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The Journal of Technology Studies 6 percei impactthe the electoralrealmcansignificantly ed. Technological advances completely outside machines andsystemsaretechnolo technology andoverlooked thatvoting thefact electronic accounts)focusedonvoting Election 2000critiques(especiall Election 2000’s technological problems. paradigm, would solve many ifnotmostof ing’s automatedtellermachine(ATM) “familiar” voting equipment,many designedusingbank- technological advocateselectronic “modern” “presumably obsolete”voting technologies. For theircurrent states andlocalitiestoupgrade (HAVA), which provided over $325millionfor passedtheHelp Congress America Vote Act technological upgrade. As aresult,in2002, tion of American Democracy requiredamassive voting technology andtheperpetua- hadfailed lawyers, that“obsolete” andelectionofficials e protector ofvoting integrity, itwas aretro- toral establishment, which presentsitselfasa pointsabouthangingchads.For theelec- fine Republicans andDemocratsarguing thelegal 1960s mainframecomputerpunchcardwith behind amagnifyingglassexamining acirca- Election 2000was theFloridaelectionofficial machines seemed“old-f computers inthe1960s,mechanicallever tampering. With theemergence ofmainframe andballotboxproblem ofhumaninterpretation adv machines w For example, inthelate 1800s,mechanicallever technologically-focused nation,soU.S. voters sanctionedsocialactivity/ritualan officially ina the voter fromrascaldom”(Phillymag). Voting is have producedmachinesand systemsto“protect v electronic with more“accurate”state-of-the-art seem antiqueandther frame technologies thatepitomizedFlorida2000 banking automatedtellermachines,themain- Now withwidespreadpersonalcomputingand results and“solve” humancalculationerrors. offered mechanismtorapidly amodern process opticalandpunchcardtechnologythe-art” b continuing toda ty. Beginning with Thomas Edisonin1869and tation oftechnologically ensuring voting integri- mbarrassment. Itwas “obvious”mbarrassment. tolegislators, oting technolo urdened fromitsv ance fromhandwrittenballotsto“solv Ho Historically any U.S. voting technology is v ed “tr w e v er, mostacademicandpopularpost- ere introducedasa“state-of-theart” ustability” ofav gy y , . numerous U er y ush isontoreplacethem inception withtheexpec- ashioned” and“state-of- oting technolo .S. manuf y gically-situat- the man acturers e” the y gy . teria focuseson oneofthemoretrustworthy and technology alonewillnot solve theproblem. tion estab counted properl to belie computerized voting technologies. Voters want (e.g.,DREs) current (e.g., punchcards)but are epitomizedbyintegrity notonly by past Today, voterregarding electoral concerns found thatonl voting technology between 1988and2000 results inallU Voting Projectstatistically analyzed voting ally increase.For example, theCaltech/MIT (probablyerrors mostly unintentional)may actu- nology. Untilthatoccurs,thenumberofvoting withthenew andcomfort tech- gain confidence must ing machines,voters andelectionofficials voting technology. Inthecaseofelectronicvot- paper ballotsbeartheimprimaturofestablished Even “primitive” electiontechniquessuchas tion riskinherentinany technological transition. isthepercep- tomodernize Election 2000rush ity (Mercuri,33-34).Forgotten inthepost- operator authentication,andsystemaccountabil- a h v used, any electionsystemmustbeapproachably ogy willensurethattheirvote “counts.” arrive atthepollsexpecting thatvoting technol- similar ratesofreliability(asmeasuredb a other electiontechnologies. There willnever be machines ma Electronicvoting voterundermine confidence. individual mistakes andmisperceptionscan w andadministeredbyformed humans.Nomatter electoral integrity, voting but isaprocessper- that voting machinesarethelighteningrodsfor is “Oneman,onevote,” soitisunderstandable intheestablishment isshaken. lic confidence media hysteriathatpub- anditisnotsurprising transition inanen w “discredited” punchcardsandsignificantly equivalently(DRE) machinesperformed well as lyhooed promises,DirectRecordingElectronic ual voting) aslever machines.Despitetheirbal- nd availability, integrity, dataconfidentiality, oter friendly while simultaneously satisfying ard technicalcriteriasuchassystemreliability orse thanpaperballots(Alv hat voting technology isused, cumulatively perfect election,b Ironicall But nomatterwhat voting technology is The mantraoftheU.S. voting establishment ve thattheirvote