Aging and Self-Realization
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Hanne Laceulle Aging and Self-Realization Aging Studies | Volume 17 To Gert – in loving memory The series is edited by Heike Hartung, Ulla Kriebernegg and Roberta Maier- hofer. Hanne Laceulle (PhD), born in 1975, obtained her doctorate “cum laude” at the University of Humanistic Studies in Utrecht, the Netherlands, where she cur- rently works as an Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Life Course and Art of Living. In 2017, she received the European Network in Aging Studies (ENAS) award for the best PhD thesis. Hanne Laceulle Aging and Self-Realization Cultural Narratives about Later Life An electronic version of this book is freely available, thanks to the support of libraries working with Knowledge Unlatched. KU is a collaborative initiative designed to make high quality books Open Access for the public good. The Open Access ISBN for this book is 978-3-8394-4422-1. More information about the initiative and links to the Open Access version can be found at www.knowledgeunlatched.org. Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Na- tionalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No- Derivatives 4.0 (BY-NC-ND) which means that the text may be used for non-commer- cial purposes, provided credit is given to the author. For details go to http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ To create an adaptation, translation, or derivative of the original work and for commer- cial use, further permission is required and can be obtained by contacting rights@ transcript-verlag.de Creative Commons license terms for re-use do not apply to any content (such as graphs, figures, photos, excerpts, etc.) not original to the Open Access publication and further permission may be required from the rights holder. The obligation to research and clear permission lies solely with the party re-using the material. © 2018 transcript Verlag, Bielefeld Cover concept: Kordula Röckenhaus, Bielefeld Typeset by Francisco Bragança, Bielefeld Printed by Majuskel Medienproduktion GmbH, Wetzlar Print-ISBN 978-3-8376-4422-7 PDF-ISBN 978-3-8394-4422-1 https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839444221 Content Preface | 9 Chapter 1—Introduction | 11 1.1 Prologue – An exemplar of “aging well” | 11 1.2 Introducing the thematic domain and background of the study | 13 1.2.1 Lack of meaning-generating narratives about later life | 13 1.2.2 Aging in an era of self-realization | 15 1.3 Objectives of the study | 18 1.4 A hermeneutic approach | 19 1.5 Some terminological issues | 21 1.6 Positioning the study in the philosophical and gerontological field | 26 1.6.1 Positioning in moral philosophy | 26 1.6.2 Positioning in gerontology | 27 1.7 Chapter outlines | 29 Chapter 2—Living and aging in late modernity | 33 2.1 Introduction | 33 2.2 Late modernity, an era of self-realization? | 34 2.3 Features and dynamics of the late modern world | 35 2.3.1 A life of one’s own: reflexive individualization | 36 2.3.2 Living in a post-traditional context | 38 2.3.3 A globalizing world | 40 2.3.4 Structural and systemic influences on individualized lives | 41 2.3.5 Repression of meaning and morality | 43 2.3.6 The moral identity crisis of late modern man | 45 2.4 Implications for late modern aging | 46 2.4.1 A (much) longer life in a complex world | 47 2.4.2 Individualization and diversification: an old age of one’s own? | 47 2.4.3 Third Age and Fourth Age | 49 2.4.4 Structural and systemic dynamics impacting late modern aging | 52 2.4.5 Aging well as an individual responsibility | 53 2.4.6 Existential vulnerability and the fragile experience of meaning | 55 2.5 Conclusion | 58 2.5.1 Ambivalences of self-realization in late modernity | 58 2.5.2 Reframing late modern self-realization discourse | 59 Chapter 3—Cultural narratives and counter narratives about aging | 63 3.1 Introduction | 63 3.2 Cultural narratives and counter narratives | 64 3.2.1 Cultural (master) narratives and their role in identity-building | 64 3.2.2 Damaging effects of cultural narratives | 67 3.2.3 Moral agency and the importance of recognition | 69 3.2.4 Narrative repair through agency-enhancing counter narratives | 73 3.3 Cultural narratives about later life | 76 3.3.1 Cultural and critical gerontology on the cultural positioning of aging | 76 3.3.2 Decline narratives | 79 3.3.3 Age-defying narratives | 81 3.3.4 Limitations of existing cultural narratives on aging | 83 3.4 Conclusion: In search of viable counter narratives about aging | 86 Chapter 4—Self-realization | 93 4.1 Introduction | 93 4.2 Introducing self-realization | 94 4.2.1 The purpose of