America’s Rangers: The Story of America’s First Warriors and their Journey from Tradition to Institution
by
James Sandy, B.A.
A Thesis In
HISTORY
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
Approved
Dr. John R. Milam Chair of Committee
Dr. Laura Calkins
Dr. Barton Myers
Peggy Gordon Miller Dean of the Graduate School
August, 2011
Copyright 2011, James Sandy Texas Tech University, James Sandy, Summer 2011
Acknowledgments This work would not have been possible without the constant encouragement and tutelage of my committee. They provided the inspiration for me to start this project, and guided me along the way as I slowly molded a very raw idea into the finished product here. Dr. Laura Calkins witnessed the birth of this project in my very first graduate class and has assisted me along every step of the way as a fantastic proofreader and a wonderful sounding board where many an idea was first verbalized. Dr. Calkins has been and will continue to be invaluable mentor and friend throughout my graduate education. Dr. Barton Myers was the latest addition to my committee, but he pushed me to expand my project further back into American History. The vast scope that this work encompasses proved to be my biggest challenge, but has come out as this works’ greatest strength. I cannot thank Dr. Myers enough for pushing me out of my comfort zone. Dr. Ron Milam has been a part of my academic career from the beginning and has long served as my inspiration in pursuing a life in academia. His constant guidance and support throughout my graduate career has been one of the impactful relationships in my life to date. I cannot thank my committee enough for assisting in the creation and completion of this work; I can truly say it would not have been possible without them.
To all my family and friends who have offered unrelenting encouragement and support I offer my deepest thanks and gratitude.
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Table of Contents Acknowledgments...... ii
I. Introduction – Leading The Way ...... 1 II. Don't Forget Your Hatchet! : The Origin of an American Ranger Tradition ………………………………...... ……………7 Benjamin Church and America’s First Rangers ...... 9 Maj. Rogers Rules the Rangers ...... 16 19th Century Rangers ...... 29 The 20th Century and ‘Ranger Amnesia’ ...... 35
III. Born in Burma : Merrill's Marauders and the Goldilocks Moment in the American Ranger Tradition………...... 49 The Marauders are Born ...... 54 The Ledo Road ...... 60 Mission #2 - On to Shaduzup…………..……………………………………….…..66
Mykityina: The End of Merrill and his Marauders…………………………..……...75
IV. Back to School : The Rangers Become an Institution...... …………………………………………………………...…………..……83
Korea…………………………………………………………………...…………….90
The Rangers Become Official……………………………………………..………..102
The Rangers go to War……………………………………………………....……...106
The Ranger School Remains…………………………………………………...…. .111
V. Conclusion - Of Their Own Accord………………………………………..…113
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Bibliography ...... 119
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Chapter I
Introduction – Leading the Way
A bloodied, grisly looking group of men had just returned from a night raid and
were cleaning and checking their weapons and supplies. Walking among these men one
could overhear a few of them joking about how it had been “a good night for a mass
murder.”1 It was February, 1943 and these men had just executed a flawless nighttime raid of a nearby Italian outpost at Sened Station. They were the men of the 1st Ranger
Battalion. Their intrepid commander, Col. William “Bill” Darby, had led them across 12
miles of desert during the night and had them within 200 yards of their target. Before they launched their attack, Darby’s company commanders told their men the nature of their mission: “We’ve got to leave our mark on these people….Every man uses his bayonet as much as he can—those are our orders. And remember this: We’re only bringing back ten prisoners—no more no less.”2 They left the camp ablaze with eleven in
tow, apparently someone miscounted, they showed up with ten.
These are the missions that the U.S. Army Rangers were designed to execute
during World War II; quick raids in which they hit their enemies hard and fast, and
Darby’s men excelled at their job. During this raid they suffered one KIA and twenty
casualties while killing over seventy-five Italians. The enemy that did survive the
1 Atkinson, Rick. An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943. New York: Henry Holt & Co, 2002. p. 331. 2 Ibid. 1
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Rangers’ ruthless efficiency referred to them as the “Black Death”.3 These men were
both physically and mentally prepared for missions like these; as James Altieri recalls, “It
was sickening, it was brutal, it was inhumane, but that was our job, and we were stuck
with it.”4 These soldiers represented the ultimate in military training and preparation; they were the definitive example of what an American soldier should be.
Darby’s Rangers were just one unit in the long history of specialized units that have been utilized in American warfare. The term Ranger first shows up in 1610, the very beginning of Colonial America. The first full incarnation of the Ranger concept dates back to the 1670’s when Captain Benjamin Church formed the “Church’s Rangers” during King Philip’s War. These aggressive volunteers were raised to defend the colonists and take the war to the Native Americans. Church learned much from his enemy and adopted a form of irregular warfare to match the fluid, deceptive methods of the Natives.5 Church and his men fought a brutal kind of war against their Native enemies, deemed atrocious by their British overseers. These men were followed by the infamous Roger’s Rangers of the Seven Years War and their intrepid commander Major
Robert Rogers. These early manifestations of Rangers adopted the tactics of the Native
Americans that they were fighting against, and Roger’s “Rules of Ranging” are still taught at the Ranger School today.6 These men were followed by the skirmishers,
3 Jeffers, H. Paul. Onward We Charge: The Heroic Story of Darby's Rangers in World War II. New York: NAL Caliber, 2007 p. 117. 4 Ibid., p. 115. Altieri wrote his memoir in the 1960’s: The Spearheaders. 5 Lock, John D., and Harold G. Moore. To Fight with Intrepidity--: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present. New York: Pocket Books, 1998. p.3. 6 United States. Ranger Unit Operations. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, 1991. p. F-1. The rules have little bearing on the Ranger training itself, but serve as a reminder of the American Ranger Tradition. 2
Texas Tech University, James Sandy, Summer 2011 sharpshooters and Partisan Rangers of the Civil War. Colonel John Mosby and his band of Partisan Rangers fought an irregular war on horseback, and proved to be a true benefit to the Confederate effort.7 Not all these units were called Rangers but they fit the mold.
Units like Col. Hiram Berdan’s Sharpshooters received special training and fought with distinction against their Southern brothers. Following the Civil War, the Ranger concept went somewhat dormant; there were no recognized Ranger units until World War II. The specially trained light infantry concept was once again brought up as the United States was hurled into the Second World War. The Rangers of World War II were originally modeled on the British Commandos and their training regime. This led to units like
Darby’s Rangers, the 5th Ranger Battalion and the 6th Ranger Battalion.
Despite these famous units and their legendary acts, the unit in World War II that came to define the Ranger name and concept fought in the mountains of Burma. The
5307th Composite Unit was better known as Merrill’s Marauders, and it existed for less than a year, but this unit is where all future Ranger units trace their heritage. The Rangers of World War II were followed closely in the Korean War as more Ranger units were trained. Most importantly, the Korean War saw the creation of the Ranger School at Fort
Benning, Georgia, which today still serves as one of the highest examples of training in the United States military. The Rangers have been a near constant throughout American
Military history.
7 Lee, Robert E., and Clifford Dowdey. The Wartime Papers of R.E. Lee. Boston: Little, Brown, 1961. p.688. 3
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This work places American Rangers and other specially trained light infantry
units in their rightful place in U.S. military history. Russell Weigley argues in his seminal
work The American Way of War that American warfare has been shaped by a combination of several European military thinkers, namely Prussian officer Carl Von
Clausewitz and military philosopher Hans Delbruck. His central thesis is that American
warfare originated and evolved from these men and their theories, and that Americans
have always engaged in one of two forms of warfare: limited and unlimited, and that
these two forms have aimed at destroying the enemy’s military via either a strategy of
annihilation or attrition.8 Weigley has been challenged in recent scholarship, namely by
John Grenier’s The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier. Grenier
challenges Weigley by stating that the original form of American warfare was forged on
the colonial frontiers by small bands of men fighting Native Americans. According to
Grenier these men waged irregular and extirpative warfare against the enemy’s non-
combatants. These men “created a tradition that accepted, legitimized, and encouraged
attacks upon and the destruction of noncombatants…” 9 Grenier names these practices the first American way of war, and the men who carried it out America’s first warriors.
While this study agrees with Grenier that these early American Ranger units were essential to the founding of a uniquely American way of war, it argues further that these units created and embodied an American Ranger Tradition that struggled to find a place within the formalized military structure.
8 Weigley, Russell Frank. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. New York: Macmillan, 1973. p. xviii – xxiii. 9 Grenier, John. The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p.10-11. 4
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American Ranger units have existed since the 1670’s in King Philip’s War and were present in every major American conflict except World War I. The original
American Rangers that fought to secure the colonial frontiers established a uniquely
American tradition of highly maneuverable light infantry units that operated irregularly in the woods and swamps. The first Rangers were volunteers that were raised when needed and then each man dispersed back to his farm. The American Ranger Tradition was incorporated into the formal military structure after the American Revolution. They have been labeled as unorthodox and have been placed outside the perceived military norm described by Weigley. Due to this unconventional perception the Ranger became a small peripheral in the U.S. military, but still represented an American tradition. Ranger units have been activated and deactivated in every major conflict they participated, only to be recalled at the outset of the next conflict; for the vast majority of American history they faced a provisional existence. Because these units were viewed outside the norm, they had been consistently forgotten about when not needed. The American military tradition had developed a serious case of “Ranger Amnesia”. Along with this lack of stability these units have operated separately from the normal infantry units from which they are drawn.
This distinction led them to develop a serious identity crisis, especially during the 20th century, in which they existed between the realms of Special Forces and supposed “Elite
Infantry”, a situation that only contributed to their shaky existence.
The Rangers identity crisis was exacerbated during the 20th century and greatly contributed to their provisional existence. This debate is best raised and argued by David
Hogan in his book Raiders or Elite Infantry? The Changing Role of the U.S. Army
5
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Rangers from Dieppe to Grenada. Hogan, a historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military
History, defines Special Forces as units formed for a particular task and “Elite Infantry”
as especially capable formations.10 Ranger units and others easily fit under both definitions, as most were created with a specific task in mind but ended up succeeding in more standard infantry roles. Another interesting approach to this identity problem lies within the work of Maj. Chelsea Y. Chae (U.S. Army). Chae’s 1996 thesis “The Roles and Missions of Rangers in the Twenty-First Century” outlined the dual existence of
Ranger units since World War II. She argued that the Rangers were resurrected as an
Elite Infantry unit in World War II, but evolved Special Forces capabilities as the century progressed.11 While Chae only deals with 20th century Ranger units in her study, the idea of an evolving dual nature force can be applied throughout Ranger history. This study argues that these units were originally designed as Special Forces which were forced to evolve toward a regular infantry role sometimes due to the nature of a conflict, but mainly because their design was not properly understood by their commands, leading to their misuse on the battlefield. This misuse then subsequently created a lack of confidence from higher commands, which ultimately resulted in their deactivation time and time again.
There has been no serious scholarly attempt to properly place the Rangers within
the larger American Military history. The American Ranger tradition is one of the oldest
American national identities and deserves to be properly analyzed.
10 Hogan, David W. Jr., Raiders or Elite Infantry: The Changing Role of the U.S. Army Rangers from Dieppe to Grenada. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992. p. xx. 11 Chae, Maj. Chelsea Y. , “The Roles and Missions of Rangers in the Twenty-First Century” M.A. Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996. p. iii. 6
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Chapter II
Don’t Forget your Hatchet! : The Origin of an American Ranger
Tradition
“Never forget that no military leader has ever become great without audacity.”12
Audacious is one of the many words needed to describe those who have led American
Ranger units into battle. Other descriptions would have to include brutal and violent.
Soldiers like Benjamin Church, Robert Rogers and William Darby stand out in American
military history. Colonel Church was America’s first Ranger and with the help of his
Native American allies and his soldiers forged a unique American way of war on the
frontiers of colonial America. Major Robert Rogers is one of America’s most famous
Rangers and his “Rules of Ranging” are still taught at the Army Ranger School. Colonel
William Darby led the 1st Ranger Battalion in North Africa and Italy. These men each led famous Ranger units and did so from the front. These men and the others that have shaped Ranger history stood out from their contemporaries, just as their units did.
From the bleak colonial beginnings of American history, there has been a need for
Ranger units that could wage an unlimited war against its enemies. These men fought the
first American way of war.13 While Grenier is correct, he only argues his point into the
early nineteenth century. These units did not stop defining American warfare; but as
12 Handel, Michael I. Masters of War. London: Routledge, 2005. p.275. 13 Grenier, John. The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p.10. 7
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American grew and evolved into a global power the Ranger and his way of war would
grow and evolve alongside. The Ranger way of war would struggle at some points during
American history, but even through adversity the American Ranger and his way of war
would always be an integral part of the American way of war. The American Ranger unit
has existed in countless differing forms and variations since the early days of America,
all the while critical to the American way of war. These men were some of the most
capable and aggressive America had to offer, and it was on their backs that the American
frontier was pacified. It was these men that allowed the colonies to rise up and claim
independence from the British in the War for Independence. Ranger units helped to
reshape America during the Civil War, and then disappeared until the American Ranger
was resurrected abroad and helped to deliver victory during World War II. By tracing the
leaders of these units the creation and evolution of the American Ranger Tradition
becomes evident.
The term “Ranger” is hard to define, especially when the history of the word itself
is examined. The word was brought over by the British where it can be traced back to the
1300’s. The original definition entailed one that acted as a forester or gamekeeper, placing the origins of the Ranger in the woods and wilderness of 14th century Britain.14
The action of “ranging” shows up during the very beginnings of American history. The
term was first used in the colonies in the early 1600’s, as Captain John Smith described
himself and his men ranging through their unknown surroundings. In a report to the
Governor of Virginia, Smith reported: “Yearly ranging the shore of Weanock, could see
14 "ranger, n.1". OED Online. June 2011. Oxford University Press. http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/158019 (accessed June 29, 2011). 8
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nothing but their [Indians] old houses which he burnt.”15 The term was also applied to the militia that was formed in reaction to the Indian Massacres of 1622.16 Americans have
been using the term “Ranger” since the very first colonies were established by the British.
This term and concept has evolved as America itself has grown and changed. The
following sections will examine the most important points in this evolution. These early
days of the colonies can be easily characterized by examining the relationship between
the newly implanted colonists and the Natives. The same is true for the first American
warriors.
Benjamin Church and America’s First Rangers
Plymouth, Massachusetts is one of the most well known locations in American
colonial history. In 1620 a group of colonists landed there and began a settlement, better
known as the “Pilgrims”. The Pilgrims and their famous ship, the Mayflower, have been
engrained in American history as one of the most iconic images and stories of the earliest
days of America. As the story goes, the pilgrims and the Natives learned to help each
other and live harmoniously, eventually leading to that all-American tradition of
Thanksgiving. The settlement of Plymouth would do more for America than provide a
backdrop for gluttonous holidays and school pageants; it would provide America with its
first warriors, and more importantly, its first way of war.
15 Lock, John D., and Harold G. Moore. To Fight with Intrepidity--: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present. New York: Pocket Books, 1998. p.2. Lock’s work, while not academic in nature, provides the only all-encompassing work of U.S. Ranger history. Serves as a good basic reference. 16 Black, Robert W. Ranger Dawn: The American Ranger from the Colonial Era to the Mexican War. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2009. p.6-9. 9
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The small settlement of Plymouth marked the beginning of a slow, but steady
process of English colonization in the territory that would eventually become labeled
New England. In the first few years, the small English settlements that began popping up
did not interfere with the sizable Native American population that had inhabited the area.
The two vastly different groups interacted very little at first, and it was mostly peaceful.
This would continue for the better part of the 1600s, but as the century dragged on the
English expansion grew in number and scope. As towns such as Hartford, Springfield,
and Providence started to spring up and grow, the Natives felt more and more encroached
upon. The different colonies and towns would all deal with the Native tribes differently.
This varying treatment by the colonists was coupled with shifting alliances amongst the
Natives, which led to a very precarious and tenuous situation towards the end of the
century.17
Tensions began to rise at an accelerated rate in the year 1662, when a native
named Metacomet rose to power. This man became the leader of a confederacy of
Natives, between the tribes of the Pokanoket and the Wampanoag. The colonists dubbed
this man “King Philip”, and he represented a shift in the colonist-native relationship.18
Metacomet’s father, Massasoit, had held together the peaceful trading relationship
between the confederacy and Plymouth colony. When he died in 1661, the relationship
shifted and became decidedly one-sided as the natives had resorted to trading their land
for tools and weapons. They were forced to do this to maintain an edge over their
17 Osgood, Herbert L. The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1957. p.537-539. 18 Ibid., p.540. 10
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traditional rival tribes like the Pequot, Narragansett, and Mohegan.19 As the relationship
became more hostile and Metacomet felt his people were becoming more and more
threatened by the encroaching English, small outbursts of violence began to occur
between the once friendly sides. The tensions erupted into an open war in 1675 with the
death of a Christianized Native, John Sassamon. This man allegedly informed the
governor of Plymouth Colony of planned Wampanoag attacks on isolated settlements.
Metacomet learned of Sassamon’s betrayal and had him killed. In response to blatant
murder, three Wampanoags were captured by the colonists, tried and hung in June of
1675.20 The two sides were grossly offended at the others’ intrusion into their respective sovereignties, and “King Philip’s War” officially began.
The Natives took the war to the colonists immediately. Narragansetts and
Wampanoags raided isolated farmsteads and plantations, destroying the colonial crops
and provisions. At first the colonists could no more than watch as their homes were
burned. The initial strategy of the colonists was just that; to sit in a protective blockhouse
and wait out the attacks and had been used before when the natives had attacked.21 This
strategy had been modeled on the European siege warfare of the time, but paid little
dividends to the helpless colonists. The lack of resistance only emboldened King Philip
and the natives, making them even more dangerous to the colonists. Benjamin Church,
then captain in the Plymouth militia, described the invigorated Natives were “skulking
19 Peirce, Ebenezer Weaver. Indian History, Biography, and Genealogy Pertaining to the Good Sachem Massasoit of the Wampanoag Tribe, and His Descendants: With an Appendix. Boston, Mass: New England Historic Genealogical Society, 1998. p.54-55. 20 Lepore, Jill. The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity. New York: Knopf, 1998. p.24-26. There exists some controversy concerning the death of John Sassamon, but this event was the spark to ignite New England into war. 21 Grenier. The First Way of War. p.30. 11
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everywhere in the bushes, shot all passengers and killed many that ventured abroad.”22
The colonists did not wholly sit back and allow these vicious attacks, but most early
attempts to meet them in battle ended poorly. In September a group of 100 farmers and militia was ambushed at the Battle at Bloody Brook. Over sixty men were killed including their commander Captain Lathrop.23 This was mainly due to the forces’
reluctance to deploy scouts to their surrounding areas. Captain Church also met with
disastrous results in his early attempts to quell the native aggression. These attacks
eventually reached the larger settlements, as Springfield, Mass. was burned to the ground
on October 5th.24 The colonists secured their first real victory of the war in December of
1675, but not without consequences. A force of nearly one thousand English militia and
farmers was joined by many friendly natives as they assaulted a Naragansett stronghold
at the “Great Swamp Fight”. The colonists hoped to defeat the natives in battle and then
attack and destroy their settlement. While it was a military victory for the colonists, they
were unable to destroy the native settlement, as the native civilians had fled during the
battle. The colonists were faced with the long march back with little to no provisions;
many resorted to eating their own horses to stay alive.25
A new strategy was necessary if the colonists were to gain the upper-hand in their
first true test of war. Benjamin Church offered the option that would eventually lead to
America’s first true way of war; he argued that the colonists “must make a business of the
22 Church, Benjamin. Diary of King Philip's War, 1675-76. Chester, Conn: Published for the Little Compton Historical Society [by] Pequot Press, 1975. p.77. 23 Osgood. The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century. p.555. 24 Grenier. The First Way of War. p.31. 25 Osgood. p.563-564. 12
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war as the enemy did.”26 While Church was not the only colonist to suggest this new approach, he stands out due to the success he would achieve and the tradition that would develop. That tradition would look back to Church and the men that fought alongside him as America’s first Rangers. Church set out to do exactly what he proposed over the winter months of 1675-76. With the help of friendly natives as guides and teachers, Church and a select few hardened militia men learned the ‘skulking’ way of war that had been used against the colonists. Church and his men raided multiple hostile native settlements. This small campaign, eventually known as the Nipmuck expedition, did little to impact the
outcome of the war, but marks the official birth of the American Ranger.27 This
adaptation of the natives’ tactics and strategy marked the swing in King Philip’s War. By
July of 1676 the first official American Ranger force was organized by the governor of
Plymouth colony, Edward Winslow, at the request of Church. This force was made up of
60 hand-picked colonists that proved to be the most aggressive and ablest of the available
militia. The men were all volunteers who proved to be the most able and aggressive of
the available pool of military age men. Church’s Rangers was completed with the
addition of 140 friendly natives, who were in no doubt the most important element.28
These skilled guides and instructors sculpted Church and his force into the very capable
‘skulkers’ that they would become. These men would fight as an irregular force in the
woods and swamps of New England for the remainder of the war: setting and avoiding
ambushes, raiding native settlements, and scouting areas for more conventional militia
units. The Rangers eventually matched their native enemy in both aggressiveness and
26 Church. p.106. 27 Grenier. p.33. 28 Church. p. 128. 13
Texas Tech University, James Sandy, Summer 2011 brutality, as they waged an unlimited war against both the enemy and the enemy’s noncombatants. Church’s Rangers embodied the fullest extent of colonial aggression; they were ordered to “in all places & by all ways & means…take, kill &destroy the enemy without limitation of place or time.”29
King Philip’s War would end by the summer of 1676 as disease and war had beaten down both the Narragansett and Wampanoag tribes. It is important to note that
Church and his men were not wholly responsible for the colonial victory over Philip; the most important factor was most likely the addition of more and more friendly tribes, like the Iroquois, to the colonial cause. This addition of skilled native fighters was what really tipped the scales. This is most notable as Church was present at the battle of Mount Hope when King Philip was shot and killed, but it was one of the natives who did it and not one of the Rangers or other colonists.30 While Church’s new unit had not proved decisive in ending King Philip’s War, they did begin a new tradition of American warfare.