countsandthatitis lishment isunderincreasingscr y y y .S. countiesthatchangedtheir the cur be prob y opticall . vironment ofelectoraland Post-Election 2000,theelec- ut perceptionise rent electronic v lematic, b y scanned ballotsoffered arez). Conductthis ut soarethe v oting hys- er ything. y utin resid y - The Journal of Technology Studies 87 t - - ed v ut the consider y ar Arlington labor b y The question to be it. Given these con- it. Given w Their personal demeanor vide not onl gislation has muddled the sit arding acceptability v g ederal le F ws re vided with rudimentary training, then y A) standards disallo Although most jurisdictions use computers Although most jurisdictions a small core Elections are administered by ly. For example, Virginia state law accepts law state Virginia example, For ly. eepers for voting. Affirmedlisted in the voters for voting. eepers olunteers that pro uation and introduced unanticipated technologi- may voter a registered Today, cal consequences. requested to produce an “H” (the County Virginia code for post-Help America code for post-Help Virginia County acceptable voters) registered Act [HEPA] Vote form of identification; and here Federal and state la to maintain their lists and pro- registration to maintain their voter usually is not duce their poll books, technology doesn’t an individual Typically, at fault here. mo appear in the poll book because he or she he or she update their registration, and didn’t voted or he or she hadn’t in time, register didn’t for a significant period of time and were fac-These long-standing dropped from the rolls. however, tors are social not technological; recentl ab photo identification as an affirmationemployer states and Federal other of identity; while (HEP much much is intentional and how is how asked is inadvertent. of army a large oversee of professionals who v book are permitted to vote and the overall expe- the overall permitted and book are to vote the but for unlisted voters rience is positive; a frus- into degenerate quickly may experience in Even potential disenfranchisement. tration of Rights and Election post-1960s Civil today’s landscape con- the electoral 2000 environment, number of widely-vary- sists of a mind-numbing to handle not only ing state and local procedures circum- anomalous voting routine but especially and laws of voting this patchwork stances. Given surprisingprocedures it is not denied that many to are left with the impression their right voters denied. unfairly was vote tinuing jurisdictional inconsistencies it shouldn’ be surprising disenfranchisement that individual persists in electoral debate. most jurisdictions serve jurisdictions most primary as the gate- k officially sanctioned and thrown together to together officially sanctioned and thrown administer an election. a and decisions can significantly whether affect feels enfranchised or not. Unfortunately voter personal face of the electoral establishment. with their volunteers, These well-intentioned temperaments, and abilities experiences, varying are pro oter is publicly publicly usted y hich poll vidual v icial tr f icials challenge f of ed the indi Although most electronic y ved voters on registration voters ved v orld. citizen must personall ficial rituals to recon- post-electoral a – lish on appro le record of anonymous votes cast by votes le record of anonymous x Successful voter registration is a critical registration Successful voter Underlying the United States voting Underlying xpected to produce an of oters who identify themselves, affirm identify themselves, oters who their ndividual voting technology, such as lever such technology, voting ndividual certify his or her identify prior to being permit- U.S. any Consequently, anonymously. ted to vote electoral mechanism be it manual or electronic, is e auditab In the idealized election estab- voters. approved pre-approve jurisdictions vet, lishment world, and pub roles; on Election Da their legitimized to validate voters prospective identity and if appro eligibility, and declare their intent to vote are and declare their intent to vote eligibility, added to the election rolls from w allowed to vote anonymously. Over time, various Over anonymously. to vote allowed rituals have and validation voting registration if oath (even – from the registration evolved administered in a grocery a League of store by Voters’ to the name and representative) Women address declaration at