Vol. 4, No. 2 ‐ Summer 2016

Migration and Citizenship Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized Section on Migration and Citizenship http://community.apsanet.org/MigrationCitizenship

Table of Contents

Letter from the Co‐Presidents 1II. Debate Letter from the Editor 3 i. Europe’s Odd Migration Policy Choices 51 I. Symposium: The Refugee in Political Georg Menz Science ii. How to make Europe’s immigration i. Introduction 4 policies more efficient and more hu‐ Rebecca Hamlin (ed.) mane 55 ii. What drives Refugee Migration? 7 Ruud Koopmans David FitzGerald iii. Europe’s Refugee and Rawan Arar Immigration Policies – Obligation, iii. Changing the Message 13 Discretion, Cooperation & Freeriding 59 Jonathan Hiskey Cathryn Costello iv. The Tensions in Protecting iv. Unpacking the Facts Behind Europe’s Forced Migrants 19 Odd Migration Policy Choices 66 Phil Orchard Kelly M. Greenhill v. Does International Refugee Law v. A Response to my Critics 71 Still Matter? 24 Georg Menz Thomas Gammeltoft‐Hansen vi. The European Refugee Crisis and III. Research Institute Profile the Crisis of Citizenship in Maastricht Centre for Citizenship Mi‐ Greece 29 gration and Development (MAC‐ Heath Cabot IMIDE) 77 vii. Explaining State Responses to Costica Dumbrava Refugees 33 Maarten P. Vink Lamis Abdelaaty viii. The Specter of Climate Refugees: IV. Mentoring Matters Why Invoking Refugees as a Rea‐ Tips for Building Productive Mentor‐ son to “Take Climate Change Se‐ ing Relationships for riously” is Troubling 38 Migration and Citizenship Scholars 80 Gregory White Irene Bloemraad ix. Why Forced Migration Studies? Els de Graauw The New Generation of Scholar‐ Rebecca Hamlin ship 45 Galya Ruffer V. Section News i. Books 85 ii. Journal Articles 87 iii. Member News 91

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Letter from the Co-Presidents

“A Great Transformation: Status without Rights?”

The world of migration and citizenship is in turmoil. Long‐standing regimes, norms and commitments to the rights of refugees, inter‐ nal migrants and immigrant minorities are eroding in response to popular sentiment and unprecedented levels of human movement. As of 2015, 62 million people were either refu‐ gees or had been internally displaced. Fear (both real and imagined) of “others” now dominates discussion of available options. success stories and successful refugee reset‐ The British exit from the European Union is a tlement programs, even in the face of current cautionary example. pressures, it is becoming clear that legal membership is no guarantee of basic human Citizenship scholarship for a long time cele‐ rights. Prospective refugees and asylum brated the expansion of rights to groups pre‐ claimants must often navigate restricted em‐ viously denied them – including ethnic and ployment opportunities in host states while racial minorities, women, and the disabled. awaiting formal status. A minimal level of Scholars of migration and citizenship now survival is made even more difficult with re‐ point to a reversal or narrowing of rights, strictions on related social and political inte‐ bringing into focus citizenship’s exclusionary gration opportunities. Long‐standing refugees potential and the power of unbridled capital‐ in developing states (e.g. in Indonesia, Kenya, ism and numbers of persons in need to coopt Morocco, Pakistan, Sudan, and South Africa, rights. Saskia Sassen’s recent work, for exam‐ among others) often remain in poverty for ple, describes the mass expulsions and simple decades. Life in poverty with no escape route brutalities visited upon those most marginal‐ belies the promise of refugee resettlement, ized by the logic of capitalism and the politics which should involve support and protection of fear. And Margaret Somers points to the by the host community. contractualization and marketization of rights amid the rise of neoliberalism. Citizenship These cases provide a cautionary note to the rights are both contracting and fragmenting, current refugee crisis in Europe. Keeping ref‐ disproportionately impacting those already at ugees in limbo, delaying adjudication, denying the bottom of a citizenship hierarchy. claims based on bureaucratic technicalities and restricting employment only impoverish In keeping with this year’s annual meeting refugee rights and create needless poverty. theme of “Great Transformations,” we point to Long‐term refugee populations are facing the ways in which the most vulnerable sub‐ intergenerational poverty in many host and jects of our scholarship are too often witness‐ transit states, creating challenges to future ing the diminution of their status and citizen‐ integration. ship rights. While there are many immigrant 1

Internal migrants often face a similar discon‐ among immigrants and other marginalized nect between their citizenship status and the populations, as evidenced by hunger strikes, rights they enjoy. In major urban cities of the sit ins, protest candidates, and growing num‐ global south (such as Beijing, New Delhi, Ja‐ bers of demonstrations. This is the hopeful karta, and Rio de Janeiro, among others) citi‐ side of the transformations occurring in an zenship becomes immaterial, an empty prom‐ increasingly globalized, corporate‐dominated ise for the vast urban poor, destitute world. homeless, and slum residents. For the urban underclass in China, India, Indonesia and Bra‐ Expanding our analytical and geographical zil, the ability to engage in wholesome citizen‐ lens to consider cases from the global “south” ship rights is severely restricted to bare min‐ in tandem with those emerging in the global imal survival, even when citizenship status is “north” will generate innovative analysis and unquestioned. A ‘thin citizenship’ is becoming perhaps move the field toward more pene‐ the norm in these places. Entangled with is‐ trating and richer insights into the great sues of state capacity, the gulf between citi‐ transformations that are occurring around us. zenship status and rights belies citizenship’s inclusive claims. Kamal Sadiq University of California at Irvine In the global north, thin citizenship permits [email protected] institutionalized discrimination towards eth‐ nic/racial minorities. Failed municipal poli‐ Marie Provine cies have led to ghettoization and impover‐ Arizona State University ishment while election‐induced anti‐ [email protected] immigrant sentiment and rhetoric have brought into question the viability of multi‐ culturalism. For immigrants, government’s attempts to distinguish between those worthy of status and those who do not qualify further impoverishes and fragments rights. Special‐ ized courts, deportation schemes, outsourced border controls and criminalized immigration laws isolate these residents. Implicit in debate about citizenship, legal status, and rights is the more complicated question of responsibil‐ ity and/or obligation to those most marginal‐ ized.

As citizenship and migration scholars, we need to interrogate the meaning of citizen‐ ship. If refugees, immigrants and the urban poor alike experience impoverished rights, what does this imply for our political future? For the stability of states? For the future of rights? Rights consciousness is on the rise 2

Letter from the Editor

This issue of the Migration and Citizenship newsletter is dedicated to the one topic that has kept migration scholars probably most preoccupied over the last year, namely the increasing inflow of refugees in Europe. To what extent it is justified to speak of a crisis and what that crisis exactly would be is highly contested. In any case, one can certainly agree with Alexandra Filindra who wrote in the last issue of this newsletter that “the outcome of this multi‐level crisis is likely to have even more lasting effects than the economic crisis of recent years and to reshape the Union in more ways than one.” (4(1): 33) real live tigers to represent what was called The various contributions in this issue pursue the violence of the new Roman empire. The two goals: The symposium that was organized conceptual artists announced to feed real live by Rebecca Hamlin allows us, first, to take a volunteer refugees to the tigers if a paragraph step back, to go beyond the current political in German law forbidding refugees from debates and to ask the more fundamental booking normal airline tickets to Europe was questions of what a refugee is, why they mi‐ not annulled (for more information see here: grate, how these refugee flows can be regulat‐ http://www.politicalbeauty.com/index.html). ed and what this tells us about state sover‐ eignty and citizenship. The different What the best political responses to these approaches in these essays and the various new challenges are is not only contested empirical examples allow us to put the cur‐ among politicians but also among academics. rent debates in a broader perspective. The second goal of the newsletter is therefore to also let academics debate about how the Learning from other contexts and trying to current problems could be solved. Georg see the bigger picture might help us solve the Menz starts with a critique of what he calls day‐to‐day problems European states and the “Europe’s odd migration policy choices”. Ruud European Union currently face. As the politi‐ Koopmans, Cathryn Costello and Kelly M. cal debates over the last year have shown the Greenhill respond to his arguments and pro‐ proposed solutions range (as in many other vide their own views. cases) from building walls to prevent refugees from entering these states to flying refugees In further contributions Costica Dumbrava directly from their countries of origin to Eu‐ and Maarten P. Vink present their Maastricht rope. In June, the Berlin based Center for Po‐ Centre for Citizenship, Migration and litical Beauty launched its controversial cam‐ Devlopment (MACIMIDE). And Irene paign with the morbid title “Eating refugees”. Bloemraad, Els de Graauw and Rebecca Ham‐ A makeshift arena was set up next to the main lin provide some tips on how to build a pro‐ building of the Humboldt University with four ductive mentoring relationship for migration 3

and citizenship scholars. As always, the news September 2 at 6:30 (Franklin 1 room, Mar‐ section features information on the latest riott). book and journal publications, as well as member news. A very big thank to everybody Marc Helbling who contributed to this issue, especially to University of Bamberg and WZB Berlin Social Jakob Biernath for his assistance. I hope that Science Center many of you will come to the section’s busi‐ [email protected] ness meeting and the off‐site reception at the annual conference in Philadelphia on Friday

Symposium: The Refugee in Political Science

Introduction Rebecca Hamlin, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, [email protected]

The refugee has been a relatively neglected figure in Political Science, a surprising fact given the clear connections between refugee migration and concepts central to the study of politics, such as sovereignty, war, and citizen‐ ship. The fields of Refugee and Forced Migra‐ tion Studies have also remained strikingly dis‐ tinct from Migration Studies, which has slowly been integrated into Political Science. Howev‐ er, as this symposium will demonstrate, Politi‐ cal Science is embracing the study of refugees and forced migration more than ever before, with some exciting results. As our Migration & Citizenship section of the American Political Science Association continues to grow, the fields are using their knowledge and skills to study of refugees is becoming a central part of ask incredibly important questions, such as: our section’s work. What is a refugee? Why and under what cir‐ cumstances do they migrate? When does this This new level of scholarly attention comes at migration become a ‘crisis’? How do we ex‐ a critical time, as crises of displacement plain various state responses to arrivals? What around the world grow in number and severity role does international law and global govern‐ to levels not seen in at least a generation. ance play in managing large‐scale displace‐ While still dominated by International Rela‐ ment? Further, what can the study of refugees tions, scholars from all Political Science sub‐ teach us about larger debates within Political

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Science about the future of state sovereignty, pared to explain why we categorize and define the scope of international legal authority, and migrants the way we do in our scholarship. the meaning of citizenship? The second theme across these essays is the difficulty of locating the practice of border To try to answer these questions, I reached out control. Several contributors argue persuasive‐ to scholars across subfields, at various stages ly that border control can occur internally to of their careers, and who approach the topic the geographical borders of a state, and be from a variety of angles. I also included a Polit‐ applied to people seeking asylum as well as ical Sociologist and a Legal Anthropologist to those already recognized as refugees. Con‐ give a sense of the questions that scholars in versely, some contributors focus on the ways adjacent disciplines are asking. What follows is in which border control has been externalized, a window into the wide array of excellent often taking place in locations that are far re‐ work addressing these topics. moved from the geographical borders of a state. Despite the diversity of the issues explored below, some common themes are striking. Finally, these contributors remind us that First is the difficulty with using coherent ter‐ when it comes to displacement, our scholar‐ minology to describe categories that are in‐ ship disproportionately focuses on the policies herently unstable, overlapping, and politically of the United States, Canada, Australia, and fraught. Some authors use the term refugee to Western Europe. As someone admittedly guilty refer to anyone who has been displaced, ac‐ of this, I greatly appreciate the essays that de‐ knowledging that receiving states may not scribe the major impact of refugee migration recognize them as such. Others distinguish on the most disadvantaged parts of the world. legal refugees (who meet the UN Convention Even within Europe, the least resourced coun‐ definition) from sociological refugees (who tries are managing the largest numbers of asy‐ may not qualify for protection). Some scholars lum seekers. Moreover, the practice of exter‐ illustrate the same distinction with the terms nalization exacerbates this reality, keeping refugees and forced migrants. Many essays displaced people further from the attention of refer to the distinction between those who the advanced industrial democracies of the cross international borders and internally dis‐ world. placed people (IDPs). Some essays suggest that the distinction between refugee and migrant is The first two essays in this symposium engage a false binary, while others argue that the pro‐ directly with the question of motivation. David tection of refugees as the most vulnerable mi‐ FitzGerald and Rawan Arar point out that our grants relies on the perpetuation of a concep‐ understanding of what propels refugee migra‐ tually distinct type. Some essays even call into tion has been limited by the fact that the UN’s question the importance of the distinction be‐ definition of a refugee has particular drivers of tween refugee and citizen, observing that they migration built into it. They ask the larger often share experiences of marginalization. As question of what causes displacement, recog‐ I see it, we need not resolve these debates as nizing that many displaced people today may long as we are clear about what we mean by not officially qualify as legal refugees. When the terms we use, and as long as we are pre‐ one steps back to examine this much larger group, FitzGerald and Arar insightfully remind

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us that the motivations behind such migration states to keep potential refugees out. He dis‐ are complex, multifaceted, and even subject to cusses how the subfield of International Rela‐ change over multiple stages of migration. tions has responded to this reality, suggesting that liberal institutionalists and realists cannot Seeking to unpack these exact types of motiva‐ adequately explain it. Further, critical legal tions, Jonathan Hiskey shares results from studies’ insights about the indeterminacy of exciting research that he and his colleagues law do not explain why states work so hard to have been conducting in the Northern Triangle claim they are still abiding by it. Explaining the of Central America. Using large‐scale survey puzzle of the international refugee regime re‐ research instruments, Hiskey demonstrates quires elements of each school of thought, and that the biggest predictor of migration for thus can help develop our understanding of people from this region is not economic hard‐ international law more generally. ship, which is fairly universal, but crime vic‐ timization, which affects some more than oth‐ The next set of essays focuses on the internal ers. While legal experts disagree about treatment of people seeking refuge. Heath whether being targeted by a gang makes one Cabot reports from her long‐term fieldwork in eligible for refugee status, Hiskey’s findings Greece, where she has been witness to the suggest that the United States has been too massive scale of asylum seeker arrivals and quick to insist that Central Americans are eco‐ the many ways in which Greek state and socie‐ nomically motivated migrants as opposed to ty have responded. She places the intersec‐ refugees. tional figure of the refugee within the context of Greek austerity, reminding us that the dis‐ The next two contributions wrestle with the tinction between vulnerable migrants and puzzle that arises from states’ increasingly marginalized citizens can collapse in the face forceful assertion of their right to turn asylum of neoliberal economic policies. seekers away, combined with the endurance of an international protection regime. Phil Or‐ Lamis Abdelaaty studies the reception con‐ chard argues that a constructivist approach text in developing countries, which host the helps to explain the situation. States pay lip vast majority of the world’s refugees. In order service to refugee protection because of the to truly understand the experience of refugees importance of norms, yet they escalate tech‐ in the developing world, she argues, one must niques designed to contain potential refugees look not just at the laws on the books but the within their states or regions. Thus, he reveals ways in which policies are implemented on the that the numbers of IDP’s have grown while ground, and the degree to which rights are official counts of worldwide refugees have actually made available. stayed more stable. Because international pro‐ tection for IDPs is limited, they are left vulner‐ The last two essays provide an important cau‐ able while norms, legal instruments, and global tion to Political Scientists studying refugees. governance institutions struggle to keep pace Gregory White reminds us that even though with this change. world leaders focus on refugees as security threats, scholars should have a more critical Thomas Gammeltoft‐Hansen focuses on the lens. While the phrase ‘climate refugees’ has rise of elaborate methods used by developed become ubiquitous, White argues that when

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leaders invoke it to generate public concern cialty fields as we think about how best to ap‐ about climate change, the concept focuses dis‐ proach the study of displacement. She argues cussions onto the potential security threat to that it is important to consider people seeking advanced industrial states and encourages refuge as actors with some agency, rather than support for militarized border control. Mean‐ only as subjects of governance. Further, she while, the evidence suggests that most people suggests that a critical view of north/south displaced by climate change will remain within relations and power dynamics should be cen‐ their states or regions. More importantly, he tral to the study of refugees. Finally, she con‐ argues that this alarmist trope distracts poli‐ cludes with the essential point that refugee cymakers from more productive strategizing. ‘crises’ are often constructed and obscure much larger humanitarian concerns. Galya Ruffer reminds us that Refugee Studies and Forced Migration Studies have had fruitful I hope you enjoy reading these essays as much and often intense debates about how to define as I did. I look forward to engaging with their our field of study. Political Scientists should ideas in my work, and to watching the Political learn from the critical approach of these spe‐ Science study of refugees continue to expand.

What Drives Refugee Migration? David FitzGerald, Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California, San Die- go, [email protected] Rawan Arar, University of California, San Diego, [email protected]

What drives refugee migration? A relatively small body of political science research has attempted to answer this question using most‐ ly quantitative methods. Types of conflict that are likely to generate refugee flows include nation‐state building (Roucek 1939; Stoessinger 1956; Zolberg et al. 1989), wars with foreign interventions, generalized vio‐ lence rather than institutionalized violations of human rights (Schmeidl 1997), and genocide and “politicide”—the elimination of politically‐ defined groups (Fein 1993; Schmeidl 1997; but founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of see Neumayer 2005). Yet these findings risk race, religion, nationality, membership of a circular reasoning because they are based on particular social group or political opinion” statistics collected by the UNHCR and national (Article 1(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention). governments that use particular legal defini‐ It may be that people fleeing other kinds of tions of “refugee” to define those who are dis‐ violence outside the statutory definition are placed. It is not surprising that genocide and refugees in a sociological sense but not count‐ politicide generate refugee flows when the ed as such by the official sources on which re‐ definition of refugees used to calculate these searchers rely (Crisp 1999; Bakewell 1999; statistics is people who flee “owing to a well‐ Betts 2013). It is difficult to escape

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the legal construction of the refugee category social realties, independent of any determina‐ when attempting to measure the determinants tion by official bodies.” This step back from the of the migration of sociological refugees, a legal category is necessary in the scholarly broader category of people fleeing violence yet pursuit of comprehensively assessing experi‐ who may not be designated as refugees by a ences of violence‐induced displacement. Defin‐ legal authority. ing refugees in sociological terms allows us to benefit from a dialogue with extant theories of There is not a commonly accepted definition of international immigration to more fully explain just who would constitute a sociological refu‐ how violence and other factors shape refugee gee or even what the proper term should be to movement. avoid confusion between categories based on law and categories based on social scientific Refugees and theories of international mi‐ analysis. The choice of terms has political as gration well as analytical implications. Some advocates The fact that the Refugee Convention defines and legal scholars promote a restricted defini‐ refugees as persons who have already crossed tion of refugee that closely adheres to the clas‐ an international border, often in the context of sical UN statutory definition because they be‐ war, heightens the salience of foreign policy lieve that in doing so they stand on firm inputs and securitization. States essentially discursive and legal terrain for maintaining make refugees. By statutory definition, refu‐ existing protections. Others seek to widen the gees would not exist without being able to definition with the hope of protecting more cross an international border into another people, such as internally displaced persons state’s territory (Haddad 2008). Legally defin‐ and those displaced by development or envi‐ ing refugees by their ability to cross state bor‐ ronmental disasters, yet in doing so they risk ders makes the topic inherently amenable to IR weakening the political support for existing and other statist approaches. Pluralist and in‐ protections (see Price 2009, Betts 2013). More stitutionalist theories of the state and the con‐ broadly, the analytically difficult distinction structivist approach to international relations between economic migrants and refugees are particularly powerful for explaining how serves an instrumental function. Essentially, states of destination shape refugee flows and the United Nations High Commissioner for for investigating the often competing logics by Refugees relies on creating a moral imperative which governments select refugees (Zucker to solicit donations for refugees based on hu‐ and Zucker 1989; Gibney 2004; Betts 2011). manitarian as well as rights‐based appeals that World systems theory posits that interventions are defined against the economic motivations by core countries spawn migration in the op‐ for generic migration. posite direction (Portes and Walton 1981). Many refugee flows are shaped by this dynam‐ We do not seek to fully address or resolve all ic in the United States and European aspects of the definitional debates here. Ra‐ metropoles (Day and White 2002; Castles ther, for the purposes of this essay on the em‐ 2003), though counterexamples abound pirical drivers of refugee migration, we adopt a (Vogler and Rotte 2000; Neumayer 2005). social scientific definition of refugee. We follow Zolberg and his colleagues, who define socio‐ States may accept sociological refugees as eco‐ logical refugees as those fleeing violence “ac‐ nomic migrants without acknowledging legal cording to criteria grounded in observable refugee status. Various measures were passed 8

in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab lio. However, individual members of a house‐ Emirates following the onset of the Syrian war hold may be targeted for persecution, and not in 2011 to facilitate the entry and residence of everyone who can leave always does, so the hundreds of thousands of Syrians without reg‐ applicability of the new economics framework istering them as refugees (De Bel‐Air 2015). is ultimately an empirical question requiring There is evidence that rich, democratic coun‐ more research (see Alvarado and Massey tries of destination have sometimes used legal 2010). refugee resettlement as backdoor labor migra‐ tion policies (Dirks 1977, Gibney 2004, Fitz‐ Economic perspectives on refugee migration Gerald and Cook‐Martín 2014), although some are most useful when distinguishing between scholars reject these arguments (Charlton et al. two stages of mobility. In the first stage, vio‐ 1988, Mitchell 1989, Suhrke and Klink 1987). lence drives the refugee to the most easily ac‐ Weiner (1992) reframes the cost/benefit anal‐ cessible safe space, which is usually a neigh‐ ysis of refugee movement by placing political boring, often poor, country. Secondary considerations over economic ones in his dis‐ movements in which the refugee has the op‐ cussion of states’ attention to security and sta‐ portunity to consider long‐term solutions and bility. options look more like migration for the pur‐ poses of work or family reunification (Zim‐ While discussions in the public sphere dismiss merman 2009; but see Day and White 2002). unwanted refugees as “merely” economic mi‐ Thus, segmented labor market theory helps grants, empirical questions remain about the explain some secondary flows to rich coun‐ extent to which violence and economic condi‐ tries, but not the initial departures. Efforts to tions intersect in producing mobility. The maximize long‐term safety, access to rights, handful of quantitative studies vary in their and social benefits for oneself and family support of economic explanations for refugee members may affect the timing of departure flows. There is widespread acknowledgement and specific destinations for asylum seekers. that violence and dire economic conditions Family reunification polices may influence the often feed on each other (Zolberg et al. 1989; decisions of asylum seekers and the routes of Neumayer 2005). Moore and Shellman (2004, secondary movement. While wealthy receiving 2007) and Neumayer (2005) find that all else states have enacted policy measures to impede being equal, per capita income and/or GDP in family reunification in an effort to deter asy‐ the country of origin are negatively associated lum seekers, there is a dearth of systematic or with refugee migration, though Schmeidl conclusive evidence that such practices achieve (1997), Davenport et al. (2003), and Melander their intended goal unless they use the most and Öberg (2006) find that economic factors draconian methods. For example, in 2016, the do not predict refugee migration. Refugees fit Danish government tried to discourage new more awkwardly within the new economics of asylum seekers by applying new restrictions to labor migration framework, in part because it family reunification that extended the wait is based on the idea that households allocate time for reunification from one to three years. labor to different markets, including the one It is unknown if such policies are actually a they currently occupy (Stark and Bloom 1985). deterrent. On the other hand, simply rejecting In contexts of violence, the major risks to be the possibility of asking for asylum, such as managed are to life and limb more than the Australia’s refusal to accept asylum applica‐ maximization of a household economic portfo‐ tions for those who arrive by sea, has effective‐ 9

ly stopped maritime entries, albeit at the ex‐ The migration industry makes it possible for pense of Australia’s compliance with its inter‐ people moving for all manner of reasons to national treaty obligations (McAdam and cross borders even if they do not have estab‐ Chong 2014). lished social networks or legal permission (Gammeltoft‐Hansen and Sørensen 2013). Gib‐ Secondary refugee movements from the Global ney (2004) and Zimmerman (2009) highlight South to the Global North may also be shaped how the migration industry facilitates the by the pull of citizenship acquisition. The movement of asylum seekers. The mass promise of citizenship can translate into long‐ movement of asylum seekers to Europe in term stability, which may be especially enticing 2015 introduced new kinds of social network for refugees that are trapped in protracted organized around solidarity as well as econom‐ situations lasting five or more years. Push fac‐ ic motivations. People on the move turned to tors like poverty, lack of employment opportu‐ Facebook, Twitter, Google Maps, and phone nities, and host country efforts to discourage applications to find support and learn about the local integration of refugees have been the changing landscape of border crossings. In cited as promoting secondary refugee flows. some of the more creative uses of technology, However, each of these challenges can be at‐ Refugees Welcome allows citizens from ten host tributed to the lack of membership status. Most states to house refugees in their homes, match‐ of the world’s refugees reside in countries that ing 608 refugees with hosts as of April 2016. do not offer a pathway to citizenship. Follow‐ With over 2000 members, Techfugees brings ing Arendt (1951), refugees may be searching tech engineers and entrepreneurs together beyond humanitarian relief for the chance to with NGOs to address the challenges of the fully belong to a community. refugee crisis.

Social networks channel migrants along par‐ While there are aspects of international migra‐ ticular routes and reduce the costs of move‐ tion theory, such as a culture of outmigration ment (Boyd 1989). The refugee literature (Massey, Goldring, and Durand 1994), which shows that a similar dynamic applies to people may be less applicable to violence‐induced fleeing violence (Hein 1993; Koser 1997; Crisp mobility, scholars don’t know the answer 1999; Neumayer 2005; Williams 2006; Scalet‐ without asking the question and doing new taris 2007; Shellman and Stewart 2007), alt‐ research. The dialogue between refugee stud‐ hough refugees may avoid recourse to their ies and theories of migration can be far more social networks in contexts where doing so mutually productive. would render them or their families vulnerable to further violence (Arar 2015). Even when it Conclusion comes to refugees in camps, social networks Social scientific analyses of the drivers of refu‐ can influence which camp one may enter and gee migrations are especially timely as Euro‐ whether it is possible to leave to settle in urban pean politicians and scholars research the over areas. For example, Sullivan and Tobin (2014) one million asylum seekers who arrived by sea show how the kafala sponsorship system in in 2015. Through bilateral agreements and Jordanian refugee camps allows a Jordanian extra‐territorialization measures, Western citizen to “bail out” a Syrian refugee so he or states are negotiating the exchange of migra‐ she can live in the city. tion concessions with buffer countries like Turkey (such as visa free movement for Turks) 10

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Changing the Message Jonathan Hiskey, Vanderbilt University, [email protected]

In the spring and summer of 2014, U.S. border apprehensions of unaccompanied minors and family units arriving from the Northern Trian‐ gle countries of Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras increased dramatically, leading to an enhanced effort on the part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its subsidiary agencies Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to “send a message.” This message came in the form of the widespread detention of border arrivals, denial of bond (or inordinately high bonds), expedited removal procedures, and the launching of the “Dangers Awareness” media campaign throughout the Northern Tri‐ angle countries. In short, this shift in U.S. poli‐ cy represented a resurgence of a longstanding engaged in ongoing research that seeks to dis‐ U.S. policy of “prevention through deterrence” entangle the myriad factors that shape the that dates back to the early 1990s (Rosenblum emigration decision calculus among individu‐ 2012: 1; see also Hamlin 2012) and is explicit‐ als living in high violence contexts such as the ly designed to persuade potential emigrants to Northern Triangle region. Through reliance on stay home. As DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson em‐ survey data of potential migrants, we are able phatically stated in June 2014: to provide a complementary approach to ex‐ tant qualitative research on the determinants Our message to those who are . . . contem‐ of the recent wave of Central American mi‐ plating coming here illegally: We will send grants.3 you back. . . . People in Central America should see and will see that if they make this journey and spend several thousand Development, the United Nations Development dollars to do that, we will send them back Program, and the Inter‐American Development and they will have wasted their money (Jeh Bank. For over three decades, LAPOP has conduct‐ ed interviews to gauge political attitudes and be‐ Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security, haviors throughout the Latin American region. June 27, 2014). Information concerning sampling, as well as re‐ ports using the LAPOP data is available at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/. Through analysis of data collected by Vander‐ 2 Dr. Abby Córdova, Assistant Professor at the Uni‐ bilt University’s Latin American Public Opinion versity of Kentucky, Dr. Mary Malone, Associate Project (LAPOP),1 my colleagues2 and I are Professor at the University of New Hampshire, and Dr. Diana Orcés, Assistant Professor at Oakland University. 1 The Latin American Public Opinion Project 3 See, for example, Elizabeth Kennedy’s outstanding (LAPOP) of Vanderbilt University is directed by report (2014) on child migrants from Central Prof. Elizabeth Zechmeister, and receives support America entitled No Childhood Here: Why Central from the United States Agency for International American Children Are Fleeing Their Homes. 13

We also evaluate the extent to which the U.S. sectors) reported sharp increases in appre‐ deterrence message works on those Central hension rates during this period, suggesting Americans most directly affected by the recent that migrants and traffickers may have simply wave of crime and violence in the region. Using adjusted their tactics to try to elude U.S. bor‐ data collected by LAPOP across twelve Hondu‐ der agents.4 ran municipalities in the summer of 2014, we assess Hondurans’ views on the U.S. immigra‐ Further, by December of 2015, apprehension tion context in an effort to gauge whether they rates were again outpacing those of previous had received the message the U.S. was sending years, calling into question the degree to which during the height of the border crisis. Below, I the “send a message” policy was having its offer an overview of this research and con‐ intended deterrence effect. In an apparent clude with a discussion of the implications of attempt to re‐send the message, DHS launched our findings for U.S. border enforcement poli‐ a series of household raids in January of 2016, cy. explicitly targeting those women and children who had arrived at the border in the spring Sending a Message and summer of 2014 and who, according to The U.S. policy response to what President DHS, had “exhausted appropriate legal reme‐ Obama referred to as an “urgent humanitarian dies” (DHS 2016). Although still early, this situation” (Obama 2014) seems to have been messaging tactic also appears to have had a driven, at least publicly, by the widely held and limited deterrence effect, as the number of seemingly unquestioned belief among U.S. pol‐ border apprehensions in March of 2016 ex‐ icymakers that the border crisis was a product ceeded those of March 2015.5 of the widespread misunderstanding of U.S. immigration policy among Central Americans. Finally, the enhanced role of the Mexican gov‐ As a consequence, detention without possibil‐ ernment in preventing Central Americans from ity of bond, an expedited removal process, and reaching the U.S. border has also played a sig‐ the CBP’s “Dangers Awareness” public rela‐ nificant role in U.S. apprehension numbers. In tions campaign in Central America became the summer of 2014, the Mexican government critical tools to not only solve the 2014 influx announced implementation of the Plan Fronte‐ of migrants, but also deter future waves of ra Sur, a redoubling of efforts to detain and migrants. Once potential emigrants realized deport Central American migrants apprehend‐ that migrating to the U.S. was not easy, and ed in Mexico. By 2015, apprehensions in Mexi‐ would likely result in deportation rather than co had increased 80 from the previous year, to receipt of a permiso, they would no longer a point where Mexico had surpassed the U.S. in attempt the journey in the first place. terms of the number of Central Americans it As of July 2015, the strategy seemed to have was detaining and deporting (2015). With all paid dividends, as the CBP reported a reduc‐ of these factors in mind, then, it is unclear how tion in unaccompanied minor and family unit effective the U.S. “send a message” policy has apprehensions of over 50 percent between October 1 2014 and July 31 of 2015 compared 4 For data on unaccompanied minor apprehensions, to the same time period in the previous year see the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol statistics, available at: (CBP 2015). However, some border crossing http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest‐ zones (particularly the Big Bend and Yuma border‐unaccompanied‐children. 5 See footnote 1 for source of apprehension data. 14

been in terms of dissuading Central Americans affected by crime in the previous year; (2) from risking their lives to have a chance at evaluate the relative impact of crime on one’s gaining entry into the U.S. emigration intentions and (3) assess the de‐ gree to which respondents’ awareness of the Evaluating the Premise of the Message U.S. immigration climate, circa August 2014, Despite the anecdotal testimony of ICE and affected their emigration plans. In the follow‐ CBP agents in support of “detention as deter‐ ing sections, I discuss our preliminary findings rence,” (Rosenblum 2012) we have very few for each of these tasks. systematic, empirical evaluations of the under‐ lying assumption that an increased focus on Crime Victimization in the Northern Trian‐ detention and expedited removal in the U.S. gle will deter potential migrants, particularly For the first, the AmericasBarometer survey those fleeing violence. Indeed, it seems Central asked respondents if they had been victimized Americans are still trying to leave, with Mexi‐ by crime in the previous twelve months. Those can enforcement efforts simply shifting the who answered yes to this item were then geographical location of this humanitarian asked how many times they had been victim‐ crisis from the southwestern U.S.‐Mexico bor‐ ized and the type of crime that occurred. We der to the southeastern border of Mexico and categorize respondents into those who report‐ Guatemala. ed no incidents of crime victimization, those who reported one such incident, and those In an effort to empirically assess at least some victimized more than once in the previous elements of the “send a message” strategy, we twelve months. It is this latter group of re‐ analyze the emigration intentions of survey spondents that we view as least likely to be respondents in Central America, providing us dissuaded by a message of deterrence from the some indication of the relative weight that US. violence has compared to awareness of the U.S. immigration climate. From this research, we Additional items in the AmericasBarometer have strong evidence that “knowing the facts”6 survey help fill out the picture of what those about the U.S. immigration climate has very individuals who had suffered multiple inci‐ little deterrence effect on whether or not indi‐ dents of crime were confronting in their daily viduals consider emigration as a viable life lives in the spring and summer of 2014. In strategy. Rather, the most decisive factor for Honduras, for example, close to ten percent of residents of El Salvador and Honduras is, un‐ survey respondents were classified as multiple surprisingly, crime victimization. crime victims in 2014. 8.6 percent suffered one such incident, and 82.1 percent were fortunate On what basis do we make these claims? enough not to be a direct victim of crime. LAPOP surveys from the Guatemala, El Salva‐ When asked if there had been a murder in the dor, and Honduras include several items that neighborhood within the previous year, 48.6 allow us to accomplish three empirical tasks: percent of those respondents in the multiple (1) Identify those respondents most directly victimization category responded “Yes”, com‐ pared to 24.6 percent of respondents in the