King Philip’s War involved the first true American Ranger force, but it was not the only early colonial example of ranging. Around the same time that Church was organizing his force, the southern colonies were creating units to defend against hostile natives, and using the term “Ranger”. These forces were similar to Church and his men only in name. The House of Burgesses in Virginia commissioned a mounted “Ranger” force in 1676. These men were designed as a screening force, very much in the traditional
29 Grenier. p.34. 30 Williams, Tony. America's Beginnings: The Dramatic Events That Shaped a Nation's Character. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010. p.37-38. 14
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lines of contemporary European warfare. This was just an extension of the Old World
into the colonies, and therefore these Rangers do not fit with Church’s Rangers.
Church’s Rangers were America’s first true warriors, aside from their Native
American enemies and allies, and their unlimited warfare was America’s first way of
war. The American Ranger represents a departure from the traditional military traditions
of the period. They were the opposite of the formalized warfare that dominated Europe at
the time. That is why these units were so important, as the colonists fought their first war
they were beginning to shape the foundations of a national identity.31 In doing so the
colonists were forced to also establish a new approach to warfare in order to survive.
While Church might have borrowed tactics from his enemy; he and his force of Rangers
broke from the traditional old world military tradition and created their own way of war,
the first American way of war.
Benjamin Church would continue to lead his Rangers against the Natives of New
England into his sixties. He fought in King William’s War and Queen Anne’s War, which
led him on five separate expeditions eastward. His last expedition ended in 1704; he then
retired from military service and briefly served in public office. 32 Church wrote his
personnel memoirs The Entertaining History of King Philip’s War in 1716 near the end of his life. This work is considered by some to be one of America’s first military manuals. Benjamin Church was the father of the American Rangers, and his protégés
31 Lepore. The Name of War. p.xiv-xv. 32 Church, Benjamin, Thomas Church, and Samuel Gardner Drake. The History of King Philip's War: Also of Expeditions against the French and Indians in the Eastern Parts of New-England, in the Years 1689, 1690, 1692, 1696 and 1704 : with Some Account of the Divine Providence Towards Col. Benjamin Church. [Whitefish, MT]: Kessinger Pub, 2007.p. 215. 15
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would go on to continue and build on the tradition he began. Men like John Gorham and
John Lovewell, who served under Church at the Great Swamp Fight, made ranging a way
of life for them and their families. Lovewell’s son and grandson were each Rangers, the
latter becoming distinguished for his service during the Seven Years’ War. John
Gorham’s grandson led Gorham’s Rangers through fighting in New England, Nova
Scotia and eventually the American War for Independence.33 Church laid the groundwork for this next generation of Rangers, and they would continue to embody this new tradition, and solidify it as the American way of war well into the 18th century. Most
prominent among them was a man named Robert Rogers.
Maj. Rogers Rules the Rangers Major Robert Rogers sat in a dark London tavern alongside a dozen fellow British
officers. These men were downing rum and regaling each other with exaggerated war
stories they had all heard before. They told stories of unheralded bravery on the part of
the noble officers while lambasting the enlisted men as the “scum of the earth”.34 Major
Rogers stood out from this group of ‘distinguished’ officers. All of the men around him
had come from wealthy families and were able to purchase their commissions, which was
the standard practice for officers in the British military. Rogers had gone a different path;
he had earned his rank in the crucible of war. In five short years, Maj. Rogers had risen
from a company commander to having a full division under his authority. He was also
one of only three colonial-born men to receive a commission in the British Army. While
33 Grenier. The First Way of War.p. 37. 34 Ross, John F. War on the Run: The Epic Story of Robert Rogers and the Conquest of America's First Frontier. New York: Bantam Books, 2009. p.2. 16
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this set Rogers apart, it was not what made the other men wary of Rogers. No physical
description of this man exists, other than his immense stature and remarks of his various
scars. There are paintings and wood carvings done after his death, but none of these are
his true likeness. Instead men wrote about the effect of being in the same room as Rogers.
He intimidated those around him, and left them uneasy and sometimes angry. 35 One of the more popular tales told about Rogers tells of a story that Rogers himself would tell in bar room competitions. He would tell his fascinated companions about how his father had been shot and killed by a fellow colonist, because he was mistaken for a bear. Roger’s mother had apparently been tracked on a separate occasion by a group of hunters because they thought she was some form of wild game.36 Rogers alienated other officers because
he was the exact opposite of them; he had grown up on the frontier of the New World and
risen from within the ranks. Yet, he still exhibited an air of superiority over those who
had come from well-to-do families. Although he was of similar rank, Rogers was nothing
like any of these men. He was born and raised on the colonial frontier, a unique
experience amongst British officers that made Rogers a bigger than life character.
Rogers was born in 1731 along the frontier of Massachusetts, in the small town
of Methuen. This small town served as the staging area for many colonists heading into
the wilds of New Hampshire. The Rogers family was not different: in 1739 Robert’s
father James founded a settlement along this frontier and named it Munterloney.37 This
area was on the leading edge of colonial expansion into upper New England, and would
35 Ibid.p.10. 36 Rogers, Robert, Timothy J. Todish, and Robert Rogers. The Annotated and Illustrated Journals of Major Robert Rogers. Fleischmanns, N.Y.: Purple Mountain Press, 2002. p. 15. 37 Ross. War on the Run .p.19-22. 17
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serve as Robert’s testing ground. He began to master the unforgiving elements early into
his childhood. He became a master hunter by the age of ten and was immediately able to
orient himself in the woods. Rogers was raised by the frontier, because from an early age
he was forced to interact with the wilderness, in much the same fashion as the Native
Americans around him had lived for centuries.38 These early experiences shaped Rogers
abilities that would allow him to master the Ranger warfare that Benjamin Church had
learned from the natives. Rogers, however, would not need to be taught by the natives he
would fight; nature had already taught him everything he would need to know.
Rogers saw his first military action in King George’s War as a private in the New
Hampshire Militia. This was the third time a war in Europe had spilled over into the
colonies.39 He joined because the Rogers’ homestead was among the many frontier
settlements under constant threat from the Abenaki natives allied with the French. He
served in Daniel Ladd’s scouting company where he put his already considerable frontier
experience to use in a wartime environment.40 King George’s War would end
unceremoniously in the colonies with the peace treaty signed in Europe in 1748, but
Roger’s had been inducted into the military lifestyle and it would dictate the rest of his
life. The hostilities would not cease for long as the fourth and final war between France
and England would once again engulf the New World.
38 Ibid. p.20-21. 39 Ibid. p.33. 40 Grenier. The First Way of War. p.62. Rogers did not begin keeping his private journals until Sept 24, 1755 when he started his expeditions from Fort Wilderness. For the purposes of this study his early life and military actions have been taken largely from secondary sources. 18
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In 1754 tensions once again burst into war on the frontiers. The French and their
Native allies threatened the English colonial frontier from Virginia to Nova Scotia. The
British suffered repeated setbacks during the opening months of this new conflict. The
most notable was an offensive expedition launched in June of 1755, which aimed at
taking the French Fort Duquesne. This strategic lynchpin sat at the junction of the
Allegheny and Monongahela rivers in present day Pittsburgh and basically secured the
Ohio country for its owner. The fort was built by the French in 1754, and was one of the
main concerns of the British in the entire area. British General Braddock led a force of
over two thousand regulars and militia to take the fort. Braddock was defeated at the
Battle of the Wilderness in July and the largest British campaign of the war to date was
ended before it ever reached its destination.41 The British were defeated by a combination
of French and Canadian regulars and militia along with numerous Native American
allies. This defeat, along with others, totally demoralized the British and colonists, to the
point that the surrounding frontier lands came into sole possession of the French and their
native Allies. The British regulars were no match for the combination of French
conventional warfare and native “skulking”.42
Even after Braddock’s defeat the British commanders were still unable to master the wild frontiers on the New World. The French forts were situated deep within the backcountries of the frontiers.43 The task of attacking one of these positions with British regulars was an arduous task due to all the logistical issues. A formation of British
41 Williams. America’s Beginnings. p.65-67.The Battle of the Wilderness took place on July 9th, 1755. 42 Grenier. The First Way of War. p. 118. 43 Ross. War on the Run. p.73-74. 19
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regulars needed many pack animals and other supply trains, which did very poorly in the
countryside, especially in the cold winter months. It was said that the French regulars in
their forts, with the assistance of their native allies, could defend against a force of British
four times greater than their own.44 This meant that the British would have to re-evaluate how they approached the war. Enter Robert Rogers, who was at Fort William Henry along with the survivors of the Battle of the Wilderness. During the winter of 1755
Rogers would successfully blend what he had learned within the British army with what all his personal experiences in the wilderness. Rogers would create an updated version of
Church’s warfare; one that was updated with newer technology and more strict military discipline.45
During that bleak winter of 1755 Rogers organized small bands of handpicked
men that he thought could keep up with him. At first these small patrols consisted of only
three or four men scouting French forts and paths that the British could use to move
around. These first sorties went undiscovered as the French never expected the British
regulars to employ irregular means. As these scouting parties continued successfully,
Rogers became more and more emboldened, eventually escalating into ambushes and
raids on enemy positions. The most audacious of these came in October of 1755 as
Rogers crept within three hundred yards of the French where he was discovered. In order
to maintain his secrecy Rogers leapt at the Frenchmen and in one fell swoop cut his throat
44 Grenier. The First Way of War.p. 119. 45 Rogers, Journals of Major Robert Rogers. p.35. In Rogers introduction he claims that his new approach to war would be instrumental in defeating any other conflict against the “savage”. He points to the importance of his tactics even before he implemented them. 20
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and scalped him.46 Rogers continued his series of raids and ambushes through the winter, all the while honing both his skills and those of his men. Rogers’ exploits had been reported on in the colonies and he was becoming well known amongst a people in dire need of hope against the French and Indian threat. In March 1756 he received orders to make haste to Boston, where he was to meet with the high commander of British forces in the colonies, Governor William Shirley.
Upon his arrival in Boston, Rogers was met by the governor and General William
Johnson. They immediately explained to Rogers that they were going to create an
independent company of men for Rogers to command. The sixty man company would
exist in between the realms of British regulars and the provincially raised militias.47 The
commanding officers referred to Rogers and his men as Rangers and ordered them back
to the countryside around Lake George and Lake Champlain where he had operated
previously. Rogers’ directions from General Johnson were:
“from time to time, to use my best endeavors to distress the French and allies by sacking, burning, and destroying their houses, barns, barracks, canoes, battoes, [etc.], and by killing their cattle of every kind; and at all times to endeavor to way-lay, attack, and destroy their convoys of provisions by land and water, in any part of the country, where I could find them.”48 Rogers and his Rangers would act independently from the British regular units, much like
the Native allies of the French and Canadian regular forces. This was the beginning of a
change among the British high command in the colonies, who would eventually realize
the absolute necessity of “Ranger” units along the frontier. Rogers named his brother
46 Rogers, Journals of Major Robert Rogers.p.42-43. 47 Ibid., p.53. 48 Ibid. p.55. 21
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Richard his lieutenant and second in command and the two began recruiting for the
company, and by mid-April had selected the very best men they could find. Rogers’
company was made up entirely of volunteers, a tradition that dated back to Benjamin
Church and continues in the American Ranger tradition to the present day.49 The vast
majority of the company was recruited from taverns and other locations of ill-repute; these brawlers were just the men Rogers was after.50
Rogers’ Rangers, as they would be called, made their way back towards Fort
William Henry and Lake George during the summer of 1756. They spent the rest of the
year scouting for the British and disrupting the French as best as they could. The
effectiveness of Rogers and his men was immediately noted by the new British
commander in the colonies, Lord Loudoun, who believed that the unparalleled advantage
on the frontier belonged to the side possessing superior irregular forces. He wrote to one
of his advisors that ”No Army can Subsist in this Country without rangers.”51 This had
always been the case along the colonial frontier, and Robert Rogers and his Rangers were
only following in the footsteps of Benjamin Church. Rogers embodied the first American
way of war to the letter; especially the unlimited aspect as he and his men regularly
offered no quarter and executed prisoners. Rogers and his men also attacked enemy civilians, burning settlements to the ground, their lack of restraint against noncombatants made what they did extirpative. The most well-known example of this was in 1759, when
49 United States. FM 7-85 Ranger Unit Operations. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, 1991. p.E-1. Sua Sponte is Latin for “Of Their Own Accord” – The Ranger Motto. Today, as always, American Rangers are all Volunteers. 50 Ross. War on the Run. p.114. 51 Grenier. The First Way of War. p.126-127. 22
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Rogers burned the native settlement of St. Francis to the ground.52 Perhaps most telling
was Rogers’ trademark that he passed down to his men of scalping those that he killed.
While Loudoun and other British officers and officials saw the battlefield necessity of the
Rangers, they took offense with the extirpative element of what Rogers and his men did.
Loudoun referred to the scalping of the enemy as a “Barbarous custom” that was below
the accepted behavior of a soldier.53 It is this divisive element that made what Rogers and
his men did the “American” way of war.
Rogers and his Rangers would serve into the end of the war in 1763. Over the
course of the war Rogers would become a legend in the colonies for his daring exploits
and those of his Rangers. The Rangers were well known for their snowshoes, which
allowed them to travel on the frozen rivers and lakes in the Ohio country. This advantage
allowed Rogers and his men to get very close to the French outposts before being spotted
as they did in January of 1757 at the first Battle of Snowshoes. While the Rangers
eventually ran into a French ambush and were forced to retreat, the raid had a distinct
effect on the French. The bewildered French had been completely surprised when one of
their supply sleds was attacked on the frozen river and had hastily organized an ambush.
Even they knew that the only man that could have orchestrated such a raid was Rogers
and try as they did to capture or kill him, it was no use as he and his men escaped as night
fell. 54 Rogers returned to Fort William Henry with vital information on the French
52 Ross. War on the Run. p.231-232. 53 Grenier. p.129 Loudoun stopped paying bounties for returned scalps in October 1756 to try and quell this ‘barbarous’ behavior. 54 Ross. War on the Run. p.122. 23
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positions and movements that they had observed.55 The information did little good as the
British were forced to surrender the fort in August. Rogers moved his men Near Fort
Edwards to an island that would eventually bear his name. Over the coming winter of
1757, Rogers would continue to raid the French and Natives, but more importantly he
would train his men. That winter Rogers would also write down his philosophy of
ranging into twenty-eight concise rules. Rogers’ “Standing Orders” outlined the basics of
survival in the backcountry and how to effectively scout the enemy, set up ambushes, and
everything else that would make Rogers famous. These rules go along with Church’s
writings as one of the first American military manuals. These rules have persisted within
US military history to the present day and have been included within every edition of the
Ranger Handbook. The last words of the handbook are Rogers’ final rule of survival:
“Don’t Forget Your Hatchet”.56
Rogers’ Rangers were the most well known force of their kind during this period,
but they were not the only American ranging force that fought alongside the British. In
1756 as Rogers’ Rangers were making a name for themselves in New York, a group
known as Armstrong’s Pennsylvanians was undertaking similar operations. In one of the
more infamous colonial actions of the war, their commander John Armstrong led 300
men in a pre-dawn attack on the Delaware village of Kittanning.57 The Delaware tribe
was allied with French and the small village had been used as a launching point for
multiple attacks on English settlements. Armstrong and his men caught the village
55 Rogers, Journals of Major Robert Rogers.p.78-79. 56 United States. FM 7-85 Ranger Unit Operations. p.D-1 57 Jennings, Francis. Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America. New York: Norton, 1988. p.276. 24
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completely by surprise and burned it to the ground, with many of the inhabitants still
inside their homes. The raiders chased down burning women and children and killed all
in their path. The entire village was utterly decimated, and many of the colonists
collected the scalps of the dead as trophies.58 While this unit did not call themselves
Rangers, they similarly operated as an irregular force and executed the same unlimited,
extirpative warfare against their enemies. Armstrong’s Pennsylvanians are just one
example of how the “ranging” approach to war was widespread as the accepted way of
war.
As the French and Indian War came to a close in 1763, the New World looked
decidedly different than before. The French were forced to hand over all of their territory
east of the Mississippi river along with French Canada. Basically the English possessions
in the New World doubled, and the French were left with only the extremely untamed
frontiers west of the Mississippi. While the English gained considerable land, the war
both in Europe and the New World had doubled the Crown’s national debt. 59 This period
signified a serious shift in the relationship between the colonists and the English at home.
In order to start paying the war debts, the crown began raising taxes for the colonists at
increasingly higher rates than before. These new measures met with stiff resistance from
the colonists themselves, which eventually required the crown to send British troops to
the colonies so that the officials could enforce the new laws and taxes. This tension
mounted to higher levels and eventually led to the outbreak of the American
58 Grenier. The First Way of War. p. 125-126. 59 Calloway, Colin G. The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2006. p.161-164. 25
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Revolutionary War in 1775. When the first shots were fired at Lexington and Concord,
many former members of Rogers’ Rangers were present amongst the militia. The
tradition of ranging had been entrenched within the colonies and would continue as the
colonies attempted to break free of the English crown.
Robert Rogers had been in and out of military service since the end of the French
and Indian war, and had become involved in legal trouble with the British. He had
accrued massive amounts of debt and had turned into an alcoholic. Rogers was a shadow
of his former self. Nevertheless as the Revolution broke out he was brought to George
Washington before the Battle of Long Island. Washington feared Rogers’ lengthy
relationship with the British army, especially because Rogers was still receiving half-pay
as a British officer.60 Rogers was arrested on the spot and charged as a spy, even though
there was no actual evidence to support this. After being released on the conditions that
he not take up arms against the colonies, Rogers was reinstated as a full officer in the
British army. In August of 1776 he was given the opportunity to command a new unit, which became known as the “Queen’s Rangers.”61 This unit would not serve in the same
fashion that Rogers’ men had in the past. It was made up of loyalists and was designed
and operated as a conventional unit of the time. Rogers would only command until
January of the next year when he was replaced due to “poor health”. Rogers would be
60 Ross. War on the Run. p.431-433. 61 Rogers. Journals. p.288-289. 26
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dominated by alcoholism for the remainder of his life and would die destitute in London
in 1795.62
The American Revolution signified a great shift in Robert Rogers’ life, but more
importantly it started a shift in American warfare that would slowly but surely make the
art of ranging less important. One of the great heroes of the colonial frontier, a legendary
man who had fought off both French and Native was arrested as a spy. As Rogers
underwent the transformation from hero to traitor, the American ranging tradition began
to shift. The tradition of ranging had ruled the colonial era of America and had
safeguarded the frontiers, but as the War for Independence arrived the colonies were not
simply defending their frontiers anymore. The colonies had to confront one of the
strongest militaries in the world in Great Britain; a more conventional army was needed.
The American Rangers would begin to shift their place within this new era of American
war. While the frontier was continually being pacified with the same brutal unlimited
warfare practiced by Church and Rogers, the term Ranger slowly began removing itself
from the frontier by the time the Revolution began. 63 New “Ranger” units begin forming
within the new organization of the Continental Army. In June of 1775 George
Washington sanctioned the creation of six companies of expert riflemen throughout the
colonies. Washington called this collection of units the Corps of Rangers, the most
famous being led by Colonel Daniel Morgan. Morgan’s Rangers took part in Benedict
Arnold’s fateful invasion of Canada, were decisive in the American victory at Saratoga,
62 Ross. p. 447-448. The end of Rogers’ life consisted of multiple stints in prison and the constant aversion of debt collectors. 63 Grenier. The First Way of War. p.147. 27
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and decimated the British at the Battle of Cowpens.64 Morgan’s Rangers was one of the
best-known and most-respected American units of the revolution. British General John
Burgoyne called Morgan and his men “the most famous corps of the continental army, all
of them crack shots”65 These men carried the name Ranger, but they did not fight as their
Ranger predecessors had. Morgan and the other Rangers of the American Revolution
mark the beginning of a new turning point in Ranger history.
The Ranger tactics were adapted into more conventional military purposes.
Continental officers like Daniel Morgan and Nathaniel Greene took the Ranger’s concept
of raids and maneuver warfare and applied it to more formal military units. They used
these tactics to even the odds against a better trained and equipped British Army.66 With
fluid raids the American military was able to slowly weaken the larger, more powerful
British forces without risking their own limited forces to destruction in a set piece battle.
This blending of Ranger ideals with conventional military practices of the time allowed
the smaller continental forces to defeat the British and secure independence for the new
United States of America. It is with these units that the American Ranger unit ceased to
fight an unlimited war along the frontier, but was incorporated within the burgeoning
formal military structure. Ranger units from this point ceased to be farmers and
woodsmen gathered together to repel a threat along their frontier. They became specially
designed units within a formalized military that were trained and equipped for a specific
purpose. The Rangers would still maintain their irregular nature, but the unlimited and
64 Lock. To Fight with Intrepidity. p.151-153. 65 United States. FM 7-85 Ranger Unit Operations. p.F-2. 66 Fuller, John F. C. A Military History of the Western World 2, From the Defeat of the Spanish Armada to the Battle of Waterloo. New York: Da Capo, 1987. p.151. The southern strategy relied on the principle of Fabian retreat: conserve one’s forces until assured of victory. 28
Texas Tech University, James Sandy, Summer 2011 extirpative element of American warfare began to die off as the frontiers became more pacified. The Rangers faced a drastic identity change as American became a nation and would struggle against that identity well into the twentieth century.
19th Century Rangers
In the years following the revolution the term Ranger was applied to a multitude of groups and units. During the War of 1812, there were six companies of Rangers raised to protect the northern frontiers. The term Ranger began to be applied to mounted units as well, which was a staunch departure from the tradition established by Church, Rogers, and others. Rangers still existed along some frontiers, but as those areas rapidly disappeared so did the need to pacify them. The best 19th century example was the Texas
Rangers, who served along the Texas frontier starting in the 1830s. There were over twenty companies of these Rangers by the 1850s, and they served as scouts for General
Zachary Taylor during the Mexican war.67 The Texas Rangers represent an important issue that the American Ranger tradition would face after the creation of the nation, while the early Rangers existed outside a formalized military structure during this period the
United States had developed an organized military. These units were created out of necessity along the frontier, but once the nation was founded the idea of Rangers was incorporated into the new U.S. military which had not existed prior to the revolution. The
Texas Rangers were somewhere in between. The problem of where these law enforcement type units fit within the increasingly militaristic Ranger tradition arises.
More work is needed done to place these Ranger units within the larger narrative.
