DOCSLIB.ORG

Steht Später Die Headline

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Steht Später Die Headline COUNTRY RE PORT Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. AFGHANISTAN NILS WÖRMER March 2014 Democratic Handover in www.kas.de/afghanistan Afghanistan? 2014 PRESEDENTIAL ELECTIONS ARE CRUCIAL Successful presidential elections on 5 province, these have between nine and 29 April 2014 would produce the first demo- seats. Altogether almost 2,700 candidates, cratic handover in Afghanistan’s history. including about 300 women, are standing The vote also represents a milestone in for the 420 provincial council seats across the current transition phase. The organi- the country. sation and conduct of the election process and the extent of proven manipulation Significance of the elections will reveal a great deal about the progress of Afghan democratisation. Ensuring that Since the second half of 2013 the political the election can be held across the entire debate in and about Afghanistan has been country will also represent the ultimate dominated by two themes: the US-Afghan test for the Afghan security forces – Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) and the shortly before the withdrawal of NATO presidential elections. These two issues combat forces. Although the election pro- have lately overshadowed discussion about cess has rolled out promisingly, there is the central action areas for the transition still a danger of the ballot being post- phase (mid-2011 to the end of 2014) de- poned or so overshadowed by violence fined by the Afghan government and the and fraud as to leave the new Afghan international community : (1) governance president with minimal legitimacy. Three and corruption, (2) building national securi- candidates have forged ahead in recent ty forces, (3) regional cooperation (above weeks, but none can yet be regarded as a all with Iran and Pakistan), (4) reconcilia- clear favourite. tion and peace process, and (5) creating an economic perspective. Nonetheless, the On 5 April 2014 Afghanistan will hold its conduct and outcome of the presidential third presidential elections since the remov- elections will function as a barometer of al of the Taliban in autumn 2001. Hamid progress and deficits in the aforementioned Karzai, who served as interim president policy fields and decisively influence future (2002 to 2004) before being elected in 2004 developments in these central areas. and 2009, is not permitted to stand a third time. Successful elections would thus bring First of all, it will reveal to what extent the about the first democratic handover in Af- current government is willing and able to ghanistan’s history. In the eyes of the inter- organise free and fair elections and thus ful- national community the vote will have been fil its promises on good governance. Since successful if it is freer, fairer and more in- the beginning of the year the Afghan securi- clusive than the 2009 presidential election, ty forces have gone on the offensive to which was overshadowed by fraud, abuse of erode the insurgents’ resources and restrict power and violence. their radius of action. On election day the security forces will be forced to operate de- As well as a president, Afghans will also be fensively to protect polling stations and oth- electing the 34 provincial councils on 5 er facilities. Especially in the eyes of the Af- April. Depending on the population of the ghan population, these operations represent 2 Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. an important indicator of the current consent of national parliaments in certain strength of the police, army and intelligence NATO member-states all also have to wait AFGHANISTAN service. Success in safeguarding more or until after the elections. Consequently, any NILS WÖRMER less nationwide elections and largely pre- significant delay in holding the elections venting spectacular, headline-grabbing at- would torpedo the required planning phase March 2014 tacks would boost the reputation and mo- for US and NATO post-2014 military en- rale of the army and police force. If the gagement in the country. This means that www.kas.de/afghanistan elections are also perceived as largely free, the future Afghanistan policy of the NATO fair and transparent, that would strengthen states and a part of the associated military respect for the institutions of the Afghan and development aid depend directly on the state. But if escalating violence prevents the shape of the election process. poll taking place at all in some parts of the country, or it is overshadowed by fraud and The election process abuse of power, the