6 The name of the Custom and Border Patrol’s 2015 non‐victim category. In El Salvador, of the public relations campaign launched throughout the nearly 10 percent of respondents who were Northern Triangle countries was “Know the Facts.” 15

victimized multiple times, nearly half reported emigrate. The picture painted by our findings knowledge of incidents of extortion or black‐ is similar in El Salvador but not in Guatemala, mail in their neighborhood, while “only” 18.2 where those considering emigration appear percent in the non‐victim category had heard similar to standard economic migrants, with of such incidents. crime victimization not emerging as a signifi‐ cant predictor of emigration intentions. These are but two examples of the severity of the situation confronted by some individuals When taken together, these findings suggest in the Northern Triangle countries. This fairly that U.S. immigration policy needs to recognize simple, and intuitive, approach will help push Central American migration flows as decidedly forward our understanding of who, and how mixed in terms of the various push factors at many, Central Americans may have at least work. We are certainly not the first ones to some legitimate basis for an asylum claim. This make this point, but our survey data analysis is an important first step in offering systemat‐ of Central Americans still residing in their ic, large‐N support for what to date have large‐ countries of birth reinforces the conclusions ly been qualitative accounts of the role crime others have drawn using different methodolo‐ and violence are playing in the lives of citizens gies. Indeed, our conclusion that migrants of the Northern Triangle countries. from Honduras and El Salvador are likely not economic migrants, while those from Guate‐ Crime Victimization and the Emigration mala are, is precisely the conclusion reached Decision by the Department of Homeland Security in its The next question we can then tackle with own analysis of the migration determinants of these data is the degree to which crime victim‐ unaccompanied minors from the Northern ization plays a role in the emigration decision. Triangle countries, finding that “many Guate‐ In a recently published report (Hiskey et al. malan children . . . are probably seeking eco‐ 2016), we find strong and robust support for nomic opportunities in the U.S. [while] Salva‐ the idea that those most likely to emigrate doran and Honduran children . . . come from from Honduras and El Salvador in 2014 were extremely violent regions where they probably driven far more by their experiences with perceive the risk of traveling alone to the U.S. crime and violence than they were by econom‐ preferable to remaining at home” (as quoted in ic motivations. In Honduras, an individual who Gonzalez‐Barerra et al. 2014; italics added). has been victimized multiple times by crime is This recognition that Honduran and Salvador‐ nearly twice as likely to report emigration in‐ an migrants, and particularly women and chil‐ tentions than her counterpart who has not dren, are not economic migrants is a critical been victimized in the previous year. Just as first step in changing the message. Whether importantly, the standard predictors of eco‐ any further steps will be taken, however, re‐ nomic migrants, such as age, gender, and the mains in doubt. household economic situation, do not offer any significant help in identifying those Hondurans Message Received . . . and Ignored considering emigration. Only receipt of remit‐ Finally, we explored whether Central Ameri‐ tances rivals our multiple crime victimization cans were misinformed about the U.S. immi‐ category in helping identify who among the gration climate in the summer of 2014, and if survey respondents reported intentions to so, whether that influenced their emigration

16

calculations. We included four questions on a our multivariate regression models did any of LAPOP survey carried out in August of 2014 these U.S. immigration context items emerge across twelve municipalities in Honduras. The as significant predictors of emigration inten‐ items were as follows: tions among Hondurans. Throughout all of our analyses and different model specifications, 1. Taking into account what you have heard the final message was always the same— about undocumented migration, do you perceptions of future risks entailed in the think crossing the U.S. border is easier, journey to the U.S. do not matter, while being more difficult, or the same as it was 12 victimized multiple times by crime matters a months ago? lot. It seems that those Central Americans most 2. Taking into account what you have heard entangled in the region’s spiral of violence about undocumented migration, do you would rather leave the devil they know, and think crossing the U.S. border is safer, less take their chances with the devil described in safe, or the same as it was 12 months ago? the U.S. “send a message” campaign. 3. Now, keeping in mind what you have heard about Central American migrants in the Conclusion United States, do you think [they] are being Crime and violence currently are the most treated better, the same, or worse than 12 powerful determinants of emigration from months ago? Honduras and El Salvador. If U.S. policymakers 4. Do you think that deportations in the Unit‐ recognize this fact, perhaps they will begin to ed States have increased, stayed the same, view the thousands of unaccompanied minors or decreased in comparison to 12 months and family units that will arrive at the border ago? in the summer of 2016 as likely refugees with legitimate asylum claims, rather than “illegal If the U.S. campaign to “send a message” immigrants” who simply need to be sent back. worked, we should find most respondents in The dogged insistence of U.S. officials to stay agreement with the view that immigrating to on message, and treat all those arriving from the U.S. in August of 2014 was much more dif‐ Central America as illegal immigrants rather ficult than it was in 2013. And in fact, this is than potential asylum‐seekers, ignores the precisely what we find. Over 85 percent of clear humanitarian crisis occurring in the respondents thought crossing the border was Northern Triangle, and the role it is playing in more difficult, 84 percent thought it was less the current migration flows from that region. safe, 79 percent felt that deportations had in‐ creased, and 65 percent thought that migrants As Hamlin (2012: 52) has pointed out, “Central were treated worse in the U.S. Clearly then, Americans have long been viewed as illegal these results suggest that Hondurans, if not all immigrants by the U.S. For these groups, the citizens of Northern Triangle countries, were regime of deterrence is not new; it is the only getting the message being sent by the U.S. regime that has ever been in place.” Perhaps, with the growing body of research that high‐ Did these perceptions of the U.S. immigration lights the role of violence in current Central context affect the emigration decision? Does American migration flows, along with continu‐ the U.S. “regime of deterrence” (Hamlin 2012: ing pressure from the U.S. courts on this most 52) work? The short answer is “No.” In none of recent version of a “regime of deterrence,” we

17

may see some progress in efforts to change the [http://immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/fil message. es/docs/understanding_the_central_american_r efugee_crisis.pdf] Kennedy, Elizabeth. 2012. No Childhood Here: Why References Central American Children Are Fleeing Their Customs and Border Protection (CBP). 2015. Homes. Washington, D.C.: American Immigra‐ “Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Chil‐ tion Council. Available at: dren.” Last accessed on Aug. 20, 2015 at: [http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/defa [http://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southw ult/files/docs/no_childhood_here_why_central_ est‐border‐unaccompanied‐children]. ameri‐ Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 2016. can_children_are_fleeing_their_homes_final.pdf ] “Statement by Secretary Jeh C. Johnson on Obama, Barack. 2014. “Letter from the President ‐ ‐ Southwest Border Security,” available at: Efforts to Address the Humanitarian Situation in https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/01/04/state the Rio Grande Valley.” Accessed online at ment‐secretary‐jeh‐c‐johnson‐southwest‐ [ https://www.whitehouse.gov/the‐press‐ border‐security office/2014/06/30/letter‐president‐efforts‐ Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 2014. address‐humanitarian‐situation‐rio‐grande‐ “Statement by Secretary of Homeland Security valle ] Jeh Johnson before the Senate Committee on Rosenblum, Marc R. 2012. “Measuring Border Secu‐ Appropriations,” available at: rity: U.S. Border Patrol’s New Strategic Plan and http://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/07/10/state the Path Forward.” Congressional testimony, ment‐secretary‐homeland‐security‐jeh‐johnson‐ Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommit‐ senate‐committee‐appropriations tee on Border and Maritime Security, May 8. Dominguez Villegas, Rodrigo and Victoria Rietig. Available at: 2015. “Migrants Deported from the United Sta‐ [https://homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony‐ tes and Mexico to the Northern Triangle: A Sta‐ Rosenblum.pdf ] tistical and Socioeconomic Profile.” Washington, Slack, Jeremy, Daniel E. Martinez, Scott Whiteford, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute. Available at: fi‐ and Emily Peiffer. 2015. “In Harm’s Way: Fami‐ le:///Users/hiskeyjt/Desktop/downloads.deskt ly Separation, Immigration Enforcement Pro‐ op/RMSG‐CentAmDeportations%20(2).pdf grams and Security on the US‐Mexico Border.” Gonzalez‐Barrera, Ana, Jens Manuel Krogstad and Journal on Migration and Human Security 3(2): Mark Hugo Lopez. 2014. “DHS: Violence, pov‐ 109‐128. erty is driving children to flee Central America Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). 2015. to U.S.” Pew Research Center, Factank: News in “Mexico Now Detains More Central American Numbers. Accessed at Migrants than the United States.” Last access on http://www.pewresearch.org/fact‐ Aug. 20 at: tank/2014/07/01/dhs‐violence‐poverty‐is‐ http://www.wola.org/news/mexico_now_detai driving‐children‐to‐flee‐central‐america‐to‐u‐s/ ns_more_central_american_migrants_than_the_u Hamlin, Rebecca. 2012. “Illegal Refugees: Compet‐ nited_states ing Policy Ideas and the Rise of the Regime of Zezima, Katie. June 6, 2014. “Could rumors be par‐ Deterrence in American Asylum Politics.” Refu‐ tially responsible for an influx of unaccompa‐ gee Survey Quarterly, 31(2): 33‐53. nied children to the U.S.?” The Washington Post, Hiskey, Jonathan, Abby Cordova, Diana Orces, and available at: Mary Malone. 2016. “Understanding the Central http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the‐ American Refugee Crisis: Why They Are Fleeing fix/wp/2014/06/06/could‐rumors‐be‐ and How U.S. Policies Are Failing to Deter partially‐responsible‐for‐an‐influx‐of‐ Them.” American Immigration Council Special unaccompanied‐children‐to‐the‐u‐s/ Report. Washington, D.C. Available at:

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The Tensions in Protecting Forced Migrants Phil Orchard, University of Queensland, [email protected]

We seem to be in a period when international cooperation around refugee protection and broader forced migration issues is breaking down. We’ve seen a significant increase in the number of forced migrants globally, with UN‐ HCR estimating at the end of 2014 that there were 19.5 million refugees and 38.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs).1 The Syri‐ an conflict has been a significant driver of this increase, with half the country now displaced as 4.1 million refugees and over 6.6 million IDPs.2 At the same time, the recent EU‐Turkey deal appears to be violating fundamental norms around refugee protection, particularly with accusations that Turkey has been delib‐ boat arrivals to two detention facilities in Pa‐ erately refouling refugees, and cannot ensure pua New Guinea and Nauru since 2013, with full protections for refugees under interna‐ Immigration Minister Peter Dutton noting that tional law.3 “We are not going to allow people to settle in our country who seek to come here by boat” But these tensions reveal an ongoing set of irrespective of whether they are determined to problems in the modern international refugee be refugees.4 And yet Australia, like other regime which is based around the Refugee states, does not seek to leave the refugee re‐ Convention and Protocol and the role of UN‐ gime. In fact, its detention policies cost HCR. While the EU‐Turkey deal may appear to AU$400,000 per year per asylum seeker and be the most egregious recent example, we can the government continues to resettle 13,750 see similar violations of international law rou‐ refugees a year, while also being one of the top tinely occurring. Australia has been sending all ten funders of UNHCR.5

1 This includes 14.4 million refugees under UN‐ 4 See Kate Aubusson, “Peter Dutton rules out send‐ HCR’s mandate, and 5.1 million Palestinian refu‐ ing Manus Island detainees to Christmas Island” gees under the mandate of the United Nations Re‐ The Sydney Morning Herald, 28 Apr 2016, lief Works Agency (UNRWA). See UNHCR, ‘Global http://www.smh.com.au/federal‐politics/political‐ Trends: Forced Displacement in 2014’, p. 2. news/peter‐dutton‐rules‐out‐sending‐manus‐ 2 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre island‐detainees‐to‐christmas‐island‐20160428‐ (IDMC), ‘Syria IDP Figures Analysis’, December gohobh.html#ixzz47BntCdiQ. 2015, 5 On the $400,000 figure, see Oliver Laughland, http://www.internal‐displacement.org/middle‐ “Immigration Detention Centre Services Should be east‐and‐north‐africa/syria/figures‐analysis. Reduced, Audit Report Says” The Guardian, 1 May 3 See Amnesty International, “Turkey: Illegal Mass 2014, Returns of Syrian Refugees Expose Fatal Flaws in http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/0 EU‐Turkey Deal”, 1 Apr 2016, 1/immigration‐detention‐centre‐services‐should‐ https://www.amnesty.org/en/press‐ be‐reduced‐audit‐report. Figures on Australia’s releases/2016/04/turkey‐illegal‐mass‐returns‐of‐ Humanitarian Programme are available at: syrian‐refugees‐expose‐fatal‐flaws‐in‐eu‐turkey‐ https://www.border.gov.au/about/corporate/info deal/ rmation/fact‐sheets/60refugee. 19

Refugee Protection as a Puzzle Seeking to examine and explain this perplexing We can make another historical comparison as mix of behaviours has been the focus of much well, looking at the contemporary period and of my research, and what I discuss here draws the period following the Second World War. on my 2014 book, A Right to Flee: Refugees, While forced migration figures have risen con‐ States, and the Construction of International siderably (as shown in Figure below), they do Cooperation. There is a confusing pattern of not come close to the flows following the Sec‐ continuity and change associated with refugee ond World War. In 1945, there were 65 million protection as an issue area. For example, if we refugees and displaced persons in Europe step back from the Syrian crisis and look at the alone. Further, in the next five years—up to early 2000s, we can see a similar ambivalence the point that the Refugee Convention was in the statements of policy makers. No gov‐ negotiated and UNHCR founded—new flows in ernment has yet adopted the strategy advocat‐ the millions were generated by the partition of ed by former British Conservative Leader Mi‐ India, the creation of Israel, and the Korean chael Howard in the 2004 election that if War. By 1950, refugees were fleeing across the elected, “we will pull out of the 1951 Refugee Iron Curtain into West Germany at a rate of Convention, as is our right... Its authors could 15,000 per month, a continuous refugee flow not have imagined that it would come to be with little prospect of ending. Facing that cri‐ exploited by tens of thousands of people every sis, states still agreed to build the regime that year” (Howard 2004). But President George W. governs international cooperation today, albeit Bush that same year argued that the United with some modifications. States will “turn back any refugee that at‐ tempts to reach our shore” (Bush 2004). A Constructivist Explanation In order to explain these patterns of continuity Statements like this echo Matthew Gibney’s and change, I anchor myself within an interna‐ (2004: 229) conclusion that “if the provision of tional relations constructivist approach. Con‐ protection for refugees is its central goal, then structivist theorizing has brought the study of the system of asylum offered by Western ideas and social structures back into interna‐ states is currently in deep crisis.” Governments tional relations scholarship. In particular, con‐ across the North acknowledge their commit‐ structivists focus on the role of international ment to asylum and the regime in rhetoric, norms, defined as shared understandings of while at the same time prioritizing national appropriate behaviour for actors with a given interests such as immigration and border con‐ identity which isolates a single strand of be‐ trol over humanitarian interests. This has led a haviour (Jepperson et al. 1996: 52; Finnemore number of commentators to suggest that the and Sikkink 1998: 891). While I consider international refugee regime has, since the end norms to be critical, in my work I view them as of the Cold War, been either in crisis or unrav‐ working together within a regime. Regimes elling (see Loescher 1994; Keely 2001; Roberts create webs of meaning by linking together 1998). But the puzzle here is this: if states are individual norms (Neufeld 1993: 43; so concerned over the issue of refugees, why Hasenclever et al. 1997: 165). Since a regime have none of them actually followed Michael bundles together what might otherwise be Howard’s view and left the Refugee Conven‐ disparate norms, it provides a clear sense of tion? the scope of the international behaviour and

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how states within international society should international legal identity they could use to deal with the problem. move between countries. But this system was ad hoc and each Arrangement needed the ap‐ How do norms work within the area of refugee proval of the League. While a binding Refugee protection? Perhaps not surprisingly, there are Convention was negotiated in 1933, it applied relatively few prescriptive norms—those that only to groups of refugees already recognized require a positive duty or action on part of by the League and only sixteen states would states (Glanville 2006: 154‐6). The main posi‐ ultimately become a party to the treaty or ad‐ tive duty that states have accepted in the refu‐ here to it (Beck 1999). The 1938 Convention gee regime is the requirement to offer asylum on Refugees Coming from Germany was signed to refugees who are within a state’s territory by only seven countries and did not come into or at its borders; in other words they reflect a force before the war (Skran 1995: 137). direct responsibility to refugees who have reached the state’s territory. A broader diffuse Thus, when the decision was made by states to responsibility also exists towards refugees as a create the 1951 Refugee Convention, this was whole, frequently defined both by states a significant break with past practice. It pro‐ providing funds to UNHCR and by resettling vided the first clear definition at the interna‐ refugees from countries of initial asylum. But tional level of who a refugee was, though it because this is not a positive duty, there exists was initially both geographically and tempo‐ a gulf between bare observance of the interna‐ rally limited.6 In addition, the United Nations tional norms which constitute the internation‐ continued the pattern set by the League of al refugee regime at any one time, and states establishing international organizations to accepting that they have an active obligation to provide refugees with protection and assis‐ provide protection to all refugees globally and tance, first through the International Refugee acting on that obligation. This gulf, as Weiner Organization and then, from 1950 onwards, (1996: 171) has noted, is brought about by a through UNHCR. States, in other words, moral contradiction “between the notion that demonstrated a clear collective responsibility emigration is widely regarded as a matter of to provide refugees with protection and assis‐ human rights… while immigration is regarded tance. And UNHCR effectively demonstrated as a matter of national sovereignty.” that it could deal with new refugee flows, first from the Communist world and then, from the A Brief History of Refugee Protection 1960s onwards, the developing world as well The idea of refugee protection as a concept (Loescher 2001). took centuries to develop (Orchard 2016). Following the First World War, the League of Nations created the first international organi‐ zation, the “High Commissioner on Behalf of the League in Connection with the Problem of Russian Refugees in Europe” (its title was later 6 The Convention originally established that refu‐ shortened). The first High Commissioner, gee status was limited to individuals displaced by Fridthof Nansen, was able to introduce an Ar‐ events prior to 1 January 1951 and states could decide whether to apply this definition only to Eu‐ rangement system which provided first Rus‐ rope, or to Europe and elsewhere. These latter limi‐ sian and then other refugees groups with an tations were removed by the 1967 Refugee Proto‐ col. 21

The Challenges of the Contemporary Period intervention to address the proximate causes Unfortunately, the significant growth in refu‐ of displacement in the states of origin of gee numbers globally which began in the would‐be refugees.” 1980s undermined this normative consensus These limited opportunities for asylum in the (see Figure 17). In particular, states began to developed world are one of the reasons that limit their obligations towards refugees while refugee numbers were relatively con‐ through extraterritorial measures, like those stant until the Arab Spring, the number of in‐ mentioned above, and through the so‐called ternally displaced persons (IDPs) has grown containment agenda, designed to contain most continuously since the mid‐1990s. This is not refugees in their regions and even countries of to entirely blame the containment agenda— origin in order to avoid incurring direct re‐ the growth of IDP numbers is also linked to the sponsibilities towards them (Betts 2009: 12; increased number of civil wars as a proportion Crisp 2003). Thus, Helton (2002: 65‐66) of conflicts and to deliberate displacement

60000000 55000000 50000000 45000000 40000000 35000000 30000000 25000000 20000000 15000000 10000000 5000000 0 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 UNHCR-mandated refugees UNRWA-mandated refugees Total Refugees IDPs Total Forced Migrants

Figure 1: Total Forced Migrants, 1970‐2014 warned the international response to the refu‐ strategies undertaken by some states (Orchard gee problem has evolved from one “of provid‐ 2010a). And we are seeing positive work to ing asylum in Western countries to contain‐ create a global IDP protection regime based ment of movement and humanitarian around the soft‐law Guiding Principles on In‐ ternal Displacement, which have been widely accepted and institutionalized at the interna‐ 7 Adapted from Orchard (2014:204). UNRWA refers to the UN Relief Works Agency for Palestinian Ref‐ tional and regional as well as at the state level, ugees, which has a separate legal mandate to pro‐ where a number of states have sought to im‐ tect and assist refugees from Palestine. 22

plement domestic policies or legislation to are the questions that are now driving my re‐ protect their own internally displaced popula‐ search because, as Syria has shown, we are tions in line with the principles (Orchard entering a new age of displacement. 2010b, 2014). And, in an important shift, the Principles have been brought into regional References hard law through the African Union Conven‐ Abebe, A. M. 2010. The African Union Convention on Internally Displaced Persons: Its Codification tion for the Protection and Assistance of Inter‐ Background, Scope, and Enforcement nally Displaced Persons in Africa (or the Kam‐ Challenges. Refugee Survey Quarterly, 29, 28‐57. pala Convention), though the Convention’s Alter, K. J. & Meunier, S. 2009. The Politics of implementation is lagging (Abebe 2010: 42, International Regime Complexity. Perspectives on Politics, 7, 13‐24. Orchard Forthcoming). Betts, A. 2009. Protection by Persuasion: International Cooperation in the Refugee Regime, Yet providing IDPs with protection and assis‐ Ithaca, Cornell University Press. tance is a significant and costly undertaking. Bush, G. W. 2004. President Bush Welcomes Georgian President Saakashvili to White House To give only one example, in Darfur, Sudan, 13 Available: years after the outbreak of conflict 2.5 million http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/20 IDPs remain in camps and receive internation‐ 04/02/20040225‐1.html al assistance and protection (through the UN Crisp, J. 2003. Refugees and the Global Politics of Asylum. The Political Quarterly, 74, 75‐87. Assistance Mission in Darfur) at an annual cost Finnemore, M. & Sikkink, K. 1998. International of almost USD 2 billion. What do these shifting Norm Dynamics and Political Change. patterns mean? First, I would argue that inter‐ International Organization, 52. national developments since the end of the Gibney, M. J. 2004. The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response to Refugees, Cold War have transformed the international Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. refugee regime. While the post‐war norms, Glanville, L. 2006. Norms, Interests and embodied in the 1951 Refugee Convention and Humanitarian Intervention. Global Change, Peace & Security, 18, 153‐171. in UNHCR continue to have resonance, layered Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P. & Rittberger, V. 1997. over top of them have been extraterritorial Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge, controls designed to prevent would‐be refu‐ Cambridge University Press. gees from accessing the asylum system. Sec‐ Helton, A. C. 2002. The Price of Indifference: Refugees and Humanitarian Action in the New ond, this has not only had the direct effect of Century, Oxford, Oxford University Press. limiting refugee access, but also the indirect Howard, M. 2004. Speech on Asylum and effect of significantly increasing the numbers Immigration [Online]. Available: of IDPs. This has over the past twenty years http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/ 3679618.stm [Accessed 28 October 2007]. necessitated a new form of response, anchored Jepperson, R., Wendt, A. & Katzenstein, P. 1996. in the Guiding Principles on Internal Dis‐ Norms, Identity and Culture in National placement and a global IDP protection regime. Security. In: KATZENSTEIN, P. J. (ed.) The But as these international structures and solu‐ Culture of National Security: Norms and Identities in World Politics. New York: Columbia tions proliferate, increasingly we are also fac‐ University Press. ing questions of regime complexity (Alter and Keely, C. B. 2001. The International Refugee Regime Meunier 2009)—how do these regimes inter‐ (S): The End of the Cold War Matters. International Migration Review, 35, 303‐314. act, and how should UNHCR, for example, re‐ Loescher, G. 1994. The International Refugee spond when its effective (if not legal) mandate Regime: Stretched to the Limit? Journal of is divided between refugees and IDPs? These International Affairs, 47.

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Loescher, G. 2001. The UNHCR and World Politics: A Orchard, P. 2016. The Dawn of International Perilous Path, New York, Oxford University Refugee Protection: States, Tacit Cooperation Press. and Non‐Extradition. Journal of Refugee Studies, Neufeld, M. 1993. Interpretation and the “Science” Early View. of International Relations. Review of Orchard, P. Forthcoming. Regionalizing Protection: International Studies, 19, 39–61. The Kampala Convention as a Protection against Orchard, P. 2010a. The Perils of Humanitarianism: Mass Atrocity Crimes for Internally Displaced Refugee and IDP Protection in Situations of Persons. Global Responsibility to Protect. Regime‐Induced Displacement. Refugee Survey Roberts, A. 1998. More Refugees, Less Asylum: A Quarterly, 29, 38‐60. Regime in Transformation. Journal of Refugee Orchard, P. 2010b. Protection of Internally Studies, 11, 375‐395. Displaced Persons: Soft Law as a Norm‐ UNHCR. 2015. World at War: Global Trends, Forced Generating Mechanism. Review of International Displacement in 2014. Geneva: UNHCR. Studies, 36, 281‐303. Weiner, M. 1996. Ethics, National Sovereignty and Orchard, P. 2014. Implementing a Global Internally the Control of Immigration. International Displaced Persons Protection Regime. In: Migration Review, 30, 171‐197. BETTS, A. & ORCHARD, P. (eds.) Implementation and World Politics: How International Norms Change Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Does International Refugee Law Still Matter? Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Denmark, [email protected]

Most international lawyers like to think that their particular branch of law exerts a certain, undeniable influence on state behaviour. And while international human rights law has tra‐ ditionally been derided by some as abstract and wishful legal thinking, stronger oversight and judiciary mechanisms have arguably made many states more actively concerned with their core human rights commitments.

The current refugee protection crisis, however, appears to have prompted several states to rate migration control to measures making life blatantly disrespect even the most basic norms harder for arriving refugees, including manda‐ of international refugee law. In some coun‐ tory detention policies and denying access to tries, such as Turkey, Lebanon, or Greece, vio‐ family reunification. lations may partly be explained by the under‐ standable shortcomings in capacity by those The current surge in asylum applications have countries, which continue to face large arrival further led several states to start questioning numbers and very limited international soli‐ the continued viability of the current refugee darity. Yet, even less affected and wealthier regime and accused the 1951 UN Convention countries have by and large responded to the Relating to the Status of Refugees of being out‐ Syrian refugee crisis by introducing a host of dated and placing too cumbersome burdens draconian mechanisms, ranging from elabo‐ 24

upon receiving states. Both the Australian and ugees’ journey, often enlisting the help of both the Danish prime ministers have openly sug‐ private companies and authorities in origin gested that the Convention ought to be renego‐ and transit countries. While such deterrence tiated. policies are nothing new—states have sought to curb the number of spontaneously arriving While in principle all states remain free to asylum‐seekers since the 1980s—these poli‐ simply withdraw from a treaty, should they cies have developed substantially over time, decide it no longer serves its interests, neither and today involve increasingly elaborate ar‐ these nor any other states have yet done so in rangements with third countries to shift or regard to the Refugee Convention. A range of avoid legal liability. factors may help explain this fact, both domes‐ tic and international. From an analytical per‐ The consequent ‘externalisation,’ ‘privatisa‐ spective, not only is the argument that the Ref‐ tion’ and ‘internationalisation’ of migration ugee Convention has become redundant control has inspired a significant amount of dubious—one would be hard‐pressed to find a scholarship across the social sciences. Similar‐ human rights instrument as sensitive to states’ ly, there has been no shortage of legal scholar‐ security and sovereignty concerns—the Refu‐ ship devoted to addressing the complicated gee Convention also serves as an important and often unclear issues of state responsibility tool to ensure that states in the developing in these situations, including by myself. The world remain engaged in refugee protection. challenges to refugee protection, however, also Today, more than 80 percent of the world’s constitutes a critical case for examining the refugees currently reside in a developing coun‐ continued impact, or lack thereof, of interna‐ try. It is difficult to imagine that any of the tional refugee law upon national and transna‐ world’s top refugee hosting countries would tional refugee policy. A perspective that in turn not want a new legal instrument to address may help us unpack larger questions about the this gross disparity in terms of global burden‐ role of international law in international rela‐ sharing. In other words, although developed tions more generally. states are increasingly concerned about the commitment that international refugee law is What role for international law in interna‐ placing upon them, receding from or renegoti‐ tional relations? ating the current legal framework is hardly in Most intuitively, the rise of deterrence policies these states’ best interest. would seem to challenge the predominant pro‐ gressive or liberal view of international refu‐ This dilemma has given rise to the deterrence gee law as a continuously developing project paradigm as a particularly worrisome instanti‐ paving the way for increased international ation of the global refugee protection regime. governance and a gradual willingness of states While the developed world continues to for‐ to submit to international institutions and ju‐ mally endorse the current regime, they have diciaries. Within International Relations theory shied away from no means to block refugees this position resonates in particular with the from reaching their territory or gaining access work of liberal institutionalists, perceiving to their asylum systems. Over the last decades, international law as a common good to order a panoply of measures have been taken to ex‐ and constrain state power, or those within the tend controls to every step of prospective ref‐ constructivist camp who view international

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law as a crucial source of legitimacy and argue eclipsing legal responsibility, as practices they that states gradually internalize international implicitly affirm that legal norms continue to norms to condition their behaviour. structure policy. Similarly, realist theory has a hard time explaining why governments make Even if one should not overlook the substantial great efforts to present deterrence policies as advances in refugee and human rights law over being in conformity with international refugee the last decades, it is difficult to square a liber‐ law, even if the argumentation underpinning al theory of international law with the deliber‐ these claims is often spurious and sometimes ate attempts of virtually all developed states to evidently incorrect. adopt deterrence policies specifically designed to avoid or circumvent legal responsibility. Many deterrence schemes are moreover costly. More generally, it is evident that positive de‐ The recently concluded EU‐Turkey refugee velopments in international refugee law have deal set back the Union USD 6.8 billion. In often been accompanied by political resistance 2009, Italy similarly pledged USD 5 billion in towards both norm application and the author‐ exchange for Libya’s cooperation in carrying ity of international institutions in interpreting out interception and accepting returned mi‐ international refugee law. A number of states grants and refugees. If governments felt they have even been seen to revert from otherwise could simply disrespect international refugee accepted standards, returning instead to more law ‘at home’, then there would be little need ‘black‐letter’ readings of their international to engage in cumbersome and costly schemes commitments. to shift governance or refugees elsewhere.