67 Lock. To Fight with Intrepidity. p. 193. 29
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This issue of placement is quite visible within the Civil War. When the country
tore itself in half over states’ rights and other issues, the American Ranger tradition was
preserved by both the Union and the Confederate militaries. While Ranger units were
present on both sides, they were more widely used by the Confederates than the Union
Army. The Ranger units of the Civil War served in a large variety of forms from irregular
partisan infantry units to mounted reconnaissance and raiding forces. The Confederacy
used Ranger units at a higher rate than their Union counterparts, especially mounted
units, with some of the most famous units of the war bearing the Ranger name like
Ashby’s Rangers, McNeill’s Rangers and most importantly Mosby’s Rangers.
The most well-known Confederate Ranger unit was the 43rd Battalion of Virginia
Cavalry, better known as Mosby’s Rangers. This mounted unit served in northern
Virginia and would eventually become one of the most feared Confederate units of the entire war. They would so dominate their surrounding area that the region was dubbed
“Mosby’s Confederacy”. John S. Mosby began the Civil War as a private in the Virginia
Volunteers, where he quickly became noticed for his intelligence gathering capabilities.
He was commissioned as a lieutenant and transferred to a mounted scouting unit where he excelled. In June of 1863 he was offered the command of a new partisan cavalry unit, the 43rd Battalion Virginia Cavalry.68 This unit was formed under the Partisan Ranger Act
that had been passed by the Confederate Congress in April of 1862. This act allowed
partisan units to be formed outside the Confederate military by commissioned officers of
68 Williamson, James J. Mosby's Rangers. Alexandria, Va: Time-Life, 1982. p.401-404. This all encompassing work includes documents covering Mosby’s force from creation to disbandment, including field reports, muster orders, etc. 30
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the regular army.69 These units would be entitled to all the same pay and benefits of
Confederate regulars, based on the premise that they were subject to the same regulations
as those regulars, but the men would be able to stay at or very near their homes. They
would also be able to defend their homes themselves.70 This was enacted as an attempt to
increase irregular recruitment amongst the southern population. The Confederate military
was not as well supplied or financially stable as their Union counterpart, so the idea of
raising irregular units to supplement the lacking regular army was very appealing to some
Confederate officials and military leaders.71
Mosby’s force was therefore intended to even the playing field between the
superior Union forces and the Confederates. While the Confederacy recognized and paid
the Rangers, they were not a conventional force. While the unit was much larger than
Ranger units of the past and was primarily a cavalry unit they still harkened back to some
of the same principles of Church and Rogers. Mosby’s men would constantly raid behind
Union lines, and although they were not used in attacking settlements or garrisons their
orders are eerily similar to those given to Rogers when he was given control of his company:
"My purpose was to weaken the armies invading Virginia, by harassing their rear... to destroy supply trains, to break up the means of conveying intelligence, and thus isolating an army from its base, as well as its different corps from each other, to confuse their plans by capturing their dispatches, are the objects of
69 Lee, Robert E., and Clifford Dowdey. The Wartime Papers of R.E. Lee. Boston: Little, Brown, 1961. p.688. 70 Sutherland, Daniel E. A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerrillas in the American Civil War. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2009. p.165. 71 United States. The War of the Rebellion A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. [Ithaca, N.Y.]: Cornell University, 2000. p.899. 31
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partisan war. It is just as legitimate to fight an enemy in the rear as in the front. The only difference is in the danger ..."72
Mosby’s mission in Virginia was simply to impede the Union Army’s progress
and generally make their life a living hell. Mosby’s main philosophy boiled down to the
use of aggression and surprise. He believed that through small highly aggressive raids
versus multiple targets he would force the Union army to attempt to guard all of their
positions equally. When this was accomplished Mosby would then reconnoiter and find
the weakest point in the Union lines. He would then attack with the full brunt of his force,
greatly increasing his chance of success. Mosby used many of the same principles that
Rogers used, but coupled them with the sheer power of a conventional unit.73 Through these tactics Mosby’s Rangers were highly effective in disrupting Union forces and forcing them to constantly worry about the Rangers. At one point it was estimated, on the
Confederate side, that General Ulysses Grant had 17,000 men assigned to guard against the possibility of a Mosby raid.74 Mosby’s force was a thoroughly annoying pain in the
side of Union officers as they always had to be accounted for, but in the eyes of
Confederate generals they did not receive much praise. There was actually a push among
some Confederate officers to have Mosby and the other Partisan Rangers disbanded,
because among other things Mosby’s force of “Thieves” kept good healthy men off the
main battlefield. General Robert E. Lee even characterized the Partisan Ranger units as a
72 Williamson. Mosby’s Rangers. p.26. 73 United States. FM 7-85 Ranger Unit Operations. p.F-3. 74 Munson, John W. Reminiscences of a Mosby Guerilla. New York: Moffat, Yard and Co, 1906. p.228. This number seems a bit excessive, especially since it is coming from a Confederate source. 32
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“…injury rather than a benefit to the service.”75 Many conventional generals and officers looked at Mosby and other Partisan Rangers as a waste of resources that could be spent on the regular army. A small portion even voiced concern that the regular men became jealous of the Rangers because of the all the privileges and freedoms they received in comparison to the line infantry of the Confederate Army.76 This could be one of the
earliest American examples of specialized units being criticized simply because of the
status afforded to them for being “elite”. These complaints reached the Confederate
Congress, which subsequently revoked the Partisan Ranger Act. There were only two
such units allowed to remain active: Mosby’s and John H. Mcneill’s.77 Mosby’s force
continued to raid Union lines until the Confederate surrender at Appomattox in 1865,
upon which time he refused to surrender, instead disbanding the Rangers.78
The Union Army also employed Ranger units, but in nowhere near the numbers of
the Confederacy. The most visible of these units operated in the same area of Virginia
that Mosby’s force called home. Samuel C. Means was a native Virginian who was
forced to evacuate after being pressured by the Confederacy after secession. Means
returned home when the Union Army invaded Virginia in March of 1862. After serving
as a scout in the Union Army he was granted a captaincy and allowed to raise a cavalry
force to serve in the border county of Loudoun. The Loudoun Rangers, or Mean’s
75 Lee. The Wartime Papers of R.E. Lee. p.689. In a latter Lee submits his criticisms of the Partisan Ranger bands. 76 Williamson. Mosby’s Rangers. p.103-105. 77 Lee. The Wartime Papers of R.E. Lee. p.689. Lee points specifically to Mosby, and McNeill, as the lone exceptions to his criticisms, even though he sees no use for the other P.R. units. 78 Ibid. p.384-385. 33
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Rangers, were raised as an independent unit much like Mosby’s force had been. 79 For the first several years of their existence they fought as partisans like Mosby’s force. In 1864 the unit was regularized into the Union Army and fought as a conventional cavalry unit under General Philip Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley. This force is consistently overshadowed by Mosby’s but as both partisans and conventional cavalry they excelled.
Mean’s Rangers were even able to capture a portion of Mosby’s force.80 They would
serve though the war until their camp was attacked by Mosby in April of 1865, which
effectively put the unit out of commission.
Both Mosby and Mean’s Rangers are good examples of American Ranger units
being employed during the Civil War; they both effectively demonstrate the change
happening to the American Ranger tradition. Both of these units were raised and operated
as irregular units that were designed to harass and disrupt their enemies via raids. They
fought outside the pitched battles between the two conventional armies. This follows
along with the tradition of Rogers and Church before him, but Mean and Mosby were
also actively a part of the Confederate military, Mean’s Rangers were even brought into
regular service. This inclusion of the Rangers into the formal military structure inherently
changed what the Rangers were, it added pressure for results. Because Mosby’s Rangers
were paid by the Confederate Army, they were under close scrutiny to produce visible
results on the battlefield. Their effectiveness was questioned by several high ranking
Confederate generals. These two units mark the beginning of the Ranger’s identity crisis.
79 Goodhart, Briscoe. History of the Independent Loudoun Virginia Rangers. U.S. Vol. Cav. (Scouts) 1862- 65. Washington, D.C.: Press of McGill & Wallace, 1896. p.40.
80 United States. FM 7-85 Ranger Unit Operations. p.F-3. 34
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Were the Rangers of the Civil War supposed to harass the enemy on the peripheries with
raids or were they supposed to visibly assist the conventional forces on the battlefield?
No unit is capable of excelling at both of these objectives, and while these two units were
not directly asked to do both they set the stage for later units to be put in the difficult
position of being designed to accomplish one role and being asked to do something
completely different. The term guerilla was put upon units like Mosby’s and some
historians have argued against that label. Some have argued that Mosby’s Rangers were
not guerillas, but in fact they were natural combination of the American ideals of
irregular warfare that were championed by men like Rogers and Church and the
burgeoning 19th century military values of Jomini and Clausewitz.81 The Rangers of the
Civil War represent the start of a trend in the American Ranger tradition, wherein the
Rangers lack a clearly defined role.
The 20th Century and ‘Ranger Amnesia’
After the Civil War ended the country began the painful process of reconstruction.
The effects of which lingered to the end of the century, which also witnessed the last of the American wars against Native Americans. This last instance of frontier pacification was not undertaken by bands of men defending their homes; it was done completely by the U.S. military. The military was brutal and extirpative in these efforts, but did not fight as the frontier Rangers had. The military relied heavily on their material and technological superiority over the Natives and rightly so. This would increasingly emerge
81 Mackey, Robert Russell. The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004. p.72-73. Mackey specifically takes issue with the term Guerilla being applied to Mosby. He equates Guerillas more towards terrorists and the like. 35
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as a dominant trend in American warfare: the heavy reliance on technological superiority.
This shift would greatly change the American military and its approach to warfare over
the course of the twentieth century, and the Ranger tradition would get lost along the
way. Mosby’s Rangers were the last American Ranger unit to be formed for nearly one
hundred years.82 Following the Civil War there were no units called Rangers until
America became involved in World War II.
The 1st Ranger Battalion was activated in May 1942 upon the approval of General
George C. Marshall.83 This was the result of several months of discussion surrounding
the idea of a U.S. commando force. The idea originally came about following the success
and glorification of the British Commandos. This unit had been raised in June of 1940
and was by Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s request a “Butcher and Blot” raiding
force.84 These men had become heroes to both the British and American people through
news of their daring raids and exhaustive training. American General Lucian Truscott had
observed the commandos training and proposed to Marshall "We undertake immediately
an American unit along the lines of the British Commandos."85 Once again an American
Ranger force was designed after observing another state’s military and their tactics. The
United States military, especially Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, was
somewhat skeptical of the actual combat value of these raids; even though this type of
warfare had been waged since even before the beginnings of the United States military.
What ultimately solidified the decision was Marshall’s desire to create a unit to breed
82 United States. FM 7-85 Ranger Unit Operations. p.F-3. 83 Hogan, Raiders or Elite Infantry, p. 17-18. 84 John, Parker, Commandos: The Inside Story of Britain’s Most Elite Fighting Force (London: Bounty Books, 2006) p. 16-17 85 Hogan, Raiders or Elite Infantry, p.17 36
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battle-hardened troops that could be rotated throughout the Army. While the idea of
specialized raids was questioned, the value of the training was not. Marshall envisioned
the highly trained Rangers would greatly enhance the combat effectiveness of a regular unit if placed in the proper tactical leadership roles.86 The 1st Ranger Battalion marked an
important impasse in both the history of American Ranger units and the U.S. military. It
is with this unit that the modern Ranger period began; The Rangers of the 20th century
faced a debilitating identity crisis while simultaneously continuing the tradition of
ranging that began in the early colonial days of America. These units represented the
ultimate in training and aggression anywhere in the U.S. military at the time, but because
they existed outside the accepted military norm of the day they were blatantly misused by
commanders. This misuse led directly to a decreased combat efficiency, which ultimately
left these units in such a state they there were disbanded. This process would continue throughout the twentieth century; the United States developed a “Ranger Amnesia”.
General Lucian Truscott was in charge of the Ranger project from the beginning,
and it was he who resurrected the Ranger moniker. He wanted this new unit to embody
the same aggression and spirit that Robert Rogers and his Rangers had displayed almost
two hundred years prior.87 Truscott chose one of his young staff officers, Colonel
William Darby, to lead the 1st Ranger Battalion. Colonel Darby would go on to become
one of the most famous Rangers in the history of the U.S. Army. He had graduated from
West Point in 1933 as an artilleryman, and was part of one of the first groups of
86 Ibid., p. 14-16. This also satisfied President Roosevelt’s desire to have U.S. troops in action in the European Theater in 1942 87 Jeffers. Onward We Charge. p.29. 37
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Americans sent to the UK. While in Northern Ireland he was exposed to the training of
the British Commandos. He developed a keen interest in the program and was selected to
oversee and lead this “new” American unit.88 Like Church, Rogers and Mosby before
him Darby was a larger than life figure. While in North Africa and facing a German tank
assault Darby would famously tell his men: “Onward we stagger, and if the tanks come,
may God help the tanks.”89 He was the perfect man to lead these new American Rangers
and his men immediately handed him their undying allegiance.90
This was the first Ranger unit since the Civil War and was activated in a much
different world than the last incarnation. The 1st Ranger Battalion was created as a raiding
force, designed to execute quick and brutal hit and run missions. This original design to
raid behind enemy lines and strike sensitive targets clearly classifies the 1st Ranger
Battalion as a Special Force unit. Although they were designed, trained and equipped as a
raiding force, Darby’s Rangers were rarely employed in this manner. The Rangers were
trained by the British Commandos under the supervision of Lord Mountbatten, who
would later be involved with an important American unit in Burma. The Rangers were
schooled in all the necessary techniques and skills of the “raid”: they were taught to land
on enemy controlled beaches, assault up sheer cliffs and how to do anything silently and
in near darkness.91 The Rangers would do all these things and anything else asked of
88 H. Paul Jeffers, Onward We Charge: The Heroic Story of Darby’s Rangers in World War II, (New York: Nal Caliber, 2007) p. 27-29. 89 Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002) p. 380 90 Altieri, James. The Spearheaders: A Personal History of Darby's Rangers. Washington: Zenger Pub. Co, 1979. p.57. 91 Altieri. Spearheaders. p.65. 38
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them. The 1st Ranger Battalion’s first task is one of the lone examples of the unit being
employed in the manner in which they were designed; the failed raid at Dieppe.
Operation Jubilee was the first combat action that saw American soldiers engaged
on the European continent. This operation was designed to take and hold the German-
occupied port of Dieppe long enough for the Allied forces to inflict as much damage as
possible to the facilities and defensive fortifications.92 This plan involved an early
morning amphibious assault in Northern France on the morning of August 19, 1942. The
Allied force was mainly comprised of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, numbering
around 5000, which was tasked with assaulting the town of Dieppe. The main landing
force was to be accompanied and supported by two smaller raiding parties landing on its
flanks. These smaller parties were tasked with silencing several coastal gun batteries that
threatened the main landing beaches. The flanking forces were made up of the British
Commandos, with 50 Rangers from the 1st Battalion assigned to take a battery.93 The raid
was a miserable disaster with some sources citing over 60% of the Allied landing force
being killed, wounded or captured. The Rangers themselves suffered 14 casualties while
4 men were taken prisoner. The Rangers saw the only real success of the day with the
destruction of the gun battery they were tasked with, but this “victory” was fleeting when
put in perspective with the rest of the operation.94 This was one of the only “true” raids
that the 1st Ranger Battalion would undertake and as a whole it was a failure which would
later contribute to growing doubt over the employment of Ranger units.
92 Ladd, James D., Commandos and Rangers of World War II. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978. p. 25- 27. 93 Jeffers, Onward We Charge. p. 65 94 Ibid p. 65-67 39
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As America prepared to join in the Second World War, the Rangers prepared to
lead the way. Operation TORCH was the Allied invasion of North Africa, and would be
the proving ground for a new and inexperienced American military. President Roosevelt
and Prime Minister Churchill had decided that the Allied war machine was not ready to
invade Hitler’s Fortress Europe, so instead they decided to push the Germans out of
French North Africa in an attempt to gain control over the Mediterranean.95 Operation
TORCH was slated to begin on November 8, 1942 when approximately 100,000
American and British troops would invade beaches along the coasts of Algeria and
Morocco. Closing in on midnight on the 7th Darby and the 1st Ranger Battalion boarded
small landing boats and silently made their way ashore at the town of Arzew, an Algerian
port city. Their mission was to capture the two ancient forts that overlooked the port. In a
brilliant display of stealth and precision Darby and his second in command Maj. Dammer
each led a column of Rangers into the forts. Each garrison surrendered their fort within
minutes, and Darby was able to convince one of the garrison commanders to compel the
mayor to surrender his town.96 The Rangers had forced the entire town of Arzew to
capitulate before the main landing force had even started their operation. No Rangers
were wounded during the raid as they had caught nearly the entire Vichy French garrison
asleep. Darby and his men had completed their first task perfectly. This raid was exactly
what the Rangers had been trained and equipped to do, and they proved that when
assigned the proper mission they would deliver.
95 United States, Martin Blumenson, and Kent Roberts Greenfield. Command Decisions. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History Department of the Army, 1960. p.186. FDR ignored the US military’s recommendations of going straight into Europe. This was a major moment of solidarity between the American and British leaders. 96 Atkinson. An Army at Dawn. p.79-81. 40
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Darby and the 1st Ranger Battalion would be employed on several raids behind
enemy lines during the North African Campaign. The two most prominent examples were
the raids at the Sened station and the critical raid on the heights of Djbel Ank. Both of
these raids involved the Rangers travelling a large distance at night to reach an enemy
position at dawn to achieve complete surprise. In February, 1943 Darby led his men on a
twelve mile hike through the African night. They crept within two hundred yards of the
Italian outpost at Sened Station before launching a brutal assault on the sleeping Italians.
Within half an hour the Rangers were on their way back to Allied lines with prisoners in
tow. The men had been told to use their bayonets as much as possible; one officer said
“They’ve got to know they’ve been worked over by Rangers.”97 These men were trained
to be as brutal and unforgiving as possible during one of these raids. Perhaps the most
important Ranger raid during the African campaign was two months later.98 The
American offensive had stalled at the Djbel Ank pass, and the Rangers had been ordered to get behind the Italians once again.99 After a murderous march and climb to the heights
overlooking the enemy, Darby radioed to his company commanders to “Give Them Some
Steel”100 and in a flash of bayonets and Tommy gun fire the deadlock was broken. Darby
and his men had captured over 200 prisoners and had opened the way for Patton. The
unit’s actions proved to be one of the deciding factors in the eventual Allied victory at the
97 Jeffers. Onward We Charge. p.111. 98 Hogan, David W. Jr., U.S. ArmySpecial Operations in World War II. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1992. p.18. 99 Atkinson. An Army at Dawn. p.437. 100 Jeffers. p.122. 41
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battle of El Guettar, and for their accomplishments they were awarded the Presidential
Unit Citation.101
Due to the success of the 1st Ranger Battalion in North Africa the U.S. military
divided the original Ranger unit and activated the 3rd Ranger Inf. Battalion on May 21
and the 4th Ranger Inf. Battalion on May 29, 1943 in Morocco.102 These new units were made up of a core of veteran surrounded by fresh volunteers. Darby and his veteran
Rangers began to train the new units to resemble their original force. This force was split because of the need for experienced fighting men to spearhead landing operations.
Military commanders had seen the Rangers successfully spearhead an amphibious landing and witnessed the success that they had achieved in specialized raids behind enemy lines. The Rangers had proven that they were one of the most capable organizations in the military as they had never failed to complete a task given to them.
The military elite decided that the Rangers should be the ones to spearhead future amphibious assaults. This idea was originally decided upon by European Theater of
Operations Command, U.S. Army (ETOUSA), which commanded all US army operations in the European theater, and was intended to be in place for the invasion of the continent.103 This idea quickly spread into the Mediterranean theater and was adopted for
the upcoming invasion of Italy. This new employment can most likely be attributed to the
removal of Generals Terry Allen and Teddy Roosevelt from their command of the 1st
Infantry Div. These men were both vocal proponents of the Rangers and the raiding
101 United States. FM 7-85 Ranger Unit Operations. p.F-3. 102 Shelby Stanton, Order of Battle US Army, World War II, (California: Presidio Press, 1984) p. 268 103 Hogan, Raiders or Elite Infantry p.36-37. 42
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concept, and their successor Lt. General Mark Clark was not properly schooled in the use of these specialized units.104 Thus these new Ranger units were forced to lead the line
infantry and be the first ones on the beach. The Rangers were designed as a raiding force,
and were not equipped for extended pitched battles against regular German units that
would be much heavier equipped than they were. This is the first time where the U.S.
military actively misused the Rangers, a consequence of the Rangers not having a clearly
defined role. This new trend would follow the Rangers through to the conclusion of the
war. This shift in use marks an important moment in the evolution of the U.S. Army
Ranger and their existence in limbo.
The 1st, 3rd and 4th Ranger Battalions would go on to participate in two
amphibious landings, first in Sicily and then the mainland of Italy. They served as the
spearhead of both of these assaults, where they incurred heavy losses. These high
casualties would continue as the Rangers fought as the Army’s assault troops throughout
the rest of the Italian campaign. The Rangers were a light infantry unit designed to hit
their targets in lightning quick raids, but they were being employed at the front of the
Allied advance and in essence the Rangers were used up in this new role, Darby’s men
would literally fight until their unit was destroyed. 105 The Ranger Battalions were
effectively decimated during the Anzio campaign, when the Rangers were finally tasked
with an appropriate mission in late January at Cisterna. The plan called for the 1st and 3rd
Battalions to infiltrate the German lines under the cover of nightfall in early January
1944. The chaos they were supposed to inflict would then allow the 4th Battalion along
104 Jeffers. Onward We Charge. p.144-145. 105 Ladd. Commandos and Rangers. p.128-130. 43
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with the 3rd Infantry Division to break through the German lines.106 This plan met with
disaster as the Germans had redeployed during the night and easily encircled the two lead
Ranger Battalions. The next day consisted of the 4th Battalion and 3rd Inf. Div. fighting
fiercely to relieve their surrounded brothers. The encircled Rangers surrendered by noon
and only 8 men from the 2 battalions escaped back to American lines, while the 4th
Battalion suffered over 50 percent casualties in a vain rescue effort.107 This was the end
of Darby’s Rangers as a fighting force; the 3rd and 4th Battalions were folded back into
the 1st which was officially disbanded on August 15, 1944.108 Darby’s Rangers
demonstrate the dual existence of the Ranger units. They were designed and trained as a
raiding force, but they were almost totally employed as assault troops in amphibious
landings or as normal line infantry. This identity crisis only hindered the effectiveness of
the Rangers. The U.S. Army’s gross misuse of the Ranger units after the African
campaign led directly to their destruction and their ultimate disbandment. These Rangers
were in effect used as Elite Infantry although they were trained otherwise, which means
when tracing the evolution of the Ranger concept in the U.S. military it is necessary to
label Darby’s Rangers as the first Special Forces gone wrong.
