Local Actors, Nation States, and Their Global Environment: Conceptualizing Successful Resistance to the Anti-Social Impacts of Globalization

VERONICA DUJON * (Departmentof Sociology,Portland State University)

ABSTRACT Nation-states arefaced with multiplecontradictions as they mediatethe insertionof their domesticeconomies intothe globaleconomy. Drawing on acase studyfrom the Caribbean country ofSt. Lucia, this paperexplores howlocal community resources may inuence the terms oftheir integrationin the globaleconomy. It is arguedthat socially embedded economic institutionsthat aretypically neglected in discussions ofeconomic developmentare in some ways bettersuited to the task ofin uencing the terms ofglobalization than state policy- making.

Introduction The termsglobal economy, globalization and global environment are increasinglyused to referto howwe understandthe dynamicrelationships andlinkages (social,political, economic and environmental) between the developedand developing worlds. Yet the term“ globalization,”

* Department ofSociology, Portland StateUniversity, P.O.Box 751,Portland OR 97207;email: [email protected]; phone: (503) 725-8503; fax: (503) 725-3957.

Critical Sociology, Volume 28,issue 3 also availableonline Ó 2002Koninklijke Brill NV,Leiden www.brill.nl 372 Dujon ² muchlike “ustainability”before it, can be extremely difŽcult to deŽ ne. Notwithstanding,from a politicaleconomy perspective the discourseon globalizationas a fundamentalevolution in capitalist development rages on. 1 The roleof nation-states in protecting and enhancing the lives oftheir citizensis weighed against the evidence thatnation-states are no longer relevant (Hirstand Thompson 1999; Burbach and Robinson 1999; Weiss 1997;Panitch 1997; Korten 1995). Nation-states indeed are faced with multiplecontradictions as they attemptto negotiate between the demands oftheir domestic economies and the logicof the globaleconomy. When statesfall shortthere ismuchinterest in the potentialfor social movements andhuman agency tohalt the perniciousconsequences of globalization (Hirstand Thompson 1999; Sassen 1998, 1996; Panitch 1997). What spaces,conditions and structures enhance suchpotential? And when such potentialdoes emerge whatconditions encourage its expansion? These questionsunderlie the basicthrust of this paper. Drawingon the experience ofthe small Caribbeanstate of St. Lucia, thiswork is a modestattempt conceptualizing successful resistance to the anti-socialimpacts of globalization.This work is speciŽ cally focusedon the internaland external circumstances(historical, economic, cultural) which allownational actors in the agriculturalcommunity to determine the terms ofits integration into the globaleconomy. In sodoing, I engage the theoreticaldebate about the alleged demiseof the nation-statethrough a presentationof empirical evidence thatmaps out the dynamicrelationship betweencommunity, nation-state and the logicof economic globalization. In essence the paperargues that: (1) nation-states continue to play a signiŽcant role in the directionof their domestic economies; and (2) that rolecan still befundamentally affected by the interestsof national actors even inthe faceof strongexternal/ globalpressures. Itis undeniable that globalization has heraldedmany positivegains for peopleworldwide. The revolution in communication technology through electronicmeans has facilitatedprogressive and productive exchanges and collaborationbetween communities of peoplethat would not have occurred otherwise.There is a growinginternational community with membership acrossthe industrializedand Third Worlds that advocates for human rights,women’ s rightsand environmental issues.Internationally linked networkshave alsoformed around concern for the adverse economic, socialand cultural impacts of globalization. Nation-states, through the

