Republic of Moldova, Between Geography and Geopolitics
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Moldova: from Oligarchic Pluralism to Plahotniuc's Hegemony
Centre for Eastern Studies NUMBER 208 | 07.04.2016 www.osw.waw.pl Moldova: from oligarchic pluralism to Plahotniuc’s hegemony Kamil Całus Moldova’s political system took shape due to the six-year rule of the Alliance for European Integration coalition but it has undergone a major transformation over the past six months. Resorting to skilful political manoeuvring and capitalising on his control over the Moldovan judiciary system, Vlad Plahotniuc, one of the leaders of the nominally pro-European Democra- tic Party and the richest person in the country, was able to bring about the arrest of his main political competitor, the former prime minister Vlad Filat, in October 2015. Then he pushed through the nomination of his trusted aide, Pavel Filip, for prime minister. In effect, Plahot- niuc has concentrated political and business influence in his own hands on a scale unseen so far in Moldova’s history since 1991. All this indicates that he already not only controls the judi- ciary, the anti-corruption institutions, the Constitutional Court and the economic structures, but has also subordinated the greater part of parliament and is rapidly tightening his grip on the section of the state apparatus which until recently was influenced by Filat. Plahotniuc, whose power and position depends directly on his control of the state apparatus and financial flows in Moldova, is not interested in a structural transformation of the country or in implementing any thorough reforms; this includes the Association Agreement with the EU. This means that as his significance grows, the symbolic actions so far taken with the aim of a structural transformation of the country will become even more superficial. -
Studia Politica 1 2016
www.ssoar.info Republic of Moldova: the year 2015 in politics Goșu, Armand Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Goșu, A. (2016). Republic of Moldova: the year 2015 in politics. Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science Review, 16(1), 21-51. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-51666-3 Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence (Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur (Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden see: Sie hier: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de Republic of Moldova The Year 2015 in Politics ARMAND GO ȘU Nothing will be the same from now on. 2015 is not only a lost, failed year, it is a loop in which Moldova is stuck without hope. It is the year of the “theft of the century”, the defrauding of three banks, the Savings Bank, Unibank, and the Social Bank, a theft totaling one billion dollars, under the benevolent gaze of the National Bank, the Ministry of Finance, the General Prosecutor's Office, the National Anti-Corruption Council, and the Security and Intelligence Service (SIS). 2015 was the year when controversial oligarch Vlad Plakhotniuk became Moldova's international brand, identified by more and more chancelleries as a source of evil 1. But 2015 is also the year of budding hope that civil society is awakening, that the political scene is evolving not only for the worse, but for the better too, that in the public square untarnished personalities would appear, new and charismatic figures around which one could build an alternative to the present political parties. -
Received by NSD/F ARA Registration Unit 08/03/2018 I 1:39:57 PM
Received by NSD/F ARA Registration Unit 08/03/2018 I 1:39:57 PM Subje_ct: News from the Democratic Party of Moldova Date: Friday, August 3, 2018 at 3:06:26 PM Eastern Daylight Time From: Democratic Party of.Moldova PDM N_EWSLETTER I AUGUST 2018 I This summer saw a high-level delegation from Moldova travel to Washington for a remarkable trip that helped solidify our transatlantic ties. Prime Minister Pavel Filip. was.joined by Speaker of Parliament Andrian Candu, Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration Tudor Ulianovsc;hi, Minister of Defense Eugeniu Sturza, and Minister of Economy and Infrastructure Chiril Gaburici for a visit that included public engagements,. high-level meetings with officials, and interviews with the American media. These visits are critical to our future as a Western-oriented democracy in the face of the extreme pressures we face from our Russian neighbors. Vladimir Plahotniuc Chairman Democratic Party of Moldova . Moldovan Prime Minister Pavel Filip addresses an audierfc8_.at th·e u.. S. Institute of Peace. (USIP) PM FiliP- SQeaks at US Institute of Peace I I I · Page'iofS Received by NSD/F ARA Registration Uni~ 08/03/2018 11 :39:57 PM Received by NSD/F ARA Registration Unit 08/03/2018 11 :39:57 PM (United States Institute of Peace) The U.S. Institute of Peace heisted Moldovan Prime Minister Pavel Filip, accompanied by seve'ral of his cabinet ministers, for a discussion focused on his country's foreign policy, regional role, reform achievements, political situation. and efforts to combat Russian influence. Parliament Speakers of Moldova1, Georgia, Ukraine Visit Atlantic Council - - . -