the precinct poll books. jurisdictions. entry in most U.S. point for voting V books are produced containing lists of the books in Poll for an election. voters approved voting accounts focus on technological disen- technological accounts focus on voting non- franchisement, there are numerous other end up disen- may voter a which DRE means by technology. franchised and most do not involve is a fundamental there process/establishment parado components – the technology of voting. the technology – components I prob- be may punch cards, and DRE machines, a part underly- of an are only lematic, but they that It is here establishment. ing electoral issues emerge. technological new numerous actually their vote that need to believe Voters not bother to par- will they “counts” otherwise registra- rituals such as voter ticipate. Procedural identification,tion, poll-side voter and official ratificationcreate trust are designed to in the modernThe U.S. establishment. voting overall by bases its legitimacy establishment voting voters acceptable pre-qualifying and registering pub- then on election day prior to an election, prior to permit- their acceptability verifying licly then performing vote, ting them to anonymously elaborate of This admirable discrepancies. voting cile any never was portrayal Norman Rockwell-type not in this post- but especially attainable Election 2000 w 8

The Journal of Technology Studies 8 estab conf identity for , while of atathirdgiven anaffirmation be deniedentry, atanother given aprovisional may one precinctavoter withoutidentification teers indifferent jurisdictions.For example, at ma v judgment. As aresult,given situation(e.g., situations w reference sheetstoassistinthesenon-routine ” tions provide with“WhatIf electionofficials (e.g., specialregistration codes).Somejurisdic- there arealsoanticipatednon-routineevents voter isverified, voter isadmitted, voter votes), picion. Although mostvoting isroutine(i.e., and an extremely sensitive toperceived improprieties training precinctsstaff together. force by conductingmorehands-ontrainingand easily improve thequalityofitsvolunteer work- ate asateam. The electionestablishment could other, arethrown together andexpected tooper- volunteers, who may ormay notknow each F there islittletimetoassimilatethematerial. withsomuchtocoverchecks andbalances,but and pollingplaceoperations,procedural tocraminbasicelectionlogistics,try machine hour classesforthepollworkers inwhich they quate. Many jurisdictionsconducttwo- tofour- training forthesevolunteers iswoefully inade- l tion publicity. The electoratevoted warily. nological andhysterical unfamiliarity pre-elec- de ized touchscreenDirectRecording Entry technologies“state oftheart” suchascomputer- their v technology,machines tomoremodern for but HA had usedthepost-Election2000Congressional hint ofdisenfranchisement.Many jurisdictions ers enteredthepollsextremely sensitive toany of pre-Election2004technological vot- failures, Election 2000meltdown andnumerousreports 2004 focus.Inthewake ofFlorida’s spectacular sheets. w tency ofnon-routineevents by providing poll y oter doesnotha urthermore, onElectionDay theseindividualurthermore, ork vices. Duetothiscombination ofv inadv y VA theirvoting money infusiontoupgrade In thepost-Election2000climate,voters are V idence intheelectoralsystem. The election be handleddif ers withstandardizedstate-widereference lishment couldeasil oting technolo oters thisw y er non-routine event canbecauseforsus- tent b m. hile othersrel These inconsistenciesareprimari ut the ve appropriateidentification) as thef ferentl gy w y under y as aprominentElection irst electionusingnew y y impro b upon indi y mine thepublic’s different volun- v e the consis vidual oter tech - - - v technolo v v are technologies encumberedby politics.U.S. tics embodiedby technologies, voting machines icant inverse difference –while Winner seespoli- than electionmachines;however thereisasignif- their politicsandnotechnolo Election 2000concer w such as“H”meansthey registered afterHAVA) “Curbside Voting” orforroutinepollbookcodes signage fornon-routineevents (e.g.,signagefor easily allay by voter concerns providing simple waiting inline. The electionestablishment could caused considerableforseveral concern voters ers were inmy trainedonit),but it precinct anticipated non-routineevent pollwork- (infact device an andtakingitoutside;thisisinfact Arlington, thisrequiresdisconnectingaDRE disabled voter