population will probably finally lose its faith in the political system. On 17 and 20 July 2013 President Hamid Karzai signed two laws regulating the pro- The regional powers of Iran and Pakistan cess and responsibilities for organising and will, like the leadership of the Afghan Tali- conducting the presidential elections: a ban, only decide their future political course general election law and the Law on the once it has become clear how the elections Structure, Duties and Authorities of the In- went and what the post-2014 NATO and US dependent Election Commission (IEC) and military presence will look like. An Afghani- the Independent Electoral Complaints stan with a legitimate president, strength- Commission (ECC).1 As required by the leg- ened political institutions and a US and islation, President Karzai on 29 July 2013 NATO military presence (even if heavily re- appointed a nine-member Independent duced) represents a completely different Election Commission. scenario than the same country after chaot- ic elections, with a severely damaged gov- In May 2013, even before the passage of ernment and an aborted Bilateral Security the election laws and the appointment of Agreement. the Independent Election Commission and the Independent Electoral Complaints So the shape of the election process will in- Commission, the Afghan government began fluence whether Iran and Pakistan choose to re-registering voters at the district level. pursue a cooperative or more aggressive The process was completed by November approach to the peace process and future 2013. The number eligible to vote is esti- stabilisation efforts by the international mated at about 12 million, out of a total community, and the extent of concessions population of approximately 30 million, alt- the Afghan Taliban may be willing to make. hough it is believed that up to 20 million The question of the outcome of the election, voting cards could be in circulation. More the election winner, is of secondary im- than three million of these were issued in portance in this connection. And because the latest registration phase in 2013, the the stance of outgoing President Karzai in rest originate from voter registrations in ad- recent months has tied the Bilateral Securi- vance of the 2004 and 2009 presidential ty Agreement to the elections, the shape of the election process will influence the entire planning of Western military and civilian for the period after 2014. Karzai is leaving it to 1 Independent Election Commission of Af- his successor to sign (or reject) the Bilateral ghanistan. Security Agreement between Afghanistan http://www.iec.org.af/pdf/legalframework/l and the United States. That means that a aw/electorallaw_eng.pdf and parallel agreement between Afghanistan http://www.iec.org.af/pdf/legalframework/l and NATO, the necessary formal invitation aw/law_structure_iec_duties_authorities_en by the Afghan government, United Nations g.pdf. legitimisation of the new mission, and the 3 Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. elections and the 2005 and 2010 parliamen- sults on 24 April and announcement of final tary elections.2 results on 14 May. Complaints about the AFGHANISTAN conduct of the election may be submitted NILS WÖRMER Altogether, according to the Independent between 7 and 27 April, for investigation by Election Commission, there will be 6,775 the Independent Electoral Complaints March 2014 polling stations across the country on 5 Commission by 7 May. If, as presently ex- April.3 Initially, in January, the Interior Min- pected, none of the candidates passes the www.kas.de/afghanistan istry declared that 414 polling stations 50 percent threshold in the first round, a would have to remain closed because of se- second round must be held 14 days after curity concerns. But shortly thereafter, on announcement of the first round final result 21 January, the Independent Election (in other words on 28 May) to decide be- Commission announced that 313 additional tween the two leading candidates. In this polling stations would be set up. Security event the announcement of a provisional circles in Kabul expect that about 5 percent result would be expected in mid-June and (in the worst case 10 percent) of the polling the final second round result not before the stations currently planned by the Independ- end of June. So even without delays in the ent Election Commission may have to be process the identity of the new Afghan pres- closed at the last minute or will remain un- ident will not be known until the beginning staffed on election day, and that voting at of the holy month of Ramadan.4 those locales will be impossible. In the event of