Rootkits on Smart Phones: Attacks and Implications
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UG1046 Ultrafast Embedded Design Methodology Guide
UltraFast Embedded Design Methodology Guide UG1046 (v2.3) April 20, 2018 Revision History The following table shows the revision history for this document. Date Version Revision 04/20/2018 2.3 • Added a note in the Overview section of Chapter 5. • Replaced BFM terminology with VIP across the user guide. 07/27/2017 2.2 • Vivado IDE updates and minor editorial changes. 04/22/2015 2.1 • Added Embedded Design Methodology Checklist. • Added Accessing Documentation and Training. 03/26/2015 2.0 • Added SDSoC Environment. • Added Related Design Hubs. 10/20/2014 1.1 • Removed outdated information. •In System Level Considerations, added information to the following sections: ° Performance ° Clocking and Reset 10/08/2014 1.0 Initial Release of document. UltraFast Embedded Design Methodology Guide Send Feedback 2 UG1046 (v2.3) April 20, 2018 www.xilinx.com Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction Embedded Design Methodology Checklist. 9 Accessing Documentation and Training . 10 Chapter 2: System Level Considerations Performance. 13 Power Consumption . 18 Clocking and Reset. 36 Interrupts . 41 Embedded Device Security . 45 Profiling and Partitioning . 51 Chapter 3: Hardware Design Considerations Configuration and Boot Devices . 63 Memory Interfaces . 69 Peripherals . 76 Designing IP Blocks . 94 Hardware Performance Considerations . 102 Dataflow . 108 PL Clocking Methodology . 112 ACP and Cache Coherency. 116 PL High-Performance Port Access. 120 System Management Hardware Assistance. 124 Managing Hardware Reconfiguration . 127 GPs and Direct PL Access from APU . 133 Chapter 4: Software Design Considerations Processor Configuration . 137 OS and RTOS Choices . 142 Libraries and Middleware . 152 Boot Loaders . 156 Software Development Tools . 162 UltraFast Embedded Design Methodology GuideSend Feedback 3 UG1046 (v2.3) April 20, 2018 www.xilinx.com Chapter 5: Hardware Design Flow Overview . -
The OKL4 Microvisor: Convergence Point of Microkernels and Hypervisors
The OKL4 Microvisor: Convergence Point of Microkernels and Hypervisors Gernot Heiser, Ben Leslie Open Kernel Labs and NICTA and UNSW Sydney, Australia ok-labs.com ©2010 Open Kernel Labs and NICTA. All rights reserved. Microkernels vs Hypervisors > Hypervisors = “microkernels done right?” [Hand et al, HotOS ‘05] • Talks about “liability inversion”, “IPC irrelevance” … > What’s the difference anyway? ok-labs.com ©2010 Open Kernel Labs and NICTA. All rights reserved. 2 What are Hypervisors? > Hypervisor = “virtual machine monitor” • Designed to multiplex multiple virtual machines on single physical machine VM1 VM2 Apps Apps AppsApps AppsApps OS OS Hypervisor > Invented in ‘60s to time-share with single-user OSes > Re-discovered in ‘00s to work around broken OS resource management ok-labs.com ©2010 Open Kernel Labs and NICTA. All rights reserved. 3 What are Microkernels? > Designed to minimise kernel code • Remove policy, services, retain mechanisms • Run OS services in user-mode • Software-engineering and dependability reasons • L4: ≈ 10 kLOC, Xen ≈ 100 kLOC, Linux: ≈ 10,000 kLOC ServersServers ServersServers Apps Servers Device AppsApps Drivers Microkernel > IPC performance critical (highly optimised) • Achieved by API simplicity, cache-friendly implementation > Invented 1970 [Brinch Hansen], popularised late ‘80s (Mach, Chorus) ok-labs.com ©2010 Open Kernel Labs and NICTA. All rights reserved. 4 What’s the Difference? > Both contain all code executing at highest privilege level • Although hypervisor may contain user-mode code as well > Both need to abstract hardware resources • Hypervisor: abstraction closely models hardware • Microkernel: abstraction designed to support wide range of systems > What must be abstracted? • Memory • CPU • I/O • Communication ok-labs.com ©2010 Open Kernel Labs and NICTA. -
Sel4: Formal Verification of an Operating-System Kernel