tovote outsidethepollsandin For example, Virginia law allows aphysically may beperceived by theaverage voter inline. election procedureandhow non-routineevents voters withthefullbodyof arenotfamiliar tion istob inclina- many technologies modern do,thefirst remains prettymuchunchanged; consequentl ing technology, theoverall establishment popular pressobsessaboutnew orobsoletevot- an electoralinfrastr machines areonly atechnology situatedwithin despite theirpopularprominencev ing controversies, hasshown asthisarticle but poster-children forpost-Election2000/2004vot- unreliable” computer devices –have becomethe “obsolete, problematic” punchcardsto“modern, the bothpopularpressandacademics. they arethemostvisible,of attracting thefocus are only oftheoverall apart electoralsystembut versies in Election2008. should notbeunexpected toreadabout contro- t and implicationsoftheirdeployment. The elec- slightedthesocialenvironment but cal fixes, the electoralestablishment pursuedtechnologi- technological and disenfranchisement.Congress Election 2004cametothepollsanticipating ofDREtechnology,“short-comings” voters in Sensitized toand“educated”aboutnumerous oral establishment needstorecognize thatmost otes arecounted. oting estab oters gotothepollse ould g F As atechnology, voting machines–from or Langdon etyalvaemn oes post- reatly alleviate many voters’ gical voting systemthatwillensuretheir lame thetechnolo lishment haspro Winner, technologies embody When thesystemf ucture. ns. xpecting thattheU While v gy vided themwitha gy ismorepolitical . V oting machines oting oters andthe ails, asso .S. y , it The Journal of Technology Studies 89 May . 31, 2003. Secure y Jul . 2001. , San Francisco: Encounter San Francisco: . May 2001 (available online 2001 (available May , TR-2003-19) ACM Ubiquity ACM 2004 [to be published] (previously published (previously 2004 [to be published] Boston: Kluwer, 2003. Boston: Kluwer, . 107-252) October 29, 2002. Philadelphia Magazine w America Vote Act of 2002: Virginia State Plan Virginia Act of 2002: Vote America November 22, 2004. November mation Security Institute , lic La Elections in Virginia: An Overview of the Current System of the Current An Overview Virginia: Elections in Help Renton: WA: Talion, 2004. Talion, Renton: WA: . ersity Infor v Secure Electronic Secure (Ed). by Dmitris Gritzalis, Boston: Kluwer, 2003, 31-42. Dmitris Gritzalis, Boston: Kluwer, (Ed). by Act of 2002 (Pub ote Washington Technology Washington V IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Black Box Voting Box Black Stealing Elections: How Voter Fraud Threatens Our Democracy Threatens Fraud Voter How Stealing Elections: 2001. America System,” System,” as Johns Hopkins Uni http://www.phillymag.com/Archives/2001May/clan_1.html). 8, 2004. Novermber Computerworld, 2001. Reliability of Existing Voting Equipment (Version 1),” The Caltech/MIT Voting Project, February Voting The Caltech/MIT 1),” Equipment (Version Voting Reliability of Existing 1, Voting Electronic Election,” Books, 2004. lvarez, R. Michael, Stephen Ansolabehere, Erik Antonsson, et al., “A Preliminary Assessment of the Preliminary al., “A Antonsson, et Erik Ansolabehere, Stephen R. Michael, lvarez, irginia State Board of Elections. irginia Ms. Laurie Robertson is a computer engineer at engineer a computer is Robertson Ms. Laurie and in Science student a doctorial and Averstar Polytechnic Virginia at Studies Technology University. Kohno, Tadayoshi, Adam Stubnblefield, Aviel Rubin, Dan Wallach, “Analysis of an Electronic Voting of an Electronic “Analysis Wallach, Rubin, Dan Aviel Adam Stubnblefield, Tadayoshi, Kohno, Mercuri, Rebecca and Peter Neumann, “Verification for Electronic Balloting Systems” in for Electronic Balloting Systems” Neumann, “Verification Mercuri, Rebecca and Peter – Maybe,” Test Their Big Systems Pass Voting Thibodeau, “Electronic Dan and Patrick Verton, State Board of Elections. Virginia V Phillymag, “The Clan Behind the Curtain,” “The Clan Behind the Curtain,” Phillymag, Help Boyle, Alan, “e-Voting Flaws Risk Ballot Fraud,” MSNBC, July 24, 2003. MSNBC, July Risk Ballot Fraud,” Flaws Alan, “e-Voting Boyle, Machines.” Voting Electronic the Debate Over “Understanding Century Foundation, Answers,” After Florida: No Easy “Voting Lorrie Faith, Cranor, Harris, Bev. Official Returns: E-voting “Early Gather Lessons Learned Presidential from 2004 William, Welsh, References A Gritzalis, Dmitris, ed. Fund, John. John. Fund,