "At what point will they begin to internalize enough of the tools that they begin to do their own work without so much reliance on me?" (Reflective Journal, July 17, 1997)
Back On Track In early September, at a senior management team meeting, 1 reponed to the tearn my observations of what had been happening over the summer. The tearn appeared to hear my feedback and addressed my concerns. There was some push back around my suggestion that Don and Sandra were still not king challenged, with several members providing concrete examples of recent incidents where they had strongly challenged Sandra on issues.
As well, afier some initial defensiveness, the tearn addressed the issue of Susan's resignation and their own contribution to her making the choice to leave. They lefi the meeting with a renewed cornmitment to integrate their leamings into their day-to-day work. In a mid-October teaming session, the &y began, as always, with rnembers reflecting on and diaioguing about both what had gone well and what concems they had about their work together since the previous meeting. The mood was optimistic with them citing numerous examples of their progress. These included: increased ability to communicate openly with less defensiveness and protection of one's own territory; more dialogue and appreciation of others' viewpoints; fewer left-hand column thoughts and feelings. Indeed, when 1 expressed some skepricism about the level of optimism in the room, they al], with
one accord, agreed that there had been a si@~cant shift and that they had, as a team, corne through sornething important since August. This upbeat mood continued into their November session where team members commented positively on their abiiity to work together on a major announcement to the rest of the organization about their new strategy, which would involve restmcturing and downsizing. in reflecting on the way in which they had corne together in this initiative,
Sandra commented that "we worked better together than we ever have." She went on to
suggest that how the tearn dealt with this potentiaiiy diffïcult situation was very different from how they would have done so six months previously.
In this session, members worked with their individuai SYMLOG feedback to one another. in this case, each person had been evaluated by six other team members on the 26 SYMLOG values. Following an initiai pend for personal reflection, people shared their feedback with the group and each person had an opportunity to ask for clarification and additional information. For the most part, the dialogue was open and people gave each other candid, often-challenging feedback. It was only when it was Sandra's mm to hear fiom others, that the conversation becarne stilted with long silences. 1 made the observation that Sandra was the only person to whom people were having difficulty offering feedback.
There was mal hesitancy to talk. 1 sat in the silence and finaily asked the group what was happening. People made jokes and one individual made a gesture of slitting his throat, as if 1 to Say, "My neck might be on the line." Everybody laughed and Sandra asked where that was corning from. (Reflective Journal, November 10, 1997) 1 encouraged the team to examine the mental rnodels attached to Sandra, as leader. and to look at the impact of their reluctance to provide her with honest feedback. This was a difficult conversation, as the foilowing journal excerpt indicates:
So there tended to be a lot of fancy footwork, dancing around giving Sandra the feedback. It was only with both my own and Sandra's encouragement that ultimately, people were able to acknowledge that Sandra has had an iniimibting demeanor and resulting negative impact on team mmben. Again, there was a tendency to want to puii back, with memben suggesting that Sandra has changed and is less that way than she was initially. 1 can only assume that people were king straight and emphasized many hes how important it was that they be candid with her. 1 went so far as to suggest if they really wanted to work together as a team, Sandra needed to be seen as a team member as well as a leader and that they were not doing themselves or Sandra any favours by not being honest. . . . It will be interesthg to see in the weeks to come how that progresses. (Reflective Journal. Novernber 10, 1997)
The Team Prepares to Co It Alone In the December session, the team seemed to be tiring of the off-site meetings and expressed their need to ""geton with it." Members had a sense that there was a tendency for them to rely on me to be their teaming "conscience" rather than to commit to integraûng their leaniings into their everyday working interactions. As weil, the tearn was under uemendous business pressure as their restructuring process went into full swing. They were now working hard to position the two sides of the business either for joint venture agreements with outside vendon or for renewed cornmitment from Axworthy to keep ABC intact. Financial pressures were extreme and the team recommended one final session to put closure to their formal teaming process. In this final session. they committed to developing a concrete plan to further integrate their learnings into their day-to-day work together and to ensure that the learnings wodd be sustainable over tirne.
The final session did not occur until mid-February. in the interim, the business pressures had escalated even further and the team meetings reflected the stress team rnembers were under. People were beginning to fear for their jobs, as there was some question as to whether a buyer might be found for either side of the business. During this period, 1 continued to coach Sandra as much as possible about the need for her to support the team in keeping communication Iines open and in surfacing the very difficult issues that they were facing. 1 also attended a senior management team meeting just prior to their last session in order to be cognizant of the current team dynarnics. The following journal excerpts reflect my thinking at chat the: I suggested [to Sandra] that ail of these issues need to be surfaced on Tuesday, that there is cleariy a lot of covert material again. She sees more silo mentality as there had been at the beginning of Our work. 1 suggested that this is typical of a team under stress and when facing major change. 1 also suggested that there is likely a sense of loss that the team may split apart after their hard work together. 1 pointed out that people do not seem to be challenging Sandra again, that she needs to be aware of this and consistently demonstrating her openness to challenge by-doing process checks, etc. 1 gave her feedback about the meeting last week when my observation was chat she did not do this, but rather "barreled" through her own agenda.
1 feel that 1 need to be tough with the team in the last session next week about how they will manage through this diff~culttime - how they need more than ever to surface their le fi-hand column material in order to be able to build on what they have created and to support each other as they confiont their cwrent business challenges. (Reflective Journal, February 13, 1998) Their last off-site session involved reviewing the work they had done together and making concrete plans for building on that work over the four-month period when 1 would not be involved. 1 raised the issue of my withdrawal and reaffumed my cornmitment to hem as a consultant over and above my role as researcher. As such, I offered to continue to work with them if, given the severe business pressures they were facing, the ongohg suppon would be seen to be advisable. 1 dso offered to be avadable for phone consultations during this time. There was unanimous agreement that they were ready to "try it on their own." Indeed, they reiterated their previous stance that there was a strong tendency for them to rely on me rather than to commit to making the necessary shifts themseives. The afternoon focused on evaluating their process and making concrete plans for transfemng the learnings into their day-to-day working envuonment. There was unanimous agreement that they were much more open and honest with one another than they had ken.
As well, they saw themselves as able to surface and deal with issues more quickly. There
continued to be concem however, that, whiie there had been some Mprovement, there was
stiil a hesitancy to challenge the three ieaders, Sandra, Don and Ted. After a lengthy discussion, they renewed their cornmitment to continue to work on this.
In planning for their continued work, they confinned their intention to be more vidant about conducting process checks and meeting evduations. Several rnembers voiced their concern that "the good work we have done over the past year could dlslip away in the four months Mary Ann is not involved." 1 suggested that they plan for a two-hour team assessrnent session every six weeks to two months where they wodd evaluate their
fbnctioning together. This was left somewhat vague and 1 sensed that there was not full cornmitment from all team members to irnplement this kind of regular review . In the end, 1 reaffïied my offer to be avdable for consultation should the situation indicate that additional support would be helpful. The session ended on an upbeat tone with my cornmitment to contact them at the end of four months.
My Journey as ConsultanüResearcher Almost as important a pan of the joumey as that experienced by the panicipants was the path 1, as researcher, traveled with the tearn. As indicated in an earlier chapter, qualitative research, by its very nature, requires the researcher to be actively engaged with her participants throughout the process. In an action research approach, this is even more mie as she plays the dual role of consultant and researçher. As has already been noted, the participants and consultant/researcher will inevitably influence each other as they work over the extended timeframe inherent in an action research model. With the added responsibility of managing the boundaries between these two roles, it was important for me to engage in an ongoing reflective process where 1 could examine my assumptions and biases. In essence, 1 was required to "walk the talk" of surfacing my own covert processes and making hmexplicit to myself and therefore available to scnitiny. Despite the fact that 1had been facilitating teaming processes as an organization development consultant for many years, 1 becarne aware early in the research process that 1 carried more "baggage" with this piece of work than 1 had with any of the others in which 1 had ken involved. My desire to conduct a "brilliant" piece of research and to create "amazing" results could affect my ability to remain unbiased in my work with the tearn,
and 1 wouid need to be vigilant about processing my own material.
In order to ensure that 1 did indeed manage this "insider/outsider" role (Wright, 1989), 1 kept a reflective journal throughout the process. The journal served as a dumping ground for my thoughts and feelings, including the anxieties that surfaced, the frustration 1 felt at some points and the elation or excitement at other times. 1 also used a number of consultant/researcher coiieagues as sounding boards and specifically requested that they challenge me around my assumptions and biases. Finally, 1 worked with a psychotherapist/coUeague more specificaiiy around my countertransference issues, especially with respect to rny relationship with Sandra, the leader.
In this section, 1 will describe my own journey from rny fmt encounter with the tearn
to my final withdrawal from the process. 1 will rely heavily on excerpts from my reflective journal to iilustrate what 1experienced as both a roller-coaster ride with many highs and lows and also a nch, leaming experience which has already significantly affected my consulting practice.
The areas that seerned to be most significant with respect to my role were my relationships both with the leader and with other team members. in each case, the underlying issue often appeared to be my stniggle with how to handle the feedback and information 1
was receiving from team members. In addition, the joumal is filled with references to my stniggle to remain unbiased about the results of my research and my concern that my own desire for a good outcome might influence my work. First. Session From the beginning of my involvement with the team, 1 struggled with boundary issues in my relationship with Sandra, the leader. 1 was conscious that while she was the client who had hired me as a consultant to work with her team, in contracting with tearn members, the team had also become my client. In one of my eariiest journal entries, following a planning meeting with Sandra, I asked the question, "How do 1 work with her as my client and not create a special reiationship such that the team sees me as biased and untmstworthy?" (Reflective Journal, March 17, 1997). Much of the struggle at this time centred on how much information to share with
Sandra ahead of time. Her need to know what was happening had to be balanced with my cornmiunent to tearn members to keep confidentid what individuals had shared with me during the interviews. The agreement with the tearn had ben that 1 would share only cornmon themes, and that 1 would feed them back in such a way that no members could be identified. My struggle with what to share with Sandra is reflected in this journal entry: 1 am aware again of my dilemma of how much to reveal to Sandra in our meeting this Wednesday prior to the teambuilding. She may want to see the latest agenda. Yet, again, 1 would be treating her differently than other tearn members if 1share it with her. 1 do think 1 have to share with ber the gist of the individual feedback to her, as leader, so that she doesn't hear it for the first time in front of the group. (Reflective Journal, March 3 1, 1997) This issue of what to include in my feedback to the team continued as 1 wrestied with how expiicit to be about one tearn member, Don, who was named by all members as a significant part of the rasons that things went "underground." I've been really trying to get clear about how much to share with the team, especially with respect to information about individual team members. It seem appropnate to report on Sandra, as the tearn leader because 1 contracted up front with the team to ask specifically about her. as leader. However, there is a lot of significant, but dificult feedback about Don. another key player. 1 feel it is important not to be covert myself in asking people to identify the undiscussables and then leaving a significant one out in the feedback. 1 want to be sure that 1provide honest feedback, about the themes, which emerged. Yet 1 want to be carefiil not to centre out individuals. (Reflective Journal, March 3 1, 1997) This continued to be an issue as 1 then wondered whether 1 should give Don advanced waniing about the difficult feedback that he wodd be hearing, as 1 had with
Sandra. 1 was conscious fiom what others had said that people were intirnidateci by Don. 1 wondered whether my giving him some warning of what was to corne might set off a chain of events in which Don might collude with others to shut down any discussion during the session.
This stmggle about how much to share continued as 1 used my consultant colleagues as sounding boards: Taiked with Loretta and Ray today. The generai consensus was that I need to be honest. but how honest? 1 continued to wrestle with using direct quotes about Sandra, such as "Gives orders and disappears" and about Don, "When Don's in the room, you won't get an honest answer." (Reflective Journal, April2, 1997) Ultimately, 1 decided to go with a more scaled-down report which, while naming Sandra and Don. did so without using the very personal and more darnning quotations.
In addition to these issues about the feedback, 1 was acutely aware of my anxiety about my dual role as consultant/researcher and the potential that existed for me to lack objectivity about what might be right for the group in my eagerness to create "good" research results. 1 recall rny endless notes to myself, thoughts scnbbled late at night in my obsessive attempt to "cover dl the bases."
1 recall going back to Marshak and Katz (1994) who warned of the complexities of dealing with this type of materiai and of the need fmt to create a safe environment in which people feel prepared to talk about previously hidden issues. They cautioned against the implications of revealing too much too swn or of foçusing on exposure at the risk of rnovement. The following excerpt seems to surnmarize my state of mind at that time: Three days before my fmt session - have been very nervous, still struggling with the distinction between my roles as consultant and researcher. 1 keep having to check out, as 1 design, what 1 am trying to achieve in this first session. Part of what 1 need to be aware of is that 1 can't expect them to open up instantaneously, just because it is my research. Indeed, my question isn't about them opening up - it's about their experience of leaming to surface and work with the covert processes. And that wiU take tirne. (Reflective Journal, Mach 3 1, 1997) The brlv Sessiom in the early sessions with the team, where many of the undiscussables were fmt surfaced, I used my reflective journal extensively in order to help me look at my role and at many of the boundary issues discussed earlier. My relationship with Sandra continued to be problematic and 1 stmggled with my countertransference issues in needing her approval In the fmt session when she asked me to take on sorne of the administrative responsibilities such as arranging for a private dining room, even though 1 was clear that this shouid not be part of my role. 1 acquiesced instead of pushing back in a respecthi way. In writing in my journal, 1 reflected on why 1 had reacted as 1 had:
My question is, "Why didn't 1 diallenge the' 1 ttink that was one of my own CO- processes about wmting to please Sarrira, bea gdfacilitator,do what the " boss" tek me @ do. Later, wben sh= asked me if 1 had taken Gare of it, I adm.tted openly that I had forgotten,apologized imnediaely and took ownership of E My questicm to myself is, " Why did 1 take ownershp of it why didn't 1 push back ?" (Reflectiw Joumai, Apnl3,1997)
This need for Sandra's approval surfaced in other ways in these early meetings. At the end of the second off-site session, 1 found myself blumng the boundaries of our relationship in my suggestion that we meet to debrief. Later, 1 questioned my judgrnent as 1 saw how 1 had coiluded with Sandra to talk about process issues, which should not be discussed outside the sessions. The issue continued to surface as 1 stmggled to differentiate between those matters 1 did need to discuss with Sandra and the team dynamics and issues related to other members, which were best dealt with during the sessions. 1 found this to be particularly challenging as Sandra often asked for my feedback and attempted to draw me into conversations about what she saw as happening.
Talking to Sandra on my ce11 phone on the way home, she clearly wanted my impressions about the session. 1 keep feeling I'm walking this fine line between coiluding with her and behaving as a responsible consultant in coaching the leader about my observations about what she rnight be doing that either helps or hinders the process. (Refiectiw Journal, April4, 1997) 1 recognized my need for Sandra's approval and suspected that that was the real reason 1 had suggested a debriefing meeting. In talking it through with a psychotherapist coileague, 1 saw that Sandra and 1 were indeed colluding to feed our own needs. Fran suggested that there is a system of mutual dependence operating between Sandra and myself. . . . Further, Sandra's dependence on me seems to feed my own need for reassurance and approval from Sandra. (Reflective Journal, May 9, 1997)
1 began to see how many times 1 had "broken the containef*in small ways by allowing Sandra to talk about what went on during the sessions. hdeed, this issue was not isolated to my relationship with Sandra, but had surfaced with other members as well. 1 was &en approached after sessions by team members who wanted to talk about what they thought was happening. Again, it was critical that 1 differentiate between taiking with them about their own individual struggles as team members and issues which were more related to the group dynamics in general or other members in parûcular. 1 recd my excitement when 1 became aware of my own covert process in not talking about this issue openly with the team:
What suddenly struck me is that 1 need to talk about this. 1 need to make this public with the group. Again, it becornes a covert process that is going on, and I'rn coliuding in it. . . . 1 realize that in the next session, 1 need to raise the issue of my role with the group, panicuiarly with respect to conversations 1 might have with people outside the sessions. (Reflective Journal, May 1 1, 1997)
Subsequently, 1 engaged the team in such a conversation and, together with tearn members, clarified the kinds of interactions that wouid be appropriate for me to have with people outside the sessions. The agreement we made was that 1 would be available to individual members for coaching about their own interactions with team members. We also clarified my role with Sandra, speciQing my need to rneet with her as the client around administrative and contractual issues and to offer feedback and coaching in her role as leader.
After the initiai sessions, as the team continued its work, I began to feel more solid in my dual role. My boundary issues with Sandra settied down, and indeed, 1 noticed that she was no longer asking for debriefrng sessions and we met less often. 1 became clearer about my boundaries with the team as reflected in this journal entry: I've been more conscious today of my role within the team and of keeping myself more separate from them than 1 might have in the past - not to Say that 1 don't engage in chatting at breaks, but I'm just not hanging out with hem as much as 1 have in the past. 1am more conscious of my own transference issues and more aware that 1 am QQ~ a tearn member. 1 feel more separate from the team and that has felt quite appropriate. (Reflective Journal, lune 3, 1997) The issue that 1 struggled with at this phase of the process was how to deal with the information shared with me outside the teaming sessions. It was during this time that 1 conducted one hour coaching meetings with each team member to assist them in understanding their SYMLOG feedback. As indicated earlier, many chose this opportunity to discuss their struggles with the process and to share information about issues that were not yet surfacing during the off-site sessions. Once again, 1 wrestled with what to do: And what is my role in facilitating them Etalking about these issues]? Do 1 need to share with them some of the themes that I'rn heafing from the coaching sessions? Would that be useful? Would members like to hem some son of mid-point check for them around what I'rn hearing from people?
And it's just occurring to me now that it might be usefid in the September session to give them a brief recap of some of the key themes I'rn hearing - not any specifics because that has to remain confidentid - but just the basic themes, such as, "There's still a lot of hiding, there are still lots of 'meetings aber the meetings', some of you are still not king honest about your perceptions both about the teaming process and about each other." 1 am aware that some of that's going to surface when they give the SYMLOG feedback to each other. So 1 may need to hold my tongue and allow the process to unfold. 1 have to be careful that I'rn not irying to push something that they're not ready for.
1 didn't contract with them to do that &ive hem more feedback], but of course, in meeting with them I'rn receiving more information again. So 1 need to think about that. (Reflective Journal, August, 8,1997) 1 did ultirnately share my perceptions at a senior management meeting in September with the result that members began to take ownership for the way in which they had begun to slip into old patterns. This question of how much to insert myself into the process surfaced in a number of other ways. Because it was apparent that the team was stmggling to integrate theu learnings into their day-to-day business environment, 1 suggested that 1 play a more proactive role as a process observer during their tearn meetings. Wethey had aiready assigned someone to this role, my observation was that the team was paying onfy cursory attention to process
issues and there might be value in my demonsvating how to do this more effectively by modeling the behaviour.
At the same tirne, 1was also conscious that they needed to take ownership of the process as opposed to relying on me to act as their "conscience." As well, 1 was aware that
because 1 had by now developed an ongoing relationship wiih them, they mi@ demonstrate the "Hawthorne Effect" (Filey, House & Kerr, 1976) in wanting to please me and help me rexh my research objectives. Consider the following entry in my journal: I've been working with them long enough that they will push back and not be influenced by what 1 say. However, Sandra did jokingly comment, 'Weil. maybe we're not going to cause you to fail your thesis research afier dl." (Reflective Journal, October 16, 1997) This comment prompted me to remind them that my primary responsibility was to them as consultant, and that the choices 1 made in my work with them would be dictated, not by my research needs, but by their needs as the client. 1 also took this opportunity to inform them that 1 would not "fail" my research as a result of what happened with the team. Rather, the intent in qualitative research is to study whatever happens. As such, my own success or failure would rest on my ability to look at and interpret what had happened and to add to the existing body of knowledge that existed relative to the research question I was asking. Decidinn When to Withdraw
As 1 indicated previously, a time came when 1 began to question when 1 should be preparing to withdraw from the tearn. This was driven by the excessive time constraints caused by the escalating business pressures and the tearn's expressed desire in the December session to prepare to "go it alone."
Again, 1 struggled between my roles as researcher and consultant and asked myself how 1 would respond to the tearn's request if 1 were acting solely as a consultant. On the one hand, 1 was aware that the team was developing a dependence on me. At the end of the November session, 1 had raised the issue of my continuing involvement with them oaly to have them declare emphatically that they were not ready and jokingly question whether they would ever be ready. On the other hand, 1 was cognizant that there were still many unresolved issues and, while progress had been made, tearn rnembers continued to smggle in tramferring their leamings into their day-to-day work together.
1 was only too aware of my need for them to succeed once 1 was gone. 1 wanted the second series of interviews four months later to dernonstrate that surfacing the undiscussables had indeed had a positive impact on th& functioning. Yet, 1 knew that my motivation for withdrawing had to be driven by the client's needs. 1 also knew that my need
to influence the results could not be the motivating force in my continued involvement. in January and early February, following our agreement to hold one last session, 1 shared my stniggles with my thesis supervisor. With her assistance, 1 becarne clearer about my own biases and possible enmeshment and collusion with the team to keep them dependent on me. The following lengthy journal entry illustrates my process of corning to
ternis with my own need to let go:
Then, continuing the dialogue with Marilyn, 1 kgan to question my need to hold on to this role. To some extent, I've been seeing them at the same place for a few months now. It's as if they really do have the tools and skills, but they're just not putting them into practice because they rely on me to do it for them. For example, in the team meeting 1stweek, Tom made a process check, and 1 joked, "Weil if you hadn't said it, 1 woufd have." The tearn al1 responded, "Well, we ody did it because you're hem" And it was said as a joke, but it felt as if there were some tmth to it. The fact is, they've known for months what they need to do and they're not doing it because of the pressure of the work, their own entrenched habits and the mental models they hold about how teams function. These are really hard to shift.
1 see them as a very bnght group who picks up concepts fast. Yet, they rnay continue to depend on me as long as I'm willing to "hand-hold them." (Reflective Journal, February 16, 1998)
As indicated in the previous section, the group ultimateiy saw the need to take responsibility to make the necessw shifts. As a result, we worked together in their 1st session to develop action plans that would assist them in integrating their leaniings, and
support hem in theù ongoing developrnent as a team.
Sumrnary In the early sessions, emotions ran high as the major undiscussables were aired. Team members seemed relieved to have the issues on the table and motivation to continue the process was high.
The honeymoon pendended as two members &parteci and one new member joined the group. Business pressures increased and issues again tended to go underground. Although the tearn did get "back on track," they stniggled to integrate theu legsinto their everyday business practices. The formal teaming process ended with team members' detemination to continue
their progress. As it becarne more likely that the company would not survive, the split between the two businesses widened, tensions increased and undiscussables again proliferated. Ultirnately, the company was not saved and the team parted with many unresolved issues. Coinciding with the team's process, my own joumey as researcher/consultant was
rnarked by my attempts to distinguish beniveen these two roles and to deal with my own biases and defensive patterns. My authority issues with Sandra seemed to parallel those of the team members and 1 wrestled with boundary issues between my relationships with Sandra and other team members. CHAPTER SIX: FINAL OUTCOMES
In the previous chapter, 1 have outlined the themes that surfacd at the outset of my work
with the team. In order to examine the impact of the actions taken, it was important to identiQ the extent to which team members were able to surface and deal with the dficult, often undiscussable issues following the tearning process. As with the pre-study evaluation, this was
done by conducting individual intemiews with each team member and by obsewing them in action. In this chapter, 1 will report on the themes that surfâced as a resuit of this pst-study assessment process. Because one of the key concerns in any process consultation initiative is transferability of
learnings (Schein, 1988, cited in French & Be& i 993,it was important that there be a pend of tirne (four months) foliowing my work with the team before the second phase of assessment was conducted. in order to eliminate the possibility that the hpact of the teaming process was dependent on my involvement with the team, 1 had no contact with membefs either in person or by relephone during this four-month period. In selecting an appropriate tirneframe, 1 considered the length of tirne individuals would need for new behaviours and learnings to be integrated into their day-to-&y team interactions ("Evaluation," 1989).