1 SeeAndrew McGrew’s 1998article “Globalization:Conceptualizing a MovingTarget” fora discussionon contemporary discourseon globalization and Jason W. Moore’s 1997 reviewof G. Arrighi’s book“ The LongTwentieth Century: Money,Power and the Origins ofOurTimes” Verso 1994. Successful Resistance to Anti-Social Impactsof Globalization 373 ² nationalinstitution of citizenship, have hadthe responsibilityto protect the rightsof their citizens. How can these rightscontinue to be protected andguaranteed with the globalizationof economicrelations? Are states still upto the task? Is there aneed fora newrelationship or “ socialcontract” betweenlocal, regional, and state governments, on the onehand, and supra-nationalinstitutions, on the other? Reportsof the demiseof the nation-stateand the risingdominance oftransnational capital and corporations are extensive (Greider2001, 1997;Burbach and Robinson 1999; Robinson and Harris 1999; Korten 1995).Others reject this view andargue that the myth ofglobalization exaggerates the degreeof helplessness inthe faceof contemporary economicforces (Dicken 1998;Sassen 1998; Panitch 1997; Hirst and Thompson1996). These worksargue convincingly that re-organization ofstate institutions is signiŽ cantly dominatedby capitalist interests. They alsopresent evidence thatsuch re-organization does not necessarily go unchallenged orunaffectedby other social actors. States continue to be sites ofstruggle,and the outcomeof thisstruggle, they argue,is notnecessarily predictable. Panitch’s work,which draws on an examinationof the roleof the state inthe contextof North American free tradeinitiatives, captures the overall thrustof this alternative conclusion.He makes acompellingargument thattoday’ s globalizationis “ authoredby states and is primarily about re-organizingrather than by-passingthem” (1997:85). Sassen arrives at a similarconclusion in her work. She arguesthat the wholeframework of internationallaw depends on the courtsof national systems andon systems ofarbitration,both national and international, that exist atthe willof states andrequire national institutions for the executionof theirdecisions (1998). Even inthe extreme cases ofstructural adjustment programs in which austerityprograms are imposed upon developing countries, Sassen argues suchpolicies also point up the participationof statesin furthering the goals ofglobalization.These austerityprograms have tobe run through national governmentsand reprocessed as national policies. The globalis notsimply the non-national(Sassen 1996:107). Muchof the evidence marshaledin defense ofthe nationstate comes fromindustrialized and newly industrializedcountries. It is not entirely clear,however, that a similarargument could be made for developing statesthat have traditionallybeen forcedto rely ondependent models of development-conditionsunder which a nation’s degreesof freedom are constrainedby the extent ofdependenceon external tradeand investment (Dicken 1998). Thispaper explores one instance where local actors in a developing countrysuccessfully contested the termsof integration into the global 374 Dujon ² economy.The evidence comesfrom St. Lucia, a Caribbeancountry where the ruralsector successfully resisted a landprivatization scheme sponsored bythe UnitedStates Agency forInternational Development (USAID)and whichhad the initialsupport of the St.Lucian state. Rural communities wereable to accomplish this in spite of the weightof neoliberal policy emanatingfrom USAID and internal support from the stateof St. Lucia. Like Panitch(1997), I arguethat the resultingrole of the statein the Žnal outcomewas determined by the struggleamong social forces located within the particularsocial formation. The particularcombination of historical, social and political circum- stances createa spacein which seemingly economicallymarginal small farmersare able to deŽ ne asphereof operation that provides them fun- damentalsocial and economic beneŽ ts. These conditionsalso support the abilityto resist land privatization advocated by the globallydominant ide- ologyof neoliberalism that has left somany destitute.The small farmers’ experience isgrounded in land ownership, which is directly linked tothe evolutionof communal land in the Caribbeanregion (Dujon 1997; Bar- row1992; Acosta and Casimir 1985; Besson 1979).This experience isthe embodimentof the strugglefor economic independence in the aftermath ofemancipation in 1838. It includes the insertionof small farmersinto the export-ledsector in the mid1900s (Dujon 2000) and the challenges of globalizationposed by the ratherdifferent economic circumstances at the turnof the twenty-Žrst century. Thecase of St. Lucia illustrates the potentialfor a communityto use alocally basedresource (in thiscase communalland and its associated institutions)to organize assets andlabor allocation in ways that beneŽ t ruralpeople traditionally disenfranchised by economic change. Many small andmarginal farmers rely onthe socialand economic advantages derived fromthe communalland institution to buffer themselves againstadverse economicimpacts. In the faceof the currentdeclining banana economy impelledby changing global market conditions, the decisionto retain communalland rather than convertingto private land turns out to be quite justiŽed. It is theoreticallycritical to note that the abilityof the community toresist a potentiallydisastrous privatization scheme wasfacilitated by a resourcegrounded in the informaleconomy itself. Ownership of the means ofproductionand the strongline ofaccountabilitybetween peasant farmers andeither of the twomajor political parties, the UnitedWorkers’ Party andthe St.Lucia Labor Party, facilitated a successfulchallenge ofthe privatizationproject. Thepaper is organized in the followingmanner: the Žrstsection briey describesthe developmentdilemmas of the St.Lucian economy asit is squeezed out of the globalbanana market. The secondsection Successful Resistance to Anti-Social Impactsof Globalization 375 ² analyzes the reasonswhy an attemptto privatize the communalsector failed.Next, the paperdescribes the fundamentalwelfare beneŽ ts that communalland holdings provide. This is followed by a briefhistorical accountof the economic,social and political conditions, both internal andexternal, whichdeŽ ne the natureof small farmers’integration into the globaleconomy. The paperthen outlinesa tentative frameworkfor conceptualizingresistance to the anti-socialimpacts of globalization with ananalysis ofthe relationshipsbetween national actors and states and the resourcesthese actorsmay call uponto negotiatethe circumstancesof their integrationinto the globaleconomy.