At the other end of the spectrum, deterrence A third attempt to theorize the relationship policies might be seen to support those among between international law and politics has realist IR scholars who argue that international come from scholars associated with the critical law only matters to the extent that it consti‐ legal studies movement. A fundamental prem‐ tutes a ‘self‐enforcing equilibrium’ where ise within this group of otherwise widely dif‐ states have clear interests in participating. ferent scholars is a belief in the inherent, or at What we currently see is thus a return to poli‐ least relative, indeterminacy of international tics, and disagreement about normative con‐ law. In areas of political and legal contestation tent and lack of hierarchy thus means that this approach favours instrumentalism, allow‐ more powerful states ultimately remain free to ing states to justify and validate just about any “ignore norms, try to change them, or pick and policy in legal terms. At the same time, interna‐ choose among them” (Krasner 2004: 26). tional law remains the quintessential venue for dealing with political antagonisms in a legiti‐ What most realist scholars overlook in the mate form, thereby accounting for its contin‐ present context, however, is that moves to shift ued growth and subsistence. migration control to e.g. third countries or private contractors to avoid incurring corre‐ According to this view, the continued, nominal late legal obligations inter alia presume that reference to international refugee law as part such norms do actually, under ordinary cir‐ of deterrence and rejection practices is thus cumstances, affect state action. Even if deter‐ not surprising. Treaty language, moreover, is rence policies are specifically aimed towards inherently open‐ended, and much of the cur‐

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rent debate on the scope of the 1951 Refugee gional courts, forcing states to abandon or sub‐ Convention would no doubt have been avoided stantially adjust their policies. had the drafters somehow been able to foresee that states would one day move outside their Towards a more holistic understanding territory to do exactly what is prohibited in‐ While none of the above positions would thus side it (Henkin 1993). appear to provide a sufficient understanding of the present case, insights may nonetheless be At the same time, however, deterrence policies drawn from each towards a deeper and more seem to challenge any claim of radical norm nuanced understanding of the interplay be‐ indeterminacy for the same reasons that real‐ tween international law and politics in this ist accounts must be rejected: the very resort area. Even if the progressive assumption of to ‘exceptionalism’ and creative policy liberal theory to improve human rights is not measures suggests that at least under some realized, states implementing deterrence poli‐ circumstances international refugee law sets cies, for whatever reasons, do consider certain certain boundaries that these very states ac‐ norms and interpretations of international cept as being beyond dispute. In other words, refugee law as setting clear barriers for their if international law casts a relatively wide net, actions. In line with realist theory it may con‐ where the particularities of certain cases or versely be acknowledged that where norma‐ political practices may fall somewhere in the tive commitments are no longer aligned with gaps, the overall framework remains in place political interests, liberal states are likely to and there is thus a limit, determined by both pursue more self‐interested policies to limit language and context, to how far legal inter‐ material obligations to the extent that this is pretation can be bent. perceived to be consistent with basic princi‐ ples of refugee law. It is this tension that leads Secondly, the history of deterrence shows that states to introduce deterrence policies that refugee law is far from always a plaything of work at the fringes or in the interstices of in‐ governments. While critical scholars may ac‐ ternational law. Within this more limited con‐ cept a space for resistance to political agendas text, states may be seen to exploit interpreta‐ by judiciaries, scholars and NGOs, the open‐ tive uncertainties, reverting to soft law ended character of legal interpretation makes standards, or establishing novel categories and lasting interpretative advances difficult. This concepts on the basis of domestic or other challenge is particularly acute in international parts of international lawmuch in line with refugee law, which has neither the dedicated the legal processes described by critical legal international judiciary or a UN supervisory studies. committee afforded to many other human rights instruments. Yet, contrary to expecta‐ What emerges is hence a picture of interna‐ tions, important and far‐reaching develop‐ tional refugee law as simultaneously con‐ ments have nonetheless taken place in regard straining and producing particular kinds of to legal interpretation, ensuring a dynamic and politics; that international law matters, albeit overall expansive development. Many of the not always the way it was intended to. When first and second generation deterrence policies developed states attempt to circumvent the have, even if sometimes very belatedly, been strictures imposed by the 1951 Refugee Con‐ successfully challenged in domestic and re‐ vention, it is legal interpretation and sover‐

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eignty norms that are instrumentalized in the where governments are able to apply a pick‐ process. States both react to developing inter‐ and‐choose approach across different legal pretation of international law, as well as em‐ regimes, standards and adjudicatory venues. ploying argumentative structures that draw directly on international norms in order to be The way that governments appear to respond exempted from legal responsibility in their to the duties imposed by international human increasingly globalized projections of power. rights law in this area may perhaps best be These practices are thus not simply a sign of likened to how self‐interested citizens and eroding respect for international law, nor in‐ corporations react to tax laws. The obligation ternational law’s inherent fungibility. On the itself, that taxes are due, is seldom denied. Yet, contrary, they could be seen as a reaction to rather than paying up, resourceful individuals the impositions made by international law and and companies are more likely to seek creative institutions in the first place. And importantly, ways to find the loop holes and possibilities international law does not remain static in the within the legal framework to minimise obliga‐ process. tions. Just like individuals or corporations that carefully relocate income to offshore bank The politics of deterrence furthermore exem‐ accounts in order to circumvent national tax plify that states may apply a degree of ‘creative laws, governments are thus themselves in‐ legal thinking’ when designing their policies; creasingly engaging in ‘offshore’ and ‘outsourc‐ develop novel forms of migration control, ex‐ ing’ strategies in order to distance the exercise ploiting interpretative uncertainties, reverting of power from the state itself and their obliga‐ on soft law standards, or establishing novel tions under international law. categories and concepts on the basis of domes‐ tic or other parts of international law. Within References international law, progressive developments Henkin, L. 1994. Notes from the President’, ASIL Newsletter (September‐October 1993), p. 1— in the form of soft law, adjudication and treaty ‘An Agenda for the Next Century: The Myth and codification is often assumed to remedy this Mantra of State Sovereignty’. Virginia Journal of problem by further clarifying interpretation. International Law 35. As international law has developed, however, Gammeltoft‐Hansen, T. 2014. The Role of Interna‐ tional Refugee Law in Refugee Policy. Journal of this may equally work in reverse. The multipli‐ Refugee Studies 27. cation of legal regimes, overlapping jurisdic‐ Gammeltoft‐Hansen, T. 2015. Non‐refoulement in a tions, and diffusion of authority also provides world of cooperative deterrence. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 53(2) 235‐85. for more conflicts. This in turn opens up an increased room for political manoeuvring in relation to international human rights law,

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The European Refugee Crisis and the Crisis of Citizenship in Greece Heath Cabot, University of Pittsburgh

Refugees and citizens In this essay, I argue that the increasing ne‐ oliberalization and austeritization of Europe are crucial aspects of the European refugee response. While, from a policy perspective, austerity has been framed largely in terms of its effects on citizens and the welfare state, my research highlights the close relationship be‐ tween the rights afforded to refugees (ground‐ ed on alienage) and those granted to citizens. In both scholarly and popular discourse, refu‐ gees are often treated as exceptional to the framework of citizenship. In Europe today, however, the predicaments of citizens and exclusion on which citizenship is based in a refugees alike share a conceptual panorama. world organized according to nation states. The steady dismantling of citizens’ rights on Europe’s borders, alongside the crisis with Since 2005, I have been conducting long‐term regard to the reception of refugees, attests to ethnographic research on asylum and social the increasing precaritization of the terrain of support infrastructures in Greece. Following rights as they apply to both citizens and refu‐ other qualitative migration scholarship gees in Europe. (Coutin 2000, 2005; Coutin and Yngvesson 2006; Coutin 2007; Cohen 1991; Ngai 2004; Scholarship in political philosophy has often Menjívar and Coutin 2014; Mountz et al. 2002), framed the refugee as the antithesis, or mirror my research highlights the complex and fluid image, of the citizen: the other who, in being ways in which refugees and asylum seekers cast out of the polis, reinforces the insides of move across the boundaries of formal legal the body politic. The refugee has thus been recognition, showing the border between citi‐ characterized as a legal “freak” (Arendt 1976 zen and alien to be much more flexible than it [1951]) whose aberrant qualities highlight the might first appear. On the one hand, refugees inextricable link between national belonging (and others occupying the position of “aliens” and human rights, the “bare life” (Agamben within a national territory), often live “sub‐ 1998) that exposes the troubled grounds of stantively” as citizens (Basch et al. 1994; Glick citizenship. Anthropological scholarship has Schiller and Fouron 2001), irrespective of their explored the peculiar position of refugees and formal legal status: participating actively in asylum seekers as “matter out of place” social networks and political actions, and iden‐ (Douglas 1966): antithetical to, and yet consti‐ tifying in many ways with the “host” country. tutive of, what Malkki calls “the national order On the other hand, those with the formal trap‐ of things” (Malkki 1995, 1995). Symbolically pings of citizenship also navigate their own and ideologically, then, refugees have often experiences of alienage and otherness, wheth‐ called attention to stark lines of inclusion and er in terms of gender, race, class, sexual orien‐

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tation, or other forms of marginalization and throwing the meaning of citizenship itself into frameworks of in/ex‐clusion. crisis. Access to stable employment, healthcare, retirement, and education— all In 2005, Greece emerged as the primary entry‐ long accepted as crucial to the configuration of point into Europe for persons fleeing Iraq and Greek (and European) citizenship—is now Afghanistan. At that time, Greece was at a high‐ increasingly precarious. point politico‐economically: enjoying the ini‐ tial burst of growth following accession to the As the Greek debt crisis has continued to un‐ Euro and deregulation (Placas 2009), as well fold, it has overlapped with the refugee crisis as the infrastructural improvements following of 2015‐16. Greece has become the key entry‐ the Olympic Games. Over the next few years, point for those seeking protection in Europe, Greece, with its land and sea borders (in the placing extraordinary pressures on state, NGO, Evros region in the North, and in the Aegean, and community‐based infrastructures which respectively), became an increasingly fraught have sought to respond to the needs of new doorstep of Europe (Cabot 2014). In 2009, arrivals. With the recent EU/Turkey deal (in Evros emerged as the most trafficked external March 2016) to deport those deemed “irregu‐ EU border. Through this spike in asylum and lar migrants” to Turkey, formally recognizing labor‐related migration, a country often Turkey as a “safe third country,” Greece prom‐ framed as unproblematically homogeneous, ises to become the last territorial holding cell where the ethnos or nation was seen to have on Europe’s borders, as routes of internal Eu‐ “triumphed” long ago (Just 1989), increasingly ropean migration have been shut down, along reckoned, en masse, with the presence of per‐ with the “Balkan route” between Greece and sons marked as “other.” These encounters with contiguous European territory. alterity served both to buoy up and throw into question existing notions of Greekness. Still, The austerity‐racked Greek state, unable to the assumed boundary demarcating Greek provide adequate services even for its own citizens, those inside the body politic, re‐ citizens, is hamstrung with regard to receiving, mained strikingly robust in relation to those caring for, and “managing” refugees. As such, marked as “foreigners” (xenoi). international organizations and NGOs have stepped in (as they so often do), and perhaps Austerity and the crisis of citizenship even more strikingly, widespread, highly orga‐ With the rise of austerity in Europe and the nized, grassroots movements based on the harsh, top‐down austerity packages imposed principle of “solidarity” have emerged, offering after the Greek debt crisis (framed as “trim‐ support to both citizens and non‐citizens. Soli‐ ming the fat” of the public sector), the extant darity networks provide services where other Greek welfare state has been increasingly dis‐ formal infrastructures of support have failed, mantled. Mass unemployment (26%), pension particularly in the arenas of housing, food, and cuts (of 30‐50%), the increasing privatization medical care. The ways in which “regular peo‐ of the public sector, material shortages in ple” increasingly fill in for a state ravaged by pharmaceuticals and medical technologies— austerity attests to the overlapping predica‐ these are just a few of the trends that charac‐ ments, and the difficulty of accessing livable terize austeritization in Greece. Austerity has lives, faced by both citizens and non‐citizens thus drastically impinged upon citizens’ rights, on Europe’s borders.

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Solidarity on Europe’s margins Greece, however, has acquired a new image The notion of “Fortress Europe” presents an during the current refugee crisis thanks to the image of the EU as a smooth, homogeneous remarkable grassroots responses of the Greek territory, with a common enemy outside, elid‐ populace, as residents have mobilized to pro‐ ing the differentials in power, sovereignty, and vide care for new arrivals and establish soli‐ capacity that structure the European Union darity with refugees. These responses have both in regimes of migration management and made headlines internationally, even garner‐ finance. A view from the margins of Europe, ing a couple of Nobel Peace Prize nominations, however, makes such power differentials, and for how Europe’s poorest country has been the constitutive inclusions and exclusions “the most welcoming to refugees.” The over‐ within Europe itself, impossible to ignore. The whelming “hospitality” of much of the Greek longstanding marginality of Greece has come populace has been particularly impressive not to the fore in European responses to the debt just owing to the recent increase of neo‐ crisis, and now the refugee crisis, through cri‐ Nazism in Greece, but also thanks to the in‐ tiques not just of Greek leadership but of creasingly dominant xenophobia articulated in Greeks themselves and Greek “culture.” Seri‐ other countries on Europe’s margins (Hungary ous discussions regarding a “Grexit” (whether and Poland, in particular). from the Euro‐zone or Schengen Area) link Greece’s symbolic marginality to concrete geo‐ What many do not know about the solidarity political and financial precariousness. movement in Greece is that these grassroots networks have, since 2011, provided services Anthropologists have long studied the segmen‐ to both citizens and non‐citizens who have tary logics of belonging: the ways in which fallen victim to the debt crisis and austerity. relations between those deemed insiders or These existing networks formed a crucial or‐ “kin,” versus those marked as strangers, shift ganizational and ideological backbone on according to varying scales on which threats to which solidarity with refugees has been enact‐ in‐group cohesion are identified. While refu‐ ed in 2015‐16. Solidarity (allileggii) in Greek gees have been marked as others outside the refers to the act of being close or near to “the body politic of Europe (though now territorial‐ other,” however that other is conceived. Soli‐ ly “inside”), there are also those who have long darity initiatives have included pantopoleia (or been marginalized even within the European groceries), soup kitchens, anti‐middlemen imaginary. Greece, in particular, has occupied a markets (Rakopoulos 2014, 2015), and clinics peculiarly unstable position within Europe. and pharmacies (Cabot 2016). Since January Michael Herzfeld (1987, 2002) has shown that, 2015, I have carried out research on the mean‐ on the one hand, Greece has often been framed ing and of practice solidarity in Greece under as a font of European civilization for the sym‐ austerity, focusing on solidarity clinics and bolic role of antiquity in the West. On the other pharmacies in Athens. This research thus hand, through an internal European Oriental‐ builds on my earlier work on the role of the ism, Greece has been marked as backward, NGO sector in Greece in providing service pro‐ disorganized—a problem child of Europe, con‐ vision and legal aid to asylum seekers and ref‐ taminated by the cultural and political influ‐ ugees. Yet whereas my earlier project focused ences of the East. on the distribution of rights and services to those marked explicitly as “aliens,” my current

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research considers how diverse groups of Thus, in approaching the refugee crisis, and people (citizens and non‐citizens) become Europe’s perplexing response to it, it is crucial both beneficiaries of, and participants in, soli‐ to hold in the same field of vision the predica‐ darity networks. ments of both citizens and refugees on the margins. The failure of the state of rights, Solidarity initiatives, while extremely diverse, which we see increasingly in Europe, and the by and large seek to provide often urgently increasing capitulation to neoliberal austerity needed services through lateral and horizon‐ policies, have formed the ground for modes of tally organized modes of resource redistribu‐ both inclusion and exclusion through which tion. As such, they attempt to transform shared citizens and non‐citizens are able (or not) to modes of precariousness and need into new access and realize livable livelihood. forms of community, creating frameworks of shared participation and belonging that might References transcend differences in class, race, gender, as Agamben, Giorgio. 1998. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Translated by D. Heller‐ well as country of origin. Of course, the way in Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press. which solidarity is ideologically conceived and Arendt, Hannah. 1976 [1951]. The Origins of imagined may differ strikingly from how it Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt. unfolds in practice (and indeed, for all of soli‐ Basch, Linda, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc, eds. 1994. Nations Unbound: darity’s strengths, many forms of power Transnational Projects, Postcolonial asymmetry and exclusion also permeate soli‐ Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation‐ darity work). What I want to emphasize here, states. . New York: Routledge. Cabot, Heath. 2014. On the doorstep of Europe : however, is how a social and political move‐ asylum and citizenship in Greece. 1st ed, The ment practicing novel forms of resource dis‐ ethnography of political violence. Philadelphia: tribution, with accompanying visions of politi‐ University of Pennsylvania Press. cal community, has increasingly taken on the Cohen, Robin. 1991. Contested Domains: Debates in Contemporary Labour Studies. London: Zed work of the welfare state in providing crucial Books. services to both citizens and refugees. Coutin, Susan. 2000. Legalizing Moves: Salvadoran Immigrants' Struggle for U.S. Residency. Ann Solidarity in Greece has emerged concurrently Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Repeated Author. 2005. Being En Route. American as a way to respond to fellow citizens in need Anthropologist 107 (2):195‐206. as well as to the needs of refugees. Yet, despite Coutin, Susan Bibler. 2007. Nations of emigrants : the impressive scale and organizational level shifting boundaries of citizenship in El Salvador of solidarity networks, we must not forget—as and the United States. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. "solidarians" themselves often lament—that Coutin, Susan, and Barbara Yngvesson. 2006. solidarity itself is a direct product of austerity. Backed by Papers: Undoing Persons, Histories, Solidarity work is done, in large part, because and Return. American Ethnologist 33 (2):177‐ 190. those institutions formally responsible for Douglas, Mary. 1966. Purity and danger: an analysis providing rights and services have either failed of concepts of pollution and taboo. London,: to show up (in the case of institutions of Euro‐ Routledge & K. Paul. pean governance) or have actively been dis‐ Glick Schiller, Nina, and Georges Fouron. 2001. Georges Woke up Laughing: Long‐distance mantled (in the case of the Greek state). Nationalism and the Search for Home. Durham and London: Duke University Press. Herzfeld, Michael. 1987. Anthropology through the Looking‐Glass: Critical Ethnography on the 32

Margins of Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge Justice: Springer. Original edition, Migration, University Press. Gender and Social Justice. Repeated Author. 2002. The absent presence: Mountz, Alison, Richard Wright, Ines Miyares, and discourses of crypto‐colonialism. The South Adrian J. Bailey. 2002. Lives in Limbo: Atlantic Quarterly 101 (4):900‐926. Temporary Protected Status and Immigrant Just, Roger. 1989. The Triumph of the Ethnos. In Identities. Global Networks 2 (4):335–356. History and Ethnicity, edited by E. Tonkin, M. Ngai, Mae M. 2004. Impossible subjects : illegal McDonald and M. Chapman. London: Routledge aliens and the making of modern America, and Kegan Paul. Politics and society in twentieth‐century America. Malkki, Liisa. 1995. Purity and Exile: Violence and Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Placas, Aimee J. 2009. The emergence of consumer Tanzania. Chicago and London: University of credit in Greece| An ethnography of indebtedness. Chicago Press. Doctoral dissertation. . Edited by R. University. Repeated Author. 1995. Refugees and exile: from Rakopoulos, Theodoros. 2014. The crisis seen from ‘refugee studies’ to the national order of things. below, within, and against: from solidarity Annual Review of Anthropology 24:495‐523. economy to food distribution cooperatives in Menjívar, Cecilia, and Susan Bibler Coutin. 2014. 18 Greece. Dialectical Anthropology 38:189‐207. Challenges of Recognition, Participation, and Repeated Author. 2015. Solidarity's Tensions: Representation for the Legally Liminal: A Informality, Sociality and the Greek Crisis. Social Comment. In Migration, Gender and Social Analysis 59 (3).

Explaining State Responses to Refugees Lamis Abdelaaty, Syracuse University, [email protected]

Nearly five million Syrians, over half of them children, have fled to neighboring countries. Za’atari refugee camp is Jordan’s fourth largest city. In Lebanon, one in five people is a Syrian refugee.1 Elsewhere, Nigerians have crossed Nigerien and Cameroonian borders by the tens of thousands. And across the globe, thousands of people are struggling to escape deadly vio‐ lence in Central America.

Depending on how other states respond, these refugees may be allowed to escape persecution and violence in their country, or they may be forced back. They may be permitted to live where they wish, earn an income, pursue an Not only are the lives of millions of refugees education, and access medical treatment. Or around the world in the balance, but state re‐ they may be confined to a camp, forced to rely sponses to refugees have consequences for in‐ on aid, and denied basic services. ternational security as well. Refugee protection can be thought of as an international public good that increases security for all states, as Suhrke (1998) argues. The reception given to 1 For the purposes of this essay, a “refugee” is an refugees can shape whether a conflict spills individual who has fled persecution or large‐scale violence. over borders, how long a war will grind on, and 33

what kind of society can emerge from the vio‐ 2015). Some developing countries have experi‐ lence. enced successive refugee movements from mul‐ tiple crises. And some have been hosting long‐ What explains state responses to the refugees standing refugee populations for years or even they receive? With some notable exceptions, decades. this question remains understudied in political science. For instance, much of the work on ref‐ Fixated on the events in Europe today, many ugees and international relations has concen‐ observers overlook conditions in the countries trated on conflict as a cause or a consequence of neighboring Syria. The UN Refugee Agency refugee movements (e.g., Salehyan and (UNHCR) estimates that only around 10 percent Gleditsch 2006; Weiner 1996; Zolberg et al. of Syrian refugees have headed to European 1989). Most of the literature on border control countries. The vast majority of Syrian refugees and identity poli‐tics has focused specifically on remain in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and labor migration (e.g., Fitzgerald 1996; Freeman Egypt. Not only are these countries more re‐ 1995; Hollifield 1992; Joppke 2005; Tichenor source‐constrained, but they were already host‐ 2002). Indeed, the conceptual separation be‐ ing sizeable refugee populations prior to the tween voluntary and forced migration might be Syrian crisis. partly responsible for these trends in the litera‐ ture. My research emphasizes asylum policies in de‐ veloping countries, specifically Egypt, Turkey, In this essay, I discuss three sets of considera‐ and Kenya. Egypt is broadly representative of tions for research that (like my own) seeks to most refugee recipients: it is a developing coun‐ understand how states respond to refugees. try that has signed on to the Refugee Conven‐ More studies of developing countries, where tion and hosts a relatively small number of ref‐ the vast majority of the world’s refugees reside, ugees per capita. Turkey is more of an outlier: are needed. Examining the treatment of indi‐ one of only a handful of countries that retains a viduals after they are accepted or rejected en‐ geographic limitation to the Refugee Conven‐ riches existing research findings on border con‐ tion (in effect, recognizing only Europeans as trol and asylum applications. And comparing refugees), it has experienced several mass in‐ policies‐on‐the‐ground with laws‐on‐the‐books fluxes and boasts one of the largest refugee can reveal considerable nuance that is both resettlement programs in the world. And Kenya informative and consequential. is often considered an important case: it hosts one of the largest refugee populations in the Paying More Attention to Developing Coun‐ world, it is home to the largest refugee camp in tries the world, and it is the site of a grave protracted Most research on asylum policy has focused on refugee situation. Western countries (e.g., Hamlin 2014; Loescher and Scanlan 1986; Miller et al. 2015). But some There is significant variation across developing 86 percent of refugees reside in developing countries that host refugees. For instance, countries, and 42 percent of refugees live in Egypt, Turkey, and Kenya vary on their adop‐ countries with a GDP per capita below USD tion of domestic legislation, their use of refugee 5,000. Turkey had the world’s largest refugee camps, and their relations with UNHCR. They population in 2014, and Lebanon ranked first in also vary on domestic conditions that might be number of refugees hosted per capita (UNHCR expected to affect asylum policies, like regime 34

type, intrastate violence, economic conditions, ployment, access to social services, freedom of and public attitudes. But they share some of the movement, and so on. same refugee groups: Sudanese and Somali refugees live in Egypt and Kenya, and Iraqi and Second, treatment by host countries determines Syrian refugees have gone to Egypt and Turkey. whether refugees remain there or attempt to My case selection allows for the comparison of move on. Indeed, the sharp increase in sea arri‐ policies towards refugee groups across coun‐ vals to Europe in 2015 is tied to conditions in tries, i.e., holding the refugee group “constant.” neighboring countries, where humanitarian aid is stretched thin and refugees are not permitted Recent studies (e.g., Klotz 2013; Margheritis to earn a living. 2015; Sadiq 2009) have demonstrated the val‐ ue of examining migration and citizenship in And third, the treatment of refugees can have developing countries, but more research on long‐term consequences. The screening of asy‐ refugee politics in these contexts is needed. The lum‐seekers can prevent armed elements from vast majority of the world’s refugees reside in residing in the host country or infiltrating refu‐ these countries, under far different conditions gee communities. If host countries restrict refu‐ than those that characterize asylum in, say, the gees to camps or segregated settlements, the United States. Additional research can shed possibility of radicalization or infiltration light on whether similar determinants and seems compounded. Moreover, when host mechanisms shape responses to refugees by countries engage in early and coerced mass developing and developed countries. returns of refugees, this can undermine peace‐ building efforts in the country of origin by Charting the Treatment of Refugees straining fragile institutions or even sparking Research on refugees has often been more in‐ conflict anew. In contrast, where host countries terested in their admission at the border than allow refugees access to social services and on their treatment within a country’s territory. employment, refugees may be able to acquire For instance, quantitative studies have sought transferable skills or generate remittances that to explain variation in the ratio of asylum appli‐ can contribute to state‐building and post‐ cations accepted (e.g., Holzer et al. 2000; Neu‐ conflict reconstruction in their country of mayer 2005; Salehyan and Rosenblum 2008). origin. The question of whether borders are open or closed, or whether individuals are granted ref‐ For these reasons, my research understands ugee status, is certainly crucial. asylum policy to encompass more than just the decision to grant entry to asylum‐seekers. But examining the treatment of individuals, Countries select the sorts of rights (re‐ whether their asylum applications are accepted strictions) that are granted (imposed) on refu‐ or not, is also important for several reasons. gees. Are refugees permitted to move around First, under the international human rights freely? Are they allowed to work? Are they able regime, as well as treaties relating specifically to send their children to school? How are re‐ to refugees, displaced individuals are entitled to patriation or integration handled? Here, I draw a set of basic rights in the country that receives on UNHCR’s Global Strategic Priorities to assess them. The 1951 Refugee Convention lists mini‐ the gap between international standards and a mum standards of treatment relating to non‐ given country’s law and practices. discrimination, access to courts, access to em‐ 35

Whether displaced individuals are able to cross In Kenya, it was only with the adoption of the borders is critical, but it is not the whole story. Refugee Act in 2006 that the country enacted a For instance, Milner (2009) argues that there is national legal framework governing asylum‐ a tradeoff between the quality and quantity of seekers and refugees. Amongst other things, the asylum: countries in the global North admit few 2006 Refugee Act set up a new refugee status refugees and treat them well, while those in the determination (RSD) process. Now, a new global South admit many refugees and treat Commissioner of Refugee Affairs had de jure them poorly. Research on the treatment of ref‐ responsibility for processing asylum applica‐ ugees can illuminate what happens to them tions. But up until 2014, UNHCR continued to after they have crossed borders. undertake de facto status determination and issue certificates to refugees. Looking at the law Studying Policies as well as Laws alone neglects the important role that UNHCR Several studies have sought to construct plays in Kenya. measures of asylum legislation, regulations, and directives (e.g., Gest et al. 2014; Hatton 2009; And Turkey has been selective in its application Thielemann 2004). But sometimes de jure laws of the 1934 Law on Settlement (No. 2510), on the books differ from the de facto practices which permits the immigration of refugees who implemented on the ground. This distinction are of “Turkish descent and culture.” It has been certainly matters for the daily lives of refugees. applied to Turkish‐speakers from the Balkans, For instance, their decisions to remain or move Caucasus, and Central Asia, but its provisions on are likely to be shaped by de facto experi‐ have also been extended to communities not ences rather than de jure protections. And the usually considered to be ethnic Turks. By far distinction matters if scholars want to explain the largest group to benefit from state‐ patterns of state compliance or non‐compliance sponsored immigration were the 310,000 Bul‐ with their commitments under international garian Turks who escaped Zhivkov’s assimila‐ refugee and human rights law. tion campaign in the summer of 1989. But when over 20,000 Bosnian Muslims fled to Tur‐ For instance, Egypt does not have any domestic key starting in March and April 1992, the 1934 refugee legislation. As a result, the conventional Settlement Law was not applied. Thus, a single wisdom about Egypt’s asylum policy is that national law may be applied unevenly for dif‐ there is, in fact, no policy. One expert I inter‐ ferent refugee groups. viewed wondered: “Does Egypt have or care to have a refugee policy?” He doubted there was To be sure, de jure laws play an important role an underlying pattern to the government’s re‐ in shaping asylum outcomes. It is also worth‐ sponses to refugees, suggesting that the “gov‐ while to examine the circumstances surround‐ ernment may not think about refugees very ing their enactment. However, the adoption of much … it couldn’t care less.” Another re‐ laws is seldom the end of the story. As the ex‐ searcher described the country’s asylum policy amples above demonstrate, even the total ab‐ as “inconsistent” and “ad‐hoc.” However, exam‐ sence of national legislation need not mean an ining de facto practices by state actors demon‐ absence of de facto policy. And even when na‐ strates that there are clear patterns in Egypt’s tional legislation on refugees exists, it may not responses to different refugee groups. be fully implemented. Seemingly general, na‐ tional‐level laws may vary in their application over time and by refugee group. It is not rare 36

for a state to ratify the Refugee Convention but Hamlin, Rebecca. Let Me Be a Refugee: Administra‐ restrict its coverage to certain groups by refus‐ tive Justice and the Politics of Asylum in the United States, Canada, and Australia. Oxford: Oxford ing to designate others as asylum‐seekers or University Press, 2014. refugees. In‐depth studies (e.g., Vigneswaran et Hatton, Timothy J. “The Rise and Fall of Asylum: al. 2010) are particularly well suited to reveal What Happened and Why?” Economic Journal, gaps between the law and its implementation. 119, no. 535 (2009): F183‐F213. Hollifield, James F. Immigrants, Markets, and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe. Cam‐ Conclusions bridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1992. The Syrian crisis has brought refugee issues to Holzer, Thomas, Gerald Schneider, and Thomas the fore for policymakers and academics alike. Widmer. “Discriminating Decentralization: Fed‐ eralism and the Handling of Asylum Applications Political scientists are especially well poised to in Switzerland, 1988‐1996.” Journal of Conflict increase our understanding of how states re‐ Resolution 44, no. 2 (2000): 250‐76. spond to refugees and why. I have argued that Joppke, Christian. Selecting by Origin: Ethnic Migra‐ tion in the Liberal State. Cambridge, M.A.: Har‐ this research agenda needs more studies of vard University Press, 2005. developing countries, more attention to the Klotz, Audie. Migration and National Identity in treatment of refugees, and nuanced comparison South Africa, 1860‐2010. New York: Cambridge of de jure laws with de facto practices. University Press, 2013. Loescher, Gil, and John A. Scanlan. Calculated Kind‐ ness: Refugees and America's Half‐Open Door, These questions matter for millions of refugees 1945 to the Present. New York: Free Press, 1986. around the world and are especially relevant Margheritis, Ana. Migration Governance across Re‐ for concerned policymakers and advocacy or‐ gions: State‐Diaspora Relations in the Latin Amer‐ ica‐Southern Europe Corridor. Abingdon, U.K.: ganizations. They also enrich the study of polit‐ Routledge, 2015. ical science by supplementing our knowledge Miller, Banks, Linda Camp Keith, and Jennifer S. on a host of political issues like border en‐ Holmes. Immigration Judges and U.S. Asylum Poli‐ forcement, national security, voting behavior, cy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014. and so on. Milner, James. Refugees, the State, and the Politics of Asylum in Africa. Basingstoke, U.K.: Palgrave The mass displacement of Syrians is particular‐ Macmillan, 2009. Neumayer, Eric. “Asylum Recognition Rates in West‐ ly concerning due to its scale and the ineffectual ern Europe: Their Determinants, Variation, and policy responses it has engendered. But this is Lack of Convergence.” Journal of Conflict Resolu‐ not the first, or even the only ongoing, refugee tion 49, no. 1 (2005): 43‐66. crisis. Refugee issues have long been part of Sadiq, Kamal. Paper Citizens: How Illegal Immigrants Acquire Citizenship in Developing Countries. Ox‐ international politics, and there is every indica‐ ford: Oxford University Press, 2009. tion that these trends will continue. Salehyan, Idean, and Kristian Gleditsch. “Refugees and the Spread of Civil War.” International Or‐ References ganization 60, no. 2 (2006): 335‐66. Fitzgerald, Keith A. The Face of the Nation: Immigra‐ Salehyan, Idean, and Marc R. Rosenblum. “Interna‐ tion, the State, and the National Identity. Stan‐ tional Relations, Domestic Politics, and Asylum ford: Stanford University Press, 1996. Admissions in the United States.” Political Re‐ Freeman, Gary P. “Modes of Immigration Politics in search Quarterly 61, no. 1 (2008): 104‐21. Liberal Democratic States.” International Migra‐ Suhrke, Astri. “Burden‐Sharing During Refugee tion Review 29, no. 4 (1995): 881‐902. Emergencies: The Logic of Collective Versus Na‐ Gest, Justin, et al. “Measuring and Comparing Immi‐ tional Action.” Journal of Refugee Studies 11, no. 4 gration Policies Globally: Challenges and Solu‐ (1998): 396‐415. tions.” Global Policy, 5 no. 3 (2014): 261‐274. Thielemann, Eiko R. “Why Asylum Policy Harmoni‐ zation Undermines Refugee Burden‐Sharing.” Eu‐

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ropean Journal of Migration and Law 6, no. 1 Weiner, Myron. “Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighbor‐ (2004): 47‐65. hoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Tichenor, Daniel J. Dividing Lines: The Politics of Flows.” International Security 21, no. 1 (1996): 5‐ Immigration Control in America. Princeton: 42. Princeton University Press, 2002. Zolberg, Aristide R., Astri Suhrke, and Sergio UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Aguayo. Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugees). UNHCR Global Trends 2014: World at Refugee Crisis in the Developing World. New War. Geneva: UNHCR, 2015. York: Oxford University Press, 1989. Vigneswaran, Darshan, et al. “Criminality or Monop‐ oly? Informal Immigration Enforcement in South Africa.” Journal of Southern African Studies, 36 no. 2 (2010): 465‐481.