The same issues of identity crisis and misuse can be applied to the other Ranger
battalions that served in the European theater. In 1942 as Darby and his men were making
a name for themselves behind enemy lines in Africa, the European Theater command was
creating a new Ranger force for the invasion of Europe. The 2nd and 5th Ranger Battalions
106 Jeffers, Onward We Charge, p. 196 107 United States. FM 7-85 Ranger Unit Operations. p.F-3. 108 Stanton, Order of Battle, p. 268 44
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were created in September of 1943 at Camp Forrest in Tennessee.109 They were both
trained under the same principles that Darby and his men had been. They were a light- infantry unit force that would not be equipped to engage in pitched battles. The operations of these two units on June 6th, 1944 are a great example of the identity crisis
thrust upon the modern American Rangers. On D-Day when the Allies invaded France one company of the 2nd Battalion was climbing the sheer cliffs of Pointe Du Hoc to
silence large German guns pointed at the landing beaches where the entire 5th Battalion
and the rest of the 2nd was spearheading the assault.110 These units were designed for the
exact same role and yet while one was being employed in that role, the rest of the
Rangers were being run through the gauntlet leading the regular infantry units. Both the
Battalions suffered heavy casualties, but completed their missions. The guns at Pointe Du
Hoc were silenced before they could inflict massive damage on the landing beaches and
the Rangers inspired the other infantry units to clear the beach. In doing so, Lt. Col Max
Schneider created the Ranger Motto of “Rangers Lead the Way!” when he screamed to
his men to push further inland.111 Both battalions would suffer the same fate as Darby and the other Ranger units; they would be used as assault troops for the push towards
Germany and ultimately be disbanded after suffering too many casualties.112
The one example of American Rangers being totally employed in the role they
were designed was the 6th Ranger Battalion which was created in January of 1944. The
6th was designed along the same lines as all of the European theater Ranger units and
109 Hogan. U.S. ArmySpecial Operations in World War II. p.39-40. 110 United States. FM 7-85 Ranger Unit Operations. p.F-4. 111 Hogan. U.S. ArmySpecial Operations in World War II. p.43. 112 United States. FM 7-85 Ranger Unit Operations. p.F-4. The 5th Battalion would go on to earn two Distinguished Unit Citations along the way to its deactivation. 45
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trained in the same tactics.113 After nine months of brutal training the unit was combat
ready in September, and slated to assist in MacArthur’s return to the Philippines. After
several successful raids of Japanese garrisons on islands surrounding Leyte, they were
tasked with their most famous operation. The Rangers were ordered to conduct a raid
behind the Japanese lines and rescue American prisoners from the prison camp at
Cabanataun. In conjunction with indigenous scouts 107 Rangers executed a nearly
flawless raid on the camp. In a little over thirty minutes the camp was destroyed and over
500 prisoners were freed. The Japanese suffered over 200 killed while the Rangers lost
two men and had 7 wounded.114 The operation was a testament to what a properly employed Ranger force could accomplish, resulting in one of the most successful rescue operations in the history of the United States military. The 6th Ranger Battalion assisted
in the final reconquest of the Philippines and executed multiple other raids and similar
operations for the duration of the war. This unit was never assigned a task outside their
design, and because of it they achieved massive success. This can be attributed to their
commanding officers like Col. Clyde D. Eddleman who served as the 6th Army’s
Operations Chief. These men understood the design of the unit, and knew how to best
employ them.115 Unfortunately, the 6th Ranger Battalion was the lone exception to the
identity crisis that eventually crippled all other American Ranger units in World War II,
113 Hogan. U.S. ArmySpecial Operations in World War II. p.84-85 114 Ibid., p.86-88. United States. FM 7-85 Ranger Unit Operations. p.F-4 115 Hogan. U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II. p.88. 46
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including a unit called the 5307th Composite Unit116 that would serve as the Modern
Ranger’s official forefathers.
When World War II was officially over in August of 1945, there were again no
more Ranger units in the U.S. military. The military created Ranger units in World War II for a very specific purpose, but in the end used them outside that purpose which ultimately resulted in them becoming combat-ineffective. The Rangers of World War II developed the identity issue that began with Mosby in the Civil War into a full-blown
crisis. The Rangers were inspired by the British Commandos, a Special Forces unit, but
were employed more often as shock troops, which was a role they were not designed to
excel in. This process would play itself out multiple times in American history as the
military would once again call up Ranger units in future conflicts, like Korea and
Vietnam, where they would again be disbanded before the conflict ended.
The American Ranger tradition originated as the original way of war for early
Americans and allowed them to pacify the frontiers. These were irregular units formed by neighbors coming together to defend their homes, and they fought an unlimited war against their enemies. They burned villages and killed civilians; their warfare had no limits. As America became a nation it developed a formalized military which adopted the
Rangers. The Rangers, now part of the military, were still irregular units that fought outside the conventional norm. This point in history signifies the transition of the
American Ranger tradition from principal form of warfare to an increasingly marginalized periphery to the accepted conventional military norm. This division would
116 To be discussed in another chapter. 47
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grow wider and the Rangers would shrink into an increasingly smaller part of the
growing American military tradition. As America became a world power in the twentieth
century, the U.S. military had completely forgotten the American Ranger and had to be
inspired by their British allies in order to create a Ranger force again. As America became a nation and eventually a world power it developed a serious case of ‘Ranger
Amnesia’ where it forgot the warfare and warriors that forged its foundation.
48
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Chapter III
Born in Burma: Merrill’s Marauders and the Goldilocks Moment in the
American Ranger Tradition
“The President of the United States has called for volunteers from experienced
jungle troops for a dangerous and hazardous operation – somewhere.”117 This is the
actual call to arms that led to the creation of one of the lesser-known but more vitally
important units in U.S. military history. This vague statement was all that potential
soldiers had to make their decision to volunteer; having no idea how much it would
impact their lives, and in the broader spectrum how much this new unit would affect the
military of the future. Several thousand would volunteer for this uncertainty and formed
into the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional). This unit would go on to become the only
American unit to serve during World War II on the Asian landmass, and would do so
with distinction which earned them the “Distinguished Unit Citation” in July 1944.118
The 5307th is a very important unit in the history of the American Rangers and other
specially trained light infantry units because it is to this unit that the current manifestation
of the U.S. Army Rangers traces their heritage. The Rangers of today pay homage to
units like Roger’s Rangers and the Rangers that fought in Europe and the Pacific, but
they look to the men of the 5307th as their military forefathers.
117 Jones, Maj. John M. “War Diary of 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) Beginning 15 January 1944.” Donovan Research Library, Ft. Benning, Georgia. D787.25 .J 718. p.1. 118 United States. FM 7-85 Ranger Unit Operations. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, 1991. p. F-5 Part of the Ranger History Appendix.
49
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The 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) was the ultimate example of a specially
trained American light infantry unit. This unit was activated to fill a specific need and
then deactivated once that need had been satisfied. This provisional existence mirrors
similar units that came before them. These men were trained and outfitted to undertake
very specific tasks and missions, and were subsequently ordered on multiple occasions to
fulfill roles that they were neither designed nor equipped to handle properly. This
represents the same identity crisis that would further haunt units of their type for the
foreseeable future. The 5307th would become better known as Merrill’s Marauders,
named after their beloved commander, and they would suffer more than any other unit of
their kind because of these issues. This unit endured one of the highest casualty rates of
any American unit in the entire war: including killed, wounded and disease related cases
the 5307th suffered over 80% casualties.119 This number is more than likely an underestimation as many light battle casualties were not reported. According to Col.
Charles Hunter who served as the 5307th‘s second in command, by the end of their
campaign there were only two Marauders who had never been hospitalized for their
wounds or disease.120 Yet, it is to these men that the U.S. Army Rangers now trace their
lineage, so it is this unit that a heavy significance must be attributed. Merrill’s Marauders
represent an important rebirth of the U.S. military’s approach to Ranger and light infantry
units. These men fall in line with their predecessor units and those that would follow; an
irregular unit specially designed and trained to operate in a specific role. The 5307th
fought against a veteran and determined enemy through some of the harshest conditions
119 Center of Military History, Merrill’s Marauders: February – May 1944, U.S. Army: Washington D.C., 1990. p. 114. Annex - 1 deals with the casualties suffered and offers a breakdown of each category. 120 Hunter, Charles Newton. Galahad. San Antonio: Naylor Co, 1963. p. 215. 50
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of World War II and completed every task assigned to them without rest or reprieve.
These men achieved unparalleled success, while receiving minimal recognition in the
larger military tradition. The 5307th represents an important moment in American Ranger history as the definitive incarnation of the “Modern Ranger” and the identity crisis that befell these units.
The 5307th would fight over the mountains and through the jungles of Northern
Burma. The larger operating area was dubbed the CBI (China-Burma-India) theater by the Allied command. This theater is by far the least well known of the war, especially to
Americans. Burma may seem to be somewhat insignificant when placed against the larger backdrop of the Second World War, but when properly examined this small piece in the puzzle was vitally important in turning back the Japanese. Burma had been captured by the Japanese by March of 1943. The British, Indian and Chinese forces had been driven out by the superior numbers, equipment and airpower of the Japanese.
Helping to lead the Chinese forces was American General Joseph Stilwell. Upon the
Allied defeat in Burma Stilwell starkly remarked: “I claim we got a hell of a beating. We got run out of Burma and it is humiliating as hell. I think we ought to…go back and retake it!”121 Their expulsion from Burma basically meant that Nationalist Chinese forces
had been cut off from all other Allied forces in the area. Burma represented the last
feasible land route into southern China, it threatened the British in India and added even
more resource-rich land to the already formidable tracts held by the Japanese Empire.122
121 Stilwell, Joseph W., and Theodore H. White eds. , The Stilwell Papers. New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc. , 1948. p. 106. Small section of Stilwell’s Associated Press dispatch. 122 Center of Military History, Merrill’s Marauders. p. 5. 51
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During the spring of 1943 the Allies’ position in the region was precarious at best
and the Japanese were bolstering their forces in Burma for a renewed offensive towards
India. After Stilwell’s Chinese troops had been expelled from Burma a new direction was
needed. A small operation was launched in January that would serve as an inspiration to
Stilwell. British Brigadier General Orde Wingate led a detachment of his 77th Indian
Infantry Brigade into Burma to harass the Japanese. This unit was formed and trained to
perform long range penetration and would serve as the model upon which General
Stilwell would base the Marauders. More commonly referred to as the “Chindits”,
Wingate’s force was made up of British, Indian, Burmese and Gurkha troops. They
marched into Burma and were supplied via air drops. This small force numbered slightly
over 3000 men, who marched over 1000 miles in a four month span.123 During that time
they gathered intelligence, harassed rear Japanese areas, cut communications and
generally tried to disrupt the Japanese in any way they could. Wingate and the Chindits
excelled at their mission and proved to be a true pain to the Japanese. Once the rainy
season returned they disappeared back into the jungles and worked their way back to
India. Wingate and his force tied up more than 5 Japanese battalions during that span, but
at a heavy cost. Out of the original 3000 only 600 would return and be ready for a second
campaign.124 Wingate’s “Ghost Army”125, as it was sometimes called, suffered from
some of the same core issues that the American Ranger units had in Europe. They were
designed as a harassment force, but were sometimes forced to engage in pitched battles.
123 Ladd, James D., Commandos and Rangers of World War II. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978. p. 262. 124 Hogan, David W. Jr., Raiders or Elite Infantry: The Changing Role of the U.S. Army Rangers from Dieppe to Grenada. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992. p. 48. 125 "THE CHINDITS." New York Times (1923-Current file), April 26, 1944, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed February 27, 2011). 52
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These situations led to a very high rate of casualties. Wingate’s “Chindits” would serve
as the perfect predecessor to the Marauders.
Following Wingate’s long range penetration campaign and the ensuing rainy
season, the Allies began to prepare for a renewed offensive. The first move in this
campaign was to be led by Stilwell who had been recently appointed as the deputy
commander of the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) while still retaining his previous
position as Chief of Staff for Allied Operations in China.126 Stilwell had been in China
for a number of years prior to the war, and therefore he knew the geography, politics and
people of the region, but in the year or so leading up to that campaign he had been in real
danger of being relieved of his command due to certain personality concerns from both
the British and Chinese camps.127 During the late summer of 1943 the Allies held a conference in Quebec to discuss the future of the CBI and China’s potential role in the rest of the war. General George C. Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, was greatly impressed by Wingate’s long range penetration idea and the success he had achieved during the previous spring. Marshall therefore dictated the creation of a similar American unit to accompany Stilwell’s Chinese troops on their upcoming campaign.128 Once again
the introduction of an American specialized infantry unit was inspired by the British, in
the same manner that the first European theater Rangers had been brought about. This
unit, like the Rangers that had come before them in Europe, would also be trained by the
British. Admiral Mountbatten would place Wingate in charge of the new unit’s training,
126 Center of Military History, Merrill’s Marauders. p. 7. 127 Tuchman, Barbara W. , Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945. New York: Macmillan, 1970. p. 375. These personality concerns and Stilwell’s struggle to maintain his command are fully discussed here. 128 Jones, War Diary. p.1. 53
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to fully utilize his mastery of the long range recon concept; the new American unit would
strive to resemble the Chindits. Marshall would eventually order, after heated argument
from Wingate, that while the newly formed 5307th would be trained under Wingate it
would fall under battlefield control of General Stilwell.129 The 5307th Composite Unit
(Provisional) was created after a British model, but would go on to embody the American
way of war and join its predecessors in leading the way as the ultimate incarnation of
American aggression and ability.
The Marauders are Born September 1, 1943 the call for volunteers for “a dangerous and hazardous mission
– somewhere”130 was given to any and all jungle trained men. The entire process of
creation, volunteer call, and training would last less than 5 months. The call went out to
MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific command, jungle training centers in Panama and
Trinidad, and Infantry schools at home. Around 3000 men volunteered for this vague
mission and unit which they knew literally nothing about. PFC Vincent Melillo was
serving in the 33rd Infantry Division in Trinidad when the call for volunteers went out,
and he probably spoke for most of the volunteers when it comes to motives for joining.
When asked why he volunteered for such uncertainty he simply replied, “Because all my
friends volunteered … [those men] were like my family.”131 The troops from the
Caribbean, along with all of the other U.S.-based volunteers, like Melillo and his buddies,
129 Tuchman, Stilwell in China. p.385. 130 Jones, War Diary. p.1. 131 Melillo, Vincent. Interviewed by James Sandy, 24 October, 2010. Digital Recorder. Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, GA. 54
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were shipped to San Francisco from which they departed on September 21.132 Unlike the
Marauders’ predecessors, these men weren’t exactly the best the Army had to offer for
this elite unit. As the Caribbean troops were mustered on the San Francisco docks, one
officer remarked “We’ve got the misfits of half the divisions in the country.”133 While
many men volunteered with their buddies like Vincent Melillo, others were ‘urged’ to
volunteer at the wishes of their commanders. After rendezvousing with the Southwest
Pacific troops in Australia, the entire unit arrived in Bombay, India at the end of October.
After a few weeks in Bombay the entire unit was transported to the tiny village of
Deogarh, in central India, which would serve as the jungle training site for the 5307th134.
This site was chosen because it provided easy access to jungle terrain for the training, and
it was separated from the sizable British camp at Deolali. The 5307th’s training would be
supervised by a Brit, but the Americans would encamp and train separately from their
Anglo-allies.135
The 5307th’s organization was in tune with its training and design, which in the
end created a unique structure that no other American unit would utilize. With Wingate in
charge of the unit’s creation and design, he modeled its organization after his own
“Chindits”. The 3000 men who made up the 5307th had been split into three battalions, but were then subsequently split into two combat teams of around 470 men each. Each of the six color-coded combat teams contained an Intelligence and Reconnaissance platoon, a heavy weapons platoon containing machine guns and mortars, medical detachment and
132 Center of Military History, Merrill’s Marauders. p.10. 133 Hogan, David W. Jr., U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1992. p. 113. 134 Jones. War Diary. p.2. 135 Center of Military History, Merrill’s Marauders. p. 11. 55
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a pioneer and demolition platoon. 136 These combat teams were self-contained units that
were capable of operating independently from each other, and would do so regularly once
in the field. Perhaps the most unique aspect of the 5307th would be the manner in which
they were supplied. Once the unit was in the field it was to be totally supplied via airdrop.
Since the unit was going to be operating to the flanks and the rear of the enemy lines and
most independently, airdrop was the only feasible way to supply ammunition, food,
water, and medical supplies to the unit as they marched over the mountains of Burma.
This vital lifeline was carried out by a detachment of men that would stay behind as the
rest of the unit set out on its campaign.137 The organization and design of the 5307th was
tailored to benefit the missions that they would undertake, which meant that it was
designed to be very flexible in the field, and able to operate in small detachments. The
training program was designed to go along with the unit’s unique organization.
The 5307th’s training program was supervised by General Wingate, but the hands
on training itself was undertaken by Col. Francis Brink. Brink was one of the U.S.
military’s foremost experts on jungle warfare and methods of countering the Japanese.
The training program was focused on producing a force that would be adept at harassing
the Japanese.138 Brink placed a heavy burden on the unit’s junior officers to be able to
operate efficiently with small units. This concept of individual proficiency was applied at
every level. Each fire team, squad, and platoon was drilled in individual movement and
engagement tactics, and all officers were required to be radio and cipher certified, and
136 Center of Military History, Merrill’s Marauders. p. 12 – 13. 137 Hogan, Raiders or Elite Infantry?. p. 50. 138 Jones. War Diary. p.7. Brink was essentially in charge of the unit at this point, while Col. Hunter handled the administrative duties. 56
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platoon leaders and non-commissioned officers were required to learn to direct mortar
support.139 This design would pay off immensely once the Marauders reached the field,
as any sized detachment was capable of operating individually. To bolster this sense of
small unit capability, the training program consisted mainly of field problems being
handed down directly to the company and platoon levels. These problems were then
solved at those levels, with one unit normally working against another to foster
competition. The best example of this occurred in the middle of December when a small
detachment of General Wingate’s forces were tasked to infiltrate an area occupied by the
Marauders.140 High importance was placed upon marksmanship, and all of the battalions
were encouraged to spend as much time on the practice range as possible during the
training period. According to Major Jones’ diary this emphasis paid off and the overall
marksmanship of the entire unit improved vastly.141 Along with marksmanship, a heavy
emphasis was placed on scouting, night maneuvering, and hardening the men both
physically and mentally. In addition to the standard training that all the men received, the
soldiers assigned to the special platoons received more specific instruction. This was
especially true of the Intelligence and Reconnaissance platoons who would serve as the
eyes and ears of the 5307th in the field. The men that operated in these highly specialized
platoons were the most impressive physical specimens among the entire unit. The I&R
platoons were carefully constructed by Brink and the other commanders, which created
the most alert, aggressive groups within the 5307th. After being selected for an I&R
139 Center of Military History, Merrill’s Marauders. p. 15. 140 Jones, War Diary. p. 8 The maneuver was stopped mid-operation because the units prematurely made contact with each other. 141 Ibid., p. 7. 57
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platoon the men received additional training in scouting and patrolling, or “snooping” as
the men called it. They were instructed in how to quickly reconnoiter an enemy’s area
and determine his strengths and weaknesses. The I&R platoons preceded the main
combat team by several miles and were usually the first to encounter the enemy.142 The
men of these platoons represented the best of the 5307th and their results in the field
confirm this, as the I&R platoons suffered some of the lowest casualty rates.143 The
heavy weapons platoons received specialized training as well, and it mainly focused on
being effective with their specific weapons in the jungles and mountains that they would
be using them in. The 5307th‘s training regime lasted roughly six weeks and the men were labeled combat ready in late January, 1944.144
The 5307th’s organization and training was intended to create a unit that was highly effective in jungle combat and that could pursue its objective regardless of what sized detachment was available at any time. The combination of the unit’s unique organization and its intensive training created an effective force adept at operating independently from the conventional force while harassing an enemy’s flanks, and performing raids behind that enemy’s lines. This design also provided the unit with some severe weaknesses that would prove unavoidable in the coming campaign. To gain superior mobility and flexibility in the field the 5307th had to sacrifice adequate organic
artillery support and logistics. The unit officially consisted of three battalions, which was
normally a regimental-sized force, but as the battalions were divided into the six combat
142 Ibid., p.8-9. 143Weston, Logan. “Recommended Tactical Formations for Small Units in Jungle Warfare” Fort Benning, Ga Feb 28, 1945. Donovan D787.25 .W52 Rest. p.1. Lt. Weston’s I&R Platoon suffered 3 men killed and 4 men wounded, while inflicting in-between 254 and 460 deaths upon the enemy. 144 Center of Military History, Merrill’s Marauders. p.17. 58
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teams there was no extra support added. Therefore the combat teams lacked sufficient
organic heavy weapons support, which gave their regimental sized force the combat
power of less than a standard American Infantry Battalion.145 This deficiency would come to light very early on in their campaign. As for the logistics the unit could only be supplied when the weather and other conditions allowed, therefore on several occasions the men went without proper nutrition and hydration for extended periods. This problem would persist throughout the entirety of the 5307th’s time in the field and would dramatically worsen as the months dragged on.
While the 5307th would fall under the operational control of General Stilwell, this
unique unit needed a worthy battle-field commander and Stilwell had just the man for the job. General Frank D. Merrill was a West Point graduate who had served in the cavalry during the interwar period. In the mid-30’s he had travelled to Japan to learn the language, where he gained an understanding of the Japanese culture. Before Pearl Harbor had been bombed, he had been assigned to General Douglas MacArthur’s staff in the
Philippines. On December 7, 1941 he was on a plane to Rangoon, the capital of Burma, on a task where he remained upon hearing of the Japanese surprise attack. He was transferred to General Stilwell’s command, and became one of “Vinegar” Joe’s intimates.146 General Merrill suffered from less than stellar health, but knew the land of
Burma and the Japanese he would fight there better than almost any other officer in the
Army. The 5307th had been designed and trained largely under the influence of Wingate,
145 Taylor, Thomas H., and Martin, Robert J., Rangers: Lead the Way Turner Publishing Co, 1997. p. 7. 146 Jones. War Diary. p. 10. While Jones’ description of Merrill comes from the viewpoint of an obvious admirer, the official history from the Center of Military History is less hagiographic and questions Stilwell’s choice of a cavalry-trained commander with poor health. 59
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but they would be directed into combat by Stilwell and Merrill. The unit departed
Deogarh on the 28th of January147 and headed for Burma and war.
