Building Sustainable Peace: Conflict, Conciliation, and Civil Society in Northern

Ada van der Linde and Rachel Naylor

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This book converted to digital file in 2010 Contents

Acknowledgements 5 5 Peace-keeping and humanitarian relief and rehabilitation Acronyms and glossary 6 Peace-keeping 30 Government relief and rehabilitation 1 Executive summary programmes 30 Background to the conflict 7 NGO relief and rehabilitation programmes 30 The impact of the conflict 8 Immediate peace-keeping and NGO/government co-operation 33 humanitarian response 8 The peace process 9 6 The peace process Conclusion 9 Government peace initiatives 34 Summary of recommendations 10 NGO initiatives 34 Peace-awareness campaign 36 2 Introduction 11 The Peace Agreement: issues addressed 41 3 Background to the conflict Peace projects initiated by NGOs and religious bodies 42 Introduction 12 Relationship with the government 43 Under-development and uneven development in Ghana 13 Assessment of the situation and future prospects 43 Population and ethnic groups in the 15 Land, production, and settlement 16 7 Conclusion 47 Governance 17 Ethnicity and identity 20 8 Recommendations For the Consortium 48 Conclusion 25 For local government 49 4 The war and its impact For traditional authority and civil-society leaders 49 The conflict 27 For central government 49 The impact 28 For donors 50 Contents

Appendices Figures 1 Example of workshop objectives, agenda Figure 1: Ghana's administrative Regions 12 and rules (Kumasi II) 51 Figure 2: Major ethnic groups in northern 2 Peace achievements in detail Ghana 14 (Kumasi I and II) 52 Figure 3: Districts in the north of Ghana 15 3 Workshop evaluation statements Figure 4: Current seats of paramounts and (Kumasi II) 53 other principal towns in the 4 Examples of grievances, losses, causes of Northern Region 18 the conflict, and action required, as Figure 5: Causes of the 1994-5 war in northern expressed by workshop participants Ghana 26 (Kumasi III) 54 Tables 5 Text of Kumasi Peace Accord 59 Chieftaincy in the Northern Table 1: Region 19 Notes 64 Acephalous groups claiming Table 2: chieftaincy 19 References 66 Some recent conflicts in the Northern Table 3: Region 24 Table 4: Conflict timeline 27 Table 5: Government and NGO relief and rehabilitation efforts 31 Table 6: Timeline of peace initiatives in northern Ghana 35 Table 7: NGO capacity-building needs 48 Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank all those in Ghana who contributed to the research on which this paper is based, and especially Isaac Osei, of ActionAid. Thanks are due also to all those in Oxford, especially the staff of the Oxfam Gender and Learning Team and the West Africa Desk, for their support while it was being written. Above all, we thank Ben Pugansoa, Programme Manager for Oxfam GB in Ghana, for his assistance and encouragement throughout the whole process.

Ada van der Linde Rachel Naylor October 1998 Acronyms and glossary

acephalous: segmentary society with no NAYA: Nanumba Youth Association chiefs or other secular political NORYDAL: Northern Region Youth and leaders Development Association ADD: Action on Disability and NPI: Nairobi Peace Initiative (Kenyan Development NGO) AGDRS: Assemblies of God Development ODA: UK Overseas Development and Relief Services Administration (now Department BADECC: Business Advisory Development for International Development) and Consultancy Centre PAC: Peace Awareness Committee cephalous: society with chiefs as part of its paramountcy: paramount chieftaincy, supreme political structure authority CRS: Catholic Relief Services PPNT: Permanent Peace Negotiation DAYA: Dagomba Youth Association Team (government-appointed) DCE: District Chief Executive REGSEC: Regional Security Council enskinment: process of installation of a chief TIDA: Ti Yum Taaba Development gate: one of the family lines Association designated to propose WFP: World Food Programme candidates for chiefship KOYA: Konkomba Youth Association Currency 1 billion cedis = MoFA: Ministry of Food and Agriculture 1 million US$ (1994)

6 1 Executive summary

Background to the conflict • Outright land sales are few. Most land is controlled by traditional authorities. Which When communities lose their stakes in peace, authority has this right in any particular area conflict breaks out. The reasons behind civil war may be contested. State-registered land titling is in Africa are often connected with livelihoods possible, but remains restricted. and power. Tensions may centre on ethnic • Limited agricultural development has priori- differences and other identities. There are also tised rice. Funds have been available for large- always issues specific to particular contexts. The scale entrepreneurs to create irrigated rice farms. main causes of the 1994-5 conflict in northern They have sometimes purchased land titles Ghana are summarised below. outright, using their knowledge of the formal land-tiding processes. This has created tensions Economic insecurity and uneven in these areas where local farmers consider that development their rights to land have been trespassed upon. • Northern Ghana remains a relatively unde- • Competition in the wholesaling and retailing veloped area. Public-service provision is weak, of yams has created tensions. Markets have also standards of literacy, nutrition, and health are become symbolically important in terms of ethnic correspondingly poor, and agriculture undevel- identity, and practically significant as arenas for oped. This situation creates insecurity. Jt has meeting and organising for war. The Konkomba been exacerbated by the negative impacts of yam market in is a case in point. economic structural adjustment. • Within the region, some areas are particularly Issues of governance deprived in terms of service infrastructure, • There have been disputes over traditional especially the rural areas. This disproportion- political leadership in the Northern Region, ately affects the ethnic groups concentrated in where four chiefly groups claim the right to those areas, often acephalous populations rule. In terms of numbers, these groups are in (segmentary groups or groups without chiefs), the minority. The 12 acephalous groups now and this in turn heightens tensions between claim the right to self-determination. The denial ethnic groups. of this right has precipitated conflict. A further cause of conflict is the fact that chiefly Disputes centred on land and groups have paramount chiefs who wield great production issues influence over development and decide on • Access to land and rights of control over traditional questions and land matters, co- land use are contested between different ethnic operating on these issues as members of the groups. 'Chiefly' (cephalous) groups claim Houses of Chiefs. Acephalous groups also seek ultimate ownership of land, vested in self-determination in the form of chieftaincy paramount chiefs. Acephalous peoples (with no structures and aspire to have their own chiefly power structures) contest this. paramounts, in order to influence the course of development and to gain representation and sway • Production systems differ. Acephalous in the Regional and National Houses of Chiefs. groups tend to practise long-term shifting cultivation, moving on to fertile areas when soil • Tensions have arisen from the democrati- fertility is exhausted. Cephalous groups tend to sation and decentralisation processes: recent live in permanent nucleated villages, using a initiatives have opened up competition for system of rotational fallowing to maintain soil limited resources at the local level. Where District fertility. This has led to tension where cephalous authorities have become the preserve of one groups believe 'their' land to be damaged by ethnic group, manipulation of resource-flows by shifting cultivation practices. that group has sometimes disadvantaged others. Building Sustainable Peace

• The rise of youth associations has been a Previous conflicts cause of conflict. With the spread of education, Northern Ghana has been subject to a cycle of associations have been formed, headed by conflict. Previously unresolved issues and desire members of the literate urban elite. These for revenge form the background to this constitute an alternative power base to chief- conflict. Rising belligerence, fuelled by rumours taincy in the Region. At first working for the and the press and by partial application of development of the Region and for education in justice and day-to-day insults, served to increase particular, newer associations have been formed tensions. along ethnic lines and they work for these smaller group interests. Since ethnic groups are Dispute over a guinea fowl effectively in competition (for the limited state resources in the Region, land control, and so Conflict was generally expected six months on), these groups are often mutually hostile. before its outbreak, although not on the scale on Alliances tend to form within groupings of the which it actually occurred. The spark for the war traditionally cephalous and groupings of was a dispute over the price of a guinea fowl at a acephalous youth associations. Youth associ- market in the . ations as well-established structures have been implicated in inciting conflict in pursuit of their own interests. The impact of the conflict • The conflict affected seven Districts in the Religious identity Northern Region. Both modern weaponry and • In rural areas, cults of the earth are practised, traditional techniques were used. Fighting was and there have been disputes over who has the most intense between February and May 1994 right to perform associated rituals. These are and in March 1995. often disputes between cephalous and acephalous • Lives lost are estimated at 15,000. Approxi- peoples. mately 200,000 people were displaced. • Most Muslims in northern Ghana belong to • The conflict entailed destruction of personal chiefly ethnic groups, whereas most Christians property, housing, and government services and are members of acephalous societies. Tensions infrastructure, and the dislocation of social life. between these groups have been fuelled by partisan missionary and development organis- • Interruption of the agricultural cycle meant ations, deciding to assist one group and not food shortages throughout the country. Vast another. government expenditure on peace-keeping reduced development budgets. Ethnicity • Some development work has empowered Immediate peace-keeping and certain groups to assert their ethnic identities and even to crystallise and standardise identities humanitarian response that were previously disparate. • Government peace-keeping was effective and • The ethnic groups make conflicting claims fair and has received wide acclaim. about rights to particular areas of land, based on • The government undertook a relief and contrasting legitimising factors (conquest or rehabilitation programme, including a refugee claims to an indigenous origin). These are evacuation and shelter programme, with food- linked to claims about rights either to rule other aid assistance from the WFP. groups or to gain independence from such rule. • Non-government organisations (NGOs) in northern Ghana formed an informal The arms race Consortium which co-ordinated their humani- Although weapons of war have been officially tarian aid efforts. NGOs organised refugee banned in northern Ghana since 1981, arms camps, food distributions, and the provision of were stockpiled and other preparations were other basic necessities. Co-operation with made before the 1994-5 conflict. This government peace-keepers and relief efforts was exacerbated tensions. good. Executive suninuii y

The peace process organsation, it aims to continue the peace campaign, defuse new tensions that arise, and work for the development of the Region. It Government provides the capacity for northern peoples to solve their own problems together, to sustain • The government formed a Permanent Peace the peace process. Negotiating Team that negotiated with each of the warring factions separately to draft a peace • Since the creation of NORYDA, the body has treaty in June 1994. This initiative had limited assisted in the dispersion ol tension in the Region long-term success in terms of reconciliation, on several occasions. NORYDA provides means because the parties were not brought together, for creating sustainable peace. and the approach relied on arbitration rather • Peace-awareness groups, meetings, and than facilitation. working groups for peace were established to work on the issues in the communities. This NGOs and civil society work is being continued and co-ordinated by • Seeing that NGO efforts at long-term NORYDA. development were being compromised by recur- • Some of the contested issues have been rent conflict in the Region, the Consortium resolved. For example, chiefly groups have sought permission to complement government agreed to recognise new paramount chiefs of efforts through a parallel peace process. some of the traditionally acephalous groups. • The Consortium sought the co-operation of Other issues remain outstanding, notably the the Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI), a Kenyan Nawuri-Gonja land-ownership dispute, which NGO specialising in conciliation work. has been exacerbated by tensions over the distribution of food aid during the current food • The Consortium and NPI started work at the crisis. grassroots, seeking to build up trust with communities and at the same time seek out peace-makers who could head a peace and reconciliation process led by representatives of Conclusion civil society. • NGO networks, like the Consortium, can play • After identifying such 'voices of reason' an invaluable role in promoting a sustainable among all the warring factions, the Consortium peace after conflict. Networks provide a neutral and NPI went on to facilitate peace workshops status which allows NGOs to work with groups with all these individuals together at Kumasi. A across civil society. civil-society organising group, the Peace • Informal, flexible consortia have many Awareness Committee, was then formed. It advantages. In northern Ghana, an informal worked with the Consortium and the NPI to consortium has been created which can build on continue peace education work at the local, its capacities generated during the conflict Regional, and national levels and to facilitate response, and its flexibility, to take on other more workshops at Kumasi involving various roles. Indeed it is attempting to do this during influential actors in the north, from youth- the current food crisis in north-east Ghana. association leaders to politicians. • The process is a good example of the • The talks were highly successful: tensions advantages that can be gained by networking eased, and some of the bases of the conflict were with other specialised NGOs in the continent to addressed. The process resulted in the signing share skills and build learning and capacities. of the Kumasi Peace Accord by the warring factions in March 1996. • In working towards the creation of a strong civil-society organisation and in continuing to • The peace process also entailed the creation fund it, capacity can be built within civil society and capacity-building of a new body, the to modify relationships peaceably and to sustain Northern Region Youth and Development peace. Association (NORYDA). Its Constitution was ratified by leaders of 12 ethnic groups in the Region. As a representative civil-society

9 Building Sustainable Peace

Summary of recommendations For traditional authority and civil-society leaders Build on reconciliation work at all levels and For the Consortium adhere to the Kumasi Peace Accord. Improve Organisation and direction: Retain the flexible collaboration with local government, especially character of the Consortium. Build its capacity in the development of political representation by devising emergency-preparedness plans, for all groups. Support and increase the capacity incorporating more gender planning, improv- of NORYDA. The Houses of Chiefs should work ing co-ordination, fostering linkages with inter- to improve the representative capacity of these national donors, and strengthening relations institutions and work quickly on conflict-related with local and national government to improve issues concerning chieftaincy and land. collaboration on information-sharing and other responses to conflict. For central government Consortium activities: Continue to support Continue the successful peace-keeping efforts. NORYDA. Institute peace training with NGOs, Ensure that policy incorporates development government officials, and local leaders. Imple- for all, to address inter-Regional and intra- ment data-gathering and disseminating for Regional imbalances. Facilitate political partici- early warning on crises. pation for all. Tighten arms-control measures. Individual NGOs: Incorporate peace Recognise and support NORYDA's work and objectives into development work, and monitor NGO development activity. on this basis. Improve development planning with government at all levels and with other For donors NGOs. Many NGOs need to build capacities for all these areas. Lobby for and support the equitable development of the Northern Region. Assist NORYDA's capacity-building and peace and For local government development work. Support the Consortium's Continue to promote peace and improve the future activities. Research and recognise the impartiality of resource distribution. Improve problems of channelling aid through the NGO collaboration with NGOs. or government sectors.

10 2 Introduction

In Northern Ghana, ethnic conflict during 1994 • Principal representatives of the NGO and 1995 resulted in casualties and dis- Consortium. placement on an unprecedented scale. NGOs in • Government officials at Regional and District the region formed a consortium to deal with the levels. immediate crisis and to initiate a process of • Divisional chiefs, community leaders, and peace negotiation among the warring factions. men and women at village level. This report describes these events and reviews • Aid-agency representatives based in Accra. the peace process. Commissioned by the The initiative for this documentation came from Consortium, it is based on an analysis of primary non-government organisations. Consequently, and secondary documents in Ghana and the UK, there was limited access to government officials undertaken by Ada van der Linde and Rachel at national and local level. Van der Linde could Naylor, and on interviews carried out in Ghana not meet with the government-appointed in August and September 1996 by Ada van der Permanent Peace Negotiation Team (PPNT). Linde and in October 1998 by Rachel Naylor. Thus, the report says little about the government Interview respondents comprised the perspective. following: This final report was written by Rachel Leaders of the warring factions who Naylor. participated in NGO-sponsored peace workshops and agreements: chiefs, youth association leaders, opinion leaders, and members of Parliament.

11 3 Background to the conflict

Introduction bordered by Togo, Cote d'lvoire, and Brong Ahafo Region (Figure 1). Together, these three Regions constitute one third of Ghana's land area. The 1994-5 conflict was confined to the Political and economic overview Northern Region. Northern Ghana comprises three Regions: Northern, Upper East, and Upper West,

Figure 1: Ghana's administrative Regions

BURKINA FASO

12 Background lo the conflict

Before independence, northern Ghana was an area of out-migration. As this migration administered as a separate Protectorate by the involves more men than women, women who are British. Independence in 1957 brought unity left behind face increased burdens as they take on and a promising economic start. However, some of the men's work in addition to their own.' strong state intervention in the economy, coupled with a policy of import-substituting Education industrialisation and agricultural mechanisa- tion, resulted in a sharp economic decline that Education suffered during the economic began in 1975. By 1983 the country was in crisis. decline, as fewer teachers were trained, school This led to the adoption of economic infrastructure deteriorated, and enrolment liberalisation and structural adjustment policies rates fell. Rural schools were harder hit than in conjunction with the IMF and the World urban institutions, and girls were more affected Bank, and a certain level of economic recovery. than boys. The macro-economy grew 50 per cent during In the north, educational provision is 1983-93, and Ghana was hailed as a flagship of particularly poor, except in the major District economic reform by the IMF.1 However, the capitals.5 Although cost-recovery in the form of social impact of the reforms has been severe. user-fees in education has not been introduced Adjustment involved thousands of compulsory in this area, because of its poverty, levies for redundancies in the civil service and the Parent-Teacher Associations and other dues parastatal organisations. Cost-recovery was are still enough to deter many parents from introduced in health and education services, sending their children to school. Enrolment resulting in sharp declines in attendance at rates are much higher in the south. Illiteracy health centres and schools. Removal of rates in the north are 92 per cent for women agricultural subsidies meant that inputs rose and 70 per cent for men, while the national drastically in price, affecting production. These averages are 64 per cent and 38 per cent.1' changes had the greatest impact on the poor. Literacy rates tend to be worse among ethnic groups living predominantly in rural areas, particularly the Konkomba. Education is the principal means of wealth acquisition and social Under-development and uneven 7 differentiation in the north. These inequalities development in Ghana of educational opportunity create a basis for ethnic strife in the north. Northern Ghana has a harsh environment with a single, unpredictable period of rainfall each year (southern Ghana has two) and poor soils. Under Health colonial rule, different policies (relating to Economic decline also took its toll on government education, agriculture, law, and so on) were health-service provision, and user fees have applied to northern Ghana. What comparative deterred attendance at clinics and hospitals. advantages the area might have had, in terms of Health status and infrastructure are generally potential for cotton and shea-nut production, for poorer in the north than elsewhere in Ghana. example, were not exploited. This resulted in NGO provision is generally of excellent quality the under-development of this area in but limited; government provision is scarce. comparison with the rest of the country. Since policy was implemented through chiefs, under Health care is especially weak in the rural areas. the system known as 'Indirect Rule', this also led Predominantly rural groups, particularly the to uneven development, often favouring some Konkomba, suffer from this pattern of provision. groups (with chiefs) over others. To a certain Severe nutritional deficiencies are common in extent, this pattern has continued ever since. the rural north, even in ordinary years, especially during the 'hunger season' before the first According to analysis of the Ghana Living harvest of the year. This is a source of tension. Standards Survey, 54 per cent of the poorest 10 per cent live in the north, although the north accounts for only 25 per cent of the total Agriculture population.- However, the north is an area of low The north's principal crops are food crops: yam, government spending. For example, the maize, guinea corn, millet, groundnuts, and Northern Region accounts for 15 per cent of the cowpeas. It also produces rice, shea nuts (mostly population, yet only 5 per cent of national gathered from wild trees), and cotton for cash resources are spent here.3 As a result, the north is and export. However, the main emphasis in

13 Building Sustainable Peace national policy implementation remains (as in fall in northern maize and rice production in the colonial era) on the southern export-crop favour of yam, groundnuts, and millet, which do sector: cocoa, coffee, and palm oil. Development not require fertiliser. support for food crops is relatively small. This In the north, post-adjustment agricultural means that northern farmers tend to be poorer schemes such as the Low Risk Agriculture than those in the south. Project8 and Global 2000" are of limited benefit. Under structural adjustment, subsidies for However, the newly liberalised cotton sector, fertiliser, seeds, and traditional agricultural working with cotton outgrowers, offers technologies (hoes, cutlasses, and sacks) were increasing opportunities for small-scale farmers withdrawn. This has affected the north to benefit from fertilisers, insecticides, and particularly badly. There has been a significant tractor-ploughing.