one of the eleven presiden- The actual election process began on 16 tial candidates dying during the first or sec- September 2013 with a three-week regis- ond round or before the election result has tration phase for presidential candidates. By been announced, the constitution and elec- 6 October, 27 candidates had submitted ap- tion law stipulate that a new vote be held plications. On 16 November 2013, after with the surviving candidates within 30 several weeks of scrutiny, the Independent days. Election Commission published its final list of eleven approved candidates and their re- Candidates spective running mates for the posts of first and second vice-president. Thus since the The most prominent presidential candidates end of 2013 the attention of the Afghan are the 2009 runner-up and former foreign electorate and media has focused on 33 in- minister Dr.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Old Habits, New Consequences Old Habits, New Khalid Homayun Consequences Nadiri Pakistan’S Posture Toward Afghanistan Since 2001
    Old Habits, New Consequences Old Habits, New Khalid Homayun Consequences Nadiri Pakistan’s Posture toward Afghanistan since 2001 Since the terrorist at- tacks of September 11, 2001, Pakistan has pursued a seemingly incongruous course of action in Afghanistan. It has participated in the U.S. and interna- tional intervention in Afghanistan both by allying itself with the military cam- paign against the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaida and by serving as the primary transit route for international military forces and matériel into Afghanistan.1 At the same time, the Pakistani security establishment has permitted much of the Afghan Taliban’s political leadership and many of its military command- ers to visit or reside in Pakistani urban centers. Why has Pakistan adopted this posture of Afghan Taliban accommodation despite its nominal participa- tion in the Afghanistan intervention and its public commitment to peace and stability in Afghanistan?2 This incongruence is all the more puzzling in light of the expansion of insurgent violence directed against Islamabad by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a coalition of militant organizations that are independent of the Afghan Taliban but that nonetheless possess social and po- litical links with Afghan cadres of the Taliban movement. With violence against Pakistan growing increasingly indiscriminate and costly, it remains un- clear why Islamabad has opted to accommodate the Afghan Taliban through- out the post-2001 period. Despite a considerable body of academic and journalistic literature on Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan since 2001, the subject of Pakistani accommodation of the Afghan Taliban remains largely unaddressed. Much of the existing literature identiªes Pakistan’s security competition with India as the exclusive or predominant driver of Pakistani policy vis-à-vis the Afghan Khalid Homayun Nadiri is a Ph.D.
    [Show full text]
  • Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions
    AGREEMENT ON PROVISIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN PENDING THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS The participants in the UN Talks on Afghanistan, In the presence of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, Determined to end the tragic conflict in Afghanistan and promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights in the country, Reaffirming the independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, Acknowledging the right of the people of Afghanistan to freely determine their own political future in accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice, Expressing their appreciation to the Afghan mujahidin who, over the years, have defended the independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the country and have played a major role in the struggle against terrorism and oppression, and whose sacrifice has now made them both heroes of jihad and champions of peace, stability and reconstruction of their beloved homeland, Afghanistan, Aware that the unstable situation in Afghanistan requires the implementation of emergency interim arrangements and expressing their deep appreciation to His Excellency Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani for his readiness to transfer power to an interim authority which is to be established pursuant to this agreement, Recognizing the need to ensure broad representation in these interim arrangements of all segments of the Afghan population, including groups that have not been
    [Show full text]
  • Final Agenda Citpax Oct 2007