I.St.Lucia: Background and Crisis St.Lucia is locatednear the southernend of the Caribbeanchain, between Martiniqueto the northand St. Vincent toits south. It is 238 square miles inarea (616 km 2),andhas apopulationof 150,000 people. The ofŽcial language is English, but Patwa 2 aFrench creole,is the predominant languagein the ruralsector. St. Lucia gained independence in 1979 andcontinues to be part of the BritishCommonwealth. The country isprimarily an agriculturaleconomy based in the exportof bananas. In 1989export agriculture accounted for approximately 18% of GDP, followedby tourism, 11%, and manufacturing, 8% (St. Lucia 1991). On average, bananaexports account for at least 95%of total agricultural exports(calculated for the years 1986to 1994). In 1994,banana exports represented97% of total agricultural exports. 3 St.Lucia, unlike many ofits neighbors, enjoyed positive growth rates inthe mid-1980s(6.0% in 1985 and 5.3% in 1986), and had a debt burdenobservers considered manageable (St.Lucia 1987). Nevertheless, in 1986the governmentof St.Lucia undertook a landregistration and titling project(LRTP) as part of an initialphase of a wideragricultural structural adjustmentprogram sponsored by USAID. The LRTPwas designed to clarifyand privatize land titles, establish a modernland registry, and thereby facilitatethe efŽcient operation of the landmarket. The longterm objectiveof the registrationand titling project was to increase export crop productionthrough the intensiŽcation and expansion of banana producing areasand to facilitate crop diversiŽ cation (USAID 1983).

2 Typicallythis would have been spelt patois.However,since the riseof the socialand cultural movement ofthe 1980sto give the uniquedialect spoken in former French colonies (andsome current French departments:Martinique and Guadeloupe) a clear identityin its ownright, the more acceptedspelling used is patwa. 3 Statisticsreceived from personalcommunication with Chief Economist,Marcia Philbert-Jules, St.Lucia Ministry of Planning, June30, 1995. 376 Dujon ²

Atthe timeof the implementationof the LRTP,the St.Lucian bananaindustry was vibrant, and the followingyear, 1987, the British Government reafŽrmed preferential trading agreements throughProtocol 4ofthe LomeConvention that seemingly guaranteeda marketfor St. Lucianbananas. However, the decisionto expand and intensify banana production,in retrospect, was questionable as asustainablegrowth strategy. Stateplanners were aware that in 1992 the preferentialtrading agreements withthe UnitedKingdom, which had assured protected access to British markets,would be in jeopardy with the consolidationof the European Community. Althoughthe governmenthas been awareof the risksassociated with dependenceon export of primary commodities, and it has soughtto promotealternatives, especially tourism,to date there isno alternative to bananas.In addition,the markethas collapsedsooner than anticipated. 4 The U.S.acting on behalf of U.S. companies in Central America, has mounteda successfulattack on British preferential trade agreements with formercolonies.

II.Land Privatization Theland privatization component of the LRTPproject was required on the premisethat communal land tenure, also called family land tenure, inhibitedincreased production (USAID 1983). Although the projectended upregistering all holdings,family land was not converted into freehold titles.Planned tenure conversions never materialized.This was due to acombinationof administrative problems and resistance to privatization byfamily landholders. Failure to clarify which body of law should take precedencein adjudicating titles –the LandRegistration and the Land AdjudicationActs which were created in 1984 to facilitate the LRTP,or the CivilCode which recognizes family land and existed priorto these acts– led toadministrativedifŽ culties. In 1987,fearing popular objection, Parliamentre-instated the precedenceof the CivilCode. OfgreatersigniŽ cance, however, is the factthat claimants to familyland chose notto participate in the voluntaryprocess. At the endof the project, areportfrom the LandTenure Center, University ofWisconsin-Madison, estimatedthat 1/ 3ofall parcels(agricultural and non-agricultural) were adjudicatedas family land.Approximately 45% of all agriculturalland parcelsare held ascommunal, or “ family”land, as it is referred to