The Specter of Climate Refugees: Why Invoking Refugees as a Reason to “Take Climate Change Seriously” is Troubling Gregory White, Smith College, [email protected]

The argument is often made that climate change needs to be taken seriously because it …[I]f we do nothing to keep the glaciers will trigger “climate refugees” that will threat‐ from melting faster, and oceans from rising en international borders. This is now a com‐ faster, and forests from burning faster, and mon refrain in a wide array of arguments storms from growing stronger, we will about climate change—not only from “dark condemn our children to a planet beyond green” environmentalists or mainstream cli‐ their capacity to repair: Submerged coun‐ mate scientists, but also from national security tries. Abandoned cities. Fields no longer officials. growing. Indigenous peoples who can’t carry out traditions that stretch back mil‐ For example, in a speech delivered in Alaska in lennia. Entire industries of people who September 2015, US President Barack Obama can’t practice their livelihoods. Desperate pointed to the melting Arctic as a matter of refugees seeking the sanctuary of nations national security for the United States and not their own. Political disruptions that highlighted that climate refugees and migra‐ could trigger multiple conflicts around the tion are a particular threat. globe (Obama, September 1, 2015).

There’s not going to be a nation on this Such invocations can obviously appeal to fear‐ Earth that’s not impacted negatively [by ful electorates anxious about national security climate change]. People will suffer. Econ‐ as it pertains to immigrants and refugees. Not omies will suffer. Entire nations will find only is there close media coverage of Europe’s themselves under severe, severe problems. 2015‐2016 refugee crisis and the proposal to More drought; more floods; rising sea lev‐ build a wall on the Mexican border, but the els; greater migration; more refugees; public is also exposed to popular movies and more scarcity; more conflict. novels that have the dystopic trope of hordes of refugees assaulting borders. Movies such as Obama added, in apocalyptic tones, an explicit Children of Men (2006), Elysium (2013), and reference to cross‐border refugees: Snowpiercer (2014) feature scenes of desper‐ 38

ate refugees straining security barriers. As gon and US security establishment began to Drezner (2014) suggests, one might even con‐ join the argument that climate change was a sider World War Z (2013) and its depictions of security concern, specifically citing climate border assault by implacable zombies as an refugees as one of the clear threats (Schwartz example of this public imaginary. Young adult and Randall 2003). literature such as The Hunger Games franchise or literature by celebrated novelists Margaret In its early years, the Bush‐Cheney White Atwood and Barbara Kingsolver have also used House and its Republican counterparts in Con‐ displaced peoples in their imaginings of the gress denied that climate change was a real future. phenomenon. Nevertheless, security bureau‐ cracies and think tanks in Washington increas‐ This essay argues, first, that viewing climate ingly asserted that not only was it real, but that change as a threat multiplier that will produce it also presented security challenges (Campbell “climate refugees” is problematic because it and others 2007). By 2008, the last year of the unduly accentuates migrants and refugees as Bush‐Cheney Administration, the Director of an ostensible security threat. Second, it asserts National Intelligence released a National Intel‐ that the evidence of large numbers of people ligence Assessment on the Implications of Cli‐ moving toward borders in the past (and in the mate Change to 2030. It, too, pointed to climate future) because of environmental change re‐ refugees as a particular threat to international mains empirically questionable. Third and and national security (National Intelligence finally, it claims that such discourse distracts Council 2008). Other North Atlantic security attention from more fruitful policy responses. bodies promulgated similar reports (Solana There is no doubt that climate change is a very and European Commission 2008; German Ad‐ real phenomenon and a deep menace to the visory Council on Global Change 2007; Devel‐ ecosystems in which humans and other spe‐ opment, Concepts and Doctrine Centre of the cies exist. Solving its challenges have been and UK Ministry of Defence 2007). will be hard enough. Nevertheless, injecting refugee and migration politics into the debate The reasoning for these arguments is rather unproductively furthers an agenda focused on straightforward and seemingly intuitive. Alt‐ militarized border security. hough the future scope and dimensions of cli‐ mate change is unpredictable, its impact will Evolution of the Discourse nonetheless be significant. The logic seems to In the early 1990s, scholars and policymakers follow, then, that deterioration in ecosystems argued that the environment and climate will displace people and prompt them to move change presented challenges to national secu‐ toward international borders. Whether labeled rity (Gore 1992; Homer‐Dixon 1991; Deligian‐ environmental refugees, climate migrants, nis 2013). The North Atlantic security estab‐ climate‐induced migration, or sometimes even lishment itself was initially resistant to this “climigrants,” this displacement would likely expansion of security beyond its traditional emerge from three causes. First, the increased focus on strategic doctrine and force projec‐ incidences of catastrophic events such as ty‐ tion. In the late 90s, however, European de‐ phoons or hurricanes would devastate com‐ fense ministries began to articulate that cli‐ munities; second, coastal or island inundations mate change did indeed pose a national would render land uninhabitable; and, third, security threat. And by the mid‐00s, the Penta‐ gradual onset climate change in the form of 39

drought would undermine livelihoods (Bates Refugees is a perfect example of that genre 2002). although it, too, ultimately emphasizes climate refugees as a security threat. Not surprisingly, the environmental left has found this kind of discourse appealing. It had Pitfalls long argued à la Homer‐Dixon that environ‐ Holding aside for the moment the question of mental change prompted displacement and the empirical evidence for displacement at‐ conflict (El‐Hinnawi 1985; Black 2001; Kibre‐ tributable to climate change—addressed be‐ ab 1997). Climate change as a particular kind low—why would it be a problem if national of environmental change is (and would be in security establishments adopted neo‐ this logic) a new set of “forcings” that would Malthusian arguments and treated climate deeply accelerate such dynamics. Estimates of change as a “threat multiplier” (Levy 1995; the future displacement ranged from 200 mil‐ Smith 2007; Dalby 2009)? The reason is that lion people to as many as one billion, with time framing climate change as a national security horizons often uncertain (Myers 2001; Chris‐ issue gives rise to an “anticipatory regime” tian Aid 2007; International Organization for that neither contributes to policies to mitigate Migration 2008). greenhouse gases nor promotes adaptation to already occurring and future climate change And once the North Atlantic security estab‐ (Hartmann 2014). It sets in motion a future‐ lishment started to take up the argument, as oriented logic that assumes the worst, thereby noted above, environmentalists subsequently enhancing the potential for a self‐fulfilling cited the official reports as confirmation of prophecy. In other words, thinking in terms of climate change’s empirical validity. If the Pen‐ the worst‐case scenario is itself the worst‐case tagon is “taking climate change seriously,” so scenario. As Adams, Murphy and Clarke write: went the reasoning, others should, too. After all, no one could accuse the security estab‐ Anticipatory regimes offer a future that may lishment of being anti‐capitalist or naïve tree or may not arrive, is always uncertain and huggers. yet is necessarily coming and so therefore always demanding a response... Anticipa‐ For environmentalists passionate about social tion is not just betting on the future; it is a justice, the argument that climate change moral economy in which the future sets the would unduly affect vulnerable people is espe‐ conditions of possibility for action in the cially compelling because it accentuates the present, in which the future is inhabited in deep inequalities at the heart of the interna‐ the present. Through anticipation, the fu‐ tional political economy. The fact that green‐ ture arrives as already formed in the pre‐ house gases are overwhelmingly emitted by sent, as if the emergency has already hap‐ advanced‐industrialized countries and would pened (Adams et al. 2009: 236). cause the dislocation of hundreds of millions of people raises crucial humanitarian questions This notion of “the future [setting] the condi‐ and/or R2P‐style obligations. In some instanc‐ tions of possibility for action in the present… es, climate refugees have even been depicted as if the emergency has already happened” is as the “human face of climate change” in an exactly the fearful, catastrophist vibe that se‐ attempt to humanize climate change’s impact. curitized discourse seeks to deploy. It endeav‐ Michael Nash’s 2010 documentary film Climate ors to make an apocalyptic future as happen‐ 40

ing right now and immediately locked in emer‐ A recent example of this dangerous rhetoric is gency. Injunctions are invoked in ethical US presidential candidate Donald Trump’s terms: we must be prepared, vigilant, and rally cry of “I will build a great wall and have alert; the “perpetual ethicized state of imper‐ Mexico pay for it.” Trump has denied the main‐ fect knowing” renders us obedient (Adams et stream scientific evidence that climate change al., 2009, 254). It can also cultivate an ac‐ is occurring. And his justification for a wall is a ceptance of anxious preparedness and even shifting potpourri of thwarting economic mi‐ violence as a political stance. grants, repelling refugees, and fighting ISIS. But when he and others in his ideological for‐ Again, thinking of climate refugees as an inevi‐ mation do concede that climate change is hap‐ table outgrowth of climate change does not pening, enhanced walled security against cli‐ lead to political support for the mitigation of mate refugees will inevitably be the logical GHGs nor adaptation to climate change “al‐ outgrowth. ready in the pipeline.” The more likely re‐ sponse is a platform of policies such as enhanc‐ “Transit countries” on the periphery of ad‐ ing border security, bolstering authoritarian vanced‐industrialized countries—e.g., Mexico, “transit states” on the periphery of advanced‐ Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Turkey—have also industrialized countries, and maintaining force long been enlisted in efforts to interdict mi‐ projection capabilities in order to respond to grants seeking access to the US and EU. Such “hotspots” with displaced populations. countries have traded their cooperation on migration interdiction for economic assistance The steady deepening of border security over and preferential terms of trade. In the case of the last 25 years is suggestive of this process. countries like Morocco and Turkey, they have Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, coun‐ parlayed their roles as transit states to deepen tries have vigorously pursued the construction their diplomatic credential (Kimball 2007; of fences, walls, and high‐tech surveillance as a White 2011; Düvell 2012). The case of Libya’s means of asserting control over borders Qaddafi and his cooperation on migration in‐ (Brown 2010; Andersson 2014). Although terdiction from 2003‐2011 especially illus‐ these structures have obviously not been trates its precarious and contradictory nature. erected in the name of stopping “climate refu‐ And the April 2016 deal between the EU and gees,” an anticipatory regime built on their Turkey, in which Turkey agreed to take back portent will only reaffirm their political appeal. migrants from Greece in exchange for financial Climate refugees fit neatly into the “rhetorical aid and the right for Turkish citizens to travel amalgamation” and interchangeable anti‐ in the Schengen zone for 90 days without a immigrant, anti‐refugee, and anti‐terrorist visa is also part of this fraught process. The discourses that serve to legitimate walls (Val‐ domestic politics of transit states are becoming let and David 2014). Military and security more authoritarian, in no small part because of firms that provide border security often lobby efforts by North Atlantic powers to externalize assiduously for contracts from governments borders. (Lemberg‐Pederson 2013). Their goal is to politically legitimate the necessity of the ser‐ Uncertain Empirical Evidence vices they provide and, in effect, create the What is especially problematic (and perhaps need for their own business (Buxton and even ironic) in using a threat‐defense logic for Hayes 2015). climate refugees is that scholarship in migra‐ 41

tion and demography has indicated that people 2012). Also, in keeping with the argument affected by environmental change—whether it above, the vast bulk of Syrian refugees have be gradual onset climate change or cata‐ stayed within the region; they cannot or do not strophic events—are actually less able or in‐ want to leave Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. clined to move (Henry et al. 2004; Massey et al. They are not straining European borders. 2007; Perch‐Nielson et al.2008). Migrating great distances requires physical strength and A second example is the Sahel region of Africa economic resources, something that most peo‐ and its experience with climate change. Tom ple affected by environmental change rarely Friedman’s April 2016 trilogy of articles in the have. The literature also argues that people New York Times had the clichéd title, “Out of who do move because of environmentally‐ Africa.” Friedman’s articles are peppered with induced displacement tend to either return to phrases like “surging migrant tide” and “one their homes to rebuild or, if they are unable to way or another [Africans] will try to get to do so, move to nearby cities or destinations Europe” and “the headwaters of the immigra‐ (Gray 2009, 2010). tion flood [are] now flowing from Africa to Europe via Libya” and “when the US and NATO There is empirical evidence that climate toppled [Qaddafi] they essentially uncorked change can indeed contribute to or exacerbate Africa.” Not only do the articles perfectly illus‐ conflict (Dumaine and Mintzer 2015). It would trate an alarmist, neo‐Malthusian anticipatory be naïve to assume otherwise. But, if people regime (Verhoeven 2014), they are scant on seek “the sanctuary of nations not their own,” empirical evidence about the impact of climate as President Obama worried, it is often in change on migration patterns. The third article nearby poor countries—not distant advanced‐ begins, “You can learn everything you need to industrialized countries. know about the main challenge facing Africa today by talking to just two people in Senegal: Two brief examples illustrate the complexity of the rapper and the weatherman.” Would that it this issue. First, the 2006 drought in Syria—an were so simple. occurrence strongly correlated to climate change—undoubtedly helped to catalyze the As argued above, most displaced peoples in onset of the Syrian civil war in 2011. And some sub‐Saharan Africa do not move northward analysts have linked the drought to the 2015‐ toward Europe but instead move south to the 16 European refugee crises. Nevertheless, it is Gulf of Guinea, straining the massive urban important to stress that sophisticated analyses centers along the Atlantic (Andersson 2014). emphasize that the drought was a contributing This represents profound challenges for hu‐ ecological factor and not the sole cause of the man security and sustainable development— civil conflict (Kelley et al. 2015). Other factors and potential humanitarian challenges, too. are far more salient—i.e., Hafez and Bashar al‐ Friedman does explicitly write that he is not Assad regimes’ economic and social policies advocating the building of walls around the over many decades, international interven‐ North Atlantic. Nevertheless, hyping the Afri‐ tions (namely, the US‐led invasion of Iraq in can “migration wave,” as he does unfortunately 2003), the aftermath of the 2008 fiscal crisis abets support for border agencies such as and international food commodity prices, and Frontex or the US Customs and Border Protec‐ the spreading upheavals associated with 2011 tion. Arab spring (Randall 2016; Femia and Werrell 42

Conclusion Trump and other anti‐immigrant rightwing In The Collapse of Western Civilization: A View parties show that popular sentiment is certain‐ from the Future, Oreskes and Conway cleverly ly susceptible to fear mongering about refu‐ imagine a Chinese historian writing 300 years gees. If/when the political right becomes fully in the future. Their fictional historian recounts convinced that climate change is real—likely the ecological ravages that took place in the via arguments from defense bureaucracies and late 21st century: contractors—it will surely embrace the “cli‐ mate refugee” line of argument. Further sup‐ Although records for this period are incom‐ port for a politics of climate change based on plete, it is likely that during the Mass Migra‐ exclusionary nativism and a militarized sur‐ tion [in the 2070s], 1.5 billion people were vivalism will undoubtedly follow. displaced around the globe, either directly from the impacts of sea level rise or indi‐ References rectly from other impacts of climate change, Adams, Vincanne, Michelle Murphy, and Adele Clarke. "Anticipation: Technoscience, Life, Af‐ including the secondary dislocation of in‐ fect, Temporality." Subjectivity 28, (2009): 246‐ land peoples whose towns and villages 265. were overrun by eustatic refugees [i.e., ris‐ Andersson, Ruben. Illegality, Inc.: Clandestine Mi‐ ing seas]. Dislocation contributed to the gration and the Business of Bordering Europe. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014. Second Black Death, as a new strain of the Baldwin, Andrew. "Racialisation and the Figure of bacterium Yersinia pestis emerged in Eu‐ the Climate‐Change Migrant." Environment and rope and spread to Asia and North America Planning A 45, (2013): 1474‐1490. (Oreskes and Conway 2014 70). ———. "Whiteness and Futurity; Towards a Re‐ search Agenda." Progress in Human Geography 36, no. 2 (2012a): 172‐187. It is an apocalyptic, biblical‐style narrative of ———. "Whiteness and Futurity: Towards a Re‐ what will happen: floods, plagues, and, yes, search Agenda." Progress in Human Geography 36, no. 2 (2012b): 172‐187. hordes of refugees dislocated because of cli‐ Bates, Diane C. "Environmental Refugees? Classify‐ mate change. ing Human Migrations Caused by Environmen‐ tal Change." Population and Environment 23, no. Obviously, refugees and migrations have long 5 (May, 2002): 465‐477. Bettini, Giovanni. "Climate Barbarians at the Gate?: been a hot‐button issue in advanced‐ A Critique of Apocalyptic Narratives of 'Climate industrialized countries. To invoke environ‐ Refugees'." Geoforum 45, (2013): 63‐72. mental refugees or climate‐induced migration Black, Richard. Environmental Refugees: Myth Or as a threat or concern is not only empirically Reality?. Geneva, Switzerland: UNHCR Evalua‐ tion and Policy Analysis Unit, 2001. questionable, but it also prompts a threat‐ Brown, Wendy. Walled States, Waning Sovereignty. defense logic that merges into anti‐immigrant Boston: MIT Press, 2010. and anti‐refugee discourses. Buxton, Nick and Ben Hayes. “Security for whom in a time of climate crisis?” in The Secure and the Dispossessed: How the Military and Corporations Some suggest that the exclusionary tendency are Shaping a Climate‐Changed World. Transna‐ implicit in a security turn for climate refugees tional Institute, 2015. has a racial dimension (Baldwin 2013; Baldwin Campbell, Kurt, Jay Gulledge, J. R. McNeill, John 2012a; Baldwin 2012b) while others argue Podesta, Peter Ogden, Leon Fuerth, R. James Woolsey, et al. The Age of Consequences: The that nativist frameworks align with notions of Foreign Policy and National Security Implications defending civilization against invading barbar‐ of Global Climate Change. Washington, DC: Cen‐ ian hordes (Bettini 2013: 63‐72). The rise of 43

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Why Forced Migration Studies? The New Generation of Scholarship Galya Ruffer, Center for Forced Migration Studies, Northwestern University, [email protected]

When I first met Barbara Harrell‐Bond in 2011, I was just starting to form the Center for Forced Migration Studies at the Buffett Insti‐ tute for Global Studies, Northwestern Universi‐ ty. At the time I did not fully understand the conflict over how we define our field of study. In 1982 Barbara founded the first center to study refugees, the Refugee Studies Center at Oxford. One of the first things she said to me was that she coined the term “forced migra‐ tion” and regrets it ever since.

As Barbara explained, the refugee was vanish‐ ing. The international legal definition of a refu‐ gee was being undermined by the urgency of every 122 humans is now either a refugee, massive ‘forced’ displacement. Indeed, the internally displaced, or seeking asylum. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee scholarly shift to cast all displaced people as (UNHCR) reports that over 60 million people ‘refugees’ was a shortsighted and misguided are forcibly displaced from their homes on project that undermined the precarious situa‐ account of conflict, persecution, and environ‐ tion of Convention refugees who were entitled mental disasters, the highest number on record to protection in countries that had signed the since World War II. This means that one in Refugee Convention.

45

Barbara made me promise that I would keep internal displacement, and statelessness have the focus of the CFMS on refugees and not, as an ethical obligation to the refugee, asylum others were doing, undermining protection for seeker, and migrant to consider how our re‐ refugees by creating all sorts of new categories search will contribute to their lives. While not such as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), all research will contribute to the formation of climate refugees and the like. As global dis‐ policy, there is a duty to consider the policy placement continues to grow, UNHCR has be‐ implications of our work and the potential come obligated to new categories of persons of harm it may cause to vulnerable persons. concern who have no internationally agreed upon legal rights vis‐à‐vis states. This has re‐ Contemporary scholars, faced with the largest sulted in a growing gap between UNHCR ‘refu‐ scale refugee crisis in our time, must fully de‐ gees’ and national ‘asylum’ grants of refugee velop the field and define its future direction in status that we see playing out today in the a way that challenges the current security par‐ Mediterranean, the South Pacific and along the adigm. In this short essay I will share my in‐ US Southern Border. sights about the contributions of Political Sci‐ ence to this emerging field. I will also describe My inspiration in founding the CFMS came the work we are doing at the CFMS to under‐ from core insights in the initial debates while stand refugee protection outside the Conven‐ the field of forced migration was forming about tion framework and launch a new research the need to question knowledge production, to program on refugee (re)settlement as we con‐ take critical approaches and methodologies tribute to developing a global vision for the and place the “refugee” or “migrant” at the cen‐ future of refugee protection. ter of the research agenda. In 2014, Oxford published the first Handbook of Refugee and What is Forced Migration? Forced Migration Studies. The editors question In 2001, Howard Adelman wrote the seminal in the introduction how far the field can piece introducing the field of Forced Migration “stretch before its focus becomes too diffuse to as a way in which to focus the “refugee prob‐ be meaningful, blurring into the broader fields lem” on the human security of refugees and of Migration Studies, Human Rights, Develop‐ internally displaced persons. The field, accord‐ ment Studies, or International Politics” (1). ing to Adelman, was in lockstep with the grow‐ ing operations of the UNHCR. Rather than pri‐ However, it seems to me that the distinctive oritizing those who had fled their countries to quality of forced migration is not so much in avoid persecution on account of race, religion, the themes it covers, but in its orientation as a nationality, political opinion or particular so‐ critical field of analysis and, as the Oxford cial group as laid out in the 1951 Convention Handbook editors note when they set out their and 1967 Protocol, it focused on human securi‐ “Brief History” of the field, the methodological ty for displaced populations whether they had demand that researchers have the ‘dual imper‐ crossed an international border or not. Schol‐ ative’ of promoting academic knowledge and arship had shifted “the framework for compre‐ undertaking ethical action (Fiddian‐Qasmiyeh, hending and dealing with the [refugee] prob‐ et al 2014, 2‐3; Jacobson and Landau 2003). lem…to the security dimension—political, Refugee and forced migration scholars, in seek‐ social, economic and even environmental in‐ ing to provide theoretical understanding of the stability that human beings pose when forced social and cultural constructions of migration, to flee their homes” (Adelman 2001: 8). He 46

challenged us to consider how else refugees ugee studies, as set out by Adelman and Hath‐ could be viewed if not through a security lens?” away had more in common in their shared (Adelman 2001: 8). purpose of “legitimizing the containment of refugees from the south to the north” (Chimni Forced migration studies, in this way, is a 2009: 12). He argued that neither refugee stud‐ pragmatic and realistic account of how state ies nor forced migration studies took a critical sovereignty and security concerns limit choices stance towards labels, categories, and the pro‐ in the real world responses to refugee crises. duction of knowledge and institutions, includ‐ Whereas the legal scholars such as James ing refugee studies centers themselves, as sites Hathaway and Guy Goodwin Gill argued for of hegemonic domination. legal protection, pragmatic realists such as Adelman pointed out that forced migration As an outgrowth of these early debates, Refu‐ scholarship could offer a better account of the gee and Forced Migration Studies has contin‐ state based conditions that generate refugee ued to develop as an interdisciplinary field flows and the conditions by which displaced bringing a critical lens to the lived experience persons could achieve human security absent a of refugees and forced migrants. Critical theo‐ state based asylum solution—how to control rists, anthropologists, geographers, and politi‐ and manage security, understood to include cal scientists have examined conflict‐ and cri‐ non‐military and non‐state threats, in an inter‐ sis‐induced displacement, development‐ state context—thereby bringing together real‐ induced displacement, protracted refugee situ‐ ist concerns and liberal emphasis on humani‐ ations, internal displacement, the citizen‐ tarianism and human rights (Adelman 2001: ship/migration nexus, smuggling and precari‐ 15). ous labor, diasporas and transnationalism, the legal and institutional responses to forced mi‐ Hathaway questioned the scholarly shift away gration in the global North versus the Global from ‘refugee studies’ in favor of ‘forced migra‐ South, the multifaceted connections between tion studies’ arguing that the shift “implies forced migration and human rights, state con‐ greater scholarly attention to phenomenologi‐ trol of borders, statelessness and transitional cal concerns – in particular, the conditions of, justice through a diverse range of methodolo‐ and solutions to, forced movement as such gies including memories, narratives and non‐ rather than the personal predicaments, needs, traditional representations of lived experienc‐ challenges, and rights of refugees themselves.” es and human suffering.1 (Hathaway 2007: 354). He believed that schol‐ arship should not adopt the agenda of govern‐ We continue to be limited by our western focus mental agencies “which increasingly sacrifice (while most refugees live in the Global South) the autonomy of the refugee himself or herself and by the categories we use as our lens to to broader migratory management goals” understand the world—states, institutions and (Hathaway 2007: 350). governance. Chimni’s critique urges us to carve out a third position and direction for Forced In 2009, B.S. Chimni redirected this initial de‐ Migration Studies as a critical approach that bate to reclaim a critical position for forced questions the production of knowledge, labels, migration studies in his article “The Birth of a ‘Discipline’: From Refugee to Forced Migration 1 I want to thank Nergis Canefe for this account as Studies.” To Chimni, forced migration and ref‐ part of our collaboration to develop forced migra‐ tion as an interdisciplinary field of study. 47

and categories. Political Science, especially, sis” in which people find themselves on ac‐ would benefit from the questions and ap‐ count of different threats whether they be en‐ proaches by scholars in the Global South. A vironmental change, food insecurity or gener‐ formative moment for me was at the 2013 Ref‐ alized violence rather than the reasons why ugee Research Network meeting in Calcutta they fled (Betts 2013). This line of work, by when my colleague Paula Banerjee stated that conducting empirical research on the reasons forced migration did not speak to her perspec‐ people migrate, seeks to move us towards the tive in South Asia. She challenged us to consid‐ individual perspective of rights deprivation er why we were studying forced migration and to locate the obligation of the international when it should really be the study of Partition. community in remedying the human rights As Political Scientists we have done little to deprivation as a matter of human dignity and theorize the role of refugees and forced mi‐ international security. grants in our study of democratization, politi‐ cal behavior, political parties, transitional jus‐ In refugee studies most of the research has tice and elite mobilization. focused on the national contexts of receiving countries. Asylum has more often been exam‐ Migration, refugees, asylum seekers: shift‐ ined as part of citizenship and immigration ing the production of knowledge with discussions of the limits of liberalism and Migration scholars in the social sciences have the securitization of borders. When refugees brought forth empirical research on why peo‐ have been the subject of research, the focus has ple migrate. While migration scholarship has remained within the framing of the Refugee been focused on the political economy of inter‐ Convention and has centered on the develop‐ national migration, the push/pull factors, My‐ ment of the international refugee framework ron Weiner years ago pointed out that “[m]uch and how to best manage the flow of refugees of the international population flows, especial‐ within this framework (Zolberg et al. 1989; ly within Africa and South Asia, are determined Skran 1995; Steiner et al. 2003; Betts 2009; only marginally, if at all, by changes in the Kneebone 2009; Loescher et al. 2008). Re‐ global or regional political economy.” (Weiner search has focused on international legal pro‐ 1992/93:97) Digging deeper into the underly‐ cesses in order “to influence agencies and gov‐ ing assumption of migration scholarship that ernments to develop more effective responses” people move based on rational economic (Landau 2012: 558). More recently, scholars choices, “crisis migration” scholars have shown have started to examine refugees as actors in that there are multiple situations throughout contributing to violence as ‘refugee warriors’ the world in which there are widespread (Lischer 2005), as political actors in camps threats to life, physical safety, health and basic (Hozler 2012) and newly emerging studies of subsistence that are beyond the capacity of refugees and displaced communities as actors individuals and the communities in which they in transitional justice processes and post con‐ reside. These “stressors” and “triggers” leave flict reconstructions. people no further choice but to migrate—force people to make the choice to migrate (Martin Much of the scholarship in both migration et al. 2014). Alex Betts has a similar thesis in studies and refugee studies, however, operates his work on “survival” migration through through the lens of the international frame‐ which he seeks to push institutions and the work. There has been little interest in research human rights framework to focus on the “cri‐ on non‐party states with the assumption that 48

they do not have a legal process or institutions ventional perceptions of forced migration through which refugees may receive protec‐ flows as opposed to innovative and unortho‐ tion. This assumption has blinded refugee dox solutions, issues arising from working in scholars from understanding refugee protec‐ unfamiliar contexts such as ethics of witness‐ tion in the Global South where most refugees ing, and dilemmas including security and con‐ are hosted. Instead of trying to understand fidentiality issues and whether researchers are how refugees are protected in countries such doing enough to ‘do no harm’. as India, Pakistan or Iran, research has stemmed from an international consensus that Critical approaches and methodologies: in order to create an effective system to man‐ placing the “refugee” and “migrant” at the age and protect refugees, those states that have center of the research agenda not joined the international refugee regime Whereas the theme of forced migration gener‐ ought to be encouraged to do so. In crafting the ally includes refugee flows, asylum seekers, research agenda for the CFMS, I have been mo‐ internally displaced peoples, and develop‐ tivated to better understand the function of the ment/climate‐induced displacement, the field convention regime in terms of refugee protec‐ is developing a distinctive research lens, meth‐ tion in emerging asylum systems and to better odological approaches, problems and concep‐ understand the ways in which refugees access tual debates. Forced migration encourages and rights and protection, formal and informal, orients research in new directions of systemic across a range of national contexts. social process in which both human agency and politics play a major part. Forced migra‐ At the CFMS we have developed a tradition of tion implies the recognition of incomplete citi‐ thought and method of study which is based on zenship, the loss of state control, especially in our conviction that much of the current re‐ the context of recent concerns about migration search on forced migration is based on rigid and security and highlights the interconnect‐ methodologies, and that the data and subse‐ edness of humanity in an increasingly transna‐ quent policy or legal conclusions derived from tional world. As such, it is a critical field that them are often impractical or with very limited questions North‐South relationships, is closely applicability. In the initial stages of project linked to current processes and tensions per‐ formation, we conduct workshops that bring taining to global social transformations and together a range of people including practi‐ provides an essential shift in the lens through tioners on the ground, policy makers, forced which we seek to understand fundamental migrants themselves, activists, legal advocates, concepts such as the state, sovereignty and judges, social workers, community advocacy through which we examine contemporary so‐ groups and NGOs/INGOs in addition to aca‐ cieties. Whereas migration, refugee and asylum demics who study refugees and forced migra‐ studies are located in the Westphalian state tion movements. We thus work on identifying tradition, by placing the word “forced” before questions and the methodological and ethical “migration” it questions whether the framing problems confronting scholars and practition‐ and discourse around states and the “other”— ers who work on forced migration and with failed, weak, developing states—is adequate as refugees and forced migrants. Some of the an analytic lens. broad problems we identified in the field in‐ clude the non‐representativeness of Shifting to the perspective of the Global South knowledge collection, the bias towards con‐ offers new directions for research on questions 49

of governance, borders, status, and protection ing the lens to understand the ways in which as we seek to understand the continued flow of refugees and other forced migrants get to a refugees and migrants to the Global North. place where their rights are real. Our projects Scholars such as Ranabir Samaddar (2003), seek to examine the ways in which a refugee or Paula Banerjee (2015) and Pia Oberoi (2006) forced migrant negotiates membership and push us to think of the state in non‐unitary rights across historic, political and social con‐ ways. Whereas the concept of the state in neo‐ texts. We have been working to push the con‐ realist theory is a unitary actor applying poli‐ ceptualization of what is a “crisis” and why cies of control based on international systemic some refugee crises lead to ongoing violence or factors, this concept is not applicable in much ongoing cycles of displacement even when of the world where people move more freely violence has ended by questioning governing across borders, there is no regard to a legal theories of the state and national sovereignty concept of citizenship and where multi‐ethnic and the meanings of rules or laws governing society means that the ‘state’ is contested in‐ refugee status in non‐party and emerging asy‐ ternally and externally in the border areas. By lum systems. In our study of the long‐term conceptualizing refugees and forced migrants experiences and outcomes of resettled refu‐ in this way, interests are not given by the ma‐ gees, we seek to contribute to our understand‐ terial structure of the international system, but ing of how refugees view “success” in the reset‐ are constructed through a process of social tlement process and to contribute to interaction and national building (Oberoi conceptualize more holistic approaches to re‐ 2006: 9). Scholars such as Zachary Lomo and settlement that take into account the problems Lucy Hovil, building on the work of Peter Ekeh of brain drain in post‐conflict reconstruction. (1975) argue for an empirical understanding of citizenship and push us to consider that the References Western understanding of citizenship blinds us Banerjee, Paula (2015) The State of Being Stateless: An Account of South Asia. Orient Blackswan. to the particular understanding of citizenship Betts, Alexander (2013) Survival Migration: Failed in Africa in which “public” had two meanings, Governance and the Crisis of Displacement. Itha‐ an ethnic and a civic that foster attachment ca: Cornell University Press. (Hovil and Lomo 2015: 42) The framing of Betts, Alexander (2009) Protection by Persuasion: International Cooperation in the forced migration gets us beyond the traditional Refugee Regime. Cornell University Press. approaches of refugee and migration studies to Chimni, B.S. (2009) “The Birth of a ‘Discipline’: examine the state and citizenship in resolving From Refugee to Forced Migration Studies,” Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1. forced migration related crises and human Ekeh, Peter P. (Jan. 1975). “Colonialism and the Two suffering, as well as analyzing existing practic‐ Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement. Com‐ es of local integration, repatriation and reinte‐ parative Studies in Society and History. Vol. 17, gration, resettlement and burden sharing. No. 1, pp. 91‐112. Hathaway, James (2007) “Forced Migration Studies: Could We Agree Just to ‘Date’? Journal of Refugee Instead of using forced migration as a theme, Studies the idea in forming our projects at the CFMS is Holzer. Elizabeth (2012)“A Case Study of Political to develop a research agenda that in its ap‐ Failure in a Refugee Camp.” Journal of Refugee Studies. 25:257‐281. proach, methods and questions are distinctive‐ Hovil, Lucy and Zachary Lomo (2015) “Forced Dis‐ ly about forced migrants. As we turn towards placement and the Crisis of Citizenship in Afri‐ the future of forced migration studies, the cur‐ ca’s Great Lakes Region: Rethinking Refugee rent projects at the CFMS are focused on shift‐ Protection and Durable Solutions,” Refuge 31:2. 50