    The Evolution of PRT Models: Towards the Pre-eminence of the Civilian Dimension? Meeting between Afghan Civil Society, PRT and International Organisations Representatives AGENDA Madrid 16 - 17 October 2007 Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales Plaza de la Marina Española, 9 Sponsored by With the support of Tuesday, 16 October 2007 9:00 – 9:30 Welcome remarks: Bernardino León, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Spain Juan Pablo de Laiglesia, Secretary General, Spanish Agency for International Cooperation (AECI) 10:00 – 14:00 The role of Civil Society consultation processes and fora in the PRT strategic and operational planning: short term and medium term prospects Introductory interventions: Fahim Hakim, Vice-President, Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) Kanishka Nawabi, Managing Director Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU), Afghanistan Discussants: Hakan Abaci, former civilian coordinator of the Turkish PRT in Wardak Chair of the session: Clare Lockhart, Director, State Effectiveness Initiative o How can CS contribute to the work of PRTs? Are the existing civil society consultation fora effective? To what extent do PRT master plans reflect CS recommendations and therefore meet the expectations of the local population? o Wrap up session, conclusions and proposals. 14:00 - 15:30 Lunch 15:30 – 19:00 The civilian role of PRTs: towards a specialised delivery platform for the development and implementation of ANDS (Afghan National Development Strategy) Pilar 1 (Political and Security) Introductory remarks: Bernardo Álvarez del Manzano, Commander of Operations Command, Spain Aziz Rafiee, Managing Director, Afghan Civil Society Forum (ACSF) Discussants: Gavin Buchan, former Political Director, Kandahar PRT; current Special Advisor to DG International Security Policy, Department of National Defence, Canada Colonel Norton, Head of UK PRT in Helmand Chair of the session: Jawed Ludin, Afghan Ambassador to Norway and former Chief of Staff to President Karzai o Short term vs.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan Assessment
    AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY REPORT April 2005 Country Information & Policy Unit IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY DIRECTORATE HOME OFFICE, UNITED KINGDOM Afghanistan April 2005 CONTENTS 1 Scope Of Document 1.1 - 1.12 2 Geography General 2.1 – 2.2 Languages/Main ethnic groups/Religions 2.3 - 2.5 3.Economy 3.1 - 3.8 4 History Overview to December 2001 4.1 Post Taliban 4.2 – 4.13 January 2004 – December 2004 4.14 – 4.59 January 2005 onwards 4.60 – 4.66 5.State Structures The Constitution 5.1 - 5.8 The Constitutional Loya Jirga 5.9 – 5.13 Citizenship and Nationality 5.14 – 5.16 Political System Overview 5.17 – 5.26 Elections: - General 5.27 – 5.29 - Presidential Election 5.30 – 5.40 - Presidential Election Results 5.41 – 5.42 - Lead up to Parliamentary Elections 5.43 – 5.47 Political Situation in Herat 5.48 – 5.50 Judiciary 5.51 – 5.64 Land Court 5.65 – 5.66 Legal Rights/Detention 5.67 - 5.83 Death Penalty 5.84 - 5.86 Internal Security Developments following 11 September 2001 5.87 - 5.90 Security Sector Reform (SSR) 5.91 - 5.94 General security situation 5.95 – 5.112 Security situation in different regions: - Kabul 5.113 – 5.116 - Central 5.117 - South and Southeast 5.118 - 5.122 - North 5.123 – 5.124 Internal Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Provincial Reconstruction 5.125 – 5.150 Teams (PRTs) Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (DDR) 5.151 – 5.166 National Security Directorate (Amniat) 5.167 – 5.170 Army 5.171 – 5.174 Police 5.175 – 5.184 Prisons and Prison Conditions 5.185 - 5.208 Military Service 5.209 - 5.212 Medical Services
    [Show full text]
  • Det Udenrigspolitiske Nævn, Forsvarsudvalget, Udenrigsudvalget 2010-11 UPN Alm
    Det Udenrigspolitiske Nævn, Forsvarsudvalget, Udenrigsudvalget 2010-11 UPN alm. del Bilag 56, FOU alm. del Bilag 54, URU alm. del Bilag 65 Offentligt The Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) and the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs have the pleasure of inviting you to a seminar on: Afghanistan: Perspectives for a Peaceful Solution Tuesday, 11 January 2011, 14.45-17.00 Danish Institute for International Studies Main Auditorium Strandgade 71, ground floor, 1401 Copenhagen K Background Afghanistan is facing a number of key challenges: The transition of security responsibilities from foreign forces to the Afghan National Security Forces, and at some stage the exit of foreign forces; a likely reconciliation and reintegration process with insurgents and the political