4 Variouspopular press (The Voice,The Vanguard)reports from St.Lucia 1997. Successful Resistance to Anti-Social Impactsof Globalization 377 ² Table 1 LandDistribution in St. Lucia 1986

Sizeof Holdings %ofTotal Farmland %ofTotal Number of (acres) Holdings under 5 21.3 83.3 5-9.9 13.4 10.3 10-24.9 13.4 4.85 25-49.9 5.6 0.85 50-99.9 4.0 0.30 100+ 42.3 0.41 Total 100 100

Calculatedfrom 1986Census, Gov’ t ofSt. Lucia: p. 13, 18. inthe Caribbean. 5 The reportconcluded that few family landparcels werepartitioned or had their ownership individualized through the Land Registrationand Titling Project (LTC vol. 5, 1988, 2). The proŽle ofthe agrarianstructure has notchanged signiŽ cantly from the decadesfollowing the creationof apeasantryin the middleto the end ofthe nineteenth century.According to the 1986agricultural census, land distributioncontinues to be very skewed.Peasants with zero to Ž ve acres accountedfor about 83% of the totalnumber of holdings but occupied only 21%of total amount of farmland. Farms with 100 acres and more represented0.4% of farm holdings but held 42%of all acreage(Table 1). AsigniŽcant number of these ‘large’farms are not in activecultivation. They are,however, owned by landed elites whoinherited them fromthe slave plantationera. The factthat these landswere idle but were never consideredto be part of the problemof low productivity is notsurprising. Many ofthese elites arealso active politicians. Thereare two interesting issues here. First,the puzzleof rational farmersresisting participation in a programthat is presumably to their beneŽt promptsa closerexamination, and reconsideration, of the utilityof familyland and the rolethat multiple tenure patterns might play within an internationalizedeconomy. It also prompts a reconsiderationof some ofthe tenets underlyingstructural adjustment policies. Second, what are the speciŽc conditionsthat made it possible for small farmersto keep theircommunal land. These issuesare dealt with in sections III andIV respectively.

5 Thispercentage re ects the proportionof parcelsheld infamilyland as opposedto the proportionof holdings. A holdingmay consistof a singleparcel or severalparcels held under oneor combinationof types of tenure. 378 Dujon ²