Figure 2: Major ethnic groups in northern Ghana (reproduced with the permission of the publisher from Barker 1986)

14 Background to the conflict.

Figure 3: Districts in the north of Ghana (from Holtkamp, 1993)

TONON- i • Siiveliiini ^ . -* /

'KUMISUNOU .-*t , \ y— ^ . • Tolon / TAMALE "" • Ycndi /

N. ^ v / WESTJMGOMBA EAST x DAGOMBA c-> •Znbzugu ,-> b ( S \ s Z/\BZUGU-

Population and ethnic groups in (, , , ) are areas of the Northern Region relatively low population density. The latest population figures from the last There are 16 major ethnic groups in the Census (1994) do not disaggregate the Region Northern Region.10 Ten are traditionally by ethnic groups. Estimates suggest that the acephalous:" Aiiufo, Bassare, Bimoba, Builsa, 1994 populations of the largest groups involved Konkomba, Mo, Nawuri, Nchumuru, in the conflict were Dagombas 268,000, Tampollensi, and Vagala. Four are cephalous: Konkombas 247,000, Gonjas 134,000, and Dagomba, Conja, Mamprusi, and Nanumba. Nanumbas 27,000.l:i The numerical strength of Figure 2 indicates the principal geographical the Konkombas suggested by these figures is areas of each ethnic group in the Northern striking in the light of assertions that acephalous Region. Since many of the group members are groups are 'minority' groups, a claim sometimes spread throughout the Region, live in multi- used to justify the lack of representation ethnic settlements, and inter-marry, this is only afforded to acephalous groups by traditional a guide. politics. Given that large groups, such as the The population of the Northern Region is Konkombas, or groups which are numerically estimated at 1.44 million, mostly living in 3,000 dominant in certain areas, such as the Nawuris scattered settlements. This makes it the most at or the Konkombas in the Nanumba sparsely populated Region, with a density of 20 District, must pay allegiance to smaller ruling per square kilometre.1-' Notably, the areas groups, tensions and demands for self- where fighting was most intense in 1994—5 determination are not surprising.

15 Building Sustainable Peace

Land, production, and Land control and acquisition at the local settlement level Although the 'ultimate' title to land is recog- nised by the state as vested in chiefs, land at the Land and state legislation local level is regarded as 'owned' (controlled) by lineages (family lines or 'clans'). All land is Since 1902 the colonial and post-colonial states regarded as owned by someone. have enacted various land laws. Some of them Most rural land is never sold. When have vested land in the state rather than the chiefs, 'strangers' require land, they will make a and some have attempted to regulate land use and request to the head of a lineage, at the same time register land 'ownership'." The most significant as presenting 'kola' (which is often actual kola impact of this was that during the colonial era nuts or another token gift). If there is spare large-scale land sales were prevented. This pre- land, the landowner will lend it. The landowner empted the emergence of a land market, unlike in may take the land back after a year, but long- the south of Ghana. term land lending is common. The borrower In practice, most land has remained outside may offer part of his or her harvest to the owner, the regulation of the state, because the use and but this is not a requirement. implementation of formal land law and The ultimate source of tension here is over registration procedures has been limited. The land ownership. For acephalous groups to current Constitution (Republic of Ghana 1992) acquire land, they are required to participate in vests land in chiefs. a process which recognises that the land belongs Chiefly control of land has not traditionally to others. implied private ownership in the Western sense. Land ownership has been bound up with the political power to control people within an area, Production and settlement rather than control over territory. Kingdoms Most farmers operate on a small-scale, semi- were based on the control of people (a scarce subsistence basis. Production patterns vary economic resource) rather than land (which was according to ethnic group. Chiefly groups tend plentiful).lfl However, by the late 1970s, chiefly to live in nucleated villages and farm on the domination had increasingly come to mean perimeters of the village, using a crop-rotation territorial control in some areas. This position and fallowing system. Acephalous groups, par- was bolstered by the 1979 Constitution.10 ticularly Konkombas, often live on isolated farmsteads which are scattered across the The Third Republic ... for the. first time in the modern landscape. When soil fertility is reduced in one history of Ghana recognised that land, tenure is vested, area, acephalous people move on to a new one, in the ethnic groups and their authorities which luippen which results in patterns of long-distance to be historically dominant in any particular area. migration over the generations. Political factors This conceptual shift to viewing land as privately invariably affect the direction of this movement. owned in some areas has also been exacerbated For example, Skalnik (1983) describes the mass by the increasing value of land (particularly its migration of Konkombas into the Nanumba reconstitution as scarce building land in urban area in colonial times, caused by the 'pull' of areas and as a scarce productive resource in rice- fertile soil and the 'push' of the relatively more growing areas) and by changes in production coercive colonial practices in Togo. relations (see below). The different production systems are a source of tension. For example, Konkomba Formal land sales farming practices are criticised by chiefly groups, who claim that Konkomba will farm Formal land acquisition remains limited. It is land until it is exhausted and then move on, confined to the sales of plots in urban areas for 17 leaving poor land. Migrations are also a source housing, and for state and business use (such as of tension when they occur on a large scale. government buildings from hospitals to adminis- trative blocks, and company premises), govern- ment acquisition of land in rural areas for various Marketing projects (such as agricultural stations, air-strips, Ethnic conflict in 1981 saw a change in market- forest and wildlife reserves, military uses), and the ing patterns. Konkomba practise extensive yam private purchase of rural land (principally for rice cultivation; until that point they were marketing farms and NGO agricultural projects). through Nanumba middlemen. They then

16 Background to the conflict began to market their own produce, and this led Ghana is divided into 10 Regions and 110 to the development of the Konkomba yam Districts. The Northern Region comprises 10 market in Accra. Districts. There are no Regional democratic Some interviewees noted that this switch in forums, but Districts were democratised in 1989. marketing has led to ethnic tension. Certainly, One third of the District Assembly members are the Konkomba market in Accra became a locus elected. Democratisation at a lower level, the lor the articulation of Konkomba identity, and, Unit, is currently underway. Democratisation is later on, a forum in which to organise and to at its early stages, since decision-making is still raise money for the 1994-5 struggle. largely centralised. Administrative decentralisation is also being The consequences of new production carried out at Regional and District levels. developments for land Regional Ministers and Regional Administrations co-ordinate activities of the sector ministries at In contrast with the south, there is little that level and liaise with the NGO sector. There extensive agricultural development in northern are also Regional-level Security Councils Ghana. Larger-scale rice projects are the (REGSECs). The newest tier of administrative exception to this. decentralisation is the District Administration In the 1970s, Ghanaian and German devel- (with District Chief Executives as politically opment aid contributed to the development of appointed heads, and District Co-ordinating irrigated rice farming and upland rice farming Directors as government bureaucratic heads, on natural swamps. The huge Ghanaian- with their sectoral district officers), which co- German Agricultural Development Programme ordinates District-level ministry activity. (GGDAP) intensified mechanised farming and There are sometimes tensions between exacerbated deforestation, particularly in the District Chief Executives and District Co- Northern Region. The programme sought to ordinating Directors as political interests and draw the Region into the global rice market. intrigues come into play. Anxious to protect long-term investments in The District Assemblies draw up District irrigation and equipment, some rice entre- Development Plans and Budgets. The District preneurs bought the land from chiefs and used Assembly has access to funds to pay for the their knowledge of the formal sector to register Plans from the government-allocated District the purchases. This created conflicts in areas where the original population felt dispossessed, Assemblies' Common Fund. Since 5 per cent of and they denied that the chiefs had the right to this Fund must be raised locally, it is evident that sell the land. This has even led to incidents of Assemblies in more prosperous urban and rural rice-burning and acts of vandalism against rice areas benefit most from this system. It is much machinery.18 harder for District Assemblies to raise income Some changing production relations, then, locally in the north. Consequently, better have been a source of conflict in northern Ghana. services, paid for by the Common Fund, can be provided in the south.19 In practice, the use of budgets is often subject to manipulation for vote-winning and aggran- Governance disement of those in power. Budget allocations are still influenced by Accra and by the dominant ethnic groups in the District The nation state, democratisation, and Assembly, leading to uneven development. The decentralisation new possibilities created by this innovation — After 11 years of military rule, democratisation the access to decision-making, power and at the national level began with the 1992 multi- resources — partly explain why groups struggle party presidential and parliamentary elections. for representation or indeed a District of their Jerry Rawlings was elected as President of the own, where the existing District Assembly does new Fourth Republic in 1992 and re-elected in not seem to provide for their needs. Holtkamp 1996. One source of tension arising from the (1993:290) notes that decentralisation has led to parliamentary system is that M Ps often lobby for the sharpening of ethnic conflicts in many the development of their own areas and ethnic Districts throughout Ghana. groups. Under-represented groups are at a disadvantage.

17 Building Sustainable Peace

'Traditional' political organisation ruled through chiefs under the indirect-rule Forms of traditional political organisation are policy.-'- The geographical areas to which the very strong in Ghana. Political organisation orbits correspond have waxed and waned over often takes the form of hierarchical chieftaincy the years, according to the strength of the structures operating in centralised traditional chiefly groups and the power of acephalous states. Paramount chiefs are at the pinnacle of groups at the periphery to resist rule. In the these structures, with responsibility for installing context of the nation state they are loosely divisional chiefs, who in turn install lesser chiefs. demarcated and labelled Traditional Areas. Eligibility to compete for chiefship is ascribed Figure 4 shows these capitals and other through inherited membership of particular principal towns in Northern Region. lineages.-'0 In the north, unlike most of Ghana, Some acephalous groups claim to be chiefs cannot be relieved of their positions. indigenous to the area. Other acephalous groups Today, Traditional Councils act as secretariats claim to be settlers in the area. Traditionally for paramount chiefs and are consulted in segmentary in structure,-3 these groups are not traditional matters. centralised and may be composed of many sub- In the Northern Region, the four chiefly groups scattered over a wide area. For example, groups are regarded as descendants of a small the Konkomba are composed of 17 clans living in band of invaders who entered the region several Districts within and outside the Region approximately 400 years ago. Traditionally, and in Togo. The Nchumurus are also spread these chiefs have been able to call on warrior over five Districts, within and outside the lineages to mobilise for war. Today, they regard Region. This reflects the pattern of production themselves as ruling over members of the and migration described. In other cases, cephalous and acephalous groups within the acephalous groups are confined to one region, 'orbits' of their chiefship.21 This position was for example the Nawuri, who consider bolstered in colonial times, when the British themselves as indigenous to the Kpandai area.

Figure 4: Current seats of paramounts and other principal towns in the Northern Region

Nakpanduri N

Key All-weather road Current seats of paramounts

18 Background to the conflict

Konkombas are a significant acephalous Table 2: Acephalous groups claiming group within the Dagomba, Gonja, and chieftaincy Nanumba orbits of chiefsliip. Navvuris and Nchumurus live within the Gonja orbit. The Ethnic group Konkomba Ncluiinuru Nawuri legitimacy of chiefly rule is questioned by all these groups. Concurrence with chiefly rule has Kingdom/ Saboba kpandai involved paying allegiance to chiefs through capital claim27 respecting traditional ceremonies, accepting chiefly authority in all manner of disputes from Paramount Ucha-bobor Nanjirowina Ubo land to marriage, following customary codes of chiefship claim conduct, and making symbolic gifts at various times, such as after hunting game.-'1 These vary according to the chiefly group. How far chiefly groups can impose their will, and how far Chiefship, local and national government, acephalous groups co-operate with custom and and development demand, determine the nature of allegiance Apart from their authority over chieftaincy and paid at any one time. land matters, chiefs have great influence over Chiefs and people from chiefly societies are many other areas of development. They have represented in the Regional and National particular sway in decision-making and Houses of Chiefs by paramount chiefs. In the resource-flows in the District.-8 This explains Northern House of Chiefs, for example, the demands for chiefs by acephalous groups and is four chiefly groups are represented. This another source of tension. cannot constitute a quorum. Exclusion of members of acephalous ethnic The sphere of action of the Houses is over groups from participation in the political Chieftaincy matters and land disputes. In the process and enjoyment of the fruits of north, land is vested in chiefs under the 1992 development also extends to non-royal, non- Constitution. Given the importance of chief- elite members of the chiefly groups. This is a taincy in everyday life and the significance of further source of tension. land, direct representation in these Houses is now sought after by all ethnic groups. This is a significant cause of conflict. Current chieftaincy Youth associations structures in the Northern Region are A Northern Youth Association was set up in represented in Table 1. the 1960s. It aimed to represent Northern Table 2 presents the acephalous groups Ghana and promote northerners' interests, currently demanding chieftaincy in order to especially in education. As education became benefit from representation in the Northern more widespread, the need for this association House of Chiefs. As one report'-6 noted, the lessened. 'process of elevation to Paramountcy ... has now Newer on the scene, local (often ethnic- become a yardstick for social and even political based) youth associations have been created strength among various ethnic groups'. over the last few decades.

Table 1: Chieftaincy in the Northern Region

Ethnic group Dagomba Gonja Nanumba Mamprusi

Kingdom Dagbon Gonja Nanun Mamprugu

Capital25 Yendi Datnongo

Paramount title Ya-Na and his Yagbonwura Cliambanaa Nayiri sister Gundulanaa

Divisional chiefs Mion Lana, Tulewura, Juonaa, Soo Naa, Wulugu Naa Susonaa, Gushienaa Mandarewura, Gambugnaa, Yunyorana, Wu-Naa Kanjasewura janjirinaa

19 Building Sustainable Peace

They are voluntary organisations with ascribed clear the virgin bush in an area, rights to membership based on origin in a particular territory or propitiate are bound up with claims about ritual ethnic affiliation. The associations fall together with the stewardship and rights to use land. The right to definitions of 'traditional areas' or chiefdoms, and the propitiate has sometimes been a source of term 'youth' generally implies no age limit on. members conflict in northern Ghana. In Nanun, for but is rather a socio-political calegoiy which places the example, Nanumba say that only the priests associations in the communal framework of the 'chiefs', whom they recognise can perform land rites. 'elders'and 'people'. 'Youth'means the politically active This right is disputed by the Konkomba earth who consider themselves opinion leaders, but only in the priests not recognised by the Nanumbas. widest sense does it also mean biologically 'young men. Christianity and Islam also find expression The ideology and. chief activities of the associations are here. There are numerous missions, churches, indeed, in most cases entirely focused, on men, even and associated development organisations and though women sometimes organise their oitrn parallel projects. Much Christian missionary activity is meetings. (Lentz, 1995:395) concentrated among acephalous people, and the number of converts is higher than among Leadership is held by a new literate elite, whose cephalous groups. This activity includes running members have attained their position through churches, schools, and literacy programmes. new forms of social differentiation based on 9 Observers note that this work has contributed to education.'-' They act to conscientise and the construction of ethnic identities and empow- empower their ethnic groups. As Lentz (1995: erment, as has the work of some Christian 395) notes, the leaders have increasingly 'acted development organisations whose main focus is as spokesmen of their ethnic groups in the development or education rather than conver- militant ethnic conflicts that have repeatedly sion. For example, Skalnik (1987:307-8) notes shaken the region since the 1970s'. Thus, the for the Konkomba: importance of youth leaders in terms of political leadership has increased in relation to that of ...the 'tribe'has emerged only very recently... They were chiefs. Respondents said that youth associations originally divided, into a number of 'sub-tribes'... are particularly strong among acephalous Likpokpaln (the Konkomba language) is the result of groups, particularly the Konkombas. efforts... of the Ghana Institute of Linguistics, Literacy The principal youth associations in Northern and Bible Translation, who designed its alphabet, Ghana are the Anufo Progressive Union, Bimoba fomuilised Us grammar and published the first texlbooh Youth Association, Dagbon Youth Association, on the basis of the most central Sanguli dialect. The Gonja Youth Association, Konkomba Youth Konkomba speak various, only marginally mutually Association, Mamprusi Youth Association, intelligible dialects. Implicitly this contributes to identity Nanumba Youth Association, Nawuri Youth fonnation. Association, Nchumuru Youth Association, World Vision, for example, works mainly in Tampulma Youth Association, and Vagla Youth Konkomba areas, regarding these regions as Association. particularly impoverished. Empowering the Elite echelons within youth associations were poor and contributing to identity formation in regarded by interview respondents as having an this area may have contributed to conflict. This, important role in bringing about the 1994-5 of course, is one of the dilemmas of develop- conflict. ment. However, there have been accusations that some religious organisations have delib- erately incited conflict in an effort to address the Ethnicity and identity power imbalance. Elites of the ruling groups, on the other hand, are generally Islamic.30 Islamic development Religion and identity agencies are now increasingly supporting the Traditional religion featuring cults of people creation of primary schools and the promotion (ancestor cults, individual shrines) and cults of of education as well. Again, this contributes to place (earth cults) remains important in the empowerment and the crystallisation of Northern Region among all ethnic groups. identities. Earth priests have traditionally propitiated the Tension related to this religious-ethnic division spirits of the land, although observers note that has grown significantly in the north, with the rise their influence is waning. Since earth priests are of Christian and Islamic militancy associated with regarded as descendants of the first people to the influx of certain missions in the last 15 years.