consequences of that; the need for progress in governance and development; the relationship with its neighbors. All at the backdrop of a prolonged conflict, that has had dire human and developmental consequences for Afghanistan and has framed international relations for the last ten years. The debate on Afghanistan has become more and more polarized with those calling for a rapid exit of foreign troops arguing that the present military involvement is part of the problem rather than the solution; and those stating that international involvement (also military) in Afghanistan is a key requirement for peace and stability in the country, region and globally. What, in the view of the government of Afghanistan, are the perspectives for continued international involvement, the possible political solutions, and the overall benefit of the present international involvement in Afghanistan? And what can the international community in turn expect from the Afghan government in areas such as governance and development? Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan October 2003
    AFGHANISTAN COUNTRY REPORT October 2003 Country Information & Policy Unit IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY DIRECTORATE HOME OFFICE, UNITED KINGDOM Afghanistan October 2003 CONTENTS 1 Scope Of Document 1.1 - 1.4 2 Geography 2.1 - 2.5 General 2.1 Languages 2.2 - 2.5 3.Economy 3.1 - 3.6 4 History 4.1 - 4.94 1992-1994: Mujahidin Government 4.1 - 4.4 Emergence of the Taliban 4.5 - 4.8 February 1995-June 1996 4.9 - 4.10 September 1996-June 1997 4.11 - 4.18 August 1997-December 1999 4.19 - 4.33 January 2000 - December 2000 4.34 - 4.39 January 2001 - December 2001 4.40 - 4.58 January 2002 – December 2002 4.59 - 4.79 January 2003 onwards 4.80 - 4.94 5.State Structures 5.1 - 5.137 The Constitution 5.1 - 5.4 Citizenship and Nationality 5.5 - 5.7 Political System 5.8 - 5.24 -Interim Administration 5.8 - 5.10 -The Emergency Loya Jirga and Transitional Administration 5.11 - 5.17 -Elections 5.18 - 5.19 -Situation in Herat 5.20 - 5.21 -1996 - 22 December 2001 5.22 - 5.24 Judiciary 5.25 - 5.37 -Current Position 5.25 - 5.35 -1996 - 22 December 2001 5.36 - 5.37 Legal Rights/Detention 5.38 - 5.53 -Current Situation 5.38 - 5.45 -1996 - 22 December 2001 5.46 - 5.48 Death Penalty 5.49 - 5.53 -Current Situation 5.49 - 5.51 -1996 – 22 December 2001 5.52 - 5.53 Internal Security 5.54 - 5.94 -Current Situation 5.54 - 5.73 -National Security Directorate 5.74 - 5.76 -Accountability Department 5.77 -Army 5.78 - 5.80 -Police 5.81 - 5.84 -1996 - 22 December 2001 5.85 - 5.91 -Religious Police 5.92 - 5.94 Prisons and Prison Conditions 5.95 - 5.110 -Current Situation 5.95 -
    [Show full text]
  • Understanding Ethnic-Electoral Dynamics: How Ethnic Politics Affect Electoral Laws and Election Outcomes in Afghanistan
    MOBASHER 4/18/2016 3:11 PM UNDERSTANDING ETHNIC-ELECTORAL DYNAMICS: HOW ETHNIC POLITICS AFFECT ELECTORAL LAWS AND ELECTION OUTCOMES IN AFGHANISTAN *Mohammad Bashir Mobasher After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan began transitioning toward democracy. The democratization, which began with the Bonn Agreement, was very promising for all ethnic groups in Afghanistan. The Bonn Agreement provided that Afghanistan must establish “broad based, gender sensitive, multi- ethnic and fully representative government.”1 As a part of this agreement, Afghanistan adopted a new Constitution in 2004, which established elections as the foundation for representative government and guaranteed that the elections be inclusive, fair, and representative of all groups and regions. Despite this progress in the laws, Afghanistan has not been able to reduce ethnic tensions. In fact, this article shows that ethnic tensions tend to intensify during elections, a result that belies the vision of the Bonn Agreement. After presenting a statistical and qualitative analysis of voting practices across three presidential elections and 26 provinces, this article makes several observations about the role of ethnicity in Afghan presidential elections. These observations are: (1) people of an ethnic community are more likely to vote for a candidate of their own ethnic group; (2) voters from one ethnic group are likely to vote for a candidate from another ethnic group only when they do not have a candidate of their own; (3) cross ethnic voting is more likely to occur in blocs and in exchange for patronage to the elites of voting groups; and (4) candidates and ethno-political elites tend to prioritize their electoral campaigns by ethnic mobilization, manipulation of laws and political bargains rather than by policy development in order to generate votes.