seL4: Formal Verification of an Operating-System Kernel Gerwin Klein1;2, June Andronick1;2, Kevin Elphinstone1;2, Gernot Heiser1;2;3 1 1 1;2 1;2 David Cock , Philip Derrin ∗, Dhammika Elkaduwe ,z Kai Engelhardt 1;2 1;4 1 1;2 1;2 Rafal Kolanski , Michael Norrish , Thomas Sewell , Harvey Tuch y, Simon Winwood 1 NICTA, 2 UNSW, 3 Open Kernel Labs, 4 ANU [email protected] ABSTRACT We report on the formal, machine-checked verification of the seL4 microkernel from an abstract specification down to its C implementation. We assume correctness of compiler, assembly code, hardware, and boot code. seL4 is a third-generation microkernel of L4 provenance, comprising 8,700 lines of C and 600 lines of assembler. Its performance is comparable to other high-performance L4 kernels. We prove that the implementation always strictly follows our high-level abstract specification of kernel behaviour. This encompasses traditional design and implementation safety properties such as that the kernel will never crash, and it will never perform an unsafe operation. It also implies much more: we can predict precisely how the kernel will behave in every possible situation. 1. INTRODUCTION Almost every paper on formal verification starts with the observation that software complexity is increasing, that this Figure 1: Call graph of the seL4 microkernel. Ver- leads to errors, and that this is a problem for mission and tices represent functions, and edges invocations. safety critical software. We agree, as do most. Here, we report on the full formal verification of a critical system from a high-level model down to very low-level C kernel, and every single bug can potentially cause arbitrary code. -
Operating System Support for Run-Time Security with a Trusted Execution Environment
Operating System Support for Run-Time Security with a Trusted Execution Environment - Usage Control and Trusted Storage for Linux-based Systems - by Javier Gonz´alez Ph.D Thesis IT University of Copenhagen Advisor: Philippe Bonnet Submitted: January 31, 2015 Last Revision: May 30, 2015 ITU DS-nummer: D-2015-107 ISSN: 1602-3536 ISBN: 978-87-7949-302-5 1 Contents Preface8 1 Introduction 10 1.1 Context....................................... 10 1.2 Problem....................................... 12 1.3 Approach...................................... 14 1.4 Contribution.................................... 15 1.5 Thesis Structure.................................. 16 I State of the Art 18 2 Trusted Execution Environments 20 2.1 Smart Cards.................................... 21 2.1.1 Secure Element............................... 23 2.2 Trusted Platform Module (TPM)......................... 23 2.3 Intel Security Extensions.............................. 26 2.3.1 Intel TXT.................................. 26 2.3.2 Intel SGX.................................. 27 2.4 ARM TrustZone.................................. 29 2.5 Other Techniques.................................. 32 2.5.1 Hardware Replication........................... 32 2.5.2 Hardware Virtualization.......................... 33 2.5.3 Only Software............................... 33 2.6 Discussion...................................... 33 3 Run-Time Security 36 3.1 Access and Usage Control............................. 36 3.2 Data Protection................................... 39 3.3 Reference -
Business Informatics 2 (PWIN) SS 2021 Lecture 04
Lecture 04 Business Informatics 2 (PWIN) SS 2021 Information Systems III Mobile Information Systems Prof. Dr. Kai Rannenberg Chair of Mobile Business & Multilateral Security Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt a. M. Special of the day . “Heads in the Clouds: Measuring the Implications of Universities Migrating to Public Clouds”, v2 (2021-04- 20) . By Tobias Fiebig, Seda Gürses, Carlos H. Gañán, Erna Kotkamp, Fernando Kuipers, Martina Lindorfer, Menghua Prisse, Taritha Sari (TU Delft, TU Wien) . https://arxiv.org/abs/2104.09462 . Typical IS article in general topic and structure . Topic: analysis of information systems of organisations and strategic considerations (in this case universities) . Structure: Introduction, Background, Methodology overview (focus, data set), Data analysis of case(s), Discussion, Limitations, Related work, Conclusion(s), Acknowledgements 2 Agenda . What is Mobility? . Mobile Infrastructure and Ecosystem . Mobile Information Systems . Conclusion on Challenges / Benefits of Mobile IS 3 Mobility What is mobility? Lat. mobilitas: (1) Flexibility, velocity, motion; and as “mobilitas animi”: (mental) fitness (2) But also (and quite ambivalent to (1)) changeability, inconstancy, unstableness [SkuStowPets1998] 4 Mobility . Social implications Mobility not just “humans’ independence from geographical constraints” . Spatial mobility . Temporal mobility . Contextual mobility [KakihaSorens2001] 5 Agenda . What is Mobility? . Mobile Infrastructure & Ecosystem . Mobile Voice & Data Communication Services . Mobile Devices . Smartcards and Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) . Mobile Operating Systems . Mobile Web Apps vs. Mobile Apps . App Markets . Mobile Infrastructure and Ecosystem . Conclusion on Challenges / Benefits of Mobile IS 6 Mobile Voice & Data Communication Services . Mobile device . Base station/mobile station/cell . Connection to the Internet User terminal 7 Mobile Voice & Data Communication Services Fundamental mobile communication services . -
Partitioned System with Xtratum on Powerpc
Tesina de M´asteren Autom´aticae Inform´aticaIndustrial Partitioned System with XtratuM on PowerPC Author: Rui Zhou Advisor: Prof. Alfons Crespo i Lorente December 2009 Contents 1. Introduction1 1.1. MILS......................................2 1.2. ARINC 653..................................3 1.3. PikeOS.....................................6 1.4. ADEOS....................................7 2. Overview of XtratuM 11 2.1. Virtualization and Hypervisor........................ 11 2.2. XtratuM.................................... 12 3. Overview of PowerPC 16 3.1. POWER.................................... 16 3.2. PowerPC.................................... 17 3.3. PowerPC in Safety-critical.......................... 19 4. Main PowerPC Drivers to Virtualize 20 4.1. Processors................................... 20 4.2. Timer..................................... 21 4.3. Interrupt.................................... 23 4.4. Memory.................................... 24 5. Porting Implementation 25 5.1. Hypercall................................... 26 5.2. Timer..................................... 27 5.3. Interrupt.................................... 28 5.4. Memory.................................... 31 5.5. Partition.................................... 32 6. Benchmark 34 7. Conclusions and Future Work 38 Abstract Nowadays, the diversity of embedded applications has been developed into a new stage with the availability of various new high-performance processors and low cost on-chip memory. As the result of these new advances in hardware, there is a -
Operating System Verification—An Overview
Sadhan¯ a¯ Vol. 34, Part 1, February 2009, pp. 27–69. © Printed in India Operating system verification—An overview GERWIN KLEIN Sydney Research Laboratory, NICTA,∗ Australia, School of Computer Science and Engineering, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia e-mail: [email protected] Abstract. This paper gives a high-level introduction to the topic of formal, interactive, machine-checked software verification in general, and the verification of operating systems code in particular. We survey the state of the art, the advantages and limitations of machine-checked code proofs, and describe two specific ongoing larger-scale verification projects in more detail. Keywords. Formal software verification; operating systems; theorem proving. 1. Introduction The fastest, cheapest and easiest way to build something is properly the first time (Parker 2007). This engineer’s credo has made it into popular literature, but it seems to be largely ignored in the world of software development. In the late 1960s a software crisis was diagnosed on a summit in the Bavarian Alps (Naur & Randell 1969): Software was getting more and more complex, and we had no structured way of building it. We ended up with projects that took significantly longer than planned, were more expensive than planned, delivered results that did not fully address customer needs, or at worst were useless. This summit in the late 1960s is widely seen as the birth of the discipline of software engineering. Now, almost 40 years later, we have come a long way. There are numerous books on software engineering, a plenitude of methodologies, programming languages, and processes to choose from. -
OKL4 Microkernel Reference Manual