20 Background to the conflict

Militants constitute a tiny minority. Indeed, The Dagomba perspective numbers of practising Muslims and Christians still The Dagomba claim to land ownership, and to remain low. Barker (1986) notes, for example, legal powers over acephalous groups, is based that only 6 per cent of Konkombas are Christian on the fact that Dagombas regard themselves as and only 5 per cent of Nanumbas are Islamic, descendants of an invading chiefly class who whereas 2 per cent are Christian. Dagombas are defeated indigenous tribes over 400 years ago in the most Islamicised group: 50 per cent are the area that is now the Kingdom of Dagbon. practising adherents. Even then, most people Interviewees said that the Dagomba intro- claiming a religious affiliation still tend to practise duced chieftaincy to the acephalous Konkomba. an eclectic mix of spiritual activity. However, Konkomba heads and chiefs were gradually interviewees stated that, used as a political tool, recognised by the Dagomba. There had never religious differences have been an important been discrimination against Konkomba, and cause of conflict. this is proved by many inter-marriages. Dagomba interviewees said that over the past 30 31 years young educated Konkomba have Perspectives of the groups regretted the fact that there is no Konkomba The varied and sometimes conflicting per- paramount chief. But Konkombas still have spectives of the principal groups involved in the chiefs in some areas of Dagbon who pay 1994-5 conflict, put forward by interviewees, allegiance to senior Dagomba chiefs. are presented here. These accounts outline the Konkombas petitioned for paramountcy. histories, myths, and lived realities which are Dagombas objected to the way this was done, drawn on to validate contemporary claims to because it did not respect tradition. In October land, sovereignty, and so on, and led to the 1993 and April 1995 the Dagomba Traditional conflict. Council denounced the request for para- The Gonja perspective mountcy in writing. 'The carving out of land out Gonja interviewees claimed that the Gonja chiefly of Dagbon for the Saboba-na' was said to be dynasty began with a warrior leader who came impossible, as the traditions of paramountcy are from the north-west hundreds of years ago. He foreign to Konkombas. fought the settled population and took over the Dagomba interviewees regarded the belliger- land, corresponding to half of Northern Region. ence of the Konkomba as the cause of the conflict. Current boundaries are Kintampo (south), the They believed that the conflict was long-planned. border with Cote d'lvoire (west), the area to the Just before the war, a memorandum saying that east of Kpembe and Kpandai (these areas are Dagbon would be attacked was circulated by included in the claim), and Tamale (north). The Konkombas. Konkombas ceased to pay allegiance Gonja eventually controlled the political situa- to Dagomba chiefs, refusing to give them hind legs tion, but indigenous earth priests were allowed to of cattle slaughtered at funerals and disregarding continue. Some of the indigenous people became the judicial functions of the chiefs. warriors in the Gonja army. Respondents also said that Dagbon had not Gonja interviewees said that they live with planned for war, and arms had not been stockpiled three other ethnic groups in the west and one by Dagombas. Protracted internal chieftaincy group (the Nawuris) in the east, with whom they problems led in 1981 to an ongoing ban on arms in share language and culture (the languages are this area, which the Dagombas respected. basically Gonja, although they have a slightly Interviewees also said they felt that the different form). government had tacitly supported the According to Gonja interview respondents, Konkombas. They felt that the problems had two recent pie-1994 conflicts involving the been aggravated by Presidential speeches in Gonja were caused by 'kinsmen' fighting (firstly 1993-4 which suggested that 'the land belongs Gonja and Gonja, then Gonja and Nawuri). A to no one' and that 'minority' groups should be third recent conflict involved the Gonjas against supported in their requests for land. the Konkombas and Nawuris on the other. This account is controversial in its assertion Controversial parts of this account include that Dagomba rule is legitimate, that there has the legitimacy of the political and territorial never been anti-Konkomba discrimination, that control claimed by the Gonja, and the assertion Saboba land belongs to Dagombas, that that the other ethnic groups do not have distinct Konkomba are the only war-planners and languages and identities. These assertions are instigators, and that the government had been causes of tension. partisan towards the Konkombas.

21 Building Sustainable Peace

The Nanumba perspective one of the things that trigger problems, is the marketing Nanumba interviewees noted that Nanumba of this produce. Konkombas are the dominant people also claim descent from chiefly invaders. producers of yam. They go to the market and. arrange Later, under colonialism, Nanumba District was yams in heaps for a particular price. Somebody else administered as part of German Togoland until goes in to turn them away, and, says, 'No you can 7 do 1919, when it was transferred to British that, you. people, you are not from this place. This is our administration. land. You can't come and produce, here and. sell it at Nanumbas say that they experienced that price.' And it created, a lot of friction a. number of considerable Konkomba migration into the times. And. people fought locally over that. District after World War II as a threat, because it Controversial parts of this account include the meant that Konkombas could sway things in assertion that Nanumbas have a legitimate right their favour. However, Nanumba say that they to rule over Konkombas, and accusations of accepted the Konkombas. Konkomba war-mongering. Nanumbas lived through severe conflict with Konkombas in 1981, but peace was restored The Konkomba perspective thereafter. Towards 1994, their fear began to Konkombas claim that they are indigenous to increase that Konkombas would try to wipe them Dagbon. In an interview with The Ghanaian Times out entirely. The creation of the Konkomba (1995), 14 Konkomba chiefs claim that long Youth Association increased Nanumba fears, as before the Dagomba ancestors set foot in the area did the mounting refusals of Konkombas to pay 'our forefathers were there, and the Ya-Na's allegiance to Nanumba chiefs and submit to their ancestors did not dispossess the Konkomba of judicial authority. For example, the Konkomba their land either through battle or by any other started to refuse to give the cows' hind legs to means ...'. Konkomba rather say that they gave chiefs at the funerals of important persons, as sanctuary to the arriving Dagombas. The demanded by tradition. Konkomba say that Dagomba historians have Nanumba interviewees contended that given the wrong information on land tenure to Konkombas began to receive outside sympathy the Ya-Na. The Dagomba chiefs at Sunsun, in the build-up to the war. They also contend Demon, and elsewhere in the Konkomba area are that Konkomba have no title to the land and no regarded as 'outpost' chiefs by Konkombas. They ambitions for paramountcy. There are 365 self- were sent there to check Konkomba advance and declared Konkomba 'chiefs', whom Nanumbas they do not have control over Konkombas. do not recognise. Indeed, their creation has Konkomba agree that in other areas of Ghana caused Nanumbas offence. Nanumbas say that Konkombas are recent settlers and should not Konkombas did not mix with Nanumbas, have paramountcies. The Konkomba land claim because Konkombas felt inferior, and they say in the Oti Basin is based on long-term that the two groups never intermarried. settlement. In Nanun, Konkomba settlement is The Nanumbas say that they did not expect a a much more recent phenomenon. war in 1993 and had not planned or prepared Before the conflict, the Konkombas had for one. There was a build-up of letters, petitioned the President for a paramountcy. exchanges, accusations, and rumours that led to This had been referred to the Northern the conflicts with the other ethnic groups, but the Regional House of Chiefs. The demands were Nanumba did not feel particularly concerned, lor the elevation of the Konkomba Saboba because they were not mentioned in letters. Divisional chief to paramountcy, a Konkomba Nanumba say that the government acted Traditional council, a Konkomba chief in the partially towards the Konkombas. Supporting the Nanumba District, and improved state dealings Konkombas with housing, the government also with Konkombas (including a fair legal process, gave the impression that 'minority tribes' would DCE impartiality towards Konkombas, and an gain support if they fought for land. Nanumbas ethnic balance in political appointments). In the conclude that the Konkombas deliberately caused petition, the Konkombas threatened that, if they the war just before the elections, to ensure victory did not get a paramountcy, they would fight for for the Rawlings government. it. Konkombas did not take kindly to the Nanumba also see some of the Konkomba Dagomba refusal of their requests. yam-production and marketing activities to be Konkomba say that they are disadvantaged by illegitimate. One respondent commented: limited access to education and other services. .. land is generally plenty ...So whoever is strong to And with education, people who were considered, farm should be allowed to farm. ... But the problem, minorities, they haven't had access to education. So the

22 Background to the conflict agitation came that they had to fight for rights and Association, Konkomba Youth Association. So when we fighting for your rights means they have to make a met we decided, okay let's fust go and find a solution to all stand saying: 'Enough is enough of this, we also want this dichotomy. ... so that we urill have an all-embracing to have land'. union that will bring us together and. then we will be able to sort of recommend good, relationships and resist any Konkombas also say that they have been treated tension that vie can foresee to be coming. When the with partiality by chiefs, particularly in the judgement of Konkomba marriage cases. In 1981, Gonjas iiient for their Gonja Youth Association meeting Konkombas began to claim and practise the right in , they came back ivitli this all infuriating in Nanumba District to try their own such cases, tenninology: 'Gonjaland. Youth Association'... to avoid embarrassment and promote justice. Bitterness about the relationship with Gonjas led Coupled with disputes over the right of Nanumba to Nchumurus and Nawuris fighting Gonjas in middlemen to dominate the yam trade in the 1991. The same unresolved issues led to the 1994 District, this led to the huge Konkomba-Nainimba conflict. The legitimacy of the Nchumuru claim to iL conflict in 1981 .' ' Konkombas also state that they land and political independence is controversial. have received derogatory treatment from chiefly groups, being referred to as 'aliens', 'uncivilised The Nawuri perspective people', and so on. Nawuris assert that they are indigenous to the Again, the claims about legitimacy of Kpandai area and claim the land there as Konkomba rights to land and self-determination Nawuri territory. This is contested by the are controversial. Gonjas. The status of the area was not clarified under colonial rule. It was first administered as The Nclmnmru perspective part of German Togoland under Yendi (the The Nchumuru feel that their identity and Dagomba capital) and then as part of Salaga rights and their claims to Nchumuru land District by the British. This encouraged Gonja ownership are being denied under Conja rule. claims, since Salaga is a Gonja town. Nchumurus were placed under Gonja rule by The area is administered on paper by the the British colonial administration. One Salaga District Assembly. However, the Nawuris interviewee said, 'Until we are identified as say that educational and health services are groups, we will not participate in anything.' being refused to them by a partisan Assembly. Another said, 'Every Gonjaman knows ... the (Gonjas claim that it is rather the Nawuris who Nanjirowura, who is the paramount chief of the refuse to accept these services, as it would imply Nchumurus and who is the aid of Nchumurus in dependence rather than sovereignty.) Nawuris every place ... So, where does the word come certainly do not want Kpandai to remain under from, "Gonja land"?' Nchumurus contest the the Salaga District Assembly, arguing that it concept of 'Gonjaland', because it implies that denies their status. They demand a separate they have no land rights. District. Currently, Nawuris use health and Nchumurus state that they feel oppressed in education services provided by the World Northern Region. Nchumurus feel they have Evangelical Council. been discriminated against and that their human Nawuris have developed chiefs and say that identity has been denied. As one interviewee said, all 'strangers' in Kpandai, among whom they 'It is just an evolution. Things have come to a include Gonjas, are acceptable as citizens who point where people must think that others too are respect Nawuri chiefs, and not 'overlords'. human and they want to live with them as equals.' Before 1992, the Nawuris attempted to go They also feel they are denied development. through the central government to attain the 'We are in five Regions... [with paramount] chiefs paramountcy they desired. However, after the ... [at]Yeji... Prang... [and]... Kpasa. These are all 1992 Constitution was put in place, the Nchumurus and there is only a small segment of government said that this document implied [us] in Northern Region. That is why we are that only Houses of Chiefs could decide on suffering. We have become a minority.' chieftaincy matters. The National House of Nchumurus describe how they tried to bring Chiefs did not consider the case, and the themselves, Nawuris, and the Gonjas together Nawuris believed that it would not do so, in 1980, by suggesting a joint youth and because they are a small group. This was a development association. However, they claim further source of tension. that the idea was subverted by the Gonjas. Once more, Nawuris make controversial ... at that lime there were Gonja Youth Association, claims for self-determination. Nawuri Youth Association, Nchumuru Youth

23 Building Sustainable Peace

Table 3: Some recent conflicts in the Northern Region

Year Groups involved Description

1981 Konkonibas and Nanumbas Issue: chieftaincy reforms instituted by Konkomba Youth Association. Largest conflict pre-1994.

1984 Bimobas and Konkonibas Issue: chieftaincy. In the north-east of the Region. Sparked by a market dispute. 20 dead.

1986 Biniobas and Konkonibas About 20 dead.

1989 Bimobas and Konkonibas About 20 dead.

1991 Nawuris and Gonjas Issue: Nawuri independence at Kpandai. Modern weapons used. 78 dead.

Dagombas Issue: succession dispute at Karaga and Gushiegu. 40 dead.

Dagombas and security forces Issue: anti-government feeling at Tamale. Riot at traditional Fire Festival, 8 dead.

1992 Konkomba, Nawuri, Bassare, Issue: chieftaincy. High deatli loll. Nchuniurus and Gonjas

Dagombas and security forces Issue: post-election anti-government feeling. Riot in Tamale.

1993 Mossis and Konkonibas Issue: chieftaincy. Spilled into Togo.

Previous conflicts and unresolved issues Even government admits not to have anticipated the The 1994-5 conflict followed a cycle of conflict scale ami intensity of the fighting, which was and insecurity in the north of Ghana, related to unprecedented, and tliat the conflict luid very serious anti-government disputes, intra-ethnic succession fundamental undertones. Until. 1994, similar eruptions disputes, feuds within ethnic groups, and inter- had been very localised; but this time there was use of ethnic disagreements between cephalous and very sophisticated weapons, which exposed the fact that acephalous groups.311 Recent conflicts are listed in there could be some external factors at play as well. Table 3. Some of the unresolved disputes from One interviewee commented: these conflicts formed the bones of contention in the 1994-5 war. There were more arms around,... and. they were actively sold... in Tamale, Accra, and in other markets. The Arms race presence of arms seems to have been a cause or at least a heavily provocative factor in the conflict and in the Preparations for conflict, the stockpiling of weapons, and the availability of arms also spread of the violence. contributed to the war. There had been an The arms build-up was funded by careful ongoing government ban on arms for war since organisation on the part of some of the groups. 1981, but arms control is difficult to maintain in the context of an under-resourced state and in a Exclusion, subjection, belligerence situation where weapons are widely used for hunting and at funeral rites. Often, chiefly rule involves the exclusion of The 1994 conflict was the first time that members of acephalous ethnic groups from modern arms, such as AK47s, were widely used participation in the political process and from in conflict in the Northern Region. Their origin enjoyment of the fruits of development. It has is not established, but they were certainly sometimes gone further than this, entailing widely available. An NGO report34 on a meeting oppression. For example, the traditional system with the Minister of Employment and Social allows for flexibility in patterns of land control. Welfare states: Where acephalous people have been staying on

24 Background to ihe conliici. land for several years, they can be given seized arms, ammunition, and tear gas held permanent land-holding status. To deliberately there. A week later, a dispute over the price of a deny this without good reason, as has so often guinea fowl at Nakpayili market in the same been the case, according to interviewees, may be District sparked off full-scale violence. regarded as subjection. Another example is the abrupt way in which acephalous petitions for paramountcy have been rejected. Conclusion On a day-to-day level, some of the interviewees said that the tensions were raised by individuals Cairns (1997) argues that risks of war are from chiefly groups belittling individuals from increased when the following conditions are acephalous groups. No one likes to be made to satisfied: feel inferior. This everyday situation is a key issue. In the face of these denials of representation, • Societies are divided by ethnic or religious identity, and status, acephalous groups have identity, particularly if people see that they demanded self-determination. suffer because of belonging to their group and they blame the other group for this. On the other hand, animosity and belliger- • There is intense competition over the means ence have also been shown by acephalous to earn a living, particularly if the groups. This has exacerbated tensions. In the competition is rapidly increasing and the presentations of petitions, for example, protocol means are decreasing. has not been followed. In the Konkomba • There is no framework to permit peaceful petition, one clause contained an open threat of change. violence. Ethnic relations have, of course, varied from All these factors operated in northern Ghana. place to place, depending on the claims made. As Pul argues,3" ethnic groups are inter- For example, one respondent described how, dependent, and the conflict represents an among the Konkomba at Saboba, land and attempt to redefine the terms of this inter- political independence are claimed, and relations dependence, in the absence of any legitimate were particularly poor with the chiefly groups process to contain it. Chieftaincy and land issues also claiming authority. On the other hand, in are markers in this process of redefinition. Bimbilla town there was a certain level of sharing ... the fad that the conflicts exist and persist in the and integration with the Nanumba and, in region is an indicator of some, degree of Dagbon, inter-marriage. interdependence among the various parties to the The importance of certain bellicose individ- conflict. The. conflict situation represents attempts of uals in generating and orchestrating aggression the parties to redefine the terms of their independence; and organising for war cannot be under- namely production relationships, power relationships, estimated. access to and control, over productive resources etc. For instance, the issues frequently mentioned, as the Communications and rumours of war immediate causes of the conflict are those related to the Tensions were further heightened because of subjects of chieftaincy and. land. But it must be realised, rumours of war circulating in the press and by that no one is fighting for chieftaincy and. land for their word of mouth. NGOs had started gathering data own sake. Beyond these issues are deeper questions of about rumours in the previous rainy season.'15 the resources and. opportunities these factors provide The circulation of certain documents exac- for cultural, material and even spiritual development erbated tension, such as copies of the Konkomba for the members of the various groups. demand for paramountcy. Inflammatory state- The outbreak of wars represents the lack of or ments were also made in Parliament by MPs inadequacies of existing conflict resolution procedures from the various groups. Circulation of rumours to peacefully manage the process of redefinition of in the press increased tensions. terms of inter-dependence. Consequently, frustration with the existing process has tended to breed aggression The sparks among the parties; and. without the necessary safely valves to stem the violent reactions to the frustration, At the end of January 1994, tensions greatly war breaks out/7 increased in the Nanumba District when police intercepted a shipment of arms heading for Principal causes of the 1994-5 conflict are Bimbilla. This led to the destruction of the depicted in Figure 5. Bimbilla police station by a Nanumba mob, who

25 Building Sustainable Peace

Figure 5: Causes of the 1994-5 war in northern Ghana

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26 4 The war and its impact

The conflict The Districts affected were Nanumba, East Gonja, East Dagomba, Gushiegu-Karaga, A dispute over the price of a guinea fowl -Tatale, Saboba-Chereponi and West between a Nanumba and a Konkomba at Dagomba (see Figure 3). The principal areas of Nakpayili market near Bimbilla in Bimbilla conflict were around Yendi, Salaga, Bimbilla, District sparked off the conflict. It was described Gushiegu, , Kpandai, Sekpiegu, and by a witness as follows. Zabzugu-Tatale. Alter 10 days of fighting, the government declared a state of emergency, and A Nanumba and a Konkomba had a misunderstanding peace-keeping troops were sent in. The most over a guinea fowl at the market. But they resolved, the intense fighting lasted for about one month. A dispute in the market. The following day the Nanumba major incident at the start of the conflict was a and his people went to farm. The Konkomba who lost Gonja ambush of Konkombas at the strategic the guinea fond mowed, down the buyer and. his brothers. Bridge, a key point on the main Three of them. So one escaped, ran to the house and Tamale-Kumasi road, where 20 people were gave the alarm. Before they could, prepare, there was a killed. See Table 4 for a timeline for the conflict. counter charge from the same group of people. So they A combination of traditional and modern locked horns ...M weaponry was used: AK47s, bows and poisoned Within three days, fighting had spread into arrows, and shotguns. Fighting techniques seven Districts. The first attack on Dagombas by including surprise attacks, surrounding and Konkombas occurred at Nakpacliei. The village burning villages, and gunning down fleeing was burned down. The fighting then spread populations. At the Dagomba village of Sambu, north to the villages surrounding the Dagomba for example, the village was surrounded by capital, Yendi. Except for Yendi and one nearby village, all Dagomba settlements in the District 2,000 Konkombas and burned. Children were were burned down. The attacks met with little killed, and animals were slaughtered or taken. resistance, but a number of Konkomba settle- ments in the District were burned. Fighting also Government response spread to the East Gonja District, where conflict The government response was delayed, because was sparked off by a Nawuri killing of two there was no means of communication between Konkombas. Konkombas then allied with the Districts and central government. Reports by Nawuris to attack Gonjas. government officials, political leaders, and chiefs

Table 4: Conflict timeline

Year Date Events

1994 1 February Konkombas attacked Nanumbas at Nakpayili, Nanumba District.