Intetviewing
As with the pre-study interviews, the meetings were conducted using a senes of questions (see Appendix H) designeci to reveal the relevant themes. In order to ascertain the impact of the
work on the team, it was important to inquire about the issues that had surfaced previously (degree of openness, undiscussables, assumptions and willingness to challenge) and about any additional undiscussable issues (question 1). It was also important to include a senes of questions related to tearn members' perceptions of the impact of the teaming process (questions 2 - 7). Additional questions were added following the fmt two interviews and an analysis of these preliminaxy data done in order to enhance both the quality of material generateâ and the ability to assess the impact of the process. (see Appendix H)
As indicated previously, in order to decrease the likelihood of researcher and participant bias, an independent researcher conducted two of the second senes of interviews. The riata gathered and themes identifid were compared with that generated fiom the interviews 1 had conducted in order to look for differences that might be attributed to bias. This decision proved to bring both benefits and drawbacks to the process as demonstrated in these journal excerpts: I'm aware of my own anxiety about Susan and Lome doing some of the interviews. 1 was anxious aU day, waiting to hear how the interviews went. I'm aware also of my need to hear positive comments and results. It makes me realize the importance of having independent consultants doing some of the interviews. In listening to the tapes later and after taiking with Susan, it became clear that she had had some difficuity in getting the kind of indepth information that 1 might have been able to obtain. She didn't have enough background into my study, what 1 had done with the tearn or what the details of my fmdings from the fmt set of interviews had ken. As a result, she wasn't able to probe as much or to know where exactly to probe or what questions to ask,
1 was also aware of Susan's tentativeness in the way she posed some of the questions and her seeming lack of understanding about some of the areas into which she was probing. Consequently ,1 may have to re-interview them to get more complete responses to some of the questions. Despite the drawbacks, 1 still feel it was important and in Listening to the tapes, 1 did hear some rather frank admissions from the two team rnembers about the perceived lack of value of some of the sessions, particularly the later ones where their workload was so tremendous and it appears that nobody wanted to attend. I'm not sure if they would have felt free to be quite as frank with me.
What it has demonstrated to me is the importance of my setting the context of their viewing me as a researcher in this interview and not as someone they have established a relationship with. I will need to emphasize that 1 need honest fdback and that 1 need to hear any negative thoughts that they might have. (RefIectiwe Journal, Jme 15,1998)
It should be noted that out of the original eleven tearn members, nine remained at the end of the study. The two who left the organization during the study did so after four and five months respectively. A new member came in to replace one of the departing people after four months. The other position was not filled. Two additional members joined the team partway through the study, one afier seven months, the other after ten months just prior to the last teaming session.
As a result, the original interviews included the two members who left and not the three members who joined pamway through the study. The second round of interviews did include some comments from the original departing members (these were conducted at the tirne of their depamire from the team) and aiso those who joined the team later. The latter were therefore unable to respond to questions asking for direct cornparisons between before and afier.
More than half the team members- made comments that wodd indicate that they had seen some shift towards more openness.
1 think we've corne a long way. We are certauily more open around most of the things people were uncornfortable talking about before. (Roger)
It's better than what it used to be when we fmt started this whole progrm. There's no doubt about that. (Ted) There is more listening and a more relaxed atmosphere. . - -1think people are more able to share their personalities, more able to be natural in their responses instead of guarded. (Barbara) Others, w hile acknowledging a shift, saw it as less dramatic, using words iike ''~~liifginally more open" and dependent on the issues king addressed. People did comment on the "heightened sensitivity" to one another and greater awareness of undercurrents by members.
Despite this obvious improvement, everyone agfeed that there were subject areas where the tearn was very closed and times when "the tension in the air is so thick, you could cut it with a knife." Ted characterized the team as swinging from king very open to totdy closed, and several admitted that they use some individual discretion as to what they Say. "You know we still have too much behind the scenes discussions going on. . . . there's one meeting and then there's the sub-meetings that still go on." The Past
Issues related to the pst, particuiarly the previous president, Paul, were seen to be a non- issue with the tearn now, both because they were adequately dealt with in the initial teaming sessions and because some of the people who were most affected by them were no longer with the tearn.
1 think ut,by and large, has been a dead issue since we aU talked about it. . . . And 1 think as new people have corne on, that's been sornething that's been reinforced with them from &y one. (Sandra) Work and Lifestvle
There was general agreement that people continuai to work long hours. Eric commented: "We have no lifestyle." Everyone felt that the critical issues and ongoing demands of the business precluded anyone doing anything about the situation.
The majority of members did not see work and lifestyle to be an undiscussable in the way that it had been at the beginning of the process. At that tirne, people tended to modei themselves after Sandra and Don who worked extremely long hours. In general, there was little or no challenging of demands bat might result in late night or week-end work. When asked if individuals would now push back on last minute requests, most acknowledged that they would, especially if they had made previous plans. A number comrnented that team members would be more inclined to help each other out if one of them were not able to stay late .
Despite this change, the overwhelming feeling was chat the pressures of the business required that team members work very long hours under a great deal of pressure and that was unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. As Doug commented, "That hasn't sorted itself out and 1 don't know [that] any amount of push back would reaily solve that." Feeling The general sense was that as a tearn, individuals still did not tak about their feelings. What took precedence was survival of the Company. A number of people suggested that most members didn't tend to express their feelings as a general mie, as evidenced by Roger's remark, "They wouldn't instinctively go to that place." The foiiowing comments illustrated the general sense that members were hesitant to enter the emotional arena.
We still don't have the capability within the group to be sensitive to the unspoken in a meeting. . . checking for body language, picking up on somebody's tone of voice. We' re not that sensitive. (Eric)
1 think everybody's still a little uncornfortable coming out and saying, "You know you hurt my feelings" or "1 can't believe you said that to me", those types of things. Certainiy, we've got it to a point where we can kid about it anyway, which we couldn't even do before. So, the tip of the iceberg is showing. (Barbara) Richard, who expressed his feelings quite openly during one of the early sessions, wasn't sure he would do so again. "1 think I'd have to see people feel that they can be more approachable to me as much as I want to be approachable to them, and I've not seen that."
One Member's Behaviouc While Don's behaviour had been a major issue with team members in the early interviews, almost half the team saw him as having made an effort to be less abrasive in his interactions with team rnembers and in meetings. Barbara comrnented, "You can see that he's trying very hard not to vash people. 1 mean you literally almost watch him bite his tongue these days. . . . But he's definitely trying." Several individuals described him as less rigid, more patient, calmer and more aware of the impact he has on people, that "'people do take what he says personaily". These mernbers did not see his behaviour as affecting team meetings in the way that it used to.
Others, however, continued to see his behaviour and manner as having a negative impact on the tearn and as king undiscussable. Richard sumrned it up in this way: "Don is a sizable ingredient in the undiscussables going underground. . . . I've noticed that when he's not around, 1 think there's a sigh of relief. And I see the tearn pulling well together." With one exception, this type of comment tended to come from the members on the leasing side of the business or from those whc did not report directly to him. One member saw a shift in the kind of undiscussable Don's behaviour has become. It's more of a joke . . . it's more out in the open and people will Say, "1 have to go tell Don this. Will you come with me?" And it's kind of a team effort . . . to kind of protec t yoursel f. (Barbara) While Don himself felt he had changed, he did not expect the team to see that he had. "1 think the team would say I have modifieci my behaviour, but not enough. . . . Because 1 actuaily believe I've moved." Additional Undiscussables In addition to the unacceptable topics that had been raised before the teaming proçess
began, participants were asked to identifv any other issues which were considered to be undiscussable at the theof the second round of interviews. These were the split between the two businesses, Sandra's leadership and fear for their own jobs.
@lit between the two businesses.
Without exception, every team member saw the biggest undiscussable at the tirne of the second round of interviews to be the split between the two businesses. The senior management team was seen to have formed hto two distinct camps, leasing and loans, often referred to as "Ted's and Don's camps." The team is badly fractured. The spiît in the team is never discussed, it's so political and such a huge issue. (Bill)
As Sandra moved to separate the businesses more and more, that made the formation of the other, of the teams [two camps] . . . al1 that more necessary. (Don) I really think most of the tension and where people don? discuss things is when the two businesses are king cornpared. And there may be things on the table that you would want to but don? Say. (Barbara) I'm getting a sense that it's now a split tearn and that you're either on the leasing or the loans side of the business, and that if you're not totally dedicated to either one of those, then you're probabty feeling a littie uncornfortable about which side of the fence you should be on. (Frances) That's [when conversation is about the two businesses]when 1 see the stilted dialogue, the unwillingness for certain people to speak freely, and yet two days later in a one-on-one session, that individual will speak freely to me . . . So it's al1 the side bar dialogues that go on that tell me, "Well why didn't you Say that?" (Frances)
As indicated in the description of the organization and senior management team structure (see Chapter Four, p. 85 and Appendices J and K), both Ted and Don were Senior Vice-
Presidents, each with members of the team reporting to them. Because Don was the Chief Operating Officer for both sides of the business, his direct reports included those Vice- Presidents who had responsibilities for both leasing and loans. Ted, on the other hand, was involved only on the leasing side. The stmggle was seen to be between Ted and Don with some vying for control. Keith wondered, "Who's going to be the winner in the toss-up between Don and Ted?" Members reported feeling caught in their "turf war" and tended to blarne aü three leaders, Don, Ted and Sandra, for not deahg with it openly. The split into the two camps extended into the perceptions of Don's and Ted's levels of engagement in the businesses. Don was seen by leasing team rnembers to be more aligned with loans than with leasing. Those members with responsibilities either solely for loans or for both loans and leasing saw Don as engaging equaiIy on both sides of the business. Ted, however, was seen to engage only on the leasing side. in fact, the leasing team as a whole was rarely seen to engage in dialogue around issues related to loans. Roger's cornrnents seemed to surnmarize the perceptions: . . . when Don and Ted engage, it's aiways over the leasing side, and feeds the perception that says Don's always jumping ont0 Ted's side of the shop and challenging it. . . . The oniy reason he and Ted always end up butting heads on leasing is because Ted doesn't corne over to the loans side at dl. In addition. there seemed to be some perception by the leasing team that those with responsibiIities on both sides of the business tended to place more emphasis on the bans side because they reported to Don. Those with dual roles did not share this opinion- hdeed, while acknowledging that he had heard people make such a suggestion, Roger resented the implication: "1 find that offensive and I think a number of other people . . . probably find it equally offensive."
Sand ta's leaders hi^.
Sandra's leadership was seen to be an undiscussable by almost al1 tearn members. While people did not know Sandra well at the tirne of the first round of interviews. she was now a known quantity. Most members held strong opinions about her and her leadership style, but no one would raise it as long as she was present. Rather, it seemed to be a topic that was talked about only behind closed doors, never openly in a senior management meeting. Sandra was seen by the majority of tearn members to be indecisive, "not prepared to take the decisive actions that you have to take as a leader." The perception was that she someîimes got too much input from the team, was not willing to give answers to direct questions and that team members were sometimes left "holding the bag." People saw her as not wanting to "rock the boat" or take sides with one business over the other. Lndeed, her perceived unwillingness to take a stand was identified as a major factor in causing the silos between the ~WObusinesses to grow. Al1 members saw her as demonstrating poor leadership in dealing with this issue and many people Iooked to her to heal the riftc
Because the majority of people reponed directly to either Don or Ted, mernbers were reiuctant to take on the control issues chat surfaced ktween the two Senior Vice-Presidents.
Sandra's lack of leadership regarding [the smggles between] Ted and Don is seen to be a sizable ingredient in the undiscussables going underground. . . . And what 1 trdy expected from the president was a. . . responsibility that she would play that leadership role. And that she would shut that kind of crap down in a hurry. (Richard) Sandra was generally not seen to encourage discussion of sensitive issues; indeed, people appeared to take their cues fiom her and were unwilling to challenge if she didn't: several people made references to king afraid to raise controversial subjects out of fear for their own jobs. Fear for their own iobs. Because of the cntical situation that existed in the business with the very real possibility that the Company could be closed down or a new one created, almost half the team listed fear for one's job as an undiscussable. Richard felt that everyone was asking thernselves the question, "Where am 1 going to end up in the new organization?" Frances cornmented that some people were waiting with dread. wondenng, "Oh man, what's that going to mean to me?"ome noted that people were so concemed with their own performance that they wouldn't deal with the difficult issues:
1 think they become very protective, very defensive and . . . you're not going to deal with the real issues that are out there. They're very protective of their own part of the business. And they 're very uncornfortable and insecure with what the future holds for them. (Ted) Frances comrnented on the "gailows" humour that was sometimes used to deal with
people's anxiety : And they make comments . . . chippy rernarks every now and then, "You know, you're not going to need a chief financial office? or "you know you won't be needing me in a few months." And the reality is, "You're right. We might not be needing you." sumptione
As with the fmt round of interviews, the assumptions that team rnernbers made tended to fail into the categories covered under the undiscussables or topics which were difficult to raise openly. While almost half the members saw changes in Don's behaviour, they continued to assume that it was not okay to challenge him, as iliustrated by Barbara's earlier comment that team members joked about needing support before they could confront Don on issues. The assumption was made that Don continued to "manage by intimidation" even though only one of his direct reports cited an incident that would have validated this opinion.
Many of the assumptions made by team members were related to the issues between the two businesses. Leasing members assumed that Don favoured the loan side of the business despite the fact that he was seen to engage on both sides of the business. Indeed, it was further assumed that Don instnicted those of his direct reports who had responsibilities for both businesses to devote more of their time and energy to the loan side. This opinion was never shared by Don's reports. As indicated earlier, several of them expressed indignation when asked about this. Assumptions were made about Sandra's leadership and her handling of the situation between Don and Ted. While everyone assumed that she wasn't dealing with it, nobody checked this out. Some members saw Sandra as very political and assumed that she was out for herself and her own interests. One member assumed that she wanted to wind this Company down so that "1 can move on with the next piece of my career." When asked about the degree to which members checked out assurnptions, the responses were rnixed. Aimost half the team saw this occumng more frequently than before. 1 think people will ask questions, will inquire . . . "How did you corne to this conclusion?" . . . 1 believe it's become much better . . . because we engage more frequently in team meetings. (Richard)
Well, you hear a lot more of people saying, "Okay, this is what 1 heard. 1s this is what you really meant?" Or paraphrasing, so I think that's kind of almost a routine. (Barbara) Sandra felt that in general, tearn members were doing a better job at checking assumptions. She
saw mst levels having improved to the point that people would ask questions of her before rnaking assumptions. Several people comrnented on the tendency to check out people's cornfort with issues rather than moving on too quickly as they rnight have done in the pst-
People are now aware that they should be making sure that people are cornfortable so that it's just an awareness of the team members and more discipline around that generally. (Sandra) 1 think of a recent meeting where somebody just looked at Roger and said, "Are you with us here? You know, is there something wrong?'@arbara) Some felt that the team had siipped again since I had stopped working with them and were
not as disciplined as they had ken. Roger commented, "We check out assurnptions more than
we used to but considerably less than we did when you Mary AM] were working with us."
Two members indicated that there was no improvement in checking out assumptions and Eric even saw it as decreasing because of time pressures: "We're not having those discussions because we just don't have the time."
Willimess to Cm When asked about their willingness to challenge one another around issues or ideas, more
than half the team saw an improvement. They described a signif~cantincrease in dialogue around business issues, more questioning, discussion and willingness to put ideas on the table than there had been in the past. Comrnents like "1 need to push back on this one", "Let me give you my thoughts" and "Well, that's one opinion, but 1 have ths opinion" were felt to be more cornmonplace, and challenging was seen by one person as "just a regular routine of our meetings now ." She cited an exarnple where tearn members challenged Ted strongly around his assumption that he has no conuol over the areas of the leasing business that don't report in to hirn directly. 'The day he said that in a meeting, a whole bunch of people went 'What? You know you control the whole business. It's your business. What are you talking about?"' Many people felt that challenging did not occur often enough across the two businesses or around functional boundaries. Ted put it down to the fact that "everybody's under such tremendous pressure here that we have a whole organizaîion that's incredibly defensive." He saw this resulting in people going "around and behind the scenes, [picking] the words and the different ways of doing it."
There is a constant pushing back into your role. . . . So if you happen to be in [one area] and you mention something about [another ma], it's "Well, when we get to your area, we'îl give you a call." (Barbara)
Because of this defensiveness, Barbara felt that ideas got stifled "to the point where a lot of suggestions don't come out anyrnore." As indicated earlier, members involved only in the leasing side of the business are seen to engage very little with the loans side; challenging issues and putting forth of opinions by this group was alrnost non-existent. Most people felt that some members challenged more often than others, depending on their degree of comfort and their individuai personalities. Sandra and Don were seen by some to be chailenged more than before, but there was stiil less questioning of their opinions than those expressed by other mernbers. Eric commented, "1 think that most team members are still intimidated by Don and Sandrâ. And then, 1 think there are some team members who are saying.
'1 would not want to rock the boat."' Severai people volunteered that they were much more willing to challenge Don individuaily than they were before, because he was seen to be less abrasive and more willing to listen.
1 mean . . . the other day . . . he left me a voice mail that really ticked me off. 1 called hirn back and he said, "Gees, did 1 come across that way?'And 1 said, "Ya, Don, you did." (Vince)
For the most part, behaviour of team members was not seen to be addressed in the meetings. Several members felt that generally, there was less dysfunctional behaviour than before, but that any chaüenging of behaviours tended to be done one-on-one. Don saw this as linked to having one's "boss" in the room and the fear that crïticism implied poor performance. Several members commented on the fact that they took their leads from Sandra who was not seen to challenge inappropriate behaviour in meetings. A number of references were made in the interviews to an altercation that occurred berween Don and Ted during a senior management meeting that deteriorated to the point where people were extremely uncornfortable.
Sandra was criticized during the interviews for not intervening and dealing with the situation, thus setting a poor example for the rest of the team.
ret Hopes and Wishes Because the business context was so extreme and members were dealing with survivai issues, it did not seem appropriate to ask about unexpressed secret hopes and wishes during this series of interviews.
Jmaact of Deal iu with the Undiscussables in order to allow for an in-depth exploration of this topic, participants were asked to comment on the impact of the study from a number of perspectives. (see Appendix H, questions
2 - 7; additionai questions 3 - 4) As with the fmt round of interviews, it was important to ensure that participants did not provide me with the "politicaily correct" answers.
Because they had spent a considerable amount of tirne with me by this time, and might be more inclined to want to ensure that 1 "did weii" in my research, there was greater likelihood for this to occur with the second series of interviews. As indicated previously, two independent interviewers each conducted one of these interviews in order to allow for disclosure of any researcher or participant bias. As well, participants were asked to comment on both the positive and negative effects of surfacing the undiscussables. Positive Im~act The rnajority of team members felt that getting to know one another on a personal level resul ted in more productive conversation when engaged in business issues: 1 actually have a better understanding of sorne of the people around the table. . . . And we've taken sorne seps towards king comfortable, fmt of dl, with oufselves, and then with some of the people around us. (Roger) Roger went on to say that the impact for him was chat he often found himself thinking, "Now 1 understand how this person sees things." Eric commented on the impact of seeing how team members rated theniselves and each other on the SYMLOG assessment instrument. 1 said this is so [like] Bill - you know, you never know where he's coming hm. And now 1 understand because that's his makeup - and understanding where Sandra is coming from and where Don is coming from. Trying to appreciate that no [one] way is the right way, that you've got to give a little and take a iittle to be able to work as a team.
Whde there was some acknowiedgment that, over time, this might have happened anyway, many members saw the teaming work as accelerating the process. They went on to Say that given the critical business challenges they were faced with over a sho~period of time, the tirne saved was significant from a business perspective.
It wouid have taken us longer to get through certain things. People wouid have had something stored up in their humps iïke camels and wouid have been keeping it down a long tirne. (Roger) Sandra went even farther in her assessment of the impact of surfacing the ciiKicult issues: Given the pace of change in our organization, . . . and if you just look at what this organization has gone through in the last 16 months, . . . 1just don? think we would have got there [without the work toward speaiung more honestly with each other]. CIosely related to the above fmduig was the perception that there was more active engagement and challenge around business issues than there might have been without the process. This seemed to be related to an increased trust in one another and willingness to give people the benefit of the doubt as illustrated by the following comments: We actually do have discussions and we do work through issues better than we did those many months ago when we statted. (Roger)
We have more confidence in each other. We are able to . . . present different views. (Vince) And 1 think . . . that we're comfortable in engaging each other and working together on those issues that are business issues. (Richard) Roger cited an example where he felt the team was able to work through an extremely dificult issue more effectively than it rnight have in the past. In a cost expenditure exercise where it became clear that the leasing business was costing much more than loans, after several attempts to revisit the figures, Roger suggested that the team stop trying to re-work the
1 suspect that in the past, we would have kept gnawing away at it like a dog with an old bone cause they (the numbers] just weren't telhg us what we wanted to hear. . . . pecause of the work we had done as a tearn,] we were able to believe sorneone who said that. The integrity of the exercise we were going through, it was not a loaded answer to a loaded question. . . . People couid hear what you said and hear what you know. "1 trust Roger, he wouldn't be bullshitting us." Several members spoke about the development of close personal relationships which they saw as having an impact on work-related decisions or issues. Barbara comrnented that even though the problems between the two businesses continued to privent the large team from king Wyopen and honest, where several team members worked together on issues, there was more opemess, honesty and constructive challenge. Susan saw members beginning to deal with interpersonal issues one-on-one that they rnight previously have ignoreci. When asked about the impact of this on the team, she comrnented:
1 think it's great because what they're trying to do is Say, "Okay, we have a prablem" or "We have a situation" and then, that reflects through the team because as you build more and more respect for each other, then the rest of the team starts to feel it too. So I think that's positive. All members saw the benefits of the first two sessions where many of the undiscussables were surfaced and dedt with, especially issues related to the past and to new mernbers not king told the whole tmth about the business before they joined the organization. These two sessions were very emotional, with people expressing feelings they had never shared with the team:
Even the rnost hard-nosed amongst the senior management team, 1 have to believe, had to be moved by people's honesty and openness about how they were feeling. (En4 Several members believed that these issues would likely never have surfaced without the interviews and feedback process. [There would have ken] . . . less undentandhg and therefore . . lower threshold for everything we were going through. . . . It would have silenced some of the voices that were probably the ody ones that would have talked about certain issues. . . . 1 think we would have been les productive because 1 think we would have had fewer ideas on the table, given the. (Roger) Sandra doubted that members wodd ever have been honest with her about these issues and was clear about the impact they would have had, left untoucheci.
1 think that particular problem was really impacthg on their tmst level of me as a leader, so 1 think it would have negatively ixnpacted on what we were trying to do in the organization. So 1 think in terms of getting ail that stuff out on the table . . . the faster we could do it as a team the better, and that gave us the forum.
More than half the members felt that there might have been more people (in addition to
Susan and Mary) leaving the company if the undiscussables had not ben raised. Paradoxically, for Mary, who had a young baby and was stmggling to keep pace, it was the surfacing of the issue around work and lifestyle that resulted in her deciding to leave:
And once [my feeiings] were aired, that gave me time to sort of think about how redy important they were. And before, 1just had sort of kept them aII bundled up. . . . And it reinforced for me that [work and lifestyle] just wasn't going to happen. Like 1 was kidding myself to think that . . . within the next year, that there was going to be any significant change. Both Sandra and Don later acknowledged that her departure was ultimately a benefit for the organization, as they were able to replace her with someone who was better able to handle the demands of the position.
Sandra was of the opinion that Richard would have left the company as wek if the issue of new members not king told about the severity of the business issues had not been raised during the session. She felt that while Ted would probably have stayed, "he would have had a different level of cornmitment to what had to be done." Several members cited the retention package for executives that was put in place as a tangible result of that discussion. Many commented on the impact of the process tmls used dunng the sessions: lefi-hand colurnn, ladder of inference, process checks, operating noms, 'plops' , SYMLOG. While it was acknowledged that they were still not used as frequently as might be advisable. the comments suggested that there was now a shared understanding within the team about the importance of checking for clarity, not making assumptions, making process cornrnents and tallang about ciifficuit issues. Nenative Im~act
Ody 4 out of the 12 team members inte~ieweddescribed any negative effects of dealing with the undiscussables. Don wondered if people tended to shut down when they saw the impact on him of speaking the tnith. ''Weli, they've seen how people get deait with in subsequent meetings as a result of having taken a particular position in a previous meeting." He saw this as having corne mostly from people's observations of the positions he himself took but "not exclusively." In fact, Don went so far as to Say that he has become "a scapegoat for everything that's wrong in this cornpany." Ted and Richard both comrnented that they were not sure how supported they had been for sharing so openly their feelings about not knowing the whole truth about the Company.
There was some sense from Richard that he had heard some off-the-cuff comments that made hirn wonder whether he had been seen as too emotional in opening up his feelings in the fmt session. While he acknowledged that he didn't know the context underlying the comments, nor whether they had been directed at hirn, he admitted that "1 take away the leaming that I'm net going to ever expose myself again." Ted commented on the same subject as follows: 1 ttiink that people got an appreciation of the situations that we were in but I'm not sure the empathy was there other than, "Hey, you're .ownpeople, you should know what you get involved in and deal with life."