    [Show full text]
  • The 2014 Presidential Elections in Afghanistan Written by Darren Atkinson
    Democracy as Theatre: The 2014 Presidential Elections in Afghanistan Written by Darren Atkinson This PDF is auto-generated for reference only. As such, it may contain some conversion errors and/or missing information. For all formal use please refer to the official version on the website, as linked below. Democracy as Theatre: The 2014 Presidential Elections in Afghanistan https://www.e-ir.info/2014/08/12/democracy-as-theatre-the-2014-presidential-elections-in-afghanistan/ DARREN ATKINSON, AUG 12 2014 Saturday, June 14th 2014, saw voting take place in the second round election run-off between the final two candidates for President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Dr. Abdullah Abdullah and Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai. In the first round, neither had been able to secure the required 50%, so a run-off was required. The second round results were initially counted and Ghani was said to have won with 56.44% of the votes, with Abdullah taking 43.56%. After allegations of irregularities, including ballot box stuffing (referred to as “stuffed sheep” in recordings released by Abdullah’s camp), the US Secretary of State John Kerry brokered a deal that would see 100% of the votes recounted in order to find an outright winner and a form of power-sharing to be established once the recount had been conducted. At the time of writing, we are still awaiting the outcome of the recount. Election coverage initially provided an optimistic, if cautious, counterpoint to the regular negative media attention paid to Afghanistan. Successful administering of democratic elections and a peaceful “transfer of power” was seen to highlight the potential for a future of peace and political progress.
    [Show full text]
  • ELECTORAL ALLIANCES in the 2014 Presidential Season
    Jackson Keith BACKGROUNDER October 3, 2013 The FORMATION OF ELECTORAL ALLIANCES IN the 2014 Presidential Season ey Takeaway: Candidates for Afghanistan’s 2014 elections will declare their intent to run for office by KOctober 6, 2013. The most prominent candidates to emerge are Zalmai Rassoul and Abdullah Abdullah. They represent the two main electoral factions will decide the 2014 election: the Karzai-Establishment and an anti-Karzai opposition. Although it appears that a large number of electoral alliances have formed and are backing a wider pool of high profile candidates, these two factions will predominate. The Karzai-Fahim electoral alliance that has characterized Afghan politics since 2009 seems to have broken, and Fahim has joined Abdullah Abdullah. Northern powerbrokers are reorienting, but some influential Tajiks such as Mohammad Atta Noor are likely to join the pro-Karzai establishment candidate. Rassoul is either a Karzai puppet or a placeholder for another candidate. He will need the Karzai family for electoral support. From now until October 6, candidates for the 2014 to the Karzai-establishment, and the opposition organized Afghan presidential election can officially declare their to defeat it. The opposing forces reflect significant trends intent to run for office. The Afghan political rumor mill that cut across ethnic lines and demonstrate that the has proffered a number of viable contenders, with early players are pursuing a real strategy to form coalitions with speculation centering on President Karzai’s older brother electoral and power political strength. Qayum Karzai,1 controversial Islamist figure Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf,2 popular former Ambassador to Pakistan THE ANTI-KARZAI FACTION-THE ELECTORAL ALLIANCE and recently appointed Interior Minister Omar Daudzai,3 OF AFGHANISTAN (EAA) and former National Security Advisor and current Foreign The anti-Karzai faction is primarily composed of Tajik Minister Zalmai Rassoul.
    [Show full text]
  • Newsletter Feb 2013.Pub
    February, 2013 February, Afghan News Latest News Facts about the 2014 security transition the transition is not something to be con- cerned over, it is tes- tament to the greater capacity of Afghani- stan and is to be welcomed More than 75% The percentage of areas where Afghan security forces already lead mis- sions Up to 12,000 The number of interna- tional soldiers that may H.E. President Karzai addresses regional issues at Is- remain in Afghanistan post-2014 in support lamic Summit Conference roles H.E. President Hamid Karzai attended the Other areas of importance discussed by H.E. 352,000 12th Session of the Islamic Summit Confer- President Karzai were support of an inde- The size at which Afghan ence Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt on Febru- pendent Palestinian State, the importance of security forces will be ary 6th and 7th. H.E. Foreign Minister Dr. addressing the plight of Rohingya Muslims maintained at least Zalmai Rassoul and H.E. Dr. Rangin Spanta, in Myanmar, and the necessity to help bring through 2018. National Security Advisor, were also in atten- peace to Syria. dance. H.E. President Karzai added, “Over the past In his address to the participants, H.E. Presi- decade, we have made great progress to dent Karzai highlighted a number of chal- provide safer, healthier and more prosperous Inside this issue: lenges within the Islamic sphere and the Is- lives for the Afghan people,” but stressed lamic Republic of Afghanistan’s position. One that challenges were shared throughout the such area of importance described was the nations and that they needed united atten- Latest News Pg.1-4 necessity to combat terrorism in a unified tion.