2 February Konkombas attacked Dagombas at Nakpacliei, East Dagomba District. Nawuris attacked Konkombas at East Gonja District.

10 February State of emergency declared in 7 Districts, government peace-keeping troops arrive.

February-March Intense fighting in 7 Districts.

June Peace treaty signed.

1995 March Nanumba-Konkoinba violence at Bimbilla.

27 Building Sustainable Peace that were eventually transmitted to Regional Nanumba District alone put them at 20,000.4:i authorities were not clearly acknowledged or After the conflict, a climate of insecurity quickly acted upon. However, after a meeting prevailed: rates of theft of livestock and between the REGSEC and the Regional Minister, property remained high, and sporadic the peace-keeping troops were finallysen t in. incidents, such as crop destruction, occurred.

The impact Impact on agriculture The impact on agriculture was severe. Since seed and agricultural implements had been destroyed, Casualties and displacement farmers found it difficult to restart production. As low-level conflict continued, including the It is estimated that close to 15,000 people were sporadic destruction of crops, the climate of killed during the conflict. The nature of the uncertainty dissuaded farmers from investing weaponry and fighting techniques used led also time and resources in production. Fears for to widespread injuries. Psycho-social impacts security at the farm also affected cultivation. In have been severe, and human suffering untold. Bimbilla, Yendi, and Salaga Districts, many One interviewee described the case of a girl who displaced people farmed at their villages but could lost both parents and five brothers. The Ghana not stay there, for security reasons. Time spent Broadcasting Corporation televised an interview travelling meant less time available for farming with a woman who described in detail the :!U operations, and this affected yields. At Kpandai, horrific killing of her baby son. Salaga, and Bimbilla, many farmers restricted By April 1994, it is estimated that 135,000 their cultivation to the area around their persons were displaced within the Region. By compounds, since they were afraid to go to the 40 June 1995, the number stood at 160,000. bush to farm. Again, this affected yields. Others had been displaced to neighbouring Regions and even to Togo.'11 Bacho, Musah,and The impact on agriculture affected food Manama (1996:1) suggest a total figure for all security in the area. A 1994 survey found that most food stocks in the targeted villages had displaced people of 200,000. As war raged, rural 44 women and children of chiefly groups sought been destroyed. Many families faced by shelter in the District Capitals, notably Salaga, restrictions on farming were not able to meet Bimbilla and Yendi. Others were taken to even half of their food requirements. Food aid Tamale in government buses and private was provided for nine months (see below), but vehicles. Konkombas fled to Saboba, Wapilu, some farmers were not able to resume normal and Bimbonayili. Some displaced people relied farming, even in the 1996-7 season. on families to house, feed and shelter them. At the same time, the agricultural extension Training centres and other institutions were and veterinary services were disrupted. This transformed into refugee camps for those led to the spread of unchecked pests and without such connections. disease. Owing to insecurity, the Agricultural While some groups returned to their villages Development Bank suspended loans. Three Farmers' Service Centres were destroyed and very quickly after the fighting was over, other 45 groups remained displaced for up to two years, two looted in the conflict areas. and Tamale is still not accessible to Konkombas. Since this area is a major exporter of foodstuffs, lower yields affected food prices and national food stocks up to 1996. Cotton Impact on villages and households production in the conflict area has also been low, 42 At least 442 villages were destroyed. In Bimbilla with adverse consequences for cotton companies. District, lor example, 56 villages were burned down and ransacked in 1994. Of only eight villages not attacked at this time, three were Trade and marketing targeted in March 1995 in a second round of The conflict also affected trade. In 1994 most attacks. This affected local coping mechanisms, as market trade ceased for up to six months in the villages were torn apart and leaders killed. worst-affected areas. The huge markets of The destruction and looting of family Nakpayili (livestock and yam) and Wulense (yam) livestock and property, including agricultural ceased to function. Even after that, Konkombas implements, food and seeds, left many people found it difficult to stay at markets until the destitute. One estimate of cattle losses in the evening and they still do not go to Tamale market.

28 The war and its impacl

Impact on services and infrastructure NGO and other development work was Education was halted in the conflict areas. In affected. For example, GTZ (the German 1994, 65,384 children were displaced, 746 government development agency) withdrew its schools closed, and 2,500 teachers were affected. support to Nanumba District projects and later Schools were destroyed: 155 in total, including from Northern Region as a whole. Support 24 in Salaga District alone. Others lost teachers from Christian Aid and Bread for the World for and equipment. In 1997 many schools had still agricultural centres and literacy programmes in Saboba and Yendi is now in question. not reopened. One interviewee noted, 'This conflict has drawn education back by 10 to 15 The national economy has been affected by years or even 50 years, the destruction that has the allocation of vast government resources to its conflict-response programme. been caused.' Other service areas were disrupted as teachers, agricultural extensionists, health personnel, and Elections other workers fled, and clinics, offices, and water The conflict also affected the timing, turnout, sources were destroyed. The displacement of and voting patterns at the 1995 District local Traditional Birth Attendants, smiths, and so Assembly elections in the areas directly affected on also had a severe impact. by the fighting.

29 A 5 Peace-keeping and humanitarian relief and rehabilitation

Peace-keeping In June 1994, the Minister for Food and Agriculture made a needs-assessment. The seven Districts under the State of Emergency Consultation meetings were held with farmers were placed under a joint Military Task Force. throughout the conflict area.47 Hoes and There was ajoint military-police presence in each machetes were distributed during the tour. The of the District capitals, and detachments were sent government then implemented a relief package to 12 villages where the tension was highest, to valued at 650 million cedis, containing hoes and deter confrontation. The State of Emergency was power tillers. MoFA also provided tractor services, lifted on 10 August 1994, one month later than animal vaccinations, bull-lending for husbandry, expected, due to continuing insecurity. By then, stray-animal quarantine, training for bullock peace-keeping activities were gradually being ploughing, seed multiplication, and pest control. handed over to the police. The government also facilitated the return of Despite the initial delay, the peace-keeping agricultural officers. Finally, it negotiated for the operation has been widely praised, by Agricultural Development Bank to resume representatives of NGOs and civil society alike, as lending and soften its conditions for obtaining effective and judicious. This contrasts with credit, and for the recommencement of agri- government interventions in many other African cultural inputs sales and services.48 conflicts. The government also organised a rehabili- The military were called in to separate warring tation programme to provide house-building groups and contain the conflict. There were some materials. It was hampered in some areas by the accusations that they occasionally compromised continued tensions. For example, government their neutrality during the conflict. However, attempts to resettle Gonjas near Kpandai failed, most respondents paid tribute to the troops for because of continued opposition between Gonjas halting the fighting, providing safety, aid, and and Nawuris. medical services, and analysing situations in a The Ministries of Health and Education have 41 measured way before acting. ' One interviewee also started to rehabilitate services with the co- recalled, 'Soldiers picked up the wounded while it operation of District Assemblies. The National was unsafe to travel for NGOs.' Another said, 'The Mobilisation Programme supported self-help role of the police and army is appreciated, they initiatives and group projects, and funded didn't take accusations for granted.' An NGO agricultural and reconstruction ventures. official described the military group as 'peace- Funding was a major constraint on this relief makers' and 'peace-brokers' who made sure they programme. Government requests for donor censured only the minority of warmongers. funding met with little success. Most donors felt that relief channelled through NGOs would be more appropriate. This embarrassed the govern- Government relief and ment and was a source of tension between NGOs rehabilitation programmes and the government. A timeline for relief and rehabilitation initiatives is given in Table 5. The government organised NGO relief and rehabilitation camps for the displaced, and the Task Force programmes facilitated NGO relief distribution, providing escorts and sharing security information. On 15 March 1994, the government appealed to the WFP for assistance. The response was NGOs prompt, and 11 tonnes of food aid was provided NGOs in Northern Ghana have supported social for a 150-day period. Assistance was later development, agriculture, health, education, extended up to January 1995. credit-provision, and well-digging for more than

30 Peace-keeping and humanitarian relief'ancl rehabilitation

Table 5: Government and NGO relief and rehabilitation efforts (NGO initiatives shaded)

Year Date Events

1994 February Joint UN/NGO/governineni assessment mission.

Start of local government reliel.

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May-June Tours by government representatives, MoFA needs-assessment.

1995 January WFP assistance ends.

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20 years. Programmes have become part of the organisations, Gubkatimali, Penorudas, and Ti essential social-services infrastructure, comple- Yum Taaba Development Association (TIDA). menting government services or compensating The active international NGO members are for the lack of them. The aim of most NGOs is ActionAid, Action on Disability and Develop- 'development'; in interviews they said it was ment (ADD), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), necessary 'to abandon their development pro- Lifeline Denmark, Oxfam UK and Ireland grammes for relief during and after the conflict. (now known as Oxfam GB), the Red Cross, and This was inevitable, because of the NGOs' close World Vision. relationships with various groups of the population. Needs-assessment Defining their mandates as 'humanitarian aid', The Inter-NGO Consortium the NGOs started collecting and publishing At first, individual NGOs provided relief in the information about the conflict. Two NGO conflict areas. The Inter-NGO Consortium assessment missions were undertaken in May began as an informal, co-operative response to 1994, aiming to provide an informed basis for the 1994 conflict. Although not operational the relief effort. Help was provided in line with itself, it attempted to co-ordinate NGO efforts. these and with government assessments from The Consortium drew up a relief programme. April 1994. This was when the worst of the The international agencies that had good fighting was over, and NGOs could begin to relations with the government and international access the war zones. donors became the lead agencies. The most active local NGO'19 members of the Donors Consortium are Amaschina, Assemblies of God The principal multilateral and bilateral donors Development and Relief Services (AGDRS), who supported this programme were UNICEF, Business Advisory Development and the World Food Programme (WFP), and the ODA Consultancy Centre (BADECC), Catholic (UK Overseas Development Administration5"). Secretariat, Council of Churches and related Others included the Red Cross, international

31 Building Sustainable Peace churches, and the British High Commission. The population, which necessitated lengthy investi- Consortium made funding requests as a collective gations. Another problem was mollifying local body, and the response was positive. people who complained that there was more aid for the displaced than for them. A further Camps for the displaced difficulty was how to communicate information about relief aid to all population groups. Apart from the camps organised by the Districts, Konkombas staying in remote areas were not the NGOs and religious leaders organised always informed, and this led to misunder- camps in the District capitals. Access was standing and fear about the relief effort among possible with the co-operation of the Military them. Some Konkombas were not included in Task force, who provided protective escorts. the initial relief aid, although coverage was There were complaints that the army expected better after the second registration. 'backhanders' from the aid, and inevitably some relief items found their way to the army; but most aid was delivered straight into the conflict Agricultural relief area by NGOs and distributed to the needy. The The NGOs also provided aid to assist refugees in Military Task Force also provided useful restarting agriculture. Seeds were purchased assistance in the form of updates on the security and distributed under the umbrella of the NGO situation and guarding of the camps. Consortium. This was funded by the ODA with ActionAid, CRS, Oxfam, and World Vision Relief aid and strategy (these were also involved in distribution). A second distribution of seeds, recommended at Food aid was funded by the WFP, and non-food the end of 1995 in the evaluation report of the aid (including food and blankets, sleeping mats, first relief distribution, was never undertaken. buckets and so on) by the German, Chinese, This was due to lack of co-ordination among and Swiss Red Crosses and Oxfam. To ensure NGO Consortium members and to admin- neutrality as well as efficiency, this aid was istrative delays. NGOs also provided fertiliser, distributed by a group of NGOs, including the 51 AGDRS, the Council of Churches, and other cutlasses, and hoe blades. local NGOs. These were called joint neutral There was various other assistance, including teams'. Even then, some NGO staff were gifts from the Danish Community Project, the accused of favouring members of their own Chinese Red Cross, and the Ghanaian Red ethnic groups. On the other hand, some NGO Cross. A private company, Ghana Cotton staff said they had to work 'under cover' to Company Limited, also provided assistance. It ploughed 3,000 acres and provided food and reach victims of ethnic groups other than their 52 own, to avoid criticism from their own groups. cotton seeds for farmers in the Gushiegu area. The relief effort continued for a year and a In the displaced-people's camps, the approach half. As the Consortium established its proce- was to support the cohesion and coping strategies dures and working methods, its organisation of families, and the existing gender-determined division of labour. Aid was principally channelled improved. through male household heads, but was distributed to women where widows had become Evaluation household heads. The Red Cross arranged for aid UNICEF evaluated the NGO relief operation.511 distribution to be supervised by a woman. NGOs Its report found that the programme had many organised sanitation work by mobilising vol- strengths, including the'co-ordinated program; unteers and leaders from among the displaced. the pooling of resources and co-ordination of The registration of aid recipients by NGO resource allocation' and the fact that 'Impartial teams was led by AGDRS staff who had previous identity for all NGOs was obtained'. This meant experience of working in conflict. The Red Cross, that 'The immediate food security issues of the TIDA, and BADECC were also involved. WFP displaced people were addressed immediately later insisted on a re-registration by the AGDRS. following the 1994 conflict.' There were 152,600 refugees registered. Needs However, UNICEF noted that the were then assessed and distribution mechanisms Consortium was weak"in its general lack of established. District co-ordinators were appoin- emergency preparedness, the absence of an ted to monitor distribution. institutional framework, and a failure to One problem was the difficulty of address the multi-sectoral character of needs in distinguishing displaced people from the local an integrated approach. Also, there were

32 Peace-keeping and humanitarian relief and rehabilitation difficulties in the quality of aid delivery and • Women in general: In many cases, supervision. community-based organisational structures Inevitably, there were some problems linked to set up to support relief efforts did not include the problems of collaboration among organisa- women. Women continued to need support tions of different aims and interests, rationales, in their productive and reproductive roles to sizes, capacities, profiles, and connections. revive their coping strategies, for the However, co-ordination was achieved, even following reasons: though each NGO used its respective admin- - Women had lost working equipment and istrative systems while the Consortium was capital in the conflict, and since many drawing up a common programme, budget, and villages lost grinding mills or other funding requests. processing equipment, women were now grinding grain by hand, which prevented them from engaging in other activities. Post-conflict NGO rehabilitation - Women's groups had disintegrated, NGOs carried out limited rehabilitation work resulting in a loss of this source of mutual up to 1996. Some NGOs initiated projects, such support, and precluding access to as new schools and clinics, implemented by rehabilitation aid for villages. groups consisting of members of previously - Women were particularly suffering from warring groups. These acted as models to the decline in 'formal' antenatal provision demonstrate the possibility of reconciliation and (which resulted in a 50 percent reduction regeneration through shared work. in attendance rates). The services of In 1996, the Consortium initiated a Traditional Birth Attendants were also rehabilitation assessment that identified imme- scarce, because many of them had also 54 been displaced. diate resettlement and rehabilitation needs. It was funded by Oxfam and UN1CEF. The A rehabilitation funding request was formulated assessment report identified the groups who in mid-1997, following participatory research continued to be vulnerable as a result of the into food shortages in May 1997. conflict and the organisation of relief efforts: • Disabled people: Disablement as a result of the conflict made people entirely dependent NGO/government co-operation on relatives. People who had been disabled There was considerable co-operation between before 1994 had often lost their occupations NGOs and government in the areas of camp as a result of the conflict. organisation, military escorts, and information- • Children: Under-fives' malnourishment rates sharing, as described. Meetings were held in the conflict areas were as high as 60 per cent between the Military Task Force relief in 1996. There were large numbers of committee and the Consortium co-ordinator, orphans, and of children who had not gone although these tailed off over time. The back to school. Consortium even provided a vehicle for the • Widows: Widows, often with many children, government's rehabilitation programme. had to find a source of livelihood and were not However, national-level collaboration was always capable of providing for the family. Aid more problematic, because there was a degree was mainly targeted at male family heads, and of competition for donor funding, and NGOs so widows did not have access to basic were more successful in gaining it. Co- materials. House-repair for widows was not ordination of funding proposals was difficult. included in the government rehabilitation One interviewee said: programme. Food relief that had been Delays in the preparation of joint funding proposals and. targeted at women heads of households was the result, a lack of operational collaboration in discontinued, although it was still required in execution, may have contributed, to a degree of mistrust many cases. hindering NGO/government relations at national level.

33 6 The peace process

Government peace initiatives peace had been brokered by the Consortium between Dagombas and Konkombas and Apart from its highly successful peace-keeping between Gonjas and Konkombas, Bassares, and operations, the government also set up a Nchumurus. The President's attendance at each Permanent Peace Negotiation Team (PPNT). of these ceremonies lent them weight. They Consisting largely of chiefs from other Regions included sacrifices according to the customs of and headed by a member of the Council of State, each ethnic group. However, the Konkombas the PPNT made several missions to the various did not attend the ceremony in the Gonja area, ethnic groups and held talks. It held meetings in saying the notice given to them was too short. Tamale, the conflict districts, and Accra and They later sent a delegation to make a formal Kumasi with chiefs, opinion leaders, and the apology to the President for this snub. Northern Regional Security Committee. An Table 6 presents the chronology of all the arbitration approach was taken, with the PPNT peace initiatives. It shows that PPNT successes, acting as an intermediary. Four delegates from such as the peace ceremonies, built upon NGO- each of the warring factions were invited to initiated peace work. present their cases to the PPNT. In June 1994 a Peace Treaty was signed with the warring factions. They agreed to lay down their arms and submit to the government security agencies. NGO initiatives However, each faction signed separately, and the The reconciliation and peace process promoted legitimacy of some signatories was in doubt. by the NGO Consortium began in September Therefore the process did not foster significant 1994. The objective was to end violence in the trust or the beginnings of reconciliation. short term and to promote sustainable peace in Respondents also noted that the delayed the long term, through changing perceptions, government response to the conflict in February attitudes, and building new relationships 1994 left deep suspicions among some local among societies in the region. The rationale for leaders that the government had acted in a the work was as follows: partisan manner, rather than seeking a lasting and just settlement. They felt that the ...first that development projects undertaken Iry Non- government was not now to be trusted to Governmental Organisations in the region have facilitate a fair peace. stultified, and. secondly, that in the absence of real peace, there can be no meaningful development in the The peace treaty had limited success. region nor would, any tangible gains be realised from Fighting broke out again in March 1995. the democratic structures that have been put in place The PPNT suffered from a lack of financial with decentralisation ... through the functioning of the support and facilitation skills. In August 1995 it District Assemblies. In the past year, development invited the NGO Consortium and the NPI to activities have been suspended while focus is on relief provide such skills. This invitation was not work to help displaced people in the Region. Since most accepted, because the Consortium was afraid it might compromise its 'independent' position. of these organisations are not specialised in relief Another problem was that the PPNT is remote activities, an important consideration is given to the management of the conflict so that it will be possible to from the northern context, with its head office 5: in Accra, 400 miles from the nearest conflict resume normal programmes ... "' zone. NGOs recognised that the primary PPNT meetings with individual ethnic group responsibility for the maintenance of peace leaders resulted in two reconciliation rested with the government, so they aimed to ceremonies, at Yendi on 21 December 1995, and complement the government's peace work. at Salaga on 18 May 1996. These took place after However, NGOs needed to act, because

34 Tlie peace process

Table 6: Timeline of peace initiatives in northern Ghana (NGO initiatives shaded)

Year Date Events

1994 April PPNT created.

June Peace treaty signed. Tours by government representatives.