The Ledo Road After a thousand mile journey by train and boat, the 5307th marched the last one
hundred miles towards the jump-off point in ten days. This march was the last bit of training and preparation the unit would undergo. The 3rd Battalion arrived in the staging
area of Ningbyen on the 21st of February148, completing the concentration of the newly
dubbed “Merrill’s Marauders”149. Stilwell was in command of two Chinese divisions, the
2nd and 38th, and planned on them advancing down the Hukawng Valley. This lowland
was carved out of the mountains by the Chindwin River and presented the easiest path to
traverse for the land route to China. Reopening the land supply route to China was the
Allies’ main objective with this campaign, but if Stilwell could come down this valley he
could basically retake the entire country of Burma and open up several more routes into
China, like the old Burma Road from Rangoon.150
The most important objective to achieve for the Allies was the linkup with the
forces of Chaing Kai-Shek and the Nationalist Chinese. A successful linkup would prove
doubly beneficial for the Allies in their war against the Japanese. First it would alleviate
the strained “hump” air route that was daily transporting thousands of pounds of vitally
important supplies to the Chinese forces still fighting within China itself. If the Allies
147 Ibid., p. 21. 148 Ibid., p.26. The 1st and 2nd Btn. Had arrived a few days earlier. 149 TILLMAN DURDIN by Wireless to THE NEW YORK TIMES.. 1944. U.S. UNIT IN BURMA A DASHING OUTFIT :' Merrill's Marauders' Are All Volunteers, Using Highly Specialized Equipment. New York Times (1923-Current file), March 8, http://www.proquest.com/ (accessed April 7, 2011). 150 Center of Military History, Merrill’s Marauders. p. 17 – 19. 60
Texas Tech University, James Sandy, Summer 2011 were able to open the land route, they would be able to transport nearly 65,000 tons of material every month to the beleaguered Chinese. This is a staggering improvement when compared to the total amount transported from February to October, 1944 of 18,000 tons.151 The ability to supply the Chinese by the proposed Ledo road would allow the air transports to focus solely on supplying Allied bomber groups in the area. A second benefit of an Allied controlled Burma would be the ability to place those American bomber groups even closer to the Japanese. While the C-B-I is the least discussed theater of the Pacific war it carried massive significance in repelling the Imperial Japanese from
China first, and eventually throwing them back towards Japan itself.
Stilwell planned on sending Merrill and his newly arrived Marauders on a wide encircling maneuver to the East of the main Chinese advance on Maingkwan and hitting the Japanese 18th Division’s forward command post in the village of Walawbum eight miles to the south. The veteran Japanese 18th division had been at war since 1937 and had fought in the battle of Shanghai, and the invasions of both Malaya and Singapore. The
18th division had been part of the Japanese force that had thrown out Stilwell and the
Allies in 1943. The 18th was commanded by General Shinichi Tanaka, who was an expert in maneuvering his troops and logistics in the mountainous terrain.152 The Japanese retreating from the Chinese advance would then come upon the Marauders in a series of roadblocks and ambushes set in the area surrounding Walawbum.153 The important part of the plan was that the Marauders would be quickly relieved by the advancing Chinese.
151 Sherry, Mark D. China Defensive. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1996. p. 15 152 Tuchman, Stilwell in China. p. 416. 153 Stilwell. The Stilwell Papers., p. 279. 61
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This was imperative because the Marauders would be at the tip of the advance at
Walawbum, and completely exposed to any Japanese counterattack, a situation they were
not equipped to handle.
On the 24th of February the 5307th departed Ningbyen, one battalion at a time. As
the men prepared to start their march they furiously wrote their last letters home. No one
knew the next time they would get or be able to send mail. One private who had served in
the South Pacific prior to volunteering finished his letter to his family with a paragraph
that was surely representative of many of his fellow marauders: “my pack is on my back,
my gun is oiled and loaded as I walk into the shadow of death, I fear no son-of-a-
bitch.”154 The Marauders were tired of waiting, they were ready.
The Combat Teams travelled independently of each other down the trails with
their I&R platoons out front. On the 25th, the second day of the mission, two of these lead platoons came into contact with Japanese patrols. After the ensuing firefights word spread through the ranks that Cpl. Werner Katz of the Orange Combat Team had killed the first Japanese but had also been wounded.155 The blue Combat team’s platoon also
made contact and Pvt Robert Landis was the first Marauder to be killed. Vincent Melillo
was bringing up the rear of the patrol as they were scouting the small village of Lanem
Ga which rested along the trail. A camouflaged Japanese machine gun opened up on
Landis, who was acting as lead scout, as he rounded a corner.156 The rest of the platoon
pulled back and Landis’ body was recovered the next day as the full column came
154 Jones, War Diary., p.30. Maj. Jones was struck by the young man’s letter as he was censoring the outgoing letters. 155 Center of Military History, Merrill’s Marauders. p. 32. 156 Melillo Interview. 62
Texas Tech University, James Sandy, Summer 2011 through the village. Landis was given a proper burial near a small grassy hill by the village; he had been the first American combat death on the Asian landmass since the
Boxer Uprising.157
With intermittent contact with the enemy the teams moved into position around
Walawbum as quickly as possible as Stilwell’s Chinese troops were advancing south down the Kamaing road. The lead Marauders reached their target on March 3rd and began to set up their roadblocks. Lt. Logan Weston led the Orange Combat Team’s I&R platoon into position just north of Walawbum; they were the first American unit to reach their destination. The rest of the units arrived overnight. Almost immediately as the men arrived in the area they began engaging small Japanese patrols. The Japanese seemed caught off guard to be running into an American unit behind them.158 This was exactly what the 5307th was designed to do; harass and disrupt the enemy from an unexpected position. As the advance continued, Stilwell was eager to see what Merrill’s boys were capable of. He wrote in his journal on March 3rd as the Marauders were about to get into position: “Chinese in Maingkwan. Now if Merrill can do his stuff!”159 The morning of
March 4th the men moved on Walawbum while the roadblocks held up against the retreating Japanese.
The battle for Walawbum started as a few skirmishes between small Japanese patrols, but steadily escalated into heavy firefights coupled with artillery and air strikes.
The heaviest fighting took place on a small hill occupied by Lt. Weston’s I&R platoon,
157 Jones, War Diary., p.31. 158 Center of Military History, Merrill’s Marauders. p.37. 159 Stilwell. Stilwell Papers. p. 282. 63
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which was protecting one of the flanks of the Orange Combat Team. Weston’s platoon
was probed for weaknesses for the better part of the morning until the young lieutenant
realized that he was being surrounded and radioed in for mortar support. Weston’s fire
missions were aided by his interpreter’s ability to translate the Japanese as they yelled
their attack commands. The Orange Team’s mortar section dropped over 230 shells
around the embattled platoon as they retreated across a stream towards the rest of the
unit.160 The American positions continued to confuse the retreating Japanese, and the
Marauders took full advantage in inflicting high numbers of casualties. As the fight
progressed through the night of the 5th, the Japanese attacks became more intense and
most of the Marauder positions were forced to withdraw from their roadblocks to more
favorable positions, all except the Orange Combat Team. Near sunset two full companies
attacked Orange head on with heavy artillery support. The two Marauder machine guns
held their fire until the enemy reached the bank of a small river, which was only 25 yards
away. When they opened fire, they did so with deadly accuracy, inflicting over 400
casualties on the assaulting Japanese, which ended their attack. The Marauders suffered
only 3 wounded in the engagement.161 Sgt. James McGuire was in command of the Khaki
Combat Team’s heavy weapons section as they attempted to take the town of Walawbum.
His journal gives a small look into what was happening on the ground:
“Mar 5 - Crossed river to-day to take Walawbum. They're alot of Japs here. Japs attacked us this morning. They gave us hell…. We have little ammo and no food. It looks like Japs evacuating this valley. Mar 6 - Still no food, no food for 2 days.
160 Weston. “Recommended Tactical Formations for Small Units in Jungle Warfare” p. 9. Lt. Logan provides an in-depth tactical replay of all the actions in which he and his I&R platoon were involved in, including the firefight around Walawbum. 161 Center of Military History, Merrill’s Marauders. p 43. 64
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We have walked 242 mi so far, 175 mi into Burma. Stay here to nite. Orange mowing them down that are charging across river.”162 The devastated charge at Orange Combat Team was the last effort of the Japanese to
break through the roadblock, and get to Walawbum. The Japanese retired towards
Kamaing, leaving the Allies in possession of Walawbum.163 The Marauders were
relieved by the lead elements of the advancing Chinese that evening and were completely
relieved from Walawbum on March 7th, the next day as the entirety of the Chinese
divisions arrived. General Merrill declared “The first phase of our operations is over” in a
staff meeting and allowed a 2 day rest period for the Marauders as a reward for
completing their first mission.164
The 5307th’s first mission had been a massive success. The unit had performed
perfectly in the role for which it had been designed: They had gotten behind an
unsuspecting enemy and harassed them as they retreated. The confused Japanese were
then forced into an ill-advised counter attack which resulted in a decidedly one-sided
victory for Stilwell and the Allies. The Japanese casualties reached approximately 800
while the Marauders lost 8 killed and 37 wounded. The American men were hit harder by
disease and other incapacitations than they were by the enemy, losing close to 200 men to
malaria, dengue fever and other various illnesses. Most of these cases were evacuated
after the fight in Walawbum.165
162 McGuire, T/Sgt. James F. , Combat Diary: February-June 1944. www.Marauder.org/diary.htm Accessed April 11, 2011. 163 Center of Military History, Merrill’s Marauders. p 43. 164 Jones, War Diary., p.47. 165 Center of Military History, Merrill’s Marauders. p 45. 65
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Even though this first action was a success, it also showed some foreboding signs
of what was to come. The Japanese and the Marauders were engaged in a pitched battle
for nearly two days before they were relieved by the Chinese. Luckily for the Marauders
they caught the Japanese by surprise and were able to take advantage of that surprise.
When Orange Combat Team stopped the massive Japanese assault and inflicted the
heaviest casualties of the battle, they were outnumbered and outgunned, but they had the
advantage of the high ground. As the Japanese stormed the American position most of
their small arms and machine gun fire went harmlessly over their heads.166 The
Marauders weren’t designed to remain in pitched battles for long periods of time, and that
would soon become glaringly obvious. The number of sick men would continue to be a
problem and as the marauders remained under-supplied, as Sgt. McGuire wrote, their health would continue to take men out of the campaign.167
Mission #2 – On to Shaduzup While the unit rested, General Merrill and his staff were quickly planning the next
phase of the operation after conferring with the newly arrived Chinese and receiving
orders from General Stilwell. The victory at Walawbum had given the Allies a firm
control of the Hukawng valley which stretched south, which left the next objective as the
Mogaung Valley which reached further south into the heart of Burma. To take this the
Allies needed to capture the town of Shaduzup and its surrounding area, and the
166 Hogan, U.S. Army Special Forces in World War II. p. 115. Hogan goes in to detail on how the Chinese advance was sluggish, which forced the Marauders to remain engaged alone for a much longer period of time. 167 Hopkins, James (M.D.), Stelling, Henry (M.D.), and Voorhees, Tracy S., The Marauders And The Microbes: A Record of Righteous Indignation, Infantry Journal 64 (March 1949) p. 396. This article goes into great detail describing the wretched medical state that eventually enveloped the majority of the men in the unit. 66
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Marauders would lead the way. General Merrill’s plan was to split the Marauders into
two separate columns and hit two different spots simultaneously. The 1st Battalion would
make a wide hook and position themselves south of the town where they would block the
main road. They would be followed by the 113th Chinese Infantry regiment, which would relieve the Marauders at the roadblocks upon arrival. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions would
make an even wider hook and set the same block south of a small town called
Inkangahtawng.168 This column would also be followed and eventually relieved by a
Chinese regiment. The Marauders were given two weeks to get into position, and would have to travel over some of the roughest terrain in Burma. The second column would have to negotiate one series of ridges that had a 1600 ft. change in elevation over a less than four mile stretch.169
As the Marauder columns departed the Walawbum area, the Allied position in the
CBI suffered a serious setback. The Japanese launched a large offensive from southern
Burma into British India in the middle of March. Three Japanese divisions advanced
towards Imphal with the larger goal of isolating the Assam province of India.170 The
north-eastern province of Assam was the logistical base for both Stilwell’s campaign and
also contained the airbases that were flying the Hump routes into China. If the Japanese
took Imphal, they would basically cut Assam off from the Allies in India: simultaneously strangling Stilwell and the Chinese war effort.
168 Jones, War Diary. p. 51. 169 Center of Military History, Merrill’s Marauders. p 49. 170 Tuchman. Stilwell in China. p. 439-440. 67
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The 1st Battalion began its march towards Shaduzup on March 12th. The trail
became quite difficult almost immediately as it avoided stream beds and other easier
paths in favor of taking the hills on directly. The column made decent progress regardless of the harsh terrain, travelling over 20 miles in the first two days. On the 14th the I&R
platoon of White Combat team, led by Lt. Sam Wilson, made the first contact with the
enemy. After “snooping” within only a few meters of a small Japanese patrol Lt.
Wilson’s men opened fire killing 5 Japanese.171 This small encounter is the perfect
example of the I&R platoon excelling. After this initial small engagement, the Japanese
presented considerable resistance for the rest of the march. The Marauders began running
into the Japanese along the trail in their infamous S-formation.172 The Japanese would
position six machine guns along the trail. This allowed them to unleash a withering
amount of fire down the trail while providing adequate covering fire for the lead guns to
reposition. This second trait allowed the same six guns to constantly retire down the trail
and fire upon the advancing Americans. The 1st Battalion fought both the jungle and
Japanese for the better part of the hike until Colonel Osborne, the battalion’s
commanding officer, decided surprise was the most important aspect of the upcoming
operation. The entire battalion left the trails and slowly hacked their way through the
thick jungle.173 It took two days to go the final five miles as the growth was so thick that
the lead elements were essentially cutting a 6 ft high tunnel through the jungle. The men
had to constantly unload and load their pack animals to clear steep inclines and declines.
171 Jones, War Diary. p. 52 172 Center of Military History, Merrill’s Marauders. p. 50-51. The official history provides an in-depth description of this insidious Japanese tactic as well as several sketches as to how it was employed. 173 Ibid. p.54. 68
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This process made movement excruciatingly slow, but once the column left the trail they
stopped running into the Japanese. The 1st Battalion arrived outside Shaduzup on the 24th, and after a feint attack on the town to distract the enemy, began setting up the roadblock about four miles south of town.174
The 1st Battalion moved into its preferred roadblock area to discover several
Japanese camps. After the I&R platoons swept the area, it was determined that the
Japanese were still unaware of the Marauder’s presence. Col. Osborne decided upon a
surprise attack during the night against the unsuspecting enemy. The attack would take
place very early on the 28th. The camp rested in between the Kamaing road and the banks
of the Mogaung River, so the Marauders would have to wade to the opposite bank
silently, attack through the camp to set up their road block.175 Major Johnson’s White
Combat Team was chosen to lead the attack while the Red Combat Team would cover
from the bank. The Marauders split into 3 columns and at 3 a.m. began to wade across the
Mogaung. The Marauders crept within only a few yards of the sleeping Japanese as they
fixed bayonets. The men waited until a radio signal was given at dawn. The Marauders
swept through the camp in a flash of Tommy gun bursts, grenade pops and bloodied
bayonets. The Japanese ran about in the hail of lead and confusion, some were able to
grab their guns, but most were gunned down before they could put on their pants.176 The
wild success of the attack harkens to Darby’s Rangers and their night raid on the Sened
Station two years prior in North Africa; but unlike Darby and his men, the Marauders
174 Jones. War Diary. p.55. 175 Center of Military History, Merrill’s Marauders. p. 55. 176 Osborne, Lt. Col. William L. “Shaduzup” Infantry Journal (April, 1950) p. 15-16. 69
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were not on a hit and run mission. The Marauders had to hold the position until they were
relieved by the advancing Chinese.
As the attack continued Lt. Caldwell’s rifle platoon was the first to reach the
Kamaing road, where they immediately began digging in to create a perimeter for the
roadblock. They were soon joined by other platoons. The Japanese counterattack began in
earnest by midmorning on the 28th as enemy artillery began falling on the newly
established perimeter. The Marauders were being shelled by Japanese 77 and 150
millimeter guns, but could only answer with their 60mm mortars.177 The Marauders were seriously outgunned. White Combat Team repelled several concentrated attacks from the
Japanese as the morning turned into day. The Marauders’ position was well fortified and established, and they held it throughout the night. By morning on the 29th the 1st Battalion
had been completely relieved by the Chinese 113th regiment that was held in reserve. The
Marauders suffered 8 men killed and 35 wounded, while subsequently inflicting over 300
casualties on the enemy.178
The success of the 1st Battalion can be directly linked to their employment. They
were given a task, upon completion of which they were quickly removed from the battle
and replaced with normal infantry units. The 1st Battalion was used perfectly in support
of the main Chinese advance coming south from Walawbum. The entire Japanese force
had been in the process of retreating from the advancing Chinese. The Chinese 22nd
Division had been making serious progress in the days leading up to the Marauder attack
177 Jones. War Diary. p.59. 178 Center of Military History, Merrill’s Marauders.p.57. 70
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south of Shaduzup. The confusion created by the presence of the American unit to the
rear had lessened the Japanese resistance to the advancing Chinese, who had captured the
tail end of the Hukawng Valley at Jambu Bum on March 19th.179 The 1st Battalion’s
actions demonstrate the proper use of the 5307th which led to the high degree of success
and low rate of casualties. The other two battalions would not be as lucky with their
mission further south.
The 2nd and 3rd Battalions had also moved out on the 12th and made a wide hook
to reach their destination about ten miles south of the 1st Battalion at Shaduzup.
Compared to the 1st Battalion which ran into the Japanese almost immediately, the only obstacle that the second column encountered was the jungle. Intermittent rains made the slopes of the trails very muddy, which made an already difficult hike exponentially worse. In the small village of Naubum, the Marauders were joined by an indigenous force that was created by “Detachment 101”. This small operation was an extension of the
American O.S.S., and had arrived in Burma in 1942 to train an indigenous guerilla force to combat the Japanese. The force of native Kachins180 was around 300 strong and was
armed with a menagerie of weapons, from flintlocks to Tommy guns. 181 The force was
led by U.S. Captain Vincent Curl, and provided Gen. Merrill and his men an excellent
recon force that knew the area of operations better than anyone else. As the column
neared its original target they received new directives from Stilwell. A force of Japanese
estimated around two thousand strong was reported moving along the Tanai River which
179 Stilwell. The Stilwell Papers. p. 285. 180 The Kachins are one of Burma’s ethnic minorities, and during the war numbered around 1 million in population. Maj. Jones spends several pages describing the Kachin people and their society. War Diary p. 71-74. 181 Hogan, U.S. Army Special Forces in World War II. p. 99-112. 71
Texas Tech University, James Sandy, Summer 2011 ran west of the town of Kamaing. Stilwell ordered the 5307th to accomplish its original task of blocking the road at Inkangahtawng while simultaneously blocking any movement up the Tanai.182 Merrill was forced to split his force a second time. Merrill ordered the 2nd Battalion along with Khaki combat team, under the command of Col.
Charles Hunter, to head south to set a block on the main road. The remaining Combat team, Orange, would remain behind along with the headquarters of the 3rd Battalion ready to react to whatever situation unfolded.183 This change of plans was to safeguard the
Allied advance at Shaduzup from being flanked by a considerable Japanese force coming from Kamaing. This put the Marauders in a very disadvantageous situation: they were being split into even smaller detachments and being put in the way of a sizable Japanese force that most likely had heavy support when compared to the lightly equipped combat teams.
These new plans were accelerated when Gen. Merrill heard of the success of the
Chinese at Jambu Bum. So in order to protect the advancing Chinese, the Japanese coming up the Tanai had to be met immediately. After multiple encounters, some quite heavy, with the Japanese in the Inkangahtawng area Col. Hunter and the 2nd Battalion, along with Khaki Combat Team, were ordered to hold a defensive position at Nphum Ga.
This tiny village sat atop a knobby hill, and was directly in the path of the Japanese attempting to flank the Chinese at Shaduzup. The Marauders arrived tired and began setting up their defensive perimeter. In order to reach their new destination on schedule they had marched seventy miles in four days, while dealing with intermittent contact with
182 Center of Military History, Merrill’s Marauders. p.62. 183 Jones. War Diary. p. 71. 72
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the Japanese.184 They were now tasked with holding the small hill against a very large
and determined enemy force.
As soon as the Marauders arrived and began fortifying Nphum Ga the Japanese
began shelling the village and sending probing patrols. The men of the 2nd battalion took
every available moment to better their fortifications and dig in, knowing that they were in
for the fiercest part of their campaign to date. The night of March 28th saw the true
beginnings of the battle for Nphum Ga, as the Japanese bombarded the weary Marauders
all night. This was done to simply keep the defenders awake.185 The 29th saw an early
morning infantry assault at 6 a.m. which was repulsed. The Japanese attacked the tiny
hilltop all day and into the night, all while bombarding the village with heavy artillery
and mortars. The Marauders were besieged on all sides by a superior force, and had no
choice but to hold on. This continued for a few days and the defenders held on, with the
help of a few airdrops to replenish ammunition and food.186 The Marauders were able to
repulse any attacks on their main position but lost control of their only water source,
which made a bad situation even worse. To compound these dire circumstances, on the
29th General Merrill suffered a heart attack and had to be evacuated from the 3rd
Battalion’s position at Hsamshingyang.187 Col. Hunter took control of the 5307th and
attempted to relieve his beleaguered battalion.