self-realization | 96 4.2.2 The self in self-realization | 101 4.2.3 The practice of self-realization | 106 4.2.4 The timing of self-realization | 109 4.3 Exploring the best in us | 112 4.3.1 Selected historical and philosophical interpretations of the best in us | 113 4.3.2 Three threads: autonomy, authenticity and virtue | 117 4.4 Self-realization and aging | 120 4.4.1 Self-realization and the shrinking of the future | 120 4.4.2 Self-realization and radicalization of existential vulnerability | 123 Chapter 5—Narrative identity and moral agency | 127 5.1 Introduction | 127 5.2 Introducing narrative identity | 128 5.2.1 Life and self as stories | 128 5.2.2 The relation between life and narrative | 130 5.2.3 Narrative integration and unified personhood | 132 5.2.4 Narrativity and aging | 134 5.3 Three interpretations of narrative identity | 136 5.3.1 Marya Schechtman – Narrative self-constitution | 136 5.3.2 Hilde Lindemann – Narrative identity as a social practice | 139 5.3.3 Kim Atkins – Narrative identity and moral identity | 142 5.4 From narrative identity to moral agency | 145 5.5 Conclusion: composing a definition of moral agency | 153 Chapter 6—Autonomy | 159 6.1 Introduction | 159 6.2 Introducing autonomy | 160 6.2.1 Historical roots of autonomy discourse | 160 6.2.2 Harry Frankfurt: A dominant contemporary account | 162 6.3 Selected alternative accounts of autonomy | 163 6.3.1 Charles Taylor: Autonomy and the strong evaluation of desires | 164 6.3.2 Laura Ekstrom: Autonomy and the coherence of our value orientation | 165 6.3.3 Diana Meyers: Autonomy and the conditions of its practicability | 166 6.3.4 Relational view: Autonomy, interdependence, socialization and power | 169 6.4 Autonomy in the context of aging | 174 6.4.1 Harry Moody: The communicative approach | 175 6.4.2 George Agich: The phenomenological approach | 176 6.4.3 Martha Holstein and colleagues: The relational approach | 178 6.5 Evaluation of the discussed accounts on autonomy | 180 6.6 Conclusion: Towards an individuating conception of autonomy | 182 Chapter 7—Authenticity | 189 7.1 Introduction | 189 7.2 Introducing authenticity | 190 7.3 Selected philosophical accounts of authenticity | 194 7.3.1 Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his Romantic heirs | 194 7.3.2 Existentialist views of authenticity | 197 7.3.3 Charles Taylor’s ethics of authenticity | 203 7.3.4 Diana Meyers – Authenticity and intersectional identity | 205 7.4 Authenticity in the context of aging | 207 7.4.1 Spiritual perspectives on aging | 207 7.4.2 Existential perspectives on aging | 209 7.4.3 Art of living perspectives on aging | 210 7.5 Evaluation of the discussed authenticity accounts | 212 7.6 Conclusion: Towards authenticity as a social and moral practice | 215 Chapter 8—Virtue | 219 8.1 Introduction | 219 8.2 Introducing virtue | 219 8.3 Selected accounts of virtue ethics | 223 8.3.1 Aristotle: Virtue as ‘nobility of the soul’ | 223 8.3.2 Alasdair MacIntyre: Virtue as a remedy for the modern “moral crisis” | 226 8.3.3 Christine Swanton: Pluralistic virtue ethics | 229 8.4 Virtue in the context of aging | 235 8.5 Evaluation of the discussed virtue accounts | 239 8.6 Conclusion: Towards virtue as attitudinal concretization of moral agency | 244 Chapter 9—Conclusion | 251 9.1 Introduction | 251 9.2 Recapitulation of the argument | 252 9.3 Advancing older people’s moral agency | 257 9.4 Objections to the self-realization discourse | 264 9.4.1 Elitism/demandingness objection | 265 9.4.2 Self-centeredness objection | 266 9.4.3 Social structure/social justice objection | 266 9.4.4 Western/masculine bias objection | 268 9.4.5 Moralism/paternalism objection | 269 9.4.6 Mental/cognitive ability objection | 270 9.5 Unanswered questions | 273 9.6 Final thoughts | 274 References | 277 Preface What does it mean to lead a good life? This question has puzzled moral phi- losophers for centuries. As is characteristic for all fundamental philosophical questions, it will never be fully answered. But finding the ultimate answer is not what matters; the continued quest for the meaning of a good life is of value because of the richness of perspectives it can open. In turn, these perspectives may inspire a variety of practices that are conducive to what Ricoeur (1992) has defined as the ethical aim of human life: ‘a good life, with and for others, in just institutions’. This phrase forms the heart of the mission statement of the University of Humanistic Studies in Utrecht, The Netherlands, a small university that in its research program focuses on the humanization of society, in order to enable individuals to lead a meaningful, dignified life of optimal human flourishing.