The Political Settlement, Growth and Technical Progress in Bangladesh
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A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Khan, Mushtaq H. Working Paper The political settlement, growth and technical progress in Bangladesh DIIS Working Paper, No. 2013:01 Provided in Cooperation with: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Copenhagen Suggested Citation: Khan, Mushtaq H. (2013) : The political settlement, growth and technical progress in Bangladesh, DIIS Working Paper, No. 2013:01, ISBN 978-87-7605-522-6, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Copenhagen This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/122274 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu The Political Settlement, Growth and Technical Progress in Bangladesh Mushtaq H. Khan Abstract: The characteristics of a political settlement allow us to analyse the dynamics of institutional and policy evolution and their associated developmental outcomes. Four phases in the evolution of the political settlement in Bangladesh are identified, corresponding to the periods of military government in Pakistan from 1958 to 1971, the dominant party rule of the Awami League from 1971 to 1975, authoritarian clientelism under military rulers operating formally multi-party democracies from 1975 to 1990 and competitive clientelist democracy from 1990 onwards. For each period, we look at the dominant institutional and policy characteristics and the ways in which the political settlement constrained or enabled development outcomes. The framework is then used to analyse the dynamics of three sectors that have played a critical role in driving or constraining development in the growth acceleration after 1980. The first is the garments and textile industry, which emerged during the clientelistic authoritarian period of the 1980s and has driven growth in exports since then. Growth in the sector took off when financing instruments emerged that could finance the ‘learning’ of the appropriate technological and organizational capabilities for achieving competitiveness. The financing was partly based on the rents created by the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), and partly on a private financing arrangement between Desh and Daewoo, with institutional support from the government. The package created strong incentives and compulsions for high levels of learning effort. As the political settlement evolved, technological upgrading has become more difficult though it is happening at the level of individual firms. Second, we look at the electronics sector whose takeoff in the 2000s took place under a competitive clientelist political settlement. The external financing support available to the sector was much less significant and the takeoff depended on the leading role played by a nationalist enterprise that absorbed the risks of investing in learning-by-doing. Progress has been much slower compared to garments. The development of supportive policy for these sectors requires an understanding of both the importance of supporting learning with appropriate financing instruments and the requirement that these instruments should create strong incentives for putting in high levels of effort given the enforcement capabilities of the contemporary political settlement. Finally power generation is an example of an infrastructure sector where poor investment has constrained development. The problem here is not learning-by-doing but adverse incentives for investment that can be traced to an excessive reliance on private sector financing in a political settlement where long-term investments face significant political risks. This combination has resulted in only a few politically connected players bidding for projects with a focus on immediate ‘procurement rents’ rather than on the profits from future production. Conventional reform strategies focusing on transparency, competition and anti-corruption have not achieved results and the political settlement analysis can explain why. However, a strategy focusing on a long-term financing agency with a dedicated governance structure could change incentives sufficiently to enable improvements in power generation to be achieved even in the context of a competitive clientelist political settlement. August 2012 2 Contents 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 5 2. The Political Settlement: A Brief Review ............................................................... 10 The Political Subsystem .......................................................................................... 13 The Bureaucratic Subsystem ................................................................................... 17 The Economic Subsystem ....................................................................................... 20 3. The Evolution of the Political Settlement in Bangladesh ........................................ 25 4. Military Authoritarianism: 1958-1971 ..................................................................... 36 5. The Rise and Fall of Dominant Party Authoritarianism 1972-1975 ........................ 45 6. The Transition Period of Authoritarian Clientelism 1975-1990 .............................. 59 7. Vulnerable Democracy 1990- .................................................................................. 70 Bengali versus Bangladeshi Nationalism and Democratic Vulnerability ............... 74 The Absence of (Informal) Rules for Live-and-Let-Live Cycling.......................... 85 Economic Organizations under Vulnerable Democracy ......................................... 92 8. Catching up and Learning: An Analytical Model .................................................... 97 Learning, Effort and Governance .......................................................................... 113 Financing Instruments ........................................................................................... 126 Governance Agencies............................................................................................ 129 Firm Structure ....................................................................................................... 130 The Political Structure .......................................................................................... 134 Interdependencies Affecting Policies for Learning ............................................... 135 9. The Garments Takeoff ........................................................................................... 136 Contracting Failures and Institutional Solutions in the Garments Industry .......... 144 Effort, Learning and the Success of Desh Garments ............................................ 150 Technology Upgrading in the Garments Sector .................................................... 158 10. The Emergence of the Electronics Sector ............................................................ 167 11. The Crisis in Power Generation ........................................................................... 182 Significant Characteristics of the Power Generation Sector ................................. 185 Analytical Framework ........................................................................................... 194 Evaluation of Policy Responses ............................................................................ 204 12. Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 209 13. References ............................................................................................................ 211 3 Figures Figure 1 Growth and Crisis under Authoritarianism 1958-71 ..................................... 43 Figure 2 The Dominant Party 1972-5 .......................................................................... 58 Figure 3 Growth led by new sectors under Authoritarian Clientelism ........................ 68 Figure 4 Growth with Vulnerable Democracy 1990- .................................................. 73 Figure 5 Loss Financing and Learning-by-doing....................................................... 110 Figure 6 Effort Levels and the Viability of the Learning Process ............................. 119 Figure 7 The Interdependence of Variables Determining Effort ............................... 125 Figure 8 High-Effort Learning under the MFA in Bangladesh ................................. 149 Figure 9 The Financing of Learning in the Electronics Industry