OKL4 Microkernel Reference Manual API Version 0316 Document Number: OK 10000:2006 (revision 12) Software Version: 3.0 Date: September 11, 2008 Copyright 2006–2008 Open Kernel Labs, Inc. Copyright 2006 National ICT Australia Limited This publication is distributed by Open Kernel Labs Pty Ltd, Australia. THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED “AS IS” WITHOUT ANY WARRANTIES, INCLUDING ANY WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, NON-INFIRNGEMENT, FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR ANY WARRANTY OTHERWISE ARISING OF ANY PROPOSAL, SPECIFICATION OR SAMPLE. Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage, the copyright notice, the title of the publication and its date appear, and notice is given that copyright is by permission of the authors. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers, or to redistribute to lists requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Authors: Open Kernel Labs Contact Details: Open Kernel Labs Pty Ltd Attention: Open Kernel Labs Suite 3, 540 Botany Road Alexandria, NSW 2015 Australia email: [email protected] web: http://www.ok-labs.com/ 3 Contents Preface 15 1 Introduction 17 1.1 Outline of This Manual 18 1.2 Definitions 18 1.3 Notation 19 1.4 Credits 20 PART A—GENERIC INTERFACE A-1 Overview 23 A-1.1 The OKL4 Programming Environment 23 A-1.2 OKL4 API Elements 24 A-1.3 Compatibility between OKL4 Versions 24 A-1.4 Variants of the OKL4 API 25 A-1.5 Microkernel Extensions and -
Palm OS Cobalt 6.1 in February 2004 6.1 in February Cobalt Palm OS Release: Last 11.2 Ios Release: Latest
…… Lecture 11 Market Overview of Mobile Operating Systems and Security Aspects Mobile Business I (WS 2017/18) Prof. Dr. Kai Rannenberg . Deutsche Telekom Chair of Mobile Business & Multilateral Security . Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt a. M. Overview …… . The market for mobile devices and mobile OS . Mobile OS unavailable to other device manufacturers . Overview . Palm OS . Apple iOS (Unix-based) . Manufacturer-independent mobile OS . Overview . Symbian platform (by Symbian Foundation) . Embedded Linux . Android (by Open Handset Alliance) . Microsoft Windows CE, Pocket PC, Pocket PC Phone Edition, Mobile . Microsoft Windows Phone 10 . Firefox OS . Attacks and Attacks and security features of selected . mobile OS 2 100% 20% 40% 60% 80% 0% Q1 '09 Q2 '09 Q3 '09 Q1 '10 Android Q2 '10 Q3 '10 Q4 '10 u Q1 '11 sers by operating sers by operating iOS Q2 '11 Worldwide smartphone Worldwide smartphone Q3 '11 Q4 '11 Microsoft Q1 '12 Q2 '12 Q3 '12 OS Q4 '12 RIM Q1 '13 Q2 '13 Q3 '13 Bada Q4' 13** Q1 '14 Q2 '14 s ystem ystem (2009 Q3 '14 Symbian Q4 '14 Q1 '15 [ Q2 '15 Statista2017a] Q3 '15 s ales ales to end Others Q4 '15 Q1 '16 Q2 '16 Q3 '16 - 2017) Q4 '16 Q1 '17 Q2 '17 3 . …… Worldwide smartphone sales to end …… users by operating system (Q2 2013) Android 79,0% Others 0,2% Symbian 0,3% Bada 0,4% BlackBerry OS 2,7% Windows 3,3% iOS 14,2% [Gartner2013] . Android iOS Windows BlackBerry OS Bada Symbian Others 4 Worldwide smartphone sales to end …… users by operating system (Q2 2014) Android 84,7% Others 0,6% BlackBerry OS 0,5% Windows 2,5% iOS 11,7% . -
Lltzvisor: a Lightweight Trustzone-Assisted Hypervisor for Low-End ARM Devices
Hugo Miguel Eira Araújo lLTZVisor: A Lightweight TrustZone-assisted Hypervisor for low-end ARM Devices Outubro de 2018 Hugo Miguel Eira Araújo lLTZVisor: A Lightweight TrustZone-assisted Hypervisor for low-end ARM devices Dissertação de Mestrado em Engenharia Eletrónica Industrial e Computadores Trabalho efetuado sob a orientação do Doutor Sandro Pinto Outubro de 2018 Declaração do Autor Nome: Hugo Miguel Eira Araújo Correio Eletrónico: [email protected] Cartão de Cidadão: 14887613 Titulo da dissertação: lLTZVisor: A Lightweight TrustZone-assisted Hyper- visor for low-end ARM Devices Ano de conclusão: 2018 Orientador: Doutor Sandro Pinto Designação do Mestrado: Ciclo de Estudos Integrados Conducentes ao Grau de Mestre em Engenharia Eletrónica Industrial e Computadores Área de Especialização: Sistemas Embebidos e Computadores Escola de Engenharia Departamento de Eletrónica Industrial De acordo com a legislação em vigor, não é permitida a reprodução de qualquer parte desta dissertação. Universidade do Minho, 29/10/2018 Assinatura: Hugo Miguel Eira Araújo