    [Show full text]
  • Dr. Zalmai Rassoul, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
    Det Udenrigspolitiske Nævn, Forsvarsudvalget, Udenrigsudvalget 2010-11 (Omtryk) UPN alm. del Bilag 38, FOU alm. del Bilag 42, URU alm. del Bilag 56 Offentligt Dr. Zalmai Rassoul, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan In January 2010 Dr. Zalmai Rassoul received the confidence vote of the Afghan National Assembly to serve as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Prior to his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Zalmai Rassoul served as National Security Advisor of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan since June 2002. As National Security Adviser, Dr. Rassoul rendered a constructive role in collaborating activities of Afghan security institutions with Afghanistan’s foreign policy. Moreover, among his numerous responsibilities included conducting national threat assessments and National Security Policy Dr. Rassoul has accompanied H.E. President Hamid Karzai on all official visits since the establishment of the Interim Administration in 2001. Prior to his appointment as National Security Adviser by President Karzai, Dr. Rassoul was nominated by President Karzai as the Minister of Civil Aviation, and unanimously approved by the Cabinet in March 2002. Under his able leadership, Afghanistan’s aviation sector was revived after many years of United Nations sanctions against the Taliban and Afghanistan. Dr. Rassoul played an important role in Afghanistan’s readmission to the International Civil Aviation Organization (IATA) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Prior to his service in the current Afghan Government, Dr. Rassoul served as a delegate to the historic November 2001 Bonn Conference. Following the Bonn Conference, he accompanied President Karzai to Kabul for the inauguration of the Afghan Interim Administration.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 11 the Pathway to Brazilian Diplomacy in Pakistan
    Relações coleção coleção Internacionais Challenges and opportunities in the Brazil-Asia relationship in the perspective of young diplomats Ministry of Foreign Affairs Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation The Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation – FUNAG, established in 1971, is a public foundation linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs whose goal is to provide civil society with information concerning the international scenario and aspects of the Brazilian diplomatic agenda. The Foundation’s mission is to foster awareness of the domestic public opinion with regard to international relations issues and Brazilian foreign policy. FUNAG is headquartered in Brasília, Federal District, and has two units in its structure: the International Relations Research Institute – IPRI, and the Center for History and Diplomatic Documentation – CHDD, the latter being located in Rio de Janeiro. (Editor) Pedro Henrique Batista Barbosa Challenges and opportunities in the Brazil-Asia relationship in the perspective of young diplomats Brasília – 2019 Copyright ©Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation Ministry of Foreign Affairs Esplanada dos Ministérios, Bloco H, Anexo II, Térreo 70170-900 Brasília-DF Phone numbers: +55 (61) 2030-9117/9128 Website: www.funag.gov.br E-mail: [email protected] Editorial staff: Eliane Miranda Paiva André Luiz Ventura Ferreira Gabriela Del Rio de Rezende Luiz Antônio Gusmão Guilherme Lucas Rodrigues Monteiro Graphic design and cover: Varnei Rodrigues / Propagare Comercial Ltda. Originally published as “Os desafios e oportunidades na relação Brasil-Ásia na perspectiva de jovens diplomatas”, FUNAG, 2017. The opinions expressed in this work are solely the authors’ personal views and do not necessarily state or reflect those of the Brazilian government’s foreign policy.
    [Show full text]