Public Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova
Public Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova March 2016 Detailed Methodology • The survey was coordinated and analyzed by Dr. Rasa Ališauskienė from public opinion and market research company Baltic Surveys/The Gallup Organization on behalf of the International Republican Institute. The field work was carried out by Magenta Consulting. • Data was collected throughout Moldova (except in Transnistria) between March 11-25, 2016 through face-to-face interviews at respondents’ homes. • The main sample consisted of 1,500 permanent residents of Moldova older than the age of 18 and eligible to vote with an oversample in the capital Chisinau. It is representative of the general population by age, gender, education, region and size of the settlement. • Multistage probability sampling method was used with the random route and next birthday respondent’s selection procedures. • Stage one: all districts of Moldova are grouped into 11 groups. All regions of Moldova were surveyed. • Stage two: selection of the settlements: cities and villages. o Settlements were selected at random. o The number of selected settlements in each region was proportional to the share of population living in a particular type of the settlement in each region. • Stage three: primary sampling units were described. • The margin of error does not exceed plus or minus 2.8 percent. • Response rate was 50 percent. • Charts and graphs may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. • The survey was funded by the National Endowment for Democracy. 2 Overwhelming Dissatisfaction with Status -
Public Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova
Public Opinion Survey Residents of Moldova September 2016 Detailed Methodology • The survey was coordinated by Dr. Rasa Ališauskienė from the public opinion and market research company, Baltic Surveys/The Gallup Organization on behalf of the International Republican Institute. The field work was carried out by Magenta Consulting. • Data was collected throughout Moldova (with the exception of Transnistria) between September 1–23, 2016 through face- to-face interviews at respondents’ homes. • The main sample consisted of 1,516 permanent residents of Moldova older than the age of 18 and eligible to vote. The survey also contained an oversample in the capital of Chisinau. It is representative of the general population by age, gender, education, region and size of the settlement. • Multistage probability sampling method was used with the random route and next birthday respondent’s selection procedures. • Stage One: All districts of Moldova are grouped into 11 groups. All regions of Moldova were surveyed. • Stage Two: Selection of the settlements – cities and villages. o Settlements were selected at random. o The number of selected settlements in each region was proportional to the share of population living in a particular type of the settlement in each region. • Stage Three: Primary sampling units were described. • The margin of error does not exceed plus or minus 2.8 percent. • The response rate was 61 percent. • Charts and graphs may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding. • The survey was funded by the National Endowment for Democracy. -
Moldova's Political Crisis Abates
CRS INSIGHT Moldova's Political Crisis Abates June 20, 2019 (IN11137) | Related Author Cory Welt | Cory Welt, Specialist in European Affairs ([email protected], 7-0530) On June 14, 2019, a political crisis in Moldova ended when leaders of the formerly ruling Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM) agreed to dissolve the outgoing government in favor of a new coalition. The coalition includes a reform- oriented, Western-leaning alliance, ACUM (or "Now"), and the socially conservative, Russian-leaning Party of Socialists, which placed first in Moldova's February 2019 elections. Moldova is one of three post-Soviet states that, together with Ukraine and Georgia, have sought greater integration with the West while coping with separatist territories occupied by Russian forces. Many Members of Congress have long supported Moldova's democratic trajectory and territorial integrity and have called on Russia to respect Moldova's sovereignty and withdraw its military forces. Growing Discontent Moldova's political environment was increasingly contentious before the recent crisis. The PDM gained power in 2016 after the prior government collapsed amid fallout from a bank fraud case involving the alleged loss of some $1 billion, equivalent to more than 12% of Moldova's gross domestic product. ACUM leaders and many observers contend that the PDM, in particular party leader and wealthy businessman Vlad Plahotniuc, effectively "captured" Moldova's state institutions for personal and party gain. In summer 2018, mass protests opposed a court decision to annul a snap mayoral election in Chisinau, Moldova's capital, which had been won by Andrei Nastase, who later became one of ACUM's two co-leaders. -
Dgapkompakt / Nr