Jacobsen, Karen and Loren Landau (2003). “The Samaddar, Ranabir (2003) Refugees and the State: dual imperative in refugee research: some Practices of Asylum and Care in India. Sage methodological and ethical considerations in so‐ Skran, Claudena (1995). Refugees in Inter‐War Eu‐ cial science research on forced migration,” Disas‐ rope. Clarendon Press ters 27(3): 185‐206. Steiner, Niklaus, Mark Gibney and Gil Loescher, eds Kneebone, Susan, Editor (2009) Refugees, Asylum (2003). Problems of Protection: The UNHCR, Ref‐ Seekers and the Rule of Law: ugees, and Human Rights. Routledge. Comparative Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge Weiner, Myron (1992/93) “Security, Stability and University Press. International Migration,” International Security, vol 17, no. 3, Winter. Loescher, Gil, Betts, Alexander, Milner, James Zolberg, Aristide R., Astri Suhrke, and Sergio (2008) United Nations Higher Aguayo (1992) Escape from Violence: Conflict Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): The Politics and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World. and Practice of Refugee Protection into the Twen‐ Oxford University Press. ty‐First Century. London and New York: Routledge. Martin, Susan, S. Weerasinghe and A. Taylor, eds, (2014) Humanitarian Crises and Migration. Ab‐ ingdon: Routledge. Pia Oberoi (2006) Exile and Belonging: Refugees and State Policy in South Asia. Oxford University Press

Debate

Europe’s Odd Migration Policy Choices Georg Menz, Goldsmiths College, University of London, [email protected]

The 28 member states of the European Union (EU) comprise more than 508 million inhabit‐ ants and include some of the most densely populated regions on the planet. Average un‐ employment hovered around ten percent in March 2016 and economic malaise continues to linger in southern Europe, with youth un‐ employment exceeding 50 percent in south‐ ern Italy and Greece. Given rising concerns over increasingly frequent incidents of Mus‐ lim terrorism, the poor track record of the second and third generation of descendants of eral immigration policies are still being pur‐ previous immigrants in pursuing meaningful sued in a number of European countries. In integration into the labor market and society fact, oblivious to the manifold problems im‐ at large (Koopmans 2013), and the dispropor‐ migration is causing on the ground, senior tionate share of immigrants and their de‐ officials at the European Commission openly scendants among convicted criminals and and aggressively clamour for turning Europe prison inmates, it seems perplexing that lib‐ into “a continent of immigration” (DW Octo‐ 51

ber 14, 2013) and demand that “any society, migration parties, as the negative conse‐ anywhere in the world will be diverse in the quences of mass immigration become impos‐ future…and will have to get used to that” (Po‐ sible to ignore. litico September 24, 2015). Europe’s citizenry could not disagree more: across the EU‐28, 56 Let us look at both of these claims migration percent of those polled in the latest Euroba‐ advocates often deploy – flawed as though rometer (2015: 153) poll are opposed to fur‐ they both are. On the face of it, fertility rates ther immigration from outside the EU. Mean‐ across Europe are low. With the exception of while, despite the poor integration track France, total fertility rates are below the re‐ record of Muslim immigrants, individual Eu‐ placement value of 2.1 everywhere in Europe ropean governments, notably in Sweden and (Eurostat 2014). But birth rates can be turned Germany, have ignored European and nation‐ around on a dime. Sustained public policy al law and created considerable chaos by en‐ efforts to improve childcare and help recon‐ couraging illegal immigrants currently ag‐ cile work and family life demands will have gressively forcing their way into Europe. more tangible effects. By contrast, relying on immigration to remedy falling birth rates is In this article, we shall explore the reasons for fundamentally flawed. A quick fix approach, which there is such a stark disjuncture be‐ this is an unsteady Ponzi scheme. In order to tween a population concerned with the obvi‐ have a meaningful impact on the labor mar‐ ous negative ramifications of excessively lib‐ ket, this would assume full and permanent eral immigration policy and an out‐of‐touch employment for all newcomers. The much policy elite at the EU level and in some mem‐ higher than average unemployment rates ber state governments that keeps promoting a among Europe’s ethnic minorities demon‐ failed policy, while proving oblivious to its strates that past immigrants and their de‐ failures. scendants are struggling to find employment (Kahanec et al. 2010). A 2001 UN Study, tell‐ The explanation for this dichotomy is two‐ ingly entitled “Replacement Migration”(UN fold. Firstly, at the elite level, two key claims, 2001), postulated the need of up to 500,000 related to demographic developments and annual net immigrants for countries such as alleged skilled labor shortages, are bandied France and Germany. Aside from the disas‐ about. Both are factually wrong and have trous consequences for the labor market, such been proven wrong repeatedly, but continue policy would also irretrievably annihilate to be used in political debates. Secondly, left‐ these countries’ cultural and ethnic identity. wing parties promoted immigration aggres‐ The second meme, related to alleged labor sively in order to recruit future voters. This market shortages, is equally fallacious. Eight policy does not sit easily with its current cli‐ years after Europe’s most devastating eco‐ entele because low skill immigration under‐ nomic crisis since the 1930s, economic cuts wages and places negative pressure on growth is still anaemic. The 2008 crisis also working conditions, public services, housing, led to wage stagnation throughout Europe health, and education, all of which are of core (ILO 2013: 10‐14). With both youth unem‐ concern to working class voters. Ultimately, ployment being a concern and very low levels there is reason to expect growing dealign‐ of labor market participation for those 55 ment and disillusionment from Europe’s left‐ years and above, there is substantial labor leaning and nominally conservative pro‐ force potential that is not being used. Automa‐ 52

tion and the introduction of robots will likely tions for the working class in particular, eliminate the need for many low skilled jobs working class voters shift their allegiance to in gastronomy, hospitality, agriculture, and anti‐immigration parties (Kitschelt 1997). transportation. These sectors currently ab‐ There is reason to suspect that lower middle sorb low skilled employees, both of immi‐ and middle class voters are joining the exodus grant background and natives. With self‐ across Europe. driving automobiles on the horizon, Europe can ill afford to import more unskilled immi‐ As dealignment from parties wedded to mass grants to drive taxis. At the high skill end, the immigration and oblivious to its consequenc‐ low take‐up of Europe’s Blue Card for skilled es gathers pace, immigration policy will prove immigrants suggests that whatever shortages a highly embattled policy domain. Electoral might exist are fairly limited—and could pushback against open door immigration pol‐ probably be filled from within Europe. The icy can be readily observed across Europe. It German economy, which recuperated most is unlikely that EU level migration policy will quickly from the devastation of 2008, has produce substantial output in the near future. absorbed merely 4,600 Blue Card highly In fact, a retreat to national level border en‐ skilled immigrants in 2013. The minimum forcement seems likely, as previous land‐ annual gross salary required to qualify was marks in EU policy on asylum and migration brought down to EUR 49,600, in select in‐ (notably Dublin and Schengen) are de facto stances even to as low EUR 38,688 (BAMF being ignored. Southern European govern‐ 2016), and thus below the average annual ments’ calls for help in defending Europe’s salary. borders against aggressive illegal immigrants have been ignored for years. The disastrous Since mass immigration is neither wanted nor decision by the German Merkel government necessary, why has it not been reined in, simi‐ to welcome in excess of 1.3 illegal immigrants lar to the 1970s recessions causing cutbacks in 2015 alone, most of whom seeking to es‐ to immigration numbers? The political Left cape poverty, not political persecution, has (and the pro‐migration Right) supports an predictably led to other countries re‐ ideology of mass migration for selfish reasons. introducing routine border controls. Across It needs to continue garnering votes. Surveys Europe, there is steadfast refusal to accept conducted after the 2012 presidential elec‐ Commission bullying and Merkel’s attempts tions in France suggested Socialist candidate to browbeat others into accepting unintegrat‐ Hollande secured 85 percent of the eligible able immigrants. As the Commission is forced voters (Le Figaro 7 May 2012) among the to abandon its claim that such individuals are estimated 4.7 million Muslims. Similarly, sur‐ an enrichment, it is openly threatening to veys among Turks with German passports impose a EUR 250,000 fine for each and every suggest that around 60 percent regularly immigrant individual countries refuse “to support the Social Democrats and about 23 save its botched migration quota plan” (Daily percent vote for the far‐left Green party (Die Telegraph May 3, 2016). Merkel’s extreme Welt March 18, 2009, Wüst 2013). In the UK, unilateralism and her ill‐judged attempt to 65 percent of all minority voters supported negotiate a dubious quid pro quo migration Labour in the 2015 general elections (Ipsos deal with Turkish president Erdogan have left Mori 2015). As the Left encourages mass im‐ EU level migration policy design in tatters. migration and ignores the negative ramifica‐ Meanwhile, massive illegal immigration into 53

southern Europe continues, supported by dezember.html, internet accessed on May 16, organized crime gangs (Frontex 2015) and 2016 CNBC (September 27, 2015) “Angel Merkel caught left‐wing political activists. Stymied by fund‐ on hot mic griping to Facebook CEO over anti‐ ing cuts and political ill will (EurActiv July 7, immigrant posts” 2014), European border guard Frontex is aid‐ Daily Telegraph (May 3, 2016) “EU to fine coun‐ ing and abetting (EurActiv October 29, 2014), tries ‘hundreds of millions of pounds’ for refus‐ ing to take refugees” instead of stopping illegal immigrants. Re‐ DW (October 14, 2013) “EU Still torn on Immigra‐ laxed border security and uneven enforce‐ tion”, available at: http://www.dw.com/en/eu‐ ment of deportations has encouraged oppor‐ still‐torn‐on‐immigration/a‐17157240, inter‐ tunistic illegal immigration from safe net accessed on May 16, 2016 EurActiv (July 7, 2014) “Italy pushes ‘Frontex plus’ countries in north and sub‐Saharan Africa and to tackle migration crisis” the Balkans (Frontex 2015). While left‐wing EurActiv October 29, 2014) “Britain opposes oper‐ media reports focus on refugees from Syria, ations to save migrants in the Mediterrean” Eurobarometer (2015) “Public Opinion in the Eu‐ studiously avoiding the predominance of ropean Union”, Luxembourg: Eurobarometer young males dodging military service, less Number 83 than a third of all asylum claims lodged in Eurostat (2014) “Total Fertility Rate: 1960‐2014”, Germany in 2015 stemmed from Syrians available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics‐ (BAMF 2016b). ex‐ plained/index.php/File:Total_fertility_rate,_19 With the pro‐migration camp having lost the 60%E2%80%932014_%28live_births_per_wo political argument, it certainly has not given man%29_YB16.png, internet accessed on May 16, 2016 up the fight. Merkel’s Germany lurks as a par‐ Le Figaro (7 May 2012) “Le religion, le facteur le ticularly dystopian and totalitarian vision of plus explicative du vote”[Religion: The strong‐ what might lie ahead. When young Muslim est explanatory factor of voting behaviour], thugs engaged in gang rapes, mass sexual available at: http://elections.lefigaro.fr/presidentielle‐ harassment, and assault in Cologne over New 2012/2012/05/07/01039‐ Year’s Eve 2015, the German government 20120507ARTFIG00612‐la‐religion‐le‐facteur‐ responded promptly – by imposing a four day le‐plus‐explicatif‐du‐vote.php, internet ac‐ cessed on May 16, 2016 media black‐out on public television coverage Frontex (2015) “Africa‐Frontex Intelligence Com‐ of the issue. In October 2015, Merkel was munity Joint Report”, Warsaw: Frontex overheard asking Facebook CEO to censor ILO (2013) “Global Wage Growth 2012‐13: Wages critics of her migration policy more ruthlessly and Equitable Growth”, Geneva: ILO IPSOS Mori (2015) “How Britain Voted in 2015”, (CNBC 27 September 2015). Observers of available at: future European migration policy are unlikely https://www.ipsosmori.com/researchpublicati to suffer from boredom. ons/researcharchive/3575/How‐Britain‐ voted‐in‐2015.aspx?view=wide, internet ac‐ References cessed on May 16, 2016 Kahanec, M., A. Zaiceva, K. Zimmermann (2010) BAMF (2016) “EU Blue Card FAQs”, available at: “Ethnic Minorities in the European Union: An http://www.bamf.de/EN/Infothek/FragenAnt Overview”, IZA Discussion Paper 5397, Bonn: worten/BlaueKarteEU/blaue‐karte‐eu‐ IZA node.html, internet accessed on May 16, 2016 Kitschelt, Herbert (1997) The Radical Right in BAMF (2016b) “Asylanträge im Jahr 2015”, availa‐ Europe, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan ble at Press https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Meldungen Koopmans, Ruud (2013) “Multiculturalism and /DE/2016/201610106‐asylgeschaeftsstatistik‐ Immigration: A Contested Field in Cross‐

54

National Comparison”, Annual Review of Sociol‐ Wüst, Andreas (2003) “Das Wahlverhalten einge‐ ogy 39: 147‐169 bürgerter Personen in Deutschland”, Aus Politik Politico (September 24, 2015) “Timmermans: und Zeitgeschichte B 52: 1‐7 Central Europe ‘has no experience with diversi‐ ty’, available at: http://www.politico.eu/article/migration‐ news‐diversity‐timmermans/, internet access on May 16, 2016 UN (2001) “Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?”, New

York: United Nations Die Welt (March 18 2009) “Türkische Einwanderer wählen SPD oder Grüne”[Turkish Immigrants vote SPD or Green]

How to make Europe’s immigration policies more efficient and more hu- mane Ruud Koopmans, WZB Berlin Social Science Center & Humboldt University, [email protected]

Within the monotonous chorus of academic voices that assure us that migration is neces‐ sary, inevitable, and enriching, Georg Menz’s contribution is a welcome dissonant. He does, however, overstate the point by slipping into the reverse error of regarding migration as entirely unnecessary and harmful. Europe’s long‐term demographic and labor‐market problems cannot be solved by child‐friendly policies and raising the labor‐market partici‐ pation of women and older workers alone. Europe will need skilled immigrants and it cultural barriers – e.g., low access to social will need quite a few of them if it wants to capital because of high degrees of social seg‐ retain its political and economic place in the regation – that also harm the labor market world. But of course it needs a particular kind chances of the men among them. of immigrants, who participate in high rates in the labor market and who pay more into I disagree with Menz that a lack of labor‐ social security and pension funds than they market demand is the reason why Europe – take out. The problem of continental Europe’s and particularly Germany as the country with welfare states is that, as Menz correctly points the largest demographic problems and the out, they have in the past, and are now with greatest labor‐market shortages – has thus far the refugee crisis again disproportionately attracted only few high‐skilled labor migrants. attracting the wrong kind of immigrants, with low skill levels and conservative religious European and German employers sure want values. These values make it unlikely that the immigrant workers. In fact, sustained em‐ women among them will participate in the ployer campaigns are a key explanation for labor market in high numbers and they erect 55

the political shift to pro‐migration positions, can earn a higher income. The low‐skilled and particularly behind the remarkable con‐ immigrant, by contrast, will prefer Western version of the European Centre‐Right, with Europe because even with a minimum wage Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union job or on welfare benefits he can live a pretty as the most prominent example. Foundations decent life there with subsidized housing, of large German firms – Thyssen, Volkswagen, universal health care and an equitable school Mercator, Bertelsmann, Hertie and the like – system. have over the past decade or so poured mil‐ lions of Euros into migration research insti‐ Because of these structural difficulties Europe tutes, prizes, policy conferences, workshops, faces in the global competition for the best symposia, and academic scholarships, and and brightest, Menz’s criticism of Europe’s unsurprisingly the outcome of this semi‐ immigration policies is overly voluntaristic. academic propaganda effort has been a loud But still, it is a legitimate question why so and unison “Germany needs immigrants!” that many of Western Europe’s governments and has not missed its effect on policy makers, mainstream parties are so committed to de‐ especially those with an open ear for business fending policies that end up attracting the interests. kind of immigrants that will not be of much help in solving Europe’s demographic and So why then have the immigrants, or at least labor‐market problems. Here, Menz points those that the German labor market needs singularly to the electoral lure of the immi‐ most, not come in large numbers? One reason grant electorate, but that alone can hardly be is that much of migration everywhere is chain the explanation because the size of that elec‐ migration. If you are an Indian computer en‐ torate is in Europe too small and insufficient gineer you are more likely to have family or to compensate for the fact that many more acquaintances who are already in the United working class voters desert left‐wing parties Kingdom or the United States than in Germa‐ for their pro‐immigrant stances. ny or the Netherlands. Conversely, low‐skilled immigrants from the Middle East and North Much more important, in my view, is the fact Africa are highly likely to have family and that immigration has become the defining acquaintances among the descendants of issue for a new moral politics of class. Left‐ guest‐workers and refugees in Western Eu‐ wing parties may gain small numbers of im‐ rope, and less so in Canada or Australia. Sec‐ migrant voters, but much more importantly, it ond, among the highly skilled, English‐ is an issue that is highly normatively loaded speaking countries have a competitive ad‐ and is an efficient mobilizer of the votes of the vantage because English is the global lingua sizeable electorate of professionals in the franca, and not German or French, and even public and semi‐public sectors such as teach‐ less so Dutch or Swedish. This is reinforced by ers, lawyers, academics, and health, cultural the fact that continental West European coun‐ and social workers. Public sector profession‐ tries are developed welfare states with a rela‐ als plus immigrant minorities have become tively equal income distribution and high lev‐ the new voting base of the European left. At els of tax and social security contributions. So the same time, immigration, because of its the Indian computer engineer will prefer the easy linkage to morally charged issues of hu‐ United States over Germany also because he man rights, discrimination, tolerance, and speaks the language, and will pay less tax and globalism, is a perfect tool for competitive 56

electoral mobilization and for discrediting that. Who the “we” was that she was thinking one’s political opponents. So effective has the about quickly became clear. branding of immigration and multiculturalism skepticism as racist or at least as fuel for rac‐ Although the decision to suspend Dublin and ists been, that Centre‐Right parties have now open the borders had been taken by Germany in many countries also begun to embrace im‐ without any consultation with its European migration and diversity as the moral impera‐ partners, Merkel now demanded that other tives of our time. This moral politics of immi‐ countries would take their share of the refu‐ gration, more than the narrower effect of gees. When most European partners under‐ immigrant electorates, is the main reason for standably refused, and instead Austria and the shift of mainstream parties to a largely several Balkan states reinstated border con‐ pro‐immigration discourse. This has come at trols, Germany criticized them harshly for the cost, of course, of opening a political space abandoning European values. The hypocrisy on the right, where populist right parties now of this criticism became obvious when instead have the playing field all to themselves and Merkel promised the Turkish Prime Minister have become the monopolistic suppliers of Erdogan shortly before the Turkish elections arguments in favor of national borders and of November 2015 a reopening of EU acces‐ national culture. sion talks and visa‐free travelling for Turks in exchange for a refugee deal. When the deal While much of the moralizing around immi‐ was finally made in the Spring of 2016 it gration serves political purposes, there is no turned out to be much worse from a human denying that in at least one important type of rights perspective than anything the Bavarian, immigration, namely asylum migration, moral Austrian, Hungarian or Macedonian govern‐ and humanitarian issues play an important ments had contemplated in their wildest role, and rightly so. This humanitarian dimen‐ dreams. While controlling intra‐European sion of asylum policies is not addressed by borders was deemed by the German govern‐ Menz at al. He is certainly right to criticize the ment as a devilish sin, Turkey was good European Union’s and especially Chancellor enough to become the EU’s bouncer. Merkel’s handling of the refugee issue. In the early Fall of 2015, Germany singlehandedly Turkey to wit; a country that does not even suspended the European Union’s Dublin recognize the Geneva Convention – except for Agreement and Merkel made such a big public refugees from (!) Europe; a country bombing relations event out of Germany’s taking up of cities in its Southeast leading tens of thou‐ a few thousand refugees stuck in Budapest sands to flee their homes; a country that jails that across the Middle East and far beyond journalists and academics for “insulting the the idea took hold that Europe’s borders were President”; a country that erects a wall at its now open and anyone who wished could frontier with Syria and does not hesitate to come and claim refugee status. When criti‐ shoot and kill refugees who cross the border cism rose, because what was supposed to nonetheless. Along the way, Merkel not only have been a limited humanitarian gesture betrayed the humanitarian principles she turned into uncontrolled mass immigration, claims to hold so dear, but by overplaying Merkel brushed aside all worries and pro‐ Germany’s hands in such a flagrant manner claimed “Wir schaffen das” – We can handle also dealt the European integration process a fatal blow. The outcome of the UK’s Brexit 57

referendum was to a large extent decided by asylum system and stayed in Turkey, Jordan the immigration issue and by fears of German or Lebanon. domination in the EU. Under these circum‐ stances, the image of the refugee crisis as a The pro‐immigration camp likes to present German‐inspired move towards uncontrolled immigration as inevitable and uncontrollable mass immigration within the EU was the – something we’d “better get used to” in the worst possible signal. words of Vice‐President of the European Commission Frans Timmermans that Georg Merkel’s meandering policies over the course Menz cites. But if there is one thing that the of the last year are yet another illustration refugee crisis of the past year has taught us, it that the wish to morally “do the right thing” is is that immigration is actually strongly affect‐ not a convincing explanation why the Europe‐ ed by political decisions. Germany’s suspen‐ an Left and increasingly also centrist con‐ sion of Dublin and Merkel’s “wir schaffen das” servatives such as Merkel have uncritically led to sharp increases of asylum immigration, embraced pro‐immigration positions. In fact, and conversely, the reinstatement of border there is little morally defensible about the controls by Austria, Macedonia and other Bal‐ European asylum system that the Centre‐Left kan countries reduced immigration to a trick‐ defends so arduously. Who are the people le. who made it to Germany and other European countries over the course of the last year? There is therefore the potential for a Europe‐ First, they are selected from a privileged up‐ an solution to the asylum issue that is both per layer, namely those who can afford the more effective and more humane than the hefty fees of people smugglers. Second, they current failing system. The first ingredient is a tend to be healthy, young, single, and male – generous policy of taking up contingents of the kind of people that can physically shoul‐ refugees from the countries immediately sur‐ der the long and difficult journey. Third, Eu‐ rounding areas of conflict, such as currently rope’s asylum laws are an open invitation to Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. Those who seek fraud. There is nothing to prevent people who asylum in Europe should register themselves are not political or war refugees in any sense with European (or if a European agreement intended by the Geneva Convention from on this cannot be reached, German, Dutch, claiming asylum. By throwing away their ID’s, etc.) registration offices where the burden of claiming another origin, and helped by a huge proof for their credible refugee status lies industry of asylum lawyers who will take with the applicants. If the number of those their case from appeal to appeal, they easily registered exceeds the take‐up capacities of gain a few years of residence and welfare the countries that grant asylum, candidates benefits. And even when they have finally lost can be selected on the basis of neediness, their case, lack of cooperation from the coun‐ waiting time or random lots. The system can tries of origin will usually prevent that they also give preferential treatment to categories are ever sent back. Fourth, thousands of peo‐ of people who can make a stronger claim to ple die terrible deaths at the hands of ruthless being individually persecuted rather than people smugglers on their way to Europe, generally being on the run for war. Thus, for likely many more than would have died had instance, persecuted religious minorities such they not be tempted by the Siren of Europe’s as Christians and Yezidis, homosexuals, as well as political activists can be given prefer‐ 58

ential access to the European asylum contin‐ papers that show that they are indeed form, gent. e.g., Syria. Also for those who show up in Eu‐ rope and have somehow made it across its Even if not every application can be accom‐ land and sea borders, the burden of proof modated, this system is a lot fairer and more should be reversed. These people should humane than the current system, which re‐ demonstrate that they have not had the op‐ wards being young, male and healthy, and portunity to register for asylum in one of the further leaves it up to criminals to decide who countries of immediate reception and they, makes it to Europe – if they survive at all. too, should provide evidence that they are Once the opportunity to register for asylum in indeed from a war zone or are individually Europe in the countries of immediate recep‐ politically persecuted. tion is guaranteed, the second ingredient of a new system are strict controls of Europe’s The total number of humanitarian refugees external borders, and if the situation demands that Europe would take up under such a sys‐ it, also of its internal borders. Anyone who tem must not necessarily be lower, on aver‐ makes it to or across the border and has not age, than the numbers that come under the passed through the regular channel for apply‐ current system. But the alternative system ing for refugee status in the countries of im‐ allows for a more well‐dosed distribution mediate reception, should be stopped and across time and across countries of reception, turned back and has no right to claim asylum. it allows to take into account the absorption This leaves a category of people who nonethe‐ capacities of the housing and labor markets of less make it into Europe, either by plane or the countries of asylum, it will destroy the illegally across Europe’s land and sea borders. business model of people smugglers, it will no This category can make a claim to asylum, but longer reward those who play the system and with a reversed burden of proof. People com‐ who undercut popular support for asylum, ing by plane directly from a war zone can be and, last but not least, it will help those who granted the opportunity to apply for asylum, need and deserve. but only if they can show valid identification

Europe’s Refugee and Immigration Policies – Obligation, Discretion, Cooperation & Freeriding Cathryn Costello, University of Oxford, [email protected]

Menz sets up a critique of liberal (in the sense clear legal errors in his analysis, and obscures of relatively open) immigration policies, refugee issues. These two characterisations of explaining them as a product of cross‐ the events of 2015 are typical of his account: ideological elite domestic political support. He ‘The disastrous decision by the German Merkel frames the mass arrivals of refugees in government to welcome in excess of 1.3 illegal Europe in 2015 as part of the general immigrants in 2015 alone, most of whom phenomenon of ‘mass immigration.’ That [were] seeking to escape poverty, not political characterisation is inapt. As my expertise is as persecution….’ and ‘While left‐wing media a legal scholar working in refugee studies, I reports focus on refugees from Syria, studiously have concentrated on where Menz makes avoiding the predominance of young males 59

dodging military service, less than a third of all period, the costs of being smuggled into the asylum claims lodged in Germany in 2015 EU plummeted, and many took an stemmed from Syrians (BAMF 2016b)’. The opportunity to find refuge (Abdul‐Ahad suggestion is that Merkel ‘invited’ illegal 2015). immigrants, not refugees. Let me provide a more accurate account. So were they refugees? Menz is correct that claims from Syrians made up only about one‐ Readers must recall the context of what I will third of the total in the German 2015 term (for want of a better expression) the statistics. However, that is due to an increase ‘mass influx’ of 2015. To summarize the in claimants from the Western Balkans, and events, in 2015, over a million people entered some time lag in the late 2015 arrivals the EU irregularly, about 800’000 via Greece showing through in the official data. But when and 150’000 via Italy, many times in excess of people from Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia previous years. Those arriving in Greece in claim asylum, they are rarely recognized as 2015 were mainly Syrians, but there were refugees, and often they are deported when also many Iraqis and Afghans (often ethnic their claims are rejected (Polke‐Majewski minorities) (UNHCR 2015). Irrespective of 2015). The reasons people from the Western whether they all meet the definition of Balkans claim asylum are manifold, but it ‘refugee’ in the 1951 Refugee Convention seems to be a product of social factors there, (and most do), they should be regarded as in and the fact that for some claiming asylum search of refuge from conflict and human gives a temporary respite from harsh living rights violations. To understand those conditions (EASO 2013; Alscher et al. 2015). extraordinary events, one would need to So Menz is correct that some who claim consider the drivers – what led people to flee asylum in Germany and elsewhere across the Syria in 2015, and/or to give up on their EU are not recognized as refugees, but then prospects of protection in Lebanon, Jordan these individuals are amenable to being and Turkey(where work, education rights and deported. In contrast, irrespective of where protection are curtailed). Here, we can point they claim asylum, Syrians tend to be to the protracted and brutal nature of the recognized as refugees, or at least granted a conflict in Syria, and rising levels of violence status to protect those fleeing conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq. It would also require (UNHCR 2016). To describe young men an examination of the actions of Turkey as the fleeing conscription into Assad’s army as main transit country. Kelly Greenhill has ‘dodging military services’ is to obscure the employed her thesis on ‘coercively right to conscientious objection, and that engineered immigration’ to explain the events those who flee military service in such of 2015, noting Turkey’s role in enabling regimes are avoiding participating in massive refugees to leave its territory, and then use human rights violations, and risk persecution them as a bargaining chip (Greenhill 2016). for so doing. This is a well‐established basis Even if one does not share her viewpoint, at for recognition of as a refugee under the 1951 the very least the new entrants to the Convention (UNHCR 2013). The refugeehood smuggling market in Turkey were clearly of most asylum‐claimants in the EU currently decisive – when mobility is supressed in the is evidenced by remarkably high recognition face of great unmet demand for refuge, new rates – for many nationalities (Syrian, smugglers enter the market. For a brief Eritrean, Iraqi) over 80 percent at first 60

instance, with Afghans being recognized in is the deadliest sea crossing in the world, with over 60 percent of cases (EASO 2016: 22).15 smugglers completely indifferent to whether Also, missing from Menz’s account is any their customers live or die (Fargues 2015). In notion of how asylum adjudication works. contrast, the route that opened up in late This process sorts the refugees (those fleeing 2015 was relatively safe. I write ‘relatively persecution and serious human rights abuses, safe’ feeling shameful, given that of course, including those arising in conflict) from the many did drown. Not only the toddler Alan non‐refugees. Adjudicators enjoy a degree of Kurdi, but an estimated 804 others. In insulation from politics. Rather than contrast, 2’892 people drowned on the embodying a ‘liberal immigration policy’ or a Central Mediterranean route from Libya (IOM tool of ‘mass immigration’, asylum is highly 2016). selective. Menz claims that Sweden and Germany To suggest that those taking these journeys ignored ‘European and national law’, but that belong to those ‘invited’ as part of ‘mass claim is not explained. Some have claimed immigration’ is to obscure not only their that Germany flouted the Dublin rules16 on refugeehood, but also that they are the the allocation of responsibility for asylum victims of policies to supress mobility. So claims, in suspending the Dublin return of when Menz describes them as ‘illegal Syrians for a time. That decision was not immigrants’, that is in part accurate. To illegal – under the Dublin system, states have explain, there are few legal routes to claim discretion to take on asylum claims if they so asylum in the EU (such as a specific visa for wish. Nor was it unusual – in practice most asylum‐seekers issued in large numbers), so asylum claims in Europe are determined almost invariably, refugees must risk their where the individual claims asylum, lives to claim asylum. This is because in the irrespective of the Dublin rules. The Dublin absence of visas, carriers sanctions mean System is only one aspect of the EU asylum asylum seakers cannot board regular flights system, one that has been ineffective for and ferries (FRA 2015). The global refugee decades (Maiani and Vevstad 2009; Guild et regime is premised on the containment of al. 2014). Transfers back to Greece have long refugees in the Global South. The situation been prohibited by human rights law.17 So to where refugees are compelled to have focus on the failure to use Dublin returns recourse to dangerous means of travel if they extensively (a long‐established feature of wish to seek asylum in Europe is nothing new, European practice) seems somewhat but rather the culmination of years of policies tendentious. aimed at deterring and deflecting refugees (Grahl‐Madsen 1983; Gammeltoft‐Hansen 2011; den Heijer 2012). The main route available until 2015 was the Central 16 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Mediterranean one from Libya to Italy, which Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for de‐ termining the Member State responsible for exam‐ 15 These are recognition rates for both refugee ining an application for international protection status and subsidiary protection at first instance. lodged in one of the Member States by a third‐ On appeal, the recognition rate rises. The aggre‐ country national or stateless person (recast) (Dub‐ gate EU‐wide recognition rates masks considera‐ lin III Regulation)[2013] OJ L 180/31. ble variation across Member States. 17 MSS v Belgium & Greece (2011) 53 EHRR 2. 61