Septeinber- PPNT field visits. November

^^

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•HP*! ^^ May PPNT-led peace ceremony at Salaga between Gonjas and Konkonibas. m•i HP mHliiiPiPifiP

35 Building Sustainable Peace

... the basis of sustainable development for which most The NPI philosophy58 considers peace to be NGOs exist cannot be attained, when the efforts of the the transformation of conflicting and destructive NGOs and, the communities they work with are interactions into more co-operative and construc- cyclically undermined, by the destruction of human and. tive relationships, where the inter-dependence of material resources that accompany the outbreak of people is acknowledged. It is based on the violence in the Region.™ following principles: The peace process consisted of a reconciliation • There are spiritual, psychological, social, and needs-assessment followed by a peace- ecological levels of existence. Reconciliation awareness campaign, involving a series of involves making peace with God, self, workshops with leaders of the warring factions 57 neighbours, and nature, and it demands the held in Kumasi, and grassroots-level work, restructuring of relationships.5'1 which continued after the Kumasi series ended. • Conflict cannot be resolved unless the root The timeline of the process is given in Table 6. causes are identified and dealt with. Funding and other support was provided by • Conflict cannot be resolved unless there is a UN1CEF.ODA, and NGOs. just and fair resolution process as well as outcome. Peace and Reconciliation Working Group • The deep needs of people are not totally The Consortium created a Peace and incompatible. Reconciliation Working Group (PRWG) This holistic vision demands a holistic approach. consisting of six NGO staff to organise and The NPI aims to work out an in-depth evaluate the peace process with the Peace understanding of peace for those in conflict Awareness Committee (see below). The PRWG resolution. Its goal is to find common ground stipulated that the NGOs were there to facilitate among people in conflict and to facilitate and empower the people in the conflict area to consensus-building. It then seeks to enhance work towards their own solutions. In other community values, which the NPI regards as words, the approach was to facilitate conciliation more significant in the African context than rather than to arbitrate between the parties, as individualism.1'0 attempted by the PPNT. The Consortium's work was to support leaders who were accountable to their communities and to use consultative Key problems and opportunities methods and process. Chiefs, acephalous The task of developing strategies was leaders, and other community leaders were to challenging, because of the complexity of the play the main role, in order to increase their situation and the multiplicity of actors and 'ownership' of the peace process. Transparency power brokers, including politicians, traditional and momentum were to be promoted. leaders, youth associations, Christian and The Consortium also appointed a co- Islamic organisations, the army and police, the ordinator for the follow-up process, made PPNT, the Regional Administration and District available by BADECC, and provided logistical and Regional Security Councils, local and support. This permitted a series of visits to the international NGOs, and citizens. different Districts to take place, undertaken by It was also problematic because some NGOs ASRDP, ActionAid, Amasachina, TIDA, and and churches had close links with certain Penorudas. However, theco-ordinator met with groups because of their work or personnel. an unfortunate accident, and the car was out of This created an impression that they were use from April 1996. partisan, putting their neutrality in question. A further problem was that, as the December 1996 elections approached, some aspiring The Nairobi Peace Initiative politicians saw advantages in undermining The Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI, a Kenyan government peace efforts.'1' NGO) was invited to assist in the process. The NPI has experience in mediation and peace- making in many African civil conflicts, at both Peace-awareness campaign local and national levels. Training is undertaken in the form of reconciliation workshops and The campaign was planned at three levels: seminars. The director has published widely on community, Regional, and national. A Peace conflict resolution and mediation in civil wars. Awareness Committee (PAC) was formed to take

36 The pence process up the planning and implementation of the who had been identified earlier on, on a one-to- peace campaign at the first Kumasi workshop one basis.l)4 These were then invited to (see below). It consisted of eight members from participate in a series of peace workshops. the four warring factions. The PAC was created as a civil-society organisation, with the aim of During and after the. Kumasi workshops leading the peace process, calling on the Local peace education subsequently took the assistance of the Consortium and NPI as following form: required. Funds for the peace programme were Leaders from the four elhnk.covimunities [moved]from to be raised on behalf of the PAC. one community to another, talking to people and. engaging them to accept the values of peace. In this Grassroots work effort they are assisted by the NGOs in the basic •minimum logistics, such as transportation and other In preparation for the, Kumasi workshops needs, while the presence of NPI enables a. continuous The NPI and individual NGOs worked with search for alternatives... ensuring a. careful implemen- chiefs and community leaders at the grassroots tation of the peace initiatives. A periodic assessment of level to bring about peace. The process started the extent of the impact of these campaigns helps to re- at the community level, identifying possible focus strategy as ... required.}" peacemakers and ways in which peace might be brought about in this context. The flexibility of the approach is evident here. October 1995 to February 1996 saw a In April 1995, the NPI together with the NGOs programme of field meetings, leading up to the undertook a, working visit to all the conflict areas. The signing of the Kumasi peace agreement. Field main purpose was to Improperly informed and. educated,visits were made in East Gonja, Saboba- and to... listen to all the parties involved in the conflict, Chereponi, Gushiegu-Karaga, Nanumba, East the victims, community activists, chiefs and elders and and West Dagomba Districts. They involved Regional and District political leaders. It was also ... peace-education messages and campaigning in [a] unique opportunity to begin to identify 'voices of local languages by leaders of ethnic groups reason' in all the conflict areas. The best peacemakers working in the areas of former 'opposing' ethnic would have to come from, the communities at conflict. groups, using the dove as a widely recognised [They would be] ... people who through their influence peace symbol. Discussions took place with a appealed, for non-violence and, even assisted, in saving broad cross-section of the community. How- the lives of some of their adversaries. Such people were ever, financial constraints prevented extended the bridge-builders who were identified and, through work.06 their engagement would later engage others. Such an expanding engagement it was envisaged would Regional level gradually permeate the different communities and, thereby facilitate peace building designs/'2 The strategy at the Regional level was as follows: The NPI and Consortium met a cross-section of ... to engage more actors to become peace builders ... the population and Regional and District A nother aspect of peacemaking at this level is engaging authorities. There were also special meetings chiefs, and. by regular contacts continuing to reassure with community activists and opinion leaders. them of the absolute need, for peace in order for These interactions gave a wide perspective on development work to proceed smoothly in their the conflict and causes of the conflict that would communities. From this point of view, the chiefs consistently have to be beseeched. to appeal, to their have to be addressed. The need for an inter- 61 vention was apparent: people called for more people not to fight again when provoked. peace work by the government. Peace seminars were held in East Gonja, Saboba- The outcome of these meetings was that the Chereponi, Gushiegu-Karaga, Nanumba, East team was able to establish the goodwill and the and West Dagomba Districts, aimed at a wider confidence of political and community leaders. constituency of youth-association leaders, This was demonstrated in the enthusiastic women's representatives and opinion leaders, reception and willingness to talk openly about local NGO staff, District authorities, Divisional the conflict throughout the affected areas.63 chiefs, and security-force representatives. These The NPI then designed an immediate follow- were facilitated by the NPI. up programme. Selected NGO staff returned to The process was boosted by the momentum the conflict areas and met the 'voices of reason' begun at the first Kumasi workshop.

37 Building Sustainable Peace

Work at the national level The workshop began with a confidence- At the national level, attention was focused on building exercise that promoted group 'supporting the PPNT to enhance their capacity dynamics. The workshop then looked at the in completing the work of negotiations among issue of conflict in Africa and in northern Ghana the leadership of the four ethnic groups and in particular. The concept of mediation was dealing with the outstanding issues of the discussed and distinguished from arbitration, conflict'1"1* through the second and subsequent and the NPI's peace paradigm was introduced. Kumasi workshops. This was less successful than Participants were challenged to apply these the local and Regional-level work. values and become peace-makers. Participants The process encountered management asked for forgiveness from each other, agreed to problems and co-ordination problems because stop making accusations, and hoped that this of the practical difficulties of getting the PRWG, position would build confidence among people PAC, and other actors together and ensuring in the region and convince them that peace was their commitment in the face of the other work possible. The damage and causes of the war were that members were engaged in.09 then discussed and what needed to be done. This led to the expression of further regret and remorse and increased the sense of urgency to Kumasi Peace Workshops begin building peace. Participants then looked at The basic principle behind the workshops was what they would do to further peace, and what that the warring groups should be assisted to was expected of the NPI and the Consortium. consult among themselves to resolve their Participants were invited to consider what role differences. they could play in counselling their own people 71 Kumasi I to accept peace work. The workshop was organised by the Consortium These first consultations were confidential, to and NP1, and funded by ActionAid and AGDRS. protect the process from external pressures at It was attended by representatives of the NPI that stage. The following needs emerged from and the Consortium and leaders of the four the workshop:7- warring factions, invited on the basis of the roles • To organise meetings by participants to they played as 'voices of reason' during and after educate people on the effects of the war. the conflict and on the basis of their individual capacities, their influence in the communities, • To form teams of people from different and the respect they commanded. Importance ethnic groups to preach peace throughout was attached to the fact that the individuals did the conflict areas. not represent any groups that were party to, or • To contact chiefs, MPs, opinion leaders, and had an interest in, the conflict. When issuing youth leaders to promote free movement in invitations, the Consortium was careful to try to the conflict areas and to organise a similar avoid raising expectations in the communities. workshop for them. This was the first time since the conflict that all • For NPI and the Consortium to assist the the parties had sat together in one room. The PPNT. organisation and the contents of the workshop • For more dialogue between the paramount therefore had to be packaged very sensitively. The chiefs and the NPI/Consortium. basis on which the invitations were issued was a • For the Consortium to provide logistical 'consultation on resettlement and development in support for peace work. the conflict areas of the Northern Region'. There was a response to most of these needs, The overt aim of this initial workshop, with the exception of support for the PPNT. then, was to ask how NGOs could continue The PAC was set up to organise peace work. development work in the Region, but the long- They later requested the Consortium to term goal was to enable the participants to see organise Kumasi II. the possibilities for peace-making in their communities. The workshop followed the Kumasi II principle that communities must be able to see As agreed at Kumasi 1, the second workshop was themselves as the best people to solve their own widened to incorporate those who could conflict, while the Consortium 'shared their influence events towards peace because of the pain', 'encouraged', and 'facilitated' the return positions they held. Participants were drawn to peace.70 from the following groups:

38 The peace process

• Four or five leaders from each of the ethnic The workshop was evaluated according to a groups.71'These included two MPs, six DCEs, written questionnaire. A sample of responses two PPNT members, six chiefs (Nanumba, shows the success of the workshop:77 Konkomba, Gonja and Dagomba), and 12 youth association leaders and other opinion From the lesson of Peace and Reconciliation leaders. Philosophy, I have learned thai reconciliation is possible when differences are openly discussed. ... For • Two N PI staff. the first time since the last war, I have spoken, openly • Seven representatives of the Consortium and freely to my opponents without the presence of any from ActionAid, AGDRS, the Council of security personnel. Churches, CRS, Oxfam, World Vision, and BADECC. I learned, to tolerate and. accommodate the views of people other than my ethnic affiliation, and saw the Widening of participation was possible because people from the other side of the conflict are equally Kumasi II had built on the work with prepared for conflict resolution; I had been thinking communities:'1 that it was only my side. If the approach to these ... maintaining the trust that had been built had to be meetings continues, we can see peace in sight... More taken into account by developing a. mechanism that will grease to NPI. After all, the government, mediation allow continuous interaction, visits and. exchange of committee has failed, the nation in resolving this views. Such activities facilitated the possibility for this conflict. second, workshop, which was larger and more delicate The main purpose of Kumasi I and II was to because of the political dimension manifested, by the generate peace. The peace achievements that presence of all the political heads of the Districts went in tandem with these workshops are listed affected by the conflict. in Appendix 2. The objectives, agenda, and ground rules for The NPI's holistic approach was vital to the the Kumasi II workshop are presented as an facilitation of the peace process. By bringing example in Appendix 1. together leaders involved in the conflict in The workshop considered NPI and the person, space was provided for all points of view Consortium as 'partners' in the peace process.7:' to be expressed, challenged, and reassessed. The discussion was contextualised by The process was difficult, because fear, mistrust, considering the incidence and cause of conflict and hatred had to be overcome. The NPI urged in Africa in general. A definition of conflict was participants 'to stop pointing fingers and to agreed as follows: 'incompatible behaviour admit the mistakes that were made while between parties whose goals are or appear to be reaching out to the other side in the hope that incompatible or clashing'. The extent of the the conflict can now take a positive turn towards damage was then discussed. Participants were resolution through reconciliation'.78 Eventually, next divided into groups according to ethnicity, participants on all sides began to express and the reasons for the conflict were discussed. contrition, and participants began to desire The workshop report7" observes the progress peace and development more than conflict. One at this stage. report described this process as follows: ... all participants fell a. great sense of frankness had. The sense of remorse and. regret among the participants been demonstrated by all the groups and this initiated further increased, when together they assessed, the the collective reconciliation process within this group... damages brought about by the conflict. Together they There was a. common sense that the communication gap shared, the sad reality of their communities becoming that had existed, all along was now being bridged ... dependent on relief aid when the region used, to be the There ivas the beginning of the expression of 'we were bread basket of the countiy. The long litany of all. wrong and none of us gained anything from this destruction and, damages was revealing enough. No senseless war'. [There] was the eagerness to move one could, express the sense of urgency to bring peace to forward and. do something together to ameliorate the the region more than the participants themselves.'' situation and work towards a. sustainable peace. It was evident that at Kumasi II positions were The workshop then looked at ways of moving not completely polarised and that a way forward forward in single ethnic-group discussions. To was possible. From then on, participants took an plan more concretely, participants then divided active role in promoting peace, by sharing the into role groups (MPs, chiefs, DCEs, opinion process and results of the workshops in their leaders, youth leaders, and the PPNT). Positive communities of origin, and in formerly opposed and workable plans were the outcome. communities.

39 Building Sustainable Peace

Kumasi III parties involved. The delegates severally and At Kumasi III, the workshop was opened to jointly agreed to a draft document outlining the wider community participation, although the agreements reached on the contentious issues content was similar to that of Kumasi II brought up in the negotiations. The delegates (see Appendix 1). For the first time, women then took away the draft agreement, for community leaders were included in the extensive consultation with all segments of their discussions. These leaders continued to partic- communities. ipate in subsequent workshops. Kumasi V and the Peace Accord The representatives of the ethnic groups Alter four weeks, the delegates returned to expressed their grievances about the situation, Kumasi for the fifth workshop, to report on the described the damages and loss suffered due to outcome of the consultation process. The the conflict, and again gave their views about amendments generated by the consultations the causes of the conflict. The way forward was were incorporated into the agreement. Some then discussed (see Appendix 4 for details). It sections required re-negotiation in the light of called for: consultation feedback. Delegates signed the • A discussion of the PPNT's role. Kumasi Accord on Peace and Reconciliation • Debate to be held at a future workshop on the Between The Various Ethnic Groups In The role of the chiefs in creating paramountcies Northern Region of Ghana on 30 March 1996 and making reforms. (see Appendix 5). This symbolised a commitment • The creation of a new pan-Regional youth by all to find a proactive solution to all the association for the promotion of peace, problems that breed conflict in the Region. The security, arms control, and rumour control, Accord was widely reported in the press. with Regional and local consultative commit- Kumasi VI and NORYDA tees. A planning committee was to be set up Ethnic groups participating in the Kumasi and possible members identified. workshops wished to set up a forum for continued • Rehabilitation and reconciliation. dialogue to assist in the prevention of future • A continuing follow-up field programme. conflict, and this was called for in the Accord. The Progress after the first three workshops forum was conceived as the Northern Region At the end of these three workshops it was Youth and Development Association (NORYDA) evident that the process had moved forward.80 at a meeting facilitated by the Consortium in August 1996 with leaders from each of the youth • There was a general willingness among associations. It was formally constituted at Kumasi Dagombas for a dialogue with Konkombas on VI as a broad body with representatives from all the issues of land, traditional councils, and ethnic youth associations in the Northern Region. paramountcy. An interim executive committee was formed. • The Konkombas also showed a willingness to NORYDA's first constitution was ratified on 13 talk. They said they wanted recognition of October 1996. Widespread agreement and their chiefs in the Nanumba District, and not support was shown in the appended signatures of land. 31 chiefs and youth-association leaders repre- • The Nanumbas were moved to say that they senting 12 ethnic groups. Plans were put in place would consider appointing Konkomba to set up an office in Tamale. elders. The creation of NORYDA is highly significant. • Gonjas said that they were prepared to live As a widely representative organisation of ethnic peacefully with Konkombas. groups in the Region, it constitutes the potential Positions had come even closer together, and for a fundamental shift in Regional politics and a there were positive indicators that the problems basis for sustainable peace. Developments in could be resolved. NORYDA are discussed below. The workshop also reviewed the Accord to Kumasi IV identify obstacles in it which mitigated against At the fourth Kumasi meeting, there were 48 peace. The Gonja/Nawuri problem was revisited, delegates from seven ethnic groups consisting of and continuing differences were discussed.81 chiefs, PPNT delegates, opinion leaders, and Both parties agreed to consult their home youth leaders. They worked towards a durable communities and to find ways to bring about resolution to the conflicts. The NPI facilitated peace. The Gonjas said they were prepared to bilateral and multilateral negotiations to identify talk to the Gonja paramount about supporting the issues and find solutions acceptable to all the Nawuri desire for paramountcy.