Barbara saw the only negative consequence of surfacing the undiscussables as being "that you may raise or surface other people's discornfort." Individual Learning Five members commented on the increased self-awareness they had gained. 1 think it [SYMLOG feedback] made some of us realize that we . . . were not building the imagery with our teammates that we wanted to. . . . Some of the thuigs that people saw in us ,we were very uncornfortable with. (Roger)
1 think my awareness about it [my behaviour] has been heightened. Because for the most part, 1 think that a lot of it is unintended. So . . . that's had an impact. @on) 1 think that 1 think I've leamed a lot about feelings and keeping things open and not killing the messengers. So people kid about me al1 the time killing the messenger. 1 redy don't, you know. (Barbara)
Sandra felt the biggest leaming for her was understanding the impact of people's perceptions of the leader on team functioning. She cornmented that "despite the fact that I thought 1 was bending over backwards to dea! with that stuff, it was still there."
Several people cited the confidence they had gained in what they bnng to the team, in king more open and in taking risks to challenge and ask questions. Vince said he'd leamed
"It's okay to be your own person." Eric seemed more able to value bis unique contribution to the team: 1 learned that the basic values that 1 cqaround with me are values that I've had al1 my life and that 1 needn't be asharned of the fact that I'm sensitive and supportive, and that 1 can contribute with those values and those strengths to the same extent as somebody who has . . . a strong accounting background and can . . . interpret nurnbers. . . -1feel less threatened personally and much more confident. (Eric)
A number of people talked about the awareness they had gained about the complexity of tearn dynamics. 1 would Say 1 do have a heightened awareness of how complex team interaction is. . . . so many of the challenges we encounter got blown out of proportion because the sender and receiver didn't understand each other, andor questioned motives, or were womed about some of the non-business-related elements. (Don) It's emphasized for me . . . some of the dynamics that you need to deal with, how important it is to deal with them. (Roger) ut] brought to light how a team continues to stniggle because you don't deal with the real issues. (Bili) Others gained understanding about the importance of taking the tirne to get to know people on a tearn in order to interact more effectively.
. . . there are ways to challenge and ways not to and that everybody has a different personality. You need to understand that personality before you understand how best you can work and interact with them. (Barbara)
But 1 really do think . . . it is quite interesting for people to understand the different ways people approach things . . . how people process information, . . . and the importance of checking out the assurnptions that we're making. (Don) Vince reflected that "just spending time with them, seeing how they perfom, how they operate . . . understanding more what makes them tick" was important. Im~acton Particimon.. . in. a Future Team Severai members said that they would go through some kind of process like this with their tearns in the future. Don acknowledged that while he might not want to experience the "tear- jerking, gut-wrenching process we went through," he would probably take the team through some sort of teaming process. "And 1 woulàn't have done that before. 1 cm say that for sure." Roger went so far as to Say that he would actuaiiy go out "looking for some of those signs of discornfort . . . taboo topics" and would take a team through a similar process. Sandra taiked about the need to "provide the forum [for a teaming process] and provide it as early as you cm and probably provide it more intensely than we did."
At least three rnembers had already started working with their own tearns and were using many of the tools, trying to create an environment where people could talk about the difficuit issues. Roger shared some of his own struggles in doing this "really tough work:
I think if 1 had not gone through this exercise, even if 1 knew it was the right thhg to do, 1 don't think I'd have had the patience. . . . We're going to keep at it because we have so many challenges over the next year and a hdf. The other two commentai that they might have done some work with their teams previously, but now understand the process rnuch better, have more tools to use and would therefore do it more deliberately and consciously. Almost al1 members talked about king more open and sensitive themselves, speaking up sooner and encouraging more candor in future tearns whether they were a leader or member. The following are some of their cornrnents: Allow people to show themselves and their worth through their team. (Barbara) Be] more compassionate with other people's roles, responsibilities, just have a better understanding of the other person's views of things and how they deal with things. (Ted) Have the confidence and strength to challenge . . . ask questions, to probe. (Vince) 1 would probably corne forward much earlier in the future. (Bill) It will cause me to ask more questions than 1 would have in the past. (Don) Show them your kart and really showing feelings is okay. And do it early on. - . . 1 think I would be able to ask the questions in the right way so they're not threatening. (Susan)
Oniy Frances indicated that she would not take any learning from this expenence into another team. She acknowledged that she came into the process much later (der seven months) and therefore did not have the same involvement as other members. She saw the impact on the team as king very limited because of the continuing and ongoing crisis and change the company was experiencing. 'The work situation king what it is . . . 1just donPtknow if it was a great year to do it with this team."
Team Effectiveness Just over half the members saw the tearn as working more effectively togetkr to achieve "results" (not necessarily financial). Without question, we are a more effective team now than - . . we were when we started. (Roger) It's enabled us to get this far and we may have failen apart a long time ago if we had not ken going through these processes. . . . Certainly there have ken a couple of times where we could have durnped the lom business . . . so the teaming has allowed kind of a cohesive approach. (Barbara) 1 think it's more effective . . . there's greater knowledge, more openness and that to me adds to more collective input, better thought processes. (Vince) 1 think the tearn is more focused, . . . [able to] cut to the chase, figure out what the problem is and . . . fix it. (Sandra) Even Susan who left the company five months into the process, reported an irnprovement in the tearn's effectiveness. When asked in her exit interview to comment on the team's ability
CO achieve its results, she responded, "Oh 1 think they've come miles. . . . there's more respect. there's more people showing how much they're cornmitted to doing this." When asked about the impact of this on hard results, she saw cornmitment as the "driving force to getting the work done and to making sure that people are focused in the right direction." Many members felt that the team was less able to operate effeçtively because of the situation the company was in, with the two businesses and the pending split. People cited the market realities, as they tried to negotiate a joint venture for the leasing business and other extemal factors unrelated to the teaming work they were doing. Even those who saw the team as functioning more effectively taIked about the impact of the business realities. 'The fact that we didn't get there [to the positive business outcornes] is probably a combination of circumstances where we are right now within the business." (Roger) The majority of members felt that there was a significant decrease in the team's effectiveness since Febmary when the push toward splitting the two businesses accelerated, and when the formal teaming sessions and my involvement with the tmended. The businesses have faced much more challenge and. .. people have kind of retrenc hed. (Don) As soon as we stopped having you present as a check and balance . . . everyone forgot everything they'd ever leamed . . . [and] dl hell broke loose. (BU) There reall y is no extemal reinforcement and the cornmitment of the group to essentially step up to it themselves has been somewhat less than perfect. . . . So there has been a regression. (Roger) One member felt that the team was operating less effectively than they had been at the start of the teaming process. "We're probably as ineffective a team today as we were eighteen months ago." He cited the decision to split the two businesses as the reason for this decline.
In summary, the data from the pst-study interviews appears to indicate that working to surface undiscussables had a positive impact on the majority of individual members. For some, the result was heightened awareness of their own intetactional patterns ancilor increased understanding about team dynamics including the importance of surfacing and deaiing with difficult issues. For one member, there were some negative repercussions of reveaiing previously unshared emotions.
More than half the members saw the work as having had a positive impact on the tearn's effectiveness, even when taking into account the very dificult business challenges facing the team and the silo mentaiity which existed by the time of the second round of interviews. Other members felt that the work done with the team had no impact on their overall effectiveness in ac hieving results. Observation of the Team In addition to conducting individual interviews with team rnembers, 1observed the tearri in action during a reguiar two-hour senior management meeting. The findings from this session tended to confirm those from the interviews.
The meetkg began on time with one person, BiU, absent and another, Ted, hving one- haif hour late. Keith chaired the meeting, Frances twk on the role of timekeeper and Don of scribe; there was a pre-detennined agenda with specific time allotmenu for each item. In order to observe interaction patterns, I noted the number of times each person contributed to the conversation. Taking into account that those who made presentations or who
had more information about certain topics would need to speak more often, my observation was that, while some members were less vocal than others, everyone participated, with Sandra and Don speaking more frequently than most. Members tended to build upon one another's comments and there was some checking for clarification and understanding, especiaiiy from Don, who. as scribe, needed to record decisions accurately. There were a number of examples where individual members made "process" comments
which drew attention to how they were operating together. Barbara observed, "1 think chat was a 'plop"' (a plop king a point that is not acknowledged by anyone). Sandra responded, "1 think
Barbara was Qing to make a point," but it still was ignored and ultimately dropped.
At the ena of a lengthy discussion centred on the results of an employee culnire survey, Roger pointed out that "we dealt only with the negative issues and didn't spend even five minutes on the positive comments." This tendency not to acknowledge and celebrate successes had been an issue the team had raised early on in the teaming process. During a discussion centred on departmental expenses, Douglas, Vice-President, Finance, expressed disappointmen! with team members' inabilities to meet the agreed upon deadline for subrnission of funding requesu. He challenged people on both sides of the business and stressed his requirernent for timely responses. This would seem to validate comments during the interviews by those (including Douglas) with dual accountabilities that they did not favour loans over leasing as members on the leasing side had indicated. The dialogue during this discussion was heated with a number of members chailenging one another. indeed, Douglas himself pushed back on Sandra's request that individuais submit their numbers to hùn earlier than had been requested. Yet, he aiso noticed Barbara's non-verbal behaviour and checked for clarification: "You're looking at me [as if you're] really confused. That womes me." This was a significant departure from the first observation session, where members were polite and, with the exception of Don and Sandra, there had been little chaiienging or picking up on non-verbal behaviour.
Despite this shift, there appeared to be cues that were missed by team members and tension that was left unexplored. When Douglas expressed his frustration and Sandra supported him, Keith and Ted replied in a curt tone of voice, "We'll have them [the numbers] to you, Don, tomorrow." Don attempted to rally support by saying, "As a team, let's really commit to making these dates final." Sandra asked, " Can people live with that?" While no one responded, some members looked uncornfortable and appeared to avoid eye contact. Sandra did not check out the obvious discomfort and the meeting moved on. In surnmary, in the pst-study observation session, there seemed to be a freer exchange of ideas with more challenging and checking for understanding. Yet, non-verbal cues were ignored at times and some topics were left unexplored.
Summary of Findings The senior management team members appeared to have made some progress in their ability to have honest conversations with one another. The majonty acknowledged the value of greater candor and saw the negative impact of defensive interpersonal patterns. While some of the original undiscussables had kensuccessfully addressed, others had surfaced to take their place with the result that the team was fractured into two camps. There was some beiief that learning how to surface the mcdt issues and speak more openly had been invaluable in their working through the challenging business issues they had faced. Most members felt positively irnpacted at a personal level and believed that they would take the learnings into their work on friture tearns. At the same tirne, many did not see themselves as a more effective team and were discouraged by the undiscussables that remained. CHAPTER SEVEN: THE EPILQGUE
While the research study oficidy ended with the second round of interviews, as with any piece of action research, the story is incomplete until one can foilow it to its ultimate
conclusion. hdeed, while the process itself appears to be hear with clearly deheated steps to be followed in a logical sequence, in practice, action research is often "messy, incomplete,
iterative, . . . with many loose ends that are never quite mcked in(Weisborci, 1987, p. 4). In the case of ABC Inc., there wem many lwse ends and a number of unanswered questions. Because 1 had contracted with Sandra and the team to play a dual role of both consultant and researcher, it was important for me to ensure that 1 had followed through on my commitments as a consultant, even though the research process had ben completed- As well, 1 had agreed to share my findings with the team foiiowing the second round of interviews and to respond to any questions they might have about the fmdings. For these rasons, 1 had some ongoing contact with tearn rnembers and was privy to additional information both about the final business outcomes for ABC and the further reflections of tearn memkrs on the process as a whole. in this section, 1 will share these additional findings.
ABC Fights for Survival Following the second series of interviews in June, 1998, ABC continued to operate in a crisis mode. Pressure was mounting from Axworthy Global for improved financial results with the likelihood that the parent Company would not be wiiiing to continue supporting ABC without a siNcant tuniaround. ABC'S attempts to attract a partner in the leasing side of the business were unsuccessful as the combination of Axworthy's delay in allowing ABC to go out to possible vendors, the global market cnsis and ABC'S poor performance, conspired to make this option less and less viable. At the same tirne, the loans si& of the business appeared to be moving in a more positive direction, with a greater IikelihOOd that a joint venture could
Occur.
Because the future of the Company was so uncertain, the senior management team was under a great deal of strain. information about the negotiations with potential partners was confiden tial information, except for Sandra, Don, Ted and the Vice-Presidents of Finance and Operations. As a result, there were many undiscussables, nimours spread and, despite the fact that members appeared to understand the reasons behind their not king fully informed about what was happening, the tension mounted.
While I had intended to share my preliminary research fmdings with the team in a final session af'ter the second series of interviews, the above events conspireci to prevent this fiom happening. When it became clear late in the fall of 1998 that the business pressures were such there was Little motivation for an off-site session, 1 met individually with Sandra and then with Sandra, Don and Ted together, in order to feview the fmdings.
In both of these meetings, 1 shared the results and helped It was not until April, 1999 that 1 was able to meet with Sandra for an update. At this tirne, 1 was informed that the loans side of the business had a buyer in an American company which intended to form a new organization. Madlock Inc.' The latter would see Don becoming President and Chief Executive Officer with Barbara, Roger and buglas taking on executive roles which matched their cwrent roles at ABC. The leasing side of the business had been unsuccessfi~lin its bid to find a partner. As a result, it would be sold off to a number of vendors with one portfolio corning back into Axworthy Global- Ted, as the Senior Vice-President and the other rnembers of the leasing team, would be out of jobs and would leave ABC with severance packages. ABC Inc. would cease to exist as an independent business as of June 1, 1999. Sandra herself had been offered a position as Senior Vice-President of a high profile company within Axworthy Global and would be leaving ABC by May 3 1st. During my April meeting with Sandra, i was infonned that she had contracted with a South African consulting company who speciaiizes in working with senior management teams of companies who have either ken bought out or who are shutting down. They would work intensively with the team in one day to deal with the unresdved issues and help the team put closure to their work together. Because it was clear that 1 would no longer have the opportunity to share the research results with the team collectively, 1 agreed to send letters to each member offering to share them individually. Because some of the more negative results tended to implicate Sandra, Don and Ted, 1 sent each of them a copy of the chapter which described the pst-study findings and met with them individually to respond to their concerns or questions. As 1 had anticipated, Don was extremely upset when he read my description of the initial findings. He saw it as damning to his career and was upset that Sandra had seen a * All narnes of persons. companies. andior proprïetary information have kendisguised. 138 copy. When he told me that he was considering obtaining legal advice, 1consulted rny lawyer about the agreements 1 had made with the participants, in order to assure myseif that 1 had not reneged on my contract. In addition, 1 re-read the interview transcripts to ensure that 1 had represented members accurately. in a meeting with Don, 1 remindeci him that thete was no information in my writing that had not already been reveaied to ali rnembers in teaming sessions. 1 did make some changes that he requested and Don was satisfied with the final result. Neither Sandra nor Ted expressed any concem about how I had represented the fmdings. No other members asked to see copies of the findings chapters, despite my offer to do so. Final Retïections Because 1 had the opportunity to speak with a number of team members, either in sh&ng the findings or, in Barbara's case, because I was doing some additional consulting work for her, it was natucal that they would want to reflect further on the experience. Some were now entering new positions in different organizations where they would be participating in another senior management team, as well as leading their own teams. This provided an opportunity to ask them about the impact of their expenence at ABC as they went forward into these new roles. Barbara saw herself as king more conscious of team dynamics and of the need to raise issues and check assumptions, particularly those attached to her role as leader. She claimed to have gained greater insight into her own defensive patterns both from the SYMLOG feedback and from the ongoing work in the tearning sessions. Indeed, she was anxious to continue the 1-g and contracted with me to work witb her in conducting a 360" feedback survey with her current team (including her manager, peers and subordinates). Despite the diff~cultbreak-up of the tearn, Barbara continued to believe that they could not have accomplished what they did, if they had not gone through this kind of teaming process with its emphasis on surfacing undiscussables. She beiieved that both Roger and Douglas felt the same way and added that the three of them had chaiienged Don in his new role as president to put in place a teaming process for their new senior management team. In meeting with Don, it was apparent that he too saw the impact of the process on him in his new role. When asked directly to provide examples of changes in his approach to teaming and leadership, he commented that "1 am so aware of checking assumptions now and that's something I didn't do before." While he continued to emphasize that he wouid "do it differently" than 1 had, he did acknowledge his desire to do the work of building the tearn and confirmed Barbara's story of team members pressu~ghim to do so. Even Ted, who ended up without a job in a new organization, commentai on the learnings from the process. Where Ted saw the impact was in the strength of the two sub- teams in leasing and loans. He taiked about the final months where the leasing team worked under incredible pressure, fmt to fmd a partner, and then, when that was no longer an option, to prepare the employees for the eventual shutdown of the organization. He saw his colleagues use the leaniings in building a strong leasing team whose members were able to speak honestly with and support one another through, an extremely difficult process. Both Don and Ted agreed that a key reason for the low impact at the large tearn level was in the team structure, where there existed two separate businesses with very different objectives attempting to manufacture a common vision. They saw Sandra's failure to acknowledge this natural spiit in the Company as cornpounding the already chailenging problems and ultimately resulting in issues going further underground, particularly in the later stages as the business pressures mounted. Sandra saw things quite differently. She shared with me her own dilemma of having information which she had been directed by the Axworthy Board not to share, even with Ted and Don. She believed that she was seen as having hidden agendas and king indecisive because there were so many pieces of information missing for team members. Sandra claimed to have dealt with the issues between Ted and Don on a reguiar basis, although this was not confmed by them. Because she saw some of the issues as involving performance probierns, she felt it inappropriate to challenge their behaviour in front of the large group. In the end, Saxidra concluded that she had tried to create a context wherein the team couid continue to operate as a united company, where al1 rnembers were accountabie for all resuits, regardless of which business occupied the majority of their tirne. Indeed, she reported that after my meeting with her, Don and Ted, where 1 had shared the feedback about the severe split in the team, Don and Ted's relationship had improved. She saw them as "having gotten the message" as evidenced by their collaborative relationship in the finai months before the break-up of the company was announced. Once the split and the ultirnate dernise of the leasing business became inevitable, team members resisted any efforts by Sandra to do further work to repair the relationships. They insis ted that they were no longer one tearn, but two very disparate teams who had no cornrnon purpose. She claimed that, until the dernise of the company had becorne a certainty, she had continued to do "process checks" by making comments such as "What's going on?", when there was obvious tension in the room. She believed that she, as the leader, should not cany the full responsibility for rnaking such interventions, and that ail members should be responsible for monitoring the team's process. Al1 the team members 1 spoke with describeci the closure session facilitated by the South African consulting company as unsuccessful. The session was seen to be "SandraTs show", designed to fulfill ber own needs for closure. There appeared to be no choice as to whether the tearn engaged in this exercise, and the rnajority of members were resistant to the process. Al1 agreed that the divisions in the team rernained and most people were unwilling to deal with the underlying issues. lndeed, the leasing sub-team was seen to corne as a "united front" in their agreement rlQtto open up the conflicts, and the &y ended with no resolution. Summary It is clear, in looking at the journey traveled by team members, that the combination of extreme business pressures and a team structure that tended to support an already existing dichotorny, conspired to create a fractured team, whose members, in the end, were unable co look together at their learnings, heal the wounds and put positive closure to their work. Despite this, one year after the end of the reseaxh snidy, individual members have taken the leaniings into their new work environments and continue to believe that, without the work, even the fractureci team would not have accomplished what they did. CHAPTER EIGHT: TISE ENQUIRY CONTINUES One of the goals of a research process is to add to an existing body of knowledge in a particular field of study. The question to be answered then is: 'mat have we learned?" More specificaiiy, for this study, the question becomes: "What conclusions can be drawn about the process of surfacing undiscussables and its impact on this team's functioning?" in this chapter, I wiU explore the learnings by looking at both the positive outcomes and at the following challenges which infiuenced the overall results: the role of and mental models attached to the leader; the psychodynamic defenses which kept difficult issues hidden; and the team context, including the business realities, team structure, the impact of hierarchy and communities of practice. 1 will frame the discussion within the context of both the literature, cited in Chapter Three and additional material which will add insight to the reflective process. Throughout, 1 will relate my discussion to the fmdings from the study as reported in the previous chapters. Finaüy, I wiii explore the impact which my role as consultant/researcher had on the outcomes. Positive Outcornes in its broadest formulation, the intent of the study was to look at the impact, both on team members and on the team as a whole, of uncove~gthe range of covert processes that operate wittiin an intact workplace team. As the research evolved, the road traveled by the team. its twists and turns, as well as the experience of the participants in traversing this road, became as significant a part of the study as the original question. The findings as revealed in the previous three chapters were mixed. The impact at the individual level seemed to be significant, with the majonty of participants reporring a positive effect on their personal awareness as team members, their wiilingness and ability to be more open and candi4 and their cornmitment to taking their learnings into a future team environment. At the team level, the picture was less clear, with some members seeing the resuits as positive, and others reporting little impact on team effixtiveness. Yet, even those who questioned the demonstrated effect were unanimous in their belief that covert processes that interfere with the ability of team rnembers to speak honestly with one another should be raised. They had each experienced enough benefit from "discussing the undiscussable" that they were adamant that in future team environments, they would attempt to hold more honest, candid conversations. Certainly, in the early sessions, where many of the original undiscussables were fust raised, the team did begin to engage in the kind of "straight talk" advocated by Blanton ( 1996, cited in Van Housen, 1997), Hirschhom (199 l), Hinsey ( 1W2), and Schutz ( 1984, 1994). Lf we look at Schutz' six leveis of tmth ( 1994), it is clear that the majority of team members moved from feeling something and not expressing it, through to expressing it with some degree of self-awareness. A few were able to move to Schutz' highest level of tmth in recognizing theu feelings about thernselves. Members' abilities to examine their assumptions and mental models (Senge, 1990) improved significantly as a result of the tearning process. Yet, the mental models attached to those in leadership roies remained fumiy entrenched, as evidenced by the ongoing difficulty peopIe had in chailenging Sandra and Don. Nevertheless, for the most part, tearn members did move frorn level one, "lack of awareness (unconscious incornpetence)*" (Laiken. 1997, p. 37) to level three, "ability to act on awareness, with effort (conscious cornpetence)," where individuals make explicit attempts to examine assumptions. The movement to level four, "unconscious cornpetence," where the espoused theory has become theory in action without conscious effort, did not become intemalized as "the way we do business." Yet, * The original sources of the unconscious/conscious cornpetencc mode1 is credited to Bandura. A. (1974. Decernber). Behavior theory and the models of man. The Psvchol~,29, 859-869. there were times during the sessions where this kind of seemingly effortless engagement with one another in genuine dialogue did occur. The tearn became more attentive to their language (Domelion, 1996) and to ensuring that there was shared understanding about words and issues. Comrnents such as "What's in your Ieft-hand column?', "The-out", and "1 think that was a 'plop"' became more cornmonplace. Dialogue, with its focus on inquiry (Bohm, 1989; Ellinor & Gerard, cited in Johnson, 1998; Isaacs, 1996, 1999; Schein, 1994), took the place of discussion, with its emphasis on advoçating a position, in more of the team's conversations. People tended to check with one another more frequentiy to ensure that opinions had been expressed and common understanding had been reached. While the team did revert to less effective conversation styles as the business pressures increased and after my involvement with them had ended, we have already seen tfiat for individual members, the impact was greater and more sustainable. The most significant contribution made by this research study is the rich description it provides of the struggles that both individual members and the team as a whole experienced in attempting to make this kind of transfomative shift in their mode of operation. With the exception of Argyris' five-year case study (1993) and the MIT AutoCo Epsilon project (1996), 1 am aware of no other research which has been conducted that documents the process of working with a team to uncover their hidden processes. Where this study differs from that of Argyris and MlT is in its shoner time span, its changing membership and its severe business pressures. The results show that this kind of transformative shift possible at the individual level. Members achieve increased self-awareness and the cornmitment to change their interaction patterns, even under the adverse conditions experienced by this team. As we move into the new rnillennium, where exponential change and global cornpetition are the noms, it will be increasingly important for teams to be able to learn how to create a leaniing culture where honest, candid exchange of information is the rule, rather than the exception. As with any research process of this nature, it is important to engage in a discussion of the positive resuits within the context of how learning occurs. For some individuals, the impact of a Iearning experience is felt almost immediately. They see the connections between the newly acquired knowledge and insight and are able to integrate them into their lives and behavioural patterns relatively quickly. For others, the process wiil be considerably slower. New ideas may incubate over a significant time period, often at pre or unconscious levels. In this study, individuals in the latter category rnay not have experienced or felt positive effects by the time of the final data collection. As already indicated, in looking at the impact of the study on team performance, the results were less obvious. Whiie some members saw significant effects, others did not. AU agreed that the process of moving toward greater honesty was difficult and fraught with a number of challenges. In the sections which follow, 1 wiîi explore these challenges and their impact on the research outcomes. Psychodynamic Issues This thesis has already established that current literature cites an understanding of emotion and "emotional intelligence" as critical to successful team and organizational functioning. Yet the same literature acknowledges that, in the corporate world, reason and thinking are still valued over emotion and feelings. The dilemma which this study highlights is clear. The very act of surfacing undiscussable issues requires people to acknowledge psychological material which has often been conxiously or unconsciously buried. It raises content which is emotionally challenging to deal with and results in defensive reasoning at both individual and group levels. in so doing, it may reduce the wiliingness of team members to travel this difficult path and result in the proliferation of the same undiscussables. In this section, 1 wiii explore the psychodynamic processes which may have been the driving forces behind ABC team rnembers' interactions. 