Some states characterised arrivals as posing a decision renders it unintelligible and threat, and set about to use their borders and unrecognisable. He states that ‘Across Europe, criminal laws to deflect and deter, Orbán’s there is steadfast refusal to accept Commission Hungary in particular. Its illegal actions in‐ bullying and Merkel’s attempts to browbeat clude expelling asylum‐seekers without prop‐ others into accepting unintegratable er process to Serbia, and criminalising and immigrants.’ Given that the relocation imprisoning many border crimes. Most did decision was agreed by all governments but little in terms of providing asylum – out of the the aforementioned four, this is a remarkable 28 Member States of the European Union, the characterization. It is not about immigrants at majority of asylum‐seekers (over 75 percent) all, but asylum‐seekers who are in likelihood are in just five Member States (Eurostat refugees. The aim is to create greater 2016). The others are free‐riders on the pro‐ responsibility‐sharing across the EU. Had tection provided by others. So when Menz such a system been in place in 2015, then decries the ‘aggressive unilateralism’ of the Germany would not have had been left in a Merkel government in accepting to examine position to manage so many people arriving all the asylum‐seekers, and assess whether in a short space of time, surely the nub of the they are indeed refugees, he is obscuring the integration challenge Germany faces. fact that Germany was left out on a limb when other EU Member States failed to step up to Politically, sustaining mass arrivals seemed the crisis. There were many possible coopera‐ unviable, so the EU cobbled together a deal tive responses that could have been adopted. with Turkey to stem the irregular arrivals from Turkey to the Greek islands (EU‐Turkey The cooperative response that was agreed Statement 2016). Elements of the deal are of was minimal – relocation of 160’000 asylum‐ doubtful legality (Peers 2016). For now, it has seekers from Greece and Italy across the EU, led to a large drop in arrivals to Greece. Some namely those deemed likely to be recognised 57’000 refugees are stranded in Greece, most as refugees (Peers 2015). The distribution in dire living conditions (IRC 2016). Immense was based on Member States’ capacity, taking political capital has been spent on this deal, into account population, GDP, unemployment and it may have a contagion effect across the rate, and existing refugee population. The EU global refugee regime. In its aftermath, for agreed to this, following its normal legislative instance, Kenya decided to expel its Somali procedures. Only a few Member States voted refugee population from Dadaab, citing the EU against the temporary relocation, namely example to justify its stance. Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania). The swing to the right in the Menz’s account seeks to explain these events domestic politics of these States gets no solely in terms of decisions by domestic mention from Menz, but was certainly political elites in Germany and at EU level. significant in shaping the EU response. This However, this approach cannot explain the system of relocation has now been agreed, but decision to treat refugees and non‐refugees has proved difficult to put into action, differently, and expend much political capital although many governments are keen to to suppress arrivals when pan‐European make it work (European Commission 2016). cooperation was not forthcoming. I have a degree of sympathy with the claims that Menz’s characterisation of the relocation governments and employers often share an 62

ideological leaning to enable employers to and persecution are in need of a new state to import cheap migrant workers. Indeed it was protect them, whether temporarily or a theme in a collection I co‐edited to which permanently. With regard to refugee Menz contributed (Costello and Freedland protection, an important perspective is that 2014). However, that account cannot explain this protection is a global public good, so all of immigration and refugee policies. A when states cooperate to offer protection strong domestic political consensus in they generate benefits throughout the global receiving countries in favor of sustained ‘mass regime (Betts 2003). Conversely, when they immigration’ cannot explain the causes of the fail to cooperate, some free ride on the mass influx of 2015, the responses thereto, or protection offered by others. We should not the 2016 EU‐Turkey deal. berate those providing protection as ‘aggressive unilateralists’ but rather criticise Many other aspects of Menz’s account seem those who do not step up as free riders. unproven, for instance the claim that the political left supports immigration in order to EU States could invite refugees directly from garner future voters. That claim is premised countries in the region, avoiding illegal jour‐ on a long‐term perspective usually missing in neys altogether, and making arrivals more electoral politics. New immigrants tend to orderly and subject to security screening. have temporary, precarious migration They are three main policy options – humani‐ statuses (precisely as they are moulded to fit tarian visas, embassy asylum procedures and imagined short‐term labour shortages) and resettlement. A humanitarian visa is a visa to refugees get a three‐year residence permit. enter a country legally to claim asylum. Brazil When their countries are safe, states may issues them to Syrians – they claim asylum on (subject to legal constraints) send them home, arrival and are generally granted it (Calegari as Germany did previously with many and Baeninger 2015). Embassy procedures Bosnian and later Iraqi former refugees. Their entail adjudicating at least some asylum paths to voting rights are by no means clear. claims abroad, and then allowing people trav‐ Many may never naturalise. The imagined el legally as refugees. European countries do electoral gain seems at best one that is not use these practices extensively. Resettle‐ postponed for several years, and hardly ment is the practice whereby recognised ref‐ bankable. ugees are offered protection in a new state Overall, the explanatory force of Menz’s that can offer them integration prospects. central argument seems lacking. Moreover, Historical examples of mass resettlement in‐ his frame of reference, focusing solely on host clude that of the Indochinese refugees reset‐ countries, should not be relied upon to make tled in their millions from Thailand and Hong normative assessments of such policies. Kong to the US, Canada, Australia and else‐ Evidently, any critique of these policies where (Betts 2006). Again, for geographical should consider not only the impact on host and historical reasons, EU States are not tradi‐ societies, but also the rights and interests of tional countries of resettlement. However, the migrants and refugees and the impact on their EU‐Turkey deal entails a significant resettle‐ home communities and states. Evidently, the ment obligation (albeit tainted by the context reason why refugee protection is a matter of of the ‘1 in 1 out’ framework as a reward for international legal obligation (in contrast to Turkey’s acceptance of returned refugees immigration) is that refugees fleeing conflict from Greece). 2015 was characterised not by 63

sustained policies of mass immigration, but as My last time in Berlin, I visited one of the regards refugees, the massive backfiring of large reception centres for refugees, and met policies of containment. a 9 year old Afghan boy. We chatted in German. He had arrived last October, just a The events of 2015 were extraordinary, but tiny person in a ‘mass influx’. Remarkably, they were the product of restriction and the refugee children go to local school pretty suppression of mobility, not ‘liberal quickly after arrival. They are the engines of immigration policies’ or an invitation from integration, as are their fellow kids, parents, Chancellor Merkel. Her ‘Wir schaffen das’ teachers and the rest. Refugees have fled a speech of 31 August 2015 came when the ‘dystopian and totalitarian’ place, and are now mass influx was well underway. Had she said somewhere better. Europe, thankfully, is no ‘Please go away, you unintegratable longer such a place, but if we do see a turn to immigrants’, are we really imagine that darkness in Europe, are we really to see it in people fleeing would have stopped? the actions of Angela Merkel rather than those Sometimes, the only statesperson‐like action Viktor Orbán and his ilk? is to offer leadership to adapt to the realities of the moment. Her government also then References took the decision to do a deal with Erdoğan to Abdul‐Ahad, Ghaith. 2015. “Some Tips for the Long‐Distance Traveller.” London Review of stop refugees arriving. In the absence of Books 37(19):39‐41. cooperation from other EU Member States, Alscher, Stefan, Johannes Obergfell and Stefanie Germany was not an ‘aggressive unilateralist’ Ricarda Roos. 2015. “Migrationsprofil but rather an isolated humanitarian. The EU‐ Westbalkan: Ursachen, Herausforderungen und Lösungsansätze.” Bundesamt für Migration und Turkey deal stinks, legally and ethically, and Flüchtlinge, Working Paper 63. may fall apart politically, but in Menz’s Betts, Alexander. 2003. “Public Goods Theory and account it is to be understood as part of a the Provision of Refugee Protection: The Role of the Joint‐Product Model in Burden‐Sharing policy supporting ‘mass immigration.’ That Theory.” Journal of Refugee Studies 16(3):274‐ seems simply implausible. 296. Betts, Alexander. 2006. “Comprehensive Plans of Germany is evidently facing an integration Action: Insights from CIREFCA and the Indo‐ chinese CPA.” UNHCR Evaluation and Policy challenge. Menz is a pessimist on this front. Analysis Unit, New Issues in Refugee Research He tells us that the second and third Working Paper No. 120. generation immigrants in Europe are poorly http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ff163c82.ht integrated. But the best empirical work on ml. Calegari, Marília and Rosana Baeninger. 2016. this topic shows significant variations in ‘From Syria to Brazil’ (2016) Forced Migration integration outcomes across EU States. Review, Studies in particular of second‐generation http://www.fmreview.org/destination‐ Turks across several European countries europe/calegari‐baeninger.html Costello, Cathryn and Mark Freedland (eds.). 2014. show that that they are doing much better in Migrants at Work: Immigration & Vulnerability other countries than in Germany. The key to in Labour Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. understanding integration is the integration Crul, Maurice, Jens Schneider and Frans Lelie (eds.). 2012. The European Second Generation context (Crul et al. 2012). So here Menz is Compared: Does the Integration Context right – much depends on domestic politics Matter?. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University and society. Press. den Heijer, Maarten. 2012. Europe and 64

Extraterritorial Asylum. Oxford and Portland, Guild, Elspeth, Cathryn Costello, Madeline Garlick, Oregon: Hart Publishing. Violeta Moreno‐Lax and Minos Mouzourakis. EASO. 2013. “Asylum applicants from the Western 2014. “New approaches, alternative avenues Balkans: Comparative analysis of trends, push‐ and means of access to asylum procedures for pull factors and responses”. persons seeking international protection: https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/file Study for the LIBE Committee.” European s/public/WB‐report‐final‐version.pdf. Parliament. EASO. 2016. Annual Report on the Situation of http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en Asylum in the European Union 2015. Malta; /document.html?reference=IPOL_STU(2014)5 EASO. 09989. European Council, 2016. “EU‐Turkey statement” IOM. 2016. “IOM Counts 3,771 Migrant Fatalities in Press release 144/16, 18 March. Mediterranean in 2015.” IOM Press Release, 1 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pr May. http://www.iom.int/news/iom‐counts‐ ess‐releases/2016/03/18‐eu‐turkey‐ 3771‐migrant‐fatalities‐mediterranean‐2015. statement/#. IRC. 2016. “Refugees in Limbo: Greece.” Accessed Eurostat. 2016. “Asylum in the EU Member States: 18 July. Record number of over 1.2 million first time https://www.rescue.org/country/greece. asylum seekers registered in 2015 ‐ Syrians, Hatton, Tim. 2015. “Explainer: why some Afghans and Iraqis: top citizenships.” Eurostat European countries do more than others to news release 44/2016, 4 March. help refugees.” The Conversation, 5 September . http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/299 http://theconversation.com/explainer‐why‐ 5521/7203832/3‐04032016‐AP‐EN.pdf/. some‐european‐countries‐do‐more‐than‐ European Commission. 2016. “Relocation and others‐to‐help‐refugees‐47115. Resettlement: EU Member States urgently need Lawton, Chris and Robert Ackrill. 2016. “Hard to deliver.” European Commission Press Evidence: how areas with low immigration Release, 16 March. voted mainly for Brexit.” The Conversation, 8 http://europa.eu/rapid/press‐release_IP‐16‐ July. http://theconversation.com/hard‐ 829_en.htm. evidence‐how‐areas‐with‐low‐immigration‐ Fargues, Philippe. 2015. “2015: the year we mis‐ voted‐mainly‐for‐brexit‐62138. took refugees for invaders.” Migration Policy Maiani, Francesco and Vigdis Vevstad. 2009. Centre Policy Brief 2015/12. “Reflection Note on the Evaluation of the FRA. 2015. “Legal entry channels to the EU for Dublin System and on the Dublin III Proposal.” persons in need of international protection: a European Parliament. toolbox.” FRA Focus 02/2015. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etud http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra‐ es/note/join/2009/410690/IPOL‐ focus_02‐2015_legal‐entry‐to‐the‐eu.pdf. LIBE_NT(2009)410690_EN.pdf. Gammeltoft‐Hansen, Thomas. 2011. Access to Peers, Steve. 2015. “Relocation of Asylum‐Seekers Asylum: International Refugee Law and the in the EU: Law and Policy.” EU Law Analysis, 24 Globalisation of Migration Control. Cambridge: September. Cambridge University Press. http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com.au/2015/0 Grahl‐Madsen, Atle. 1983. “Identifying the World's 9/relocation‐of‐asylum‐seekers‐in‐eu‐ Refugees.” The Annals of the American Academy law.html. of Political and Social Science. 467:11‐23. Peers, Steve. 2016. “The final EU/Turkey refugee Greenhill, Kelly M. 2016. “Open Arms Behind deal: a legal assessment.” EU Law Analysis, 18 Barred Doors: Fear, Hypocrisy and Policy March. Schizophrenia in the European Migration http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com.au/2016/0 Crisis.” European Law Journal 22(3)317‐32. 3/the‐final‐euturkey‐refugee‐deal‐legal.html. Guild, Elspeth, Cathryn Costello, Madeline Garlick Polke‐Majewski, Karsten. 2015. “Europe's and Violeta Moreno‐Lax. 2015. “Enhancing the Deportation Machine.” Die Zeit, 6 August. Common European Asylum System and http://www.zeit.de/feature/refugees‐in‐ Alternatives to Dublin: Study for the LIBE germany‐deportation‐flights‐laws. Committee.” European Parliament. UNHCR. 2014. “Guidelines on International http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etud Protection No. 10: Claims to Refugee Status es/STUD/2015/519234/IPOL_STU%282015% related to Military Service within the context of 29519234_EN.pdf. Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Convention and/or

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the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Europe in 2015’ Refugees.” HCR/GIP/13/10/Corr. http://www.unhcr.org/uk/news/latest/2015/ 1. http://www.refworld.org/docid/529ee33b4 12/5683d0b56/million‐sea‐arrivals‐reach‐ .html. europe‐2015.html UNHCR. 2015. ‘Over one million sea arrivals reach

Unpacking the Facts Behind Europe’s Odd Migration Policy Choices Kelly M. Greenhill, Tufts University and Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, [email protected]

Georg Menz’s palpable frustration with the dysfunctional state of European Union (EU) migration policy is in many ways understand‐ able. In 2015 alone, well over a million refu‐ gees and migrants arrived in Europe through irregular channels, about half of whom were fleeing the brutal civil war in Syria and about one‐third of whom were seeking political asy‐ lum. As I argued in the European Law Journal earlier this year, the question of who should bear responsibility for the new arrivals and how those responsibilities should be shared generated very different, sometimes schizo‐ phrenic, policy responses among EU member states. In addition to creating population bot‐ The lack of EU solidarity and absence of a tlenecks and placing strains on the physical collective response to the humanitarian, polit‐ infrastructure and social fabric of many recip‐ ical and economic challenges imposed by the ient states, these divergent national responses influx further laid bare the limitations of generated fierce political debates over legal common border control and migration and and normative obligations to the displaced refugee burden‐sharing systems that have within and across member states. In some never been wholly and satisfactorily imple‐ cases, they also (re‐) ignited national divi‐ mented as well as demonstrated the dangers sions that have redounded to the benefit of inherent in EU policy‐making as triage (rather right wing, nationalist political parties an than strategic engagement).19 President of the fueled further alienation certain segments of European Council Donald Tusk even warned society within member states.18 that a failure to find a solution to the then

19 See e.g., Susan Fratzke, “Not Adding Up: The Fading Promise of Europe’s Dublin System,” Mi‐ 18 Kelly M. Greenhill, “Open Arms Behind Barred gration Policy Institute Report (March 2015), avail‐ Doors: Fear, Hypocrisy and Policy Schizophrenia able at in the European Migration Crisis” European Law http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/not‐ Journal, vol. 22, no. 3 (May 2016): 279‐94; adding‐fading‐promise‐europes‐dublin‐system; “France’s Alienated Muslims,” The Week.com, Jan‐ Elizabeth Collett, “The Asylum Crisis in Europe: uary 24, 2015, available at Designed Dysfunction,” http://theweek.com/articles/535096/frances‐ http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/asylum‐ alienated‐muslims. crisis‐europe‐designed‐dysfunction. 66

seemingly unending stream of new arrivals However, it is misleading to claim by exten‐ could lead to the EU failing as a political pro‐ sion that officials are naïfs who have been ject.20 The results of the recent Brexit vote, “aggressively clamouring” for mass migration driven in no small part by concerns about to combat demographic decline and labor border control and immigration, have further shortages and gain votes while blithely and exacerbated concerns in some circles about blindly ignoring the “negative consequences” the EU’s future.21 of liberal policies. In fact, evidence suggests EU officials understand well that unrestricted However, while Menz’s basic critique that EU in‐migration is not a panacea for what ails migration policy suffers from dysfunctions Europe economically, as research sponsored and potentially dangerous disconnects is un‐ by—and available on the websites of—the EU doubtedly sound, his diagnoses of their un‐ Commission and EU Parliament makes clear. derlying sources miss the mark on several A 2014 OECD and European Commission‐ critical dimensions. Moreover, his elision of funded study expressly concludes that, “alt‐ fundamentally distinct conceptual categories hough migration can make an important con‐ (e.g., refugees and migrants) further muddies tribution to labor force growth, its role in what is clearly supposed to be a persuasive counterbalancing the effects of population argument. Consequently, his recommenda‐ ageing critically depends on the capacity of tions for how to combat the problems he countries to match labor needs to migrants’ identifies are also less useful and applicable characteristics.”23 A 2015 European Parlia‐ than they might otherwise be. As space is lim‐ ment Committee report likewise concludes ited, I highlight only a few misdiagnoses and that immigration is an imperfect solution to their broader implications below. labor shortages, since immigrant workers It is certainly true that some EU policy elites tend not to be perfect substitutes for domestic favor broadly liberal migration policies.22 workers within the same industry, occupa‐ tion, or skill level. The 2015 report further 20 “Tusk Gives the EU Two Months to “Save acknowledges that immigration of low‐skilled Schengen”,’ EuroNews, January 19, 2016; available workers can have a variety of negative im‐ at http://www.euronews.com/2016/01/19/tusk‐ pacts on the economic development of host gives‐the‐eu‐two‐months‐to‐save‐schengen/.; ‘Schengen to Fail in Months if Migration Crisis not countries and calls for careful analysis of cur‐ “Under Control,” says Tusk’, DW.com, January 19, rent and future needs and a focus on targeted 2016; available at migration to meet identified needs, noting http://www.dw.com/en/schengen‐to‐fail‐in‐ months‐if‐migration‐crisis‐not‐under‐control‐ that “employers and member states [not the says‐tusk/a‐18989697. 21 Constanze Steinmuller, “Does Brexit Portend the End of European Unity?, Washington Post, June 25, 2016, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/glob Conspectus Borealis, vol. 1, no. 1 (2016); available al‐opinions/does‐brexit‐portend‐the‐end‐of‐ at: european‐unity/2016/06/25/74e27d4a‐3a5a‐ http://commons.nmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?art 11e6‐8f7c‐d4c723a2becb_story.html. icle=1014&context=conspectus_borealis. 22 However, even among theorists, there is broad 23 OECD/European Commission, Matching Eco‐ disagreement about how open borders should be nomic Migration with Labor Market Needs in Eu‐ in a liberal system and to whom. See e.g., Paula rope (September 2015), available at Hafner, “The Varying Degrees of Liberalism in http://www.oecd‐ilibrary.org/social‐issues‐ Migration and Immigration Policy Within the Eu‐ migration‐health/matching‐economic‐migration‐ ropean Union: Causes, Consequences and Clashes,” with‐labour‐market‐needs_9789264216501‐en. 67

EU] are the prime actors to counter labor instead issuing a warning about the dangers shortages effectively.”24 of right‐wing fear‐mongering in countries that lack a history of diversity. Citizens of such Of course, the existence and ready accessibil‐ countries can be particularly susceptible to ity of such research does not mean that claims fears of Muslim refugees, Timmermans ar‐ about declining birth rates and labor shortag‐ gues, making it all the more imperative that es are not deployed in EU policy debates. citizens in such countries come to grips with However, Menz provides no references to said the fact that being a member of the EU—an debates, and even the officials he specifically entity without internal borders—means di‐ cites as “aggressively clamouring” for mass versity is just a fact of life.26 immigration do not make such arguments. Indeed, if one reads the stories from which To be sure, profound and consequential disa‐ the officials’ quotes were culled in their en‐ greements do exist within the EU over how tirety, it is hard to square Menz’s assertions of liberal and welcoming migration policies aggressive clamouring with what appears on should be. However, the critical division of the page. Rather than advocating for the crea‐ opinion is not, as Menz suggests, between tion of a “continent of immigration,” President allegedly “out of touch” policy elites and a of the European Parliament Martin Schulz monolithic EU citizenry “concerned with ob‐ instead argues that it is high time for Europe vious negative ramifications of excessively to acknowledge that it already is such a conti‐ liberal immigration policy.” Rather, the fun‐ nent. “That’s why we need a legal immigration damental divisions are between different system,” says Schulz. “All big regions of immi‐ countries in the EU and between different seg‐ gration on this planet, be it the US, Australia ments of society within individual EU coun‐ or Canada, have modern laws which regulate tries, as both polling data and observable pol‐ legal immigration.” In short, Schulz is not in icy behavior demonstrate. fact advocating for more liberal migration policies; rather he is making an ardent plea to As Menz observed, the 2015 Eurobarometer EU member states to finally reach a collective survey revealed that 56 percent of those agreement on regular migration channels and polled were opposed to more immigration equitable refugee burden‐sharing, with the from outside the EU. However, his focus on intent more effectively combatting irregular aggregate data masks very significant and migration and, by extension, preventing mass consequential divisions of opinion across deaths at sea.25 Likewise, a reading of the Po‐ member states. For instance, while Sweden litico piece reveals that quoted EU Commis‐ was the only country where an overwhelming sion Vice President Frans Timmermans is not majority of the population strongly favored issuing a demand for greater diversity, but immigration from outside the EU (66%), ma‐ jorities of respondents in Romania, Spain, 24 European Parliament, Labor Market Shortages in Croatia and Ireland also all said they felt posi‐ the European Union (March 2015), available at tively about in‐migration. On the other hand, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ STUD/2015/542202/IPOL_STU(2015)542202_EN .pdf. 26 “Timmermanns: Central Europe ‘Has No Experi‐ 25 “EU Still Torn on Immigration,” DW.com, Octo‐ ence with Diversity,” Politico.com, September 24, ber 13, 2013, available at 2015, available at http://www.dw.com/en/eu‐still‐torn‐on‐ http://www.politico.eu/article/migration‐news‐ immigration/a‐17157240. diversity‐timmermans/. 68

immigration from outside the EU evoked neg‐ In terms of policy outcomes, such heterogene‐ ative feelings in other member states, most ity of opinion can (and does) divide states into strikingly in the Czech Republic (81%), Latvia more (e.g. Germany, Sweden) and less (e.g. (78%), Greece (78%) and Slovakia (77%). Hungary) accepting of migrants and refugees Likewise, while 73 percent of all Eurobarome‐ more broadly.29 Although member states are ter respondents said they favored a common ostensibly collectively committed to free EU immigration policy, enthusiasm for such a movement within the EU and defense of a policy varied significantly across member common border at its frontiers, responsibili‐ states: support for a common policy was far ties for shouldering the monetary, social and more widely embraced in the Netherlands political costs of recent inflows have not been (85%), Germany (84%), Malta (84%), Lithua‐ equally shared. As of this writing, Germany nia (82%), Luxembourg (82%) and Spain has absorbed the largest number of refugees (81%) than in the Czech Republic (52%), Es‐ in absolute terms, while Sweden has taken in tonia (53%), Finland (57%) and Austria the largest number on a per capita basis. (58%).27 Some other member states have not accepted any refugees at all.30 Moreover, by the end of Intra‐EU disparities of opinion about migra‐ 2015, half a dozen members of the Schengen tion are not unique to the Eurobarometer. A Zone had unilaterally reinstituted internal 2015 Pew survey uncovered similarly mixed border controls under the “exceptional cir‐ views. In frontline states, such as Greece and cumstances” provision of the Article 26 of the Italy, people were more likely to say that Borders Code. Others, such as Hungary, had “immigrants are a burden on society because erected physical barriers along borders with they take jobs and social benefits,” while Brit‐ non‐Schengen states. ish and German respondents were far more likely to say that “immigrants make their Frontline states along the EU’s southern bor‐ country stronger because of their hard work der, such as Italy and Greece, have also borne and talents.” As for attitudes towards asylum significant burdens as the key entry points seekers and refugees specifically, 40 percent and—due to the Dublin Regulations that gov‐ of all respondents in a 2014 German Marshall ern treatment of asylum seekers—holding Fund survey wanted their country’s policies and processing areas for the vast majority of to be more restrictive, but such sentiments new arrivals. Despite the fact that the Dublin were particularly strong in Italy (57%) and rules are to apply to all EU member states, Greece (56%).28 29 See Kelly M. Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migra‐ tion: Forced Displacement, Coercion and Foreign Policy (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, 2010 and 2016); and Naftali BenDavid and Tom Fairless, 27 “Public Opinion in the European Union,” Euroba‐ “EU Immigration Dispute Splits Leaders,” Wall rometer 83 (May 2015), available at: Street Journal, June 26, 2015, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/ http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu‐immigration‐ eb83/eb83_first_en.pdf . dispute‐splits‐leaders‐1435326764. 28 Jacob Poushter, “Refugees Stream into Europe, 30 Willa Frej, “Here Are the Countries that Want to Where They are not Welcomed with Open Arms,” Refuse Refugees,” HuffingtonPost.com, September FactTank: News in the Numbers, April 24, 2015, 9, 2015; available at http://www.pewresearch.org/fact‐ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/europe‐ tank/2015/04/24/refugees‐stream‐into‐europe‐ refugees‐not‐ where‐they‐are‐not‐welcomed‐with‐open‐arms/. welcome_us_55ef3dabe4b093be51bc8824. 69

some have selectively been ignoring their To be sure, Menz is not alone in eliding the provisions, in order to shirk responsibility critical distinction between migrants (irregu‐ and pass the buck onto other member lar or otherwise) and refugees. It is becoming states.31 Such beggar thy neighbor can appear increasingly common to see the terms used individually rational. However, selfish defec‐ interchangeably in media and public dis‐ tions encourage other states to follow suit, course. However, as Menz well knows, the leaving the whole EU less well off, and, as I distinction between these categories is of have argued elsewhere, collectively more great legal and political significance. Member vulnerable to the machinations of enterpris‐ states deal with migrants under their own ing states and non‐state actors willing to use national immigration laws and processes, and refugees and migrants as bargaining chips to each country decides unilaterally how many extract political, economic and/or military legal migrants it is willing to accept in a given concessions in exchange for preventing or year. All migrants who arrive through irregu‐ staunching further inflows.32 The EU‐Turkey lar or illegal channels can be summarily de‐ deal was hardly the first time we have seen ported. In contrast, member states deal with this sort of coercive bargaining in action, and refugees through norms of refugee protection it won’t be the last. and asylum that are defined in both national legislation and international law. The 1951 Arguably the most puzzling of Menz’s asser‐ Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol are tions about Europe’s policy choices is his the cornerstones of modern refugee protec‐ characterization of the bulk of the new arri‐ tion, and the principle of non‐refoulement vals as “illegal immigrants,” “most of whom enshrined in these instruments means that seeking (sic) to escape poverty, not political refugees may not be expelled or returned to persecution,” despite the fact that the majori‐ situations where their life and freedom would ty of people who arrived in Europe in 2015 be under threat. So, short of overturning in‐ were from countries at war or which other‐ ternational and European law, EU countries wise are considered to be “refugee‐ are legally obligated to adjudicate the claims producing” by UNHCR. For instance, 1.1 mil‐ of those claiming seeking asylum. The perti‐ lion of those who arrived in Germany were nent issues are not demographic decline, la‐ asylum seekers, 64 percent of whom hailed bor shortages, or shifting electoral prospects, from war‐torn Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq.33 but rather fundamental human rights, refugee protection and the laws that undergird them.