40 The peace process

The Kumasi Peace Agreement: • Both Konkombas and Bassares are to receive issues addressed82 an unspecified number of paramountcies. • The question of the 365 Konkomba self- The Peace Accord is a series of separate appointed chiefs in Nanumba District will be agreements between different delegations. looked into. However, general issues can be identified. • The Nchumuru Paramountcy request will be supported by the Gonja Paramount chief in the Tension and belligerence National House of Chiefs. • The Accord commits the signatories to creating an enabling atmosphere of peace through Religious issues forgiveness, moderation, compromise, and co- operation, in order to foster social reintegration • Mutual respect and sensitivity towards the and development. religious practices of the different ethnic groups is to be shown. • The arms build-up is condemned, and a commitment is made to stem the inflow of arms. • It was confirmed that the Nanumba earth priests should perform the land rituals in • The parties resolve to cease provocative acts Nanun. and inflammatory statements in the media and to facilitate the free movement of people. Discussion Relationships between the ruling groups and Land issues the acephalous groups were calmed by the • The Accord states that the allodial title, or acceptance of the principle that all groups are ultimate ownership of land, is held only by entitled to paramountcy and other rights. This existing paramount chiefs. Through this title, signifies a recognition of the rights and status of land is held in trust for all citizens of the all ethnic groups by all parties. respective areas, regardless of ethnic group. The limited success of governmental initia- • The Dagombas, Konkombas, and Bassares tives had left a gap which the civil-society process agree that divisional chiefs, whatever their filled. One interviewee, commenting on the ethnic group, are the caretakers of the land, Nchumuru paramountcy request, noted the and all citizens have an equal and unimpeded effectiveness of the conciliation approach of the access to land in accordance with customary Kumasi workshops in this context: 'The PPNT law. honestly did not broker any peace between Gonja and Nchumurus ... it was Gonjas and Among the sixteen ethnic groups of the Northern Nchumurus who brokered peace, at Kumasi IV.' Region, there seems to be no problem beyond resolution related to land tenure systems. The procedures for the The Kumasi Peace Agreement: acquisition of land, for agricultural purposes seem to outstanding issues apply to all tribes and even people who come from other Regions to invest in agricultural activities.*3 Even though older cephalous leaders have referred to versions of history which legitimise the status quo, at the end of the Kumasi peace Chieftaincy and paramountcy issues process they were ready to compromise in most • The legitimate status of the paramountcies of cases. However, the degree of compromise was the traditionally chiefly groups was confirmed. sometimes regarded as insufficient by acephalous groups, such as the Nawuris and Nchumurus. • The legitimacy of the allegiance and associ- The most important unresolved issue is that of ated customs demanded and paid to the tradi- the Nawuri-Gonja conflict. It concerns the return tional paramount chiefs of the ruling groups is to Kpandai of Gonja inhabitants, which the confirmed. Nawuris oppose, and the resettlement of Nawuris • The legitimacy of chiefs among acephalous in Kpembe and Salaga. Nawuris still claim land groups to be enskinned by the Paramount chiefs ownership over Kpandai, a claim still disputed by of different ruling ethnic groups is confirmed. the Gonja. Nawuris still demand a paramountcy The agreement foresees creation of such chief- and request the Gonja paramount to giant it. ships in the near future. Peaceful co-existence remains at stake here.

41 Building Sustainable Peace

Peace projects initiated by NGOs ActionAid sponsored a Wofo initiative in the and religious bodies Chereponi area whereby over 3,000 displaced people were absorbed back into their communities through the assistance of Wofo Several NGOs, including ActionAid, CRS, the yo Council of Churches, Islamic organisations, and Committees. ActionAid is also supporting a ADD, initiated reconciliation projects with peace education campaign in two Junior Secondary Schools in every District affected by communities, resuming development work, but 1 with a new focus. These NGOs also developed the conflict. " agendas for peace. This has had a positive influence on the peace process. Since October Local Council of Churches 1995, these individual programmes have gained The Local Council of Churches has made an momentum and are situated in all conflict- active contribution to the peace process. As an affected area Districts (though not every NGO extension of its social development, a number of works in every District). Examples are given here. peace seminars and related events were organ- ised, on themes including reconciliation, the CRS and the Catholic Church role of the church in the democratic process, CRS and the dioceses have development and and women in the conflict. A peace programme education programmes in all Northern Region was drawn up, with the following components: Districts. Peace-education programmes were • A schedule of peace and reconciliation work initiated in those communities which had been within churches in the conflict areas. part of the conflict, including at Yendi, Tamale, • A schedule to promote dialogue and co- and Damongo. operation among churches of all denomi- nations and between Christians and Muslims. ActionAid • A commitment to play a central role in the As part of its schools programme, ActionAid peace efforts of the Consortium. supported the rebuilding 61 schools. A notable The Council has co-operated in organising example has been the Sunsun project in Saboba- dialogue between Muslim and Christian youth . This involved the co- organisations, and joint prayer meetings with operation of the Konkomba and Dagomba Christian and Muslim communities. A week of communities, and children of both communities 81 joint Christian and Muslim prayer meetings now attend this school. The project has become was held in December 1995 at Yendi. This a symbol of reconciliation. As a result of the project eased tensions. The Ya-Na, the Dagomba and through ActionAid peace education, 'the paramount chief, had written a letter to the community in Chereponi and the surrounding Archbishop forbidding a Catholic priest to work Konkomba villages have started peace talks which 85 in Yendi. Because of reconciliation work, the have now filtered to other areas'. Ya-Na later apologised and invited the priest to ... communities have put in place checks and balances return. to deal with any potential threat to peace in the area. As Because of the links made between religious a result of their good, work, the [military] Task Force organisations and the causes of the conflict, does not frequent the area, as the people ensure that there has also been a debate in the Christian peace prevails and. any acts of aggression are dealt with church about the relationship between church decisively and quickly through the local system.86 development work and politics, and workshops were organised to clarify this. ... as a result of discussions ... the 33 disaster The Council has also assisted in training management committees, an apex body of both sl teachers for the former conflict areas, incorpo- Konkomba and Anufo Wofo ('Peace') Committees, rating courses in trauma counselling. are setting up the Saware ('Peace') Committee. The Saivare Committee will be recognised by the District Administration which has also been lobbied to create a Amasachina Peace Committee reporting to the Regional Co- Amasachina is working with Dagomba and ordinating Council."8 The Committee's function is to Konkomba communities on a joint project to play a proactive role in conflict prevention strictly build nurses' quarters at Kpatinga. This work is adhering to the traditional mode of conduct where all supported by the District Assembly and interested parties are consulted.8'-1 UNICEF.9-1

42 The peace process

Relationship with the Deterioration of relations government Relations between the government and the Consortium/NPI were later strained. The government did not accept the Kumasi peace Government approval for NGO peace agreement of March 1996. The delegation of work chiefs, NGO representatives, and ethnic opinion leaders presenting the agreement to the Consortium and NPI representatives met the government in Accra in May 1996 was not Minister of Employment and Social Welfare, received, which was perceived as a significant responsible for NGO affairs, and the Minister of snub. Interviewees gave several reasons for this. the Interior in November 1994. The Minister They said that the government played a for Employment and Social Welfare said that significant role in West African peace initiatives, the government valued the NGO relief efforts such as in Liberia, and was embarrassed that an and contribution to peace in the region. He NGO was required to negotiate peace within its welcomed the NGO desire to get involved in the own territory. Further embarrassment results peace process, saying it would be 'another from the fact that the NPI is a Kenyan NGO. feather' in the cap of NGOs. He urged the Kenya does not have a good domestic peace NGOs to incorporate civic education into their record. Thirdly, the government felt that the programmes and to develop peace messages for PPNT had suffered from a lack of donor dissemination as part of community-level support, because NGOs had been in competition activities.s;! The Minister of the Interior made for this money. similar statements. Relations looked good, and NGO peace initiatives seemed to be welcomed. However, the NPI failed in attempts to meet the Minister of Defence and the PPNT Chairman. Assessment of the situation and Relations with the PPNT later improved when future prospects PPNT members participated in several Kumasi workshops. Tensions began to subside in the conflict areas. By October 1995, for example, reports about the situation in Yendi stated: 'Dagombas and Relations between NGOs and District and Konkombas have been moving along without Regional authorities any fear and they do brisk business.' In Saboba The first part of the NGO/NPI peace process too, the situation was becoming calmer: saw good relations at this level. 'During visits to Saboba, many Dagomba were The relations with political, Regional and District also noted there in town, transacting business, authorities were very open, co-operative and helpful and some of them said "it is now time to build a during the first tour of NGO representatives with NPI new united Region". [...] Dagomba and of the conflict areas.w Konkomba Christians meet and worship together.' District and Regional authorities wished to However, in Tamale in 1996, Konkombas still participate in the NGO conflict-resolution did not have access. One interviewee said, process, feeling that they had done all they 'Because, when we talk of free movement, the could. free movement is ... [everywhere except] in Some of these leaders admitted that they did. not know regards to Tamale. But of late I don't think it is how to handle the situation of senseless hostility and. as difficult as it was. Because Konkombas pass this explains the need for their involvement, in the peace through ... but maybe we don't stop. Because of process .m' threats.' The Regional Minister was supportive of DCE involvement in the peace process and The PRWG assessment encouraged DCEs to attend Kumasi II. In January 1996 the PRWG assessed the peace- However, there were also elements of rivalry awareness campaign and the emerging peace. between the Consortium and the Regional Findings included the following: administration, when the administration also • The normal work schedules of members of made a proposal for funding for similar peace the follow-up team interfered with peace- work. process activities and visits.

43

. Building Sustainable Peace

• Throughout the conflict area, communities' Konkomba paramount, the Dagombas have wounds were not yet healed. Certain areas decided to grant three paramountcies to were still considered 'no go'. Konkombas. The Konkombas had requested • The need for Konkombas to apologise to the that only the divisional Chief of Saboba be raised Gonja paramount was still an issue. to paramount status. They fear that they may • Certain attitudes still caused problems. become fragmented if three paramounts are For example, some Konkombas drove created, because the paramounts may compete Nanumbas away from farming and among themselves for followers. Konkombas enskinned their own chiefs in the Nanumba regard this as a divide-and-rule tactic on the District. part of Dagombas. The Konkombas formally • The dissemination of information by the refused the offer of three paramountcies in PAC to the communities remained poor. April 1996. This could be a source of further • People were inconsistent in what they said conflict. inside and outside meetings. During the 1997-8 season there has been a • There was a lack of trust among the activists food crisis in northern Ghana. Although in the PAC. centred on the Upper East Region, it has • Most of all, it was felt important that PAC affected the Northern Region to some extent, should keep its focus and limit its relations and food aid has been supplied. This provides with outside donors or partners other than the setting for increased tensions, particularly in the NPI, to maintain its strategic direction the Salaga area. Nawuris living at Kpandai claim and thinking, withstanding the temptation of that the District Assembly, dominated by tied money offered. It was also acknowledged Gonjas, has denied them food aid just as they that peace is a slow process. have been denied other services. The District Assembly claims that Nawuris have refused the The situation in October 1998 food aid (because they do not wish to draw on District services, which would indicate The general situation is calm. Scaled-down dependency rather than sovereignty over the government peace-keeping efforts contribute Kpandai area). Another development in the to this. The government has made it clear that Gonja-Nawuri crisis is that Gonjas have been violence will not be tolerated, and it will clamp trying to persuade the REGSEC to assist Gonjas down on any infringement. Rural-rural migra- to return to live in Kpandai. tion continues, as people move to areas where their ethnic groups predominate. Yendi is The next stage of the democratisation process peaceful, and Konkombas are able to move in Ghana is being implemented with the election there freely. Tamale is calm, but Konkombas of Unit Committees at sub-District level. The still cannot enter the city. But Tamale is impact of this is yet to be felt. becoming ungovernable, owing to tensions The PPNT continues its work. The PPNT between youth gangs (not related to ethnic organises ad hoc village meetings in Accra and issues). villages. Some of this work has a negative impact, Reconstruction proceeds, and in many places because the PPNT is not always impartial. The it is being carried out co-operatively among PPNT currently has a poor relationship with Konkombas, Dagombas, and Nanumbas. As Dagomba representatives, but a good relation- well as the NGO work described, other agencies ship with Konkomba representatives. continue to support these schemes. The Canada The PRWG and PAC have been wound up, Fund, for example, has supported the recon- because they regarded long-term support for struction of the Nakpayili market90 (where the NORYDA, the new civil-society organisation, as fighting first broke out). Agriculture has been the best way forward. The Consortium has re-started. It is evident that few village people taken a secondary role in the on-going peace will wish to fight again. The picture is generally process, acting as adviser and collaborator with positive. NORYDA, and assisting NORYDA in obtaining The creation of the new paramountcies funding. There is continued limited NPI agreed under the Kumasi Accord is scheduled involvement. NPI recently funded and to go before the National and Northern Houses facilitated a workshop on the role of the media of Chiefs. However, although the Kumasi Peace in bringing peace, in collaboration with Agreement provided for the enskinment of one NORYDA.

44 The peace process

New role for the Consortium iations can work together to foster peace. Although the Consortium is now less closely However, it is not clear whether they all have involved in the peace process, it is still active. In this intention. Smaller groups within NORYDA the face of the current food crisis, the seem to be serious about peace, but the sincerity Consortium has worked for seven months to put of some of the representatives of larger groups is together a proposal for joint action and to lobby questionable. NORYDA has been misrep- for funding to tackle the problem. This was resented to local communities by some of these initiated by Oxfam and ActionAid and carried leaders. A few of these NORYDA members do out in conjunction with the Upper East regional not actually represent their own youth associ- government. It has involved carrying out a ations, because the associations are faction- Rapid Rural Appraisal of the situation in the alised. NORYDA faces derailment if individual area. Unfortunately, donors have not been representatives and constituent youth associ- sympathetic to the NGOs so far, and the ations pursue their own personal or political situation has been complicated by the fact that interests at the expense of those of the wider the central government put in a proposal for a group. Prominent and partisan press criticism relief programme at the same time. of the representativeness of NORYDA also undermines its status in the Region."

Future prospects and NORYDA Achievements NORYDA has achieved much so far. Despite the Challenges problems, it is developing itself as a repre- NORYDA faces several challenges. These sentative, co-ordinated organisation with clear include the unresolved tensions and new aims and objectives. conflicts that have arisen in the Region since the • Members have worked together on many Peace Accord: issues. As this has gone on, good working • The continuing dispute between Nawuri and relationships have been built up, and Gonja groups, which has been aggravated by effective working practices established. the issue of food aid.97 Nawuris continue to • NORYDA is a dynamic movement with a refuse to pay basic rates to the East Gonja clear agenda for the future. As well as wishing District Assembly and to demand a separate to continue peace work and organise a District. secretariat, NORYDA aims to work and lobby for the development of the Region as a whole. • Rival youth gangs in Tamale9s threaten • NORYDA has received Oxfam funding for disturbance and new conflict. two years. This has allowed for the devel- • The new Dagomba-Konkomba dispute about opment of its capacities and the peace numbers of paramountcies to be created. programme. Challenges also include continuing the peace NORYDA is also working towards peace in campaign and attempting to get recognition for innovative ways. NORYDA by the grassroots communities, the government, and donors. An agenda has been • It has worked with the NPI on a workshop set to continue meeting all opinion leaders, about the role of the media in peace-making, community leaders and chiefs, as well as NGOs as noted. Again, this addresses one of the and political and administrative authorities causes of the 1994-5 conflict. throughout the Region, in order to push • NORYDA now co-ordinates the peace forward the peace campaign and to gain campaign. Innovative work has included organising broadcasts for peace on the recognition for NORYDA's work and status. 100 NORYDA is experiencing financial problems new Regional FM station, Savannah, and time constraints and has appealed for incorporating discussions with paramount funding to organise a secretariat. At present, all chiefs. NORYDA members are in employment else- Finally, NORYDA has made a vital contribution where and so cannot commit much time to the towards settling disputes in several contexts. project. • On the Kpandai issue, Oxfam and Finally, NORYDA faces the challenge of Consortium representatives have agreed to creating itself as a representative organisation in go with NORYDA to Kpandai and assess the a hostile environment. Constituent youth assoc- situation.

45 Building Sustainable Peace

On the issue of social unrest in Tamale among • It has contributed to the resolution of a dispute rival youth gangs called the 'Uganda' and in the West of the Region in the Mo area. 'Rwanda Boys', NORYDA has worked to • It is working towards achieving free movement alleviate the tension. for all in Tamale, including Konkombas. NORYDA has also worked to reduce conflict NORYDA has the potential to catalyse peaceful in the Mamprusi area (in a dispute between participatory social transformation and to work traditional authorities and the District for equitable development for a sustainable Assembly over the siting of District offices). peace and a better future.

46 7 Conclusion

The Consortium has played an important role constituency. The 1996-7 food crisis in the in promoting the peace process among warring Upper East Region again saw the Consortium groups in northern Ghana. One very significant activated to respond in a co-ordinated way, result was the facilitation of a participatory drawing on capacities built up during the process leading to the Kumasi Peace Accord, Consortium's response to communal conflict. which tackles some of the major causes of Unfortunately, funding constraints curtailed conflict, and a follow-up process that led to the activities in this instance. creation of NORYDA. The process was a The peace process involved substantial co- challenging one. Problems were encountered operation with another southern NGO, the on the way, and difficulties remain. These NPl.This is an excellent example of the value to include certain unresolved ethnic tensions and be derived from South-South linking. The form problems of co-operation with the government. taken by peace facilitation was holistic However, the process is instructive and is an (ideologically 'African', according to the Kenyan example of best practice in conflict resolution, NGO), and this proved highly appropriate for with wide implications. the context of northern Ghana. Not only did The Consortium grew out of an informal NPI's work lead to peace, it also built the network. It retains its informal and flexible capacities of NGOs and civil society to deal with character, and this is the source of its strength. future tension in this region, through providing Individual NGOs have their own priorities, tools for analysis and facilitation. objectives, and programmes, reflecting their The creation and development of a strong, donors' interests, which they pursue in normal new civil-society organisation, NORYDA, is a times. But in a crisis they come together to work significant positive outcome of the peace in a co-ordinated way. This brings several process. Working for sustainable peace with advantages, including the benefits of a larger- NGO financial and capacity-building support, it scale operation and the ability to lobby for has already proved its effectiveness in the substantial funding because of their collective resolution of several outbreaks of conflict. This size and extensive contacts. Advantages also ability is based on the confidence and co- include the potential to draw on a wide range of operation that NORYDA has earned among all partners in government, overseas governments, stakeholders in civil society, because it is a international agencies, and NGOs; and the creation of civil society. NORYDA has the plans Consortium's neutral position, derived from its and the potential to work and lobby for the diverse ethnic, religious, and geographic equitable development of the Region for all.

47 8 Recommendations

For the Consortium • Improve linkages with local and national government, and particularly the REGSEC, to improve collaboration in terms of Consortium organisation and direction information-sharing and for conflict issues that may arise. Retain the informal and flexible character of the Consortium. Build on the capacity of the Consortium by: Consortium activities • Devising emergency-preparedness plans, Continue: including a division of roles and respon- • To support the capacity-building of sibilities. Formulating pro-active and preven- NORYDA to ensure the sustainability of the tative action plans. peace process. Support should also enable • Incorporating more gender planning and NORYDA to become truly representative of analysis. This should apply to plans for crisis all ethnic groups in the Region. response, development, lobbying, and other Put in place: plans, and include gender mapping within • A training plan in peace facilitation with NGOs and the Consortium. NGOs, government officials, and local • Improving internal communications and leaders. overcoming the minor but significant difficul- • Information-gathering for crisis early ties of NGO co-ordination highlighted by the warning, given the highly uncertain and Consortium itself. Improving communication data-sparse context. Design a mechanism for and co-operation between international and communicating this information to NGOs in local NGOs. Promoting collaboration in the south of Ghana, the government, the analysis and planning between service- REGSEC, and donors, to ensure swift oriented and lobbying-oriented NGOs. responses. • Improve linkages with international donors (such as the UK Department for International Development) in order to appraise them of current issues.