1 will then look more specificdly at how these were played out in manager/subordinate relationships, and at the social defenses employed by the team. In each case, 1 will examine the impact which these processes had both on members' efforts to surface undiscussables and on the team Eunctioning and effectiveness. In Chapter Two, I exaLniaed a psychodynamic fkamework for team functioning. More specifically, 1 suggested that centrai to this framework is the belief that individuals develop psychological defense mechanisms in or&r to ward off anxiety which threatens their seif esteem. Krantz (1989) suggested that people use their work desto manage their anxieties and meet other socio-emotional needs as well as to satisw their needs CO accompiish the work itself. Thus the irrational dimensions of life are brought into the workplace and fmd expression through such processes as repression, splitting, projection, and introjection, tenns used by theorists and practitioners of a number of schools of psychoanalysis. Repression, in its suppression of key events or confiicts from conscious awareness, is often dernonstrated in the form of resistance to change or leaming (Diamond, 1993). For the ABC team, members appeared sometimes to be unaware of the underiying tensions that 1 sensed during sessions, and, on many occasions, denied rny observations of these. Their inability to transfer their leamings from the sessions to their day-to-day interactions suggests that unconscious, repressed processes existed. ïndeed, during the final sessions, when members became aware of their tendency to slip into unhealthy patterns between sessions, they seemed to be baffled by their inability to "make it work." Such a response would seem to indicate some resistance to making the necessary shifts, to facing suppressed emotions or conflicts. The concepts of splitting, projection and introjection revealed themselves in a number of ways. Much of the current literature on teams acknowledges that members take on different roles, depending both on their own preferences and personal styles and on the needs of the group (Parker, 1991 ; Quick, 1992). Krantz ( 1989) and Gernrnill and Kraus (1988) take this further in suggesting that @cular individuals, as members of groups, are induced into roles on behaif of, and carry some degree of emotional freight for, the entire group. For the ABC senior management tearn, Don was clearly seen to be the challenger or critic. Throughout the process, he dernonstrateci his willingness to ask the tough questions, have people dislike him and nsk king rejected. We have already established that one of the origins of undiscussables is the tendency to avoid conflict and the accompanying emotions of fear, shame, embarrassment, anger and rejection (Argyris, 1990). Smith and Berg (1987) suggest that team members who give the group the negative feedback it needs to survive and grow are ofien rejected by the group and seen as overly cntical. It would appear that members split off from their own negative sides and projected their undesirable traits ont0 Don. Projective identification as a defense mechanism suggests that the way in which the recipient of this process responds has an important impact on the sender. If the recipient simply enacts the role he or she is assigned, then a tacit, coiiusive agreement is established in which the original meaning of the unwanted feelings is reinforced and the defense against thinking about them confirmeci (Gilrnore & Krantz, 1985). Thus, the scapegoat takes on or accentuates the characteristic attributed to him and confm the repugnance the others feel for that (disowned) aspect. Because Don acknowledged this tendency in himself to be abrasive, he became an easy repository or scapegoat for the tension and conflict which existed within the tearn. In fulfilling this role, he unknowingly colluded with the team in keeping these other tensions buned and undiscussed. In king seen as the "problem member," Don seemed to take the heat off Sandra. While Don's behaviour was seen to be more obviously dysfunctional, rnembers stmggled with Sandra's style as well. They saw her as impersonal, demanding, critical and a perfectionist. While members did begin to challenge Don, dbeit with some difficulty, they never seemed able to give Sandra candid fecdback, either individuaiiy or in front of the team- Even after she had received her SYMLOG results from team members and asked for additional comments, people became silent and needed a mat deal of prodding before they would speak. By projecting the unwanted parts of themselves ont0 Don and Sandra, team memben could introject the more desirable qualities into themselves. They could see themselves as "team players" who were collaborative, and ready to do what was needed to build a high functioning group. While members did acknowledge their own contributions to the clifficuit tearn dynamics, more often than not, conversation would remto Don and Sandra's shortcornings as primary obstacles to theu effective functioning. The Man-flubordinate Relationshjp Nowhere are the psychodynamic defense mechanisms more iikely to be played out than in the relationship between manager and subordinate. A number of authors have highlighted the impact of the hierarchical nature of the manageriaYsubordinate relationship and the dependence that each has on the other (Czander, 1993; Diarnond. 1986: Gould Wilkinson, Voyer & Ford, 1997; Hirschhom, 1990, 1993; Hirschhorn & Gilmore, 1992; Krantz 1989). Diamond (1986) argues chat organizational hierarchy produces unilateral protectiveness and defensive interactions in superior-subordinate relations by suengthening infantile feelings of attachrnent and dependency. The superior's accountability for a subordinate's performance ties the subordinate and manager together in an emotionally charged. interdependent bond in which they need each other to succeed. While the levels of influence obviously differ, each can damage or empower the other. Members (superior and subordinate) engage in defensive maneuvers designed to reduce painful feelings. The manager who disowns and projects away his or her aggressiveness. for example, will be unable to act decisively in managerial situations callhg for action. Alternatively, if the superior's dependency and vulnerability has been split off and projected into the subordinaîe, the boss wiU likely have trouble receiving bad news from the subordinate, and the subordinate is likely to be helpless and submissive. In addition to projecting unwanted feelings and traits ont0 each other. members use the defense mechanism of transference by projecting their unresolved feeiings and attitudes from past relationships (parent, siblings, etc.) ont0 another person in the present. Group members' eariiest, most troubling conflicts are reawakened and authority figures are symbolically equated with parents (Krantz, 1989; Czander, 1993). Subordinates often dive and attempt to rework emotional experiences with their superiors that they had with their parents as young children. indeed, Senge (1998) suggests that most business relationships work like dysfunctional families where "everybody is concentrathg on just pleasing the boss and avoiding getting their ass[es] kicked, rather than on building reai relationships" (p- 1 1)- At ABC, both Sandra and Don were authority figures who seemed to elicit emotional responses and reactions in tearn members. Sandra was always seen to hold people's careers in her hands. Though 1 never heard her make comments which implied that there rnight be negative repercussions, members continued to see her as wielding enough power over hem that effective challenging was, for the most part, shut down. Members appeared consistently to transfer unresolved feelings about authority figures ont0 Sandra in her role as CE0 and President. Don, because he was the direct manager of rnany of the tearn members, elicited similar transference reactions. When one considers that his leadership style had been one of "cornrnand and control," it is not surprising that, despite the personal changes he made during the time the team was together, the mental models were fdyentrenched and some members continued to be intirnidated by him. We have seen that mental models are the fdters through which we see the world, the assumptions we make about people and events. They are shaped by Our life expenences. including childhood lessons leamed. Some wnters have suggested that it is the psychodynamic defensive processes of projection and tramference which, because they are often below people's conscious awareness, result in mental models becorning fdy entrenched and remaining unexamined (Diamond, 1986; Long & Newton, 1995). Argyris' Mode1 I theo~y-in-use( 1990) is based on assumptions and mental models about organizations and interpersonal relationships that idealize authority and control and minimize eliciting negative feelings. In so doing, it supports the defense mechanisms of projection and transference that exist between manager and employee. Having said this, one cannot ignore the fact that, despite the flattening of organizatiom and the move toward more egalitarian structures. the corporate worfd remains essentially hierarchical with power and authority resting in the manageriai ranks. As long as managers continue to be the final authority as to how people are evahated, rewarded and compensated. these mental models will most Uely remain fdyembedded. In such an environment, when the boss is in the room, honest conversation may. to some extent. continue to be cd&. At ABC, the projections ont0 Sandra and Don and the tram ference which occurred because of their authority positions within the team. seem to have contributed significantly to diff~cultissues king buried. As the teaming work progressed and some of these issues were surfaced. members were more candid. Once the business pressures became extreme and people's fears for their careers increased, the defense mechanisms reasserted themselves more strongly than ever as Sandra and Don once again became authority figures who were not to be chailenged. Krantz (1989) suggests that when a "managerial couple" (i.e., a superior/subordinate reiationship) is regressive, other group members will avoid anxiety with the result "that issues of dependability, accountability, and trust. which are inevitably painhl in a failing coIlaboration" (p. 17 1) will not be confronted. While Don and Ted were not strictiy speaking a managerial couple, this dynamic was demonstrated in the research team. in this case, the tension between Don and Ted, which was cited as a significant cause of the conflict between the two businesses, was never openly addressed. Sanàra, as the president, and person in authonry over them, was seen to be the only one who could raise this issue. Yet, even when the tension erupted into open conflict between Don and Ted in a team meeting, she neglected to intervene. As a result, the spiit between sales and leasing surfaced as a major undiscussabie in the final set of interviews. Social Defenses At the team level, members establish social defenses or rituals (Hirschhom, 1993) as a way of inducing thoughtlessness in order to avoid feeling anxious. It is aimost as if members silently acknowiedge their individual anxieties and collude to keep those fears unexpressed. if we look at what happened with the research team from this perspective, a numkr of observations can be made. ABC team began its work with the conscious intent to do its real task: significantiy improve its financial results and secure its future either within Axworthy Global or as two separate businesses in partnership with outside companies. Underlying this overt intent, a number of patterns of behaviour could be observed. Eac h of them was founded on an unconscious assumption about the group's purpose. and each was designed to rninimize the group's collective amiety about its real task. Schneider and Shrivastava (1988) defined Bion's concept of basic assumption as "a system of shared meaning that governs collective perceptions. thoughts, feelings, and action" (p. 494). Throughout the research period, the team manifested the characteristics of two of the basic assumption groups as identified by Bion (cited in Colman & Bexton, 1975). At the beginning of its work together, one could see the signs of the fightlflight basic assumption where group members blarne dlthe problems on an outside cause (fight) or pretend that the problem doesn't exist (flight). The tendency was to blame the financial dificulties on the previous president, Paul . In fact, this became an underlying issue embedded in one of the main undiscussables - the inability to talk about the past and the tendency to blame previous team members, by association, with Paul. The team also exhibited pairing basic assumptions in its tendency, in the early stages, to see Sandra and Ted as a messianic couple who would save the group. Sandra had a reputation of rescuing "sick" companies and turning their fortunes around. Ted was seen as Sandra's heir apparent and the "shining light" who. dong with Sandra, would deliver them fiom their severe financial difficulties. The fightlflight assumption also operated in the team's tendency throughout the process to blame Axworthy Global for many of its problems, particularly for Axworthy's refusal to continue to support the team's attempts to turn their financial woes around. Each of these basic assumption activities hinged on the defense mechanisms of splitîing and projection which were applied at the group level. In painng, rnernbers split off from their own feelings of helplessness and destructiveness and projected their hopes ont0 Sandra and Ted. In the fight/!Xght mode, anger and hosrility were ciisowned and projected ont0 either Paul, the former president or Axworthy Global. Hirschhorn ( 1993) takes Bion' s work a step further in identifiing "covert coalitions" ( p. 63) in which members control anxiety through a more durable and sustained set of relationships. These work relationships are based on family roles which match the group's need to control task-induced anxieties. A boss and subordinate may play out a stormy parentkhild interaction pattern which takes the spotlight off other conflictuai issues within the team. At ABC, Sandra and Don foda covert coalition, in which Don was seen as the rebellious child and Sandra, the controilïng parent, whose responsibility it was to deal with Don's anti-social behaviour. Through the use of the defense mechanisms of splitting and projective identification, the rest of the team members were absolved of responsibility for dealing with Don's abrasive behaviour, and Sandra could be held accountable. Sirnilarly, the rifi in the tearn between sales and leasing became an easy foi1 for fostering a covert coalition between two warring siblings, Don and Ted. Mernbers split off their own anger at those who belonged to "the other side" of the business. and projected it ont0 Don and Ted, thus reducing their own anxiery about how to hande the situation. Don and Ted were seen to be engaged in sibling rivalry in their attempts to be in Sandra's favour, and Sandra, as parent, was again responsible for fmding a solution. In looking at the tearn dynamics from the perspective of Diamond's "regressive and defensive work groups" (1993, p. 99),a nurnber of connections can be made. Members in an "institutionalized" group cope with annihilation anxiety by producing "paranoid social de fenses" (p. 102) that encourage submission to a hierarc hical structure and impersonal authority. They construct depersonaiizing and controiiing sociai structures and split their perceptions of self and others into good and bad categories. They accomplish work in a routine and rational fashion, relying on niles, regdations and procedures. The ABC team's tendencies to scapegoat Don and blame Sandra, combined with their belief that Sandra had hidden agendas, would seem to reflect institutionalized work group behaviour. As well, the rift between the two businesses and the resulting camps, with each blaming the other for the team's problems, matches the institutional group's paranoid tendencies. While my perception was that this highiy skilled, bright group of executives did everything they could to find innovative solutions to the severe financial losses which plagued the Company, there were times when their decisions seemed to be driven by an aimost slavish adherence to mies. An example of this can be found in Sandra's insistence that other members of the team couid not be told what was happening as negotiations to find a buyer were underway. There were also a number of times when team members were kept out of the laop with respect to Axworthy's opinion, and conversations between Sandra, Ted and Don occurred "behind closed doors." It is true that in the high stakes game of corporate mergers and buyouts, there are strict guidelines and protocols about what can be shared and what is to be kept confidential. Yet, at a time when al1 team members were working around the clock to find solutions that would Save ABC, one would wonder at the level of secrecy that existed even within the senior management team. The resulhg Iack of awareness of what was happening only heightened an aWytense enviromnent and fbeled a rampant nimour miil. In addition to institutionalized behaviour, the team aiso exhibited characteristics of the "autocratic" work group with its tendency to identifjr with an ail powerful leader (Sandra) whom they both idealized and resented. As would be expected, the inevitable "fall frorn grace" occurred as she could not possibly meet people's fantasized expectations. Paradoxically. despite this ambiguous relationship with the leader. it was the presence of a stabIe, identifiable leader, in the person of Sandra, which adowed the autocratic group to cany out its work in an effective rnanner. Diamond suggests that the quality of work accomplished by an autocratic group will vacillate depending on whether the leader is king idealized or denigrated. Because the business pressures were severe throughout, the team aiways appeared to be working extremely hard. Yet, 1 detected a tendency for team members to be more optimistic and enthusiastic when Sandra was more visible and available to the group. 1 recall in July, 1997 when she had been away for a number of weeks. people resented her absence. issues were buried, resentrnent increased and things seemed to fa11 apart. When she returned, she spent a great deai of time with team members both individually and together, and the team seemed to rebound into more productive work. Diamond sees the "resilient" work group as one in which rnembers engage in a reflective process that ensures that covert issues are surfaced and defensive processes acknowledged and explored. It would seem that in its early stages, the ABC tearn was operating as a resilient group, as it attempted to surface undiscussables and learn new approaches to communicating honestly. As business pressures increased, members seemed to regress into both institutionalized and autocratic behaviours. Once 1 had completed my work with hem, when the survivd of the Company was at serious nsk, the team reverted to regressive patterns where issues were buried and anxiety was deait with in unconscious, defensive ways. Regardless of which psychodynamic theory one adopts, there seerns to be consensus that the danger with social defense mechanisms is that they operate below the level of awareness. As such, they remain unexamined and become "habituai routines" (Gersick & Hac kman, 1990) which preserve and perpetuate existing patterns of behaviour. When these patterns are dysfùnctionai, the group becomes stuck in unproductive and inefficient team processes. Gersick and Hackrnan (1990) suggest that groups develop "meta-noms" (p. 82). rarely articuiated, that prevent an examination of habitual routines and potential change from regressive to resiiient behaviour. Even where individual group members privately feel the need to change, the meta-nom is often poweriül enough to suppress expression of individual opinions. This was certainly the case at ABC when it was clear that individuaily, everyone agreed that the deepening rift between the two businesses was resulting in dysfunctional team performance and needed to be addressed. Yet, the meta-nom to "not go there" for fear of stirring up even more tension and generating more anxiety was strong enough to keep the issue undiscussable and the boundaries between the two sub-groups were maintained (Gemmill, 1986). GouId Wilkinson, Voyer and Ford (1997, p. 2) describe reinforcing loops that can sustain or even worsen anxiety in organizations and teams. The "fight" loop would seem to apply to the ABC tearn in its self-perpetuating cycle of anxiety, conflict, intemal cornpetition and the need to be right. As the boundaries between the two groups tightened, perceptions of each other were distorted, and the "we/theyWmentality increased, with each group seeing the other as the enemy (Gemrnili, 1986). Anxiety re / business \ Distorted perceptions and Intemal deaeasd understanding cornpetition t Fipure 3. ABC Team's "Fightmight" Loop: Adapted from Gould Wilkinson, Voyer and Ford, 1997 Smith and Berg (1987) see group "stuckness" as a consequence of the various ways that group members attempt to cope with the paradoxical nature of goup life. In order to work collaboratively, group members need to voice their contradictory reactions. The expression of opposing feelings can also threaten the group. as members fear that such conflicting reactions will tear the group apart. at worst, and stymie any foward progress, at best. The result is the weaving of a "dialogic unconscious" (Cumming, 1999), "group shadow" (Gemrnill, 1986: Gernmill & Kraus, 1988) or "pool" of shared thoughts, feelings, mechanisrns and processes of which group members are unaware and which, because of their ofien negative content, remain unexamined. This collective resistance to exploring the painhl and anxiety-provoking aspects of the group's psychologicaJ world keeps the group stuck in the proliferation of defensive routines and undiscussables. Smith and Berg (1987) descnbe three ways in which groups attempt to deal with the contradictions that result in their getting stuck: comprornising the emotions associated with the stuckness by finding a middle ground; elirninating the contradictions by pitting oppositional reactions against each other to see which is "stronger" or more powerfd in the group; and using time to separate the contradictory elements by ignorïng or avoiding the larger issue that divides them. h each case, the group attempts to eiiminate the paradox. Such efforts only exacerbate the stuckness because they are airned at destroying a fundamental characteristic of groups to "raise and provide expression of opposing, conflicting, ambivalent reactions" (Smith & Berg, 1987, p. 215). The more the group tries to eliminate the paradoxes, the suonger will be the urge to find expression for these contradictions. The result is a self-perpetuating cycle of defensive behaviours which only serve to keep it stuck. Figure 4 illustrates just this type of cycle which existed at ABC toward the end of its work together. Cornpetilion for resources between two businesses J Tensions become Increased tension undiscussable Figure 4. ABC Tearn's Cycle of "Stuckness" Movement through stuckness requires members to live in the paradoxes and contradictions, to immerse themsehes in the opposing forces in order to discover the link between them. They must leave old patterns and risk facing the anxiety that underlies these opposing forces. From a psychologicai perspective, members must reclaim emotions and reactions that have been split off and projected ont0 other individuals, subgroups or groups (Smith & Berg, 1987). In the early teaming sessions, the participants were willing to engage at this level in looking at their defensive routines. Team members shared their reactions to Don and, to a lesser extent. Sandra. Members who had projected their feelings about the previous president ont0 "older" team members acknowledged the impact on their colleagues, and openness and candor increased. The team began to create a "reparative" culture (Hirschhorn, 1993) where the focus became accomplishing their work goals as opposed to defending against the anxiety they brought both to their task and to their work relationships. Smith and Berg (1987) describe the cycles that groups go through as they are confronted wiih changes in team memberstiip and new business pressures or demands. New paradoxes wil1 emerge, new anxieties surface and defensive behaviours reassert thernselves. This cyclical process was demonstrated at ABC as members left and new people came on board and as the business context changed. As the team began to see their tendency to revert to dysfunctional patterns and to rely on me to "keep them on track," their continuing experience of failure seemed to be the impetus that could push hem to change their habitua1 patterns (Gersick & Hackman, 1990). As the second set of interviews clearly demonstrated, this kind of transformation did not occur. Instead, in the four-month period after 1 stopped working with the group and before the second set of intenkws was conducted, the team regressed into previous defensive patterns. Business pressures had increased exponentially, the Company was fighting for its survival, and individuds became anxious about their own jobs. The team was unable to balance the reinforcing defensive loops as illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 with a reparative loop that would see them effectively utilking the conversation tools they had learned (Gould Wilkinson et al., 1997). Because 1 was no longer involved, Sandra needed to exhibit strong leadership in ensuring that the issues were surfaced and addressed. When she was not able to do this, the defensive positions were enuenched and the team becarne even more fractured. Svmmsrv The act of surfacing undiscussables required tearn members to reveai aspects of thernselves and issues which had ken consciously and unconsciously buried. Members disowned their unacceptable quaiities and projected them ont0 Sandra and Don. in addition, Don and Sandra were the recipients of unresolved transference issues related to authority figures. At the team level, members constnicted social defenses in order to ward off unwanted anxieties reiated both to the difficult business context and to unresolved tensions between the two sides of the business. While the team began to move toward a reparative culture where defenses were explored and mcult issues raised, the extreme financial pressures and resulting fear for their own careers coupled with a cessation of my involvement, caused them to retreat. Issues were once again buried and team members colluded in the development of reinforcing loops which kept the team from surfacing the shadow issues at the root of their dysfunctional behaviour. Leadership and the Role of the Leader There is a great ded of evidence that the role of the leader is pivotal to the ability of tearns to achieve their goals. Much has been written about the leader's role in tearn functioning (Block, 1993; Champy, 1995; Hesselbein, 1996; Scholtes et ai., 1996). Because this was an executive team in which al1 members were also leaders, one might expect the issue of leadership to be prominent in any discussion about the team's stmggles and successes. Indeed, the participant team consisted of vice-presidents who reported to two senior vice-presidents. who, in turn, reported to the president. In this section, 1 will examine the role of the leader from the perspective of the new style of leadership required, mental rnodels of leadership and the leader as catalyst. 1 will then relate these themes around leadership to the earlier discussion on the psychological aspects of team functioning. In the final section, 1 will look at aeissues specific to the executive or "top" team. A New Stvle of Leadershia The twentieth century has seen the movement frorn organizations as machines w here control is everything, to organizations as living systems or networks. where leaming and partnerships predominate. Along with this has corne the shift in leadership which focuses on the empowexment of employees, on individuals being entmsted to make decisions on their own and assume responsibility for results (Block, 1993; Champy, 1995; Watkins & Marsick, 1993). Hersey and Blanchard's "Situational Leadership" mode1 (1977) saw the leadership role shift from directing and close supetvision to delegating and tumine over responsibility for decisions, depending on the readiness and rnaturity of the employee or "follower." Handy (1996) sees the newly emerging language of organizations as radically different with talk of b*options,not plans; the possible rather than the perJect; involvernent instead of obedience" (p. 4). The top-down, hierarchicai style of leadership has ken replaced with leadership that is inspired by the principles of stewardship where service replaces self-interest (Block, 1993; McGee-Cooper & Trarnmell, 1999) and quantum physics where the inter-connected nature of reality is seen as ever-changing and uncon trollable (Wheatiey, 1992). With the "permanent white watef' (Vail, 1989, cited in Albert, 1999) of modem society, technological advancements and global cornpetition, leaders must create environments where leaming is the pnmary fcrcus and the chdenging of existing paradigrns and assumptions is the nom. Joseph Albert describes "leaderly learning*' as "openness to new ideas and an ability to nurture a clirnate in which innovation and creativity cmflourish" ( 1999, p. 2). In the early nineties, leading edge CEOS saw the ability of their companies to become "Iearning organizations" (Senge, 1990) as critical success factors in a rapidly changing marketplace. Yet, the learning organization's emphasis on shared vision. team leaming and systems thinking demanded a different kind of leadership, one which resided not just in the designated leaders, but in people throughout the organization. In this type of environment, people at al1 levels who held a shared vision of what they wanted to create, were committed to working together to make it happen. The learning organizauon required a fundamental shift from cornpliance to cornmitment (Senge, Kleiner, Roberts, Ross, Roth & Smith, 1999). The beiief that "no significant change can occur unless it is driven from the top" has ken supplanted with one that suggests that "linle significant change can occur it is driven from the top" (Senge, 1996, p. 42). The day of the "heroic leader" is over. The leader of the future will be a person who "cm lead and follow, be centrai and marginal, be hierarchicaiiy above and below, be individudistic and a team player, and above ail, be a perpetual leamer" (Schein, 1996, p. 69). Nowhere is this ability to manage the plarities of the leader role more important than in a teaming environment wkre the leader needs to be both leader and member and where leadership is tmly shared. For ABC Inc. which was facing huge financial crises, Sandra had been clear from the beginning in contracting with me, that the company could only hope to succeed if she were able to create a cohesive and strong senior management team. She clearly saw the need for the team to pull together in order to navigate the turbulent waters they were facing. Yet, she seemed to stmggle in managing the complexities of leading from this new perspective. My observations of her initiaily were that she was a whirlwind who never stopped. WhiIe 1 was impressed by her desire to lead from partnership and commiunent, 1 recail my early impressions of Sandra: "Very bnght, articulate, arnbitious, has al1 the right ideas, values, but doesn't aiways walk her talc. She means well. I'm not sure she means to disempower people, or is aware that she does." (Reflective Journal. March 17. 