Thus, only if and when their asylum claims 31 “European Refugee Policy: Dublin Regulation Applies for all EU Member States,” are deemed unfounded may such people be https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Ar deported or repatriated. To do otherwise tikel/2015/09_en/2015‐09‐02‐fluechtlinge‐ would be an “odd” policy choice indeed. dublin‐verfahren_en.html. 32 See again Greenhill, “Open Arms Behind Closed Doors” and Kelly M. Greenhill, “Demographic Bombing: People as Weapons in Syria and Be‐ yond,” Foreign Affairs (December 2015); https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015‐ 12‐17/demographic‐bombing. 33 Andrea Thomas, “Record Number of Asylum Seekers Flood Germany,” Wall Street Journal, Janu‐ ary 6, 2016, available at rise‐in‐asylum‐seekers‐to‐postwar‐high‐ http://www.wsj.com/articles/germany‐records‐ 1452081246. 70

A Response to my Critics Georg Menz, Goldsmiths College, University of London, [email protected]

In July 2016, heavily armed German police Facebook, Twitter, and the Amadeo Antonio units conducted dawn raids on more than 56 Foundation, co‐sponsored and financed by the apartments and houses nationwide. What was German Ministry of Justice, any on‐line state‐ the aim of this mission? To crack down on ment containing “xenophobic prejudices” radical Muslim Salafists? To take concerted might be construed to constitute such hate action against German‐based Islamic State speech (Bundesministerium für Justiz 2015). (IS) supporters, following the recent flurry of In time‐tested ways no doubt honed while in Muslim terrorist attacks, including a thwarted the employ of the Staatssicherheit, the authors one in Dusseldorf? To bring to justice the never define this term in any detail. Thus, more than 1’000 perpetrators of the flurry of “hate speech” is so loosely constructed as to mass rape and sexual abuse carried out in encompass almost any statement mildly skep‐ front of the Cologne cathedral and in cities tical of the benefits of immigration. Just like in throughout Germany over New Year’s Eve the old days, individual citizens may also re‐ 2015? To deport a fraction of those 99.6 per‐ port on other individuals. cent of Albanians who fraudulently submitted applications for political asylum last year? Three cheers for American‐based publica‐ tions and the US tradition of free speech! No, none of these things, of course. The tar‐ While the increasingly totalitarian police state gets were Germans accused of engaging in methods with which the Merkel government and promulgating so‐called “hate speech” on is squashing political dissent might be partic‐ the internet, primarily via social network ularly worrying behind the backdrop of 20th sites. The policing of these websites, including century German history, there is nothing notably Facebook, is now carried out by a task uniquely German about the combination of force commissioned by the German Ministry open border policies and stepped up police of Justice. Operational input is provided by a surveillance. Eight months after the Muslim hard‐left non‐governmental organization mass slaughter of French civilians in a Paris called Amadeo Antonio Foundation. Director nightclub, accompanied by gruesome acts of Anetta Kahane is well versed in the art of torture and disembowelment of the corpses, maintaining social order and ensuring that France remains in a state of emergency. Heav‐ the proles do not take bourgeois flim‐flam like ily armed special forces are now a quotidian that old freedom of speech thing too far or too feature of Parisian life. Open borders and mul‐ literally. She acquired this expertise in her ticulturalism come at a price. function as a long‐standing informer to East Germany’s notorious secret police, the State One such price is not just freedom of speech, Security Service (Stasi). but yet another basic civil liberty– freedom of press. Consider the latest Muslim terrorist Welcome to Angela Merkel’s Germany. attack in July 2016 in Nice, this one, for a Cathryn Costello is worried about Europe’s change, not involving Arab IS operatives who “turn to darkness”. Germany has already tak‐ had entered Europe as “refugees”. The perpe‐ en that turn. Under the terms of the “Online trator in Nice was a Tunisian immigrant who Civil Courage Initiative”, bringing together had entered France legally in 2005. Within 71

hours of the mass murder of 88 civilians, the words are an epitome of arrogance and signal dominant tag line used in English‐speaking complete detachment from reality. news reports was one of a “truck attack”. The fact that the perpetrator was Muslim and was The rest, for now, at least, is history. Between inspired by racial and religious hatred clearly 2014 and 2015, the number of apprehended did not fit a certain narrative. Similar subter‐ criminal foreign nationals in Germany has fuge prevailed in the news coverage of the risen from 617’392 to 911’864 or 38.49 per‐ deadliest terrorist attack on US soil since cent of the total (BMI 2015: 44). Extrapolating 9/11, the mass murder of more than 50 main‐ from local German media coverage, 2016 will ly homosexual revellers of a night club in Or‐ probably see new sad record levels of crime lando, Florida. Much of the media coverage being reached, especially regarding rape and attempted to downplay the IS inspiration and sexual abuse. An estimated 300’000 to the Muslim identity of the perpetrator, son of 500’000 immigrants have absconded alto‐ Afghan immigrants Omar Mateen. gether from their hostels. Cathryn Costello tellingly does not recount any heart‐warming In a scenario not unlike the emotional anec‐ anecdotes involving encounters with the mass dote recounted by Cathryn Costello, Chancel‐ of surly, aggressive, and footloose young lor Angela Merkel interacted with a young males of military age loitering around German Palestinian girl at a visit to a high school in public squares and train stations these days. July 2015. The girl’s family had entered Ger‐ Perhaps she was wise to avoid any such en‐ many illegally four years earlier, their applica‐ counters. Two of the Cologne assailants, both tion for political asylum had been refused, and of whom had entered the country as asylum they were poised for deportation. Merkel ex‐ seekers from Iraq and Algeria respectively, plained to the tearful child: “…you are an in‐ have just received suspended sentences (Der credibly sympathetic human, but as you know Spiegel July 7, 2016). They were last seen for yourself, in the Palestinian refugee camps leaving the court room cheering and flashing in Lebanon there are thousands and thou‐ the victory sign. And why not? The message sands, and if we now say ‘you can all come, sent by the court was unambiguous enough. and you can all come from Africa, and you can Considering the regional ministry of interior all come’ – that, we simply cannot manage affairs heavily leaned on two beat cops to that.” (The last segment reads in the original have any reference to “rape” removed from a German: “das, das können wir auch nicht police report of the events of that fateful night schaffen.”) (transcription in FAZ July 16, (Die Welt May 2, 2016), it is surprising that 2015). Within days, she seemed to regret her any legal action was taken at all. words. Within weeks, a chancellor previously known for her detached and rational ap‐ De gustibus non est disputandum. Merkel’s proach to policy‐making personally inter‐ catastrophic migration fiasco has attracted vened to stop her Minister of Interior Affairs much applause from the liberal kommentari‐ who was about to second armed police units at. Some of the responses to my initial sub‐ to the German‐Austrian border based on reli‐ mission mirror this bizarre fascination. Sadly, able reports of mass migration movements too much migration scholarship is tainted by via the Balkans. Within months, she reversed an uncritical and cheer‐leading ideological her statement entirely, to the better known vantage point regarding immigration, multi‐ and often cited “Wir schaffen das”. These culturalism, and diversity. Take the example 72

of Crul et al. (2012). Commissioned and fi‐ cites in fact sustain these points. While there nanced by European Commission funding, the may well be variation across country lines, as authors do little to disguise their extreme pro‐ one would expect from 28 very different migration bias. All too rare are those voices countries, the broader point stands: Elites pointing to poor integration without instantly that embrace pro‐migration ideology are woe‐ blaming the host society. Rarely do we en‐ fully out of touch with the much more scepti‐ counter in‐depth studies concerning the cal masses. Shunned by mainstream parties, emergence of “parallel societies”, which are a many voters worried about migration, its truly dangerous outcome of the failed multi‐ pressures and dangers are turning to the Far cultural and identity politics the Left still Right. All too commonly demonized as bigots cherishes. Excessive immigration levels and a and racists for voicing legitimate concerns, misguided approach to integration have cre‐ these voters drive the electoral success of the ated safe havens for criminals and Islam‐ French National Front, the Dutch PVV and the inspired hatred, violence and terrorism. Large German AfD, to name but a few examples. parts of Birmingham, East London, Duisburg, Immigration certainly played a role in the south central Berlin, and many of the French Brexit vote. Even supporters of EU‐level im‐ suburbs of major cities have become breeding migration policy may not support the particu‐ grounds for terrorism, anti‐Semitism, sexual lar political tack that current and future EU violence, and subpar educational achieve‐ policy is taking. Those expressing their assent ments. Much of the existent social science might have effective border protection and research tells us little about these problems, defense in mind, as opposed to the current proffers no solution and would rather not practice of Frontex ships aiding and abetting even acknowledge them. traffickers in helping bring more unwanted immigrants to Europe. Kelly Greenhill’s response seemed to miss the point of many of my arguments. Nowhere did To many on the political Left, there is no dif‐ I claim that senior European Union officials ference between being anti‐immigration and are naïve. Their advocacy for mass immigra‐ anti‐immigrant. And to many of those in the tion is a matter of public record. While Com‐ reality‐based community, there is no real dif‐ mission initiatives have been routinely wa‐ ference in practice (though not in law) be‐ tered down by member states in the process tween asylum seekers and illegal immigrants. of policymaking, as I documented elsewhere If on this occasion I, too, use the latter two (Menz 2009), this does not take away from terms interchangeably, I do so not out of igno‐ the point of enduring and pervasive bias on rance. Because of the Dublin Convention and the part of the Commission. Greenhill at‐ the burden it places on the first countries of tempts to refute my assertions by reviewing entry, not a single asylum seeker has reached the source material at length. Yet she seems to Germany legally in recent years. Morally, the miss the bigger point: Both Timmermans and Muslim countries of the Middle East and the Schulz are attempting to talk something into Persian Gulf would be a much more logical existence that most Europeans reject alto‐ safe haven. Yet Saudi‐Arabia has not accepted gether. Most Europeans object to their coun‐ a single Syrian refugee. Even where refuge is tries being considered countries of immigra‐ offered, many illegal immigrants shun such tion. Most Europeans object to so‐called hospitality for the more enticing financial “diversity”. The opinion poll data Greenhill rewards that await in northern Europe. The 73

photograph of the tragic death of a Syrian boy forts by well‐organized and well‐connected off the Turkish coast shocked many and was hard left activists. The German Ministry of cynically exploited by the pro‐migration lob‐ Family Affairs (sic) has just raised the budget by. Yet his family had legal status in Turkey for funding extremist Far Left political groups and no reason to embark on a hazardous to 50.5 million Euros annually. In 2014, the journey to Europe. ministry abolished the previous requirement for recipient groups to pledge allegiance to Many illegal immigrants are far from impov‐ the German constitution. This opens up ample erished and are wilfully cooperating with or‐ political space for funding the pro‐ ganized crime gangs and traffickers to secure immigration advocacy industry. passage to Europe. Pakistanis, Albanians, Rus‐ sians and Nigerians, three nationalities prom‐ Successful applicants for political asylum or‐ inently represented amongst the asylum dinarily receive permanent residence rights seekers in Germany, are clearly largely not after three years of residence. It seems plain fleeing political persecution. Their low recog‐ churlish to deny that left‐wing parties are nition rates as asylum seekers reflect the eyeing up this group as potential future vot‐ large‐scale abuse: 7.3 percent for Pakistan, 0.4 ers, as Greenhill endeavors to do. In fact, ex‐ for Albania, 5.1 for Russia, and 9.5 for Nigeria trapolating from evidence of past waves of (Statista 2016). While Costello mentions the migration, this seems fairly likely. new legal mechanisms for quickly rejecting claims by nationals of Serbia and Kosovo, While the role of business in clamoring for from whence opportunistic applications more liberal immigration provisions is hard abound, sadly she omits the politics under‐ to exaggerate (Menz 2009), it is interesting to girding this decision. It was politically ex‐ note how quickly the meme according to tremely difficult to secure this measure. Since which “Germany needs skilled migrants” has then, the political hard Left, especially the been mothballed. Sometimes, reality bites. In Green Party, has successfully torpedoed at‐ the autumn of 2015, CEOs of both Daimler tempts to declare Tunisia, Morocco, and Alge‐ Benz and VW made lofty declarations of sup‐ ria as “safe countries”, which would permit port for Merkel’s Open Door policy. Daimler swift deportations. Benz CEO Zetsche claimed that “refugees” would provide the “basis for the next German Some of my detractors have an unwarranted economic miracle”. By summer 2016, it faith in the integrity of the German asylum emerged that neither company had hired a system. Only 44 percent of the unsuccessful single refugee. Germany’s top 30 stock market asylum seekers of 2014 had actually left the listed companies had employed 54 of the 1.3 country by late 2015, according to research million immigrants. 50 of them were hired by conducted by the political party Die Linke. partially state owned Deutsche Post (FAZ July Many German Länder do not deport during 4, 2016). German economic research institute the winter. The states of Bremen and Berlin, IFW estimates that future annual expenditure both governed by the Left, deported a mere 6 for the unwanted newcomers will cost 25 to percent of unsuccessful applicants in 2014 55 billion Euros annually, depending on the and 2015 (Der Tagesspiegel February 28, volume of future asylum seekers and the suc‐ 2016). Police officers seeking to carry out cess rate of deportations (IFW 2016). If even a deportations are often frustrated in their ef‐ fraction of this expenditure were to be spent 74

on the reintegration into the work force of opposed to de facto collaboration with traf‐ elderly workers, women, existing ethnic mi‐ fickers as well as fast track deportation for norities or those unemployed, major break‐ manifestly unfounded applicants and appli‐ throughs in improving social cohesion could cants from safe countries would ease the bur‐ have been achieved instead. For a country den. Rather than punishing countries unwill‐ with an ageing infrastructure, significant hid‐ ing to accept aggressive young Muslim den unemployment, low birth rates, and a immigrants, the Commission could provide long record of austerity to squander billions leadership in helping Mediterranean coun‐ on attempting to integrate often illiterate and tries protect their borders and deport unde‐ undereducated Afghans is an extraordinarily sirables speedily. Non‐refoulement does not poor policy choice. mean “rescuing” illegal immigrants in interna‐ tional waters. The fair weather construct that Germans are rightfully wary of their govern‐ is Schengen has collapsed under pressure and ment. The police state measures now taken will probably have to be abandoned perma‐ against alleged right wing extremists, or, nently. There are serious dark clouds on the more accurately, any critic of the Merkel gov‐ horizon. Consider that in 2012, the United ernment, suggest that even inside the Berlin Nations had to revise their assessment of total bubble the realization is dawning just how fertility rates (TFR) for much of sub‐Saharan unpopular Merkel’s criminal actions really Africa upwards. With the exception of South are. The Commission’s doubling down on Africa, all of the region has TFR projections steaming ahead on the communautarization for 2015‐2020 in excess of 4. In some coun‐ of asylum and immigration suggests no les‐ tries, such as Niger, a woman will have an sons have been learned in Brussels from the average number of 7.5 children. After a lull in Brexit. A densely populated continent with the early 2000s, annual population for all of countries in which 50 percent of the youth are Africa is forecast to be 2.55 percent for 2015‐ unemployed does not need immigrants. And 2020 (UN 2015). This will theoretically lead in a democracy the voices of those rejecting to the continent’s population reaching 3.95 mass migration should count, too, whatever billion inhabitants by 2100. African policy‐ the personal opinions of well‐insulated left‐ makers will struggle to find space, jobs, and wing academicians. food for even a fraction of those. European policymakers would be well‐advised to pro‐ There are alternatives to the Merkel mess, tect their borders sooner, rather than later. of course. Tougher international pressure on the Merkel’s disastrous policy decision can still be wealthy Arab Gulf states would lead to the reversed. Her vision of the future – surveil‐ creation of temporary safe zones for Syrian lance, repression, state‐imposed multicultur‐ bona fide refugees. Mass deportations of ille‐ alism, open door mass migration – is terrify‐ gal immigrants and failed asylum seekers ing and dystopian. In the minds of many of from Europe are long overdue. Given the US Merkel’s sycophants, these policies somehow responsibility for creating the messy political project an image of a new Germany, one that situation in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq, a lead is “tolerant” and “open”. But most Europeans role played by the US in this respect would disagree. All they see is a new form of bullying behove Washington quite well. Tougher and ‐ this one using the language of pseudo‐ meaningful border protection by Frontex as humanitarianism. However well‐intended, the 75

disastrous consequences of throwing billions FAZ (July 16, 2015) “Die Kanzlerin und das wei‐ at unvetted, illegal, unwanted, and non‐ nende Flüchtlingsmädchen” FAZ (July 4, 2016) “Dax‐Konzerne stellen nur 54 integratable immigrants are hard to deny. Flüchtlinge ein” Whatever Viktor Orban’s failings, it is hard to IFW (2015) “Simulation von Flüchtlingskosten bis see how securing Hungarian public safety by 2022: Langfristig bis zu 55 Mrd Euro jährlich”, enforcing Hungarian and European law is available at: https://www.ifw‐ kiel.de/medien/medieninformationen/2015/si morally reprehensible. The hang‐over follow‐ mulation‐von‐fluchtlingskosten‐bis‐2022‐ ing Merkel’s excesses is kicking in. The top‐ langfristig‐bis‐zu‐55‐mrd‐20ac‐jahrlich down attempt to engineer a “welcoming cul‐ Menz, Georg (2009) The Political Economy of Man‐ ture” by government fiat has predictably aged Migration, Oxford: Oxford University Press. failed. Nobody is throwing flowers and teddy Der Spiegel (July 7, 2016) “Kölner Sylvesternacht: bears at the floods of illegal immigrants any‐ Zwei Täter wegen Sexualdelikten zu Bewäh‐ more. It is high time for common sense to rungsstrafen verurteilt” Statista 2016 “Gesamtschutzquote der Asylbewer‐ prevail. There is nothing odd about self‐ ber aus den Hauptherkunftsländern in defense. It is high time to close the border ‐ Deutschland im Jahr 2016”, available at and enforce the closure. http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/ 451967/umfrage/anerkennungsquote‐der‐ asylbewerber‐aus‐den‐ References hauptherkunftslaendern/ BMI‐ Bundesministerium des Inneren (2015) “Po‐ Der Tagesspiegel (Feburary 26, 2016) “Asylbewer‐ lizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 2015” ber gehen auch ohne Abschiebung” Bundesministerium für Justiz (2015) “Taskforce UN (2015) UN Department of Economic and Social Ergebnispapier: Together against hate Speech”, Affairs, Population Division, World Population available at: Prospects, the 2015 Revision, available at: http://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/ /Artikel/12152015_TaskForceErgebnispapier_ Die Welt (May 2, 2016) “Wer wollte, dass “Verge‐ eng.pdf;jsessionid=2BD574E46C2487A5551AE waltigung” nicht auftauchte?” 21C98965BDD.1_cid324?__blob=publicationFil e&v=2 Crul,M J Schneider & F Lelie (2012) (eds) “The European Second Generation Compared – Does the Integration Context Matter?” Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam.

76

Research Institute Profile: Maastricht Centre for Citizenship Migration and Development (MACIMIDE)

Costica Dumbrava, Maastricht University, [email protected] Maarten P. Vink, Maastricht University, [email protected]

The Maastricht Centre for Citizenship Migration and Development (MACIMIDE) is the interdis‐ ciplinary research centre of Maastricht Univer‐ sity that brings together scholars working in the fields of migration, mobility, asylum, citi‐ zenship, integration, transnationalism, devel‐ opment and family life. MACIMIDE was set up in 2013 after receiving a seed‐funding grant of €1 million from the Executive Board of Maas‐ tricht University. The Centre combines various research lines across four Faculties (Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Faculty of Humanities contexts that affect behaviour. The research is and Sciences, Faculty of Law and School of organised along four thematic perspectives. Business and Economics). The Centre is cur‐ Each research theme has a leader who is in rently co‐directed by René de Groot and Maar‐ charge of ensuring that the research projects ten Vink, who are joined from 1 September by cross‐link within the themes as well as across Melissa Siegel. There are currently more than the themes. 120 senior and junior researchers affiliated to MACIMIDE. Costica Dumbrava is MACIMIDE’s The research theme of Migration and Devel‐ current Executive Coordinator. opment, led by Melissa Siegel, focuses on the dynamic relations between receiving and send‐ MACIMIDE’s research programme focuses on ing countries. While most research in the past how cross‐border mobility offers opportunities was directed towards the determinants of emi‐ and poses challenges for individuals and their gration and the problems of integration of im‐ families, as well as for economies and societies migrants, this research group emphasises that at large, both in the origin and destination effects go both ways not only in financial and countries. The programme is characterised by knowledge streams (remittances) but also by three key elements: a) an interdisciplinary transferring and transforming societies across perspective—it combines approaches and borders. Among the research projects devel‐ methodologies from law, political science, an‐ oped in this theme are the IS Academy project thropology, sociology, economics, and cultural on Migration and Development sponsored by studies; b) a multi‐sited approach—it takes a the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as transnational approach to migration paying projects on migration and health, on diasporas attention to developments in both sending and and peace (focusing on the engagement of the receiving countries; and c) an integrated Syrian diaspora in the contemporary conflict), view—it combines macro‐, meso‐, and micro‐ migration and multi‐dimensional poverty, to perspectives analysing both micro‐level behav‐ name just a few examples. iour as well as the family networks and societal 77

Hildegard Schneider leads the research theme effects of migration. A key characteristic is the of Cross‐border Mobility, which focuses on the use of transnational networks as the unit of European perspective of migration and asylum, analysis, giving equal emphasis to migrants specifically on people who live and work in and the people they are tied to, forming a border regions and the gap between applicable transnational network. Key projects within this legal rules and the reality they are confronted theme have focused on the effects of transna‐ with in their daily lives. Even if the free move‐ tional child raising arrangements on life‐ ment of persons and the right to work in a dif‐ chances of children, migrant parents and care‐ ferent Member State of the EU is considered as givers between Africa and Europe, as well as being a fundamental right linked to EU citizen‐ good governance in international child trans‐ ship, problems created by mobility can be felt fer. on a daily basis. These problems can be caused e.g. by differences in education standards and Maarten Vink leads the research of Citizenship grants for students as well as the difficulties to and Immigrant Integration theme, which fo‐ recognize foreign qualifications, but also dif‐ cuses on the role of citizenship in the two‐way ferent social security, pensions and tax process in which newcomers and host societies schemes, family law and inheritance legislation work together to build a cohesive community. as well as nationality matters can make the Successful integration, broadly defined, relates daily life of a migrant worker enormously diffi‐ to a range of issues, such as access to rights, cult and often financially unattractive. These educational performance, labour market per‐ obstacles are even more evident for non‐EU formance, residential conditions, among oth‐ citizens who seek to study, work or provide ers. Aiming to consolidate and intensify exist‐ services in the EU or who enter the territory of ing inter‐faculty collaboration, UM researchers a Member State as a refugee or asylum seeker. within this research theme analyse the links Some of the projects included within this between citizenship and immigrant integration theme focus on, for example, EU asylum law, from a comparative and interdisciplinary per‐ conflicting coordination rules in the case of spective, using approaches from law, sociology, cross‐border employment, and marital captiv‐ politics and economics. Researchers within this ity. theme also cooperate closely with the Europe‐ an Union Democracy Observatory on Citizen‐ The projects under the research theme of ship (EUDO CITIZENSHIP) of which Maastricht Transnational Families, led by Valentina Maz‐ University was a founding consortium partner zucato, examine the legal, cultural, social and and which is currently co‐directed by Maarten economic issues that families and their mem‐ Vink. Key projects are, among others, a study bers face in the context of international migra‐ on the relation between immigrant naturaliza‐ tion. This research group focuses on how fami‐ tion and socio‐economic outcomes (analysing lies operate across borders: the ties that are data from the Dutch population register), the maintained, forged and transformed, the MACIMIDE Global Expatriate Dual Citizenship changes in social customs that this engenders Database (covering dual citizenship rules in and the effects it has for migrants as well as for nearly all countries of the world since 1960), the people who stay in the country of origin. It as well as a project on protection against state‐ investigates the social relationships that un‐ lessness in Europe (in cooperation with the derlie the sending and receiving of remittances UNHCR Stateless Unit). by including the non‐monetary, socio‐cultural 78

MACIMIDE researchers are engaged in many and Social Sciences, the Migration Seminars of international projects and within established the UNU‐Merit/Maastricht Graduate School of research networks in the areas of migration, Governance, and the Nationality Law Work‐ citizenship and development. In 2014 the MAC‐ shop of the Faculty of Law. While organised IMIDE was accepted as full member of the within these faculties, presenters and partici‐ IMISCOE—Europe's largest interdisciplinary pants are drawn from across the various re‐ research network in the field of migration, in‐ search themes and faculties. tegration and diversity studies. Maarten Vink currently represents MACIMIDE in the IMIS‐ Maastricht University and MACIMIDE have COE Board of Directors and is one of the coor‐ developed substantial expertise in the area of dinators of the IMISCOE Standing Committee migration studies and currently offer general on Migration, Citizenship and Political Partici‐ and specialised courses at bachelor’s, masters’ pation (together with Jean‐Michel Lafleur and and PhD level. The Maastricht Graduate School Marco Martiniello of Liege University). Another of Governance together with UNU Merit offer a IMISCOE Standing Committee, on Interactions joint MSc in Public Policy and Human Devel‐ of Migrant Integration and Transnationalism in opment with a specialisation track in Migration Europe, is chaired by MACIMIDE’s Özge Bilgili. Studies. The Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences In 2015 MACIMIDE researchers were among offer MA and BA (Minor) programmes in Glob‐ the founders of the Institute for Transnational alisation and Development focusing on how and Euregional Cross Border Cooperation and globalisation dynamics affect developing areas, Mobility (ITEM), which seeks to contribute to especially the Global South. This Faculty also the promotion of cross‐border mobility and the offers a MA in European Studies that focuses removal of obstacles to mobility. This project on multi‐level governance in European and was initiated among others by the (Dutch) broader context, including in the area of inter‐ province of Limburg, the city of Maastricht and national migration. The Faculty of Law offers a the Meuse‐Rhine Euregion. In 2016 two MAC‐ LLM in European Law, which provides in‐ IMIDE researchers were awarded prestigious depth legal training in European and compara‐ Consolidator Grants from the European Re‐ tive law as well as in migration law and asy‐ search Council for projects on “Mobility trajec‐ lum. tories of young lives” (Valentina Mazzucato) and “Migrant life course and legal status transi‐ Finally, MACIMIDE is very happy to welcome tion” (Maarten Vink). visitors and currently has two visiting fellow‐ ship schemes through which it provides junior MACIMIDE organises regularly conferences, and senior researchers opportunities to con‐ panels and workshops. In April 2014 MAC‐ duct research and engage in collaborative work IMIDE organised a two‐day kick‐off conference along the four MACIMIDE research themes. For and PhD Workshop, together with the Dutch more information about MACIMIDE research, Association for Migration Research (DAMR). people, study opportunities, publications and Özge Bilgili is the current chairman of DAMR. events please visit the MACIMIDE website at: MACIMIDE integrates several research seminar https://macimide.maastrichtuniversity.nl. series running at Maastricht Universities, such If you are interested in our events, don’t forget as the Globalisation, Transnationalism and to sign up for our bi‐weekly newsletter. Development Colloquia at the Faculty of Arts

79

Mentoring Matters: Tips for Building Productive Mentoring Relationships for Migration and Citizenship Scholars

Irene Bloemraad, University of California, Berkeley, [email protected] Els de Graauw, Baruch College, the City University of New York, [email protected] Rebecca Hamlin, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, [email protected]

Developing and maintaining productive men‐ toring relationships is daunting for political scientists in any subfield, but the highly inter‐ disciplinary nature of migration and citizen‐ ship studies poses unique challenges.1 Political scientists in this subfield regularly work in conversation with scholars in other disciplines. For example, two recent National Academies committees, tasked with reporting on immigra‐ Berkeley and Bloemraad a new junior faculty tion and integration in the United States, in‐ member in sociology. Now that we are all facul‐ cluded twelve sociologists, eleven economists, ty members, we reflect on the lessons learned two political scientists/public affairs scholars, from both receiving and providing mentorship. two demographers, one geographer, one social We offer tips for students and faculty in three work scholar, one public health scholar, one distinct but related areas: acquiring scholarly anthropologist, and one lawyer.2 Yet getting a expertise, publishing, and networking. We job and tenure in political science often re‐ want to help other scholars build productive quires proving one’s disciplinary skills and mentoring relationships to take advantage of expertise. What are productive strategies for the disciplinary diversity of migration and citi‐ capitalizing on interdisciplinarity for political zenship studies. scientists seeking and providing mentorship in the field of migration and citizenship? Acquiring Scholarly Expertise Because migration and citizenship expertise is Our mentoring relationship began over a dec‐ found in a range of disciplines, students need ade ago, when de Graauw and Hamlin were to develop learning strategies early on to tap political science graduate students at UC into this rich interdisciplinary scholarship. Students should consider classes in other de‐ partments and need to read outside the stand‐ 1 Authors are listed in alphabetical order. ard texts in political science. In turn, faculty 2 The Committee on Integration of Immigrants into teaching migration and citizenship classes can American Society released its report on 21 Septem‐ ber 2015; see encourage interdisciplinary conversations by http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/ne opening up their courses open to students in wsitem.aspx?RecordID=21746. The Committee on different departments and assigning texts from the Economic and Fiscal Impact of Immigration will a range of disciplines. release its report later in 2016; see http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/Committe eView.aspx?key=49595. 80