v Acknowledgements The accomplishment of this master’s thesis involved great contributions from sev- eral people, whom I will be eternally grateful. Foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to my advisor Dr. Sandro Pinto for giving me the opportunity to develop this groundbreaking work and for all the guidance and continuous support throughout this great journey. Thank you for all the confidence placed on me, and especially, for all the motivation and advices given during difficult times. I would like to also thank Dr. Adriano Tavares, my professor, whom I appreciate all the given advices and reviews. And of course, thanks for all the music tips that helped me to increase productivity. -
Mobile OS and Security Aspects
…… Lecture 11 Market Overview of Mobile Operating Systems and Security Aspects Mobile Business I (WS 2015/16) Prof. Dr. Kai Rannenberg . Deutsche Telekom Chair of Mobile Business & Multilateral Security . Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt a. M. Overview - Market Overview of Mobile Operating …… Systems and Security Aspects § The Market for mobile devices and mobile OS § Mobile OS unavailable to other device manufacturers § Overview § Palm OS § Apple iOS (Unix-based) § Manufacturer-independent mobile OS § Overview § Symbian platform (by Symbian Foundation) § Embedded Linux § Android (by Open Handset Alliance) § Microsoft Windows CE, Pocket PC, Pocket PC Phone Edition, Mobile § Microsoft Windows Phone 10 . § Firefox OS . § Security features of selected mobile OS . 2 Worldwide Smartphone Sales to End …… Users by Operating System (2009-2015) Market share Market . OS [Statista 2015a] 3 Worldwide Smartphone Sales to End …… Users by Operating System (Q2 2012) Android 64,2% Others 0,6% Symbian 5,9% Bada 2,7% BlackBerry OS 5,2% [Gartner2013] Windows 2,6% . iOS 18,8% . Android iOS Windows BlackBerry OS Bada Symbian Others 4 Worldwide Smartphone Sales to End …… Users by Operating System (Q2 2013) Android 79,0% Others 0,2% Symbian 0,3% Bada 0,4% BlackBerry OS 2,7% Windows 3,3% iOS 14,2% [Gartner2013] . Android iOS Windows BlackBerry OS Bada Symbian Others 5 Worldwide Smartphone Sales to End …… Users by Operating System (Q2 2014) Android 84,7% Others 0,6% BlackBerry OS 0,5% Windows 2,5% iOS 11,7% . Android iOS Windows BlackBerryBlackBerry OS Symbian Bada Others [Statista 2014a] 6 Worldwide Smartphone Sales to End …… Users by Operating System (Q2 2015) Android 82,8% Others 0,4% BlackBerry OS 0,3% Windows 2,6% iOS 13,9% . -
Openmoko Neo1973 User Manual
www.openmoko.com OpenMoko Neo1973 user manual 1 www.openmoko.com Federal Communication Commission Interference Statement This equipment has been tested and found to comply with the limits for a Class B digital device, pursuant to Part 15 of the FCC Rules. These limits are designed to providereasonable protection against harmful interference in a residential installation. Thisequipment generates, uses and can radiate radio frequency energy and, if not installed and used in accordance with the instructions, may cause harmful interference to radio communications. However, there is no guarantee that interference will not occur in a particular installation. If this equipment does cause harmful interference to radio or television reception, which can be determined by turning the equipment off and on, the user is encouraged to try to correct the interference by one of the following measures: Reorient or relocate the receiving antenna Increase the separation between the equipment and receiver Connect the equipment into an outlet on a circuit different from that to which the receiver is connected Consult the dealer or an experienced radio/TV technician for help This device complies with Part 15 of the FCC Rules. Operation is subject to the following two conditions: (1) This device may not cause harmful interference, and (2) this device must accept any interference received, including interference that may cause undesired operation. FCC Caution: Any changes or modifications not expressly approved by the party responsible for compliance could void the user’s authority to operate this equipment. IMPORTANT NOTE: FCC Radiation Exposure Statement This equipment complies with FCC radiation exposure limits set forth for an uncontrolled environment.