1997) Early on, 1 experienced her need for control in designing the initial teaming sessions and in her reluctance to be candid with the tearn about the possibility that the company mtght not be able to overcome the financial pressures it faced. Yet, on many occasions, 1 was smck by her willingness to Listen and to be challenged around her assumptions about her role as leader. She appeared to understand that "the soft stuff is the hard stuff' (Leider. 1996. p. 189) in creating radical change. enta1 Models about the kader Chapter Two looked at the impact of mental models and one's worldview on team functioning. In particular, it examined the role that unexamined assumptions and mental models play in determining the quality of communication and in tbe proliferation of undiscussables. Nowhere is the impact of mental models felt more strongly than in the leadership role. Mental models of leaders are shaped by people's previous experiences with leadership and by their own individual issues around authority (Berg, 1998; Krantz, 1998; Senge, 1998). For the vast majority, these mental models will be pattemed after out-dated hierarchical models where we were told what to do and where chdlenging the leader was considered to be taboo. Ryan and Ostreich (1998) found the relationship with one's boss to be a key factor in preventing people from speaking up at work. In their study of 260 people in 22 organizations, the largest single category of undiscussable issues was the boss* interpersonai style. In the study of ABC hc., the sarne result oçcurred with Sandra and Don's leadership styles surfacing as one of the most significant undiscussables. Indeed, the researchers in the earlier 199 1 study (Ryan & Ostreich. 1998) cited abrasive and abusive behaviour as one of the most signifiant triggers of mistrust. This type of behaviour ranged from glaring eye contact. insults and put-downs. to yelling. shouting and angry outbursts. It was clear from the first round of ABC interviews that Don's abrasive behaviour was a significant factor in issues not king surfaced and effectively handled. Ryan and Ostreich ( 1998) also found that ambiguous behaviour displayed by leaders caused employees to shut down. They described this type of behaviour as secretive decision-making, lack of or indirect communication, lack of responsiveness to input or suggestions, and uninviting behaviours, The latter involve "inattention to the small. but significant and expected pleasantries and manners associated with human interaction" (p. 68). such as king acknowledged in passing, or asking about personal matters. Both Sandra and Don were seen to ignore many of these "social amenities" in their day-to-day involvement with team members. Because of the secretive nature of the negotiations with potential joint venture partners, many of the team members were kept in the dark about what was happening. Even though the business environment may have demanded this level of silence, it is likely to have contributed to the already growing anxiey and mistrust. What Ryan and Ostriech's study clearly dernonstrated was the tenacity with whch people held to the mental models attached to the leader as ultimate authority. Schein's ( 1996) suggestion that leaders have tremendous power in organizations to shape the culture of the organization would seem to support this view. Yet, the recent move toward the iearning organization calls on people to challenge the deepiy embedded mental models they hold of leaders and fùndamentaiiy transfomi their relationship from superior/subordinate to pamers. in the new. egalitarian work environment. mernbers are king encouraged to speak their rninds, even when it involves confronting the leader. Such a transition is extremely Micult, as evidenced by the research results where members continued to struggle with challenging Sandra and Don. This pattern took hold even more frrmly towards the end, when team members were fearful of losing their jobs and saw Sandra as the ultimate authority who could significantly impact their career paths. Sandra seemed to want to be the kind of leader who led from pannershp, but the transition appeared to be dificult for her. She was seen as tough, aggressive and demanding and 1 believe that her desk to be the "new" leader was often overshadowed by her own need ro be successful, achieve results and rnake an impact. Team members described her as reverting to comrnand and control outside of sessions with her perfectionism and 1st minute demands. hdeed, the system in which she operated, including the Axworthy Board and her own superiors, seemed to demand that she demonstrate this style of aggressive leadership. The findings revealed that while members chdlenged each other more at the end of the process than they had when the work began, there was still less questioning of Sandra and Don than of others, and when 1 was no longer working with the tearn. the willingness to ask the hard questions declined significantly. One could argue that as long as 1, as faciliïator/consultant, was there, both to sustain an environment where challenging was encouraged and support people to take the necessary nsks, the old mental models attached to Sandn and Don could be shifted. Once I was no longer in the room, these mental models reasserted thernselves. One wonders whether there were also tramference issues operating between myself as consultant and team members. Did they feel safer to be candid when 1 was in the room, or were they attempting to please me, as the "authority figure/consultant"? 1 suspect that both dynamics were in operation. Members rnay have seen me as providing a container for the anxiety they had about speaking up and therefore felt safer to do so when 1 was present. Yet, they may have also projected their mental models of "consultant as expert" ont0 me and felt some unconscious pressure to comply with my suggestions. The tenacity with which the mental models were held was highlighted during the SYMLOG feedback session when members gave one another feedback on their behaviour. Sandra dernonstrated her hurnility in acknowledging the critical comments her report had included, and asked for specific examples €rom tearn members. The mental mode1 attached to her as leader and authority figure remaineci strongly held and it took significant encouragement both from myself and Sandra before people were willing to be candid. In addition to Sandra, Don, as another senior leader, was burdened by the mental models attached to him. While it was clear that he had earned the reputation of tyrant, someone to be feared. even when he did make significant changes in his abrasive behaviour, there were members who were unable to acknowledge those changes. As with Sandra. he continued to be challenged somewhat less than others and there continued to be joking comments about the potential for him to revert to his old ways. The mental models were finnly entrenched and ciifficult to alter. in the end, when al1 three leaders were ernbroiled in their own dysfunctionai system, no one would surface this as an issue, because they were the "bosses" who wielded power over the rest of the tearn. In the section which follows, 1 will look at the link between the mental models attacheci to the leader and the ways in which the leader is cded upon to be a role model for others- der as Role Model The literature is filled with references to the "leader as role model." (Dixon, 1997: Fisher, 1993; George, 1996; Ginette, 1987, cited in Allen, 1996; Roth & Kleiner, 1996; Schein, 1996). Ginette suggests that how group leaders act in initial meetings can set lasting precedents for group interaction. Gersick and Hackman's research (1990) into habitua1 routines reveals that pattems of behaviour are established early in the life of groups. These pattems would include perceptions of the leader and, presumably, mental models about behaviour based on what is demonsuated by the leader. Nancy Dixon (1997) suggests that, despite the move toward organizational learning and partnership, the assumption that al1 orgaiiizations are fundamentally hierarchical in nature still exists. Power continues to rest in management roles and good managers are seen to be teachers and coaches who help subordinates perform effectively. Jennifer George ( 1996) cites leader affect as a powerful antecedent to group affective tone. "Leaders who feei excited, enthusiastic and energetic thernselves are likely to sirnilarly energize their followers, as are leaders who feel distressed and hostile likely to negatively activate their followers" (p. 84). The MIT/AutoCo Epsilon project ( 1996) listed "leaders who modeled the desired behavior" (p. 17) as an important factor in creating an atrnosphere of trust and cooperation. Indeed, people throughout the Epsilon team, when asked what factors provided them with the greatest opportunity to leam and change, singled out the examples set by the program managers' "walking their talk (p. 25) Schein (1996) cornments that a leader's behaviour "is a role model that encourages subordinates to identify with [him] and thereby intemalize [his] beliefs, values and assumptions." (p. 6 1). Schein goes so far as to suggest that if the organization is successful, and the success is attributed to the leader, the leader's entire personality becornes embedded in the culture of the organization. Such a belief that calls on leaders to be a "living example" (Fisher, 1993) of exernplary behaviour, would seem to place a significant burden on them to "do the right thing." The question that this raises for me is: How can a leader strive to elirninate the mentaI model of the heroic leader when she is expected to be the idealized example for others? Surely the concept of leader as role model or idealid figure is in direct contradiction to that of leader as member and patner. Peter Senge (Senge et ai., 1999) questions the still prevaient tendency to ask people in this "age of empowerment" to accept the singular power of top executives unquestioningly. At ABC,Sandra arrived with paradoxical mental models attached to ber; on the one hand, she was seen as a "saviour," someone who would rescue the Company from potenfial financial min; on the other hand, she was perceived to be a "terminator," the person who would ultimately shut down both the business and the Company. These contradictory mentai models ensured that she could never be seen as a partner, "one of us", but would be either idealized and depended on, or feared and resented. At the same rime. she was expected to be a role rnodel for the rest of the team when relationships becarne severely strained and conflicts went underground. The majority of rnembers biamed Sandra for not deding with the issues between Don and Ted, and held her personaliy accountable for the depth of the rift between leasing and loans. In asking leaders to dismantle the mental model of heroic leader, the one in control and not to be challenged, they must be role models in demonstrating their humility and wlnerability. Perhaps the real challenge is to transfomi the mental mode1 of "role model" from "one who is perfect" to "one who does his best and has the confidence and humility to acknowledge when he is wrong." If tearn rnembers see that the leader can be open and vulnerabIe, they will be more likely to challenge him. Together. they can then uansform the old mental model of leader to one that suits the new organizational paradigrn. Hirschhorn (1990) summarizes this paradox of the fdyentrenched mental model of heroic leader, in combination with the requuement for leaders to be role models in demonstrating their humility and fallibility. Leaders must be vulnerable to their subordinates, which requires [theml to reveal more of their "personhoods." They cannot hide behind the role of leader, but instead must bring more of their passions, fears, and values to it. Yet the role cannot be ignored. Leaders cm neither pretend to be "just one person talking to another," nor act as if differences in power and authority between them and their subordinates can be ignored.(p. 532) Leader as Catalvst Instead of placing the burden on leaders to be a role model for others, a "shining example" of best practices, some writers have suggested that leaders act as catalysts for change. Their role becomes to create a context and the conditions in which productive conversations can be held, in order to facilitate the work of the tearn king done in the most effective way possible. The leader's role is to foster a "Synergistic mode" (Kas1 et al., 1997) of team leaming where members create knowledge mutually, integrating divergent perspectives "through dialectical processes that create shared meaning schemes" (p. 23). Leaders need to be able to create a "holding environment" (Heifetz & Laurie, 1997) in which diverse groups can talk to one another about the challenges facing them. to frame and debate issues, and to c1ariQ assumptions behind competing perspectives and values. This requires the leader to see conflict as normal and positive, a prerequisite to healthy tearn dynamics. Rather than king the heroic leader in taking responsibility for seeing that conflict is resolved. the work of the leader is to create an environment in which conflict can be surfaced and even used as a source of creativity and productive work. She does this by "getting on the balcony" (Heifetz & Laurie, 1997, p. 125) where she can see the patterns, both productive and defensive. Her role is to make observations about what she sees and, in helping the group to examine its habitua1 routines, encourage members to develop meta- routines (Gersick & Hackman, 1990) whereby they regularly review sets of behaviours to see if they are still functional. She must exercise bbdialogicleadership" (Isaacs, 1999), balancing advocacy with inquixy in order to "consistently uncover, ttirough conversation, the hidden. creative potential in any situation" (p. 2). In the case of the senior management team at ABC, Sandra anempted to play this role in the early stages of the process. On many occasions, 1 saw her making public what she observed and checking with people as to whether they had ken as candid as possible. At the same tirne, there was a tendency for her to advocate more than to inquire. People continued to look to her for approval and she often gave her opinion before others had offered theirs. This occureci most frequently during tearn meetings where Sandra appeared to have difficulty lening go of conuol and becoming a tearn member who shared the ownership for critical business decisions. Indeed, the findings revealed that she was perceived to Wear one hat in the teaming sessions and a very diffèrent one when back at the office. While there is no question that the crisis situation at ABC required Sandra to set the direction and, at times, make tough decisions on her own. there was a perception that her hard-nosed, perfectionist personality showed through too often, thus effectively shutting down productive. if contentious, conversation. In the later stages, where the split in the team between leasing and loans became severe, challenging conversation ceased and members talked in "meetings afrer the meetings." Because neither Don, Ted nor Sandra "stepped up to the plate" in narning the conflict. the issues went further underground and were never resolved. While Sandra claimed to have dealt with Don and Ted's issues privately and saw them as inappropriate to raise in front of the other members, the problem with undiscussables is that people continue to talk about them behind closed doors, assumptions are made, and additional undiscussables are created. The split between the two businesses, the tensions between Don and Ted, and Sandra's perceived lack of leadership in dealing with them. became woven into a tapestry of undiscussable issues which became more entrenched as time went on. Heifetz and LaUrie cdon the leader to step in and put the tearn to work on reframing the issues. He has to "deepen the debate with questions, unbundling the issues into their parts rather than letting confiict reniain polarized and superficial. . . . When the tearn fragments and individuals resort to protecting their own turf, [be has to] demonsuate the need for collaboration." (1997, p. 128). In her inability to do this. Sandra "unwittingly [became] a prisoner of the system" (p. 128). Having said al1 this, Heifetz and Laurie acknowledge that this type of "adaptive work" is stressful for both the leader and team members. They suggest that one of the most difficult jobs for the leader is regulating distress. He rnust be attuned to how much pressure people cm manage and still be able to be creative and productive. He must "hold steady and maintain the tension" (p. 127)-at the same tirne, watching for the signs of defensive reasoning, emotional overload and bumout - a tail order for one fdible, non-heroic human being. Again, towards the end, where the disintegration of ABC became probable but not yet inevitable, the stresses of holding confidentid information. which Sandra, Don and Ted were not at liberty to reveal, were such that they made the decision not to open up the conflicts. believing that the additional tension would be more than people could handle. By the time it became obvious that the company would not be saved, the stresses were tremendous as people feared both for their own jobs and for those of the people reporting to them. Sandra acquiesced to the team's decision not to air the difficult issues and to operate as two separate teams, each with separate agendas. The result was that the resentrnents and conflicts remained buried and even the "1st minute" efforts of the South African consulting company to surface them in order to allow for closure were unsuccessful. Was Sandra right to make the calls as she did? Should she have known what was the "right thing" to do? Was there a right thing that could have ken done? In framing this new rote for leaders, the question aises: Have we replaced one set of impossible expectations we have of leaders, with another equally unattainable set? What Ievel of emotional maturity are we asking of leaders in this "white water," continual learning environment where there are often no right answers and where they are asked to live with constant ambiguity and uncertainty? Psvcholonical Demands on Leaders Earlier in this chapter, we looked at the psychodynamic aspects of team functioning and at the psychological underpinnings of the manager/subordinate retationship. A search of the relevant literature finds a number of writers suggesting that the psychologicai demands on leaders to do their own inner work is si~ficant(Albert. 1999; Berg, 199?: Block, 1993; Heifetz & Laurïe, 1997; Hirschhom, 1990; Kets de Vries. 199 1 ; Krantz, 1989: Senge, 1998; Sinetar, 1998; Smith & Berg, 1987). This is seen to be especially critical in an environrnent of constant change where living with ambiguity is the nom. With a focus on learning and innovation, where members are encouraged to challenge the way things are done, leaders are called upon to deal with "the full range of paradoxical tensions that arise" (Smith & Berg, 1987). As the groups they lead wrestle with seemingly opposite patterns, conficts arise with greater frequency and leaders are called upon to act as catalysts in suggesting actions that examine the patterns of stuckness that groups develop. Hirschhorn (1990) asks leaders to reveal more of their "personhoods", to bring "more of their passions, fears, and values" (p. 532) to their roles. Heifetz and Laurie ( 1999) suggest that leaders have to have the emotionai capacity to tolerate uncertainty, frustration, and pain, to raise tough questions without getting too anxious themselves. Rather than king seen as the heroic leader who has the right answers and is always strong and invincible, Block (1993)asks us, as leaders, to demonstrate stewardship, in "our willingness to work on ourselves first, to stay in intimate contact with those around us, to own our doubts and limitations, and make them part of our didogue with others" (p. 43)- Block (1993) sees it as critical for leaders to do their own intemal work, the work of personal mastery (Senge, 1990), in order to be able to operate from a heaithy sense of self, that "does not depend on others to provide primary esteem supplies" (Kilmann & Kilnimn, 1994, in Albert, 1999). The leamhg leader's basic orientation must be one of openness and growth, rather than of defensiveness and avoidance. In a study of 191 successful executives, McCall, Lombardo and MO~SO~(1988, cited in Albert. 1999) found that "leaming from experience required an ability to look inside oneself and ded with one's own feelings and motives . . . Experiences that confront us with Our own shoncomings can teach, only if we've corne to grips with Our defenses against hem" (p. 136, In Albert, p. 2). When we look at the relationship between leader and tearn member, the situation becomes even more demanding. Hùschhorn (1990) suggests that a high degree of psychological sophistication is required for leaders and followers to work collaboratively, that with teamwork and shared authority cornes increasing complexity and the need for greater psychological understanding and maturity. Hirschhom and Gilmore (1992) cal1 on leaders to be aware, not only of their own emotions but dso of those of their peers and subordinates. They see these feelings as "data." valuable clues to the dynamics of the new "boundary relationships" (p. 1 15) which exist in coilaborative work structures. Leaders must understand these relationships intuitively; they must "not only manage with their heads but also with their gut feelings" (p. 115). Yet Hirschhom does not suggest that the role of leader can be ignored. He sees the leader/follower relationship as paradoxical in its move toward partnership coupled with the ongoing need to delineate the role differences that separate leaders from followers. We have already explored the nature of the psychodynarnic relationship between the manager and subordinate. In a teaming environment, where members are expected to assume greater responsibility for the collective team "outputs", finding the willingness to use one's voice means developing the capacity to take the risks necessary to say what one actually thinks and feels. This can be an especially difficult undertaking in a hierarchicd relationship. The leader, as the one who holds the "balance of power," must understand her own needs for dependency and control, her own defensive patterns, if she is to create the kind of "holding environment" (Heifetz & Laurie, 1997) that is required in an adaptive learning organization. In the research study with the senior tearn at ABC, members, who were themselves leaders. sat side by side other leaders (Sandra, Ted and Don) who were their direct supervisors. As a result, the leader/follower or manager/subordinate relationship was always at play in the dynamics of the team. Sandra tried to balance the tensions between exercising her authority and letting go of control. Yet. the mental mode1 of her as ultimate authority, with "their careers in her handsT'never seemed to change significantly. Don, too, made significant changes in his behaviour, as noted in the second set of interviews. People saw him as less abrasive and more approachable. Yet, members continued to "dance around him" and jokes were made about "having to go and see Don." The mental model, for the most part, remained intact. Did Sandra and Don possess the Ievel of emotional intelligence that Goleman (1998) adv~atesfor leaders? Were they emotionally self-aware and self-confident. able to hande conflict and to empathize and communicate openly with others? Certainly Don was clear that he was not into the "soft stuff*that seemed to be required to surface undiscussables. He was very clear, when given feedback, that he was seen as impersonal and unapproachable, that he had no interest in sharing anything about his personal life. He saw his work and home lives as king completely separate and had no intention of changing that perception. Yet, he was later seen to have sofiened, and one member even cornmented on the lengthy conversation they had shared about Don's new boat and their mutual passion for sding. Sandra also uied to respond to the feedback that she was dernanding and unapproachable. During teaming sessions. she demonstrated her empathy with team members and, on one occasion in an early session, her vulnerability and humility. Yet, for the most part, in the day-to-&y business environment, her behaviour was seen to revert to that of the more hard-nosed, perfectionist leader. She tended to keep her emotional side and her vulnerability under wraps. Where Ted seemed to stmggle was in his inability to manage the boundary between himseIf as leader and tearn member. When he held confidential information that he was unable to share, he seemed to feel personally responsible for what might happen to those who reported to him. Later, when the split did occur, he had difficulty chailenging his own leasing team members' tendency to solidi@ against the loans side of the business, and instead, was seen CO coiiude with them in increasing the intensity of the split between the two businesses. The question that this discussion raises for me is: "Can we legitimately expect leaders to possess the level of emotional maturity that seems to be required of them in today's corporate environrnent?'Kecr and Minno (In Senge et ai., 1999) describe a process of intensive personal mastery work with leaders that involves individuai reflection and coaching around the deep-seated fears and anxieties fomed in their family of origins and enacted in their work relationships. In my experience, few leaders have done or are willing to do this Ievel of personal mastery work. The work of surfacing undiscussables, of speaking honestly with one another as we work to solve problerns, find innovative solutions and remain cornpetitive in a global environment is difficult and challenging. Leaders will require support to do this inner work and some will be clear that they did not bargain for this when they assumed the mantle of leader. Executive Teams One final leadership theme which surfaced in a review of the literature was the executive team and the issues that are specific to those at senior levels. Since the participant group in ùiis study were al1 at the vice-president level or higher, they brought with them a unique set of challenges. Katzenbach and Smith (1998) cite the complexities of long-tem challenges, heavy demands on executive time, and the deep-seated individualism of senior people as the most powerfiil obstacles to the effective fbnctioning of executive tem. Typically, executive tearns are populated by aggressive "movers" who are used to getting what they want and getting things done. While group maintenance skills are just as important, they may be less developed than in less senior teams, where members are not as accustomed to "calling the shots." Indeed, such skills are typicdly less rewarded in top tearns where king aggressive and a charismatic leader is still considered to the hallmark of the top executive (Kiefer. 1998). Most executive teams operate in an unforgiving environment where there is intolerance for rnistakes and the organization continues to long for heroic leadership. As such. one's own promotion is often at the expense of someone else. "One person getting ahead often means another getting left behind, particularly regarding succession. Lip service to collaboration notwithstanding, this is a very real dynamic on many executive teams." (Kiefer, 1998, p. 18) At ABC, this issue of competition for top positions was significant, and a factor in the dynarnics between Don and Ted. Sandra had always made it clear that she did not intend to stay on at ABC once the business was either back on its feet or soId. The issue of who would be given the top position within the Company was an underlying theme throughout the tenure of my work with them. When Ted came on board early on in the proçess, Don was said to be upset that Ted had been made a senior vice-president. He was also seen to be jealous of Ted's seemingly favoured position with Sandra. Towards the end, when it becarne clear that the leasing business wouid not find a partner but be sold off, Ted, as the executive heading up that business, was out of a job and Don, as the senior executive who had ken most involved on the loans side, became the obvious person to head up the newly forrned loans business. Ellen Hart (July, 1996) describes a number of the defensive routines or beliefs held by many executives such as, "Only the strong survive.", "Red men don't need help.", "1 did it my way.". and "If you're so smart . . .", where any faiiure is hidden with a series of self- protective routines clustered around deniai and blaming of others. She suggests that surfacing undiscussables is even more chailenging with executive tearns because of both the additional pressures they often face and the increased tendency toward self-protection and de fensive reasoning. At ABC, the senior management team was able to surface some diff~cult undiscussabIes in the early stages. However. at a iater date, when questions about the financial performance of the leasing side of the business arose. defensiveness set in and turf wars intensified. Again, the role of the most senior executive as catalyst for effective dialogue is seen to be critical. In a study of top management groups, Eisenstat and Cohen ( 1990) found that when the senior executive conducted team-relevant business with certain members outside the ,oroup, trust and learning within the team inevitably deteriorated- On the other han& by insisting that the tearn deal expiicitiy with difficult topics as a group. and by recognizing and rewarding the tearn when it did so, the executive could noticeably boost the ability of the team to leam frorn its own experiences. When we apply this to what occurred with the research team at ABC, we see how Sandra, in her perceived need to keep certain information confidentid, may have unwittingly fed into the already growing mistrust within the tearn. As well. her inability to deai openly in the team with the issues between leasing and loans, and more particularly, between Don and Ted, may have reinforced an already widening gulf between the two sides of the business. Katzenbach (1998) explodes a number of myths attached to top teams, arnong them, that the senior group should function as a team whenever it is together. He acknowledges that many senior leadership initiatives are not necessarily best served by tearn efforts and that some situations warrant more efficient, individually driven approaches. He suggests that executive tearns can best optimize their performance as a group by consciously working to obtain a better balance between their team and non-team efforts, rather than by try ing to becorne an ongoing single team. Katenbach caiis on executives to learn "to integrate the discipline required for team performance with the discipline of executive (single-leader) behavior - not in replacing one with the other" (p. 11). This is a difficult balance to achieve and maintain and one which requires a simcant degree of self-awareness on the part of executive tearn members. Again, 1 question the readiness of many senior Leaders to do the work of personal mastery in an environment which ofien rewards aggressive, individual performance over tearn accomplishment. Summarv Issues around leadership were significant in this study. Sandra seemed committed to operating from partnership, was successful at some points, and struggled at others. The mental models attached to the leader role were entrenched and difficult to shift. Sandra was cnticized for king both indecisive and aggressive. Don was seen as abrasive and intimidating, even afier some members acknowledged that he had made significant changes. Neither Sandra nor Don were ever challengeci to the same degree as other members. The demands on the top leaders, especiaiiy Sandra, to be catalysts for effective, candid interaction were extreme, especially at times when the business pressures accelerated and conflicts both increased and went underground. The level of self-awareness and emotional maturity required of Sandra, Don and Ted, as senior leaders, was perhaps greater than they were able to demonstrate, and the question of how realistic it is to expect and demand that level of personal mastery of leaders is raised. Finally, the issues specific to executive teams, dong with the mental models attached to this group, were significant in shaping some of the results of this study. The Team Context The work of tearns does not occur within a vacuum. Work tearns always exist within the context of both the intemal organization and externat environment or marketplace (Sundstrom, DeMeuse & Futrell, 1990). All organization development models include the impact of both the intemal and external environments on performance and effectiveness (Beer & Walton, 1987; French & Bell, 1995; Katz & Kahn, In Lawler, 1980; Ponas & Silvers, 1991). As such, team effectiveness is dynamicaliy interrelated with a variety of factors embedded in the environmental context. Systerns theory, a foundation of organization development, "views organizations as open systems in active exchange with theû surrounding environments" (French & BeU, 1995, p. 89). When taking a systems approach, one seeks to understand the nature of the coiiective interaction and interdependencies of the individual parts. Systems theory includes the concept of "boundary" as that which separates the system from its environment. ABC inc. was a system of interrelated parts contained within a larger system, its external environrnent. The research team was bath a part of the ABC organization and a separate system in and of itself. An exploration of the dynarnics which occurred within the senior management team must include the impact of the system within which it operateci. In this section, 1 WUexamine the research fmdings from the perspective of the ABC team's context. This will include both the turbulent business environrnent and the way in which the tearn was structureci. 