Communalland tenure in St. Lucia was a targetof a registrationand titlingproject in 1986, on the premisethat the undercapitalization and low productivityof suchland inhibited growth. These drawbacks,it wasargued, couldbe corrected by establishing an efŽcient land market based on freehold.Using empiricalevidence fromSt. Lucia, I have arguedelsewhere (Dujon1997), that the inefŽciencies attributed to communal land only arenot justiŽ ed. Many ofthe inefŽciencies attributed to communal lands are,in fact, also shared with freehold tenure. Shortcomings in insurance institutionsand reliable markets, the underlyingproblems that affect all types oftenure, are responsible for low performance (Dujon 1997). To the extent thatlimitations in these areascan be addressed, the agricultural sectorin general willexperience improvedperformance in production. Mostimportantly, the evidence suggeststhat, contrary to being a liabilityto economic performance in the agriculturalsector, the communal landinstitution does contribute to the vitality andgrowth experienced in the export-ledsector. Family landis as integrated as freehold land into foodand export crop production. Indeed, small farmers,who manage a combinationof communal and freehold parcels often rely onproduction strategiesthat combine banana cultivation on both types ofparcels. In addition,many beginningfarmers who are capital poor, use commercial cultivationon communalland to accumulatecapital. This is then invested inthe purchaseof private holdings for expanded production (Dujon 1997). Family landclaims then, canbe understood as resource mechanisms that facilitateintegration into the export-ledeconomy. Stateeconomic planners in St. Lucia were driven by the need to generate,speciŽ cally, exportrevenues, andprivatization was seen asthe wayto accomplish this. Little thought was given tothe possibilitythat privatizationmay have comeat the expense ofbeneŽ cial social institutions. Smalland marginal farmers, on the otherhand, when given the choice toprivatize were ultimately concerned with retaining the beneŽts of communalland. The evidence paintsa complexdynamic in which state plannersfailed to understand the reallimitations to increased production orthe socialand economic value ofthe communalland institution. Family landcan sustain a broadrange of needs: itcan be exploited commercially,serve asa basefor capital accumulation, and provides a subsistencesafety net when exportmarkets falter (Dujon 1997). In contrast tostandard atomistic economic models, the familyland institution is based ina system ofreciprocity that meets variouslevels ofeconomic need andserves asa safety net forall members.In an environmentwhere unemploymentis high, formal social security is scarce and the economy ishighly vulnerable toexternal shocks,family land seems well adaptedto localeconomic constraints and the needs ofitsusers. Successful Resistance to Anti-Social Impactsof Globalization 379 ² III.The Family Land Institution Traditionalforms of communal land tenure in other developing regions suchas Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America evolved priorto contact withcapitalist forms of production. Unlike these traditionalforms of tenure, communalland in the Caribbean,evolved withinthe contextof market formsof production and an export-ledplantation growth model with essential linkages toan internationaleconomy. The factthat a communal landinstitution could take rootand  ourishwithin such an unexpected contextmay bean indicationthat far from being anachronistic and inappropriate,it is ratherwell-suited for its economic context. In addition, contraryto expectations that the numberof family land holdings was stagnant,there isevidence thatcontemporary families often convert private holdingsinto communal holdings through the processof inheritance. This trendsuggests that family landwill continue to be part of the agrarian landscapefor some time to come (Dujon 1997). Communalforms of land tenure are a long-standingelement ofthe St.Lucian agricultural landscape. In St.Lucia and other islands such asDominica, Grenada, St. Vincent, Barbados, Jamaica and Guyana, communalownership is based on lineage tothe originalpurchasers of the land(whence the termfamily land).This grouping of claimants is differentfrom communal ownership based on membership in a tribeor ethnicgroup that predates capitalism. In St.Lucia groups of relatives inthe postemancipation period purchasedlarge lots of land. These familiesgranted claim, informally, throughinheritance to all succeedinggenerations whose lineage could betraced to the originalpurchasers (Besson 1979).Upon the deathof alandholderimmediate kin inheritthe propertyas a group,and family landis born. Management isshared amongst a numberof relatives, or managedby one or a reducednumber of them onbehalf of the rest. Family landconforms to the deŽnition of common property resources in whichaccess is controlled and outsiders may beexcluded. As a peasant formof organization designed to allocate resources, family land embodies withinits social and economic structure, a responseto the opportunities andconstraints of the widersociety within which it is located. Resource allocationis constantly negotiated on the groundsof individual relative need. Thisis balancedagainst the physicallimits of the land.The rulesof the institutionare maintained by social obligations and sanctions (Dujon 1997). Five centraloperating rules of family land tenure form the foundation ofthe institution.The Žrstis the claimto rightsby virtueof proof of family lineage. Thisclaim system guaranteestwo signiŽ cant distributive features: Žrst,access to resources irrespective of the extent ofthe resource,and 380 Dujon ² second,equal access irrespective of gender.In St.Lucian law, based on the NapoleonicCode, multiple inheritance of