Interdisciplinary campus workshops can be cal Association annual meeting in San Francis‐ particularly useful tools for connecting stu‐ co. This conference included sessions that pur‐ dents and faculty across departments. Hamlin posely assigned a mix of senior faculty and and de Graauw both benefitted enormously junior scholars, both graduate students and from participating in the Interdisciplinary Im‐ pre‐tenure faculty, to one of two dozen migration Workshop that Bloemraad started at roundtables. Similarly, de Graauw helped to UC Berkeley in 2003. The workshop is de‐ organize a half‐day short course on “Methods, signed to foster exchanges about migration and Data, and the Study of Migration and Citizen‐ citizenship research among students and facul‐ ship” ahead of the 2014 APSA meeting in ty from across campus by sharing work‐in‐ Washington, DC. The reception after the work‐ progress, bringing in visitors, and occasionally shop provided valuable networking opportuni‐ talking about professionalization, such as jour‐ ties. nal publishing. If no such workshop exists, stu‐ dents can create a reading or working group Students can further acquire interdisciplinary with peers in other disciplines to support each expertise by working as a research or teaching other. The Immigration Working Group at the assistant with faculty outside their home de‐ CUNY Graduate Center, created in 2009, is an partment. As grad students at UC Berkeley, de example. A student‐led reading or working Graauw and Hamlin both worked as course group should have regularly scheduled meet‐ graders for American Studies courses, and de ings and be based on strong reciprocity norms, Graauw was a TA for a Geography course. de with members committed to reading each oth‐ Graauw and Hamlin also worked as RAs for ers work and sharing knowledge of literatures Bloemraad on her “Immigrant Civic Engage‐ and debates in their respective disciplines. ment Project.” These positions exposed them to different literatures, teaching techniques, Students can further build expertise by partici‐ and research methodologies, and let them pating in interdisciplinary conferences that work under the supervision of an experienced draw migration and citizenship experts from scholar who later co‐authored with them and across the United States and beyond. These supported their academic job searches. de include, for instance, the annual meetings of Graauw in turn has advertised her RA positions the Law and Society Association, Urban Affairs widely and now works with undergraduate Association, Social Science History Association, and graduate RAs from political science, soci‐ Latin American Studies Association, and Inter‐ ology, and public policy. Hamlin uses RAs from national Studies Association, as well as special‐ legal studies and communication. RAs from ized conferences such as PRIEC (Politics of different disciplinary backgrounds bring valu‐ Race, Immigration, and Ethnicity Consortium) able new perspectives to a research project. and SPIRE (Symposium on the Politics of Im‐ migration, Race, and Ethnicity), which hold Publishing regular meetings on different university cam‐ Mentorship in publishing is critically important puses across the United States. for political science students and junior faculty Students and faculty can also organize their doing research on migration and citizenship. own conferences. Bloemraad helped organize Some of the top migration and citizenship the “Making Connections” conference on mi‐ journals are interdisciplinary, including the gration, a full‐day event on the UC Berkeley International Migration Review and the Journal campus ahead of the 2009 American Sociologi‐ of Ethnic and Migration Studies. Most of these 81

journals’ authors and readers are not political too. If a mentor is from another discipline, a scientists; junior scholars who want migration junior scholar can combine her or his research and citizenship experts to read and engage with the mentor’s work to develop an article with their work need to be able to write for with a unique argument or new comparative such audiences. Fellow political scientists, in‐ contribution. That is how de Graauw, Shannon cluding those who will review grad students’ Gleeson (another of Bloemraad’s former grad job applications or tenure files down the line, students), and Bloemraad developed an article might not know, however, about the status or on immigrant organizations that was published impact of such journals and perhaps even in the American Journal of Sociology in 2013. Or question the authors’ stripes as true political grad students can work with their mentor by scientists if they publish in non‐political sci‐ combining their data with the mentor’s theo‐ ence journals. How can early career scholars rizing to produce new scholarship, as in Matt navigate these conflicting publishing demands, Wright and Bloemraad’s co‐authored and and how can senior scholars help? award‐winning article published in Perspec‐ tives on Politics in 2012. If a grad student Grad students and junior faculty should keep worked as an RA, she or he can ask their men‐ their strongest data for their solo‐authored tor about co‐publishing that research. When book or key articles in political science jour‐ the data are rich enough to allow multiple pub‐ nals. But establishing a reputation in the field lications, first authorship can be rotated among of migration and citizenship studies demands the team, with each member taking the lead on engagement with additional audiences. Early a different article. This is what Bloemraad did career researchers should use portions of their with de Graauw and Hamlin in analyzing data to prepare articles for different audiences newspaper data from her “Immigrant Civic and journals. It can feel daunting to have re‐ Engagement Project.” Early career scholars do viewers evaluate one’s work in interdiscipli‐ need to be cautious, however, in balancing co‐ nary journals, but it often deepens and broad‐ authored work with publications that clearly ens the impact of the work. Indeed, being able establish their independent scholarly voice to show that one’s scholarship has a receptive based on their own original data. audience outside of political science can help build a strong tenure file as colleges and uni‐ Senior faculty can also take advantage of their versities tend to think more broadly about standing in the academy to spearhead a special impact and reputation than departments journal issue or edited volume in which they might. At tenure, it can help to have a few solicit submissions from a mix of academic strong letters from migration and citizenship ranks and disciplines and perhaps invite a grad experts in other disciplines, to demonstrate the student or junior faculty to serve as co‐editor. wide reach of one’s scholarship. Senior schol‐ Examples of these mentoring strategies are the ars who write those letters should clearly spell volumes Civic Hopes and Political Realities (co‐ out the importance of such interdisciplinary edited by Bloemraad and Karthick Ramakrish‐ journals and underscore the professional bene‐ nan, published by the Russell Sage Foundation fits of a wide audience for citations, impact, in 2008) and Unsettled Americans (co‐edited by and influence on academic debates. John Mollenkopf and Manuel Pastor, published by Cornell University Press in 2016). It is im‐ Mentors can help grad students and junior portant to remember, however, that book faculty publish in this interdisciplinary field, chapters are not as prestigious as journal arti‐ 82

cles, especially on the job market and for ten‐ that their accumulated knowledge is not self‐ ure, so grad students and junior faculty need to evident to early career researchers; students be mindful about what aspects of their re‐ and junior scholars should not be afraid to ask search and data to include in edited volumes, for advice. and what they should save for peer‐reviewed journals. Faculty can also include students in their net‐ works by passing on information about rele‐ Networking vant publication, funding, jobs, and service Getting to know the right people with similar opportunities. For example, when junior facul‐ research interests in political science and other ty are interested in serving on the editorial disciplines can be challenging for students who board of a journal that is central to their schol‐ have little name recognition and few contacts. arship, they can ask senior faculty to submit a In contrast, senior faculty often have rich pro‐ recommendation on their behalf. Or when fac‐ fessional networks spanning different disci‐ ulty receive an invitation to contribute to a plines that they can call upon while mentoring special journal issue or an edited volume but students and junior faculty. Doing so is often cannot do it, they can recommend one of their easy, but junior scholars need to recognize students or junior colleagues instead. Both de these opportunities while established scholars Graauw and Hamlin ended up with publication need to remember how helpful these contacts opportunities in this way. Faculty can also in‐ can be. For example, when senior faculty bring vite a student to co‐author and present the co‐ a colleague to campus to give a talk, they can authored research at a conference. Such ar‐ create opportunities for students and junior rangements should always include a frank dis‐ faculty to meet the visitor. They can invite stu‐ cussion of expectations, the division of labor, dents and junior colleagues to the post‐talk and the order of authorship. Whoever contrib‐ dinner, or they can arrange a get‐together be‐ utes the key ideas, analysis, or original data tween the visitor and grad students on campus. should be the lead author and lead presenter, Faculty can also invite grad students to help regardless of rank or position. organize such events. Doing so provides stu‐ dents with opportunities to interact with a Finally, faculty who want to foster mentoring range of scholars whom they may otherwise relationships for students and junior faculty not have a chance to meet. through networking need to keep in mind bar‐ riers or challenges related to gender, race, and Mentoring through networking can also take ethnicity. Women and ethnic/racial minorities place in more casual settings. For example, are notably underrepresented in the academic faculty can meet with grad students and junior ranks of political scientists.3 This fact makes it colleagues over coffee or lunch or while going more difficult for political science students and for a lunchtime walk. Informal get‐togethers junior faculty who are women and eth‐ lend themselves well to talk about research but also a broad range of professionalization topics 3 American Political Science Association. 2005. related to finding a job, applying for a grant, “Women’s Advancement in Political Science: A Re‐ port on the APSA Workshop on the Advancement of developing effective teaching strategies, pub‐ Women in Academic Political Science in the United lishing a book or journal article, and balancing States.” a demanding academic career with a fulfilling http://www.apsanet.org/portals/54/Files/Task%2 personal life. Senior faculty sometimes forget 0Force%20Reports/Womens_Advancement_in_Poli tical_Science_2005.pdf 83

nic/racial minorities to learn from successful mentoring program, as the Sociology of Law role models of similar backgrounds. Senior Section of the American Sociological Associa‐ mentors, especially in a field like migration and tion has done. Here, willing grad student mem‐ citizenship, need to take proactive steps in bers can get teamed up with senior scholar reaching out to students who might not see members, and they set up a regular time to themselves represented in academia. Barriers connect (by phone or email) throughout the of gender and ethnic/racial background may year. Such a longer‐term mentoring relation‐ also make junior scholars more hesitant to ask ship can be rewarding for everyone involved. questions about family‐work balance, fairness and inequity in the academy, or related issues. Cross‐disciplinary mentorship can be an ad‐ vantage here, as networking with senior schol‐ ars in disciplines where women and eth‐ nic/racial minorities are better represented among faculty, such as in sociology, can pro‐ vide female and ethnic/racial minority political scientists with more opportunities for these conversations and for role modeling.4

It is not easy forging an academic career bal‐ ancing the demands of political science with the interdisciplinary nature of migration and citizenship studies. But doing so successfully brings significant rewards in richer research, broader audiences, and a dynamic network of colleagues passionate about similar topics. A diverse set of mentorship strategies can make this a win‐win opportunity for junior and sen‐ ior scholars.

Of course, our Section can play a role in foster‐ ing mentoring relationships, including those crossing disciplines. Just like APSA has been doing for grad students who are new to APSA, our Section can organize a mentoring lunch during the annual meeting to connect grad students with senior migration and citizenship scholars. The Section can also develop its own

4 Paula England, Chair, Committee on the Status of Women, American Sociological Association. 2009. “Final Report of the Committee on the Status of Women.” http://www.asanet.org/documents/ASA/pdfs/com mittee_on_women.pdf 84

Section News: January – June 2016 in Brief – Books, Journal Articles, Member News

Books Bulmer, Martin, and John Solomos. 2016. Mus‐ lims, migration and citizenship. Processes of inclusion and exclusion. Ethnic and racial Alarcón, Rafael, Luis Escala‐Rabadan, Olga studies. Basingstoke: Taylor & Francis Ltd. Odgers, Dick Cluster, and Roger D. Walding‐

er. 2016. Making Los Angeles home: The inte‐ Carlarne, Cinnamon P., Kevin R. Gray, and Rich‐ gration of Mexican immigrants in the United ard Tarasofsky. 2016. The Oxford handbook States. English‐language edition. Oakland, of international climate change law. First edi‐ California: University of California Press. tion. Oxford Handbooks. Oxford, United

Kingdom: Oxford University Press. Ambrosetti, Elena, Donatella Strangio, and

Catherine Wihtol de Wenden. 2016. Migra‐ Chávez, Sergio R. 2016. Border lives: Fronteri‐ tion in the Mediterranean: Socio‐economic zos, transnational migrants, and commuters perspectives. Abingdon, Oxon, New York, NY: in Tijuana. New York, NY: Oxford University Routledge. Press.

Aspinall, Peter J., and Martha J. Chinouya. 2016. Chin, Esther. 2016. Migration, media, and glob‐ The African Diaspora Population in Britain: al‐local spaces. Palgrave Macmillan series in Migrant Identities and Experiences. Migra‐ international political communication. tion, Diasporas and Citizenship. London: Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New Palgrave Macmillan UK. York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Besharov, Douglas J., and Mark H. López. 2016. de Graauw, Els. 2016. Making Immigrant Rights Adjusting to a world in motion: Trends in Real: Nonprofits and the Politics of Integra‐ global migration and migration policy. Inter‐ tion in San Francisco. Ithaca: Cornell Univer‐ national policy exchange series. Oxford, New sity Press. York: Oxford University Press.

Dettlaff, Alan J., and Rowena Fong. 2016. Immi‐ Bhabha, Jacqueline. 2016. Child Migration and grant and refugee children and families: Cul‐ Human Rights in a Global Age. Human Rights turally responsive practice. New York: Co‐ and Crimes Against Humanity. Princeton. NJ: lumbia University Press. Princeton University Press.

Ehrenreich, John. 2016. Third wave capitalism: Bilgrami, Akeel. 2016. Beyond the secular West. How money, power, and the pursuit of self‐ Religion, culture, and public life. New York: interest have imperiled the American dream. Columbia University Press. Ithaca, London: ILR Press.

Brunnbauer, Ulf. 2016. Globalizing Southeastern Fine, Sarah, and Lea Ypi. 2016. Migration in Europe: Emigrants, America, and the state political theory: The ethics of movement and since the late nineteenth century. Lanham: Lexington Books. 85

membership. First edition. Oxford, United ders and citizenship 6. Abingdon, Oxon, New Kingdom: Oxford University Press. York, NY: Routledge.

Flores, Lori A. 2016. Grounds for dreaming: Mex‐ Longazel, Jamie. 2016. Undocumented fears: ican Americans, Mexican immigrants, and the Immigration and the politics of divide and California farmworker movement. [The La‐ conquer in Hazleton, Pennsylvania. Philadel‐ mar series in Western history]. New Haven: phia: Temple University Press. Yale University Press. Mavroudi, Elizabeth, and Caroline R. Nagel. Freeman, Gary P., and Nikola Mirilovic, eds. 2016. Global migration: Patterns, processes, 2016. Handbook on Migration and Social Pol‐ and policies. Abingdon, Oxon: New York, NY; icy. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publish‐ Routledge. ing. McCarty, Nolan M., Keith T. Poole, and Howard Furman, Rich, and Douglas Epps, eds. 2016. Rosenthal. 2016. Polarized America: The Detaining the immigrant other: Global and dance of ideology and unequal riches. Second transnational issues. Oxford: Oxford Univer‐ edition. Walras‐Pareto lectures. Cambridge, sity Press. MA: MIT Press.

Gerard, Alison. 2016. The securitization of mi‐ Mishra, Sangay K. 2016. Desis divided: The polit‐ gration and refugee women. London: ical lives of South Asian Americans. Minneap‐ Routledge. olis: University of Minnesota Press.

Guo, Shibao. 2016. Work, learning and transna‐ O'Brien, Peter. 2016. The Muslim question in tional migration: Opportunities, challenges Europe: Political controversies and public and debates. London, New York: Routledge. philosophies. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Temple University Press. Harper, Marjory, ed. 2016. Migration and men‐ tal health: Past and present. Mental health in Paschel, Tianna S. 2016. Becoming black politi‐ historical perspective. London, London: Pal‐ cal subjects: Movements and ethno‐racial grave Macmillan. rights in Colombia and Brazil. Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press. Haynes, Amanda. 2016. Public and political dis‐ courses of migration: International perspec‐ Piller, Ingrid. 2016. Language and migration: tives. London, New York: Rowman & Little‐ Critical concepts in linguistics. Milton Park, field. Abingdon, Oxon, New York, NY: Routledge. Köhn, Steffen. 2016. Mediating mobility: Visual anthropology in the age of migration. Lon‐ Portes, Alejandro, Rosa Aparicio, and William don: Wallflower Press. Haller. 2016. Spanish legacies: The coming of age of the second generation. Oakland, Cali‐ Light, Matthew. 2016. Fragile migration rights: fornia: University of California Press. Freedom of movement in post‐Soviet Russia. Routledge studies in criminal justice, bor‐ Provine, Doris M., Monica Varsanyi, Paul G. Lewis, and Scott H. Decker. 2016. Policing 86

immigrants: Local law enforcement on the Vieira, Kate. 2016. American by paper: How doc‐ front lines. The Chicago series in law and so‐ uments matter in immigrant literacy. Minne‐ ciety. Chicago: The University of Chicago apolis, London: University of Minnesota Press. Press.

Scott, Felicity D. E. 2016. Outlaw territories: Weatherill, Stephen. 2016. Law and values in Environments of insecurity/architectures of the European Union. 1st edition. Clarendon counterinsurgency. New York, Zone Books. law series. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Shields, Juliet. 2016. Nation and migration: The making of British Atlantic literature, 1765‐ Wiest, Karin. 2016. Women and migration in 1835. New York, NY: Oxford University rural Europe: Labour markets, representa‐ Press. tions and policies. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmil‐ Silva, Kumarini. 2016. Brown threat: Identifica‐ lan. tion in the security state. Minneapolis: Uni‐ versity of Minnesota Press. Yılmaz, Ferruh. 2016. How the Workers Became Muslims: Immigration, Culture, and Hege‐ Suzuki, Kazuko. 2016. Divided fates: The state, monic Transformation in Europe. Ann Arbor: race, and Korean immigrants' adaptation in University of Michigan Press. Japan and the United States. Lanham: Lexing‐ ton Books.

Journal Articles

American Behavioral Scientist Terror Bombings.” American Behavioral Sci‐ Boyd, Monica, and Siyue Tian. 2016. “Educa‐ entist. doi:10.1177/0002764216643127. tional and Labor Market Attainments of the Fong, Eric, and Jing Shen. 2016. “Participation 1.5‐ and Second‐Generation Children of East in Voluntary Associations and Social Con‐ Asian Immigrants in Canada.” American Be‐ tact of Immigrants in Canada.” American Be‐ havioral Scientist 60 (5‐6): 705–29. havioral Scientist 60 (5‐6): 617–36. doi:10.1177/0002764216632830. doi:10.1177/0002764216632833. Choi, Susanne Y. P. 2016. “Gendered Pragma‐ Fong, Eric, Maykel Verkuyten, and Susanne Y. tism and Subaltern Masculinity in China: P. Choi. 2016. “Migration and Identity: Per‐ Peasant Men’s Responses to Their Wives’ spectives From Asia, Europe, and North Labor Migration.” American Behavioral Sci‐ America.” American Behavioral Scientist 60 entist 60 (5‐6): 565–82. (5‐6): 559–64. doi:10.1177/0002764216632832. doi:10.1177/0002764216632845. Edling, Christofer, Jens Rydgren, and Rickard Garip, Filiz, and Asad L. Asad. 2016. “Network Sandell. 2016. “Terrorism, Belief Formation, Effects in Mexico–U.S. Migration: Disentan‐ and Residential Integration: Population Dy‐ gling the Underlying Social Mechanisms.” namics in the Aftermath of the 2004 Madrid American Behavioral Scientist. doi:10.1177/0002764216643131.

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Gee, Gilbert C., Brittany N. Morey, Katrina M. Scientist 60 (5‐6): 637–58. Walsemann, Annie Ro, and David T. doi:10.1177/0002764216632831. Takeuchi. 2016. “Citizenship as Privilege and Social Identity: Implications for Psycho‐ American Political Science Review logical Distress.” American Behavioral Scien‐ Enos, Ryan D. 2016. “What the Demolition of tist 60 (5‐6): 680–704. Public Housing Teaches Us about the Impact doi:10.1177/0002764216632834. of Racial Threat on Political Behavior.” Jin, Lei. 2016. “Migration, Relative Deprivation, American Journal of Political Science 60 (1): and Psychological Well‐Being in China.” 123–42. doi:10.1111/ajps.12156. American Behavioral Scientist 60 (5‐6): Hersh, Eitan D., and Clayton Nall. 2016. “The 750–70. doi:10.1177/0002764216632826. Primacy of Race in the Geography of In‐ Lancee, Bram. 2016. “The Negative Side Effects come‐Based Voting: New Evidence from of Vocational Education: A Cross‐National Public Voting Records.” American Journal of Analysis of the Relative Unemployment Risk Political Science 60 (2): 289–303. of Young Non‐Western Immigrants in Eu‐ doi:10.1111/ajps.12179. rope.” American Behavioral Scientist 60 (5‐ 6): 659–79. British Journal of Political Science doi:10.1177/0002764216632835. Abou‐Chadi, Tarik. 2016. “Niche Party Success Menjívar, Cecilia. 2016. “Immigrant Criminali‐ and Mainstream Party Policy Shifts – How zation in Law and the Media: Effects on La‐ Green and Radical Right Parties Differ in tino Immigrant Workers’ Identities in Ari‐ Their Impact.” British Journal of Political zona.” American Behavioral Scientist 60 (5‐ Science 46 (02): 417–36. 6): 597–616. doi:10.1017/S0007123414000155. doi:10.1177/0002764216632836. Miller, David. 2016. “Majorities and Minarets: Ngo, Hang‐yue, and Hui Li. 2016. “Cultural Religious Freedom and Public Space.” Brit‐ Identity and Adaptation of Mainland Chi‐ ish Journal of Political Science 46 (02): 437– nese Immigrants in Hong Kong.” American 56. doi:10.1017/S0007123414000131. Behavioral Scientist 60 (5‐6): 730–49. doi:10.1177/0002764216632837. Comparative Political Studies Okamoto, Dina, and Kim Ebert. 2016. “Group Ahmadov, Anar K., and Gwendolyn Sasse. 2016. Boundaries, Immigrant Inclusion, and the “A Voice Despite Exit: The Role of Assimila‐ Politics of Immigrant–Native Relations.” tion, Emigrant Networks, and Destination in American Behavioral Scientist 60 (2): 224– Emigrants’ Transnational Political Engage‐ 50. doi:10.1177/0002764215607580. ment.” Comparative Political Studies 49 (1): Verkuyten, Maykel. 2016. “The Integration 78–114. doi:10.1177/0010414015600468. Paradox: Empiric Evidence From the Neth‐ Helbling, Marc, and Richard Traunmüller. erlands.” American Behavioral Scientist 60 2016. “How State Support of Religion (5‐6): 583–96. Shapes Attitudes Toward Muslim Immi‐ doi:10.1177/0002764216632838. grants: New Evidence From a Sub‐National Yeoh, Brenda S. A., and Theodora Lam. 2016. Comparison.” Comparative Political Studies “Immigration and Its (Dis)Contents: The 49 (3): 391–424. Challenges of Highly Skilled Migration in doi:10.1177/0010414015612388. Globalizing Singapore.” American Behavioral

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Electoral Studies ernment and Opposition/Leonard Schapiro Jin, Lei. 2016. “Migration, Relative Deprivation, Lecture, 2015).” Government and Opposition and Psychological Well‐Being in China.” 51 (02): 183–208. American Behavioral Scientist 60 (5‐6): doi:10.1017/gov.2015.40. 750–70. doi:10.1177/0002764216632826. Grzymala‐Busse, Anna. 2016. “The Difficulty with Doctrine: How Religion Can Influence Ethnopolitics Politics.” Government and Opposition 51 Oded Haklai, and Liora Norwich. 2016. “Bound (02): 327–50. doi:10.1017/gov.2015.38. by Tradition: The Exclusion of Minority Ethnonational Parties from Coalition Gov‐ Law and Society Review ernments—A Comparison of Israel and Ryo, Emily. 2016. “Detained: A Study of Immi‐ Canada.” Ethnopolitics 15 (3): 265–84. gration Bond Hearings.” Law & Society Re‐ doi:10.1080/17449057.2015.1052612. view 50 (1): 117–53. Ala Uddin. 2016. “Dynamics of Strategies for doi:10.1111/lasr.12177. Survival of the Indigenous People in South‐ Kemp, Adriana, and Nelly Kfir. 2016. “Mobiliz‐ eastern Bangladesh.” Ethnopolitics 15 (3): ing Migrant Workers’ Rights in “Non‐ 319–38. immigration” Countries: The Politics of Res‐ doi:10.1080/17449057.2015.1037060. onance and Migrants’ Rights Activism in Is‐ Katie Attwell. 2016. “Ethnocracy Without rael and Singapore.” Law & Society Review Groups: Conceptualising Ethnocratiser 50 (1): 82–116. doi:10.1111/lasr.12179. States Without Reifying Ethnic Categories.” Ethnopolitics 15 (3): 303–18. Party Politics doi:10.1080/17449057.2015.1035559. Dinas, Elias, Vassiliki Georgiadou, Iannis Kon‐ stantinidis, and Lamprini Rori. 2016. “From European Journal of International Relations dusk to dawn: Local party organization and Gallagher, Julia. 2016. “Creating a state: A party success of right‐wing extremism.” Kleinian reading of recognition in Zimba‐ Party Politics 22 (1): 80–92. bwe’s regional relationships.” European doi:10.1177/1354068813511381. Journal of International Relations 22 (2): Håkansson, Nicklas, and Elin Naurin. 2016. 384–407. “Promising ever more: An empirical account doi:10.1177/1354066115588204. of Swedish parties’ pledge making during 20 years.” Party Politics 22 (3): 393–404. European Journal of Political Research doi:10.1177/1354068814549338. Simonsen, Kristina B. 2016. “Ripple effects: An exclusive host national context produces Political Geography more perceived discrimination among im‐ Martina Blank. 2016. “De‐fetishizing the analy‐ migrants.” European Journal of Political Re‐ sis of spatial movement strategies: Poly‐ search 55 (2): 374–90. doi:10.1111/1475‐ morphy and trabajo territorial in Argenti‐ 6765.12131. na.” Political Geography 50:1–9. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2015.09.002. Government and Opposition Ulrich Oslender. 2016. “The banality of dis‐ Hansen, Randall. 2016. “Making Immigration placement: Discourse and thoughtlessness Work: How Britain and Europe Can Cope in the internal refugee crisis in Colombia.” with their Immigration Crises (The Gov‐ 89

Political Geography 50:10–19. cal Science & Politics 49 (02): 228–33. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2015.08.001. doi:10.1017/S1049096516000081.

Political Research Quarterly Public Opinion Quarterly Morel, Domingo. 2016. “The Effects of Central‐ Gravelle, Timothy B. 2016. “Party Identifica‐ ized Government Authority on Black and tion, Contact, Contexts, and Public Attitudes Latino Political Empowerment.” Political Re‐ toward Illegal Immigration.” Public Opinion search Quarterly 69 (2): 347–60. Quarterly 80 (1): 1–25. doi:10.1177/1065912916639136. doi:10.1093/poq/nfv054.

Political Theory Third World Quarterly Jewkes, Michael, and Jean‐François Grégoire. Geraldina Polanco. 2016. “Consent behind the 2016. “Models of Citizenship, Inclusion and counter: aspiring citizens and labour con‐ Empowerment: National Minorities, Immi‐ trol under precarious (im)migration grants and Animals? An Interview with Will schemes.” Third World Quarterly 37 (8): Kymlicka (WK).” Political Theory 44 (3): 1332–50. 394–409. doi:10.1080/01436597.2015.1129892. doi:10.1177/0090591715581612. Kylie Baxter, and Renee Davidson. 2016. “For‐ Honig, Bonnie. 2016. “What Kind of Thing Is eign Terrorist Fighters: managing a twenty‐ Land? Hannah Arendt’s Object Relations, or: first century threat.” Third World Quarterly The Jewish Unconscious of Arendt’s Most 37 (8): 1299–1313. “Greek” Text.” Political Theory 44 (3): 307– doi:10.1080/01436597.2016.1159127. 36. doi:10.1177/0090591716641888. Cathrine Thorleifsson. 2016. “The limits of hospitality: coping strategies among dis‐ PS: Political Science and Politics placed Syrians in Lebanon.” Third World Wilkinson, Betina C., and Natasha Bingham. Quarterly 37 (6): 1071–82. 2016. “Getting Pushed Back Further in Line? doi:10.1080/01436597.2016.1138843. Racial Alienation and Southern Black Atti‐ tudes toward Immigration and Immigrants.” World Politics PS: Political Science & Politics 49 (02): 221– Huber, John D., and Pavithra Suryanarayan. 27. doi:10.1017/S104909651600007X. 2016. “Ethnic Inequality and the Ethnifica‐ McKee, Seth C., and Jeremy M. Teigen. 2016. tion of Political Parties.” World Politics 68 “The New Blue: Northern In‐Migration in (1): 149–88. Southern Presidential Elections.” PS: Politi‐ doi:10.1017/S0043887115000349.

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Member News

Kristy A. Belton (Human Rights Center, Uni‐ Adam M. Butz (Graduate Center for Public versity of Dayton) Policy and Administration, California State  Published “Rooted Displacement: the para‐ University, Long Beach) and Jason E. dox of belonging among stateless people.” Kehrberg (Visiting Adjunct Instructor, De‐ Citizenship Studies 19.8: 907‐921. partments of Political Science and Health Sci‐  Published “Bearing the progressive mantle.” ence, Muskingum University, USA) The Tribune. Op‐Ed. May 2.  Published “Estimating Anti‐Immigrant Sen‐ http://www.tribune242.com/news/2016/ timent for the American States using Multi‐ may/02/bearing‐progressive‐mantle/. Level Modeling and Post‐Stratification,  Published “Bearing the progressive mantle.” 2004–2008,” Research & Politics 3 (2016), The Nassau Guardian. Op‐Ed. April 29. accessed March 11, 2016, doi: http://www.thenassauguardian.com/opini 10.1177/2053168016645830 on/op‐ed/64451‐bearing‐the‐progressive‐ mantle. Els de Graauw (Political Science, Baruch Col‐  Published “Statelessness as forced dis‐ lege, City University of New York) placement.” Contribution to the openGlob‐  Published Making Immigrant Rights Real: alRights debate on the future of refugee Nonprofits and the Politics of Integration in protection. OpenDemocracy. San Francisco (Ithaca: Cornell University https://opendemocracy.net/openglobalrigh Press, 2016). ts/kristy‐belton/statelessness‐as‐forced‐  Published (with Floris Vermeulen) “Cities displacement. and the Politics of Immigrant Integration: A  Reprinted at Truth Out. May 7, 2016. Comparison of Berlin, Amsterdam, New http://www.truth‐ York City, and San Francisco.” Journal of out.org/opinion/item/35906‐statelessness‐ Ethnic and Migration Studies 42(6): 989‐ as‐forced‐displacement. 1012.  Published “Vision Reconfiguration: state‐  Published (with Manuel Pastor and Rhonda lessness as forced displacement.” View‐ Ortiz) Opening Minds, Opening Doors, Open‐ point, Issue 31. Discover Society. ing Communities: Cities Leading for Immi‐ http://discoversociety.org/2016/04/05/vi grant Integration. (New York and Los Ange‐ ewpoint‐vision‐reconfiguration‐ les: Americas Society/Council of the statelessness‐as‐forced‐displacement/. Americas and the Center for the Study of Immigrant Integration at the University of Irene Bloemraad (Sociology, University of Southern California, 2015). California)  Published “Rolling Out the Welcome Mat:  Published (with Silva, F. and Voss, State and City Immigrant Affairs Offices in K.) „Rights, Economics or Family? Frame the United States.” IdeAs/6 (fall/winter Resonance, Political Ideology and the Immi‐ 2015). grant Rights Movement.“ Social Forces 94(4): 1647‐1674. Leila Kawar (Political Science and Legal Stud‐ ies, University of Massachusetts Amherst)

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 Published“Grappling with Global Migration:  Published (with Tiffany D. Joseph) “Exclud‐ Judicial Predispositions, Regulatory Re‐ ed and Frozen Out: Unauthorised Immi‐ gimes, and International Law Systems.” Tul‐ grants’ (Non)Access to Care after U.S. sa Law Review 51 (2016): 101‐14. Healthcare Reform. Journal of Ethnic and  Her Book „Contesting Immigration Policy in Migration Studies 41(14): 2253‐73. Court: Legal Activism and Its Radiating Ef‐ fects in the United States and France“ (Cam‐ Laura Morales (Politics and International Rela‐ bridge University Press) was named joint tions, University of Leicester) winner of the 2016 Law and Society Associ‐  Organized conference on "MPs of Immigrant ation Herbert Jacob Award for best book in Origin in Eight European Countries: A Mid law and society. Project Conference" on February 15, in the framework of the Pathways project Anna O. Law (Political Science, CUNY Brooklyn (http://pathways.eu/) at the Institute of College) Government in London. Recordings of the  "How do U.S. Immigration Courts Decide presentations are available on the following Gender‐Based Asylum Claims," yielded an YouTube channel: award of $79,497 to Brooklyn College (NSF https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL #155655), and $185,948 to UC Hastings Vk44rR24WKef4nojZMUSMNVNTFyD0eed School of Law (NSF Grant #1556131). ‐ See  Organized workshop (with Thomas Saal‐ more at feld)on the “Representation of Citizens of http://www.brooklyn.cuny.edu/web/news Immigrant Origin at the European Consorti‐ /bcnews/bcnews_160317.php#sthash.KDet um for Political Research (ECPR) *Joint Ses‐ oKkh.dpuf sions of Workshops in Pisa* in April 2016.

Willem Maas (Political Science, Glendon Col‐ Stefan Rother (International Relations, Uni‐ lege, York University) versity of Freiburg)  Co‐edited (with Alexander Caviedes) a spe‐  Published (with Christl Kessler) “Democra‐ cial issue on "Sixty‐Five Years of European tization through Migration? Political Remit‐ Governance" for the Journal of Contempo‐ tances and Participation of Philippine Re‐ rary European Research 12 (1). turn Migrants.“ Lanham: Lexington Books.  Published “European Governance of Citi‐  Published “Migration und Demokratie.“ zenship and Nationality,” Journal of Con‐ Wiesbaden: Springer VS. temporary European Research 12 (1): 532‐  Published “Freedom and development: The 551. current refugee crisis is ultimately a crisis of refugee policy.” D+C (Development + Coop‐ Helen Marrow (Sociology, Tufts University) eration) epaper (April).  Published (with Daniel J. Hopkins, Jonathan http://www.dandc.eu/en/article/lack‐ Mummolo, Victoria M. Esses, Cheryl R. Kai‐ consensus‐concerning‐definition‐refugee‐ ser and Monica McDermott) “Out of context: has‐serious‐consequences‐millions‐people the absence of geographic variation in US immigrants' perceptions of discrimination.” Galya Ruffer (Political Science and Director, Politics, Groups, and Identities (published Center for Forced Migration Studies, Buffett online at DOI: Institute for Global Studies, Northwestern Uni‐ 10.1080/21565503.2015.1121155). versity) 92

 was awarded a Senior Fellowship at the  Consolidator Grant, from European Re‐ Käte Hamburger Kolleg/ Centre of Global search Council, for project Legal Status Cooperation Research in Duisburg, Germa‐ Transitions and the Migrant Life Course ny for a period of six months from 1 June to (MiLifeStatus). Duration: 1 September 2016 30 November 2016 where she will be work‐ – 31 August 2021. ing on her project, “Does the Refugee Con‐ https://macimide.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ vention Regime Contribute to Refugee Pro‐ milifestatus/ tection? Understanding ‘Success’ in the Implementation of Refugee Status Determi‐ nation in Emerging Asylum Systems.”

Maarten Vink (Political Science and Political Sociology, Maastricht University)  Published (with F. Peters, H. Schmeets) “The ecology of immigrant naturalisation: a life

course approach in the context of institu‐

tional conditions.“ Journal of Ethnic and Mi‐

gration Studies, 42(3), 359‐381.  Pulished (with F. Peters) “Naturalization and the Socio‐Economic Integration of Im‐ migrants: a Life‐Course Perspective.“ In G. Freeman and N. Mirilovic, eds, Handbook on migration and social policy. Edward Elgar, pp. 362‐376.

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APSA – Migration and Citizenship Section Officers

Co‐Presidents: Doris Marie Provine, Arizona State University Kamal Sadiq, University of California at Irvine

Secretary: Els de Graauw, Baruch College, CUNY

Treasurer: David Plotke, The New School

Newsletter Editor: Marc Helbling, University of Bamberg and WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Council: Rebecca Hamlin, UMass Amherst Michael Jones‐Correa, Cornell University Gerasimos Tsourapas, University of London Audie Klotz, Syracuse University Natalie Masuoka, Tufts University Shyam Sriram, UC Santa Barbara

Program Co‐ Sara Goodman Wallace, University of California at Irvine Chairs: Anna Law, Brooklyn College, CUNY

©Copyright 2016 by The American Political Science Association. Migration and Citizenship is edited by Marc Helbling (tel: +49‐30‐25491‐449, fax: +49‐30‐25491‐452, email: [email protected]). Jakob Biernath served as this issue’s editorial assistant. Opinions do not represent the official position of Migration and Citi‐ zenship. After a 6 months lag, past issues will be available to the general public free of charge, at http://community.apsanet.org/MigrationCitizenship.

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