1 will then look more broady at the impact of hierarchy, even within the context of teams, on members' abilities to surface undiscussables. 1 will conclude by exarnining "cornmunities of practice" (Wenger, 1998) as a potential buffer against the undercurrents that often plague the work of business teams. The Turbulent Environment There is no longer any question that change is here to stay. Since the early 80s, the buzzwords have ken "unprecedented change," "change is the only constant," "constant chaos." At a number points in this paper, I have referred to the "white water" (Vail, 1989, cited in Albert, 1999) environment and its impact on organizations and leadership. The key characteristics of todayTsturbulent work envuonments are increased interdependence arnong departments and work groups, more unanticipated consequences. and less time to respond to events. The results are greater ambiguity and uncertainty, reduced predictability and, therefore, less direct and indirect control over outcornes (Moss Kanter, 1985; ODR@, 1996). Indeed, organizations seem to Live in a perpetual "transition state" (Lewin, 1947) where the status quo is disrupted and established frames of reference and accepted patterns of behaviour and methodologies are invalidated. The impact on ernployees of working in this kind of unstable, chaotic environment is high emotional stress and high, often undirected energy as they strive to find a new operating framework. At the individual and interpersonal levels, control becornes a major issue, past patterns of behaviour become highly valued and conflict increases (ODR@, 1996). The anxiety which such an environment creates results in the profiferation of de fensive routines, designed to mask feelings of inadequacy and vulnerability (Piterman, 1999). A number of models have been developed for looking at the emotional response to negatively perceived or unwanted change. The mode1 developed by Elizabeth Kubler-Ross (1973)- from her work with tenninaily il1 patients, has been adapted for use in organizations. It identifies seven stages that individuals go through as they attempt to corne to terms with unwanted change: immobilization, denial, anger, bargaining , depression, testing and acceptance. Scott and Jae(1988) have developed a Change Grid in which people are depicted as moving through four phases of the transition process: deniai, resistance, exploration and cornmitment. It is at the stage of resistance where people experience self-doubt, anger, depression, anxiety and frustration, fear and uncertainty, that results in significant decrease in productivity. Both models suggest that if there is not an effective working through at each stage, or if the desired future state is not realized, people can become stuck in a more regressive, earlier stage. In such an environment, defensive modes of interaction will predominate and openness will likely be shut dom. Eistenstat and Cohen (1990) cited organizational stability as a prime factor in predisposing top management teams to successful perfomance. Ln a study of three senior teams, the tearn that was most successful was one that operated within a relatively mature organization. The two teams that existed in newer or more turbulent, unstable conditions, had to develop their organhiions, their teams and thernselves simdtaneously, an extraordinarily chailenging undertaking. "It is dficult to leam. to cneate new organizational forrns and to develop a team if virnialfy everything is unsettled, if nothing can be counted on to stay put" (p. 84). At ABC, the team was in a state of continually recurring disequilibrium (Weisbord, !987) from the beginning of their work together until the Company officially closed down. As a result, members operated in a consistent environment of high instability and stress, where confiict was inevitable and defensive patterns predorninated. Once it became clear that people's jobs were at risk, as Maslow's hierarchy would predict (Gwynne, 1997), security needs predorninated and needs for beionging which would fuel attention to problems in the team, kameless important. As a result, difficult issues which might make people even more vulnerable and anxious tended to be buried. This was especially evident once 1 was no longer there to catalyze and support their efforts. Faced with failure, and the very real possibility of never achieving their "desired state" (Lewin, 1947), tearn members executed their existing habitua1 routines more vigorously, rather than calling them into question (Gersick & Hackman, 1990). They exhibited the well-documented (Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981, cited in Gersick & Hachan, 1990) tendency of social systems, including groups, to close down rather than open up under stress and threat. in addition to this environment of constant instability and uncertainty, the team experienced a number of changes in team rnembership, ofien at critical points in their journey. Following the fust two teaming sessions, Mary made the decision to leave ABC. Douglas took over her role as vice-president of finance in August, 1997 at the same tirne that Susan, a highly respected and valued team member chose to leave. In November when business pressures were increasing, Frances came on board to work on the sales side of the business. Findly, Keith joined the team on the sales side just before the tearn's final tearning session in February, 1998. This continual flux in membership iikely resulted in a retreat to less openness as rnembers were forced to make adjustments and revisit the work of "fonning" (Moreland & Levine, 1988, cited in Sundstrom et al., 1990; Tuckrnan, 1965, cited in Laiken, 1994). Certaidy, it was my observation that neither Frances nor Keith demonstrateci their cornmitment to or understanding of the process, as evidenced by their lack of willingness to address the issues and by their comments in the final interviews. The increasing emphasis on intellectual capital and knowledge management demanded by today's cornpetitive and volatile climate, requires people to collaborate in finding innovative solutions to complex problerns. The irony is that the profond uncertainty of this sarne corporate climate mirrors unconscious processes and primitive anxieties because of its often contradictory, unpredictable, and non-rational qualities (Krantz, 1998). It is likely that for the ABC tearn, the extremely unsettling environment in which they were forced to operate, conspired to make it more difficult for them to achieve the level of openness and candor that might have assisted them in finding the solutions they needed, in order to achieve a more favourable business outcome. lbmmmam A second contextuai issue which had an impact on the ABC team's abiiity to surface their undiscussables was the way in which the team was structwed. Social defense theory looks at the impact of impersonai organizationai arrangements, such as structures, procedures and technologies, on the ability of people to function. First developed by Eiiiott Jaques and Isabel Menzies (cited in Krantz, 1998), it explores the ways in which these arrangements support the individual's defenses against the painful anxieties and emotions stimulated by participation in work organizations. While the pioneering work of Jaques and Menzies was designed at the Ume of the hierarchical, bureaucratie organization, Krantz ( 1998) sees social defense theory as even more applicable in the pst-industrial era of cross-functional teams, flattened hierarchies and decentralized authority. He suggests that the hierarçhical structure and bureaucracy of the "Old Order" (p. 4) institution acted as a psychologicai buffer against the sometimes painful experiences of working together to confront chaiienging tasks. As these former structures have been dismantled, the "containing" function that they provided has also been sacrificed, Tearn members are required to work in an environment where leaming together is paramount. As such, they must acknowledge what they don't know, live witb the vuinerabiiïty required to leam fiom others and cope with the public experience of being wrong. As these experiences resonate with eatly life experiences, "they can elicit primitive fantasies and pressure to defend against them with equally primitive defensive postures" (Krantz, 1995, p. 7). Ironiçally, the egalitarian stmcnire of teams seems to create a barrier to team members' abilities to do the very thing it was designed to do - to share opinions and information openly in order to find better solutions. For the ABC team, an additionai stnicturai issue was evident. While the team was designated as the senior management team with responsibility to work together towards ABC'S strategic objectives, it actually consisted of two sub-teams each with its own unique and separate goals. With the exception of Eric, the Vice-President, Hurnan Resources who reported directly to Sandra, team members were accountable to either Ted or Don, both of whom were senior vice-presidents (see Appendices J and K). As was already indicated in Chapter Four, Ted had responsibility for those members who worked on the sales side of the business. Don, however, had responsibility both for members on the leasing side and for members responsible for operational activities such as finance, risk, technology and client services. Because the laner group provided support services to both lines of business, Don was seen to have control of the resources ailocated to sales even though Ted was solely accountable for the business results. This resulted in tension between Ted and Don around both the allocation of fiaancial resources and the availabiliy of the vice-presidents of finance, risk, technology and client services. Sundstrom, DeMeuse and Futreli (1990) describe an ecological fi-arnework for anaiyzing work team effectiveness which cites the interdependence among organizational context, boundaries and team development. They see boundaries as demarcations between work units, transfer points for information, goods or people and points of extemal exchange with other tearns, customers or peers (p. 121),Where boundaries are too open or indistinct, the team may become overwhelmed and lose its identity. Where they are too closed, the team is in danger of becorning isolated and out of touch with the rest of the system, inciuding other teams and customers. Organization design theonsts such as Galbraith, Miller, and Rice (cited in Hirschhorn, 1993) argue that, when boundaries are poorly designeci and rnanaged, they can cause considerable stress and anxiety. If group rnembers are unable to influence the people upon whom they depend, they cannot reduce the uncertainty they face when doing their work. For the ABC team, boundary issues were significant. From the beginning of my work with them, some rnembers questioned the tearn structure. Don suggested that the fact that there were three sub-teams within the iarger team (Don's, Ted's and the senior group of Don, Ted and Sandra) made the work of teaming that much more difficult. Indeed, the latter group were commonly referred to as "the triumvirate" who met together regularly and had private conversations to which others were not privy. The findings clearly showed that the difficulties at this senior sub-team level permeated the work of the larger tearn and the bounciaxy issues between the sub-tearns prevented them from king dealt with openly. Even w hen this structural issue had been raid with Sandra by Don and Ted, she remained adamant that because of the cost involved in duplicating the support fumions for two separate businesses, a different team structure was not an option. Boundary issues between Don's and Ted's teams were also significant as each business unit struggled to resolve its own severe financial crises. As it became more likely that the company would not survive intact and each business line would need to fmd separate partners, the fragmentation within the larger team becaxne extreme and collaboration diminished considerably. Deutsch (1990, cited in Alper et ai., 1998) argued that the way in which people believe their goals are related is an important variable affecting the dynamics and outcomes of their interaction. Once there was no clearly defined joint mission or purpose, the motivation to work together diminished (Shea & Guuo, 1987, cited in Sundstrom et al., 1990). Rather than cooperative goal interdependence (Alper et al., 1998), cornpetition for resources and people predominated. Ted perceived Don to be curtailuig the arnount of tirne the support function tearn rnembers (risk, finance, technology and client services) spent on the sales side; Don denied Ted's allegations and his direct reports seemed to support his position. An atmosphere of "If you win, 1 iose," took over. This was not helped by the fact that the leasing business was able to negotiate a successful joint venture and at least haif the team members ended up in executive positions in the newiy formed company. The contrast between the fortunes of the sales grorip and the rest of the ABC tearn seemed to increase the resentment Ted and his direct reports had for Don. The latter was perceived to have put more energies on sales at the expense of leasing. The fact that Don becarne the President and CE0 of the newly formed leasing company only "fanned the flames" of an already festering resentment. The ultimate outcome was a severely diminished motivation to work together or heal any of the severe rifts which had formed. Even before the business outcomes had become clear, the team had hunkered down in their determination to work even more separately as two teams. In January, 1999, when Sandra suggested that the team re-contract with me to help them deal with the confïict and dissension, there was strong resistance and no wiliingness to go forward. Team members saw thernselves as two separate business units who each needed to work independently. One could argue the logic in this position when it was clear that the company would not survive, and once the key objective became fmding viable parmers for each of the businesses. The question remains: "Why was this option not offered at a much earlier point, when the possibiiity for successfui collaboration still existed?" The severe boundary issues had been identif~edmuch earlier in the process and were highlighted at the theof the second set of intemiews in June, 1998. When I had urged Sandra to have me work with the "triumvirate" in order to surface and work with the issues between Don and Ted, she was not willing to go this route and insisted that she was dealing with them on her own. Later, afier the post-study interviews, Sandra was made aware of the increasing severity of these conflicts and their impact on the team, as were Don and Ted. Yet, the undiscussables as a result of the spiit between the two businesses and the conflict between Don md Ted were never addresseci in the larger team. The result was a severely reduced "team confidence" (Alper, 1998, p. 37) or belief that group members could interact effectively, and the defensive patterns further solidified. Ironicaily, as the sub-team boundaries were clearly delineated, each of these smaller groups becarne more cohesive and better able to work effectively to do what was necesSay. On the leasing side, the team was able to negotiate a successful joint venture agreement with its new partner and do the work of fonning a new leasing company. On the sales side, Ted's team worked tirelessly to wind down the business, sel1 off parts to interested buyers and deal sensitively with the difficuit personnel issues that shutting down one side of the business entailed. Yet the rift remaineci and became so enbenched that the team was unable to put successful closure to their work together. The sales team agreed "as one" not to participate in dealing with the unresolved issues during the scheduled tearning day with the South African consulting team hired by Sandra. Further, this same team chose not to stay for the final dimer which was intended to be an opportunity for the larger team to Say good-bye and celebrate their efforts and successes- Jon Katzenbach (1998) calls into question a key myth about the "team at the top" - that it shouid fimction as a team whenever it is together. He suggests that "nontearn efforts can often be faster and more effective, particuiariy when the value of the collective work products are either difficult to identify or not compelling" (p. 10). Senior tearns need to optirnize their performance as groups by consciously working to obtain a better bdance between their team and nonteam efforts, rather than by trying to become an ongoing single tearn. Had the senior tearn acknowledged and dealt with both the interpersonal and structural issues earlier in their work together, one wonders whether it might have been able to create a structure which would allow the two businesses to work independently toward their separate business goals and collaborate on the issues which continued to bind them together at ABC Inc. e Imimct of Hierarchy At numerous points in this thesis, 1 have acknowledged the impact of power issues on the ability to be candid and speak the tnith. The manager/subordinate relationship has been seen to support the psychodynarnic defense mechanisrns of projection and transference that exist between manager and employee. Indeed, the previous section highiighted Krantz' (1989) view that the loss of the "containing" function of bureaucratie hierarchies has resulted in employees feeling less safe to speak their minds. The bluning of distinction between boss and subordinate encourages people to challenge the stanis quo. Yet, the very people we are asking them to challenge are those who have the power to promote and fm them. At ABC, as the financial crisis deepened and survival issues predominated, team members became more and more paralyzed by the authority invested in Sandra, Don and Ted. Ultimately, the structure of bosses with power over subordinates silenced the team, and issues remained buried. Karash (1 997)sees structure as the network of relationships that create behaviour. As long as elements of the traditional hierarchical structure remain, one wonders whether it will ever be possible for workplace tearns to achieve the level of openness that the literature suggests is bene ficial for their effective hnctioning . Hirschhom and Gilrnore ( 1992) propose that as companies move to more collaborative structures, the new boundaries are more psychological than organizational. Rather than king drawn on a company's organizational chart, they exist in the minds of its managers and employees. As such, they "must be 'enacted' over and over again in a manager's relationships with bosses, subordinates and peers" (p. 105). My experience suggests that in the majority of today's organizations, the boundaries are both organizational and psychological. The postmodeniist maintains that "conflict, contradiction and lack of consensus primarily exist because of power relations which produce subordination and assign some voices to silence and marginalism" (Jennings, 1995, p. 83). Such a view seems to speak to both organizational and psychological boundary issues. Jaques (1996) attempts to solve these structural problems in advocating a clear delineation between manager and subordinate. His "requisite organization" focuses on achieving the most effective organizational structure "with the 'right' number of layers, combined with systematicaily defdaccountability and authority in both manager- subordinate relationships and in lateral working relationships" (Cason, 1997,p. 25). Jaques espouses a top-down approach to managerial leadership that establishes clear accountabiiities with the manager in a relationship of authority over her subordinates. He proposes that even within teams. managers make the decisions in the light of the knowledge, expertise and perspective provided by their subordinates. We have seen that such a recommendation mns counter to the current leadership theory which cals on managers to paruier with tearn members and create a context in which people feel empowered to speak and act, including participating in decision-making. Edgar Schein (1989, cited in Dixon, 1997) suggests that we need new organizational models, but rnay have difficulty inventing them because of our automatic tendency to think hierarchicaliy. Helgesen (1995) writes about organizations whose suuctures are remarkably similar to a spider. web with many points of interconnection and an emphasis on patterns of relationship. Like a web, the structures are continually changing and evolving with a great deal of movement within the system. Leaders tend to emerge and, instead of king at the top of a pyramid or hierarchy, are at the centre of a circular structure which emphasizes communication and consensus-building. Because the system is flexible, the focus is on actual tasks that people perform as opposed to their position, thus suengthening the egaiitarian aspects of the culture. The author suggests that both webs and hierarchies "have deep structural integrity: in both, the architecture determines how people within them interact with one another, how they are motivated and rewarded, how they perfom" (Helgesen, 1995, p. 22). She describes Intel's headquarters where a nonhierarchicai ethic prevails, from its lack of reserved parking spaces to its standardized office cubicles for ail staff from the Chairman and CE0 to the support staff. The emphasis is on non-positional power and resources flow to wherever there is a problem, as opposed to king hoarded in one person's area by vixtue of his title. Ricardo Semler (1993) transformeci his father's traditional manufacturing Company from a pyramidal srnichue, with a rule for every contingency, into r fluid, flexible and nonhierarchical organization based on concentric circles, where the tenns "worker" and "boss" were replaced with "Associate" and "Coordinator" (p. 6). He tells of baving absolute trust in the employees and of democratic decision-makùig king the nom, right down to deciding how profits would be shared. He saw the need for bosses and the number of supervisors diminishing as workers exercised more control over their jobs and assumed more voice in policies. The true measure of Semco's success is in its exponential growth in productivity and profit, its backlog of up to 2.000 job applications and its extremely low employee turnover. What each of these examples illustrates is the attempt to restructure on egalitarian Lines. Each offers stories which speak to the impact which organizational stnicture has on open, candid communication. What each example aiso demonstrates, once again. is the need for leaders to be wiliing to be catalysts for change in challenging and transforming their mental models (Senge, 1990) of the "heroic leader'' who has ultimate authority and control. Further, the transformation which occurred in these organizations involved major structural changes in an attempt to reduce authority issues. In Sernler's (1993) organization, these were radical with accountability for performance evaiuation. compensation and hiring decisions king shared with employees. Communication was wide open and information became available to anyone on the payroll, inciuding financiai records, salaries and profit margins. While these stones offer some hope that it is possible to radically transforrn organizations, such a transformation is uniikely to occur on a broader scale. As such, OD consultants need to continue to look for opportunities to support managers in challenging their mental models about leadership and in developing their emotional competencies. In addition, consultants may want to look for ways to support people in corning together in less threatening environrnents where they can find common ground in learning and sharing knowledge. This study has demonsuated that people see the value in open dialogue. It has dso demonstrated that it is possible to surface undiscussables in a team environment. However, as long as the boss/subordinate relationship is endemic to our organizational structure, there will most likely be limitations to the level of candor that can be achieved. Without extraordinary self-awareness, including both confidence and humility on the part of leaders, structural issues related to power and authority wiil continue to affect team members' abilities to have authentic, open conversations. Co-ties . . of Practice as a Tes- Tool In wrestling with this dilemma, 1have tumed to the current Iiterature on organizational leaming and knowledge management. in particuiar, 1 have wondered whether the relatively recent emphasis on "communities of practice" (Wenger, 1998) has something to offer. A comrnunity of practice is "a group that shares knowledge, lems together and creates common practices" (McDermott, 1999) about an area of shared interest. It offers a non-traditional, dynamic approach to knowledge management in its participation by people who are "fully engaged in the process of creating, refining, communicating, and using knowledge" (Wenger, 1998. p. 2). Cornmunities of practice are developed informally within businesses and across business units and Company boundaries. A group of engineers may develop a community around a technical issue, consultants, around organizational change and executives, around leadership practices. Because they link capability development to strategic questions and business needs, they cannot be considered *'just another 'soft' management practice". Richard McDermott (1999) argues for a "double-knit" organization which. in linking cross functional teams together through communities of practice, enables them to systematicaily leam from each other. Organizations who embrace this concept would see individuais belonging to several cornmunities of practice as well as their ongoing teams with its focus on business results. He suggests that this combination of work groups will counteract the tendency for work teams to become new silos with a myopic vision that prevents them from seeing their work within its wider context. People form comrnunities of practice out of their own intrinsic desirie to leam and improve practice. They are not forced to join by a boss or driven to join by a shrinking bottom line. One wonders whether the benefits offered by people engaging in real dialogue around issues that matter to them would be felt back in their business groups. In a teaming environment, where members bnng different areas of expertise to the table, individuals may feel unheard, misunderstood or not valued. Cornmunities of practice are driven by values and defmed by knowledge. Members who have regdar opportunities to increase that knowledge and share issues th mamr to them in a comrnunity of like-mindeci colieagues may feel more confident in bringing that newly acquired knowledge back to their day-to-day teams. They rnay be less vulnerable to feeling aiienated and defensive with team members. Perhaps this type of infrastrucnire could offer a buffer against the undercurrents which so often arise in a day-to-day work pupdriven by deliverables and the bottom line and structureci dong hierarchical iines. As 1 take this principle stiit further, 1 wonder whether focusing more on lehg within a teaming context itself rnight result in decreased defensiveness on the part of members. In my recent work with tearns, 1 have collaborated with team members to include opportunities to share leamïngs, best practices and siniggles into their regular tearn meetings. in so doing, my observation has been that members have been able to engage in meaningful dialogue around comrnon issues. Because members king their own insights and concems to the table, they are motivated to engage more openly and honestly. Learning requires people to acknowledge what they don? know and may result in some anxiety and defensive behaviour. Yet, in my experience, individuals are less threatened by a conversation in which the focus is on sharing knowledge and building learning capability than by dealing "head-on" with diff~cultinterpersonal dynamics. The creation of a leaming environment in tearn meetings rnay offer members a buffer against the everyday tearn conflicts which act as viggers to one's core psychodynarnic issues. "Emergent leaming" practices (Darling & Pany, 1999) in which teams and business uni& develop "islands of mastery" (p. 1) or growing areas of expertise are one example of this approach. Leaming together may provide a practice field for engaging in productive, candid conversations. It rnay help to dissipate the tensions and difficult issues which people rnay not be ready or able to deal with. While 1 do not advocate that conflicts and issues be ignored or "swept under the carpet," my suggestion is that, in creating a healthy leaming environment that &ses out of what is important to people, we rnay be able to prevent the proliferation of conflicts which often have nothing to do with the business issues thernselves, but have more to do with people's individual psychodynamic material and defenses. Ln such an environment, members may be more ready to empbasize what they can share and build together rather than their differences. Such a focus would draw on the concepts embedded in a ''future search process (Weisbord & Janoff, 1995) where differences are included in the cmnt reality, but the primary focus is on fmding comrnon ground. Even with the ABC team, in the midst of their struggles and severe business pressures and tensions, there were sessions where they would engage in challenging, but healthy and productive conversations. Without exception, those conversations involved creating something together, about which they felt passionately. 