184 Ibid. p.86. 185 Center of Military History, Merrill’s Marauders. p. 72. The idea that the artillery and mortar fire was designed to keep the defenders awake is simply speculation on the part of the official history, which cites no evidence supporting this claim. 186 Ibid. p.72-73. 187 Stilwell. Stilwell’s Papers. p. 286. 73
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The 2nd Battalion would have to hold Nhpum Ga for nearly two weeks. Multiple attempts were made from both the besieged battalion and the Orange and Khaki Combat
Teams which sat mostly helpless at Hsamshingyang. The men at Nhpum Ga were subject to rampant dysentery and other stomach disorders due to the lack of fresh water. This was partially relieved by an airdrop of water, but it could not come close to fully stabilizing the problem. The final effort to break the siege was launched on April 4th by both Combat teams at Hsamshungyang. The men fought the Japanese for every yard of the dense jungle terrain and after 3 days of heavy fighting were within a mile of the 2nd
Battalion.188 On the 7th the Marauders pushing for Nhpum Ga got a serious boost as Col
Osborne and the 1st Battalion arrived. They had only received word of the situation several days prior and marched at a breakneck pace to assist. With the newly arrived reinforcement, the Marauders were re-invigorated. This coupled with the Japanese continued retreat in the face of the advancing Chinese allowed the breakthrough. April
8th, Easter Sunday, finally saw combat patrols of Khaki Combat Team walk into the perimeter of the 2nd Battalion.189 The Japanese fully evacuated the area almost immediately, especially as advanced elements of the Chinese force arrived in the
Hsamshungyang area. The Marauders had suffered 57 dead and 302 wounded, while the
Japanese casualties where over 500. Close to 400 Marauders had to be evacuated for dysentery, malaria and other afflictions.190
188 McGuire. Combat Diary. Entry for April 7th. 189 Jones. War Diary. p. 126-127. 190 Center of Military History, Merrill’s Marauders. p. 91. 74
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When Stilwell ordered Merrill to stop the Japanese at the Tanai, he ordered the
5307th to do something it was not designed to do. The 2nd Battalion essentially switched
from a brief flanking mission at Inkangahtawng to a static defensive role at Nhpum Ga.
This switch represents a “radical change” in the unit’s employment as it was not designed
to withstand a protracted firefight; much less a siege.191 The Marauder’s second mission
had taken a serious toll on the men and the unit, especially the 2nd Battalion. Over 700 of
the original Marauders had been killed, wounded, or evacuated due to illness. Over 450
of these casualties came from Col. McGee’s 2nd Battalion alone. The unit had marched
over 500 miles to this point and almost every Marauder was suffering from some type of
illness.192 The men’s poor health coupled with their exhaustion left the 5307th a shadow of its previous self.
Myitkyina: The End of Merrill and his Marauders With Shaduzup and Jambu Bum in Allied hands and Japanese in retreat Stilwell had decided that he should press his advance towards his ultimate goal: Myitkyina. This town held the main Japanese base for the defense of Northern Burma and the only all- weather airfield. Myitkyina also sat at the head of a railroad to Rangoon and the navigable Irrawaddy River. This was the most strategically important point in the retaking of Burma and Stilwell wanted it before the monsoons effectively ended his campaign.193 The monsoons basically meant a halt to any viable operations as the mud
made any considerable maneuvers impossible. If Myitkyina was successfully captured
191 Hogan. Raiders or Elite Infantry? p.65. 192 Jones. War Diary. p.132. Maj. Jones provides a breakdown of all the casualties and illness related evacuations in anticipation that the 5307th’s campaign had come to an end. 193 Stilwell. The Stilwell Papers. p.287-288. 75
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then the Allies could use the monsoon season to reequip and re-outfit their forces in
preparation for the renewal of operations upon the arrival of the dry season. If the
Japanese still held Myitkyina once the monsoons came, then Stilwell and the Allies
would be hard-pressed to hold the gains of their campaign. The looming battle for
Myitkyina would take place in concert with the Japanese attempt to take Imphal. The city
of Imphal represented the last Japanese effort to reach India. These two battles represent
the moment in which the momentum fully shifts to the Allies. If Myitkyina could be
taken and Imphal was defended then the Japanese war effort in Asia would be dealt a
tremendous blow.194 Stilwell had to take Myitkyina.
To ensure this was accomplished Stilwell would press his Chinese divisions
further south down the Mogaung Valley toward the town of Kamaing. The 5307th would
once again have to strike out on a wide hook over extremely harsh terrain. Their objective
would be to strike at Myitkyina. No roadblocks or flanking maneuvers this time: the
Marauders were tasked with a frontal assault on the most important Japanese base in
northern Burma. This was a complete departure from the unit’s design.195 Stilwell felt he had to do this even though he knew that the 5307th was exhausted and losing more men
everyday to illness. Stilwell thought it would look bad if the American general pushed the
Chinese troops onward but pulled the only American unit out of action before the most
important battle of the campaign. He wanted the Chinese to succeed even “if necessary at
194 Latimer, Jon. Burma: The Forgotten War. London: John Murray, 2005. p.272-274. 195 Crombez, Lt. Col. M.C. “General Merrill’s Forces 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional)” Report. Donovan D787.2 .C 88 dU. Lt. Crombez stresses in his report that this unit could not hold up in sustained action. 76
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the expense of the one American infantry unit in the theater.”196 Therefore the Marauders, which contained less than half of their original numbers, had to press on.
The Marauders had been resting in the Nhpum Ga area since the Japanese had been forced out. Their strength barely reached 1400 with so many more falling to illness on a daily basis, the commander had suffered a heart attack and been evacuated, and for nearly four months they had only eaten cold k-rations and slept outside in the rain and mud of the unforgiving Burmese countryside. Despite the abysmal shape of the unit, the men were in high spirits as they assumed their mission was over and they would soon be on the way back to India. On April 20th the men of all three battalions began drilling for an hour a day, and they knew that meant they had another mission.197 With the unit so
under strength, reorganization was necessary to create a combat effective force. With no
possibility of reinforcing the battalions with Americans, Stilwell decided to boost the
ranks of the Marauders with Chinese and Kachin troops. The 2nd Battalion, which had
suffered the most casualties, was totally reorganized to accept the new troops. The 1st and
3rd Battalions retained their original formations, but accepted the new men into their
ranks.198 General Merrill finally returned to command his unit on April 27th, the same day
Gen Stilwell arrived to brief the 5307th of their next and final mission. Stilwell explained
to Merrill that he had no choice but to employ the Marauders again, over the objections
of the Marauder general. Merrill demanded that his men needed rest and proper
reinforcement; he argued that they deserved that much after what they had already been
196 Tuchman. Stilwell in China. p. 444-445. 197 McGuire. Combat Diary. Entry for 4/20. Sgt. McGuire is noticeably angry that the unit is being given another mission. 198 Center of Military History. Merrill’s Marauders.p.97. 77
Texas Tech University, James Sandy, Summer 2011 through. Stilwell was adamant, and promised to evacuate the 5307th immediately “if everything worked out as expected.”199
On April 28th the 5307th set off for Myitkyina. This final mission would take the
Marauders over 65 miles of the absolute worst terrain that Burma had to offer. A large portion of the trek would bring the men over the 6000 ft Kumon range, a series of razor- like ridges. The men of the unit felt unappreciated and misused, but they pressed on. Lt.
Ogburn would later write of this last trek:
“We set off with that what-the-hell-did-you-expect-anyway spirit that served the 5307th [GALAHAD] in place of morale, and I dare say served it better. Mere morale would never have carried us through the country we now had to cross… The saw-toothed ridges would have been difficult enough to traverse when dry. Greased with mud, the trail that went over them was all but impossible.”200 The Marauders fought the mountains, jungle and the rain all the way to Myitkyina. Their approach to the airbase was supposed to be in secret as Stilwell imagined the Japanese would send any reinforcements to stop the main Chinese advance. As the Marauders were starting their march Stilwell began to worry if he had sent Gen. Merrill and his men into the teeth of a fortified garrison. As the operation was already under way he wrote “The die is cast, and it’s sink or swim.”201 The 5307th had a little over two weeks to reach their destination. They encountered scant Japanese resistance along the nearly impassable trails. The 3rd Battalion stopped to attack a Japanese garrison at Ritpong on the 7th of May but were underway shortly thereafter.202 On May 16th the lead elements were less than four miles from the airfield. The Marauders needed a clear day to launch their surprise
199 Hogan. U.S. Army Special Forces in World War II. p.117. 200Ogburn, Charlton. The Marauders. Woodstock, N.Y.: Overlook Press, 2002. p.229-230. 201 Stilwell. The Stilwell Papers. p.291. 202 Jones. War Diary. p. 141. 78
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assault so that they could be immediately reinforced via the airstrip. May 17th was that
clear day.203
Col. Hunter directed the attack on the airfield which began at 10 a.m. The 1st
Battalion led their Chinese allies from the southwestern tip of the airfield and fought their
way across the entire facility. The attack was a complete surprise to the Japanese
defenders, who could only mount minimal resistance. After the initial assault, Col.
Osborne took the Red and White Combat Teams to the nearby village of Pamati to secure
a ferry. This ferry was instrumental to controlling the Irrawaddy River. The entire airfield
and Pamati was in Allied hands by early evening.204 Stillwell was in jubilation and
immediately began sending in reinforcements to the newly captured airstrip. The first to
arrive was the 89th Chinese Regiment.205 The success at the airstrip and the addition of the new troops led Col. Hunter to press his attack onto the town of Myitkyina itself, believing that it could not have been heavily defended. The attack on the town itself would not mirror the attack on the airfield, but would quickly turn into a quagmire.
The newly arrived Chinese troops were green to battle and proved mostly
ineffective, which slowed the attack on the town. This reprieve allowed a force of nearly
7000 Japanese defenders to fortify Myitkyina. This opportunity swayed the momentum of
the battle and by the end of May the Japanese had taken to the offensive and were
threatening the Allied control of the airfield. The task of holding the airfield fell to the
only combat-experienced unit present: the Marauders. Even though the men of the 5307th
203 Stillwell. The Stilwell Papers. p.295-296. 204 Jones. War Diary. p. 146-147. 205 Stilwell. The Stilwell Papers. p. 297. 79
Texas Tech University, James Sandy, Summer 2011 had been in combat for four months they were ordered onto the front lines and first were tasked with pushing back the Japanese counterattack and eventually with taking the town from a determined and fortified enemy. The unit was simply not up to this task. Only
1300 men had reached Myitkyina, and between the assault on the airfield and June 1st almost 700 were evacuated to hospitals. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions were deemed unfit for combat and pulled back. Around 200 men from the 1st Battalion stayed through to the end.206 The town of Mytikyina would not fall until August 3rd, as the Japanese fought to the last man. Each individual pocket of resistance had to be dug out individually. Stilwell had his prize, but in doing so he had completely used up the 5307th. The unit was officially deactivated on August 10th; there were only 130 combat effective men and their officers.207
The Marauder’s reward for their endurance and sacrifice? In July of 1944 the unit was awarded the “Distinguished Unit Citation”, which read:
“After a series of successful engagements in the Hukawang and Mogaung Valleys of North Burma, in March and April 1944, the unit was called on to lead a march over jungle trails through extremely difficult mountain terrain against stubborn resistance in a surprise attack on Myitkyina. The unit proved equal to its task and after a brilliant operation on 17 May 1944 seized the airfield at Myitkyina, an objective of great importance in the campaign, and assisted in the capture of the town on Myitkyina on 3 August 1944.”208 The 5307th also enjoyed the rare distinction of every member receiving the Bronze Star.
This was the relatively unceremonious end to the Marauders. The 5307th was reorganized into the 475th Infantry shortly after their deactivation and merged with the 124th Cavalry
206 Center of Military History. Merrill’s Marauders. p.113. 207 Hunter. GALAHAD. p.215. 208 Center of Military History. Merrill’s Marauders. p.113. 80
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to form a new long-range penetration group, the Mars Task Force. None of the original
Marauders were involved in the Mars force, but they provided its blueprint. This new unit
continued the fight in Burma until January of 1945. The “Marsmen” were then
transferred to China where they trained Chinese troops until the unit was disbanded in
July of 1945.209 The dormant 475th would later be re-designated the 75th Infantry, which
would eventually form the 75th Ranger Regiment.210
The 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) more than lived up to its provisional tag,
but not because it had run out of missions. The unit was literally employed until there
was no unit left to employ. The men of the 5307th were organized, trained and equipped to play a very specific role in Stilwell’s campaign. As that campaign dragged on the
Marauders were increasingly given tasks outside that role. While the Marauders never failed to accomplish a mission, they began suffering increased casualties until the unit was in essence “used up”. This theme of misuse by their commanders is directly in line with other Ranger and light infantry units of the 20th century. Like the other Ranger units of World War II the 5307th and its tactics and design would be quickly forgotten by the
U.S. military. This leaves these units outside the military norm and paints them as
unorthodox when compared to a regular infantry formation. This outward appearance of
irregularity made these units seem more like a “flash in the pan” rather than the American
military staple that the Ranger had been. In reality, these units are the only semblance of
the original American warfare tradition left, as postulated by Grenier, that the American
209 Hogan. Raiders or Elite Infantry? p. 68. 210 Adams, Thomas K. , US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenges of Unconventional Warfare. London: Frank Class, 1998. p.157. 81
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way of war is carried out by irregular units waging an unlimited war against their
enemies. 211 Although the Marauders did not engage in an unlimited war, they fought via
irregular methods, and achieved total success. It is in this vein that the Marauders took up
the standard of their predecessors and continued to embody the true American way of
war.
The Rangers of World War II represent the low point in the American Ranging
tradition. The American Military had no Ranger units at the outset of the war, and they
were all deactivated before the war was over. The Ranger units and their unique skill-sets
were not deemed imperative in the new American Military, one that valued the newly
perfected destructive power of the airplane.212 Rangers have been a mainstay throughout
American history, but as the United States developed into a more powerful nation both
home and abroad the Ranger slowly fell to the wayside. The end of World War II
signified the United States’ ascension to world hegemon but also brought about the
darkest days of the American Ranger. Merrill’s Marauders are the ultimate example of
the American Ranger being under appreciated and cast aside, but the Marauders would
also serve as the beginning of a new phase for the American Ranger. The 5307th would be
re-designated multiple times over the following decades and would serve as the official forefathers of the modern American Ranger. The American Ranger Tradition had shifted from the first American approach to war towards a fringe concept that was widely misunderstood and deemed unnecessary by the military elite by the end of World War II.
211 Grenier, John. The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p.10-11. 212 Weigley, Russell Frank. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. New York: Macmillan, 1973. P.363. This “New American Military” will be discussed at length in Ch.3. 82
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Chapter IV
Back to School: The Rangers become an Institution
The Ranger units of World War II are some of the most recognizable of any
American military units that fought with distinction. These units were a long outgrowth
of the American Ranger tradition that had been growing and evolving with American from the beginning. That relationship was inversely proportional for the American
Ranger, because as the United States grew more powerful on the global scale the Ranger tradition became a smaller part of the overall military tradition. The Rangers of World
War II signified the low point in their long history that dates back to the early 1600s. The way of war forged on the frontiers by the Early Rangers had long fallen by the wayside as the U.S. military achieved total victory in the world’s largest and most destructive conflict.
The end of World War II signified the United States’ emergence as one of the world’s most powerful nations. Over the course of the war the U.S. military had demonstrated a devastating ability to crush its opposition, no matter who that enemy was or where they called home. Against the Japanese in the Pacific the United States displayed a masterful control of its immense Naval forces in the systematic destruction of
Imperial Japan and her Navy. The American naval victory over Japan was a textbook example of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s dictum of an all powerful Navy ruling supreme. The
American Navy’s inclusion of aerial and amphibious elements made it that much more
83
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decisive in bringing the war to an end.213 Opposite of the Pacific theater, the United
States showed remarkable flexibility in its approach to ending Hitler’s stranglehold on
Europe. The United States Army, along with its British allies, executed a strategy of
annihilation, which meant an all out drive to destroy the German war machine at all
costs.214 This called for the mass coordination of ground forces and their logistics, and
assisting those forces with newly perfected air power. As the war progressed this strategy
of annihilation escalated towards the brutal act of strategic bombing. These two
strategies, when combined, made for an unmatched military power. The U.S. military of
World War II proved to those around them that small highly trained units like the
Rangers had only a small part in the future of warfare, if any at all. The dominant idea
was that the airplane would win any war that needed to be fought through any future that
unfolded; this was the “Air War Thesis”.215 Lewis argues that although this was the accepted theory of future war strategy at the time, the true element that wins a war is the soldier on the ground. The United States would have to learn this first hand, and that learning process would be long, drawn out, and extremely painful. Lewis does not specify the American Ranger, but this work argues that units like the Rangers represent the essential human element of American warfare.
To understand the next phase in the American Ranger tradition it is first necessary to fully grasp the strategies of victory during the war and most importantly the changes that enveloped the U.S. military following World War II and ultimately the creation of
213 Weigley, Russell Frank. The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy. New York: Macmillan, 1973. p.311. 214 Ibid. p. 313. 215 Lewis, American Culture of War, p.37. 84
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the Atomic weapon. The invention of the nuclear weapon and the subsequent use of that
weapon to end World War II fundamentally changed the way the world looked at
warfare. The governments of the world thought that conventional ground wars were a
thing of the past and that the wars of the future would be won by strategic air campaigns
and nuclear weapons. This was certainly the case with the United States. As World War
II ended the United States possessed the most powerful military force in the world. The
U.S. military was the only country capable of delivering a nuclear weapon and had
demonstrated that it was not above doing so.216 The dropping of the atomic bombs on
Japan had signaled the U.S. military elite that the airplane was the weapon of the future,
and the United States began to fully embrace this stance in developing its military future.
This shift is easily identifiable as by December of 1945 the United States had already
dismissed over 2,000,000 men and women from its armed services as the military argued
over downsizing in favor of a strategically dominant and nuclear armed Army Air
Corp.217 This downsize coincided with a massive military buildup by the Soviet Union
and a top-notch espionage effort at Los Alamos which culminated with the successful test
of the USSR’s own nuclear weapon in August of 1949.218 This second nuclear capable country greatly shifted the balance of power world-wide, which forced the United States to place even more importance on its own capabilities. The Cold War had begun almost
216 Weigley. The American Way of War. p.366 – 367. Weigley goes into detail concerning the United States’ past reliance on deterrent weapons, and claims the Nuclear weapon was the ultimate incarnation of that idea. 217 Michael D. Gordin, Red Cloud at Dawn: Truman, Stalin, and the End of the Atomic Monopoly, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009) p. 26 – 27. 218 Ibid, p. 247. 85
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immediately after World War II ended and escalated at an exponential rate during the late
1940’s and finally erupted in the form of the Korean War.
The Cold War saw the two most powerful countries in the history of mankind butt
heads for over 40 years. This conflict would become kinetic in places like Korea and
Vietnam but the two nations would never directly face each other in armed conflict. The
Cold War was a war of tension, military buildup and ideology; all of these things greatly affected the doctrine and makeup of American military forces. This Cold War began at
the Potsdam Conference that took place from July 17 to August 2, 1945. During this
conference of the Allied powers President Truman advised Soviet leader Joseph Stalin
that the United States possessed a new “extraordinary” weapon that could be used on
Japan to end the war. 219 From this point forward the tension and competition between the
two superpowers began to escalate rapidly. The United States saw an argument evolve
between the Army and the newly created Air Force. At this point 4-star Air Force
General Curtis LeMay became an important figure in the transformation of the American
military machine.
General LeMay earned international recognition following his service during
World War II. Gen. LeMay served as the commanding officer of the 20th Air Force which
conducted operations over Japan during the closing days of the war. These bombing raids
were similar to the British and American bombing of German cities in Europe, like
Dresden, but were on a much larger and more destructive scale. The bombing campaign
over Japan was decidedly more brutal than similar operations in Europe, because the
219 Ibid, p. 3 – 10. 86
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Japanese cities were largely comprised of wooden buildings built close together and the
American sentiment regarding Pearl Harbor. It has been argued that the American
military was more aggressive with the fire-bombings against Japan in order to exact revenge.220 LeMay directed the now infamous “Fire Bombings” against the Japanese
mainland that killed many more people than both of the original atomic bombs combined.
Between the beginning of this campaign in March of 1945 and the Japanese surrender in
August the fire-bombing campaign killed over 500,000 civilians. On the night of March
9th in Tokyo, LeMay’s bombers killed well over 100,000 people, destroyed over 250,000
buildings and incinerated over 16 square miles of the city.221 These actions both in
Europe and the Pacific demonstrated that LeMay and the United States was ready to do
anything to end a war, even if that meant the mass slaughter of an enemy’s civilian
population. Following the particularly brutal raid on Tokyo LeMay was famously quoted
by New York Times: “… [LeMay] declared that if the war is shortened by a single day,
the attack will have served its purpose."222 While LeMay had nothing to do with the
atomic bombings he voiced his support in their use, he expressed his appreciation of this
new power in his autobiography: “These bombs brought into the world not only their own
speed and extent of desolation. They brought a strange pervading fear which does not
seem to have affected mankind previously, from any other source.”223 LeMay would take
over the Strategic Air Command (SAC) in 1948 knowing full well that warfare was due
to change forever because of these new weapons. General LeMay would change SAC
220 Weigley. The American Way of War. p.364-365. 221 John Buckley, Air Power in the Age of Total War (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999) p. 193 – These figures are not precise but demonstrate the devastation caused by these “Fire” raids. 222 Robert Trumbull, “B-29s Turn Japan into Chaotic Land,” New York Times, 23 March 1945 p. 10. 223 Curtis LeMay, Mission with LeMay (New York: Doubleday, 1965) p. 387. 87
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into one of the most powerful combat arms the United States has ever seen.224 LeMay
and the newly created Air Force began to gain an upper hand in the balance of the U.S.
military forces during the late 1940’s. The Army Chief of Staff, General Omar Bradley,
stated in 1948 that the Army would defend the Air Force bases and attack enemy air
bases in order to neutralize the enemy’s air efforts. He states that: “Success in modern
war can come only through a carefully planned employment of balanced land, sea, and air
forces operating as a team.” He then follows by outlining the Army’s obvious backseat
role to the Air Force in this new warfare: “…the land forces -- the Army -- will be responsible for seizing and holding bases from which the air effort may be most effectively launched….The Army will also play a large part in preventing the enemy from holding bases from which he can attack our bases and the United States itself…”225
This speech from the Army Chief of Staff clearly shows that the United States military
was planning on the Air Force being the deciding factor in its future conflicts. This claim
is backed up by the small standing army that existed at this time. At the time Gen.