DGAP kompakt Nr. 11 / April 2016 Moldova at an Impasse Can the Formation of the Latest Government Forestall Crisis? Sarah Pagung European and Moldovan politicians both tend to reduce Moldovan politics – and the EU’s policy toward the country – to a simple formula: “European Union vs. Eurasian Union.” While the debate about the direction of Moldova’s foreign policy is certainly of enormous importance, it tends to distract from two other significant facts: the coun- try’s longstanding corruption and its inability to push through effective reforms. The Moldovan public is still reeling from the discovery in December 2014 that as much as a billion euros had vanished from three Moldovan banks, but the coutry’s political situation remains at an impasse. The corruption and self-interest of Moldova’s politi- cal elite consistently impede the development of the small Eastern European country and its rapprochement with the EU. Whatever its geopolitical preferences, Moldova remains in the hands of the elite. At present, the EU is not presenting any robust so- lutions to the problem. In late January in Moldova’s capital, Chisinau, President The Government Coalition Wants to Nicolae Timofti appointed a new government under Prevent New Elections Prime Minister Pavel Filip – the fifth government since Pavel Filip’s appointment as prime minister met with parliamentary elections were held in December 2014. The vigorous public protest. In the run-up to the December latest of these had collapsed in the fall of 2015, brought elections, President Timofti had initially refused to nomi- down by the “Great Moldovan Bank Robbery”: the dis- nate the oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc, the candidate of covery, shortly before the December 2014 parliamentary the pro-European government coalition. -
Newsletter on Foreign Policy and European Integration Issues of the Republic of Moldova
Foreign Policy Association together with Friedrich- Ebert-Stiftung Moldova offer you a newsletter on foreign policy and European integration issues of the Republic of Moldova. The newsletter is part of the “Foreign Policy Dialogue” joint Project. NEWSLETTER MONTHLY BULLETIN SEPTEMBER 2018 NR.7 (149) Synthesis and Foreign Policy Debates The newsletter is developed by Sorina Ştefârţă, editor-coordinator TOPICS OF THE EDITION: 1. Eugen Sturza, Minister of Defense of the Republic of Moldova: The National Army reform means, above all, the qualitative change of people, not just equipment and technology 2. Valeriu Mija, Doctor of Political Sciences, Security Expert at Pro Marshall Center: Any large-scale regional phenomenon has implications for several states - and the Republic of Moldova is no exception 3. Expert opinion. Rosian Vasiloi: „When it comes to policy documents, things look fine” News in Brief The Republic of Moldova remains a strategic priority for Bucharest and its European course will be further supported by Romania. National Army, invisible shield This message recently announced at the Annual Meeting of the Romanian Diplomacy was passed to Prime Minister Pavel Filip by HE Daniel Ioniţă. Pavel Filip thanked Romania for its support, noting its importance in the realization of the European agenda of the Republic of Moldova, but also in the development of the bilateral or illusion of the shield? projects of major interest. Among these are the Ungheni-Chisinau gas pipeline, the interconnection of electricity networks, the development of infrastructure and the removal of roaming tariffs Sorina Ștefârță between the two countries. The Romanian Ambassador said in this context that Romania’s grant for renovation of kindergartens in the Republic of Moldova has been recently supplemented by three million euros. -
Monitoring Report
Monitoring report Elements of propaganda, disinformation and informational war in the domestic mass media November 1, 2015 – January 31, 2016 This report is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents are the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States Government. The report was developed within the Media campaign against false and biased information, conducted by the Association of Independent Press (API), Independent Journalism Center (IJC) and Association of Independent TV Journalists (ATVJI), under the Moldova Partnerships for Sustainable Civil Society project (MPSCS), implemented by FHI 360. I. OVERVIEW Within November 1, 2015 – January 31, 2016, the Independent Journalism Center monitored 12 media institutions – news portals, online versions of weekly publications and TV stations to identify whether the media products offered by these editorial teams contain elements of information manipulation. To this end, the way of presenting the major events in the political, economic, foreign, etc. areas by the Moldovan medias was analyzed. In addition, the analysis checked whether the media institutions follow the journalism rules concerning the verification of information from several sources, the pluralism of opinions and the maintenance of a balance in case of conflict news. The reference to the Journalist’s Ethical Code and to the relevant scientific works has enabled the identification of the procedures and techniques applied by the Moldovan media to influence the public by disseminating manipulative messages. Goal of the monitoring: To establish whether the media use manipulative methods when addressing subjects of high political, social or economic importance and to identify them; to reveal the errors committed, deliberately or unintentionally, by journalists when presenting the facts so that the case studies and the monitoring reports have an instructive mission. -