1 recall the excitement they felt âfter they had worked to create a vision for their team. A similar enthusiasm was shared during the sessions where they worked on the values and guiding principles which would drive their business results. Summary The context in which the team worked played a significant role in detemiining the outcornes of their attempts to irnprove their openness, candor and effectiveness. The turbulent environment in which they operated and extreme business pressures resulted in a survival mode of operation that saw team rnembers' anxieties heightened and defensive patterns entrenched. The changes in team membership may have exacerbated an aiready unstable field and eroded members' abilities to continue their burgeoning movements toward greater honesty. Boundary issues becarne significant as the team struggled to find commonality of purpose in a flawed stmcture which defined them as two (if not three) separate sub-groups, as opposed to one, unified tearn. In addition, their attemps to speak with candor were underrnined by an essentiaily hierarchicai structure in which those who needed to be chatlenged held the power to promote or fire them. Ultimately, these contextual issues contributed to the proiiferation of undiscussables as increasing anxiety was buried in defensive patterns of behaviour. MyRole as Researcher/Consultant The role of the consultant in the consultant/client relationship has ken widely researched from a number of different perspectives (Bell, 1998-99; Czander, 1993; Forrest, 1991; French & Simpson, 1999; Gilmore & Krantz, 1985; Hirschhom, 1993; McIntyre, 1999; Menzies Lyth, 1989; Piterman, 1999; Redding Mersky, 1999; Sher, 1999; Smith & Berg, 1987). In this final section, 1 will look at the client/consultant relationship in my work with the ABC team. In particular, 1 wili explore the issues that surfaced in my description, in Chapter Five, of my own jomey as researcher/consultant, and their impact on both the team and the research outcomes. In Chapter Three, 1described the interdependent relationship that exists between researcher and participant in any qualitative research study. E further suggested that this interdependence is even more acute in action research where the researcher plays a dual role of researcher and consultant (Hunt, 1992; Wright, 1989). hdeed, the consultant is an integral part of the system she is consulting to (Czander, 1993; Sher, 1999) and the consultant/client relationship itself becomes the instrument of change and inquky into the client systern (Gilmore & Krantz, 1986). As such, any exploration of the results of a consulting process must include consideration of the consultant's impact on the dynarnics. While this topic is broad enough to warrant a more lengthy exploration, 1 wiii limit the discussion of my role as researcherfconsultant in this study to the two key areas which surfaced in the record of my jouniey in Chapter Five: transferencelcountertransference issues and the consultant as container. In the final section, 1 will look at the impact which these issues may have had on the reseatch results. We have already seen the impact of the defense mechanism of tramference within the ABC team, as members projected unnsolved feelings anwind authority ont0 Don, San& and to a lesser extent, Ted. In a consulting relationship, countertransference is projection by the consultant ont0 the client. The consultant will bnng her "unfinished business" from her childhood or from other relationships into her work relationships. She. too, may split off unwanted parts of herself and project these ont0 the client. Because these defense mechanisms most often operate at unconscious levels, left unexamineci, the transference/countertransferençe issues between client and consultant wili be played out in ways that are counterproductive to the process (Czander, 1993). The consultant must thetefore be as open as possible to her own feelings and prejudicial ways of coping with anxiety so that, when stimulateci to respond in a particular way, she can use the feeling reaction as data about relationships in the client system (Hirschhorn. 1993). Because she may be drawn into the client's view of the presenting problem, she must be constantly vigilant to the feelings, alliances and internal motives of both parties (Guerin, 1995). She must rely on her intuition or "tacit knowing" (Polanyi, 1958, cited in Czander, 1993) to help her detennine when the client's opinions are a reflection of his projections and unconscious feelings (Gilmore & Krantz, 1985). In the description of my own joumey with the ABC team, 1 have already referred to my countertransference issues with Sandra. Sandra seemed to elicit unresolved authon ty issues in me, and I sometimes stniggled to "frnd my voice" in challenging her ideas and opinions. Her tendency to approach things in a rational way with little expression of emotion was reminiscent of my "heady," unemotional father. 1 sensed Sandra's discornfort with my focus on feelings, especially when conversations would tum to her own emotionai responses. Her transference issues seemed to combine with my own, resulting in neither of us king as direct and honest as we migbt have ken. While 1 did challenge her on many occasions about her role as leader, and encouraged her to look at her own issues, I ofien felt somewhat intirnidated by her, at times, brusque and aloof manner. The result was that I may have "soft-pedaled" my feedback to her on a number of occasions. My need for Samira's approvai was a corollary of the authonty issues and resulted in a nurnber of inappropriate interactions between us, especially in the early months when we were both still "finding our feet" together. These "enactments" (Redding Mersky, 1999) where 1 would "fd out of role" as a result of my own projections ont0 Sandra, were ofien signded by a feeling of discomfort, as if 1 had been somehow inappropriate. I recail, after the second off-site teaming session, feeling uneasy about suggesting that Sandra and 1 schedule a meeting for the following week, in order to debrief the session. 1 very quickly realized how inappropriate Uiis was, as it violated the boundary between myself and the team. My desire to rneet with Sandra was fbeled by my need to hear positive feedback from her about my work with the group. 1 suspected that because of her own need to be in control of what was happening, Sandra colluded in agreeing to the meeting. Once 1 had become aware of the pattern operating, 1 talked with her about my concems and we re- contracted about what was and was not appropnate for us to share. A similar incident occumd with another team member, Susan, who had attended a five-day leadership development program 1 had facilitated at ABC'Sparent Company, Axworthy Global. Again, 1 transferred my own need for approval ont0 her, in reveaiing my vulnerabiiity with some of the difficult dynamics. This incident coupled with the ones with Sandra resulted in my re-conttacting with the group about confidentiality and boundiuy issues. Countertransference issues were also evident in my lack of assertiveness with the team about my role in team meetings. Early on in the tearning process, 1 suggested that 1attend the regular bi-weekly team meetings as a process observer. The intent here was to support members in integrating their learnings into their &y-CO-day work together. 1 was aware from my experience in consulting to teams that this would be a valuable and important adjunct to the off-site sessions. While the team agreed to rny suggestion, I did not contract clearly enough as to the what my role would entail. Because of the urgency of the business issues they were facing, 1 sensed their need to get on with the "real work-" and their reluctance to intempt meetings to conduct "process checks." As a result, there were times when dysfunctional behaviour was ignored and oniy "lip service" was paid to dealing with process issues. My need for their approval and my projections ont0 the more vocal and assertive team members rnay have prevented me from challenging their assumptions about "real work" and the value of attending to process on a more consistent basis. The task of the consultant requires constant self evaiuation and assessrnent of one's own feeling state. My jomey with the ABC team was complex witb many psychodynamic undercurents. Without the support of two organization development colleagues as shadow consultants and a psychotherapist/colleague to assist me in dealing with my own unconscious defenses, 1 would have struggled to find the delicate balance ktween "joining" and colluding with the client. 1 would have "fallen out of role" more often and the impact would surely have been felt by the client and evident in the results. In creating a "holding environment" or "container" (Bion, 1961, cited in MçIntyre, 1999), the consultant ensures that group members feel safe to share potentially threatening material. Sher ( 1999) suggests that embryonic and pre-conscious thoughts and feelings that people are unwilling to acknowledge publicly only becorne open for discussion when there is a container to receive them. Holding the container may require the consultant to take in group members' projections onto hi.without engaging in reciprocal defensive responses. It rnay also challenge him to judge the client's readiness to receive feedback about what he, the consultant, is "picking up," in order to minimize the client's defensive reactions. Findy, because he is the recipient of a vast reservoir of information. îhe consultant must distuiguish between the information that the client needs to hear and that which is best held confidential. He must manage the boundaries between hirnself and team members and resist the temptation to leak inappropriate information or act on his own defensive reactions. This rather daunting task can only be accomplished if the consultant is able to adopt a stance of "strategic neutrality" (Mchtyre, 1999) where he can process interna1 and extemal pressures to collude. If the consultant is unable to be aware of and consistently work his own countertransference issues, he will be in danger of "breaking the container" and jeopardizing his work with the client- In Chapter Five, 1 alluded to the boundary issues which were evident, particularly in my early work with the team. Even befote the fmt session, 1 struggled with how much of the interview data to share. 1 wrestled with the decision to narne Don as the person members described as abrasive and detrimental to team functioning. 1 also struggled with what to share with Sandra separately from other members, and saw the potential for my own countertrans ference issues resulting in my creating a special relationship w ith her. The countertransference issue described in the previous section with Susan was a boundary issue, as were my struggles to know what to do wifh the information other tearn members had shared with me. In fact, wkn Susan left the Company part way through the tearning process, she expresseci her concem that members believed that what they said pnvately to me outside the sessions might be repeated to Sandra. As indicated previously, this information prompted me, with Susan's permission, to raise boundary and confidentiality issues with the team and clanfy what could and could not be shared. A fmal boundaxy issue which 1described in the recounting of my journey with the team was my dual role as researcherkonsultant, When working with the team, it was critical that 1 take off my "researcher hat" and stay in the role of consultant- My desire as researc her for an excellent outcorne raised the possibiiity that 1 would stay involved as consultant longer than was in the best interests of the team. 1 needed to create a safe container for the tearn to "throw me out" regardless of my research results. b~acton Results Because 1 played an "insider/outsider" role (Wright, 1989) with its inherent trade- offs, the question 1 must ask is: 'matimpact did my presence, as consuitant, have on the findings?" More specificaiiy, 1 wonder whether my countertransference issues and stmggles at the boundary affected the team enough that it altered what rnight have happened. Could 1 have infiuenced Sandra more had she not triggered authority issues in me? If 1had been able to challenge her more consistently and with greater confidence, would it have made a difference? Ironicaiiy, when I met with her recently to put final closure to our work together, 1 was able to be more candid with her about the difficulties 1 had had in challenging her. 1 shared with her what 1 believed to be our mutual transference/countertransferenceissues. While she appeared to be better able to hear me, 1 still sensed that it was difficult for her to acknowledge her own limitations and show me her wlnerable side. Yet, she appears to have made a beginning connection with one of the South Afncan consultants who worked with the tearn just prior to the company's closure. She told me of plans she was making to do some individual work with him and began to share some of the insights she was having. 1came away from rny meeting wondering whether Sandra and 1 had been a good match. 1 rnay have triggered responses in her that made it difficdt for her to be open with me. One wonders if she could have tmly done the personal mastery work with someone else or if the critical business demands on her made it more difficult for her to do the personal mastery work with anyone at that tirne. 1 also wonder about my inability to convince Sandra of the serious problems which were king created by the flawed team structure. My tendency to over-focus on the obviously dysfunctional dynamics may have clouded my ability to see the degree to which the problems with the team structure, and the resulting blurred lines of accountability between Ted and Don, exacerbated those dynamics. As well, my countertransference issues with Sandra may have made it more dficult for me to challenge, more assertively, her unwillingness to question the existing structure. In researching the work of a nurnber of consultants who work at the psychodynarnic level, 1 was stmck by their attention both to the interpersonai dynamics and to issues around structure and roles. Larry Hirschhorn (1993) offers a lengthy case study of his work with the environmental review division of the Department of the interior in the American feded governrnent. While there were clearly many tensions and dysfunctional dynamics evident, he worked fmt with the problems that were apparent in a flawed matrix stnicture before he began the "teaming" work with the senior management group. My final question concems the impact 1 might have had on the tearn if 1 had had the confidence to insert myself more forcefiy into their tearn meetings. Again, my instincts tell me that they would have resisted no matter what I had done. As indicated previously, the business pressures were so extreme that 1 question whether the outcomes could have ben different, even if 1 had acted more assertively. In sunimary, 1 am lefi with tremendous leaniing. My confidence in the contribution 1 made to the positive impact tearn members described is tempered by my humiiity in acknowledging my own shortcomings and blind spots. The good news is that the leaming for me has been significant. 1 am more confident in my abiiity to work at this level and with greater authority. The knowledge and experience 1 have gained are refiected in the consulting mode1 (see Chapter Nine) which 1 have since successfuily applied with a number of teams. Summary In exploring the fmdings from this research study within the context of the literature, it is clear that the issues raised are cornplex. The majority of participants were positively impacted by Iearning how to surface and deal with their undiscussables. A number of people reported ways in which they were already utilizing their personal leamings with their own teams and in other tearning environments. At the ABC team level, some saw the team as having been better able to come together in the most difficult of situations because of the work done to improve their interaction patterns, specificdy, to move toward pater openness and candor. Even those who did not see the benefits for the team were convinced of the value of doing this type of work. The challenges and issues which have been explored were the psychodynamic defenses that were operating within the team, the role of the leader, the team context and the impact of the consultant. It appears that the team began the work of dismantling the undiscussables with some signi ficant success. Business pressures increased and the heightened anxiety created a "suwival mode" business context. The mental models attached to the leaders as authority becarne entrenched and individual and social defenses were activated. The "teams within a team" structure created a silo mentality which on1y exacerbated an already extreme situation. Ali of these conspired to undennine the tearn's ongoing and consistent progress to come together in an open, coilaborative process. CHAPTER NINE: TOWARD THE FUTURE The question that frarned the discussion in Chapter Eight was: "What have we learned from this researcti?'h this chapter, I will present my conclusions from the study and look at the implications of the leamhg for both for the organization development consultant who contracts to work with teams and for leaders who recognize the value of doing this diff~cult work. 1 will fmt review the research purpose and process and sumrnarize the key findings and conclusions. The overall intent of the implications section is to outline the value of this study and to explore its contribution to organizational leanring at the team level. in my discussion, 1 wiil expiore two key themes, the need for OD consultants to become more self-aware and the sustainability of leamings. I WUthen offer an Authentic Teaming Mode1 that integrates the research findings. in so doing. 1 will suggest a number of implications for the practice of organization development consulting. In the final section, 1 wiii suggest possible areas for hrther researc h. The Research Rationale and Process, Reiterated The decision to conduct this research study came as a result of the observations 1 had made in my work as an organization development consultant about the difficulty people had in making significant changes in their workplace behaviour. My previous work as a psychotherapist had significantly influenced the perspective 1 brought to my consulting work in the interpretation 1made of the interpersonal dynamics that ocçurred at al1 levels in org anizations. It had been my observation that, in general, "corporate Canada" demands that people conform to a culture which often mns counter to their own values and self-concepts. The result is a proiiferation of wispoken thoughts and feelings and the developrnent of an organzational persona or faise self. 1 came into my doctoral program with a desire to explore this issue by 1ooki.g at the impact of the psychologicai aspects of interpersonal interactions on organizational effectiveness. As 1 began to discover the writings of Argyris and Schon (1978), Senge ( 1990) and Diamond (1993) who seemed to combine similar concems to mine with a wide body of knowledge and expertise, my excitement grew and my research focus becarne clearer. Argyris' focus on espoused theory versus theory-in-use and defensive routines seemed to mesh with Senge's emphasis on personal mastery and mental models. Michael . . Diarnond's Unconscious life of omons( 1993) introduced me to the field of psychodynamic organization consulting and to a variety of additional writers and practitioners who were looking at the impact of the psychologicai domain oo organizational Me. Because my own consulting practice involved extensive work with tearns who were struggiing to work together more effectively, 1 decided to narrow my focus to the psychodynamic aspects of team functioning. The specific research question was fiameci as: "What is the impact on tearn members and on the team as a whole of leaming how to work with the underlying and fiidden dimensions of their interpersonai interactions?" My research objectives were: 1. To facilitate a tearning process whic h uncovers and works with defensive interpersonal patterns and behaviours; 2. To help team members understand and examine the impact of these patterns and behaviours on thernselves, on other team members and on team functioning; 3. To explore the impact on individual team members and on the team as a whole of participating in such a process. While the original question was limited to examining the impact of such an approach to teaming, my fmdings revealed broader objectives related to understanding the pmess involved in taking such a jouniey, and the difficulty both in sustainhg the leaniings and in transfemng the insights and new behaviours to the day-to-day business environment. Finally, the study raidrnany questions about the impact of both the leader's and the OD consultant's roles in such a process, with particular emphasis on the dynamics embedded in authonty relationships. My expectation was that taking a team through such a process would result in members king more able to surface the covert assumptions they make about each other and about what is and is not acceptable to discuss. 1 further expected that they would be more cornfortable in speaking honestly with one another about previously unmentionable issues and would use less "fancy footwork" (Argyris, 1990, p. 45) and fewer defensive routines in their team interactions. As a result, they would function more effectively in accompiishing their tasks and achieving their results. The study was placed within the qualitative paradigrn in its exploratory nature, and used an action research methoàology, following the four phases of data gathering and diagnosis, joint planning with participants, implementation and evaiuation (French & Bell, 1995). The research plan called for an intact workplace team to be assessed before and after a psychodynamic teaming process in order to evaluate the impact which surfacing and dealing with their coven processes had on team rnembers' perceptions both of themselves individually and on their fimctioning as a team. The tearn chosen was the senior management group of a subsidiary company, ABC hc.,of a large financial~servicesinstitution, Axworthy Global. ABC was composed of two distinct businesses, one deaiing with leasing agreements and one with small business loans. The company was in severe financial difficulties and in danger of king shut down unless significant improvement could be demonstrateci within one year. There were many tensions both between the two businesses and between members who had a history at ABC and those who were recent arrivals to the company. Sandra, the new president, believed that the company could ody deiiver on its promises if these tensions were addresseci and if the members could work to become a strong, cohesive team. The tearn was observed and members were interviewed individually before the study began. The psychodynamic approach entaileci working with the participant group in an intensive teaming process which would assist them in uncovering the covert processes that were operating within the team, and thus, having an impact on their effectiveness. This involved using a variety of tools and concepts that have been designed to facilitate the surfacing of assumptions, beliefs and unspoken thoughts and feelings. Examples are the left-hand column exercise (see Appendix B) based on Argyris' and Schon's two-column research metfiod ( 1974) (see Appendix A) and the ladder of inference (Argyris, 1990) (see Appendix J). One and two-day off-site tearning sessions were combined with process observation at team meetings over a ten month period (see Appendix I). Foiiowing the teaming process, and alter a tirneframe of four months to allow for the team to work with and funher integrate their leamings. they were again observed in a tearn meeting and rnembers interviewed. Using a constant comparative rnethcxi, the &ta were andyzed and interpreted, with ongoing feedback to and input fkom the participants. Summary of Findings The initial round of data collection revealed that this was a team with rnany unresolved issues. The combination of "new to the company" and longer-tenured team members as well as a new leader who seemed determined to "put the past behind us" resulted in low levels of trust and a number of major undiscussables. These were unresolved issues about the past. work and iifestyle and the abrasive behaviour of one team member, Don. There was linle wiliingness to check assurnptions or to challenge one another, especiaily when it came to Don or Sandra, the President, and interactions reIIliLined at the rationai level with no discussion of feelings. Following the data coiledon phase in March, 1997, the teaming process began with the team embarking on a lengthy and difficult journey that contained many peaks and vaileys. The euphoria of the early sessions where ail the key issues had been raised, and the cathartic relief expressed by tearn members, was followed by a period of leveling off where there was less focus on emotions as attention tumed to critical business issues. Changes in team membership and increasing business pressures over the summer months saw the honeymoon period end and issues went underground as "meetings after- the-meeting" once again becarne the nom. With ongoing work over the fail, progress resumed, old issues were revisited and new ones addressed, at the same time that mounting business pressures competed for the team's already overcrowded schedules. Recognizing a pattern of dependence on me as consultant to sustain and reinforce their efforts, team members readied themselves to "go it alone" and resolved to improve their efforts at integrating their leamings into their day-to-day work together. The last off- site teaming session was held in February, 1998. Despite the fact that the research study called for my non-involvement for a four-month tirneframe, my cornmitment to team members in my role as consultant resulted in an invitation to Sandra to contact me should circurnstances change. 1 did not hear from Sandra during this pend despite a substantial increase in business pressures and tensions. The spht between the two businesses had been solidified as the probability that the Company would not survive intact became more likely. The second set of interviews in June, 1998 revealed that while some of the old undiscussables had ken adequately addressed and were no longer seen to be as problematic, new issues had surfaced which were not king acknowledged. These were largely related to the split between the two businesses and resulting cornpetition for resources, anxiety related to potential job losses and new issues related to Sandra's leadership style. Ultimately, by the end of May, 1999, ABC ïnc. was dismantled. The leasing side of the business partnered with an American Company to fom a new organization under Don's leadership, with several of the former ABC team members in key executive positions. Some parts of the sales side were sold off and ohers came back into the parent Company, Axworthy Global. Ted, the Senior Vice-Resident, Sales, Ieft ABC without a new position, as did the members who reported to hirn. The unresolved issues remained and resentment on the sales side was significant. In Iooking at the original question about the impact of the study at the individual and team levels, the fmdings are anythmg but straighd;orward. Most members felt positively aff'ted at a personal level, were aware of their own defensive patterns in team interactions and believed that they would take the learnings into their work on future teams. Some reported ways in which they were already utiiizing their individual leamings with their own work groups and in other teaming environments. One year after the second set of interviews, a few rnernbers who were contacted again about other unrelated business issues confvmed the ongoing benefit to them both individually and in their curtent teaming work. At the ABC team level, some felt that members had been better able to corne together in a most chailenging business environment because of the teaming process they had engaged in. They attributed this to tbeir efforts to improve their interaction patterns, more specifically, to surface the difficult issues and speak more openly at critical points dong the way. Those who did not see the benefits for the ABC team attributed this largely to the extreme "life and death business situation. Despite the mixed outcomes, these members were convinced of the value of doing this type of work. At the same time, many did not see thernselves coilectively as a more effective team and were discouraged by the undiscussables that remaineci. A closer examination of the dynamics revealed that the key factors which influenced the team's success or failure were: the psychodynamic defenses that were operating within the tearn; the role of and mental models attached to the leaders (Sandra, Don and Ted); and the team context. Individuals struggled with authority issues around the leader role. The mental models attached to Sandra, Don and Ted, as leaders, were entrenched and diffïcult for members to shift. When the conflicts between Don and Ted increased at the same time as business pressures mounted, people feared for their jobs, openness in meetings shut down and survival instincts took over. Psychodynamic &fense mechanisrns were evi&nt at individual and group levels. People projec ted their unresolved negative emotions ont0 the senior Leaders, thus affording them more power and control than was in the best interests of the team. Members who had coiluded in investing "messianic" hopes in Sandra and Ted early on in the process, now shifted to blaming hem for the team's failures. Indeed, the conflicts between Don and Ted, and Sandra's "weak leadership" were deemed to be the reasons for both the team's failings and the demise of the Company. Sandra struggled to dismantle the mental models anached to her as "heroic leader." She tried to be a role mode1 in the teaming sessions by encouraging members to surface their issues and by making process observations and comments. Yet, her own ambition and perfectionism seemed to take hold in the day-to-day work environment where she continued to be seen as unapproachable by some, and remained largely unchailenged by most. Don, as weil, could not shake the mental models of the aggressive, intimidating leader. Even though many mernbers saw him as making significant attempts to soften his leadership style and become more approachable, the "behind closed doors" conversations about him continued. As the pressures increased, none of the three senior leaders seemed able or willing to surface the ever widening spiit in the team. Indeed, the team structure, which saw two sub- teams with separate business goals competing for resources, only exacerbated the already existing tensions. This flawed stmchue and a turbulent, crisis-driven business environment fueled already existing anxieties, and psychodynarnic defense mechanisrns designed to eliminate these sarne anxieties became more fdyentrenched. In the end, despite acknowledging that they had learned a great deal at both individual and tearn levels and had corne through a torturous joumey together, members were unable to look at their leamings and accomplishrnents, hed the wounds and put positive closure to their work together. Implications This study has implications for both organization development consultants and for leaders at al1 levels in today's corporate world. 