Bradley made these remarks the standing U.S. Army was comprised of 542,000 men,
which failed in comparison to the 2 million man standing army of the Soviet Union.226
The American approach to warfare was rapidly changing and the Army was no longer at the forefront, and if the Army was struggling to remain relevant then the basically dormant Ranger tradition was even farther away from becoming accepted into the military norm.
224 Lewis, American Culture of War, p. 71-73—Gen. LeMay transformed SAC into THE power of the U.S. military by his departure in 1957. When he left its command SAC employed over 2000 heavy bombers. 225 Omar Bradley, “Our Military Requirements – III,” AID, July 1948 p. 74-78 – Address to the House Armed Services Committee. 226 Lewis, American Culture of War, p. 73 – 74. 88
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In August of 1949 the Soviet Union detonated their first successful atomic
weapon, Joe-1, effectively ending the American atomic monopoly.227 This event
essentially leveled the playing field and meant that global nuclear war was that much
more possible. This event was the signifying event that the Cold War had fully arrived. In
his inaugural speech in 1949 President Harry Truman had codified the tension with his
famous “Us against Them” speech. He opened with: “The peoples of the earth face the
future with great uncertainty, composed equally of great hopes and great fears…”228
Truman would go on to outline the threats posed by the Soviet Union and explain how
the United States must rise up and meet those threats. With this speech Truman began
committing the United States to the confrontation of the USSR and communism
worldwide. This idea would be outlined in the infamous report by the National Security
Council, NSC 68. This report outlined the threats of Communism worldwide and coined
the term “containment”, an idea that would dominate U.S. foreign policy for the
remainder of the Cold War. This report was written in April 1950 and its final
recommendations read:
“In summary, we must, by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with convincing evidence of the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will. Such evidence is the only means short of war which eventually may force the Kremlin to abandon its present course of action and to negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of major importance.”229
227 Gordin, Red Cloud at Dawn, p. 247. 228 Jeffrey Feldman, Framing the Debate: Framing Presidential Speeches and How Progressives Can Use Them to Change the Conversation (New York: Ig Publishing, 2007) p. 75. 229 National Security Council, N.S.C. 68, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1950, Volume I. 89
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As this report and its findings were accepted by the U.S. government it further committed
the United States to conflicts in order to contain Communism. These conflicts were to be
fought as defensive wars with the objective to maintain the status quo and not seek
complete military victory in the fear of igniting the powder keg that was the Cold War.
This idea and new style of American warfare was to be tested and refined shortly after
NSC 68 as the Korean War exploded in June of 1950. The Ranger Redux was about to
begin as no Ranger units had existed since the disbandment of Merrill’s Marauders in
August of 1944.230
Korea The peninsula of Korea was occupied by the Japanese from 1910 throughout
World War II and upon its conclusion was divided by the victorious Allies. Korea was
divided along the 38th Parallel; The United States occupied everything south of the line
while the Soviet Union controlled the North.231 This small nation on the edge of Asia
would be the site of the first clash of western ideals against Communism. The original
plan for Korea was to allow the Korean people to select their own form of government
after a few years under “joint” U.S. and Soviet influence. Over the first few years the
United States began to fear that the Korea that was unfolding would be decidedly left-
leaning and fall into Communism immediately if left to its own course. The U.N was
asked to intervene and supervise the formation of a new unified Korea, but due to lack of
230 United States. FM 7-85 Ranger Unit Operations. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, 1991. P. F-5. The Official Ranger history recognizes the Marauders as the final Rangers of World War II, even though the 6th Ranger Battalion was active until the end of hostilities. 231 Stewart, Richard W. American Military History, Volume II: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917-2008. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2010. p.217. 90
Texas Tech University, James Sandy, Summer 2011 cooperation from the ruling leader of the North, Kim Il Sung, the elections were only held south the 38th parallel. A pro-U.S. politician, Syngman Rhee, was elected president of the Republic of South Korea in July of 1948.232 The United States was satisfied with at least half of Korea based on western ideals, and ended the American occupation shortly after Rhee’s inauguration. The Soviets followed suit after they had helped to establish the new Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the North under the communist rule of
Kim Il Sung. The plan to create a unified Korea had no chance because both the United
States and the Soviet Union were determined to make sure their way of governance had at least a foothold on the peninsula.
The two Koreas were created in similar fashion; both were set up and aided by one of the world superpowers. But two years after the creation, as they sat on the brink of war, the two countries were in very different positions. The Republic of South Korea suffered internal opposition from the start as President Rhee was constantly dealing with dissention within his rank and file, while North Korea was unified behind Kim Il Sung.
The South Korean Army, Republic of Korea (ROK), was small and lightly armed in comparison to the large army of the North Korea, the People’s Army of Korea (PKA).
The Soviet influenced North maintained a large standing army that numbered around
135,000 by 1950, and it was comprised of a large number of veteran soldiers that had served with the Chinese or Soviet militaries.233 It was well equipped with heavy Soviet tanks and artillery and was supported by Soviet aircraft. The ROK military lacked
232 Ibid. p.218. 233 Appleman, Roy Edgar. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu: June-November 1950. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1961. p.24. 91
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sufficient armor or artillery and was more of a constabulary force designed to safeguard
the border.234 With dreams of a unified Korea, Kim Il Sung and the vastly superior PKA prepared to overwhelm their southern counterparts.
On June 25, 1950 Communist forces of North Korea swarmed across the border
completely overwhelming the small mainly police-type forces of South Korea. The capitol, Seoul, fell in three days to the advancing PKA and the ROK military was retreating at full speed southward.235 The United Nations passed U.N. Security Council
Resolution 82 two days after the invasion, which recommended that members yield their
military assistance to the Republic of Korea.236 In the weeks following President Truman
would commit the U.S. to lead the U.N. mission to maintain a free South Korea. He first
pledged only air and naval support, but shortly thereafter promised the introduction of
ground troops. General Omar Bradley commented that Korea was not a situation for
appeasement as the United States had done in reaction to Adolf Hitler’s aggressions in
the late 30’s but was instead the place to “Draw the Line” against the Communist
threat.237 The United States had considerable garrison forces in Japan and they would be
committed quickly to the defense of South Korea. The lead elements of the 24th Infantry
Division would engage the North Korean Army (KPA) as early as July 5th.238 Douglas
MacArthur who had famously delivered on his promise to liberate the Philippines during
234 Stewart. American Military History, Volume II. p.219. 235 Key Korean War Battles Fought in the Republic of Korea. Eighth Army Staff Historian’s Office, San Fransisco, 1972. p.iv. This official history was compiled after consulting the after action reports of the Eighth Army. 236 UN Security Council, Resolution 82 (1950) of 25 June 1950, 25 June 1950, S/RES/82 (1950), available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b00f15960.html [accessed 1 June 2011] 237Gary R. Hess, Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam and the Persian Gulf (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001) p. 155. 238Key Korean War Battles Fought in the Republic of Korea. p. iv. 92
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World War II was chosen as the commander of the U.S.-led UN forces. The stage had
been set and the call to war had been made and the United States answered in its first
opportunity to contain Communism and employ its new military machine.
As the United States military and the rest of the U.N. forces scrambled to slow the
PKA advance, they also hurried to rebuild and outfit a more potent ROK force. When the
24th Inf. Div. made it to Korea most of the soldiers assumed that the PKA would run at
the site of the newly arrived American troops. The first encounter between Korean and
U.S. troops occurred around the town of Osan on July 5. Task Force Smith, named after
their commander Colonel Charles Smith, met the KPA but was unable to destroy their
armor and was forced to retreat. The Americans suffered heavy casualties and retreated
all the way towards Pusan.239 Contrary to the beliefs of the men of Task Force Smith, the
advancing Koreans did not flinch in the face of their new opposition.240 The U.S. Army
had fallen into a mere shadow of its victorious form of only 5 years prior. The American
combat soldier had lost both his mental and physical toughness, and did not compare to
the battle-hardened troops that they were facing. This was most definitely a result of the
United States’ revamping of the military after World War II. When the decision was
made to use the Air Force and strategic bombing as the United States’ main offensive
arm, the Army began to fall into a state of un-readiness.241 This was because no one
believed the Army would have to fight a serious ground war again. One of the few who
argued for the continued importance of combined forces was General Lawton Collins
239 Appleman. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu. p.16-20. 240 Hogan, David W. Jr., Raiders or Elite Infantry: The Changing Role of the U.S. Army Rangers from Dieppe to Grenada. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992. p.105. 241 Lewis. The American Culture of War. p. 70-73. 93
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who served as Army Chief of Staff from 1949-1953, and he would prove to be
instrumental in the upcoming transformation of the American Ranger tradition.242
Even with the introduction of U.S. combat troops, the PKA advance was not
deterred. The U.S. and ROK forces were pushed down the peninsula until they were
essentially bottled up in the southern tip of Korea, near the town of Pusan. This pocket of
resistance would be dubbed the Pusan perimeter, and by mid-September this was all that
stood between Kim Il Sung’s PKA and the complete unification of the Korean
peninsula.243 The PKA had proved to be an efficient military machine as they forced the
U.S. south, one of the more effective strategies utilized by the PKA were raids. The
North Koreans raided behind the U.S. lines extensively during their initial advance
southward. These raids were undertaken by both uniformed units of the PKA and
operatives dressed as refugees headed south. As the KPA advanced south, the civilians of
South Korea attempted to head south so as to avoid the communist rule of the north as it
swallowed up the Republic of Korea. The raiders would sneak behind the retreating
American lines and cut communication lines, set roadblocks and ambushes, raid
command posts and artillery bases, and anything else they could do to disrupt the
American effort.244 These raids were executed with a ruthless brutality that ignored any rules of decency or morality that the U.S. soldiers expected. The KPA raiders used truce flags as a lure for ambushes, executed prisoners, and even used the fleeing refugees as
242 Collins, Gen Lawton J. , War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969. p.vii-viii. 243 Key Korean War Battles Fought in the Republic of Korea. p.iv-v. 244 Hogan. Raiders of Elite Infantry? p.105. 94
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human shields for assaults.245 This type of behavior appalled the U.S. soldiers, but that
was exactly the type of warfare that the early American Rangers had employed against
their enemies. The U.S. military had evolved away from this unlimited warfare as they
became a world power, and now it was being used against them with ruthless efficiency.
This is yet another example of “Ranger Amnesia” because the tactics of the KPA raiders
were quite similar to the original Ranger units, and were not that different from the
Rangers of World War II, but the United States military had completely forgotten that
way of war in the five short years since the end of World War II.
Once again, like the Rangers of World War II, the idea to form an American
Ranger unit in Korea was inspired from an external inspiration and not from within. The
disruptive raids that were being carried out with a brutal efficiency by the KPA got
American officers in the field thinking that the American raids of a similar fashion could
be equally successful.246 Even though these types of units had been present only 5 years
prior, there was no training in place to prepare the U.S. combat soldier to undertake this
type of mission. The U.S. Army of 1950 was designed to support the Air Force and be
completely mechanized for a war in Eastern Europe; they were not designed to undertake
raids that traversed the rocky mountainous terrain of the Korean Peninsula.247 Since these
raids would require some specialized training, the standard combat soldiers on the ground
were not valid candidates. The U.S. military therefore decided to form specialized units,
and like the Rangers of World War II these would also be grossly misused.
245 Ibid. 246 Collins. War in Peacetime. p.108-110. Collins was touring the Pusan area and meeting with different company commanders, all of which complained about the KPA raids and lack of their units’ ability to counter-raid. 247 Lewis. The American Culture of War. p. 63-64. 95
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The first of these units was thrown together at the Far East Command (FECOM)
headquarters in Tokyo in late August. This unit was designated the 8213th Ranger
Company but would soon be dubbed the Eighth Army Ranger Company. This unit was
organized in an ad-hoc fashion as its chosen commander Lieutenant Ralph Puckett filled
its ranks by scanning the rear echelon ranks of FECOM. Puckett was only a 2nd
Lieutenant when he was offered the command, and when he volunteered he offered to
take any spot available even as a rifleman simply because “he wanted to be with the
best.”248 Puckett perused the cooks, clerks, typists, mechanics and other non-combat
ranks looking for volunteers. After filling the ranks with mainly non-combat personnel
the company was shipped to Korea for training on September 2nd.249 Puckett was given
seven weeks to train these men into Rangers. The training location was near a small
village names Kijang which sat northwest of Pusan. The camp itself was dubbed “Ranger
Hill” and sat in region quite close to the active U.S. defense perimeter. Puckett and his
Rangers were trained in an area that was infiltrated by the PKPA on several occasions.
The Ranger Company consisted of two 36-man platoons that were each divided into a
headquarters element, two assault sections, and a heavy weapons squad. The Rangers
were mostly armed with sub-machine guns and had only four machine guns for the entire
company, so like the Rangers and Marauders of World War II before them this
incarnation of the Rangers was outfitted as a light infantry unit capable of maneuvering
248 Puckett, Ralph. Interviewed by James Sandy, 2 November, 2010. E-mail correspondence. 249 Lock, John D., and Harold G. Moore. To Fight with Intrepidity--: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present. New York: Pocket Books, 1998. p. 308-309. 96
Texas Tech University, James Sandy, Summer 2011 quickly.250 Puckett only fielded a five man company headquarters element. The Eighth
Army Ranger Company was designed to operate as simply as possible, so it could act quickly and efficiently while conducting the dangerous task of raiding and patrolling behind enemy lines.“Ranger Hill” required the Rangers to maintain a 360° defensive perimeter while simultaneously training. Their training focused on the fundamentals of a light infantry unit: shoot, move, and communicate. The training was somewhat simple, but the process was intense and unrelenting. The Rangers were taught to overcome mental and physical fatigue and the fear of bodily harm.251 The unit was only allowed to train for five and a half weeks, because they were called into action and the Eighth Army
Ranger Company (8ARC) linked up with the 25th Infantry Division on October 12th. The last day that the unit was at “Ranger Hill” was probably the most important as Colonel
John McGee, who organized the creation of the unit itself, made an important decision.
McGee decided that the combat value of the unit be evaluated immediately upon their entry into combat as to either expand the Ranger concept into a full battalion or deactivate it.252 This was vitally important for future Ranger units in Korea, because this unit would determine if any other units were to be raised.
The company was attached to the 25th Infantry Division and caught up with their new parent unit in the vicinity of Poun, on October 12th. By this time in the war the U.S. military had broken out of the Pusan perimeter and were making a breakneck advance north across the peninsula. When the war was very young, the U.S. commander of the
250 Ibid.p.308. Like Merrill’s Marauders the 8ARC was lightly equipped and ill-suited for long pitched battles. 251 Puckett Interview. 252 Lock. To Fight with Intrepidity. p. 309. 97
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entire effort General Douglass MacArthur began planning an aggressive amphibious
operation. On September 15, the U.S. Marines had successfully landed at Inchon which
sat over 100 miles behind enemy lines. As the KPA had advanced southward they
sacrificed their logistical support for speed, and while they held the U.S. at Pusan their
logistical situation was tenuous at best. MacArthur guaranteed that with his Inchon plan
the KPA’s strength in the south would crumble, he famously remarked that “…We shall
land at Inchon, and I shall crush them.”253 The U.S. forces broke out of the perimeter on
the same day as the Inchon landings and the KPA folded into retreat. The forces from
Pusan linked up with the Marines at Inchon on September 26th, barely ten days after the
outbreak.254 As the U.S. forces advanced at this breakneck speed they invariably
bypassed pockets of KPA resistance. This was to be the first mission of the 8ARC, the destruction of any lingering enemy presence around the Poun area, which sat about halfway between Pusan and Seoul, the capitol of South Korea.255
Lieutenant Puckett and his fresh Ranger unit immediately set about pacifying the
area and met with quick success. The Rangers made a smooth transition from their
training into active combat situations and excelled in rooting out their new enemy. The
Rangers patrolled the area day and night, set ambushes, and put a premium on the capture
of enemy combatants. The most important thing that Puckett did once his unit was
conducting operations was to brief and debrief his men at any opportunity in order to
continue their training as they went. The unit refined its operating procedure as it went,
253 Key Korean War Battles Fought in the Republic of Korea. P. 84. 254 Ibid. p.v. 255 Puckett Interview. 98
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learning from its mistakes.256 This made for an incredibly efficient unit, as they totally
pacified the area by the end of October. From Poun the 8ARC moved northward with the
advance and cleared several other pockets of resistance. The threat of Chinese
intervention into the war had been percolating since early October but the U.S. had
pushed further north and captured the northern capital of Pyongyang on the 19th of
October. Unbeknownst to President Truman, General MacArthur and all the U.S. men on
the ground the People’s Republic of China had decided to intervene on October 2nd and
the same day that Pyongyang was captured the Chinese crossed the Yalu river and waited
to spring their trap.257
The bait for that trap was laid on November 1st when the Chinese attacked the
U.S. 8th cavalry and decisively routed them at the battle of Unsan. The Chinese then
retreated which made the rest of the U.S. forces doubt their full intervention into the
conflict. This doubt allowed the U.S. commanders to push their advance northward in
hopes of finishing off the remaining KPA. The Chinese would be laying in wait.258 On
November 18th, Puckett and his men were ordered under the operational control of Task
Force Dolvin. This force was led by Lt. Colonel Tom Dolvin of the 89th Medium Tank
Battalion.259 The Task Force was ordered to assume the central point of the entire Eighth
Army’s push north and the Rangers were placed in front of the tanks. On multiple occasions the Rangers went on reconnaissance patrols to the front of the entire task force,
finding nothing. On the 25th of November Puckett and his men were riding on top of
256 Ibid. 257 Thornton. Odd Man Out. p. 155. 258 Appleman. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu.p.675. 259 Lock. To Fight with Intrepidity. p.311. 99
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Dolvin’s tanks as the task force advanced near a series of hills. The hill numbered 222
suddenly came alive with Chinese defenders and the Rangers sprang into action. The two
platoons formed an assault wave and despite minimal support from the tank column the
Rangers captured the hill and deployed a defensive perimeter as night fell.260 Up until this point in the war the 8ARC had been deployed in small unit actions, but at Hill 222 that changed as the Rangers were forced to assault a defended position occupied by regular Chinese infantry.
The next day would prove to be a bad day for Puckett and the Eighth Army
Ranger Company. The following morning the task force continued its assault and moved
towards Hill 205. The operation began well enough as the Rangers were able to take the
objective with the support of the tanks at their backs and close in air support from the Air
Force. Once again by nightfall the Rangers had taken the hill and established a defensive
perimeter. Puckett quickly realized that the right flank of his position was exposed, and
that the closest friendly unit was several miles away. Through the fighting for both Hill
222 and Hill 205, the Rangers numbers had dropped to fifty-one combat ready men. He knew exactly where the imminent Chinese counterattack was going to hit his Rangers; he just hoped that they could hold out through the night. What Puckett didn’t know at the time, was that the Chinese had unleashed a massive assault on the U.S. forces. The
Chinese attack consisted of over 500,000 soldiers that overwhelmed a large portion of the
260 Puckett Interview. Col. Puckett claimed that as his Rangers were assaulting the hill they suffered friendly fire from the tank squadron behind them. 100
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American front and forced the longest retreat in the history of the U.S. military.261 Lt.
Puckett and the Rangers were at the very front of the Eighth Army and they received a
pounding from the Chinese. Over the course of the night the Rangers were assaulted by
the Chinese five times, and each time the beleaguered defenders were able to repel the
waves of attackers one after the other with the help of close in air support and what
Puckett called “the spirit of the bayonet.”262 The Rangers had suffered multiple casualties
throwing the Chinese back again and again; even Puckett himself had been wounded. The
steadfast commander continued to patrol the lines and offer words of encouragement to
the weary men in between attacks. The Chinese launched one last assault around 2:30
a.m. and came at the Ranger’s naked right flank with around 600 soldiers, or a full
battalion. The Rangers would not be able to repel this assault, and their perimeter was
overrun.263 Puckett was wounded several more times during the ensuing melee as were
many other Rangers. The Eighth Army Ranger Company was hit extremely hard and
would have to be completely reorganized before it could see action again, and it wouldn’t
fight under its commander anymore. Puckett was evacuated by one of his men and was
eventually taken to a hospital where it would take nearly a year to recover from his
various wounds.264
261 Cohen, Eliot A; Gooch, John. Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War. New York: Free Press, 1986. pp. 165–95. The Eighth Army’s retreat covered over 120 miles and is considered by some as the longest in U.S. history. 262 Puckett Interview. Once again Puckett and Rangers were let down by the tank squadron they were attached to as they did not fire a shot according to Puckett. 263 Lock. To Fight with Intrepidity. p.315-316. 264 Puckett Interview. Col. Puckett was hospitalized at Fort Benning until October 1951, when he was finally recovered from the wounds he suffered at Hill 205. 101
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During the battle for Hill 205, the Rangers were placed well outside their
designed role and were asked to fight a fixed defensive battle against an overwhelming
enemy that was much heavier equipped than they. This is reminiscent of a similar
incident in which a group of the 5307th was asked to hold a position for several days. The
situation for the Eighth Army Rangers was even worse as there were only fifty-one
Rangers at Hill 205, while the Marauders had several hundred men to defend their position. The Rangers should have never been put into that situation because they were unequipped from the beginning to hold a position against any opposition. They were designed as a quick-strike raiding force and were misused by the commander when they were assigned as the lead element of the entire advance. This poor employment is evident as only twenty-one Rangers and one officer survived the encounter and remained combat ready.265 The Rangers would be reorganized and fight again, this time under the
command of Captain John Paul Vann266, and with a more powerful force structure. Under
Vann the Rangers would carry out many more successful raids behind enemy lines as the
war progressed. The Eighth Army Ranger Company would go on to fight until it was
disbanded in March, 1951. These first Rangers for Korea would mainly serve in their
designed role, but still suffered miserably when forced outside of that design.
The Rangers Become Official The Eighth Army Ranger Company was the first Ranger unit developed during
Korea, but it was not long after its ad-hoc creation that more Rangers would be called up.