property is recognized, but only childrenborn within a marriageare allowed to inherit. Under customary lawillegitimate children are also included in the inheritancesystem. The secondclaim is to perennial crops. This guarantees a subsistencesurvival ora supplementto other income. The thirdclaim is to an undivided sharethat permits  exibility andmobility in terms of physical location of plots.This feature can accommodate the cultivationof areas larger than the technically allowedshare. The fourthclaim is to the sale ofland only throughconsensus of all claimants.In practice,this guarantees that the mostmarginal of members can veto asale. The Žnal claimis the rightto occupyor cultivatea portionof landirrespective of how long the claimant may have been non-resident(Dujon 1997). The sale ofany portionof the landto non-family members requires the consentof the entirefamily. This keeps familyland off the market. Memberswithin families may, however, sell theirrights to other relatives withinthe group.Thus, although individuals may transferland internally, communalrights are, for practical purposes, inalienable. This affords the securityof a subsistenceto both members on the economicmargins and thosewith more permanent employment outsideof the agriculturalsector (Dujon1989). The familyland institution is oftenthought of as an informaltradition, butin fact family landmanagement relies ona clearset ofrules, norms, andpractices, and its status is safeguarded in the law.The legal standing offamily landfacilitates and encourages long term decision making by providingtenure security both within the socialnetwork and externally in the formallegal system. Thesocial network that supports family land is made up of a webof complexrelations among a groupof people related through kinship. The relations/transactionsbetween two individuals of asocialnetwork occur in the socialcontext in which these tiesare embedded (Granovetter 1985). It is withinthis network that over time and with repeated interactions, the rules, norms,and expectations that govern transactions are forged, sustained andon occasion altered. Each individual in the networkis enabled and constrainedin a numberof ways. Resourceallocation is mediated by the socialobligations and responsi- bilitiesof membersand is responsive to members’ needs withinthe physical limitationsof the resource.These needs rangefrom commercial cultivation ofcrops for some, subsistence production for others, supplemental income throughaccess to perennial crops for those employed in other sectors, and the sense ofsecurity conveyed toall claimantsfrom the knowledgethat Successful Resistance to Anti-Social Impactsof Globalization 381 ² they canalways return to family land when all otheremployment options fail. Itis common for large numbers of the extended familyto receive socialand economic beneŽ ts from relatively small parcelsof land. This ispossible because there isan understandingamong members that those whoŽ ndmore lucrative employment outsidethe familyland holding will withdrawfrom full exercise ofrights to cultivate the land,although all the claimants’rights remain intact. The withdrawing claimant willingly gives upadditionalincome in the interestof continued access to the socialcapital (essentially socialsecurity) provided by the network. Resourceallocation is constantly re-negotiated. Although technically all claimantsare entitled to equal shares according to the numberof siblingsof the individualbestowing claim, in practice, actual allocations arein uenced and adjusted by a numberof social and economic factors. Forexample, olderor earlier generation claimants have moreauthority in makingdecisions. The decisionsof these individualsin turn are affected bythe natureof the relationshipwith members wishing to cultivate the land.Potential claimants who show enthusiasm for farming or a willingness totake careof older relatives when they areno longer able to farm aremore likely tobe shown favor in the allocationof resources. In the same vein, impoverishedrelatives withno alternative optionsfor income generation,may beallowed more than the technically determinedshare of the resource.Thus, although the institutionis grounded in a principleof equalityof inheritance irrespective of gender or statusat birth(legitimate or illegitimate),in realityresource allocation is alsomediated by otherfactors suchas the qualityof social relationships and the extent ofeconomic need. Trustand reciprocity nurture the efŽciency, or smoothness,with which familyland is managed. A breachof trust between two individuals canjeopardize future relations, not just with the immediateparty, but potentiallywith all membersof the network.The guiltyparty cannot be expelled fromthe property,but life canbe made extremely difŽcult. In thissame vein, reciprocityis not only bilateral.Members do favors for each otherknowing that the favormay notbe returned directly by the beneŽting party, or even inthe currentgeneration. In somecases individualsmay resortto the external legal system to resolve adispute.Members who stand to beneŽt asindividualsby invoking rulesand regulations that do not conform most often seek suchan option tothe internalones. This action signals a dysfunctionalsocial network that may ormay notrecuperate. Althoughcommunal land tenure systems arenot without inequality (Quiggin1993), family land provides access on the basisof proof of lineage, irrespectiveof the extent ofthe resource,and guarantees a minimum 382 Dujon ² safety net ofprotection against landlessness andhunger for all membersof the family.Social sanctions guided by the originaltenets guaranteesome minimumbeneŽ ts for all. Family landcontinues to exist asa dynamic sectorof the ruraleconomy in main part because it is a defacto welfare institutionin the absenceof awelfarestate (Dujon 1997).