Table 7: NGO capacity-building needs

Skills Requirements Programme

Administrative capacity Analysis of donor contacts Emergency preparedness

Co-ordination among Common development planning Rehabilitation planning and ongoing pluriforni organisations development programmes

Pro-active policy and Discussion of NGO roles Continuing support to peace campaign in advocacy design collaboration with local government

Building and monitoring Constant redefinition of NORYDA support capacity in local leadership responsibilities between NGO and local leadership

Gender-conscious analysis Higher priority Co-ordination among international and and planning local NGOs

48 Recommendations

Individual NGOs • Collaboration with local government in • Continue to incorporate peace and reconciliation and the development of reconciliation objectives in development political representation for all groups. work. Plan and monitor projects according to • Maintain support for NORYDA. Support its conflict-sensitivity indicators, to prevent bias efforts to stand alone and to become a that may heighten ethnic tensions. representative organisation of all ethnic groups • Improve development planning with local, in the Region. Increase its capacity to defuse regional, and national government. conflicts. Support its development initiatives. • Share longer-term planning with other Also: NGOs where appropriate, to prevent bias • The National and Regional Houses of Chiefs that may increase ethnic tensions. should work to improve representation of all Many NCOs require capacity-building in order to ethnic groups by actively welcoming and co- achieve these objectives. NGOs' needs in respect operating with the new paramounts. Within a of capacity-building are summarised in Table 7. representative Northern House, a dialogue should be held on land issues as soon as possible, in consultation with other repre- For local government sentatives of civil society, including NORYDA and the Consortium, and with relevant Retain: Ministry representatives. The House should • Peace-promotion activities within local areas also work on other conflict-related chieftaincy through schools, the NCCE, liaison with issues at the earliest opportunity. traditional authorities, and other appro- priate channels. Improve: For central government • The distribution of resources to ensure equity and to ensure that fairness is seen to be Continue the successful (scaled-down) peace- achieved, to prevent conflict over resources. keeping efforts for as long as necessary. • The recognition of the value of NGO work To address the root causes of the conflict: and the NGO role in civil society. • Design policy in order to support the • Communication and collaboration with equitable development of the Northern NGOs in development planning through Region through local government and NGOs regular meetings at District level as well as to end intra-regional and inter-regional Regional level. Bid to donors for funding for disparities. Improve the distribution of joint projects. Ensure that NGOs are resources so that it is fair and seen to be fair. accountable. Devise best-practice guidelines Ensure that development and services are for all government departments, in targeted to disadvantaged areas and ethnic collaboration with NGOs, to regulate human groups. Attention should be paid to all and material resource-management. aspects of development, but particularly to • Information-sharing with NGOs to promote agriculture and education, including the communications with the grassroots and to provision of vocational training for young avoid duplication of effort. Promote people. supportive networking agreements between government departments and NGOs. • Facilitate participation in the democratic political process of the currently under- represented ethnic groups. For traditional authority and • Implement tighter arms-control policies. • Recommend and promote government and civil-society leaders NGO co-ordination and collaboration over Build on: peace initiatives and other activities at • Reconciliation work at the grassroots level for all levels. Recognise and support the a sustainable peace. Consortium-brokered peace agreement and • The Kumasi Peace Accord. Agreements on end duplication/conflict of effort in this area. creation of paramountcies should be adhered • Recognise and support NORYDA's work. to. The Gonja-Nawuri dispute should be • Act to defuse religion-based tensions. Ensure resolved at the earliest opportunity. that NGOs are accountable in this context.

49 Building Sustainable Peace

For donors Research and recognise the problems inherent in channelling aid in terms of the • Lobby for and support the equitable potential for conflict and the effects of development of the Northern Region supporting NGO initiatives over government through local government and NGOs, to end activities. Devise strategies to mitigate these intra-regional and inter-regional disparities. outcomes. • Support the Consortium's future activities, Recognise and support NORYDA as an because this grouping has proved its organisation representative of all ethnic advantages in terms of size, flexibility, and groups, to ensure the sustainability of the neutrality of status, particularly for crisis peace process. Assist NORYDA's institutional work. capacity-building and programme delivery.

50 Appendix 1: Example of workshop objectives, agenda, and rules (Kumasi II, 26-29 June 1995)101

Objectives • What needs to be done? • To look at the conflict in the Northern Region • Difficulties and obstacles. and acquire an understanding of the damage • Ways forward and next steps. done by the conflict. • Evaluation. • To understand what the conflict is about and • Closing. assess its future direction. • To analyse what needs to be done to respond Ground rules to the conflict at various levels. • Each person should have adequate time to • To identify what we as participants should do, express his views and perspective. and what roles should be played by partners • Being sensitive to give others a chance and (NGO consortium, NPI). time to express their views also. • To agree on the next steps. • Listening with respect, even if we do not agree. Avoid derogatory remarks. Agenda for the meeting • This meeting is not a negotiation meeting. The • Larger context: conflict in Africa; ethnicity. aim is to understand and not to debate. • Conflict in the Northern Region of Ghana: • Everyone is acting in his individual capacity assessing the damage. and not in the name of an organisation. • What is the conflict about? Exacerbating factors. • Punctuality.

51 Appendix 2: peace achievements in detail (Kumasi I and II)102

Konkomba areas Wulensi, Nakpayili, and Pusuga to educate • The Konkomba Youth Association (KOYA), people on peace. This has also facilitated the the Nanumba Youth Association (NAYA), free movement of people and goods. and the Bimbilla District Chief Executive Konkombas now pass freely through these collaborated to resolve the situation in towns. Binchara-taanga. Konkombas had occupied • NAYA have solved disputed cases of Nanumba homes in some villages. It was compensation involving cattle between agreed that after harvest they would leave Nanumbas and Konkombas. those homes for the Nanumbas. • A dispute over the ownership of a bicycle was • KOYA has negotiated with the Dagomba resolved, and a Konkomba was declared the Youth Association (DAYA) to return stolen rightful owner. cattle to their owners. • There has been an agreement between NAYA • A misunderstanding between Konkombas and KOYA that the land and houses and Nanumbas at Nasu Village was resolved. trespassed on by Konkombas will be returned • KOYA organised a peace forum involving the to Nanumbas immediately after the crop chiefs and people of Saboba, Wapuli, and harvest. Kpalba to educate them on the values of peace. Generally there is now free movement of goods and people between Dagomba, Nanumba, and Dagomba areas Konkomba settlements. Some of the disputes that could have resulted in open conflict are now • The PAC and DAYA helped to return a resolved amicably among the factions. tractor and other personal belongings stolen from a Konkomba man. • DAYA stopped the stealing and snatching of Gonja-Nawuri-Nchumuru areas bicycles between Konkombas and Dagombas While there are small efforts at peace building in at Kulikpunduli Village, and cycles taken the Gonja lands, attempts have been intensified have been returned to their rightful owners. to hold meetings with Gonja youths, chiefs, and • DAYA has made it possible for Konkombas to people for peace education to ensure free move freely to and from Yendi market to buy movement of Konkombas and Gonjas in these and sell, and for Konkomba Assemblymen to areas. attend District Assembly meetings in Yendi. After the third meeting of the PAC in Bimbilla on 26 August, the PAC and the PRWG visited the Nanumba paramount in Bimbilla and continued Konkomba areas to Yendi to visit the Dagomba and Konkomba • Alter the Kumasi workshops, NAYA held representatives. They were warmly received. In public meetings with Unit Committee Saboba, a visit was made to the chief. Again, members and the residents of Bimbilla, discussions were cordial and productive.

52 ••f-

Appendix 3: Workshop evaluation statements (Kumasi II)103

Some samples of responses to this evaluation: ... all participants are very clear about the way to achieve lasting peace in the Northern Region. In these meetings, many of us saw our mistakes. Some of us would not even greet each other. Now after two I appreciate most the fact that all the main warring years we are all smiles. factions were able to come together to talk peace in We learned the need for self-criticism in conflict earnest. We learned to respect one another. situations. From their statement at the beginning, there were I appreciated the possibility of interacting with various people from all ethnic groups who were hard-liners adversaries. The mature manner in which the meeting when they first arrived. They now seem to feel and. think was conducted, to allow various groups to express their differently. This means that this meeting has touched, feelings and experiences was most appreciated. base with most people. I learned, that dialogue to solve the ethnic conflict in the Security lies in ensuring the security of our enemy, in north is possible ... The content of the meeting was very this way we put our enemy at ease. 'Strengthen your well planned, to really bring out everything from the enemy.' participants.

53 Appendix 4: Examples of grievances, losses, causes of the conflict, and action required, as expressed by workshop participants (Kumasi III)

Grievances of participants Konkomba group Damages/loss • Broken marriages and friendships Dagomba group • Loss of property, lives, educational and health Damages/loss facilities, drain on manpower, loss of • Great loss of human lives marketing facilities • Displacement • Displaced people in their own country • Deprivation and dependency • Politically isolated at District and national • Destruction of educational, social, and levels economic infrastructure • Cultural values broken down and • Dislocation of social life undermined • Loss of trust, confidence and security • Destruction of places of worship i.e. • Breeding of culture of violence churches/mosques • Trauma • Lack of trust among different religious faiths Causes of conflict Causes of conflict • Confusion over customary land rights • Denial of the right of the ruled to elect their • Wilful refusal to acknowledge chiefs' titles leaders and allegiance owed • Imposition of leaders who are not popular • Disregard of chieftaincy laws relating to with the governed chieftaincy in Dagbon • Tendency of one tribe to feel superior to • Disregard ofjudicial role of chiefs another • Attacks against Islam • Lack of respect for other people's cultural • Discriminatory practices of some Christian values NGOs • Dominance of the minority over majority: of • Misinformation 16 ethnic groups, four rule • Unguarded statements by high-ranking • Denial of the right to self-governance government officials • Use of derogatory term 'alien' for Konkombas • 'Konkombas are prone to fighting.' • Rumour

Gonja group Nanumba group

Damages/loss Damages/loss • Loss of life and property • Social • Strained relations with 'our brothers the - Loss of interaction between the two tribes Nawuris and Nchumurus' - About 80 per cent of the population of • Loss of goodwill from outside, which has war-torn areas became displaced retarded development - Increased migration from rural to urban • Break in traditional ties between Gonjas, areas Nawuris, Nchumurus - 56 villages were destroyed • Loss of mutual trust between Gonjas, - Insecurity Nawuris, Nchumurus - People cannot farm and feed themselves - 34 schools and three health posts Causes of conflict destroyed • Agitation for land by Nawuris and - Wulensi Senior Secondary School Nchumurus from Gonjas textbooks and electrical cables looted • 'We cannot explain why there is conflict - Most schools not functioning in the between us and Konkombas.' district

54 Appendix '1

• Economic • Spiritual - Most farms destroyed - Bitterness left in the minds of people - 80 per cent of cattle herds stolen - Drift from the fear of God - Grinding mills, vehicles, bicycles and personal belongings lost Causes of conflict - Property, including cash, lost • Political - Economic interaction between the two - Natural boundaries tribes ceased - Colonial administration policies • Political • Social - No District Assembly elections have been - Post-independence disregard of Nawuri held status - Lack of mutual trust between the two - Imposition of chiefs from non- tribes indigenous ethnic groups in the northern • Cultural social system - Eight Chiefs were killed, and their • Religion funerals have not been performed - Suspicious agenda of certain religious - Customary regalia and monuments organisations destroyed - Traditional celebrations not fully • Culture observed - Distinct practices • Spiritual • Economic - Houses of worship destroyed - Destructive weapons (sophisticated warfare) Causes of conflict • Misinformation Nchumuru group • Enskinment of self-styled chiefs • Settling without permission Damages/loss • Main cause of the conflict in Nanun is the intention to seize Nanun lands by force of arms • Economic - Loss of human life and property - Loss of farms and products Nawuri group - Disruption of economic activities - Destruction of commercial activities Damages/loss - Destruction of communication/trade • Social routes - Loss of lives, especially women's and - General economic stagnation children's • Social - Displacement - Disintegration of families - Collapse of social structures e.g. - Dislocation of society communications - Migration and immigration - Education at a standstill - Insecurity and fear - Fear and distrust - Destruction of educational infrastructure • Economic and logistics - Destruction of houses and property - Exodus of educational and health/ - Farming activities and trade halted medical personnel - Loss of jobs, workers displaced • Political • Political - Non-participation in political decision- - Breakdown of government adminis- making e.g. District and Regional levels tration e.g. District and Regional • Cultural - Development projects halted - Destruction of places of worship and Cultural activities of Christian bodies - An aggressive future generation - At the psychological level: destruction of produced human values and social ethics

55 Building Sustainable Peace

Causes of conflict • There is a need to encourage interaction between Dagomba and Konkomba to • Historical promote peace and joint co-operative - Pre-colonial history voluntary ventures. - Colonial era under Germans and British - Indirect rule Local level • Social • NGOs should embark on projects in areas - Fragmentation of Region and Districts where Dagombas and Konkombas live together. - Cultural assimilation - Lack of development and education • Mamprusis and Bimobas should be drawn into the peace efforts. • Cultural - Representation of tribes at Regional Gonja House of Chiefs - Lack of recognition of our chiefs National level - Lack of involvement in decision-making • National House of Chiefs should be involved. at the District and Regional levels • Findings of the National House of Chiefs - Lack of cultural identity should be sent to Government for discussion. • Political Regional level - Lack of representation and involvement • Regional House of Chiefs should be involved. in decision-making • Findings of Regional House of Chiefs should - Lack of political will on the part of be passed to Regional Security Council. government • All Youth Associations should be involved. Local level Actions required or • The Traditional Councils should be involved. • District Security Councils should be involved. recommended • Opinion leaders should be involved.

Dagomba Konkomba

National level National level • The NGO Consortium and NPI in contact • PPNT needs to recognise and endorse the with the Youth Associations should establish a efforts of the NGO consortium/NPI i.e. national workshop, involving all the Government recognition. Executive members of the Youth Associations. • Participants of workshop should write a letter of recommendation to the PPNT to that effect, • Government should draw up a comprehensive with copies to religious bodies, National programme for rehabilitation and recon- House of Chiefs, and Speaker of Parliament. struction to repair medical, educational, and social infrastructure destroyed in the affected Regional level areas. • There should be a meeting of all Youth • There is a need to expand and strengthen the Leaders of all ethnic groups in the North with PPNT by including representatives from the Consortium of NGOs. various ethnic groups. • We recognise the effort being made to increase paramountcies in the Northern Regional level Region. However we wish to appeal to the • A Regional Peace Consultative committee Regional House of Chiefs to consider those should be formed with representatives from ethnic groups with no representation in the all the affected ethnic groups. House to facilitate peace and development. • For quick restoration of peaceful atmo- • A working group should be formed, sphere, conciliatory gestures should be representing all ethnic groups in the region. carried out: - by Konkombas, e.g. render sincere Local level apology • Meet chiefs, opinion leaders, and youth - by Dagomba Ya-Na to instruct all leaders in Saboba and other Districts in the Dagombas to allow Konkombas access to conflict area to educate people on the all parts of Dagbon. outcome of this workshop.

56 Appendix '1

• There is a need for transport of workshop • Education on effects of conflicts e.g. radio participants to other Districts of the conflict programmes. area. • Northern MPs should be part of the peace • Workshop participants should give lectures process. to students of second-cycle institutions and • Rehabilitation. churches and mosques. Regional level • District Chief Executive should reflect the ethnicity of the District. • Representation at the Regional House of Chiefs. • Representation on the Regional Co-ordinating Nanumba committee. • Openness and fairness. National level • Adequate security should be provided to Local level enable everyone to move about safely and • All chiefs and opinion leaders should be freely. involved in the peace process. • Halt the How of arms and ammunition into • More concerned Gonjas (from Kpembe) the Region. should be involved. • Law and order should be strictly enforced. • Working groups should be assisted (funded) • Security personnel should exhibit a high to explain the peace process at grassroots sense of discipline, honesty, and fairness. level. • Those in authority should avoid inflam- • Involve other actors: women's groups, matory statements. Muslim Council, Christian Council, and • Government should direct PPNT to offer Catholic Secretariat, as well as the PPNT. maximum co-operation to the NGO Consorti u m/N PI. Nchumurus Regional, level, • Regional administration should encourage National level the creation of more paramountcies for other • Expansion of the National House of Chiefs. tribes. • National leaders should be guarded in their • The Regional Minister should pay regular pronouncements. visits to the conflict areas. • More serious and objective attention should • The Northern Youth Association should be be given to rumours of conflict. reactivated. • Security in Northern Region should be • The NGO Consortium should hold a Regional strengthened. Peace Seminar with the Regional House of • Membership of the Regional Security Chiefs and all parties involved in the conflict. Council should be reviewed. Regional level Local level • Regional House of Chiefs should be • Extensive education on peace. expanded to reflect ethnicity of the Region so • Resettlement of displaced people. as to create a forum for dialogue. • Rapid repairs to damaged education and • Regional Security Committee should be health facilities. objective and serious in handling ethnic • The paramount chief should have the problems in the region. prerogative to appoint chiefs. • More police posts/stations should be opened • Committees of reconciliation must be in conflict areas. established at local level. • Regional youth associations should be revived and used as agents for peace and interaction. Nawuri • Political leaders should be objective, open- National level minded, and fair in the administration of the • Implementation of the findings of Region. Committees of Enquiry. • We should respect each other's religious • Enforcement of law and order. views. • Information should be promptly investigated.

57 Building Sustainable Peace

Local level ' Recognition of the identity and views of other • Involvement of opinion leaders and ethnic groups. stakeholders in the process of reconciliation. • Involvement of various ethnic groups in • Meeting with various youth organisations decision-making by traditional, chiefs, NGOs, and chiefs to spread the peace message. government, Houses of Chiefs, youth • Opening channels of communication movements, Information Services Depart- between groups in conflict. ment, and religious groups.