265 Lock. To Fight with Intrepidity. p.317. 266 Vann would go onto become one of the most famous American civilians involved in the Vietnam Conflict. 102
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On August 29th Army Chief of Staff General Lawton Collins authorized the creation of
“marauder” companies in order to fulfill the growing need for specialized troops that he perceived as he toured the Pusan Perimeter shortly after the introduction of American troops. Collins saw the need for “…each division to have a lightly armed and equipped marauder company…to infiltrate through enemy lines and attack command posts, artillery, tank parks and key communication installations.”267 The directive was passed down and discussed amongst top ranking army officials and the final decision was made to create a Ranger training section at the Infantry school at Fort Benning, GA. This new course would train four new companies immediately and three of them would be deployed directly to Korea. The third company would remain behind and train the next group of companies. General Collins was pleased with this plan and personally selected
General John G. Van Houten to oversee this new training course. Van Houten served as the commander of an infantry regiment during World War II and had a proven record of combat excellence, but had no prior experience with Ranger units.268 To overcome this lack of experience Van Houten placed a high importance on including Ranger veterans of World War II as a high percentage of the original staff of instructors and staff. This group of men included veterans of Darby’s Rangers, Merrill’s Marauders, 1st Special
Services and the O.S.S. These men would provide the expertise for the training and Van
Houten would keep everything and everyone disciplined.
267 Collins. War in Peacetime. p.108-110. 268 Hogan. Raiders or Elite Infantry? p.109. Van Houten commanded a regiment in the 75th Inf. Div., which ironically would later serve as the designation of the Ranger Regiment when it would become a permanent fixture after the Vietnam war. 103
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As part of Collins’s original directive these new Rangers would all be required to
be airborne qualified. Collins did this to give this new breed of Rangers a more elite
status from the start, as a heavy prestige was laid upon airborne troops in the 1950’s.269
In order to facilitate this requirement while still fielding the first Ranger companies as
quickly as possible, the first batch of recruits was taken from the 82nd Airborne Division.
All Rangers were to be volunteers, as they had been from the beginning of the Ranger
tradition, and the initial response was astoundingly high as a supposed 5000 men from
the 82nd volunteered to take the new course.270 The training cycle would consist of forty-
eight hours a week for six weeks and would focus on the same basic principles that
Ranger units in the past had stressed to their men. The prospective Rangers were all
pushed to new levels of physical and mental toughness and were taught to ignore pain in
any situation. These new Rangers were schooled in a mix of tactics that came together
when the various instructors pooled all of their combined experiences. The school taught
demolition, amphibious assaults, close combat, aerial resupply, escape and evasion,
cooperation with indigenous forces and above all stressed perfection in the light infantry
principles of shoot, move and communicate.271 This blending of concepts and tactics by
the veteran Ranger instructors coupled with the principles of light infantry maneuver
warfare created the most in-depth and comprehensive training cycle that any American
Ranger unit had ever gone through.
269 Collins. War in Peacetime. p.110. Collins wanted to shake the undisciplined reputation that some Ranger units had garnered during World War II, therefore he wanted to create a Ranger Prestige from the very beginning of the program. 270 United States. FM 7-85 Ranger Unit Operations. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army, 1991. p. F-6. 271 Hogan. Raiders or Elite Infantry? p.110. 104
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The creation of this training section is the most important moment in American
Ranger history as the tradition had finally become a formalized institution within the
U.S. military. While this new Ranger directive outlined by General Collins was designed
to put Ranger units in the field in Korea, he also laid out a second more important idea.
In October as the first Ranger companies were beginning their training, General Collins
directed that “Ranger training be extended to all combat units in the Army in order to
develop the capability of carrying out Ranger-type missions in all Infantry units of the
Army.”272 This new directive meant that General Collins saw the potential of Ranger
training when applied outside of Ranger units. This idea goes back to General George C.
Marshall at the beginning of World War II who wanted Ranger trained personnel solely
for the purpose of disseminating them on standard infantry units to bolster that unit’s
capabilities. The Infantry school eventually outlined a more formal, two-part objective of
the Ranger school in late October: First for the Infantry School to train a Ranger Force,
and second for standard Infantry units to partake in Ranger training.273 The Ranger
training was now open to others besides those destined for specialized Ranger units, and
therefore the American Ranger tradition was now capable of joining the orthodox
military instead of standing by itself. Prior to this new directive, the American military
had succumbed to “Ranger Amnesia” where it forgot the military necessity of the Ranger
and saw those types of units as unorthodox. The Ranger tradition was now a formalize
institution within the military structure and the Ranger tradition could begin its journey
out of the shadows and back to the forefront of American Military tradition. The Rangers
272 United States Army Infantry School. The Ranger Course Pamphlet. Fort Benning, Ga: The School, 1959. p.8. 273 Ibid. 105
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of Korea would be the first to travel this path and the first four Ranger companies were
activated on October 28th and were deployed to Korea by early December, but the war
they had been designed for was not the war they were thrown into.
The Rangers go to War While Ralph Puckett and the Eighth Army Ranger Company suffered a massive
defeat at the Battle for Hill 205, their experience in Korea was exponentially better than
the Rangers that arrived after them. When the Chinese came across the Yalu in
November of 1950, the U.S. forces were not prepared and were routed time and time
again until their retreat was pushed south of the 38th parallel. On December 26th General
Matthew Ridgeway took control of the Eighth Army and was able to stabilize the
situation and halt the retreat, but not until after the KPA and Chinese were able to retake
Seoul.274 Therefore when the first three Ranger companies arrived in Korea in mid-
December and early January, they were dropped into one of the worst retreats in the history of the U.S. military. The Ranger companies were attached to Infantry divisions and were under the operational control of those commanders, most of whom had no real idea of how to properly utilize the freshly trained Rangers. Due to the change in the war and misunderstanding of their mission, the Ranger Companies that arrived in Korea were rarely used in their designed role and carried out few raids.
In all seven Ranger companies would be deployed to Korea and attached to
divisions. The vast majority of the Rangers’ missions simply consisted of assisting in the
retreat and plugging holes in the lines. More often than not the Ranger companies were
274 Key Korean War Battles Fought in the Republic of Korea. p. vi. 106
Texas Tech University, James Sandy, Summer 2011 used to spearhead assaults of defended enemy positions. Just like the Rangers of World
War II, when the light Infantry force that was the Rangers was asked to assault a defended position, it was being put outside its designed role and normally suffered heavy casualties. Several prominent examples exist of Ranger platoons being wasted in assaults of heavy defended positions. On February 14th, a platoon of the 1st Ranger Company was tasked with counterattacking a breach in their parent division’s defensive perimeter. Less than ten Rangers even reached their objective and were driven off almost immediately.275
A similar situation befell a platoon of the 3rd Ranger Company in April at the Battle of
Bloody Nose Ridge. The platoon lost twenty-four of its thirty-two men in a frontal assault of a heavily entrenched Chinese position.276 These two incidents represent a blatant waste of the highly trained Rangers and shows that their commanders really didn’t know how to utilize these units.
Examples of the Ranger Companies being utilized properly are few and far between in Korea. The 1st Ranger Company was by far employed in the best manner. The
1st Ranger Company was attached to the 2nd Infantry Division, whose commander appreciated the Ranger concept better than most. These Rangers were used to raid behind the Chinese lines on a regular basis when they first arrived; and they drew a fair amount of publicity back in the United States for their successful operations. Most notably, the
Rangers successfully infiltrated and destroyed several key Chinese headquarters installations.277 But even for this Company, which saw some well designed missions, it
275 Lock. To Fight with Intrepidity. p.326. 276 Hogan. To Fight with Intrepidity. p.119. 277 Associated Press, “Rangers Reborn, Filter Red Lines” New York Times, 11 March 1951 p. 8. 107
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wasn’t long before they were ordered outside their designed role. The rapidly changing
war was one of the main reasons that the Rangers were misused, even though their
commanders normally didn’t understand how to properly employ the Rangers, but most
of the time they did not have a choice.278
Beginning in January, 1951 the U.S. started a massive offensive to regain what
they had lost when the Chinese entered the war. By April the U.S. forces were once again
well north of the 38th parallel. The single most outstanding example of a properly assigned Ranger mission occurred during this push. It still ended poorly for the Rangers, but not by fault of the commander or the mission. As the Eighth Army was slowly grinding northward towards a pre-planned line across the peninsula where it would stop and rest, rearm and re-outfit before continuing. Directly across from this line lay the
Hwachon reservoir and the dam that held back the waters. This was a concern to the
Eighth Army command staff because if left to the Chinese, it would be possible for them to open the gates of the dam and flood the path in front of the advancing American forces. That was not a situation that was permissible to General William Hoge, who commanded the IX Corps which was part of the Eighth Army’s advance and sat directly in the path of the dam’s target flood area.279 Hoge wanted to take the dam and render the
doors inoperable so that the water would remain in the reservoir no matter who held the
dam. He first attempted to do this by ordering the 1st cavalry division to assault the dam
278 Leur, Kenneth. Interviewed by James Sandy, 25 October, 2010. E-mail correspondence. General Leur is one of the most famous Rangers in American history and firmly believes that the misuse of the Rangers in Korea was due to the Commander’s lack of proper Ranger understanding and the constantly evolving nature of the conflict. 279 Blumenson, Martin. “The Rangers at Hwachon Dam” Army (Dec. 1967) p. 38. Blumenson wrote this article after conducting the after action reports of the Rangers after they assaulted the dam. 108
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head-on; when this proved unsuccessful he began to think a bit more discretely.280 Hoge
conferred with Captain Dorsey Anderson of the attached 4th Ranger Company, and upon
Anderson’s suggestion Hoge gave the go ahead for the Rangers to conduct a nighttime
raid on the dam. The plan called for the Rangers to cross over a mile of open water in
inflatable boats to the dam. Once at their target the Rangers would then have to traverse
some extremely difficult terrain to reach the gates of the dam, when they would
theoretically disable via demolition charges.281
The raid itself turned into a massive defeat for the Rangers. After the water
crossing the Rangers ran into stiff opposition along the base of the dam. The unit became
pinned down and had to hold out all day against constant Chinese assaults. The only
reason the Rangers were able to hold out was the emergency insertion of a Battalion from
the 1st Cavalry and the precise artillery support they received throughout the day.282 Once
night fell the Rangers and Cavalrymen were able to evacuate back across the river to
safety. This raid failed, not because it was outside the Ranger’s design, but because it had
been hastily organized and executed. The Rangers were not able to reconnoiter the area
prior to the raid and were therefore not prepared to handle the stiff opposition that they
encountered. Hwachon Dam was a designated raid, but failed due to poor preparation on
the part of Capt. Anderson, the 4th Ranger Company and General Hoge. Just like World
War II the Rangers were continually being employed in roles outside their design, and
were appearing combat ineffective. Unlike World War II though, in Korea the ever-
280 Hogan. Raiders or Elite Infantry? p.118. 281 Blumenson. The Rangers at Hwachon Dam. p. 40. 282 Anderson, Dorsey. After Action Report: Hwachon Dam Raid, April 11, 1951. United States Army, conducted by Martin Blumenson. 109
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changing nature of the war made it difficult for the Rangers’ commanding officers to
properly task the units and avoid using them as stop-gaps.
This see-saw would continue as the Chinese launched another offensive in late
April and pushed the U.S. back south of the 38th.283 The rest of the war would follow this
basic pattern: The U.S. would mount an offensive and make considerable gains until the
Chinese mounted a counteroffensive which would erase the American gains until the
fronts stabilized, usually around the 38th parallel.284 By July, 1951 the major U.S.
commanders decided that the new nature of the war they were involved in did not require
such specialized Ranger units. The last of the Ranger companies was deactivated in
December, 1951.285 These Ranger units were deemed ineffective for the most part, with
the exception of Lt. Puckett’s Eighth Army Ranger Company.286
The next step is the most important for the Rangers, and arguably the future of the
American military. The Ranger School was the next item up for discussion. Several high
ranking military officials called for the deactivation of anything Ranger, especially the
School. Other officers demanded that Ranger training remain and become an integral part
in the future of the Army. What would eventually happen would be complete redefinition
of the term Ranger by the U.S. Army.
283 Key Korean War Battles Fought in the Republic of Korea. p. vi-vii. 284 Mossman, Billy C. Ebb and Flow, November 1950-July 1951. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1990. p. 466. 285 Lock. To Fight with Intrepidity. p.583-584. The final Rangers units on duty in Korea were deactivated in August, but several stateside companies stayed active until December. 286 Hogan. Raiders or Elite Infantry? p. 129. 110
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Since the Rangers of Korea had been designed for infiltration behind enemy lines,
but they had not been allowed to properly prove their abilities in that role, so they were
then seen as ineffective. The Ranger’s apparent “failure” in Korea made the U.S. Army
look elsewhere for infiltration units: mainly they chose indigenous forces because they
would prove more effective and put less American lives in danger.287 Meanwhile the
Infantry School, under the directive of General Collins, was completely reworking the
Ranger concept and the training that it ensued. The consensus that was decided upon was
a combination of the raiding concepts from Korea and the desire to create solid junior
leadership within rifle units. This combination of all the Ranger experiences from World
War II and Korea would combine to be the new Ranger Standard.288 That was the
ultimate goal of the New Ranger School: to create well-trained junior leadership within
standard infantry units. These individuals would be trained in the principles of light
infantry and maneuver warfare, while achieving the ultimate in mental and physical
toughness.289 The course would be designed to take in young officers and NCO’s from
Infantry, Armor and Airborne units and train them up to the new Ranger standard in the
hopes that the trained individuals would increase the total combat effectiveness of their
respective units.
The Ranger School Remains The Korean War settled into a brutal stalemate that resembled the trenches of
World War I by November 1951, and would persist until the United States and China
287 Haas, Michael E. In the Devil’s Shadow: U.N. Special Operations During the Korean War. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2000. p. 54-55. 288 United States Army Infantry School. The Ranger Course Pamphlet. p. 8-9. 289 Ibid. p.1. These are the tenants of the Ranger Standard. 111
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negotiated a cease fire in July 1953.290 Once again the Ranger units were not formalized into the American military, as there no were no active Ranger units in the Army after
1951. But this was the turning point in American Ranger History as the Ranger School
had been institutionalized. The new Ranger Standard was being trained into the Army’s
junior officers, and therefore entrenching itself into the American military culture.
The American approach to war had not changed since the late-1940’s as the nuclear weapon still reigned supreme. That concept would only further engrain itself as the “New Look” military would take hold in the late-1950’s. The Army would even be given access to nuclear weapons like the “Atomic Annie” which was a 260 mm cannon capable of firing a nuclear warhead.291 All of this was still designed to fight the Soviet
Union in the End War, but the Army that would now technically be infused with Ranger trained individuals. The U.S. military still had a long way to go before it fully embraced
the Ranger Standard, but with the Ranger School it was well on its way.
290 Key Korean War Battles Fought in the Republic of Korea. p. viii. 291 Collins. War in Peacetime. p.230. 112
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Chapter V
Conclusion – Of Their Own Accord
“Yes, I’m all right! I am a Ranger!” screamed Lieutenant Ralph Puckett as his
men carried him to safety during the battle for Hill 205. Puckett had been wounded by
several mortar blasts and had taken shrapnel from a fragmentation grenade when it
landed in his command post. The Rangers had been overrun and were evacuating their
position, and when Pfc. David Pollock went back to look for more of his brothers he
found his commander hunched over still calling in artillery support to try and save the
hill.292 Even after being wounded multiple times and having his position overrun by an
overwhelming enemy, Lt. Puckett made himself stand tall as an American Ranger.
Nothing in his life made him more proud than his service as a Ranger.293
The American Ranger is one of the oldest traditions within the U.S. military. The
Ranger was the first true American warrior. Men like Captain Benjamin Church forged a
uniquely American way of war along the colonial frontier as early as the 1620’s. They
differentiated themselves from the British by engaging in an irregular war where they
engaged enemy combatants and non-combatants alike. The first American Rangers
fought like the Native Americans that they were fighting against. These men forged the
very first American national identity, it was not pretty as men like Church and Rogers
burned entire Native settlements to the ground while cutting down women and children.
292 Lock, John D., and Harold G. Moore. To Fight with Intrepidity--: The Complete History of the U.S. Army Rangers, 1622 to Present. New York: Pocket Books, 1998. p.315-316. 293 Puckett, Ralph. Interviewed by James Sandy, 2 November, 2010. E-mail correspondence. 113
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These first American warriors collected the scalps of their fallen enemies as war trophies.
This kind of warfare helped to forge the American nation as it first pacified the colonial
hinterlands, and then American patriots fought irregularly as they over threw the bonds of
British tyranny. Historians, especially John Grenier, have argued that this was the first
American way of war.294 The importance of the Rangers and their warfare did not stop with the closing of the frontier, as Grenier’s work suggests. That warfare began to lose its brutal extirpative elements once the United States became a nation and the Rangers began drifting towards the periphery. Several issues need to be addressed when dealing with these early American Rangers. Both Rogers and Church wrote down their philosophies on warfare, two works that have been labeled as some of the first American military manuals. These works need to be closely examined and their impact on future military doctrine analyzed.
The American Ranger continued to fight as an irregular unit through the 19th century, and the Ranger would make a new name as America was split by the Civil War.
The most notable Civil War Ranger units fought on horseback, Confederate units like
Mosby’s Rangers and Union units like Mean’s Rangers fought a harassing, irregular war against more conventional units of either side. They harassed and raided enemy command posts and lines of communication and support, and even fought each other.
These units also were asked by their corresponding militaries to fight in more conventional roles. These units signify a shift in the American Ranger tradition as they were the first to endure a burgeoning identity crisis. In addition to the military identity
294 Grenier, John. The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607-1814. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005. p.10. 114
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Texas Rangers, who straddled the line between law enforcement and irregular military unit. This issue demands scholarly attention, as to where these units fit in with the
American Ranger tradition, if they indeed need to be discussed. These were some of the first American units to deal with jealousy and attacks from conventional officers and troops. The issue of a special or “elite” unit receiving unique training and therefore special treatment by commanding officers would blossom into a steady trend by the end of the twentieth century. This would create a situation that would play along with the identity crisis to create what this study calls “Ranger Amnesia” within the American military.
The American military began to suffer “Ranger Amnesia” as it grew and developed as a nation. This syndrome was in full effect as America entered World War
II, as no Ranger units, training or any semblance had existed within the military since the
Civil War. When Ranger units were raised at the outset of World War II, they were not created out of tradition but out of admiration of the British Commandoes. These Ranger units existed outside the military norm and were therefore viewed as unorthodox. The
Rangers of World War II suffered a debilitating identity crisis in which they existed between the worlds of a Special Forces unit that had a narrow and well-defined role and an Elite Infantry unit that was designed to spearhead assaults and amphibious landings.
The Rangers of World War II were asked to do both. Without a clearly defined role the
Rangers were subject to misuse by the commanders that had control over them. This subsequent misuse translated into the Rangers being seen as somewhat combat
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The ultimate example of this is the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional). This unit was trained for a very specific purpose, but was forced into a more standard infantry role, a move that resulted in heavy casualties, which eventually resulted in the deactivation of the unit. This was the lowest moment in Ranger history, as it only appeared to be getting bleaker as World War II came to a close.
The end of World War II heralded the acceptance of strategic bombing as the warfare of the future and combined it with the advent of the nuclear weapon. This created an outlook that placed the Air Force at the forefront of all future American war planning.
The Army took a backseat, which meant the Ranger concept was even farther from being brought into the accepted military tradition. When everyone envisioned World War III being fought with vast fleets of strategic bombers and nuclear weapons, the reality quickly sunk in that the Cold War would be fought via small proxy wars, wars that would heavily rely on the strength of the men on the ground. The United States learned this lesson in Korea, and took a major step in remedying its mistake with the establishment of the Army Ranger School at Fort Benning, GA in October 1951. While the Rangers of
Korea failed to deliver any real measure of success, the establishment of the Ranger
School signified that the Ranger concept had been accepted into the modern American military tradition. The Ranger unit itself was still over twenty years from becoming a
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staple of the U.S. Army, but what mattered was that the Army valued the Ranger training
and wanted to disseminate it through as many units as it could. The top military
commanders, starting with General Lawton Collins, saw that the ability to have
extremely-well trained combat soldiers would always be a necessity no matter the
capabilities of nuclear powered military.295 As early as the summer of 1950 Collins was
saying that the U.S. military could not lose the ability to effectively execute maneuver
warfare. That required well trained ground soldiers, and Collins saw the Ranger school as
the answer to that problem.
The establishment of the Ranger School during Korea was just the start of the
Ranger becoming a formal American Institution, but it was the start. That institution would grow exponentially during the Vietnam War and the creation of the 75th Ranger
Regiment in 1974 would give that institution an armed extension to serve the United
States abroad. More scholarly work is necessary in analyzing the Vietnam Conflict, as
this era is the last provisional period in Ranger history. The Vietnam War has a rich
Ranger history and is the next logical step in the scholarship of the U.S. Army Rangers.
Following Vietnam, the Ranger tradition fully becomes institutionalized with the creation of the 75th Ranger Infantry Regiment. General Kenneth Leuer was in charge of
organizing the 75th and was told by then Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams,
that the Army was going to be completely rebuilt upon the Ranger Standard. General
Abrams wanted one unit to serve as the model for the rest of the Army to follow.296
295 Collins, Gen Lawton J. , War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969. p.108-110. 296 Leuer, Kenneth. Interviewed by James Sandy, 25 October, 2010. E-mail correspondence. 117
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According to General Leuer, the finest Army the United States has ever fielded fought under General Norman Schwartzkoph during Desert Storm and that Army owed its excellence to the standard it was based upon: The Ranger Standard.
In the future attention needs to be paid to this idea of “elite”-ness that surrounds the Rangers. The mystique that has engulfed the term Ranger in today’s military can be boiled down into the coveted Ranger Tab. The prize for completing the brutal Ranger training course is the shoulder insignia inspired by the Rangers that landed on D-Day.
Today there are over ten thousand Ranger tabbed individuals not serving in the Ranger regiment, and the vast majority of them never will.297 This shift of the Ranger training becoming more important than the Ranger unit was started by General George C.
Marshall at the outset of World War II, it was institutionalized by General Lawton
Collins in Korea and since has entrenched itself within the American military with the help of men like General Leuer. More work is needed to understand how the Ranger concept evolved after the school was established. The scholarship will be greatly strengthened when the final chapter of the American Ranger is properly analyzed, and that work will serve as a powerful commentary on the current U.S. Army and military as a whole.
The Ranger Standard is the oldest American military tradition, and took over three hundred years to become a formal institution within the American Military. With the advent of the Ranger School in Korea that step was finally taken, and the final phase of that American Ranger Tradition was started: The American Ranger Institution.
297 Leuer. 118
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