IV.Small Farmers, Export Crops andthe Global Economy Thissection brie y discussesthe internaland global conditions that frame the natureof the bananaindustry that has supportedeconomic growth sincethe 1950s.It examines the participationof the small farmingsector inthe industry,and the risein political signiŽ cance that small farmerswill achieve asa result.It also examines the impactof the preferentialtrading agreements thathave sustaineda relatively inefŽcient production system, byneoliberal standards. The vulnerabilityof the industryto the lossof protectedtrade is also discussed. Finally, thissection identiŽ es the speciŽc conditionsthat made it possiblefor small farmersto keep theircommunal land.It also emphasizes the impactof small farminginterests on state policy. Banana productionfor export in St.Lucia Ž rstassumed signiŽ cance in the 1950sagainst the backgroundof a slowlycollapsing colonial system andthe decline ofWest Indiansugar production. This transition was a criticalfactor in determining the futureagrarian structure of the banana industryin St. Lucia. By the 1950sthe sugarindustry was characterized byproduction inefŽ ciencies and growing labor problems that took the formof strikes for better working conditions. As a resultof acute labor shortagescoupled with the decline ofsugar prices, many largeplantations wereforced to sell theirestates. Someestates hadto besubdividedfor sale andthis marked a periodof expansion of the peasantryin St. Lucia. A British/Dutchmultinational corporation, Geest IndustriesLtd., (henceforth Geest) purchasedsome of these estates andintroduced banana production (Thompson1987). Banana cultivationtriggered a signiŽcant social restructuring in the agriculturalsector. A relatively well-offsmall farmingsector was created, supportedby a well-organizedpara-statal producers’ association and a marketfor all produceof certain quality, guaranteed by Geest. The rigid system ofsocial classiŽ cation based on race and income was modiŽ ed to a certainextent (Beckford1972). However,although there werechanges inland distribution it was not signiŽcant enough to change the basicbipolar system offew large plan- tationscontrolling the majorityof agricultural land and numerous small farms.Many plantationowners moved into commercial enterprise, pre- dominantlyinto the importsof goods,to meet growingconsumer demand Successful Resistance to Anti-Social Impactsof Globalization 383 ² forgoods. These planters,for the mostpart, abandoned agricultural enter- prisebut did not sell theiridle estates (Dujon1995). Bananas provideda viable alternative tosugar because the cropwas well adaptedto small-scale peasantcultivation. It also displayed potential for the resuscitationof the agriculturalsector, creating new opportunities for the emergingpeasantry and the remaininglarge landowners. For the local colonialadministration, both small-scale andplantation banana cultivation presentedan excellent opportunityto boostthe failingsugar economy and counteractthe growinglabor unrest of the 1930sand 40s (Thompson 1987:28-29). The growingsmall farmingsector became closely alignedwith the then emergingtrade unions (Dujon 1995). These tradeunions matured intopolitical parties in the anti-colonialstruggle for independence. Both parties,the UnitedWorkers Party and the St.Lucia Labor Party actively sought,and continue to seek, the supportof small farmers.In part,this explains why the privatizationagenda of the USAIDproject was offered as avoluntaryprogram. The directorof the LandRegistry in1992admitted thatno one in the administrationwas surprised that communal landowners hadnot taken upthe offerto converttheir land titles. 6 Amajorexternal factorthat contributed to the successfulestablishment ofthe industrywas an active‘ bananalobby’ in the UnitedKingdom. This lobbywas associated with the West IndiaCommittee, established in the eighteenth centuryto maximize proŽ ts and safeguard trade with the West Indiancolonies. In 1953it successfully pressured British Board of Trade intogranting a speciallicense forthe importof bananasby Geest andother alliedtrading interests. The offerto purchase all bananasof marketable qualitymade by Geest in1954 was crucial to the emergence ofanindustry largely protectedfrom the vagariesof the marketand dependent, for shippingand trading, on the UK/Geest monopoly(Thompson 1987). A protectedpreferential trading arrangement was developed and it stabilized the bananaproducing economies until the early 1990s. In 1973,when the UKbecamea memberof the EEC,the Windward Islandswere still amongBritain’ s overseas coloniesand continued to receive preferentialtreatment in the UK market.By 1975,negotiations between the independentAfrican, Caribbean and PaciŽ c (ACP)countries and the EEChadled tothe formationof the FirstLome Convention. Lome I allowedfor the entry of99% of ACPproductsinto the Communitymarket, freeof customs duties and equivalent taxes, andin unlimited quantities. Thispreferential system forbananas in the UKhad,up to 1992, served tocompensateCaribbean producers for their high production costs and to