58 Appendix 5: Text of Kumasi Peace Accord

KUMASI ACCORD ON PEACE extensive consultation, discussion and feedback AND RECONCILIATION with all segments of their community. Alter four weeks, the delegates returned to Kumasi to BETWEEN THE VARIOUS report on the outcome of their consultation ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE processes, to incorporate into the draft NORTHERN REGION OF agreement the feed-back and amendments generated by the consultations, as well as, when GHANA necessary, to renegotiate the draft agreement. After these processes, on March 30lh 1996, the delegates signed the following document which was called the Kumasi Accord on Peace and INTRODUCTION Reconciliation Between The Various Ethnic Groups In The Northern Region of Ghana. Since November 1994 the inter-NGO Consortium and the Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI) have been organising and facilitating a PREAMBLE series of peace and reconciliation consultations and workshops among the warring ethnic WE, the Bassare, Dagomba, Gonja, Konkomba, groups in Northern Ghana. Nanumba, Nawuri and Nchumuru delegations: Follow-up and Planning committees were MEETING together at the Peace and formed from the different ethnic groups in the Reconciliation Consultations held in Kumasi in region to work the NPI and the Consortium. February and March 1996; Between May 1995 and April 1996 five meetings and consultations were organised in Kumasi as HAVING heard, considered, discussed and well as numerous others in Bimbilla, / debated the demands each group had against Karaga, Saboba, Salaga, Yendi, and Zabzugu/ each other as adversaries during the Northern Tatale aimed at creating consensus on the need Region conflict; for peace and reconciliation, building confidence among the warring ethnic communities, as well as BELIEVING that all ethnic communities have a searching for solutions to the outstanding issues crucial role to play in the building of peace; of conflict underlying the wars. DETERMINED to resolve all outstanding issues At the fourth Kumasi meeting, 48 delegates between us and to lay the foundation for a from seven ethnic groups constituting chiefs, durable and stable peace for sustainable PPNT delegates, opinion and youth leaders development; were invited to work towards the search for durable resolution to the conflicts in the CON VINCED that it is in the best interest of our Northern Region of Ghana. The NPI facilitated respective people that we create an enabling a series of bilateral and multilateral negotiations atmosphere of peace that will foster social re- aimed at identifying the issues clearly and integration, mobility, economic cooperation finding solutions that are acceptable to all the and development as individuals and as groups; parties involved. On February 29, 1996, the ACCEPTING that our individual and group delegates severally and jointly agreed to a draft aspirations of development can only be achieved document which outlined the agreements in an atmosphere of forgiveness, moderation, reached on the contentious issues presented in compromise, cooperation and the peaceful the negotiations. resolution of our differences; The draft agreement was then taken by the delegates to their respective communities for NOW AGREE as follows:

59 Building Sustainable Peace

AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE c. the prerogative to adjudicate upon DAGOMBAS, KONKOMBAS AND certain disputes in the area ofjurisdiction BASSARES d. entitlement to jurisdictional allegiance from subjects in the area ofjurisdiction. 1 The present scheme of land tenure in Dagbon reflected in the customary laws, usages and 5 We will respect and be sensitive to the practices is non-discriminatory and satisfies the respective religious subscribed to by our aspirations of all citizens of Dagbon regardless people and we shall do nothing that will of ethnic background. It is recognised that the directly or indirectly offend, impugn or Ya-Na holds the allodial title to all Dagbon ridicule each other's religion. lands and he holds same as a trustee in trust for all the citizens of Dagbon. The divisional chiefs 6 We decry the spiral of arms and ammunition whether they are Dagombas, Konkombas, build-up in the Northern Region and affirm Bassares etc are the caretakers of the land and our readiness and determination to stem their all citizens through their respective divisions flow into the region. have a birth-right of equal and unimpeded 7 We declare that we shall cooperate fully in access to the land in accordance with customary bringing about and facilitating a complete law. In this context the term "citizens" refers to reconciliation of our people in accordance all persons claiming and reputed to be with the tenets of our customs. We note in indigenous persons and recognised as such. particular the restrictions on the movement of Currently Dagombas, Konkombas, Bassares, Anufos etc. are generally known as citizens. Konkombas and Bassares in Tamale and other areas in the Region and agree that we shall 2 We are appreciative of the Ya-Na's gesture to implement such appropriate measures as may confer paramountcy on Dagomba, be found efficacious to ease the problem. Konkomba, Bassare etc. chiefs and note with satisfaction that the conditions attached to the 8 As an assurance to our continued peaceful co- elevation to paramountcy are as applicable to existence and collaborative relations we Dagomba chiefs as they are to Konkomba and undertake to cease all provocative acts, Bassare chiefs in the same situation. utterance and particularly publications in the media that may inflame passions and lead to 3 We note with satisfaction that even before the breaches of security in our areas. conflict Konkomba, Bassare and Aiiufo chiefs had representation in the Dagbon Traditional 9 We recognise and accept the value of Council. We also note that the participation of confidence-building in our efforts to structure these chiefs in the Dagbon Traditional and entrench peace and we therefore agree Council was interrupted when the conflict that in all our dealings with each other we shall broke out. We agree that the said chiefs ought demonstrate absolute good faith, sincerity to resume their active participation in the and commitment to peace. work of the Traditional Council. 4 We declare and affirm our acceptance and AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE observance of the rules, customs, practices KONKOMBAS AND NANUMBAS and usages regarding the institution of chieftaincy in Dagbon and that without 1 Nanumbas, who are indigenous and sole discrimination all chiefs in Dagbon, be they owners of the land in Nanun, do recognise the Dagombas, Konkombas, Bassares, Anufos, Konkombas as an important non-Nanumba etc. are entitled to exercise all powers, community and brothers in development jurisdiction and authority reserved for chiefs who seek the well-being of the district and under customary law. whose status, rights, duties and obligations are traditionally recognised and defined In particular we affirm that all chiefs in under Nanun customary law and usage. Dagbon, save and except as custom or the law may limit, are entitled to exercise all rights and 2 Konkombas shall be allowed to freely choose powers in the following matters, namely:- their headmen to be blessed by the Bimbilla- a. the creation and approval of new Naa or his delegated divisional authority, settlements in the area of jurisdiction provided this will not conflict with the interest b. enskinments of lesser chiefs or headmen of the Bimbilla-Naa and/or the Princes of in the area of jurisdiction Nanun.

60 Appendix D

3 Representation at administrative and political undertake, with the assistance of the Nanumba decision-making processes shall be by merit delegation, to verify and ascertain the position and following due process. of such chiefs and in consultation with our Nanumba counterparts seek a solution that 4 We declare that we shall cooperate fully in will be satisfactory to both sides. bringing about and facilitating a complete reconciliation of our people in accordance 12 We decry the spiral of arms and ammunition with the tenets and practices of our traditions. build-up in the Northern Region and affirm We note in particular the restriction on the our readiness and determination to stem their movement of our peoples in Nanun and all flow into the region. the other areas in the Region and agree that we shall implement appropriate measures as AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE may be found efficacious to ease the problem. GONJAS AND NCHUMURUS 5 Land ownership is not in dispute with the Bimbilla-Naa as the paramount chief and 1 The Nchumurus have appealed to the Gonjas allodial owner of all land in Nanun as accepted not to frustrate Nanjuro-Wura's application by the Konkombas. for paramountcy. Gonjas have agreed to cooperate. 6 Paramountcy is the preserve of eligible Nanumbas. 2 Gonjas have accepted in principle that the Nanjuro-Wura's status had been established as 7 We shall accept regulations from the equivalent to a divisional chief. It was Nanumba Traditional Council with circumstances that made him opt out of the Konkomba representation, which, with the Gonja chieftaincy system. help of ecological experts, regulates land use, land tenure and settlement patterns for 3 Gonjas will allow the Nanjuro-Wura's purposes of preservation of the ecology for application through Government, for future generations. paramountcy to go through at the National House of Chiefs. 8 Customary pacification in respect of river gods, land gods and groves should only be 4 The Gonjas also agree to support a subsequent performed by the recognised land and fetish creation of separate Nchumuru Traditional priests or Tindanas of Nanun. Council. 9 We agree to refrain from the practice of 5 The Nchumurus will have representation on ethnicising individual criminal behaviour; that Northern Region House of Chiefs. is, from blaming an entire ethnic group for the criminal conduct of an individual who is a 6 In order to facilitate these agreements, the member of that ethnic group. following steps have been agreed upon by the two sides: 10 For purposes of assuring security and the a. The Gonja delegation will immediately avoidance of recurrent inter-communal vio- brief the Yagbon-Wura and the Kpembe- lence, the parties agree to create committees Wura on Nchumura proposals and composed of Nanumbas and Konkombas demands. whose tasks will consist of the following: b. The Tuluwe-Wura will liaise with the a. identifying people in Nanun communities Mion-Lana (AA Ziblim) who has agreed to that foment or incite ethnic animosity and act as an intermediary between violence and ensure that appropriate Nchumuru and Gonja. legal actions are taken against such people in order to stop or deter their behaviour. c. In consequence of item (b) above, the Mion-Lana and Tuluwe-Wura have b. Identifying particularly conflict-sensitive areas and travelling to those areas jointly scheduled to visit the Yagbon-Wura on (Konkombas and Nanumbas together) to the 15th of March to concretise the educate people about peaceful co- Gonja-Nchumuru peace process. existence and to resolve problems in the d. The Mion-Lana will give a feedback, areas peacefully so that inter-communal subsequent to which Nchumuru will violence does not erupt. propose a tentative date to meet with the Yagbon-Wura. The date should allow 11 On the issue of the 365 self-styled chiefs and sufficient notice to enable the Yagbon- separatists, we the Konkomba delegation will Wura to assemble his divisional chiefs.

61 Building Sustainable Peace

7 A preliminary meeting between Gonja and and educate citizens on the need for Nchumuru at the highest Traditional Level peaceful coexistence and free movement, should open the avenues for the formulation of d. A peace conference will be organised in Peace-Awareness groups/meetings/workshops Salaga before the commencement of the at the community levels. farming season involving all ethnic groups in the Salaga area. 8 Both ethnic groups will commence organising their peoples for reintegration, resettlement and reconstruction. AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE BASSARES AND GONJAS 9 The follow-up Committee will be invited to facilitate the plans/expectations above. 1 Both sides recognise that the investigation of the Buipe Bridge incident is an essential AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE ingredient in the reconciliation process KONKOMBAS AND GONJAS between Bassares and Gonjas. 1 We commit ourselves to express respect to 2 The Gonjas agree to undertake an each other and refrain from activities that independent investigation into the matter and debase or insult each other's people, elders, share the findings so that both parties could customs and traditions. learn from the mistakes that might have been committed by any side and to put mechanisms 2 Konkombas have no claim to Gonja land or to in place to ensure that the same mistake is not paramountcy in the same area. However, committed again. where there is a large Konkomba community, the Gonja paramount or divisional chief may 3 Bassares have no claim to Gonja land or to confer a leadership title that he deems fit on paramountcy in the same area. However, any Konkomba who will serve under him. where there is a large Bassare community, the Gonja paramount or divisional chief may 3 We agree that when conflicts erupt or confer a leadership title that he deems fit on rumours about conflicts circulate, the chiefs any Bassare who will serve under him. and leaders from the Gonja and Konkomba communities will take initiatives to approach each other to investigate the matter and AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE arrest the escalation through respectful NAWURIS AND GONJAS discussions. 1 The Nawuris and the Gonjas recognise that 4 The Konkombas agree to undertake an there are several outstanding issues of dispute independent investigation of the causes for the between them that require peaceful 1994 war between them and the Gonjas and resolution. The Kumasi meetings have helped share their findings so that both parties could both delegations to articulate and identify learn from the mistakes that might have been these issues. committed by any side and put mechanisms in place to ensure that the same mistakes are not 2 The two delegations agree to continue the committed again. dialogue that has begun in Kumasi in order to create a conducive environment and 5 In order to encourage free movement in the understanding that would lead to the conflict areas as an element of reconciliation resolution of the outstanding issues. between Gonjas and Konkombas, we agree: a. That we shall ask our respective chiefs, 3 To that effect, the Nawuris agree to intensify headmen, elders, youth association their confidence-building and peace- leaders to ensure safe movement of education activities to encourage peaceful members of the other ethnic group within ethnic co-existence in their respective their communities. communities with the assistance of the Peace b. That if anyone from another ethnic group Awareness Committee. is attacked we agree to hold the chief or leader accountable to apprehend the 4 The Nawuris agree to assist, in whatever way culprit or be held accountable themselves. possible, in resettling the Gonjas displaced c. That working groups made up of from Kpandai due to the war between the two representatives of all ethnic groups in the ethnic groups in 1991, back in the places from area follow up at the community levels which they were displaced.

62 Appendix 5

AGREEMENT ON REGIONAL functions of such an association shall be ASSOCIATION determined at a meeting of representatives of youth associations from all ethnic communities in To underline our commitment to this Accord, Northern Ghana and this meeting shall be and to enshrine the sense of unity that the Accord organised to take place immediately subsequent generates among us signatories and our peoples to the signing of this Accord. in the Northern Region of Ghana, as well as to IN FULL AGREEMENT with the above give an institutional embodiment to the spirit of paragraphs, we the delegates from the seven this Accord which can enhance the imple- ethnic communities in the Northern Region of mentation of the Accord's provisions, we have Ghana have signed this Accord on this 30th day hereby agreed to create a region-wide association of March, 1996 in Kumasi, the capital of the that will be composed of representatives from all Ashanti Region of Ghana. the ethnic communities which currently live in the Northern Region. The specific nature and (34 signatures follow)

63 Notes

1 E1U 1996-97:13, Austin 1996:553-60, strong role in dispute settlement and Sams and Shams 1991:8. leadership in acephalous societies. 2 Glewwe and Twum-Baah 1991:47-9. 24 Here, a particular leg of a large kill is given 3 Nyakora 1994:2. to the local chief. 4 Sarris and Shams 1991. 25 See Figure 4. 5 Nyakora 1994:2. 26 NPI and Inter-NGO Consortium 1995b: 1. 6 UNDP 1997. 27 See Figure 4. 7 Goody 1968. 28 For example, Saaka notes (1978:126), 8 Promoting irrigated rice cultivation, soya, writing on the Gonja Districts, 'in the and maize crops, it mainly benefits ex-civil smaller villages (where most people live) servants and non-farmers. the only legitimate political authority is the 9 Funded by the Sasakawa Foundation, but chief. It is thus not incongruous for the channelled through MoFA extension people to accept traditional authorities as services. intermediaries between them and modern 10 Groups which lay claim to having origins in government.' this Region. There are many 'temporary' 29 Goody 1979. residents from groups outside the Region, 30 The Mamprusi are an exception. such as civil servants and Fulani cattle- 31 Sources: interviews, press statements, and keepers. workshop reports. 11 Traditionally, they have not had chiefs or 32 Skalnik 1983:20. other forms of permanent leadership. 33 Drucker-Brown 1997. 12 Pull 994a: 1. 34 November 1994. 13 The estimate for the Dagombas refers to 35 Pul 1994a. 1981. Figures from Barker 1986:170 and 36 Ibid. Staniland 1985:32. 37 Ibid: 3. 14 Ollennu and Woodman 1985. 38 GBC 1994. 15 This type of control is implied in the term 39 GBC 1994. naam, meaning 'chieftaincy'. 40 MoFA 1995:6. 16 According to Skalnik 1983:23. 41 Regional Technical Committee 1994:9. 17 Recently there has been a rise in urban land 42 MoFA 1994:2. sales, including a tenfold increase in the 43 Regional Technical Committee 1994:8. value of urban land over the past four years. 44 Inter-NGO Consortium 1994a. 18 Goody 1979. 45 Inter-NGO Consortium 1994a. 19 Norton, 1990:4. 46 The operation commander had undertaken 20 Known as a 'gate' in the north. a thorough analysis of the conflict, showing 21 i.e. the extent of their power over people how the Konkombas had mobilised for war rather than over territory; although, as by moving entire Konkomba communities suggested, territoriality is being into attacking positions, drawing on women increasingly applied as a concept. The term to provide logistics, whereas the cephalous is from Drucker-Brown 1975. communities had called on their warrior 22 Tait 1969, Staniland 1975. clans to fight. The Konkomba tactics made it 23 There are no secular leaders. Political difficult for cephalous groups to attack, organisation is maintained through the because Konkombas hid in clusters in the structural opposition between lineage bush. He concluded that cephalous groups segments at different levels (from a small were weakened in this context by the family unit to the clan) and cross-cutting participation of the younger warrior clan ties of alliance (such as religious and members in education and urban life. They marital). Traditional priests often play a no longer wished to fight or travel to the

64 Notes

rural areas and did not feel strong 73 Notably, the Bassares did not participate in obligations to do so. Many cephalous urban the Kumasi series. They declined to do so youths, filled with bravado, who did board because they were not directly involved in trucks in Tamale to join the fight elsewhere, the 1994-5 conflict and did not want to be ran away when they saw the realities of regarded as allies of any other group. conflict. Konkomba youths, on the other However, they were signatories to the hand, tended to remain in rural areas, not Kumasi Peace Accord. having had so many educational oppor- 74 NPI and Inter-NGO Consortium 1995a: 1-2. tunities, and were ready to fight. 75 NPI and Inter-NGO Consortium 1995a. 47 Scarcity of food, poor health, crop 76 Ibid: 14-5. destruction, reduced animal and poultry 77 Further responses are listed in Appendix 3. production, and continued animal theft 78 Consortium June 1995:7. were cited as the greatest problems in the 79 Consortium June 1995:7. report. Needs were assessed as agricultural 80 Pugansoa 1996:4. inputs (seed, tractor service, reinstatement 81 Inter-NGO Consortium 1996b: 1-2. of credit and banking facilities, of disease 82 Detailed in Appendix 10.8. and pest control and other services 83 NPI and Inter NGO consortium 1995a: 1. disrupted due to the exodus of civil 84 BBC (1997). servants). 85 Nyakora 1995:6. 48 MoFA 1994:1-12. 86 Nyakora 1995:6. 49 These include membership organisations, 87 Ethnic group adjacent to the main church-related professional NGOs, and Konkomba area in the Saboba-Chereponi NGOs with a small professional team. District (see Figure 2). 50 Now Department for International 88 The Regional Co-ordinating Council is a Development (DF1D). Government body consisting of 51 MoFA 1995:7. representatives of a number of government 52 Ibid. departments, including the Ministry of the Interior and the Military Task Force. 53 UN1CEF 1995. 89 Nyakora 1995:7. 54 Bacho, Musah and Manama 1996. 90 Bacho, Musah, and Manama 1996:30. 55 NPI and Inter-NGO Consortium 1995a:l. 91 Bacho, Musah, and Manama 1996:37. 56 Pul 1994a:3. 92 Ibid. 57 Capital of the Ashanti Region. 93 Pul1994b:2-4. 58 Assefa 1993. 94 NPI and Inter-NGO Consortium 1995a:4. 59 Ibid. 95 Ibid. 60 The NPI believes that multipartyism in 96 Bacho, Musah and Manama 1996:37. Africa has led to current strife. 97 Bacho, Musah and Manama 1996:36. 61 Pugansoa 1996:3-4. 98 These are said to have political links with 62 NPI and Inter-NGO Consortium 1995b:4. the government and the opposition 63 NPI and Inter-NGO Consortium 1995a:2. respectively. 64 NPJ and Inter-NGO Consortium |une 99 The Northern Monitor, a Dagomba-domi- 1995:5. nated paper, even criticised the election of a 65 NPI and Inter-NGO Consortium June Mamprusi head for NORYDA recently, on 1995:9. the grounds that Mamprusis 'swerved' the 66 Jessiwuni 1995:4—5. conflict, that is, that they did not come to the 67 )bid. aid of the other cephalous groups! 68 Inter-NGO Consortium 1995a: 9. 100 Inaugurated September 1996. 69 Pugansoa 1996:4. 101 NPI and Inter-NGO Consortium 1995a. 70 NPI and Inter-NGO Consortium 1995b:6. 102 NPI and Inter-NGO Consortium 71 Ibid: 6-8. - 1995b:10-l 1. 72 Inter-NGO Consortium 1995:2. 103 NPI and Inter-NGO Consortium 1995a.

65 References

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