1 will begin by exploring the increasing requirement for the OD consultant who works with teams to include self-reflection and personal mastery as an integral part of her role. 1will then comment on the issue of sustainability of leamings and offer a mode1 for working with teams that is based on the research outcornes. Pe-J Mastew for the OD Consultant The increasing complexity of today's organizational culture has made the ability to collaborate in teaming structures more important than ever before. We are asking employees to demonstrate greater sensitivity in their interactions in the workplace and the demand for leaders to demonstrate emotional intelligence has been documented. At the same tirne, the turbulent corporate environment has mobilized people's defenses against the anxiety generated by decreased job security and the resulting impact on self-esteem. In such an environment, organization development consultants cannot be left behind. Our world has also become more complex, and the demand on us to be aware of the impact of dysfunctional dynamics on organizational effectiveness has increased. Menzies Lyth (1989) cornrnents on the need for consultants to take a whole system approach to their work. She cautions that the consultant who lacks a psychodynamic orientation may Weil confine himself to role and structural issues without sufficient understanding of the contribution of unconscious content and dynamics to these issues. Czander ( 1993) argues for an "analytic inference" (p. 131) approach to consulting which relies not only on organizational theory and practice but also on "intuitive knowledge" or knowledge experienced from within. By entering the social field, the consultant becomes part of the system that must be examined. He must become aware of his own defensive patterns agauist anxiety and their potential impact on the clients that he serves. He must know himself well enough to both trust his intuition and challenge his blind spots and assurnptions. This type of dynamic relationship may well challenge the consultant's need for controi. Piterman (1999) suggests that working at the psychodynarnic level requires the consultant to stay with not knowing and not understanding. French and Simpson (1999) argue that there are times when our best work happens when "we don? know what we're doing," and that learning comes from king willing to allow for "uuth-in-the-moment" (p. 1). Such a stance requires courage. The consultant has to be prepared to live on this ambiguous edge between exciternent and anxiety. She must be wiiiing to acknowledge her shortcomings and mode1 the very behaviour she is demanding of the client. indeed. Redding Mersky (1999) suggests that rather than try As with leaders who did not bargain for this level of personal mastery work, one wonders whether the OD consultant is up to the challenge. Many might balk at the suggestion that they open themselves up to the scmtiny of the client- It seems that, Like the manager who is trying to let go of the role of infallible "heroic leader," the consultant who contracts to work with teams in todayTscomplex, emotionally chailenging environment must also work from a *'confidence/humility" stance. She must have enough confidence in herself to acknowledge her hdtyin the face of her own shortcornings. The consultant who is wilhg to accept this daunting challenge cannot work in isolation. To be able to contain the often confusing messages that corne from king "open on the boundary" (Gilmore et al., 1986, p. 175) requires considerable support so that one is not inappropriately drawn into the client's organizational culture and defensive patterns. Consultants working at this level need to work in teams of colleagues, or use one another as shadow consul tan ts for supervision and dialogue around their own countertransference issues (Gilmore et al, 1986; Menzies Lyth, 1989). Perhaps a contribution of this study is its indepth description of the OD consultant's jomey. Because 1 found little evidence in the literature of this End of ''fust person" narrative, 1 felt it important to share with the reader bth my doubts and fears and my stxuggles to deal with my own countertransference issues. Sustsinabilitv. . of hrnings A key fmding which this study highiights is the difficulty people have msferring the learnings gained in an off-site environment into their day-to-day business environment. The ABC team made significant strides in their teaming sessions only to find that their good in tentions were not equal to the everyday crises and demands "back at the office." Hultman (1998) acknowledges this tendency for teams to revert to older, safer, more cornfortable patterns. Rayner (1996) suggests that improved team performance will not occur without the consistent practice of newly acquired leaniings. This becomes an even greater issue when we are talking about changing mincisets and defensive routines that protect us from feelings of vulnerability and shame. Argyris (cited in Fulmer & Keys, 1998) argues that the concepts may not be cornplicated, but without ongoing and repeated opportunities to practise, the necessary transformation in thinking and interacting will not occur. The AutoCo Epsilon program (Roth & Kieiner, 1996) used learning lab simulations as practice fields for challenging assumptions and working with mental models. Results were mUed and indicated that participants had diffiçulty in transfemng leamhg fiom the simulator to real world environments. The transitions from Model 1 to Model II thinking and from single to double-loop leaniing (Argyris & Schon, 1978) ask that people make fundamental shifts which will be anxiety provoking and result, ironically, in more defensive reasoning (Diamond, 1986). The ability to suspend assumptions, and shift mincisets requires people to "plumb the depths of emotional history" (Long & Newton, 1995). Such shifts will take time, support and opportunities to reflet and practise. The organization development consultant who works with tearns at this level must recognize this need for ongoing practice. Off-site teaming sessions will simply not be enough. Indeed, in a fast-paced, increasingly competitive business environment, there is greater resistance to taking tirne out of an already overloaded agenda to schedule one or two-day teaming sessions. Whiie my experience suggests that most teams require some off- site sessions, especially in the initial stages of their work together, consultants will meet less resistance if they partner with their clients in "real time" around real business issues. In my work with the ABC tearn, 1 used pmcess observation in their business meetings as a tool to assist members to integrate their leaniings into their "real work together. One of my findings was that 1 should have contractai more clearly with team members to make obsewations and do process checks as needed. The intent here was not to foster a dependence on me as "process person." Rather, 1 had hoped that in taking on this role while members were still stmggling to expriment with new ways of interacting, they would have continued opportunities to practise in a supportive environment. Once they had begun to operate from this new perspective, they would no longer rely on me, and their need for my continued presence would be reduced or elirninated. In addition to working with the team in their business meetings, individual coaching for tearn leaders becomes critically important. We have already seen that today's leader is king asked to achieve new levels of self-awareness and emotional intelligence. If, as 1 have suggested, he is going to be a catalyst in modeling effective, less defensive communication patterns, he must be supported to look at his leadership style and its impact on the team. While executive coaching is a buzzword in the organization of the nineties, it can only be effective if it is done within the context of the leader's &y-to-day interactions with coileagues and team members. me consultant who is working with the team is in an ideal position to provide the leader with regular fdback and coaching to help him reflet on and change his dysfunc tional patterns. Team members, too, may require support and coaching to make individual changes. A self-assessrnent instrument may be useful in providing a forum for dialogue that will assist members to examine their mental models and defensive patterns. A final consideration that arises out of the above recornmendations concerns the need for careN and complete contracting with both the leader and the tearn. A contract is "an explicit agreement of what the consultant and client expect from each other and how they are going to work togethef' (Block, 198 1). The consultant who considers this approach to tearnwork must make his client aware of what the work WUinclude. Both the leader and team members must enter into such a potentiaily difficult process with their eyes open. They must know that they are contracting to do ongoing work that may not be easy. The dificulty for the consultant is to ensure that he is honest with clients about what the work may involve without frightening them away. At the sarne tirne, the consultant must ensure that her own narcissistic needs do not intmde. 'The consultant's good feelings about herself are embedded in the service she offers - her process, her techniques, her methodology. Her hopes for her clients are deeply entangled with her own sense of herself, her worth, what she offers" (McIntyre, 1999, p. 7). in contracting with the client, the consultant must have the psychological maturity to know when there is not a good match between herself and the client. She needs to be able to create an environment where clients (leader and team members) can rnake an informed choice about the teaming approach they wish to take. Figure 5 offers a team development mode1 that is based on the fmdings from this research study. It includes the following components: contracthg with leader and team members; observation of the team in a business meeting; individual interviews of team members and the leader to uncover key issues and undiscussables and to begin chailenging assumptions and mental models; this step might be omitted with a newly fomed team that has Little "history" together. off-site tearning session to receive interview feedback, leam conversation tools (e.g., left-hand colwnn, ladder of inference, balancing advacacy and inquhy) and begin the teaming work. Typical topics at this stage include: vision and mission; operating guidelines; the deof the leader; ongoing feedback and coachuig for the leader and members: process observation at team meetings; additiond off-site teaming sessions when needed, to be determineci in collaboration with team members; topics rnay include issues related to structure, and roles and responsibilities. AUTHENTIC TEAMLNG MODEL Coaching /" Integration of Leamïngs DATA COLLECTION Uncovering Assumptions & Undiscussables ( Interviews & Observation j Fi oure 5. The Authentic Tearning Mode1 This mode1 has become a template for my current work with business teams. Whiie many of the components were ones 1 have always used, the emphasis has changed considerabl y. Contracting has become an ongoing process between rnyself and al1 team members. 1 am more vigilant about re-contracting, especiaiiy where issues become more complex and contentious, and when emotions are ninning high. 1 am carefbl to ensure that the conversation includes discussions as to my role in the process. The latter involves delineating clearly the nature of my relationship with the leader, emphasizing what information will, or more importantly, willll~tbe shared. Coaching of the leader is now a given in my work with teams. 1 make it clear at the outset that 1 will not work with a tearn unless the leader is willing to meet with me on a regular basis following tearning sessions or business meetings. The purpose of the coaching is to help the leader gain greater awareness of her impact on the tearn dynamics, with particular emphasis on the mental models attached to her as leader. When working with executive or senior teams where al1 members are also leaders, 1 encourage members to engage in dialogue around the topic of leadership early on in the process. Using the conversation tools as outlined in this study (lefi-hand column. ladder of inference, balancing advocacy with inquiry), members are encouraged to challenge the assumptions they hold about their roles as leaders and to look at the impact these might have on their interactions. These conversations serve an added fûnction of building trust and breaking down barriers to honest communication as members wrestle with shared struggles around their leadership roles. In addition, they build a foundation for developing cornrnunities of practice around areas of common interest or concem. Consultants working with teams need to frnd a baiance between zealously confronting difficult issues "head-on" and avoiding them altogether. They need to be sensitive to the clients' readiness to work with dificuit inteqxrsonal issues. Without ignoring these, they can look for oppominities to build common ground around issues that engage people "at the heart." In so doing, they may avoid opening up topics which are driven by team members' own "baggage" and which are not relevant to the business at hand. These conversations will be based on leamhg together, sharing best practices, or creating desired futures. They will provide members with a safer, less threatening environnient in which to leam and practice the conversation tools they wiil need when they -are confronted with difficult interpersonal dynamics. A comment 1 make fiequently to team members is: "Trust the process." This phrase has become even more meaningful for me as 1 integrate the leamùigs fiom this study into my work in organizations. The emphasis in my work with teams has shified fiom off-site teaming sessions to ongoing process consultation in business meetings. While 1 continue to see the need for both, my mental mode1 has shified tÏom the more traditional 'ieambuilding" to "teaming" professes which are driven by the clients day-to-day business issues and which occur as frequentiy in regular meetings as in off-site sessions. The Iesson for me, and perhaps for al1 consultants who engage in the work of teaming, is to trust the process to doidin an organic way, driven by the team's and the organization' s unique challenges rather than by my own needs for control and certainty . Suggestions for Further Researcb A review of current literatufe has revealed little research into the psychodynarnic aspects of teams from an action research perspective. With the exception of Chris Argyris' five-year study ( 1993) and the MIT /AutoCo Epsilon Program (Roth & Kleiner, 1996)' no other research looked at the implications of working to surface undiscussables and shift people's awareness of their defensive interpersonal patterns Ïn a team environment- Similar snidies in dfierent organizational settings would add to this Myof knowledge. This study was significantly affected by the very severe "life and death" business pressures faced by the participant group. While there is no question that organizations will continue to exist within a turbulent environment, the level of uncertainty experienced by this team was extreme. A simiiar snidy conducted with a team in a somewhat more stable organization might yield intereshg results. The fmdings from this study suggest a number of areas for further research into the leader's role in teaming and leadership development. These include: the impact of the "emotional intelligence movement" on leaders; leaders' perceptions of their desin a teaming envuonment; and developing emotional intelligence in leaders. Communities of practice is a relatively new area of inquiry. Qualitative research into the potentiai impact which communities of practice might have on teaming initiatives might add valuable input into how teams can achieve the level of candor and honesty required in today 's cornpetitive and ever-changing business environment. Research which looks at alternative, less hierarchicai organizationai structures and their impact on team communication and effectiveness would provide additional insight into this area of inquiry. This study has raised a number of questions about the organization development consultant's role in working with teams. How prepared are OD consultants to work at the level explored in this study? What are the educational and training implications for OD consultants? Research aimed at these areas would better prepare the organization development community to stay abreast of current organizational trends. Finaiiy, the findings from this research have resulted in an untested mode1 for team developmen~This mode1 incorporates explicit and careful contrachg with the leader and team members, ongoing coaching of the leader, greater involvement by the consultant in day-to-day team meetings and increased focus on learning andor comrnunities of practice by team members. A study which utilizes this mode1 with a senior management tearn would provide an opportunity to test its usefulness. The incremental rise in the number of corporate mergers and acquisitions combined with an increasingly cornpetitive marketplace has resulted in large-scale organizarional restnicturing. People fiom disparate cultures are king asked to corne together quickly, often in ambiguous, uncertain environments, and to fmd innovative ways in which to work effectively together. 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( 1994). Paradoxes and dilemmas of self-organizing systems. Dissertation Abstracts International, 55-09A. (University Microfilms No- AAINN9û472) . . Zohar, A. (1 995). J'he enemv within: Paradoxical dimensions of or~nationalch- and resistance. Paper presented at the ARNOVA Conference, Cleveland, OH. Zuber-Skenitt, O. (Ed.). ( 1990). Action research for cueand developnent- Aldershot, England: Gower. Zucker, F. (1997, June/July). Connecting the heart and mind at EDS. The Svstems ThinkerTM.8 (S), 9- 1 f . APPENDICES APPENDIX A TWO-COLUMN RESEARCH METHOD Please describe a challenging intervention or interaction with one or more individuals that (1) you have already experienced or (2) you expect to experience in the near future. If you have difficulty with either of these conditions, try a hypothetical case in which you doubt your effectiveness. Begin the description with a paragraph about the purpose of your intervention, the setting, the people involved, and any other important characteristics. Next, wnte a few paragraphs regarding your strategy . What were your objectives, how did you intend to achieve them, and why did you select those goals and strategies? Next, write a few pages of the dialogue that actually oçcurred or that you expected to occur. Use the foiiowing format. On this side of the page, On this side of the page. write what was going on write what each person in your mind while each actuall y said or what you person in the dialogue expected him to say . (including yourself) is Continue writing the dialogue speaking. until you believe your major points are illustrated. (The dialogue should be at least two pages iong. Findly, after you reread your case, describe the underlying assumptions that you think you held about effective action. Argyris & Schon, 1974, p. 41 ACTION MAP: ORGANIZATiONAL PATTERN THAT INHIBITS LEAHNING Governing Values ) Hi~hrespcci and trusl on 1 Low rcspci and trust on 1 Hi~hcommiirncnt Io had 1 High commiimeni IO 1 a High confidence ihai organizaiionlteam 1 technical iusues 1 interpersonal issues 1 work . 1 clients 1 cm prduce value for its customers 1 +I hlental Models: Action Strategies Unfolding from Law Respect und Trust Make aitributions a Makc assumpiions CIaim that oihers Do not test validiiy Explnin non- Makc çctîain issues Make I about other people aboui others' low will not change of thesc claims and iesting by and bclicfs not undiscussabiliiy capaciîy to deat assumptions assuming oihers open for discussion itsclf undiscussable wiih hot issues won't be able to cffeclivcly handlc thc issucs raiscd or claiming thai you arc caring for others by no1 raising issues Behoviour: Consequences for Croup Dynamics Advocaic positions Do not ask othcrs Smooth over Wequest candor and Divide into camps Build false Distance self froni without cxamptes their opinion of challcnging issues becorne upsti when CO~SC~SUSon taking and iry IO convince your thinking or that have poteniial ii is deliverd 1 difficult issues responsibiliiy for othcrs how they came to to activate threat or pcrsisience of thcir conclusions embarrassrnent Cansequences for I.eudership, Membership und Commitmenl ..-. ------Keep feelings of Fecl pulled apart Cloim emphasis on Burn out Discourage leader king "damned if pressures client discussion of you do" and challenging issues "damncd ifyou likely to raise don't" covcrcd uy 1 1 1 crnotions Ahpied Sroiii Cliris clrgyris by Riiy Gordczky LADDER OF INFERENCE Take action Make assumptions "if. . . then. . .9, Draw conclusions, Confum beliefs Add meaning, Make judgrnents Observe data Adapted from Senge, Roberts, Ross, Smith and Kleiner, 1994 APPENDIX D LEFT-HAND COLUMN EXERCISE Left-hand Column Right-hand Column (what 1 was thinking and feeling) (what I was saying ) APPENDIX E PARTICIPANT CONSENT 1 understand that Mary Ann Archer is conducting a shidy on the impact on team functioning of uncove~gand working with the covert interaction and behaviour patterns that operate w i thin an intact workplace team. 1 acknowledge that I have been idormed that any uifonnation given to the researcher in written or oral form will remain confidentid. I also understand that 1 am free to withdraw from the study at any time. My signature thus indicates that 1 am wiiling to participate in the study. NAME (Please print) SIGNATURE DATE APPENDIX F PRE-INTERVENTION QUESTIONNAIRE How long have you been with the team and what is your position on the team? The team has gone through significant change duruig the past 4 - 6 months. What has that ken like for you? (Ask the "older" team members.) Lf 1 were to ask you to describe your team to me, what would you say? What do you see as this team's biggest strength? What do you see as its biggest problem or business issue that needs to be addressed? What do you see your roie to be on the tearn? (not necessarily your functional role) How open do you see other team members as king both in their working reiationships with the team generdy and during team meetings? What are the acceptable and legitirnate topics, behaviours, attitudes and feelings in ùiis tearn? What are the things, issues, topics or feelings that you think they feel most cornfortable talking about? What are the unacceptable, iiiegitimate, and/or questionable topics, behaviours, attitudes and feelings in this group? What are the topics, issues or feelings that they avoid taking about? Why? Include the things people would never talk about, the issues that everyone knows it's naokay to discuss or the behaviours people wouid never exhibit. What assumptions do team members tend to make either about you or about other team mernkrs? Where do you think those assumptions corne from? What assumptions do people (including yourself) have about Sandra? Why? * To what extent do people check out the assumptions they have of each other? Can you give me an example of a time when others made an assumption either about you or about another team member or about something that was happening during a team meeting. To what extent was it checked out? 6. How open do you see yourself as king with your team members during meetings? To what extent do you feel "under wraps", that is, have private thoughts, unspoken reservations, or unexpressed feelings and opinions that you have not felt comfortable bringing out into the open? What are the things, issues, topics or feelings that you feel most comfortable taking about ? Why? What kinds of behaviours do you feel most comfortable exhibiting ? Why ? What are the topics, issues or feelings that you avoid talking about? Why? What behaviours do you tend to avoid exhibiting? Why? What assumptions do you tend make about your tearn members? Where do you think those assumptions come from? (e.g., previous experiences with teams, etc.) Can you give me an example of a tirne when you made an assurnption either about a team member or about somethuig that was happening during a team meeting. Did you check it out? Why (or why not)? 7. To what extent do tearn members feel free to challenge one another? Are there certain members that are chaiienged more often than others? Why? 8. What do you think is the impact a) on the team, and b) on yourself, of people not talking about these issues, chdlenging one another or checking out their assumptions? inciude both positive, negative and neutral effects. 9. What do you think would be the impact a) on the team, and b) on yourself, of people "speaking the truth? Include both positive, negative and neutral effects. 10. What barriers do you see existing to team members king open and honest with one another? What would have to happen for this to occur? Additional Questions 1. What are the core beliefs, assumptions and values in this group? 2. What are the unexpressed secret hopes and wishes and/or things that seem too good to be tme in this group? 3. Have you been through a teambuilding process before? What was that experience iike for you? OESCRlPTiVE ITEMS-lndividud and Organizational Values - U 1 UP2 - UPF 3 UF4 - UNF 5 UN6 - UNB 7 UB8 - UPB 9 P 10 PF11 F 12 - NF 13 N 14 - NB 15 B 16 PB17 - DP 18 - DPF 19 - DF 20 - DNF 21 - ON 22 - DNB 23 - OB 24 - DPB 25 D 26 S Y M L O G Cansuiting ~rwp Pmasvnq- 125(6OsksNaihDlm.SumH San Dispo. Ci. 02120 (619) 673-N96 FU: (619) 674-1% How open do you see yourself and other team members as king with one another during meetings? gr To what extent do you and others feel "under wraps", that is, have private thoughts, unspoken reservations, or unexpressed feelings and opinions that you have not felt comfortable bringing out into the open? What are the acceptable and legitimate topics, behaviours. attitudes and feelings in this team? What are the things, issues, topics or feelings that you and others feel most comfortable tallcing about? What are the unacceptable, iiiegitimate, andor questionable topics, behaviours, attitudes and feelings in this group? What are the topics, issues or feelings that you and others feel least comfortable or avoid talking about? Why? (Include the things people would never talk about, the issues that everyone knows ifs mt okay t O discuss or the behaviours people would never exhibit.) To what extent do you and your team members check out assumptions? (Give examples) To what extent do you and others feel free to challenge one another in meetings? Are there any members who tend to chaüenge or be challenged more frequently? Why ? How has this changed since a) the beginning of the teambuilding process, b) the end of the 1stsession in Febxuary? What do you think would be or what &the impact now both on the team, and on yourself, of your "speaking your tmth"? How has this changed since a) the beginning of the teambuilding process, b) the end of the last session in February? Why? Were there any positive andlor negative consequences of surfacing and dealing with the undiscussables for yourself individually and for the team as a whole? If so, what were they? 4. When you recall the tearnbuiiding sessions. what aspects of the process or tools used would you Say had the greatest impact on the team's ability to open up and speak the nuth? (e.g., pre-interviews, left-hand colurnn. ladder of uiference, SYMLOG, check-in and out, meetings checklist, process checks, operating noms). Why ? Are any of these still used by the team? if not, why not? If so, how regdarly? Did any of these have a negative impact? In what way? 5. Are there any particular sessions or parts of sessions that stand out for you as being pivotal to the team's movement toward greater honesty and opemess? Why? 6. Descnbe your team's ability to achieve its results now as compared to a) at the beginning of the teambuilding process, b) at the end of the last session in Febmary? Le., In what ways is the team functioning more effectively? In what ways is it functioning less effectively? in what areas is it functioning more or less the same? To what do you atüibute any change? 7. What leaniing would you take away from this experience into another team environment? What did you leam about yourself as a tearn member (or leader)? What did you learn about tearn functioning? What impact has this had on your participation on this team? What impact do you think it rnight have on you in a future tearn environment? Additional Questions 1. When asking about the unacceptable topics or undiscussables, refer to the previous undiscussables. Ask specifically re: The past Work and Iifestyle Feelings One team member's @on ) behaviour 2. When asking re assumptions, ask about Sandra and the assumptions people rnay or may not still hold about her (i.e., she's here to "clean up" the business and then ieave). 3. Ask about the impact of the fmt two sessions where the above undiscussables were discussed- Also, in the second session where two new team members, Ted and Richard, shared their feelings about not having bengiven detailed information about the cntical nature of the company's financial position, when they were hired. These two sessions were very emotional and cathartic. What was the impact of surfacing and dealing with this on you and on the team as a w hole? Check out whether the impact has ben lasting, ie, what was the impact then? 1s there any impact now of having opened that material up? What do you think rnight have been the impact on the team of mtsurfacing these undiscussables? Can you speculate how it might have affected the tearn this past year if that had not been dealt with in the early sessions? 4. In question #6,ask about perceived changes in team eff'tiveness throughout the process, not just at the end of the process in February and now. LETTER OF INTRODUCTION Dear (name of parîicipant) 1 am working toward the completion of a Doctorate in Education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education at the University of Toronto. As such, 1 am required to conduct a research study and write a doctoral dissertation. As organizations increasingly moving toward a team environment, seif-directed or high performing teams have becorne the buzzwords of the nineties. Because the emphasis in my recent consulting work has been on team effectiveness, I will be focusing my study on the communication patterns within a team. The actual research study involves working intensively with an intact workplace team to facilitate their ability to interact more openly and honestly. My expectation is that taking a tearn through such a process will result in their king more able to surface the hidden assurnptions they rnake about each other and about what is and is not acceptable to talc about. I would further exptthat they would be more cornfortable in spealcing honestly with one another about previously unmentionable issues and be las defensive in their team interactions. As a resuit, they would function more effectively as a tearn in accomplishing their tasks and achieving their results. The research plan CASfor an intact workplace tearn to be observed before and afier a teambuilding intervention in or&r to examine the impact which learning to communicate more openly has on team members' perceptions both of themselves individuaily and on their functioning as a team. In order to look at the impact of the intervention, 1 will also need to interview each participant both before and after the teambuilding process. The interviews will focus on your perception of the degree of openness both in your own and in the team's communication patterns. The interviews will be tape recorded and transcribed into written format and 1 will video-tape the observation sessions. The information you provide will be confidentid and neither your name nor the name of the organization wiii be utilized in any written documentation. To further enswe confidentiality, 1 will store any identifjing documents in a locked file. The raw data wiIl be destroyed within one year of completion of my Ed.D. degree. You will be provided with regular feedback on the information 1 compile and given opportunities to vew my fmdings. You wïii also be offered the opportunity to read final copies of any reports or publications that are generated hmthis study. 1 am hopeful that this study will contribute to furthering organizations' understandings about effective team functioning and am gratefui for your wiiiingness to consider king a participant. 1 am asking that you sign the attacheci letter of consent to indicate your agreement. Mary Ann Archer, B.Sc.N., M.Ed APPENDIX J ABC TEAM PROCESS SCHEDULE ORCANIZATION CHART: ABC Inc. Marcb, 1997 President and CE0 m Don Ted Eric Senior Vice-President Senior Vice-Presiâent. Vice-Presidenl, and Chief Operating Muketing and Sales Human Resources Oflfica Vice-Presideni, VicePresideni, Vice-Presideni, Vice-President, Produc t Technology Finance Client Services Management APPENDIX L ABC SENIOR MANAGEMENT TEAM (FEB., 1998))