6 Interview conversationwith the authorDecember 1992. 384 Dujon ² protectthe lowerquality of their bananas from competition (Read 1994; Philbert-Jules1990). The strenuousefforts made by US multinationalcorporations operating inCentral America within the UruguayRound of GATT, directed atensuring their access to the Europeanbanana market after 1992, resultedin signiŽ cant dismantling of the preferentialagreements (Read 1994).The latest challenge fromthe US-basedChiquita corporation operatingin Central America has plungedthe St.Lucian economy intoturmoil. Without protected stable markets many bananafarmers, particularlymarginal ones, face serious economic hardship. The challenges ofcontinued growth seem insurmountable.Many farmershave stopped productionaltogether and this will undoubtedly lead to distress land sales. In the absenceof any otheralternative, farmers will fall backon family landfor survival (and many urbanworkers may beincludedin thisgroup).

V.ConceptualizingSuccessful Resistance totheAnti-Social Impactsof Globalization In acontextwhere leading capitalist states and Ž rmsseem torule outany principleother than that of “ free trade,”Caribbean states have been relatively unsuccessfulat defending their preferential access to Europeanmarkets. Although also under attack, paradoxically, the informal communalland institution has turnedout be invaluable for small domestic producers.This local capacity to protect itself is of theoretical interest. The St.Lucian experience may beunique in some ways, but the broader challenges facedby countries in the globaleconomy are not unique, and neither isthe need forinnovative socialinsurance solutions for small producersexposed to a sea devastatingrisks. Family landhas been that safety net forSt. Lucian peasants, and I wouldlike tosuggest it is a speciŽc instanceof a largerclass of social insurance arrangements that urgentlyneed tobe theorized. Socialinsurance protections against the risksof participating in market economiesare typically entitlements thatare granted to citizens by nation- states.As entitlements these protectionsare not guaranteed. They are the outcomeof negotiations between states and their citizens. With the onslaughtof economic globalization bolstered by neoliberal ideology, these entitlements have been repeatedlyundermined or totally eliminated. Market liberalizationpolicies pursued in the Caribbeanregion are fraught withundesirable social outcomes. Job loss and destitution, cutbacks in health, educationand other social services, and increasing cost of living have typically followed(Deere et al.1990). In countrieswhere liberalization ofthe agriculturalsector has been pursued,the experience withland privatizationhas notalways generated the expected outcomes.The listof Successful Resistance to Anti-Social Impactsof Globalization 385 ² failuresleading to landlessness andgrowing poverty is long, among them: Senegal inthe 1970s;Malawi in the 1980s;Northern Nigeria in the 1980s (Makandawire1983/ 84;Van DerKlei 1978;Watts 1983).Often, states do nothave the resourcesor the politicalwill to provide safety nets. The evidence fromSt. Lucia supports the adoptionof an alternative frameworkin which entitlements arenot vulnerable tochanging political andeconomic circumstances, but rather are inalienable propertyrights. Asproperty rights they carryfar greater security than entitlements. Let me explain. Family landclaimants were able to resist the riskof loss of socialprotections posed by landprivatization because their claims to these protectionsare embodied in their ownership of communal land that they wereable to retain. These socialprotections are not entitlements thatare grantedby the state,nor are they negotiable.They areclaims that are rootedin inalienable propertyrights that remain constant irrespective of statepolicy about social entitlements; shortof expropriating peasants and underminingits legitimacy, the statecannot take awaythese rights. Withinthis orientation social movements wouldmake demandsfor socialprotections not as mere entitlements butrather as property rights. Given the expansionin the applicationof the conceptof property rights to includeproperty rights in anticipated proŽ ts that may never materialize, 7 there iscertainly a compellingargument that can be made for the inclusion ofsocial protections as property rights of ordinary citizens in the faceof the sea ofrisksassociated with participating in globalmarkets.

VI.Conclusion Thereis athree-waydynamic relationship between local actors, states and the internationalcommunity. Globalization has transformedthe roleof the stateto make itmore responsive to the interestsof capital, local and global(Sassen 1998;Panitch 1997). Nonetheless, the worldis still very muchcomposed of states that are sites of struggle between capitalist and non-capitalistinterests (Panitch 1997; Harris and Michie 1998).What sorts ofcitizen participation can maximize the returnsand contain the social risksof living ina globalizedeconomy? Some citizens have ralliedfor strongwelfare states with various degrees of successand with no long term guarantees(Panitch 1997). The experience inSt. Lucia suggests that when citizenshave inalienable propertyrights to social protections, even under

7 Greider argueswith compellingevidence that under the NAFTAagreement investor protectionsin the form ofproperty rights in proŽts give primacy tocapitalist interests to the detriment ofsociety’ s broaderclaims. “ The Rightand US TradeLaw: Invalidating the 20th Century” in The Nation (October)15, 2001. 386 Dujon ² the worstof conditions (loss of the mainexport market that sustains the economy)they areguaranteed some basic protection against risks. The newera of market-driven globalization threatens inparticular the abilityof developing states to execute theirexpected domesticwelfare responsibilitiestowards their citizens. Innovative ideasfor safety nets may comefrom unexpected sources. In the case ofSt. Lucia traditional institutionsthat offer social protection as inalienable propertyrights offer someunique insights. It is possible to conceptualize a largercategory of citizenshipto which family land claims belong. In thisconceptualization, socialprotections are inalienable propertyrights. They arenot subject to changes ineconomic and political environments in the wayentitlements are.It remains to be seen whether,with the expansionof the conceptof propertyrights to apply to anticipated proŽ ts, non-capitalist social forces canargue successfully for property rights in social protections for working classes.

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