NEWSLETTER Issue No
1 NEWSLETTER Issue No. 36 |July – August 2016 Moldovan politics – internal migration Since parliamentary elections in November 2014, be in charge of most institutions anyway and respon- almost one third of the members of parliament (MPs) sible for the massive migration by members of switched their allegiance from the parties that parliament. brought them into parliament. Communists and Same new faces Liberal-Democrats were most affected and the distri- Pavel Filip’s government is supported by a coalition of bution of power changed severely. After two pro- the Democratic Party (20), Liberal Party (13) and near- European alliance governments in 2015 and the ly all 27 MPs who switched loyalties. Out of 16 minis- arrest of the Liberal Democrat’s leader Vlad Filat, terial portfolios, 8 are held by the Democrats, 4 by the accused of corruption and involvement in the bank Liberals, 3 by independent MPs candidates and one fraud, Vlad Plahotniuc tried to become prime minis- presented as technocrat. The Democratic Party con- ter in January 2016. tinues its pursuit for increasing the number of coali- Surprisingly, President Timofti refused to appoint him. tion members. Two more MPs left the Liberal Demo- After a short and intense crisis with violent protests, cratic faction and vote for the governing coalition’s Pavel Filip, also a member of the Democratic Party, initiatives since the beginning of 2016. was appointed. The new government, which was The affiliation of the members of parliament sworn in secretly at midnight at the president’s resi- dence, is currently supported by a coalition consisting 2014 2016 27 of Democratic Party, Liberal Party and independent 25 24 23 deputies. -
1 Country Visit: MOLDOVA Report of the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chair-In-Office on Combating Anti-Semitism Rabbi
CIO.GAL/162/17 29 August 2017 ENGLISH only Country Visit: MOLDOVA Report of the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chair-in-Office on Combating Anti-Semitism Rabbi Andrew Baker February 28-March 4, 2017 Introductory Acknowledgments I want to thank the Government of Moldova for its exceptional cooperation and positive response to my request for meetings with officials at the highest levels. The ability to take up the issues of my mandate including topics of some controversy with them in direct conversation has made for a better understanding of the current situation and appreciation of their respective efforts. I am also especially grateful to Ambassador Michael Scanlan and his staff at the OSCE Mission to Moldova for their invaluable assistance in both the organization of my visit and in briefing me prior to my arrival in Chisinau and throughout my stay. I believe Ambassador Scanlan’s knowledge and guidance helped me to ask the right questions and look critically at the answers I received. ODIHR has worked closely with civil society partners in Moldova and helped prepare the ground for this visit. I am especially indebted to Jan Fahlbusch for his advice and involvement. A View from the Jewish Community By its own estimate the Jewish Community of Moldova numbers about 15,000. The community operates a Jewish library, two general Jewish schools and three synagogues, and it is nearly unique in having a unified presence on both banks of the Dniester. It is an aging community, with half its members older than 50, due in some measure to the steady rate of emigration. -
Freedom House, Its Academic Advisers, and the Author(S) of This Report
Moldova By Victor Gotișan Capital: Chisinau Population: 3.5 Million GNI/capita, PPP: $5,670 Source: World Bank World Development Indicators. Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 National Democratic 5.75 6.00 5.75 5.75 5.50 5.50 5.50 5.75 5.75 5.75 Governance Electoral Process 4.00 4.25 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 Civil Society 3.75 3.50 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 Independent Media 5.75 5.75 5.50 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 Local Democratic 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.50 5.50 5.50 Governance Judicial Framework 4.50 4.75 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.75 4.75 4.75 5.00 5.00 and Independence Corruption 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 5.75 5.75 5.75 6.00 6.00 6.00 Democracy Score 5.07 5.14 4.96 4.89 4.82 4.86 4.86 4.89 4.93 4.93 NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. If consensus cannot be reached, Freedom House is responsible for the final ratings. The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest.